@rotorsoft/act-http 1.10.20 → 1.10.22

package/dist/api/index.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import {
   runSseSubscription,
   toApiError,
   withIdempotency
-} from "../chunk-BGXQRSSQ.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZQGGGU4E.js";
 import "../chunk-WZ6QI2OI.js";
 import "../chunk-MKD3SM3N.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";

package/dist/{chunk-DMDU25DN.js → chunk-G5FNOSDX.js}

@@ -74,9 +74,11 @@ async function checkWebhook(headers, body, options) {
 }
 
 // src/receiver/finalize.ts
-function make_finalizers(store, key, deduped) {
+function make_idempotency(store, { key, deduped }) {
   let settled = deduped;
   return {
+    key,
+    deduped,
     async commit() {
       if (settled) return;
       settled = true;
@@ -94,6 +96,6 @@ export {
   extractIdempotencyKey,
   verifyWebhook,
   checkWebhook,
-  make_finalizers
+  make_idempotency
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DMDU25DN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-G5FNOSDX.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-DMDU25DN.js.map → chunk-G5FNOSDX.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/receiver/extract.ts","../src/receiver/verify.ts","../src/receiver/check.ts","../src/receiver/finalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Finalizers} for one delivery.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_finalizers(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  deduped: boolean\n): Finalizers {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC9CA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAKhC,QAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AACf,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IACxD;AACA,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;ACrEO,SAAS,gBACd,OACA,KACA,SACY;AACZ,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,SAAS;AACb,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,UAAU;AACd,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/receiver/extract.ts","../src/receiver/verify.ts","../src/receiver/check.ts","../src/receiver/finalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestamp_str = pick_header(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestamp_str) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestamp_str, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestamp_str) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const provided_hex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(provided_hex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expected_hex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestamp_str}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(provided_hex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expected_hex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pick_header(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lower_name: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lower_name) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * client/configuration errors (`missing-key`, `empty-body` — HTTP 400)\n * from the five verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401)\n * so each maps to its own telemetry bucket. `empty-body` is the\n * misconfigured-raw-parser signal: `secret` is set but the resolved\n * body is empty, so hashing it would compute an HMAC over `${ts}.` and\n * reject every otherwise-valid signed request with a misleading\n * bad-signature — a distinct config error is far easier to diagnose.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"empty-body\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    // Raw body not captured (default JSON parser ate the bytes) but a\n    // secret is configured — hashing the empty string is a guaranteed\n    // bad-signature. Surface a distinct configuration error instead of a\n    // misleading 401 so the operator mounts the raw-body parser.\n    if (body === \"\") {\n      return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"empty-body\" };\n    }\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * The two-phase finalizers a receiver adapter binds to a single\n * inbound delivery. The claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*;\n * exactly one of these promotes or drops it once the business handler\n * resolves its outcome.\n */\nexport type Finalizers = {\n  /**\n   * Promote the tentative claim to a durable record so every later\n   * retry of this key dedups. Call on handler success.\n   */\n  commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Drop the tentative claim so the sender's retry re-processes.\n   * Call on transient handler failure.