@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex 2.1.6-rc.0 → 2.1.6

package/README.md

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ The application only provides the request fields and the relevant wallet adapter
 pnpm add @rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex
 ```
 
-Node.js 20 or later is required.
+Node.js 16 or later is required. When running on Node.js 16 without a global `fetch`, inject a compatible implementation through `SwapClientConfig.fetch`.
 
 ## 3. Recommended: simple quote → swap flow
 
@@ -325,8 +325,6 @@ const confidentialQuote = await client.quote({
 });
 ```
 
-This basic route is a single public-wallet swap with confidential reporting. For the complete private-balance flow with pre-swap, deposit, linking-wallet authorization, and signed withdrawal, use the dedicated confidential methods below.
-
 #### 3.3.1 Configure quote timing
 
 `quoteWaitingTimeMs`, `sameChainTimeoutMs`, and `crossChainTimeoutMs` are first-class SDK parameters. Pass them directly to `client.quote()`; do not put them in `extensions` or executor configuration.
@@ -431,499 +429,6 @@ const status = await client.getOrderStatus(
 
 Terminal statuses are `completed`, `failed`, `refunded`, and `expired`.
 
-### 3.6 Complete confidential pre-swap → deposit → withdraw
-
-The confidential flow uses two wallet roles. They may point to the same connected
-wallet, but they have different responsibilities:
-
-| Role | Responsibility | Supported chains |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Linking wallet | Signs the confidential-account authorization and every withdrawal intent. It never supplies a private key to the SDK. | NEAR, EVM, Solana, Tron |
-| Funding wallet | Validates the selected source account and sends the direct deposit. For a pre-swap, the existing v2 executor sends the swap transaction. | Any chain supported by a supplied `ConfidentialFundingAdapter` and, for pre-swaps, a registered v2 executor |
-
-The SDK obtains the unsigned authorization or withdrawal payload from the
-protocol, passes that exact payload to the application's wallet adapter, verifies
-the returned signer and signature locally, and then submits it. The application
-is responsible only for connecting the wallet and exposing its signing methods;
-do not pass a private key to the SDK.
-
-#### 3.6.1 Configure the client
-
-Configure the confidential protocol client and wallet adapters once. The source
-funding wallet may differ from the linking wallet:
-
-```ts
-import {
-  HttpConfidentialApi,
-  SwapClient,
-  createConfidentialEvmSigningAdapter,
-  type ConfidentialExecutionStore,
-  type ConfidentialFundingAdapter,
-  type ConfidentialSessionStore,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-const confidentialApi = new HttpConfidentialApi({
-  directUrl: "https://1click.chaindefuser.com/v0",
-  proxyUrl: "https://api.rhea.finance/proxy/1click/v0",
-  indexerUrl: "https://api.rhea.finance",
-  nearRpcUrl: "https://rpc.mainnet.near.org",
-  withdrawAuthorization: "signed-payload",
-});
-
-// Wrap the application's connected wallet. The SDK requests a signature only
-// when authorization is required or a withdrawal intent must be signed.
-const linking = createConfidentialEvmSigningAdapter(() => ({
-  getAddress: () => evmWallet.getAddress(),
-  signMessage: (message) => evmWallet.signMessage(message),
-}));
-
-// Implement this with the application's existing source-chain wallet SDK.
-// validate() must not broadcast. transfer() must recheck the active account
-// before signing and return the real source transaction hash.
-const funding: ConfidentialFundingAdapter = {
-  async getIdentity() {
-    return {
-      kind: "evm",
-      accountId: await sourceWallet.getAddress(),
-      chain: String(await sourceWallet.getChainId()),
-    };
-  },
-  async validate(token) {
-    await assertSourceWalletCanFund(sourceWallet, token);
-  },
-  async transfer(input, signal) {
-    const txHash = await sendSourceDeposit(sourceWallet, {
-      token: input.token,
-      amount: input.amount,
