@riceawa/dsh-lan-gateway 0.5.3 → 0.5.4

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@riceawa/dsh-lan-gateway",
   "description": "LAN/internet reverse-proxy gateway for the DeepSeek Harness web GUI: binds 0.0.0.0 and forwards to the loopback dsh web server. Default-deny: every source (loopback, LAN, internet) must sign in with an HMAC session cookie unless lanPasswordless is explicitly enabled; against dsh >= 0.1.2-rc.1 the gateway relays one shared upstream browser session, so the harness's own authorization still gates every request. Fail-closed start guard (password required, plaintext needs an explicit opt-in), session revocation by epoch (password changes and secret rotation kill cookies and live WebSockets), same-site/Origin fence on HTTP and WebSocket upgrades, optional TLS (auto self-signed or user-supplied certs), and a Settings → Plugins card for live adjustment of port, CIDRs, auth, and TLS. Includes an insecure-origin UUID shim client bundle: on gateway-served plain-HTTP origins browsers lack crypto.randomUUID, so the client half patches a getRandomValues-backed randomUUID onto the Crypto prototype, fixing workspace open over LAN without touching DSH source.",
-  "version": "0.5.3",
+  "version": "0.5.4",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "types": "lib/index.d.ts",

package/skills/lan-gateway.md

@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ user-invocable: true
 
 The `dsh-lan-gateway` plugin lets the DeepSeek Harness web GUI be reached from the
 LAN and the wider internet. dsh itself binds only to loopback (the web CLI
-hard-refuses `0.0.0.0`), so this plugin runs its own reverse-proxy gateway on
-`0.0.0.0` that forwards to the loopback web server while rewriting Host/Origin.
+hard-refuses `0.0.0.0`), so this plugin runs its own reverse-proxy gateway on the
+unspecified address — both families, so IPv6 clients reach it too — forwarding to
+the loopback web server while rewriting Host/Origin.
 
 Since v0.5.0 the model is **default-deny** (post-QVD-2026-57410 hardening):
 
@@ -31,8 +32,8 @@ Since v0.5.0 the model is **default-deny** (post-QVD-2026-57410 hardening):
 Do not edit state files by hand — use the `lan_gateway` tool.
 
 - `lan_gateway` with `command: "status"` — is it listening, on which port, toward
-  which dsh port, password set?, session epoch, upstream-session relay state,
-  ingress encryption, last error.
+  which dsh port, password set?, session epoch, how many signed-out sessions are
+  still held, upstream-session relay state, ingress encryption, last error.
 - `lan_gateway` with `command: "enable"` — start listening. If it refuses (no
   password, legacy `authRequired: false`, plaintext without opt-in, `lanPasswordless`
   without a session-capable base), the message tells you what to change.
@@ -72,3 +73,6 @@ once (passwords and sessions travel in clear).
   without an Origin) does not.
 - Sessions don't survive a password change / `rotate-secret`: that is by design —
   the revocation epoch advanced and all cookies (and live WebSockets) were revoked.
+  Signing out is narrower: it revokes only the session that signed out, so that
+  session's cookie is dead even if a copy of it was kept elsewhere, while the
+  user's other devices stay signed in.

package/src/auth.ts

@@ -100,16 +100,40 @@ export function classifySource(
   }
 
   if (address === '::1') return 'loopback'
-  // Link-local IPv6 fe80::/10.
-  if (address.toLowerCase().startsWith('fe80:')) return 'lan'
+  if (inIpv6LinkLocal(address)) return 'lan'
   return 'internet'
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether a textual IPv6 address falls inside fe80::/10. The first ten bits are
+ * `1111111010`, so the leading hextet spans fe80–febf; a `startsWith('fe80:')`
+ * test covers only fe80::/16 and misclassifies fe90::–febf:: as internet.
+ */
+function inIpv6LinkLocal(address: string): boolean {
+  const match = /^([0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}):/.exec(address)
+  if (match === null) return false
+  return (Number.parseInt(match[1]!, 16) & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80
+}
+
 /** Encode a byte buffer as URL-safe base64 without padding. */
 function base64url(input: Buffer): string {
   return input.toString('base64url')
 }
 