\n   */\n  release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n};\n\n/**\n * The `idempotency` bag a receiver adapter hands its route for one\n * delivery: the claimed key, whether it was a duplicate, and the\n * {@link Finalizers}.\n */\nexport type Idempotency = { key: string; deduped: boolean } & Finalizers;\n\n/**\n * Build the {@link Idempotency} bag for one delivery that passed\n * `checkWebhook`.\n *\n * Guarantees:\n *\n * - **Deduped deliveries are inert.** When `deduped` is `true` the key\n *   was already committed by an earlier delivery; both finalizers are\n *   no-ops so a duplicate can never release someone else's committed\n *   claim.\n * - **Finalize-once.** After the first `commit` or `release` fires,\n *   further calls are no-ops — an adapter that both auto-finalizes and\n *   lets the operator call `commit()`/`release()` can't double-fire.\n */\nexport function make_idempotency(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  { key, deduped }: { key: string; deduped: boolean }\n): Idempotency {\n  let settled = deduped;\n  return {\n    key,\n    deduped,\n    async commit() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.commit(key);\n    },\n    async release() {\n      if (settled) return;\n      settled = true;\n      await store.release(key);\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe;AAClE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,YAAY,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC7C,OAAO,GAAG,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EACjC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,cAAc,KAAK;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SACA,YACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC9CA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAKhC,QAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AACf,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IACxD;AACA,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;AC7DO,SAAS,iBACd,OACA,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,GACF;AACb,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,SAAS;AACb,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,UAAU;AACd,UAAI,QAAS;AACb,gBAAU;AACV,YAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-KC2NW7XQ.js → chunk-TTVMQYNN.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   checkWebhook,
-  make_finalizers
-} from "./chunk-DMDU25DN.js";
+  make_idempotency
+} from "./chunk-G5FNOSDX.js";
 
 // src/receiver/hono/index.ts
 function webhookMiddleware(options) {
@@ -12,25 +12,16 @@ function webhookMiddleware(options) {
     if (!result.ok) {
       return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);
     }
-    const { commit, release } = make_finalizers(
-      options.store,
-      result.key,
-      result.deduped
-    );
-    c.set("idempotency", {
-      key: result.key,
-      deduped: result.deduped,
-      commit,
-      release
-    });
+    const idempotency = make_idempotency(options.store, result);
+    c.set("idempotency", idempotency);
     try {
       await next();
     } catch (err) {
-      await release();
+      await idempotency.release();
       throw err;
     }
-    if (c.res.status >= 400) await release();
-    else await commit();
+    if (c.res.status >= 400) await idempotency.release();
+    else await idempotency.commit();
   };
 }
 function headers_bag(headers) {
@@ -44,4 +35,4 @@ function headers_bag(headers) {
 export {
   webhookMiddleware
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KC2NW7XQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TTVMQYNN.js.map

package/dist/chunk-TTVMQYNN.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/receiver/hono/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Two-phase dedup**: the claim `checkWebhook` makes is *tentative*.\n * Because Hono middleware wraps the downstream chain, this adapter\n * finalizes the claim automatically after `await next()`: a downstream\n * 2xx/3xx **commits** the key (later retries dedup); any **4xx or 5xx**\n * (or a thrown handler) **releases** it, so the sender's corrected retry\n * re-processes instead of being silently dropped (#1364). Fail-safe is\n * toward reprocessing: releasing a deterministic 4xx costs bounded\n * re-delivery, while committing it would lose a delivery the handler\n * never accepted (the shipped `receiver()` returns 422 on a schema\n * mismatch, where the handler never runs). Operators who need explicit\n * control can still call `c.get(\"idempotency\").commit()` / `.release()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\nimport { make_idempotency } from \"../finalize.