@rotorsoft/act-http 1.0.0 → 1.2.0

package/dist/dist-NWMJQI4E.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../node_modules/.pnpm/@hono+node-server@1.19.14_hono@4.12.23/node_modules/@hono/node-server/dist/index.mjs"],"sourcesContent":["// src/server.ts\nimport { createServer as createServerHTTP } from \"http\";\n\n// src/listener.ts\nimport { Http2ServerRequest as Http2ServerRequest2, constants as h2constants } from \"http2\";\n\n// src/request.ts\nimport { Http2ServerRequest } from \"http2\";\nimport { Readable } from \"stream\";\nvar RequestError = class extends Error {\n  constructor(message, options) {\n    super(message, options);\n    this.name = \"RequestError\";\n  }\n};\nvar toRequestError = (e) => {\n  if (e instanceof RequestError) {\n    return e;\n  }\n  return new RequestError(e.message, { cause: e });\n};\nvar GlobalRequest = global.Request;\nvar Request = class extends GlobalRequest {\n  constructor(input, options) {\n    if (typeof input === \"object\" && getRequestCache in input) {\n      input = input[getRequestCache]();\n    }\n    if (typeof options?.body?.getReader !== \"undefined\") {\n      ;\n      options.duplex ??= \"half\";\n    }\n    super(input, options);\n  }\n};\nvar newHeadersFromIncoming = (incoming) => {\n  const headerRecord = [];\n  const rawHeaders = incoming.rawHeaders;\n  for (let i = 0; i < rawHeaders.length; i += 2) {\n    const { [i]: key, [i + 1]: value } = rawHeaders;\n    if (key.charCodeAt(0) !== /*:*/\n    58) {\n      headerRecord.push([key, value]);\n    }\n  }\n  return new Headers(headerRecord);\n};\nvar wrapBodyStream = Symbol(\"wrapBodyStream\");\nvar newRequestFromIncoming = (method, url, headers, incoming, abortController) => {\n  const init = {\n    method,\n    headers,\n    signal: abortController.signal\n  };\n  if (method === \"TRACE\") {\n    init.method = \"GET\";\n    const req = new Request(url, init);\n    Object.defineProperty(req, \"method\", {\n      get() {\n        return \"TRACE\";\n      }\n    });\n    return req;\n  }\n  if (!(method === \"GET\" || method === \"HEAD\")) {\n    if (\"rawBody\" in incoming && incoming.rawBody instanceof Buffer) {\n      init.body = new ReadableStream({\n        start(controller) {\n          controller.enqueue(incoming.rawBody);\n          controller.close();\n        }\n      });\n    } else if (incoming[wrapBodyStream]) {\n      let reader;\n      init.body = new ReadableStream({\n        async pull(controller) {\n          try {\n            reader ||= Readable.toWeb(incoming).getReader();\n            const { done, value } = await reader.read();\n            if (done) {\n              controller.close();\n            } else {\n              controller.enqueue(value);\n            }\n          } catch (error) {\n            controller.error(error);\n          }\n        }\n      });\n    } else {\n      init.body = Readable.toWeb(incoming);\n    }\n  }\n  return new Request(url, init);\n};\nvar getRequestCache = Symbol(\"getRequestCache\");\nvar requestCache = Symbol(\"requestCache\");\nvar incomingKey = Symbol(\"incomingKey\");\nvar urlKey = Symbol(\"urlKey\");\nvar headersKey = Symbol(\"headersKey\");\nvar abortControllerKey = Symbol(\"abortControllerKey\");\nvar getAbortController = Symbol(\"getAbortController\");\nvar requestPrototype = {\n  get method() {\n    return this[incomingKey].method || \"GET\";\n  },\n  get url() {\n    return this[urlKey];\n  },\n  get headers() {\n    return this[headersKey] ||= newHeadersFromIncoming(this[incomingKey]);\n  },\n  [getAbortController]() {\n    this[getRequestCache]();\n    return this[abortControllerKey];\n  },\n  [getRequestCache]() {\n    this[abortControllerKey] ||= new AbortController();\n    return this[requestCache] ||= newRequestFromIncoming(\n      this.method,\n      this[urlKey],\n      this.headers,\n      this[incomingKey],\n      this[abortControllerKey]\n    );\n  }\n};\n[\n  \"body\",\n  \"bodyUsed\",\n  \"cache\",\n  \"credentials\",\n  \"destination\",\n  \"integrity\",\n  \"mode\",\n  \"redirect\",\n  \"referrer\",\n  \"referrerPolicy\",\n  \"signal\",\n  \"keepalive\"\n].forEach((k) => {\n  Object.defineProperty(requestPrototype, k, {\n    get() {\n      return this[getRequestCache]()[k];\n    }\n  });\n});\n[\"arrayBuffer\", \"blob\", \"clone\", \"formData\", \"json\", \"text\"].forEach((k) => {\n  Object.defineProperty(requestPrototype, k, {\n    value: function() {\n      return this[getRequestCache]()[k]();\n    }\n  });\n});\nObject.defineProperty(requestPrototype, Symbol.for(\"nodejs.util.inspect.custom\"), {\n  value: function(depth, options, inspectFn) {\n    const props = {\n      method: this.method,\n      url: this.url,\n      headers: this.headers,\n      nativeRequest: this[requestCache]\n    };\n    return `Request (lightweight) ${inspectFn(props, { ...options, depth: depth == null ? null : depth - 1 })}`;\n  }\n});\nObject.setPrototypeOf(requestPrototype, Request.prototype);\nvar newRequest = (incoming, defaultHostname) => {\n  const req = Object.create(requestPrototype);\n  req[incomingKey] = incoming;\n  const incomingUrl = incoming.url || \"\";\n  if (incomingUrl[0] !== \"/\" && // short-circuit for performance. most requests are relative URL.\n  (incomingUrl.startsWith(\"http://\") || incomingUrl.startsWith(\"https://\"))) {\n    if (incoming instanceof Http2ServerRequest) {\n      throw new RequestError(\"Absolute URL for :path is not allowed in HTTP/2\");\n    }\n    try {\n      const url2 = new URL(incomingUrl);\n      req[urlKey] = url2.href;\n    } catch (e) {\n      throw new RequestError(\"Invalid absolute URL\", { cause: e });\n    }\n    return req;\n  }\n  const host = (incoming instanceof Http2ServerRequest ? incoming.authority : incoming.headers.host) || defaultHostname;\n  if (!host) {\n    throw new RequestError(\"Missing host header\");\n  }\n  let scheme;\n  if (incoming instanceof Http2ServerRequest) {\n    scheme = incoming.scheme;\n    if (!(scheme === \"http\" || scheme === \"https\")) {\n      throw new RequestError(\"Unsupported scheme\");\n    }\n  } else {\n    scheme = incoming.socket && incoming.socket.encrypted ? \"https\" : \"http\";\n  }\n  const url = new URL(`${scheme}://${host}${incomingUrl}`);\n  if (url.hostname.length !== host.length && url.hostname !== host.replace(/:\\d+$/, \"\")) {\n    throw new RequestError(\"Invalid host header\");\n  }\n  req[urlKey] = url.href;\n  return req;\n};\n\n// src/response.ts\nvar responseCache = Symbol(\"responseCache\");\nvar getResponseCache = Symbol(\"getResponseCache\");\nvar cacheKey = Symbol(\"cache\");\nvar GlobalResponse = global.Response;\nvar Response2 = class _Response {\n  #body;\n  #init;\n  [getResponseCache]() {\n    delete this[cacheKey];\n    return this[responseCache] ||= new GlobalResponse(this.#body, this.#init);\n  }\n  constructor(body, init) {\n    let headers;\n    this.#body = body;\n    if (init instanceof _Response) {\n      const cachedGlobalResponse = init[responseCache];\n      if (cachedGlobalResponse) {\n        this.#init = cachedGlobalResponse;\n        this[getResponseCache]();\n        return;\n      } else {\n        this.#init = init.#init;\n        headers = new Headers(init.#init.headers);\n      }\n    } else {\n      this.#init = init;\n    }\n    if (typeof body === \"string\" || typeof body?.getReader !== \"undefined\" || body instanceof Blob || body instanceof Uint8Array) {\n      ;\n      this[cacheKey] = [init?.status || 200, body, headers || init?.headers];\n    }\n  }\n  get headers() {\n    const cache = this[cacheKey];\n    if (cache) {\n      if (!(cache[2] instanceof Headers)) {\n        cache[2] = new Headers(\n          cache[2] || { \"content-type\": \"text/plain; charset=UTF-8\" }\n        );\n      }\n      return cache[2];\n    }\n    return this[getResponseCache]().headers;\n  }\n  get status() {\n    return this[cacheKey]?.