@rosthq/cli 0.7.96 → 0.7.97

package/dist/generated/command-manifest.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"command-manifest.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/generated/command-manifest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAE3E,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB,EAoR3D,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"command-manifest.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/generated/command-manifest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAE3E,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB,EAsR3D,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -42746,6 +42746,20 @@ var confirmationSummarySchema = external_exports.object({
 var confirmationListOutputSchema = external_exports.object({
   confirmations: external_exports.array(confirmationSummarySchema)
 }).strict();
+var confirmationDismissInputSchema = external_exports.object({
+  confirmation_id: uuidSchema11
+}).strict();
+var confirmationDismissOutputSchema = external_exports.object({
+  dismissed: external_exports.object({
+    id: uuidSchema11,
+    status: external_exports.literal("dismissed")
+  }).strict()
+}).strict();
+var confirmationDismissStaleInputSchema = external_exports.object({}).strict();
+var confirmationDismissStaleOutputSchema = external_exports.object({
+  dismissed_count: external_exports.number().int().min(0),
+  dismissed_ids: external_exports.array(uuidSchema11)
+}).strict();
 var credentialIngressInputSchema = external_exports.object({
   seat_id: uuidSchema11.optional(),
   provider: external_exports.string().trim().min(1),
@@ -50120,11 +50134,11 @@ Keep agent scope tight at first. Approve more autonomy only after evidence. Use
     order: 71,
     title: "Confirmations and human gates guide",
     summary: "How {{brand}} routes authority-changing work through human confirmation, and why agents never approve their own requests.",
-    version: "2026-07-15.2",
+    version: "2026-07-17.1",
     public: true,
     audiences: ["human", "cli", "mcp", "in_app_agent"],
     stages: ["graph_design", "charter_design", "staffing", "operating_rhythm"],
-    relatedCommandIds: ["confirmation.approve", "confirmation.list", "confirmation.reject", "confirmation.remint", "charter.approve", "agent.go_live", "credential.ingress", "mcp_token.create", "staffing.assign_user", "goal.reparent", "friction.resolve", "task.confirm_proposal", "task.decline_proposal"],
+    relatedCommandIds: ["confirmation.approve", "confirmation.dismiss", "confirmation.dismiss_stale", "confirmation.list", "confirmation.reject", "confirmation.remint", "charter.approve", "agent.go_live", "credential.ingress", "mcp_token.create", "staffing.assign_user", "goal.reparent", "friction.resolve", "task.confirm_proposal", "task.decline_proposal"],
     legal: { publicRisk: "low", notes: ["{{brand}}-native human-gate guidance."] },
     sources: [
       {
@@ -50172,6 +50186,10 @@ A held tool call actuates the same way regardless of which command backs it \u20
 
 The \`/approvals\` page is one place a human clears every pending decision across the company. It unions still-pending confirmations, open steward escalations, and agent-proposed draft tasks into a single queue, each item shown with its risk or proposal type, the source or proposing seat, and redacted arguments \u2014 secret material is never displayed. You see only items for seats you have authority over: an owner sees all of them; a member sees confirmations for the seats they occupy, escalations routed to their steward chain, and task proposals where they occupy or steward the target seat. Confirming a task proposal runs \`task.confirm_proposal\` and moves the draft to Offered; declining runs \`task.decline_proposal\` and records a human reason. Neither action accepts the task, schedules a run, or executes agent work. Approve and reject route through the same \`confirmation.approve\` / \`confirmation.reject\` and escalation decision commands the CLI and per-seat surfaces use, so the audit trail and the agents-recommend-humans-decide rule are identical wherever you act. The queue also unions pending Forge software-credential requests (owner-scoped, read-only, deep-linking to \`/forge\`) \u2014 it surfaces the ask and links to the vault-backed fulfillment flow, never collecting the secret itself. A confirmation that fails on approval shows the actual execution error inline as a \`failed\` card instead of a dead generic banner, and its Retry re-runs \`confirmation.approve\` against current state; re-minting the same request supersedes the older card instead of leaving a duplicate behind.
 