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n *\n * `commit` / `release` finalize the tentative claim — call one after\n * the handler resolves its outcome. This adapter also finalizes\n * automatically based on the response status, so explicit calls are\n * only needed when the auto-detection doesn't fit.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: {\n    key: string;\n    deduped: boolean;\n    commit: () => void | Promise<void>;\n    release: () => void | Promise<void>;\n  };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headers_bag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    const idempotency = make_idempotency(options.store, result);\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", idempotency);\n    try {\n      await next();\n    } catch (err) {\n      await idempotency.release();\n      throw err;\n    }\n    // Commit only a genuine success (2xx/3xx); release on any 4xx/5xx so a\n    // failed delivery's corrected same-key retry re-processes instead of being\n    // deduped into a silent success (#1364).\n    if (c.res.status >= 400) await idempotency.release();\n    else await idempotency.commit();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headers_bag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AA8EO,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,cAAc,iBAAiB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAC1D,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe,WAAW;AAChC,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC1B,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAIA,QAAI,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,IAAK,OAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,QAC9C,OAAM,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,EAChC;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,YACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-BGXQRSSQ.js → chunk-ZQGGGU4E.js}

@@ -192,4 +192,4 @@ export {
   fireAndForget,
   runSseSubscription
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BGXQRSSQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZQGGGU4E.js.map

package/dist/chunk-ZQGGGU4E.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/api/errors.ts","../src/api/idempotency.ts","../src/api/sse-wiring.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n  ConcurrencyError,\n  InvariantError,\n  NonRetryableError,\n  StreamClosedError,\n  ValidationError,\n} from \"@rotorsoft/act\";\n\n/**\n * Uniform error envelope shipped over the wire by every act-http\n * transport. Hosts get the same shape from REST, tRPC, and OpenAPI —\n * a client that talks to two transports doesn't have to invent two\n * error parsers.\n *\n * - `error` — the framework error name (`\"ValidationError\"`,\n *   `\"InvariantError\"`, …). Stable identifier, safe to switch on.\n * - `detail` — the framework's message text. Human-readable; not\n *   parsed by clients.\n * - `code` — a machine-readable status code from {@link ERROR_MAP}\n *   for clients that prefer enum-style branching over name strings.\n */\nexport type ApiError = {\n  error: string;\n  detail?: string;\n  code?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * Status + code pair for one known framework error.\n */\nexport type ErrorMapEntry = {\n  status: number;\n  code: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * The single table that maps framework error types to HTTP status\n * codes and machine-readable codes. One table, three consumers\n * (Hono, tRPC, OpenAPI) — cross-transport consistency by\n * construction.\n *\n * Operators wanting different mappings wrap the generated transport\n * rather than mutating this — the consistency is the load-bearing\n * property, not the specific status codes.\n */\nexport const ERROR_MAP = {\n  ValidationError: { status: 422, code: \"VALIDATION\" },\n  InvariantError: { status: 409, code: \"INVARIANT\" },\n  ConcurrencyError: { status: 412, code: \"CONCURRENCY\" },\n  StreamClosedError: { status: 410, code: \"STREAM_CLOSED\" },\n  NonRetryableError: { status: 400, code: \"NON_RETRYABLE\" },\n} as const satisfies Record<string, ErrorMapEntry>;\n\nconst lookup_known = (\n  err: unknown\n): { name: keyof typeof ERROR_MAP } | null => {\n  if (err instanceof ValidationError) return { name: \"ValidationError\" };\n  if (err instanceof InvariantError) return { name: \"InvariantError\" };\n  if (err instanceof ConcurrencyError) return { name: \"ConcurrencyError\" };\n  if (err instanceof StreamClosedError) return { name: \"StreamClosedError\" };\n  if (err instanceof NonRetryableError) return { name: \"NonRetryableError\" };\n  return null;\n};\n\n/**\n * Translate an unknown thrown value into the canonical\n * {@link ApiError} envelope plus HTTP status. Each transport's error\n * boundary calls this once and forwards the result to the wire.