[0] ?? this[getResponseCache]().status;\n  }\n  get ok() {\n    const status = this.status;\n    return status >= 200 && status < 300;\n  }\n};\n[\"body\", \"bodyUsed\", \"redirected\", \"statusText\", \"trailers\", \"type\", \"url\"].forEach((k) => {\n  Object.defineProperty(Response2.prototype, k, {\n    get() {\n      return this[getResponseCache]()[k];\n    }\n  });\n});\n[\"arrayBuffer\", \"blob\", \"clone\", \"formData\", \"json\", \"text\"].forEach((k) => {\n  Object.defineProperty(Response2.prototype, k, {\n    value: function() {\n      return this[getResponseCache]()[k]();\n    }\n  });\n});\nObject.defineProperty(Response2.prototype, Symbol.for(\"nodejs.util.inspect.custom\"), {\n  value: function(depth, options, inspectFn) {\n    const props = {\n      status: this.status,\n      headers: this.headers,\n      ok: this.ok,\n      nativeResponse: this[responseCache]\n    };\n    return `Response (lightweight) ${inspectFn(props, { ...options, depth: depth == null ? null : depth - 1 })}`;\n  }\n});\nObject.setPrototypeOf(Response2, GlobalResponse);\nObject.setPrototypeOf(Response2.prototype, GlobalResponse.prototype);\n\n// src/utils.ts\nasync function readWithoutBlocking(readPromise) {\n  return Promise.race([readPromise, Promise.resolve().then(() => Promise.resolve(void 0))]);\n}\nfunction writeFromReadableStreamDefaultReader(reader, writable, currentReadPromise) {\n  const cancel = (error) => {\n    reader.cancel(error).catch(() => {\n    });\n  };\n  writable.on(\"close\", cancel);\n  writable.on(\"error\", cancel);\n  (currentReadPromise ?? reader.read()).then(flow, handleStreamError);\n  return reader.closed.finally(() => {\n    writable.off(\"close\", cancel);\n    writable.off(\"error\", cancel);\n  });\n  function handleStreamError(error) {\n    if (error) {\n      writable.destroy(error);\n    }\n  }\n  function onDrain() {\n    reader.read().then(flow, handleStreamError);\n  }\n  function flow({ done, value }) {\n    try {\n      if (done) {\n        writable.end();\n      } else if (!writable.write(value)) {\n        writable.once(\"drain\", onDrain);\n      } else {\n        return reader.read().then(flow, handleStreamError);\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      handleStreamError(e);\n    }\n  }\n}\nfunction writeFromReadableStream(stream, writable) {\n  if (stream.locked) {\n    throw new TypeError(\"ReadableStream is locked.\");\n  } else if (writable.destroyed) {\n    return;\n  }\n  return writeFromReadableStreamDefaultReader(stream.getReader(), writable);\n}\nvar buildOutgoingHttpHeaders = (headers) => {\n  const res = {};\n  if (!(headers instanceof Headers)) {\n    headers = new Headers(headers ?? void 0);\n  }\n  const cookies = [];\n  for (const [k, v] of headers) {\n    if (k === \"set-cookie\") {\n      cookies.push(v);\n    } else {\n      res[k] = v;\n    }\n  }\n  if (cookies.length > 0) {\n    res[\"set-cookie\"] = cookies;\n  }\n  res[\"content-type\"] ??= \"text/plain; charset=UTF-8\";\n  return res;\n};\n\n// src/utils/response/constants.ts\nvar X_ALREADY_SENT = \"x-hono-already-sent\";\n\n// src/globals.ts\nimport crypto from \"crypto\";\nif (typeof global.crypto === \"undefined\") {\n  global.crypto = crypto;\n}\n\n// src/listener.ts\nvar outgoingEnded = Symbol(\"outgoingEnded\");\nvar incomingDraining = Symbol(\"incomingDraining\");\nvar DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS = 500;\nvar MAX_DRAIN_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024;\nvar drainIncoming = (incoming) => {\n  const incomingWithDrainState = incoming;\n  if (incoming.destroyed || incomingWithDrainState[incomingDraining]) {\n    return;\n  }\n  incomingWithDrainState[incomingDraining] = true;\n  if (incoming instanceof Http2ServerRequest2) {\n    try {\n      ;\n      incoming.stream?.close?.(h2constants.NGHTTP2_NO_ERROR);\n    } catch {\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  let bytesRead = 0;\n  const cleanup = () => {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n    incoming.off(\"data\", onData);\n    incoming.off(\"end\", cleanup);\n    incoming.off(\"error\", cleanup);\n  };\n  const forceClose = () => {\n    cleanup();\n    const socket = incoming.socket;\n    if (socket && !socket.destroyed) {\n      socket.destroySoon();\n    }\n  };\n  const timer = setTimeout(forceClose, DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS);\n  timer.unref?.();\n  const onData = (chunk) => {\n    bytesRead += chunk.length;\n    if (bytesRead > MAX_DRAIN_BYTES) {\n      forceClose();\n    }\n  };\n  incoming.on(\"data\", onData);\n  incoming.on(\"end\", cleanup);\n  incoming.on(\"error\", cleanup);\n  incoming.resume();\n};\nvar handleRequestError = () => new Response(null, {\n  status: 400\n});\nvar handleFetchError = (e) => new Response(null, {\n  status: e instanceof Error && (e.name === \"TimeoutError\" || e.constructor.name === \"TimeoutError\") ? 504 : 500\n});\nvar handleResponseError = (e, outgoing) => {\n  const err = e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(\"unknown error\", { cause: e });\n  if (err.code === \"ERR_STREAM_PREMATURE_CLOSE\") {\n    console.info(\"The user aborted a request.\");\n  } else {\n    console.error(e);\n    if (!outgoing.headersSent) {\n      outgoing.writeHead(500, { \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\" });\n    }\n    outgoing.end(`Error: ${err.message}`);\n    outgoing.destroy(err);\n  }\n};\nvar flushHeaders = (outgoing) => {\n  if (\"flushHeaders\" in outgoing && outgoing.writable) {\n    outgoing.flushHeaders();\n  }\n};\nvar responseViaCache = async (res, outgoing) => {\n  let [status, body, header] = res[cacheKey];\n  let hasContentLength = false;\n  if (!header) {\n    header = { \"content-type\": \"text/plain; charset=UTF-8\" };\n  } else if (header instanceof Headers) {\n    hasContentLength = header.has(\"content-length\");\n    header = buildOutgoingHttpHeaders(header);\n  } else if (Array.isArray(header)) {\n    const headerObj = new Headers(header);\n    hasContentLength = headerObj.has(\"content-length\");\n    header = buildOutgoingHttpHeaders(headerObj);\n  } else {\n    for (const key in header) {\n      if (key.length === 14 && key.toLowerCase() === \"content-length\") {\n        hasContentLength = true;\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  if (!hasContentLength) {\n    if (typeof body === \"string\") {\n      header[\"Content-Length\"] = Buffer.byteLength(body);\n    } else if (body instanceof Uint8Array) {\n      header[\"Content-Length\"] = body.byteLength;\n    } else if (body instanceof Blob) {\n      header[\"Content-Length\"] = body.size;\n    }\n  }\n  outgoing.writeHead(status, header);\n  if (typeof body === \"string\" || body instanceof Uint8Array) {\n    outgoing.end(body);\n  } else if (body instanceof Blob) {\n    outgoing.end(new Uint8Array(await body.arrayBuffer()));\n  } else {\n    flushHeaders(outgoing);\n    await writeFromReadableStream(body, outgoing)?.catch(\n      (e) => handleResponseError(e, outgoing)\n    );\n  }\n  ;\n  outgoing[outgoingEnded]?.();\n};\nvar isPromise = (res) => typeof res.then === \"function\";\nvar responseViaResponseObject = async (res, outgoing, options = {}) => {\n  if (isPromise(res)) {\n    if (options.errorHandler) {\n      try {\n        res = await res;\n      } catch (err) {\n        const errRes = await options.errorHandler(err);\n        if (!errRes) {\n          return;\n        }\n        res = errRes;\n      }\n    } else {\n      res = await res.catch(handleFetchError);\n    }\n  }\n  if (cacheKey in res) {\n    return responseViaCache(res, outgoing);\n  }\n  const resHeaderRecord = buildOutgoingHttpHeaders(res.headers);\n  if (res.body) {\n    const reader = res.body.getReader();\n    const values = [];\n    let done = false;\n    let currentReadPromise = void 0;\n    if (resHeaderRecord[\"transfer-encoding\"] !