+/** The claims a verified session cookie carries. */
+export interface SessionClaims {
+  /** Epoch millis at which the session expires. */
+  exp: number
+  /** The revocation epoch the cookie was minted under. */
+  epoch: number
+  /**
+   * Per-session id. Present on cookies minted from 0.5.4 on, which is what
+   * lets one session be retired on its own (sign-out) instead of retiring
+   * every session the password authorized. Absent on older cookies.
+   */
+  sid?: string
+}
+
 /**
  * Issue a signed session cookie value.
  * @param secret - the HMAC signing secret (base64 string).
@@ -118,28 +142,29 @@ function base64url(input: Buffer): string {
  *   cookie whose epoch no longer matches the live state is rejected by
  *   {@link verifyCookie}. Defaults to 0 (epoch-less, legacy) for callers that
  *   do not participate in revocation.
+ * @param sid - optional per-session id (see {@link SessionClaims.sid}).
  * @returns a `payload.signature` string suitable for the cookie value.
  */
-export function signCookie(secret: string, expiresMs: number, epoch: number = 0): string {
-  const payload = base64url(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ exp: expiresMs, epoch })))
+export function signCookie(secret: string, expiresMs: number, epoch: number = 0, sid?: string): string {
+  const claims = sid === undefined ? { exp: expiresMs, epoch } : { exp: expiresMs, epoch, sid }
+  const payload = base64url(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims)))
   const sig = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('base64url')
   return `${payload}.${sig}`
 }
 
 /**
- * Whether a cookie value is a valid, unexpired session signed with `secret`
- * and minted under `epoch`. Epoch-less cookies (legacy payloads) count as
- * epoch 0, so an upgrade from a pre-0.5.0 state does not log everyone out.
+ * Verify a cookie's signature, expiry and epoch.
+ * @returns the claims it carries, or undefined when it is not a valid session.
  */
-export function verifyCookie(
+export function verifySession(
   secret: string,
   value: string | undefined,
   now: number,
   epoch: number = 0,
-): boolean {
-  if (value === undefined) return false
+): SessionClaims | undefined {
+  if (value === undefined) return undefined
   const dot = value.indexOf('.')
-  if (dot === -1) return false
+  if (dot === -1) return undefined
   const payload = value.slice(0, dot)
   const sig = value.slice(dot + 1)
   const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest()
@@ -147,20 +172,39 @@ export function verifyCookie(
   try {
     actual = Buffer.from(sig, 'base64url')
   } catch {
-    return false
+    return undefined
   }
-  if (expected.length !== actual.length) return false
-  if (!timingSafeEqual(expected, actual)) return false
+  if (expected.length !== actual.length) return undefined
+  if (!timingSafeEqual(expected, actual)) return undefined
   try {
-    const decoded = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as { exp?: unknown; epoch?: unknown }
-    if (typeof decoded.exp !== 'number' || decoded.exp <= now) return false
+    const decoded = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as Partial<SessionClaims>
+    if (typeof decoded.exp !== 'number' || decoded.exp <= now) return undefined
     const cookieEpoch = typeof decoded.epoch === 'number' ? decoded.epoch : 0
-    return cookieEpoch === epoch
+    if (cookieEpoch !== epoch) return undefined
+    return {
+      exp: decoded.exp,
+      epoch: cookieEpoch,
+      ...(typeof decoded.sid === 'string' ? { sid: decoded.sid } : {}),
+    }
   } catch {
-    return false
+    return undefined
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether a cookie value is a valid, unexpired session signed with `secret`
+ * and minted under `epoch`. Epoch-less cookies (legacy payloads) count as
+ * epoch 0, so an upgrade from a pre-0.5.0 state does not log everyone out.
+ */
+export function verifyCookie(
+  secret: string,
+  value: string | undefined,
+  now: number,
+  epoch: number = 0,
+): boolean {
+  return verifySession(secret, value, now, epoch) !== undefined
+}
+
 /**
  * Whether a browser Origin header names the same authority (hostname:port) as
  * a request Host header. Both sides run through WHATWG URL parsing so case and
@@ -181,7 +225,15 @@ export function originMatchesHost(origin: string | undefined, host: string | und
 