\n *\n * Known framework errors map per {@link ERROR_MAP}. Everything else\n * surfaces as a 500 with `code: \"INTERNAL\"`; the `detail` field is\n * populated when the throw was an `Error` instance, omitted\n * otherwise (a thrown string or object doesn't get to leak its\n * payload to the client).\n */\nexport function toApiError(err: unknown): { status: number; body: ApiError } {\n  const known = lookup_known(err);\n  if (known) {\n    const entry = ERROR_MAP[known.name];\n    return {\n      status: entry.status,\n      body: {\n        error: known.name,\n        detail: (err as Error).message,\n        code: entry.code,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n  if (err instanceof Error) {\n    return {\n      status: 500,\n      body: { error: \"InternalError\", detail: err.message, code: \"INTERNAL\" },\n    };\n  }\n  return {\n    status: 500,\n    body: { error: \"InternalError\", code: \"INTERNAL\" },\n  };\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n\n/**\n * Result of a {@link withIdempotency} call.\n *\n * - `{ deduped: false, result }` — the claim was fresh; the handler\n *   ran and produced `result`.\n * - `{ deduped: true }` — the claim was already taken; the handler\n *   was *not* invoked. The caller decides how to respond (typically\n *   a 2xx with no body, matching the receiver-side convention).\n *\n * Note: the contract does not cache the previous response. A\n * duplicate call returns the deduped marker only — replaying the\n * original handler's output would require a response-caching\n * adapter, which is out of scope here. The receiver-side convention\n * (and the convention the generated transports follow) is \"ack the\n * duplicate; do nothing else.\"\n */\nexport type IdempotencyResult<T> =\n  | { deduped: false; result: T }\n  | { deduped: true };\n\n/**\n * Wrap an action handler so the framework honors `Idempotency-Key`\n * dedup. Acquires the key via {@link IdempotencyStore.claim} (a\n * *tentative* reservation), runs the handler exactly when the claim\n * was fresh, and skips the handler entirely on a duplicate.\n *\n * The claim is finalized two-phase: on handler success the key is\n * {@link IdempotencyStore.commit committed} so later retries dedup;\n * on handler failure it is {@link IdempotencyStore.release released}\n * and the rejection re-thrown, so the sender's retry re-processes\n * instead of the delivery being permanently dropped. The tentative\n * claim still dedups a concurrent duplicate mid-flight.\n *\n * Reuses the contract `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency` already\n * defines for the receiver-side `Idempotency-Key` story. A single\n * `IdempotencyStore` implementation covers both halves of the \"Act\n * over the wire\" surface — receiver and generated API.\n */\nexport async function withIdempotency<T>(\n  store: IdempotencyStore,\n  key: string,\n  handler: () => Promise<T>\n): Promise<IdempotencyResult<T>> {\n  const fresh = await store.claim(key);\n  if (!fresh) {\n    return { deduped: true };\n  }\n  let result: T;\n  try {\n    result = await handler();\n  } catch (err) {\n    await store.release(key);\n    throw err;\n  }\n  await store.commit(key);\n  return { deduped: false, result };\n}\n","import { z } from \"zod\";\nimport type { BroadcastChannel } from \"../sse/broadcast.js\";\nimport {\n  type BroadcastState,\n  is_version_neutral,\n  type PatchMessage,\n  resync_frame,\n} from \"../sse/types.js\";\n\n/**\n * SSE wiring options shared by the auto-generated `trpc` and `hono`\n * transports. When supplied, each transport emits one streaming\n * subscription per registered state name, all reading from the same\n * host-supplied {@link BroadcastChannel}.\n *\n * The host owns publication: every `app.do(...)` call site must\n * forward the resulting snapshots to `channel.publish(...)` for\n * subscribers to see updates. The framework deliberately doesn't\n * auto-publish because the derived state usually needs app-specific\n * overlays (presence, computed fields) that only the host can supply.\n *\n * Defaults are sized for typical business-app dashboards (dozens to\n * hundreds of human viewers per process). Both numeric knobs are\n * validated at transport-function construction; out-of-range values\n * throw `ZodError` immediately so misconfiguration surfaces at startup\n * instead of at first connection (the framework-wide convention for\n * config bags — see .claude/rules/config-validation.md).