+## Clearing expired confirmations
+
+A confirmation that expires before a human acts on it is dead \u2014 it can no longer be approved. Re-mint revives one; dismiss is the opposite gesture for a card you do *not* want to revive. \`confirmation.dismiss\` clears one obsolete expired card from the queue, and \`confirmation.dismiss_stale\` clears every currently-expired card in your authority scope at once (bulk "dismiss all stale"). Dismiss is human-only queue hygiene: it never re-executes the original command and never records a decision \u2014 it just marks the dead card \`dismissed\`, notes who dismissed it, and writes an audit event for each row (\`dismiss_stale\` writes one per card). Only an already-expired card is dismissable; a still-live pending confirmation is refused, because its decision is approve or reject, not dismiss. You can only dismiss cards you already have authority over \u2014 an owner over any, a member over the seats they occupy.
+
 ## The rule for agents
 
 An agent never approves or rejects its own request. \`decisions.decided_by\` is always a human. The steward decision commands (\`escalation.resolve\`, \`escalation.reject\`) and proposal decision commands (\`task.confirm_proposal\`, \`task.decline_proposal\`) are not exposed over MCP. When an agent hits a gate, it prepares the evidence and the recommended action, returns the approve link, and waits for a human. Draft task proposals follow the same rule: the agent can propose the commitment, but a target-side human confirms or declines it unless a bounded Trusted grant applies.
@@ -52532,6 +52550,8 @@ var COMMAND_MANIFEST = [
   { "id": "compass.show_markdown", "namespace": "compass", "action": "show_markdown", "title": "Show Compass as markdown", "description": "Compose the current Compass and its open gaps into a clean, human-skimmable markdown card for review.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Render the current Compass and its open gaps as a clean markdown card to show your human a quick review." },
   { "id": "compass.update_draft", "namespace": "compass", "action": "update_draft", "title": "Update Compass draft", "description": "Replace a draft Compass document.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "draft_id", "flag": "draft-id", "type": "string", "required": true }], "hasComplexInput": true, "help": "Pass the compass_version_id returned by compass.draft as draft_id; update_draft replaces only an unpublished draft in this tenant." },
   { "id": "confirmation.approve", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "approve", "title": "Approve pending confirmation", "description": "Approve an in-flight confirmation and execute the original command as the approving human.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "confirmation_id", "flag": "confirmation-id", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "reviewed", "flag": "reviewed", "type": "boolean", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Approve pending confirmations only when the requested durable change is clear to the human owner." },
+  { "id": "confirmation.dismiss", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "dismiss", "title": "Dismiss an expired confirmation", "description": "Clear a single expired, unactioned confirmation from the queue without re-executing the original command.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "confirmation_id", "flag": "confirmation-id", "type": "string", "required": true }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Clear a single expired, unactioned confirmation from the queue. Dismiss is human-only queue hygiene \u2014 it never re-executes the original command." },
+  { "id": "confirmation.dismiss_stale", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "dismiss_stale", "title": "Dismiss all expired confirmations", "description": "Clear every expired, unactioned confirmation in your authority scope from the queue without re-executing any command.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Clear every expired, unactioned confirmation in your authority scope at once. Each dismissal is audited; none re-executes the original command." },
   { "id": "confirmation.list", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "list", "title": "List pending confirmations", "description": "List in-flight confirmations awaiting a human decision, scoped to the caller's authority (owner sees all; a member sees seats they occupy; an agent sees its own seat).", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "limit", "flag": "limit", "type": "integer", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "List pending confirmations awaiting a human decision before approving or rejecting them." },
   { "id": "confirmation.reject", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "reject", "title": "Reject pending confirmation", "description": "Reject an in-flight confirmation without executing the original command.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "confirmation_id", "flag": "confirmation-id", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "reason", "flag": "reason", "type": "string", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Reject pending confirmations when authority, evidence, or human intent is unclear." },
   { "id": "confirmation.remint", "namespace": "confirmation", "action": "remint", "title": "Re-mint an expired confirmation", "description": "Stage a fresh confirmation for the same command as an expired one, re-running the normal minting authorization checks.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "confirmation_id", "flag": "confirmation-id", "type": "string", "required": true }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Re-mint an expired confirmation into a fresh one before approving, instead of re-running the original command from scratch." },