 /** A token bucket limiter keyed by source address. */
 export class RateLimiter {
+  /**
+   * Hard ceiling on tracked sources. Expiry alone only reclaims a bucket when
+   * `prune` runs, and a spray from many distinct addresses inside one window
+   * outruns it, so the map also sheds its soonest-expiring entries past this.
+   */
+  private static readonly MAX_BUCKETS = 10_000
   private readonly buckets = new Map<string, { tokens: number; resetAt: number }>()
+  /** Epoch millis at which the next opportunistic sweep is due. */
+  private nextPruneAt = 0
   constructor(
     private readonly maxTokens: number,
     private readonly windowMs: number,
@@ -194,22 +246,42 @@ export class RateLimiter {
    */
   allow(key: string): boolean {
     const now = Date.now()
-    const bucket = this.buckets.get(key)
-    if (bucket === undefined || bucket.resetAt <= now) {
-      this.buckets.set(key, { tokens: this.maxTokens - 1, resetAt: now + this.windowMs })
-      return true
+    // Sweep on a rolling window. Without this, expired buckets are only
+    // replaced when their own key returns, so every address that ever posted
+    // to the login route keeps an entry for the life of the process.
+    if (now >= this.nextPruneAt) {
+      this.prune(now)
+      this.nextPruneAt = now + this.windowMs
     }
-    if (bucket.tokens > 0) {
-      bucket.tokens -= 1
+    const existing = this.buckets.get(key)
+    if (existing !== undefined && existing.resetAt > now) {
+      if (existing.tokens <= 0) return false
+      existing.tokens -= 1
       return true
     }
-    return false
+    // A new bucket. A spray of distinct addresses inside one window outruns
+    // expiry, so shed the closest-to-expiring entries first — they are the
+    // ones about to lapse anyway, so the eviction costs the least fidelity.
+    if (existing === undefined && this.buckets.size >= RateLimiter.MAX_BUCKETS) {
+      this.evictSoonestToExpire()
+    }
+    this.buckets.set(key, { tokens: this.maxTokens - 1, resetAt: now + this.windowMs })
+    return true
   }
 
-  /** Drop expired buckets to bound memory. */
+  /** Drop expired buckets to bound memory. Called from {@link allow}. */
   prune(now: number = Date.now()): void {
     for (const [key, bucket] of this.buckets) {
       if (bucket.resetAt <= now) this.buckets.delete(key)
     }
   }
+
+  /** Trim back to 90% of the ceiling, oldest expiry first. */
+  private evictSoonestToExpire(): void {
+    const target = Math.floor(RateLimiter.MAX_BUCKETS * 0.9)
+    const byExpiry = [...this.buckets.entries()].sort((a, b) => a[1].resetAt - b[1].resetAt)
+    for (const [key] of byExpiry.slice(0, Math.max(0, this.buckets.size - target))) {
+      this.buckets.delete(key)
+    }
+  }
 }

package/src/gateway.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * The reverse-proxy gateway: a `node:http(s)` server bound to `0.0.0.0` that
- * forwards every request to the loopback dsh web server.
+ * The reverse-proxy gateway: a `node:http(s)` server bound to the unspecified
+ * address (dual-stack, so IPv6 clients reach it too) that forwards every
+ * request to the loopback dsh web server.
  *
  * Security model (post-QVD / session-base):
  * - Source is classified from `socket.remoteAddress` only (never
@@ -23,22 +24,25 @@
  *   authority-bound session cookie). The gateway therefore relays one shared
  *   upstream session acquired through the launch-token exchange and replays it
  *   on every forwarded request. See `upstream-session.ts`.
- * - Sessions carry a revocation epoch: a password change or secret rotation
- *   bumps the epoch, every previously issued cookie dies, and established
- *   WebSockets are torn down so the client re-authenticates.
+ * - Sessions are revocable two ways. Each carries a random id, so signing out
+ *   retires exactly that session and the WebSockets it opened; and each
+ *   carries a revocation epoch, so a password change or secret rotation kills
+ *   every session at once — cookie, socket, and all.
  *
  * @module @riceawa/dsh-lan-gateway/gateway
  */
 