-      recipient: input.address,
-      memo: input.memo,
-      signal,
-    });
-    return { txHash };
-  },
-};
-
-const sessionStore: ConfidentialSessionStore = appSessionStore;
-const executionStore: ConfidentialExecutionStore = appExecutionStore;
-
-const client = new SwapClient({
-  baseUrl: "https://api.rhea.finance",
-  // The confidential app-fee endpoint uses the same JWT as v2 quote/build.
-  getAccessToken: () => sessionStorage.getItem("access-token") ?? "",
-  executors: sourceChainExecutors,
-  confidential: {
-    api: confidentialApi,
-    signingAdapters: [linking],
-    fundingAdapters: [funding],
-    sessionStore,
-    executionStore,
-    preSwap: {
-      mapAsset: token => v2AssetMap.get(token.assetId),
-    },
-  },
-});
-```
-
-`fundingAdapters` are still required for a non-direct route: the adapter binds
-and validates the source identity before the SDK lets the v2 executor broadcast.
-The pre-swap itself uses this package's existing v2 quote, build and executor
-pipeline, so the corresponding source-chain executor must also be present in
-`SwapClient.executors`.
-
-Before every new confidential quote or preview, the SDK calls
-`GET /api/swap/confidential-app-fee` on `baseUrl`. The request reuses the normal
-V2 `apiKey` or `getAccessToken` Bearer JWT. The response is validated and frozen
-into the quote plan so all dry and formal withdrawal quotes use the fee the user
-reviewed. A `confidentialAppFeeBps` value of `0` explicitly sends an empty
-`appFees` list. If the fee configuration cannot be loaded or is malformed, the
-confidential quote fails instead of falling back to a stale fee.
-
-Confidential client configuration:
-
-| Field | Required | Purpose |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `api` | Yes | `HttpConfidentialApi` or another implementation of `ConfidentialProtocolApi`. |
-| `signingAdapters` | Yes | Connected linking-wallet adapters available for authorization and withdrawal signing. |
-| `fundingAdapters` | For wallet-funded execution | Source-wallet identity validation and direct deposit transfer. |
-| `sessionStore` | No | Persists confidential login sessions. Defaults to `MemorySessionStore`. |
-| `executionStore` | No | Persists wallet-funded execution checkpoints. Defaults to `MemoryExecutionStore`. |
-| `registryTokens` | No | Fixed registry override. Otherwise tokens are loaded through `api`. |
-| `intentsContract` | No | Authorization verifier. Defaults to the API value or `intents.near`. |
-| `maxQuoteAgeMs` | No | Maximum plan review age. Default: `600000` (10 minutes). |
-| `polling` | No | `{ intervalMs, maxAttempts }`; omitted or zero `maxAttempts` means no attempt cap. |
-| `addressValidator` | For unsupported address formats | Required for BTC, Zcash, or another destination format without built-in validation. |
-| `preferredMidAssetId` | No | Previously successful pre-swap funding asset to try first. |
-| `onSuccessfulMidToken` | No | Records a successful funding asset for future route preference. |
-| `verifyWithdrawIntent` | No | Application hook for additional protocol-specific effect validation before signing. |
-| `preSwap` | No | Controls the v2 pre-swap mapping, quote timing and advanced report metadata. |
-
-`preSwap.mapAsset(token)` returns the v2 `{ chain, address }` for a source or
-registry token. The optional `quoteWaitingTimeMs`, `sameChainTimeoutMs`, and
-`crossChainTimeoutMs` are forwarded only to the v2 funding quotes. Optional
-`multiAddress` and `txType` customize the advanced funding report; `txType`
-defaults to `confidential-batch-withdraw`.
-
-`HttpConfidentialApi` requires `directUrl`, `proxyUrl`, `indexerUrl`, and
-`nearRpcUrl`. Its optional integration fields are `intentsContract`, `fetch`,
-`withdrawAuthorization`, `referral`, `appFees`, and `requestTimeoutMs`. Keep
-`withdrawAuthorization: "signed-payload"` unless the deployed backend explicitly
-requires Bearer authorization for private withdrawals. `HttpConfidentialApi`
-still has a standalone default of 2 bps paid to `dcl0001.near`, but
