@rosthq/cli 0.7.90 → 0.7.91

package/dist/generator/groups.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"groups.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/generator/groups.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAuCA,OAAO,EAAgB,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAM1D,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAKhF,CAAC;AAwsCF,eAAO,MAAM,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAmPjD,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"groups.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/generator/groups.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAuCA,OAAO,EAAgB,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAM1D,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAKhF,CAAC;AAitCF,eAAO,MAAM,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAmPjD,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -46341,11 +46341,16 @@ var statusEventPayloadSchema = external_exports.object({
     note: external_exports.string().min(1).optional()
   }).strict()).optional()
 }).strict();
+var escalationCategorySchema = external_exports.enum(["safety_refusal"]);
 var escalationEventPayloadSchema = external_exports.object({
   reason: external_exports.string().min(1),
   charter_clause: external_exports.string().min(1),
   evidence: evidenceSchema,
-  recommended_action: external_exports.string().min(1).optional()
+  recommended_action: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
+  // DER-1848: reason-adjacent category. Optional so every existing escalation event
+  // (and every ordinary held call) validates unchanged; present only when the agent
+  // explicitly escalated with a category (today: a safety refusal).
+  category: escalationCategorySchema.optional()
 }).strict();
 var issueEventPayloadSchema = external_exports.object({
   summary: external_exports.string().min(1),
@@ -46504,6 +46509,10 @@ var stewardReplayActionSummarySchema = external_exports.object({
   tool_name: external_exports.string(),
   run_id: uuidSchema20
 }).strict();
+var stewardProposedToolCallSchema = external_exports.object({
+  tool_name: external_exports.string(),
+  args_summary: external_exports.unknown()
+}).strict();
 var stewardEscalationSchema = external_exports.object({
   id: uuidSchema20,
   seat_id: uuidSchema20,
@@ -46513,11 +46522,19 @@ var stewardEscalationSchema = external_exports.object({
   steward_seat_name: external_exports.string(),
   reason: external_exports.string(),
   charter_clause: external_exports.string(),
+  // DER-1848: the first-class escalation category, or null for an ordinary held call.
+  // `safety_refusal` = the agent explicitly declined the task on safety grounds, so
+  // every read surface (command/MCP/web) can render "refused (safety)" distinctly from
+  // a routine held tool call. Sourced from the escalation event payload (no DB column).
+  category: escalationCategorySchema.nullable(),
   // DER-1634: secret-scrubbed evidence the agent attached when it escalated (the DB
   // scrubs it at write time; read projections re-scrub defensively — invariant #5).
   evidence: external_exports.unknown(),
   // DER-1634: scrubbed summary of the durable replay action, or null when there is none.
   replay_action_summary: stewardReplayActionSummarySchema.nullable(),
+  // DER-1818: the held tool call the steward is approving (present-only convention —
+  // omitted entirely when the escalation has no durable replay action).
+  proposed_tool_call: stewardProposedToolCallSchema.optional(),
   recommended_action: external_exports.string().nullable(),
   status: escalationStatusSchema,
   decided_by: uuidSchema20.nullable(),
@@ -48242,7 +48259,7 @@ External connectors are being rolled out provider by provider, conservatively (r
     order: 48,
     title: "CLI and MCP installation guide",
     summary: "Install the public CLI, register remote token-backed MCP clients, and find the full command and tool catalog.",
-    version: "2026-07-16.4",
+    version: "2026-07-16.5",
     public: true,
     audiences: ["human", "cli", "mcp", "in_app_agent"],
     stages: ["company_setup", "staffing"],
@@ -48957,8 +48974,8 @@ Several rows here are seat-operating commands (\`task.create\`, the \`signal.*\`
 | \`rost_start_sync_run\` | \`sync.run.start\` | Ensure a Sync Brief exists so the meeting can begin. | Tenant | Call with \`{}\`. |
 | \`rost_complete_sync_run\` | \`sync.run.complete\` | Record that the Sync meeting completed (idempotent). | Tenant | Call with \`{"sync_brief_id":"<id>"}\`. |
 | \`rost_assign_sync_follow_up\` | \`sync.item.assign\` | Create a follow-up task from a Sync agenda item. | Tenant | Call with brief, owner seat, title, description. |