== \"chunked\") {\n      let maxReadCount = 2;\n      for (let i = 0; i < maxReadCount; i++) {\n        currentReadPromise ||= reader.read();\n        const chunk = await readWithoutBlocking(currentReadPromise).catch((e) => {\n          console.error(e);\n          done = true;\n        });\n        if (!chunk) {\n          if (i === 1) {\n            await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve));\n            maxReadCount = 3;\n            continue;\n          }\n          break;\n        }\n        currentReadPromise = void 0;\n        if (chunk.value) {\n          values.push(chunk.value);\n        }\n        if (chunk.done) {\n          done = true;\n          break;\n        }\n      }\n      if (done && !(\"content-length\" in resHeaderRecord)) {\n        resHeaderRecord[\"content-length\"] = values.reduce((acc, value) => acc + value.length, 0);\n      }\n    }\n    outgoing.writeHead(res.status, resHeaderRecord);\n    values.forEach((value) => {\n      ;\n      outgoing.write(value);\n    });\n    if (done) {\n      outgoing.end();\n    } else {\n      if (values.length === 0) {\n        flushHeaders(outgoing);\n      }\n      await writeFromReadableStreamDefaultReader(reader, outgoing, currentReadPromise);\n    }\n  } else if (resHeaderRecord[X_ALREADY_SENT]) {\n  } else {\n    outgoing.writeHead(res.status, resHeaderRecord);\n    outgoing.end();\n  }\n  ;\n  outgoing[outgoingEnded]?.();\n};\nvar getRequestListener = (fetchCallback, options = {}) => {\n  const autoCleanupIncoming = options.autoCleanupIncoming ?? true;\n  if (options.overrideGlobalObjects !== false && global.Request !== Request) {\n    Object.defineProperty(global, \"Request\", {\n      value: Request\n    });\n    Object.defineProperty(global, \"Response\", {\n      value: Response2\n    });\n  }\n  return async (incoming, outgoing) => {\n    let res, req;\n    try {\n      req = newRequest(incoming, options.hostname);\n      let incomingEnded = !autoCleanupIncoming || incoming.method === \"GET\" || incoming.method === \"HEAD\";\n      if (!incomingEnded) {\n        ;\n        incoming[wrapBodyStream] = true;\n        incoming.on(\"end\", () => {\n          incomingEnded = true;\n        });\n        if (incoming instanceof Http2ServerRequest2) {\n          ;\n          outgoing[outgoingEnded] = () => {\n            if (!incomingEnded) {\n              setTimeout(() => {\n                if (!incomingEnded) {\n                  setTimeout(() => {\n                    drainIncoming(incoming);\n                  });\n                }\n              });\n            }\n          };\n        }\n        outgoing.on(\"finish\", () => {\n          if (!incomingEnded) {\n            drainIncoming(incoming);\n          }\n        });\n      }\n      outgoing.on(\"close\", () => {\n        const abortController = req[abortControllerKey];\n        if (abortController) {\n          if (incoming.errored) {\n            req[abortControllerKey].abort(incoming.errored.toString());\n          } else if (!outgoing.writableFinished) {\n            req[abortControllerKey].abort(\"Client connection prematurely closed.\");\n          }\n        }\n        if (!incomingEnded) {\n          setTimeout(() => {\n            if (!incomingEnded) {\n              setTimeout(() => {\n                drainIncoming(incoming);\n              });\n            }\n          });\n        }\n      });\n      res = fetchCallback(req, { incoming, outgoing });\n      if (cacheKey in res) {\n        return responseViaCache(res, outgoing);\n      }\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (!res) {\n        if (options.errorHandler) {\n          res = await options.errorHandler(req ? e : toRequestError(e));\n          if (!res) {\n            return;\n          }\n        } else if (!req) {\n          res = handleRequestError();\n        } else {\n          res = handleFetchError(e);\n        }\n      } else {\n        return handleResponseError(e, outgoing);\n      }\n    }\n    try {\n      return await responseViaResponseObject(res, outgoing, options);\n    } catch (e) {\n      return handleResponseError(e, outgoing);\n    }\n  };\n};\n\n// src/server.ts\nvar createAdaptorServer = (options) => {\n  const fetchCallback = options.fetch;\n  const requestListener = getRequestListener(fetchCallback, {\n    hostname: options.hostname,\n    overrideGlobalObjects: options.overrideGlobalObjects,\n    autoCleanupIncoming: options.autoCleanupIncoming\n  });\n  const createServer = options.createServer || createServerHTTP;\n  const server = createServer(options.serverOptions || {}, requestListener);\n  return server;\n};\nvar serve = (options, listeningListener) => {\n  const server = createAdaptorServer(options);\n  server.listen(options?.port ?? 3e3, options.hostname, () => {\n    const serverInfo = server.address();\n    listeningListener && listeningListener(serverInfo);\n  });\n  return server;\n};\nexport {\n  RequestError,\n  createAdaptorServer,\n  getRequestListener,\n  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package/dist/receiver/express/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+"use strict";
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/receiver/express/index.ts
+var express_exports = {};
+__export(express_exports, {
+  webhookMiddleware: () => webhookMiddleware
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(express_exports);
+
+// src/receiver/extract.ts
+function extractIdempotencyKey(headers) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== "idempotency-key") continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) return void 0;
+    if (value === "") return void 0;
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/verify.ts
+var import_node_crypto = require("crypto");
+function verifyWebhook(headers, body, secret, options) {
+  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;
+  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const signature = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-signature");
+  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-signature" };
+  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-timestamp");
+  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);
+  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  }
+  const delta = now - timestamp;
+  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "stale" };
+  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "future" };
+  if (!signature.startsWith("sha256=")) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const providedHex = signature.slice("sha256=".length);
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const expectedHex = (0, import_node_crypto.createHmac)("sha256", secret).update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`).digest("hex");
+  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, "hex");
+  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, "hex");
+  if (!(0, import_node_crypto.timingSafeEqual)(a, b)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+function pickHeader(headers, lowerName) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === void 0 || value === "") {
+      return void 0;
+    }
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/check.ts
+async function checkWebhook(headers, body, options) {
+  if (options.secret !== void 0) {
+    const verification = verifyWebhook(
+      headers,
+      body,
+      options.secret,
+      options.verify
+    );
+    if (!verification.ok) {
+      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };
+    }