\n */\nexport type SseOptions = {\n  /**\n   * The {@link BroadcastChannel} the generator's subscriptions hook\n   * into. Host owns its lifecycle; the generator does not construct\n   * one for you because the channel's `<S>` shape is app-specific and\n   * passing it in keeps the type chain typed end-to-end at the host.\n   */\n  // `any`: the channel's BroadcastState shape is opaque to the generator — narrowing it would force every state into one structural bound that doesn't fit real apps\n  readonly channel: BroadcastChannel<any>;\n  /**\n   * Hard cap on concurrent open subscriptions per generator\n   * instance. The 501st simultaneous open returns `503` (Hono) or\n   * throws `TOO_MANY_REQUESTS` (tRPC) — never a silent stall.\n   *\n   * Default `500`. Validated range `[1, 10_000]`. Above 10k the\n   * framework refuses to construct: at that point the FD ceiling\n   * and per-connection memory force horizontal scaling regardless\n   * of tuning, so the right move is sticky LB + per-process cap,\n   * not a higher single-process limit.\n   */\n  readonly maxConnections?: number;\n  /**\n   * Keep-alive cadence in milliseconds. Most reverse proxies idle\n   * connections out after ~60 seconds; the default `30_000` stays\n   * comfortably under.\n   *\n   * Validated range `[15_000, 300_000]`. Under 15 s wastes\n   * bandwidth on a business workload; over 5 min risks proxy drops.\n   */\n  readonly heartbeatMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Hard cap on the per-connection in-memory backlog of undelivered\n   * broadcast frames. A consumer that stalls (slow client, paused\n   * tab) can't drain frames as fast as a busy stream publishes them;\n   * without a bound the backlog grows until the process runs out of\n   * memory. When the backlog is full the oldest **version-keyed** frame\n   * is dropped to make room for the newest: the consumer sees the\n   * version gap, reports `behind`, and refetches, so it still converges\n   * on current state having skipped intermediate versions it was too\n   * slow to see.\n   *\n   * Version-neutral frames (`_overlay`, `_resync`) are never dropped\n   * silently — they create no gap to notice, so a backlog made only of\n   * them collapses into a single `_resync` instead (#1649).\n   *\n   * Default `256`. Validated range `[1, 100_000]`.\n   */\n  readonly maxPendingPerConnection?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolved SSE configuration after validation and default expansion.\n * Internal — the resolved values are what every transport actually\n * runs against.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport type SseConfig = {\n  readonly channel: BroadcastChannel<BroadcastState>;\n  readonly maxConnections: number;\n  readonly heartbeatMs: number;\n  readonly maxPendingPerConnection: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Default cap on concurrent open subscriptions per generator\n * instance. Sized for typical business-app dashboards (dozens to a\n * few hundred viewers); high enough not to surprise small\n * deployments, low enough not to mask a missing horizontal-scale\n * strategy on big ones.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 500;\n\n/**\n * Default keep-alive cadence (30 s). Sits comfortably under the\n * 60 s idle timeout most reverse proxies impose.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS = 30_000;\n\n/**\n * Default cap on the per-connection undelivered-frame backlog. Sized\n * so a briefly-stalled consumer on a busy stream keeps recent history\n * without letting a permanently-wedged client pin unbounded memory.\n * At overflow the oldest version-keyed frame is dropped: it is a full\n * version-keyed patch, so the consumer sees the gap and converges on\n * current state regardless of which intermediate versions it missed.\n * Version-neutral frames create no gap, so they collapse into a\n * `_resync` rather than being dropped silently (#1649).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_PENDING_PER_CONNECTION = 256;\n\n/**\n * Zod schema for the numeric knobs on {@link SseOptions}. Defaults,\n * ranges, and (eventual) integer constraints live in one place — same\n * declarative-validation pattern the rest of the framework uses for\n * configuration shapes.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst SseOptionsSchema = z.object({\n  maxConnections: z\n    .number()\n    .int()\n    .min(1)\n    .max(10_000)\n    .default(DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS),\n  heartbeatMs: z\n    .number()\n    .int()\n    .min(15_000)\n    .max(300_000)\n    .default(DEFAULT_SSE_HEARTBEAT_MS),\n  maxPendingPerConnection: z\n    .number()\n    .int()\n    .min(1)\n    .max(100_000)\n    .default(DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_PENDING_PER_CONNECTION),\n});\n\n/**\n * Validate and apply defaults to host-supplied {@link SseOptions}.