-| \`rost_list_escalations\` | \`escalation.list\` | List Steward queue escalations (own steward chain for humans, own seat for agents). | Seat or tenant-admin | Call with \`{}\` or \`{"include_decided":true}\`. |
-| \`rost_get_escalation\` | \`escalation.get\` | Read one escalation's secret-scrubbed evidence, recommendation, decision state, and \`replay_action_summary\` (the held tool + originating run a steward approval would replay \u2014 never the raw args). | Seat or tenant-admin | Call with \`{"id":"<escalation-id>"}\`. Resolve/reject are human-only and not exposed over MCP. |
+| \`rost_list_escalations\` | \`escalation.list\` | List Steward queue escalations (own steward chain for humans, own seat for agents). Each escalation that holds a replayable tool call also carries \`proposed_tool_call\` (\`{ tool_name, args_summary }\`, secret-scrubbed \u2014 never raw args). | Seat or tenant-admin | Call with \`{}\` or \`{"include_decided":true}\`. |
+| \`rost_get_escalation\` | \`escalation.get\` | Read one escalation's secret-scrubbed evidence, recommendation, decision state, \`replay_action_summary\` (the held tool + originating run a steward approval would replay \u2014 never the raw args), and \`proposed_tool_call\` (the same held call's \`{ tool_name, args_summary }\` payload, secret-scrubbed, present only when there is one). | Seat or tenant-admin | Call with \`{"id":"<escalation-id>"}\`. Resolve/reject are human-only and not exposed over MCP. |
 | \`rost_find_stale_escalations\` | \`escalation.stale_candidates\` | List aged open escalations on the caller's steward chain that still reference a concrete DER issue or PR, with a per-row confidence tier and evidence. Read-only. | Tenant | Call with optional \`stale_after_days\` and \`limit\`. The bulk override (\`escalation.bulk_resolve\`) is human-only and not exposed over MCP. |
 | \`rost_check_compass_alignment\` | \`compass.alignment\` | Advisory drift check: scores whether cycle goals still ladder to the active vision and flags orphan/contradictory goals. Read-only \u2014 it never edits the Compass or any goal. | Tenant | Call with \`{}\`. |
 | \`rost_team_health_score\` | \`team.health_score\` | Read the single rolled-up 0-100 team-health score (latest month) with its band and label. | Tenant | Call with \`{}\`. |
@@ -49843,7 +49860,7 @@ Resolving Friction should produce one of four outcomes: a decision, a task, a Ch
     order: 70,
     title: "Steward queue guide",
     summary: "How Stewards review escalations, approve agent boundaries, and keep agents accountable.",
-    version: "2026-07-16.1",
+    version: "2026-07-16.2",
     public: true,
     audiences: ["human", "cli", "mcp", "in_app_agent"],
     stages: ["staffing", "operating_rhythm"],
@@ -49888,6 +49905,10 @@ The Steward page itself only lists charter-clause escalations (Queue, Escalation
 
 An escalation reaches you the same way no matter how the agent raised it \u2014 in a chat or CLI session, or on its own scheduled cloud run. When the agent stops at a boundary it opens the queue item and sends a notification to the accountable human along the steward chain, preferring a connected Slack channel and falling back to email. If no human occupies the agent's seat, the chain walks up to the next Steward. Delivery is idempotent: a retried run never notifies you twice for the same escalation, and the notification carries only summarized, redacted evidence \u2014 never secret material.
 
+## Safety refusals read distinctly
+
+When an agent declines a task on safety grounds it raises a first-class **safety refusal**, not a silent stall. The escalation carries a \`category\` of \`safety_refusal\` that every read surface (the queue reads, the CLI/MCP \`escalation.list\`/\`escalation.get\` output, and the steward notification) shows differently from an ordinary held tool call \u2014 the notification reads "refused (safety)" and names that the agent declined and is waiting on you. A cloud run that ends because the agent refused is labeled "declined (safety)" in its run summary rather than reported as a plain success, so a refusal is always visible as a refusal.
+
 ## Where notifications land
 
 Every notification sent to you \u2014 escalations, approval requests, sync briefs, and your daily digest \u2014 also appears in your in-app Inbox, with unread state you can clear. A Slack or email delivery that fails is retried automatically on a bounded schedule; once it can no longer be delivered it stays visible in the Inbox rather than being lost. A once-a-day digest rolls up the day's deliverables, open approvals, and exceptions into a single message, so a quiet day stays quiet and a busy one is summarized in one place.