+  }
+  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);
+  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: "missing-key" };
+  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);
+  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };
+}
+
+// src/receiver/express/index.ts
+function webhookMiddleware(options) {
+  return async function check(req, res, next) {
+    const rawBody = bufferOrString(req.body);
+    const result = await checkWebhook(
+      req.headers,
+      rawBody,
+      options
+    );
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      res.status(result.status).json({ error: result.reason });
+      return;
+    }
+    req.idempotency = {
+      key: result.key,
+      deduped: result.deduped
+    };
+    next();
+  };
+}
+function bufferOrString(body) {
+  if (typeof body === "string") return body;
+  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(body).toString("utf8");
+  return "";
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  webhookMiddleware
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/receiver/express/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/express/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/express\n *\n * Express adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import express from \"express\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/express\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = express();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * // Raw body capture required when signing is enabled.\n * app.use(express.raw({ type: \"application/json\" }));\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   (req, res) => {\n *     const { key, deduped } = (req as any).idempotency;\n *     if (deduped) return res.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     res.json({ status: \"processed\", key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: responds with the framework-idiomatic JSON shape\n * `{ error: <reason> }` at status 400 (missing-key) or 401\n * (verification failures), and does not call `next()`. On success:\n * attaches `req.idempotency = { key, deduped }` and calls `next()`.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, mount\n * `express.raw({ type: \"application/json\" })` (or whatever\n * content-type your webhooks use) ahead of the receiver middleware.\n * The middleware reads `req.body` as a `Buffer | string` and converts\n * to a UTF-8 string for hashing. Skip when unsigned.\n */\nimport type { NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response } from \"express\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build an Express middleware that verifies the request signature\n * (when `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the\n * key on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): RequestHandler {\n  return async function check(\n    req: Request,\n    res: Response,\n    next: NextFunction\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    const rawBody = bufferOrString(req.body);\n    const result = await checkWebhook(\n      req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n      rawBody,\n      options\n    );\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      res.status(result.status).json({ error: result.reason });\n      return;\n    }\n    (\n      req as Request & { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } }\n    ).idempotency = {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n    };\n    next();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction bufferOrString(body: unknown): string {\n  if (typeof body === \"string\") return body;\n  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(body).toString(\"utf8\");\n  return \"\";\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const providedHex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expectedHex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pickHeader(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lowerName: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC3D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAc,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACnE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE;AAClD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,cAAc;AACjE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,cAAc,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACpD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AAC1C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,kBAAc,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC5C,OAAO,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EAChC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AACxC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AACxC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,WACP,SACA,WACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,UAAW;AACtC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;ACnDA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAChC,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;AHzCO,SAAS,kBACd,SACgB;AAChB,SAAO,eAAe,MACpB,KACA,KACA,MACe;AACf,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI;AACvC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACvD;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IACE,IACA,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAClB;AACA,SAAK;AAAA,EACP;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAuB;AAC7C,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO;AACrC,MAAI,gBAAgB,WAAY,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM;AACxE,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/receiver/express/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import {
+  checkWebhook
+} from "../../chunk-NOIXOF2I.js";
+
+// src/receiver/express/index.ts
+function webhookMiddleware(options) {
+  return async function check(req, res, next) {
+    const rawBody = bufferOrString(req.body);
+    const result = await checkWebhook(
+      req.headers,
+      rawBody,
+      options
+    );
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      res.status(result.status).json({ error: result.reason });
+      return;
+    }
+    req.idempotency = {
+      key: result.key,
+      deduped: result.deduped
+    };
+    next();
+  };
+}
+function bufferOrString(body) {
+  if (typeof body === "string") return body;
+  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(body).toString("utf8");
+  return "";
+}
+export {
+  webhookMiddleware
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/receiver/express/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/express/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/express\n *\n * Express adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import express from \"express\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/express\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = express();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * // Raw body capture required when signing is enabled.\n * app.use(express.raw({ type: \"application/json\" }));\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   (req, res) => {\n *     const { key, deduped } = (req as any).idempotency;\n *     if (deduped) return res.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     res.json({ status: \"processed\", key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: responds with the framework-idiomatic JSON shape\n * `{ error: <reason> }` at status 400 (missing-key) or 401\n * (verification failures), and does not call `next()`. On success:\n * attaches `req.idempotency = { key, deduped }` and calls `next()`.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, mount\n * `express.raw({ type: \"application/json\" })` (or whatever\n * content-type your webhooks use) ahead of the receiver middleware.