 import http from 'node:http'
 import https from 'node:https'
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
 import type { Duplex } from 'node:stream'
 import {
   classifySource,
   originMatchesHost,
   RateLimiter,
   signCookie,
-  verifyCookie,
+  verifySession,
+  type SessionClaims,
   type SourceClass,
 } from './auth.ts'
 import {
@@ -49,12 +53,17 @@ import {
   serveLoginGet,
   type LoginPageOptions,
 } from './login.ts'
-import { verifyPassword, type GatewayState } from './state.ts'
+import {
+  isSessionRevoked,
+  revokeSession,
+  verifyPassword,
+  type GatewayState,
+} from './state.ts'
 import type { UpstreamSession } from './upstream-session.ts'
 
 /** Configuration the gateway needs at listen time. */
 export interface GatewayConfig {
-  /** Port to bind on 0.0.0.0. */
+  /** Port to bind on the unspecified address (dual-stack; see {@link LanGateway.listen}). */
   gatewayPort: number
   /** The loopback dsh web server port to forward to. */
   dshPort: number
@@ -74,6 +83,12 @@ export interface GatewayConfig {
   classifySource?: (req: http.IncomingMessage) => SourceClass
   /** Optional shared upstream session relayed onto every forwarded request. */
   upstreamSession?: UpstreamSession
+  /**
+   * Called after the gateway revokes a session itself (sign-out), so the plugin
+   * can persist a state the gateway changed on its own. The gateway has already
+   * installed it locally by then.
+   */
+  onStateChange?: (state: GatewayState) => void
 }
 
 const DEFAULT_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES = 64 * 1024
@@ -83,15 +98,102 @@ const LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_WINDOW_MS = 60_000
 /** Methods a browser never attaches a CSRF-meaningful body to; safe without an Origin. */
 const READ_ONLY_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS'])
 
+/** The upstream browser-session cookie name prefix; the relay owns this namespace. */
+const UPSTREAM_COOKIE_PREFIX = 'dsh-auth-'
+
+/**
+ * Headers a proxy must not forward in either direction (RFC 9110 §7.6.1), plus
+ * the non-standard proxy-connection.
+ */
+const HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS = new Set([
+  'connection',
+  'keep-alive',
+  'proxy-authenticate',
+  'proxy-authorization',
+  'proxy-connection',
+  'te',
+  'trailer',
+  'transfer-encoding',
+  'upgrade',
+])
+
+/**
+ * Headers by which a client asserts where a request came from. The gateway
+ * classifies on `socket.remoteAddress` and never reads these, so relaying a
+ * caller's own values only hands the next hop a forgeable claim.
+ */
+const FORWARDING_HEADERS = [
+  'forwarded',
+  'x-forwarded-for',
+  'x-forwarded-host',
+  'x-forwarded-port',
+  'x-forwarded-proto',
+  'x-real-ip',
+]
+
+/** Whether a Cookie fragment names the upstream session cookie. */
+function isUpstreamSessionPair(pair: string): boolean {
+  return pair.startsWith(UPSTREAM_COOKIE_PREFIX)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Drop every `dsh-auth-*` pair from a Cookie header, returning the remainder
+ * (possibly '').
+ *
+ * `attachUpstreamSession` appends the relay's session to the client's own
+ * cookie, and upstream reads the FIRST name match. A client that holds any
+ * `dsh-auth-<hash>` — typically one minted before dsh's signing secret was
+ * reset, so still present but no longer verifying — would therefore shadow the
+ * relay's session on every request. That draws a 401, the gateway reads the
+ * 401 as "upstream revoked our session" and discards it, the next request
+ * re-acquires, and the client's stale cookie shadows that one too: a loop that
+ * never converges. Stripping the namespace makes the relay's copy the only one.
+ */
+function withoutUpstreamSessionPairs(cookie: string): string {
+  return cookie
+    .split(';')
+    .map((pair) => pair.trim())
+    .filter((pair) => pair !== '' && !isUpstreamSessionPair(pair))
+    .join('; ')
+}
+
 /** Prefixes the gateway owns and must never relay to dsh. */
 function isOwnedPath(pathname: string): boolean {
   return pathname === '/lan-gateway' || pathname.startsWith('/lan-gateway/')
 }
 