\n *\n * Out-of-range values throw at the call site — each transport calls\n * this once at the start of `hono(...)` / `trpc(...)` so\n * misconfiguration surfaces at construction, not at first\n * connection.\n */\nexport function resolveSseConfig(options: SseOptions): SseConfig {\n  const parsed = SseOptionsSchema.parse({\n    maxConnections: options.maxConnections,\n    heartbeatMs: options.heartbeatMs,\n    maxPendingPerConnection: options.maxPendingPerConnection,\n  });\n  return {\n    channel: options.channel,\n    maxConnections: parsed.maxConnections,\n    heartbeatMs: parsed.heartbeatMs,\n    maxPendingPerConnection: parsed.maxPendingPerConnection,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-generator concurrent-open counter. Constructed once inside\n * `hono(...)` / `trpc(...)` and consulted at every subscription\n * open: failure to acquire means the cap has been hit and the\n * transport reports `503` / `TOO_MANY_REQUESTS` to the caller.\n *\n * The counter is intentionally process-local. SSE doesn't multiplex\n * across processes; operators wanting more than `maxConnections`\n * viewers run multiple processes behind a sticky load balancer.\n */\nexport class SseConnectionCounter {\n  public readonly limit: number;\n  private _open = 0;\n\n  constructor(limit: number) {\n    this.limit = limit;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Reserve one slot. Returns `true` when accepted (caller must\n   * eventually {@link release} the slot, even on error paths) or\n   * `false` when the cap is already reached.\n   */\n  acquire(): boolean {\n    if (this._open >= this.limit) return false;\n    this._open++;\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Free a previously-{@link acquire}d slot. Always runs from a\n   * `finally` block in the transport's subscription handler so\n   * crashed handlers don't leak count.\n   */\n  release(): void {\n    if (this._open > 0) this._open--;\n  }\n\n  /** Currently-open count. Test/observability hook. */\n  get open(): number {\n    return this._open;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap a fire-and-forget Promise-returning operation so its\n * rejection is swallowed in place of leaking an unhandled\n * rejection. Used by the Hono heartbeat tick (the interval callback\n * isn't `await`ed, so its rejection has nowhere to go) and by any\n * other \"best-effort write\" the transports run.\n *\n * Pure: same input → same output, no side effects on the caller.\n * Returns the chained Promise so the caller can also `await`\n * completion if they want to (the Hono heartbeat doesn't).\n */\nexport function fireAndForget<T>(op: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T | undefined> {\n  return op().catch(() => undefined);\n}\n\n/**\n * Frame yielded by the per-state SSE subscription generator. The\n * initial cached state (when present) arrives as `kind: \"state\"`;\n * every subsequent broadcast publication arrives as `kind: \"patch\"`\n * with the channel's `PatchMessage` payload.\n */\nexport type SseSubscriptionFrame<S> =\n  | { readonly kind: \"state\"; readonly data: S }\n  | { readonly kind: \"patch\"; readonly data: unknown };\n\n/**\n * Subscription accounting hook. Implementations have a chance to\n * acquire a slot before the loop starts and to release it once the\n * loop's `finally` block runs — used by the tRPC side to enforce\n * `maxConnections` from inside the generator, where it can throw\n * `TRPCError` cleanly. Hono enforces the cap outside the loop (so a\n * full counter returns `503` *before* streamSSE writes headers), then\n * passes `undefined` here.\n */\nexport type SseAccounting = {\n  acquire(): boolean;\n  release(): void;\n};\n\n/**\n * Per-subscription knobs for {@link runSseSubscription}, bundled so the\n * two transports (and their tests) pass one options object rather than\n * a growing positional tail.\n */\nexport type RunSseOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Invoked when {@link SseAccounting.acquire} returns `false` (the\n   * connection cap is full). tRPC throws `TRPCError` here to reject the\n   * subscription cleanly from inside the generator; Hono enforces the\n   * cap outside the loop and omits this.\n   */\n  readonly on_cap_exceeded?: () => never;\n  /**\n   * Upper bound on the per-connection undelivered-frame backlog. When\n   * the backlog reaches this many frames the oldest is dropped to make\n   * room for the newest (drop-oldest). Defaults to\n   * {@link DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_PENDING_PER_CONNECTION} when omitted.