\n * The middleware reads `req.body` as a `Buffer | string` and converts\n * to a UTF-8 string for hashing. Skip when unsigned.\n */\nimport type { NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response } from \"express\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Build an Express middleware that verifies the request signature\n * (when `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the\n * key on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): RequestHandler {\n  return async function check(\n    req: Request,\n    res: Response,\n    next: NextFunction\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    const rawBody = bufferOrString(req.body);\n    const result = await checkWebhook(\n      req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n      rawBody,\n      options\n    );\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      res.status(result.status).json({ error: result.reason });\n      return;\n    }\n    (\n      req as Request & { idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean } }\n    ).idempotency = {\n      key: result.key,\n      deduped: result.deduped,\n    };\n    next();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction bufferOrString(body: unknown): string {\n  if (typeof body === \"string\") return body;\n  if (body instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(body).toString(\"utf8\");\n  return \"\";\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAkDO,SAAS,kBACd,SACgB;AAChB,SAAO,eAAe,MACpB,KACA,KACA,MACe;AACf,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI;AACvC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACvD;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IACE,IACA,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,MACZ,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAClB;AACA,SAAK;AAAA,EACP;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAuB;AAC7C,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO;AACrC,MAAI,gBAAgB,WAAY,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM;AACxE,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/receiver/fastify/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"use strict";
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/receiver/fastify/index.ts
+var fastify_exports = {};
+__export(fastify_exports, {
+  webhookMiddleware: () => webhookMiddleware
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(fastify_exports);
+
+// src/receiver/extract.ts
+function extractIdempotencyKey(headers) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== "idempotency-key") continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) return void 0;
+    if (value === "") return void 0;
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/verify.ts
+var import_node_crypto = require("crypto");
+function verifyWebhook(headers, body, secret, options) {
+  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;
+  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const signature = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-signature");
+  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-signature" };
+  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-timestamp");
+  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);
+  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  }
+  const delta = now - timestamp;
+  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "stale" };
+  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "future" };
+  if (!signature.startsWith("sha256=")) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const providedHex = signature.slice("sha256=".length);
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const expectedHex = (0, import_node_crypto.createHmac)("sha256", secret).update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`).digest("hex");
+  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, "hex");
+  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, "hex");
+  if (!(0, import_node_crypto.timingSafeEqual)(a, b)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+function pickHeader(headers, lowerName) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === void 0 || value === "") {
+      return void 0;
+    }
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/check.ts
+async function checkWebhook(headers, body, options) {
+  if (options.secret !== void 0) {
+    const verification = verifyWebhook(
+      headers,
+      body,
+      options.secret,
+      options.verify
+    );
+    if (!verification.ok) {
+      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };
+    }
+  }
+  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);
+  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: "missing-key" };
+  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);
+  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };
+}
+
+// src/receiver/fastify/index.ts
+function webhookMiddleware(options) {
+  return async function check(request, reply) {
+    const req = request;
+    const rawBody = req.rawBody ?? "";
+    const result = await checkWebhook(
+      req.headers,
+      rawBody,
+      options
+    );
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      await reply.status(result.status).send({ error: result.reason });
+      return;
+    }
+    req.idempotency = { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped };
+  };
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  webhookMiddleware
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/receiver/fastify/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/fastify/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/fastify\n *\n * Fastify adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import Fastify from \"fastify\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/fastify\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = Fastify();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   {\n *     preHandler: webhookMiddleware({\n *       store: dedup,\n *       secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n *     }),\n *   },\n *   async (request, reply) => {\n *     const { key, deduped } = (request as any).idempotency;\n *     if (deduped) return { status: \"dedup-skipped\", key };\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return { status: \"processed\", key };\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: replies with `{ error: <reason> }` at status 400\n * (missing-key) or 401 (verification failures). On success: attaches\n * `request.idempotency = { key, deduped }` and lets the route handler\n * run.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, register a\n * content-type parser that preserves the raw body string. Fastify's\n * default JSON parser eats the bytes — register a custom parser via\n * `app.addContentTypeParser(\"application/json\", { parseAs: \"string\" }, …)`\n * and stash the string on `request.rawBody` (Fastify pattern). The\n * middleware reads `request.rawBody` for hashing. Skip when unsigned.\n */\nimport type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from \"fastify\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\ntype WebhookRequest = FastifyRequest & {\n  rawBody?: string;\n  idempotency?: { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Fastify `preHandler` hook that verifies the request\n * signature (when `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and\n * claims the key on the configured store. See the module-level docs\n * for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => Promise<void> {\n  return async function check(\n    request: FastifyRequest,\n    reply: FastifyReply\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    const req = request as WebhookRequest;\n    const rawBody = req.rawBody ?? \"\";\n    const result = await checkWebhook(\n      req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n      rawBody,\n      options\n    );\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      await reply.status(result.status).send({ error: result.reason });\n      return;\n    }\n    req.idempotency = { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped };\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const providedHex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expectedHex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pickHeader(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lowerName: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. 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package/dist/receiver/fastify/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import {