-/** The pathname of a request URL (query string stripped, not decoded). */
+/**
+ * The pathname a request is routed by: the one dsh's router resolves it to
+ * (WHATWG URL parsing, which strips the query and collapses dot segments),
+ * with trailing slashes then removed for the gateway's own surface tests.
+ *
+ * The decision paths below (owned prefix, login, logout) must use this rather
+ * than the raw request target. dsh normalizes before matching, so a raw-string
+ * test disagrees with it on `/foo/../lan-gateway/config` — that is not an owned
+ * path by string prefix, stays in the relay, and lands on the plugin's own
+ * config route once Host has been rewritten to loopback. Forwarding still
+ * relays the raw target: dsh applies the same normalization itself.
+ *
+ * WHATWG parsing does not drop a trailing slash, and neither does dsh's
+ * router, so `/__login/` is not the login page to either of them. The gateway
+ * recognizes its own surfaces there anyway: `/__logout/` must still sign out,
+ * and `/lan-gateway/config/` must be refused rather than relayed into dsh's
+ * single-page fallback. Blocking a trailing-slash spelling of an owned prefix
+ * errs toward refusing, which costs nothing — no upstream route lives under it.
+ */
 function pathOf(url: string): string {
-  const query = url.indexOf('?')
-  return query === -1 ? url : url.slice(0, query)
+  try {
+    return new URL(url, 'http://gateway.invalid').pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/'
+  } catch {
+    // Unparseable here means unparseable for dsh too; the raw target routes
+    // nowhere and is relayed as-is.
+    return url
+  }
+}
+
+/** A fresh per-session id: 128 random bits, URL-safe. */
+function newSessionId(): string {
+  return randomBytes(16).toString('base64url')
 }
 
 /**
@@ -104,8 +206,14 @@ export class LanGateway {
   private readonly loginLimiter = new RateLimiter(LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_LIMIT, LOGIN_ATTEMPTS_WINDOW_MS)
   private state: GatewayState
   private disposed = false
-  /** Established WebSockets (upgraded client sockets), torn down on session-epoch change. */
-  private readonly activeDuplexes = new Set<Duplex>()
+  /**
+   * Established WebSockets (upgraded client sockets), each keyed by the session
+   * that opened it. A socket outlives the request that authenticated it, so it
+   * has to be closable by session: on an epoch bump every socket dies, and on
+   * sign-out only that session's. The value is undefined for a cookie minted
+   * before per-session ids existed, which only a wholesale revocation reaches.
+   */
+  private readonly activeDuplexes = new Map<Duplex, string | undefined>()
 
   constructor(
     private readonly config: GatewayConfig,
@@ -131,7 +239,14 @@ export class LanGateway {
     this.state = state
   }
 
-  /** Start listening; rejects if the port is already in use. */
+  /**
+   * Start listening on the configured port. The listener is dual-stack: with
+   * no host given, node binds the unspecified IPv6 address `::` — which also
+   * accepts IPv4 clients, arriving as `::ffff:a.b.c.d` for the classifier to
+   * unwrap — when the host has IPv6, and falls back to `0.0.0.0` when it does
+   * not. Binding IPv4 only used to leave every IPv6 client (including `::1`)
+   * unable to reach a gateway that classifies them.
+   */
   async listen(): Promise<void> {
     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
       const onError = (err: Error): void => {
@@ -144,10 +259,18 @@ export class LanGateway {
       }
       this.server.once('error', onError)
       this.server.once('listening', onListening)
-      this.server.listen(this.config.gatewayPort, '0.0.0.0')
+      this.server.listen(this.config.gatewayPort)
     })
   }
 