\n   */\n  readonly maxPending?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * The shared subscription loop both transports run. Optionally\n * acquires one slot on the supplied {@link SseAccounting}, yields the\n * cached state (when present), then forwards every channel\n * publication as a `kind: \"patch\"` frame until either the consumer\n * breaks (calling `iter.return()`) or the supplied abort signal fires.\n *\n * Exported as the testable seam — the Hono and tRPC sibling\n * generators wrap this so the signal-driven cleanup and counter\n * accounting live in one place.\n */\n// `any`: the channel's BroadcastState shape is opaque to the loop — narrowing it would force every state into one structural bound that doesn't fit real apps\nexport async function* runSseSubscription<S extends { _v: number } = any>(\n  channel: BroadcastChannel<S>,\n  stream_id: string,\n  accounting: SseAccounting | undefined,\n  signal: AbortSignal | undefined,\n  options?: RunSseOptions\n): AsyncGenerator<SseSubscriptionFrame<S>> {\n  // Track whether we actually reserved a slot. Releasing in `finally`\n  // unconditionally would decrement the counter below the true open\n  // count when acquire() fails without an `on_cap_exceeded` handler —\n  // inflating the effective cap over time. Only release what we\n  // acquired.\n  let acquired = false;\n  if (accounting) {\n    acquired = accounting.acquire();\n    if (!acquired && options?.on_cap_exceeded) {\n      options.on_cap_exceeded();\n    }\n  }\n  const max_pending =\n    options?.maxPending ?? DEFAULT_SSE_MAX_PENDING_PER_CONNECTION;\n  const pending: unknown[] = [];\n  let resolve_wait: (() => void) | null = null;\n  const unsubscribe = channel.subscribe(stream_id, (msg) => {\n    enqueue(msg as PatchMessage<never>);\n    resolve_wait?.();\n  });\n  /**\n   * Bound the per-connection backlog: a stalled consumer (slow client,\n   * paused tab) can't drain as fast as a busy stream publishes, so a frame\n   * has to go.\n   *\n   * Which frame is not arbitrary. A version-keyed patch can be dropped\n   * safely — the client sees the version gap, reports `behind`, and\n   * refetches. A version-neutral frame (`_overlay`, `_resync`) carries no\n   * versions at all, so dropping one leaves no gap to notice and the update\n   * is lost silently (#1649). So: evict the oldest version-keyed frame if\n   * there is one, and only if the whole backlog is version-neutral collapse\n   * it into the single frame that says \"you missed something\".\n   */\n  const enqueue = (msg: PatchMessage<never>) => {\n    if (pending.length < max_pending) {\n      pending.push(msg);\n      return;\n    }\n    const versioned = pending.findIndex(\n      (m) => !is_version_neutral(m as PatchMessage<never>)\n    );\n    if (versioned >= 0) {\n      pending.splice(versioned, 1);\n      pending.push(msg);\n      return;\n    }\n    // Every pending frame is version-neutral. 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package/dist/hono/index.cjs

@@ -20095,16 +20095,26 @@ function hono(app, options) {
       // short-circuits with its own 400 + raw body — two statuses and
       // two shapes for the same "malformed input" failure class on one
       // endpoint. The OpenAPI doc only documents the 422/ApiError path.
+      // A JSON body that doesn't parse gets the same envelope: the
+      // validator would throw its own plain-text 400 before the hook runs.
+      async (c, next) => {
+        if (is_json(c.req.header("content-type")))
+          try {
+            await c.req.json();
+          } catch {
+            return c.json(
+              validation_error("Malformed JSON in request body"),
+              422
+            );
+          }
+        await next();
+      },
       zValidator("json", schema, (result, c) => {
-        if (!result.success) {
-          const message = result.error.message;
-          const body = {
-            error: "ValidationError",
-            detail: message,
-            code: "VALIDATION"
-          };
-          return c.json(body, 422);
-        }
+        if (!result.success)
+          return c.json(
+            validation_error(result.error.message),
+            422
+          );
       }),
       async (c) => {
         try {
@@ -20164,6 +20174,9 @@ function hono(app, options) {
   return api;
 }
 var JSON_CONTENT_TYPE = /^application\/([a-z-.]+\+)?json(;\s*[a-zA-Z0-9-]+=([^;]+))*$/i;
+function validation_error(detail) {
+  return { error: "ValidationError", detail, code: "VALIDATION" };
+}
 function is_json(content_type) {
   return !!content_type && JSON_CONTENT_TYPE.test(content_type);
 }