+  checkWebhook
+} from "../../chunk-NOIXOF2I.js";
+
+// src/receiver/fastify/index.ts
+function webhookMiddleware(options) {
+  return async function check(request, reply) {
+    const req = request;
+    const rawBody = req.rawBody ?? "";
+    const result = await checkWebhook(
+      req.headers,
+      rawBody,
+      options
+    );
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      await reply.status(result.status).send({ error: result.reason });
+      return;
+    }
+    req.idempotency = { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped };
+  };
+}
+export {
+  webhookMiddleware
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/receiver/fastify/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/fastify/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/fastify\n *\n * Fastify adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import Fastify from \"fastify\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/fastify\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = Fastify();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   {\n *     preHandler: webhookMiddleware({\n *       store: dedup,\n *       secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET,\n *     }),\n *   },\n *   async (request, reply) => {\n *     const { key, deduped } = (request as any).idempotency;\n *     if (deduped) return { status: \"dedup-skipped\", key };\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return { status: \"processed\", key };\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: replies with `{ error: <reason> }` at status 400\n * (missing-key) or 401 (verification failures). On success: attaches\n * `request.idempotency = { key, deduped }` and lets the route handler\n * run.\n *\n * **Raw body requirement**: when `secret` is configured, register a\n * content-type parser that preserves the raw body string. Fastify's\n * default JSON parser eats the bytes — register a custom parser via\n * `app.addContentTypeParser(\"application/json\", { parseAs: \"string\" }, …)`\n * and stash the string on `request.rawBody` (Fastify pattern). The\n * middleware reads `request.rawBody` for hashing. Skip when unsigned.\n */\nimport type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from \"fastify\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\ntype WebhookRequest = FastifyRequest & {\n  rawBody?: string;\n  idempotency?: { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Fastify `preHandler` hook that verifies the request\n * signature (when `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and\n * claims the key on the configured store. See the module-level docs\n * for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => Promise<void> {\n  return async function check(\n    request: FastifyRequest,\n    reply: FastifyReply\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    const req = request as WebhookRequest;\n    const rawBody = req.rawBody ?? \"\";\n    const result = await checkWebhook(\n      req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n      rawBody,\n      options\n    );\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      await reply.status(result.status).send({ error: result.reason });\n      return;\n    }\n    req.idempotency = { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped };\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA2DO,SAAS,kBACd,SACiE;AACjE,SAAO,eAAe,MACpB,SACA,OACe;AACf,UAAM,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW;AAC/B,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AAC/D;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC/D;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/receiver/hono/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+"use strict";
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/receiver/hono/index.ts
+var hono_exports = {};
+__export(hono_exports, {
+  webhookMiddleware: () => webhookMiddleware
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(hono_exports);
+
+// src/receiver/extract.ts
+function extractIdempotencyKey(headers) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== "idempotency-key") continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) return void 0;
+    if (value === "") return void 0;
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/verify.ts
+var import_node_crypto = require("crypto");
+function verifyWebhook(headers, body, secret, options) {
+  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;
+  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const signature = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-signature");
+  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-signature" };
+  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, "x-webhook-timestamp");
+  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);
+  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "missing-timestamp" };
+  }
+  const delta = now - timestamp;
+  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "stale" };
+  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: "future" };
+  if (!signature.startsWith("sha256=")) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const providedHex = signature.slice("sha256=".length);
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  const expectedHex = (0, import_node_crypto.createHmac)("sha256", secret).update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`).digest("hex");
+  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, "hex");
+  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, "hex");
+  if (!(0, import_node_crypto.timingSafeEqual)(a, b)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "bad-signature" };
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+function pickHeader(headers, lowerName) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === void 0 || value === "") {
+      return void 0;
+    }
+    return value;
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
+
+// src/receiver/check.ts
+async function checkWebhook(headers, body, options) {
+  if (options.secret !== void 0) {
+    const verification = verifyWebhook(
+      headers,
+      body,
+      options.secret,
+      options.verify
+    );
+    if (!verification.ok) {
+      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };
+    }
+  }
+  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);
+  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: "missing-key" };
+  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);
+  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };
+}
+
+// src/receiver/hono/index.ts
+function webhookMiddleware(options) {
+  return async function check(c, next) {
+    const headers = headersBag(c.req.raw.headers);
+    const rawBody = await c.req.text();
+    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);
+    }