@@ -52351,7 +52372,7 @@ var COMMAND_MANIFEST = [
   { "id": "escalation.bulk_resolve", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "bulk_resolve", "title": "Bulk resolve escalations", "description": "Override (safely close) a batch of stale open escalations in one human-confirmed action, with a required reason. Each escalation is decided independently (partial success) and writes its own human decision; already-decided, not-routed, or missing ids are skipped. Agents cannot bulk-resolve.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "human_required", "exposeOverMcp": false, "fields": [{ "name": "escalation_ids", "flag": "escalation-ids", "type": "array", "required": true, "itemType": "string" }, { "name": "reason", "flag": "reason", "type": "string", "required": true }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Override (safely close) a batch of stale open escalations in one human-confirmed action; each records its own human decision and already-decided, not-routed, or missing ids are skipped. Agents cannot bulk-resolve." },
   { "id": "escalation.get", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "get", "title": "Get escalation", "description": "Read a single escalation the caller is allowed to see (own steward chain for humans, own seat for agents).", "requiredScope": "seat", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "id", "flag": "id", "type": "string", "required": true }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Read one escalation's evidence and recommendation before a human resolves or rejects it." },
   { "id": "escalation.list", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "list", "title": "List escalations", "description": "List Steward queue escalations routed to the caller's steward chain (human) or raised by the caller's seat (agent).", "requiredScope": "seat", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "include_decided", "flag": "include-decided", "type": "boolean", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "List Steward queue escalations (own chain for humans, own seat for agents) before resolving or routing them." },
-  { "id": "escalation.raise", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "raise", "title": "Raise escalation", "description": "Emit an escalation event and open a Steward queue item for the acting seat.", "requiredScope": "seat", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "reason", "flag": "reason", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "charter_clause", "flag": "charter-clause", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "recommended_action", "flag": "recommended-action", "type": "string", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": true, "help": "Raise an escalation to the seat's Steward when a decision exceeds the seat's authority; humans decide." },
+  { "id": "escalation.raise", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "raise", "title": "Raise escalation", "description": "Emit an escalation event and open a Steward queue item for the acting seat.", "requiredScope": "seat", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "reason", "flag": "reason", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "charter_clause", "flag": "charter-clause", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "recommended_action", "flag": "recommended-action", "type": "string", "required": false }, { "name": "category", "flag": "category", "type": "enum", "required": false, "enumValues": ["safety_refusal"] }], "hasComplexInput": true, "help": "Raise an escalation to the seat's Steward when a decision exceeds the seat's authority; humans decide." },
   { "id": "escalation.reject", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "reject", "title": "Reject escalation", "description": "Override an open escalation so the agent must not proceed. Writes a human decision; agents cannot reject.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": false, "fields": [{ "name": "id", "flag": "id", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "rationale", "flag": "rationale", "type": "string", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Reject (override) an escalation so the agent must not proceed; the decision records the human decider. Agents cannot reject." },
   { "id": "escalation.resolve", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "resolve", "title": "Resolve escalation", "description": "Approve an open escalation (or convert it to Friction). Writes a human decision; agents cannot resolve.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": false, "fields": [{ "name": "id", "flag": "id", "type": "string", "required": true }, { "name": "action", "flag": "action", "type": "enum", "required": false, "enumValues": ["approve", "convert_to_issue"] }, { "name": "rationale", "flag": "rationale", "type": "string", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "Resolve an escalation as a human Steward; the decision records decided_by as the approving human. Agents cannot resolve." },
   { "id": "escalation.stale_candidates", "namespace": "escalation", "action": "stale_candidates", "title": "Find stale escalations", "description": "List open escalations routed to the caller's steward chain that have aged and still reference a concrete DER issue or PR, with a per-row confidence tier and evidence. Read-only \u2014 it never decides anything.", "requiredScope": "tenant", "confirmation": "none", "exposeOverMcp": true, "fields": [{ "name": "stale_after_days", "flag": "stale-after-days", "type": "integer", "required": false }, { "name": "limit", "flag": "limit", "type": "integer", "required": false }], "hasComplexInput": false, "help": "List aged open escalations in the caller's steward chain that still reference a concrete DER issue or PR \u2014 candidates for a bulk override. Read-only." },
@@ -53257,6 +53278,9 @@ function renderConfirmationList(output) {
     return `${field(record2, "id")}  ${field(record2, "risk_level")}  ${field(record2, "command_id")}  ${field(record2, "summary")}`;
   }).join("\n");
 }
+function safetyRefusalTag(record2) {
+  return record2.category === "safety_refusal" ? "[safety refusal] " : "";
+}
 function renderEscalationList(output) {
   const escalations = asArray(asRecord(output).escalations);
   if (escalations.length === 0) {
@@ -53264,12 +53288,12 @@ function renderEscalationList(output) {
   }
   return escalations.map((escalation) => {
     const record2 = asRecord(escalation);
-    return `${field(record2, "id")}  ${field(record2, "status")}  ${field(record2, "seat_name")}: ${field(record2, "reason")}`;
+    return `${field(record2, "id")}  ${field(record2, "status")}  ${safetyRefusalTag(record2)}${field(record2, "seat_name")}: ${field(record2, "reason")}`;
   }).join("\n");
 }
 function renderEscalationGet(output) {
   const record2 = asRecord(asRecord(output).escalation);
-  return `${field(record2, "id")}  ${field(record2, "status")}  ${field(record2, "seat_name")}
+  return `${field(record2, "id")}  ${field(record2, "status")}  ${safetyRefusalTag(record2)}${field(record2, "seat_name")}
 reason: ${field(record2, "reason")}
 recommended: ${field(record2, "recommended_action")}`;
 }