+  /** The address actually bound, for logs and status (never a claim about it). */
+  boundAddress(): string {
+    const address = this.server.address()
+    if (address === null || typeof address === 'string') return `port ${this.config.gatewayPort}`
+    const host = address.family === 'IPv6' ? `[${address.address}]` : address.address
+    return `${host}:${address.port}`
+  }
+
   /** Close the server, drop upgraded sockets, and stop accepting connections. */
   async close(): Promise<void> {
     if (this.disposed) return
@@ -160,14 +283,23 @@ export class LanGateway {
   }
 
   private destroyActiveDuplexes(): void {
-    for (const socket of this.activeDuplexes) {
+    for (const socket of this.activeDuplexes.keys()) {
       socket.destroy()
     }
     this.activeDuplexes.clear()
   }
 
-  private trackDuplex(socket: Duplex): void {
-    this.activeDuplexes.add(socket)
+  /** Close the sockets one session opened, so signing out ends its live streams too. */
+  private destroyDuplexesFor(sid: string): void {
+    for (const [socket, owner] of this.activeDuplexes) {
+      if (owner !== sid) continue
+      this.activeDuplexes.delete(socket)
+      socket.destroy()
+    }
+  }
+
+  private trackDuplex(socket: Duplex, sid: string | undefined): void {
+    this.activeDuplexes.set(socket, sid)
     socket.on('close', () => {
       this.activeDuplexes.delete(socket)
     })
@@ -192,15 +324,27 @@ export class LanGateway {
     return undefined
   }
 
-  /** Whether a request carries a session valid under the current epoch. */
-  private authorized(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {
+  /**
+   * The session a request carries, or undefined when it presents none, presents
+   * one that no longer verifies under the current epoch, or presents one whose
+   * id has been signed out.
+   */
+  private session(req: http.IncomingMessage): SessionClaims | undefined {
     const cookie = this.sessionCookie(req)
-    return cookie !== undefined && verifyCookie(
+    if (cookie === undefined) return undefined
+    const claims = verifySession(
       this.state.cookieSecret,
       cookie,
       Date.now(),
       this.state.sessionEpoch,
     )
+    if (claims === undefined) return undefined
+    return isSessionRevoked(this.state, claims.sid) ? undefined : claims
+  }
+
+  /** Whether a request carries a session valid under the current epoch. */
+  private authorized(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {
+    return this.session(req) !== undefined
   }
 
   /** Whether this source must present a gateway session (default: everyone). */
@@ -312,7 +456,7 @@ export class LanGateway {
       return
     }
 
-    void readBody(req, DEFAULT_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES, res).then((body) => {
+    void readBody(req, DEFAULT_BODY_LIMIT_BYTES, res).then(async (body) => {
       if (body === undefined) return // response already sent (413/400)
       let password: string | undefined
       try {
@@ -321,23 +465,47 @@ export class LanGateway {
       } catch {
         password = undefined
       }
-      if (password === undefined || !verifyPassword(this.state, password)) {
+      const accepted = password !== undefined && await verifyPassword(this.state, password)
+      if (!accepted) {
         this.serveLoginError(res, 'Incorrect password.')
         return
       }
       const maxAgeSeconds = this.config.cookieMaxAgeDays * 86_400
       const expiresMs = Date.now() + maxAgeSeconds * 1000
-      const cookie = signCookie(this.state.cookieSecret, expiresMs, this.state.sessionEpoch)
+      // Every session gets its own id so signing out can retire this one alone.
+      const cookie = signCookie(
+        this.state.cookieSecret,
+        expiresMs,
+        this.state.sessionEpoch,
+        newSessionId(),
+      )
       res.writeHead(302, {
         location: '/',
         ...this.securityHeaders(),
         'set-cookie': [this.sessionSetCookie(cookie, maxAgeSeconds)],
       })
       res.end()
+    }).catch(() => {
+      // The body reader reports its own failures through the response; this
+      // catches the async verification path so it cannot become an unhandled
+      // rejection.
+      if (!res.headersSent) {
+        res.writeHead(500, this.securityHeaders())
+        res.end('login failed')
+      }
     })
   }
 