+    c.set("idempotency", { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped });
+    await next();
+  };
+}
+function headersBag(headers) {
+  const out = {};
+  headers.forEach((value, key) => {
+    out[key] = value;
+  });
+  return out;
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  webhookMiddleware
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/receiver/hono/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/receiver/hono/index.ts","../../../src/receiver/extract.ts","../../../src/receiver/verify.ts","../../../src/receiver/check.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @packageDocumentation\n * @module act-http/receiver/hono\n *\n * Hono adapter for the receiver-side webhook check.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from \"hono\";\n * import { webhookMiddleware } from \"@rotorsoft/act-http/receiver/hono\";\n * import { InMemoryIdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * const dedup = new InMemoryIdempotencyStore();\n *\n * app.post(\n *   \"/webhooks/orders\",\n *   webhookMiddleware({ store: dedup, secret: process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET }),\n *   async (c) => {\n *     const idem = c.get(\"idempotency\") as { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n *     if (idem.deduped) return c.json({ status: \"dedup-skipped\", key: idem.key });\n *     // ... process the inbound event ...\n *     return c.json({ status: \"processed\", key: idem.key });\n *   }\n * );\n * ```\n *\n * On failure: returns `c.json({ error: <reason> }, status)` directly\n * (Hono short-circuits when middleware returns a Response). On\n * success: stashes `c.set(\"idempotency\", { key, deduped })` and\n * continues with `await next()`.\n *\n * **Raw body**: Hono exposes `await c.req.text()` natively, which\n * the middleware reads when `secret` is configured. No extra setup\n * needed.\n */\nimport type { MiddlewareHandler } from \"hono\";\nimport { type CheckWebhookOptions, checkWebhook } from \"../check.js\";\n\n/**\n * Variables this middleware contributes to the Hono context. The\n * generic on the returned {@link MiddlewareHandler} threads it\n * through so route handlers downstream of `app.post(..., webhookMiddleware(...), handler)`\n * see `c.get(\"idempotency\")` typed without a manual cast.\n */\nexport type WebhookVariables = {\n  idempotency: { key: string; deduped: boolean };\n};\n\n/**\n * Build a Hono middleware that verifies the request signature (when\n * `secret` is set), enforces `Idempotency-Key`, and claims the key\n * on the configured store. See the module-level docs for usage.\n */\nexport function webhookMiddleware(\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): MiddlewareHandler<{ Variables: WebhookVariables }> {\n  return async function check(c, next) {\n    const headers = headersBag(c.req.raw.headers);\n    const rawBody = await c.req.text();\n    const result = await checkWebhook(headers, rawBody, options);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      return c.json({ error: result.reason }, result.status);\n    }\n    c.set(\"idempotency\", { key: result.key, deduped: result.deduped });\n    await next();\n  };\n}\n\nfunction headersBag(\n  headers: Headers\n): Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> {\n  const out: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> = {};\n  headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n    out[key] = value;\n  });\n  return out;\n}\n","/**\n * Pull the `Idempotency-Key` header from a Node-style headers bag,\n * case-insensitive. Returns `undefined` when any of the following\n * carries no usable key:\n *\n * - the header is missing\n * - its value is an array (ambiguous — can't pick one without a\n *   policy the receiver hasn't declared)\n * - its value is the empty string (carries no idempotency\n *   information; structurally equivalent to \"no header at all\")\n *\n * Pair with `IdempotencyStore.claim` from\n * `@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency`: extract the key from the inbound\n * request, claim it on the store, return a `deduped` marker when the\n * claim fails. The framework-agnostic middleware that wires these\n * together lands in #744.\n *\n * Validation beyond \"is there a usable key?\" (length bounds, format\n * checks, normalization) is intentionally out of scope. Receivers\n * picking a policy can layer it on top — or, when #744 ships, opt\n * into the middleware's opinionated defaults.\n */\nexport function extractIdempotencyKey(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== \"idempotency-key\") continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value)) return undefined;\n    if (value === \"\") return undefined;\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link verifyWebhook}. Either the request signature\n * checks out, or one of five distinct failure reasons applies. Each\n * reason maps to an operator-meaningful telemetry bucket — separated\n * deliberately so dashboards can distinguish \"client lost its secret\"\n * from \"client clock is wrong\" from \"this is a replay attack.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true }\n  | {\n      ok: false;\n      reason:\n        | \"missing-signature\"\n        | \"missing-timestamp\"\n        | \"stale\"\n        | \"future\"\n        | \"bad-signature\";\n    };\n\n/** Options for {@link verifyWebhook}. */\nexport type VerifyOptions = {\n  /**\n   * Maximum acceptable timestamp drift in either direction, in\n   * seconds. Default: 300 (±5 minutes) — matches Stripe / GitHub /\n   * Slack conventions. Tightening narrows the replay window;\n   * loosening accommodates clients with worse clock sync.\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Current Unix-seconds time. Exposed for tests; production\n   * callers should leave it undefined so wall-clock is used.\n   */\n  now?: number;\n};\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's signature and timestamp against the\n * shared secret. Pair with the sender side: configure\n * `webhook({ secret })` from `@rotorsoft/act-http/webhook`.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false; reason }` on\n * failure. The reasons are:\n *\n * - `missing-signature` — no `X-Webhook-Signature` header, value\n *   was an array, or value was empty.\n * - `missing-timestamp` — no `X-Webhook-Timestamp` header, value\n *   was empty, or value isn't a parseable integer.\n * - `stale` — timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` from `now`.\n * - `future` — timestamp more than `maxAgeSeconds` ahead of `now`.\n * - `bad-signature` — signature header didn't start with `sha256=`,\n *   wasn't 64 hex chars, or the recomputed HMAC didn't match\n *   (constant-time compare).\n *\n * The signed payload is `${timestamp}.${body}`, so `body` must be\n * the **raw request body bytes**. Any pre-parse normalization\n * (whitespace trimming, JSON re-stringification) would change the\n * hash and reject every otherwise-valid request. Framework adapters\n * in #744 will provide the raw body alongside the parsed one.\n *\n * Uses Node's `crypto.timingSafeEqual` for the final comparison to\n * avoid signature-equality timing attacks.\n */\nexport function verifyWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  secret: string,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): VerifyResult {\n  const maxAgeSeconds = options?.maxAgeSeconds ?? 300;\n  const now = options?.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\n  const signature = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-signature\");\n  if (!signature) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-signature\" };\n\n  const timestampStr = pickHeader(headers, \"x-webhook-timestamp\");\n  if (!timestampStr) return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  const timestamp = Number.parseInt(timestampStr, 10);\n  if (Number.isNaN(timestamp) || String(timestamp) !== timestampStr) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"missing-timestamp\" };\n  }\n\n  const delta = now - timestamp;\n  if (delta > maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"stale\" };\n  if (delta < -maxAgeSeconds) return { ok: false, reason: \"future\" };\n\n  if (!signature.startsWith(\"sha256=\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n  const providedHex = signature.slice(\"sha256=\".length);\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(providedHex)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  const expectedHex = createHmac(\"sha256\", secret)\n    .update(`${timestampStr}.${body}`)\n    .digest(\"hex\");\n\n  const a = Buffer.from(providedHex, \"hex\");\n  const b = Buffer.from(expectedHex, \"hex\");\n  if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad-signature\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n\nfunction pickHeader(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  lowerName: string\n): string | undefined {\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (name.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) continue;\n    if (Array.isArray(value) || value === undefined || value === \"\") {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n","import type { IdempotencyStore } from \"@rotorsoft/act-ops/idempotency\";\nimport { extractIdempotencyKey } from \"./extract.js\";\nimport { type VerifyOptions, verifyWebhook } from \"./verify.js\";\n\n/**\n * Failure reasons returned by {@link checkWebhook}. The shape splits\n * `missing-key` (a client error, mapped to HTTP 400) from the five\n * verification failures (authentication errors, HTTP 401) so each\n * maps to its own telemetry bucket.\n */\nexport type CheckFailureReason =\n  | \"missing-key\"\n  | \"missing-signature\"\n  | \"missing-timestamp\"\n  | \"stale\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"bad-signature\";\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link checkWebhook}. Either the request passed every\n * configured check and carries a usable idempotency key, or it\n * failed one of them and the framework adapter should reply with the\n * corresponding HTTP status.\n */\nexport type CheckResult =\n  | { ok: false; status: 400 | 401; reason: CheckFailureReason }\n  | { ok: true; key: string; deduped: boolean };\n\n/** Options for {@link checkWebhook}. */\nexport type CheckWebhookOptions = {\n  /** Idempotency store the framework-agnostic core claims the key on. */\n  store: IdempotencyStore;\n  /**\n   * Optional HMAC-SHA256 secret. When set, the request's\n   * `X-Webhook-Signature` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp` headers are\n   * verified before the dedup claim. When omitted, signature\n   * verification is skipped (unsigned receivers).\n   */\n  secret?: string;\n  /**\n   * Verification options forwarded to {@link verifyWebhook}. Only\n   * meaningful when `secret` is set. Defaults to a ±300-second\n   * timestamp window.\n   */\n  verify?: VerifyOptions;\n};\n\n/**\n * Framework-agnostic receiver check: verify the signature (when a\n * secret is configured), extract the `Idempotency-Key`, and claim\n * it on the store. Returns the request's fate as a discriminated\n * union the per-framework adapter translates into the framework's\n * idiomatic 4xx response or context injection.\n *\n * **Order of checks** (matters):\n *\n * 1. Verify signature + timestamp window (when `secret` is set).\n *    Rejecting bad signatures *before* extracting and claiming the\n *    key keeps attacker-supplied keys out of the dedup store —\n *    otherwise a flood of spoofed POSTs would pollute the LRU.\n * 2. Extract the `Idempotency-Key`. Missing → reject with 400.\n * 3. Claim the key on the store. If already seen, return\n *    `{ ok: true; deduped: true }` so the framework adapter can\n *    short-circuit the handler without re-running side effects.\n *\n * The dedup store may be sync (`InMemoryIdempotencyStore`) or async\n * (durable adapters like a future `PostgresIdempotencyStore`); the\n * core awaits unconditionally so both shapes compose cleanly.\n */\nexport async function checkWebhook(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  body: string,\n  options: CheckWebhookOptions\n): Promise<CheckResult> {\n  if (options.secret !== undefined) {\n    const verification = verifyWebhook(\n      headers,\n      body,\n      options.secret,\n      options.verify\n    );\n    if (!verification.ok) {\n      return { ok: false, status: 401, reason: verification.reason };\n    }\n  }\n\n  const key = extractIdempotencyKey(headers);\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, status: 400, reason: \"missing-key\" };\n\n  const claimed = await options.store.claim(key);\n  return { ok: true, key, deduped: !claimed };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;;;ACsBO,SAAS,sBACd,SACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,kBAAmB;AAC9C,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,QAAI,UAAU,GAAI,QAAO;AACzB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AChCA,yBAA4C;AAgErC,SAAS,cACd,SACA,MACA,QACA,SACc;AACd,QAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAChD,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAExD,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC3D,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAEhE,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAc,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACnE,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE;AAClD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,cAAc;AACjE,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpB,MAAI,QAAQ,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAe,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AAEjE,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACpC,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AACA,QAAM,cAAc,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACpD,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AAC1C,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,QAAM,kBAAc,+BAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAC5C,OAAO,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EAChC,OAAO,KAAK;AAEf,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AACxC,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AACxC,MAAI,KAAC,oCAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,WACP,SACA,WACoB;AACpB,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACnD,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,UAAW;AACtC,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,UAAa,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;ACnDA,eAAsB,aACpB,SACA,MACA,SACsB;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAChC,UAAM,eAAe;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI;AACpB,aAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc;AAEjE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAC5C;;;AHpCO,SAAS,kBACd,SACoD;AACpD,SAAO,eAAe,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,UAAU,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAC5C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,aAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,MAAE,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AACjE,UAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EACb;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,WACP,SAC+C;AAC/C,QAAM,MAAqD,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC9B,QAAI,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACb,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}