-  /** POST /__logout: sign an immediately-expired cookie and bounce to / . */
+  /**
+   * POST /__logout: revoke this session and clear the cookie.
+   *
+   * The session is stateless, so clearing the cookie only stops the browser
+   * that ran the sign-out; a copy of the same value held anywhere else would
+   * keep working until it expired. Revoking the id in the cookie retires that
+   * one session for good, and leaves the account's other sessions — other
+   * devices, other browsers — alone. Bumping the session epoch here would be
+   * the blunter instrument: it signs out every session there is.
+   */
   private handleLogout(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): void {
     if (req.method !== 'POST') {
       res.writeHead(405, { allow: 'POST' })
@@ -350,6 +518,12 @@ export class LanGateway {
       res.end('forbidden')
       return
     }
+    const claims = this.session(req)
+    if (claims?.sid !== undefined) {
+      this.state = revokeSession(this.state, claims.sid, claims.exp)
+      this.config.onStateChange?.(this.state)
+      this.destroyDuplexesFor(claims.sid)
+    }
     res.writeHead(302, {
       location: '/',
       ...this.securityHeaders(),
@@ -371,6 +545,14 @@ export class LanGateway {
       delete headers.connection
       delete headers.upgrade
     }
+    // A caller's own forwarding claims are not ours to relay.
+    for (const name of FORWARDING_HEADERS) delete headers[name]
+    // The relay is the only authority on the upstream session cookie.
+    if (typeof headers.cookie === 'string') {
+      const kept = withoutUpstreamSessionPairs(headers.cookie)
+      if (kept === '') delete headers.cookie
+      else headers.cookie = kept
+    }
     return headers
   }
 
@@ -387,6 +569,31 @@ export class LanGateway {
     return true
   }
 
+  /**
+   * The headers to send back to the client: hop-by-hop headers dropped, and
+   * the upstream session cookie withheld. Upstream's one cookie-minting route
+   * is the launch-token exchange at `/`, so a client that already holds a
+   * gateway session could otherwise post the token through the gateway and
+   * walk away with a durable upstream credential the relay exists to keep on
+   * this side. Cookies from other routes (plugins) still pass through.
+   */
+  private downstreamHeaders(upstream: http.IncomingHttpHeaders): http.OutgoingHttpHeaders {
+    const headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders = {}
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(upstream)) {
+      if (value === undefined) continue
+      const lower = key.toLowerCase()
+      if (HOP_BY_HOP_HEADERS.has(lower)) continue
+      if (lower === 'set-cookie') {
+        const list = (Array.isArray(value) ? value : [value])
+          .filter((entry) => !isUpstreamSessionPair(entry.trim()))
+        if (list.length > 0) headers[key] = list
+        continue
+      }
+      headers[key] = value
+    }
+    return headers
+  }
+
   /** Forward an HTTP request to dsh, replaying the shared upstream session. */
   private async relayHttp(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse, url: string): Promise<void> {
     const session = this.config.upstreamSession
@@ -407,7 +614,7 @@ export class LanGateway {
       if (attached && session !== undefined && proxyRes.statusCode === 401) {
         session.invalidate()
       }
-      res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode ?? 502, proxyRes.headers)
+      res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode ?? 502, this.downstreamHeaders(proxyRes.headers))
       proxyRes.pipe(res)
     })
     proxyReq.on('error', () => {
@@ -436,7 +643,10 @@ export class LanGateway {
       return
     }
 
-    if (this.requiresLogin(source) && !this.authorized(req)) {
+    // The session is read once: the socket this upgrade ends up holding stays
+    // attributable to it, so signing that session out can close the socket.
+    const claims = this.session(req)
+    if (this.requiresLogin(source) && claims === undefined) {
       refuse(401)
       return
     }
@@ -462,7 +672,7 @@ export class LanGateway {
       headers,
     })
     proxyReq.on('upgrade', (proxyRes, proxySocket, proxyHead) => {
-      this.trackDuplex(socket)
+      this.trackDuplex(socket, claims?.sid)
       // node's http client has already consumed the 101 response headers, so
       // reconstruct them on the client socket before splicing.
       const statusLine = `HTTP/1.1 ${proxyRes.statusCode ?? 101} ${proxyRes.statusMessage ?? 'Switching Protocols'}\r\n`