-`SwapClient` overrides it per plan with `/api/swap/confidential-app-fee`.
-Configured fees apply only to withdrawal quotes, not the funding deposit quote.
-
-#### 3.6.2 Wallet signing adapters
-
-Use the helper matching the linking wallet. Each helper checks that the connected
-account has not changed while the prompt is open and validates the returned
-signature before it is sent to the service.
-
-| Helper | Wallet methods supplied by the application | Signed standard |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `createConfidentialEvmSigningAdapter` | `getAddress(): Promise<string>` and `signMessage(message: string): Promise<string>` | ERC-191 |
-| `createConfidentialSolanaSigningAdapter` | `publicKey.toBase58()` and `signMessage(message: Uint8Array)` | raw Ed25519 |
-| `createConfidentialTronSigningAdapter` | `getAddress()` and `signMessageV2(message: string)` | TIP-191 |
-| `createConfidentialNearSigningAdapter` | `getIdentity()` and NEP-413 `signMessage(...)` | NEP-413 |
-
-Examples for Solana and Tron wallets whose provider already exposes the expected
-methods:
-
-```ts
-import {
-  createConfidentialSolanaSigningAdapter,
-  createConfidentialTronSigningAdapter,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-const solanaLinking = createConfidentialSolanaSigningAdapter(() => ({
-  publicKey: solanaWallet.publicKey,
-  signMessage: message => solanaWallet.signMessage(message),
-}));
-
-const tronLinking = createConfidentialTronSigningAdapter(() => ({
-  getAddress: () => tronWallet.defaultAddress.base58,
-  signMessageV2: message => tronWallet.trx.signMessageV2(message),
-}));
-```
-
-NEAR named accounts may need one explicit `add_public_key` transaction before
-their first authorization. Supply `registerPublicKey`; the adapter checks the
-Intents contract before and after registration. Implicit accounts do not need
-registration, but their account ID must match the signing public key.
-
-```ts
-import {
-  createConfidentialNearSigningAdapter,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-const nearLinking = createConfidentialNearSigningAdapter(
-  {
-    getIdentity: () => nearWallet.getIdentity(),
-    signMessage: request => nearWallet.signMessage(request),
-    registerPublicKey: (accountId, publicKey, contract, signal) =>
-      registerNearIntentsKey({
-        accountId,
-        publicKey,
-        contract,
-        signal,
-      }),
-  },
-  confidentialApi
-);
-```
-
-Register every currently selectable linking-wallet adapter in
-`confidential.signingAdapters`. BTC, Zcash, Aptos and Sui may be funding wallets,
-but they cannot be linking wallets.
-
-#### 3.6.3 Authorization and sessions
-
-`confidentialSwap()` authenticates the frozen linking identity before it sends
-source funds. A valid session is reused, an expiring access token is refreshed,
-and a new wallet signature is requested only when no usable session remains.
-For explicit login UX, authorize before opening the final confirmation screen:
-
-```ts
-const linkingIdentity = await linking.getIdentity();
-
-if (
-  await client.requiresConfidentialAuthentication(linkingIdentity)
-) {
-  await client.authenticateConfidentialWallet(linkingIdentity);
-}
-
-const balances = await client.getConfidentialBalances(linkingIdentity);
-
-// Remove the locally stored confidential session for this identity.
-await client.logoutConfidentialWallet(linkingIdentity);
-```
-
-Calling `requiresConfidentialAuthentication()` may validate or refresh an
-existing session, but it never opens the wallet. Concurrent authentication calls
-for the same identity share one in-flight request, so they do not create multiple
-signature prompts.
-
-The default `MemorySessionStore` loses the login on reload. Supply a
-`ConfidentialSessionStore` for a persistent application session:
-
-```ts
-import type {
-  ConfidentialLogin,
-  ConfidentialSessionStore,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-class BrowserSessionStore implements ConfidentialSessionStore {
-  private storageKey(key: string) {
-    return `rhea:confidential-session:${key}`;
-  }
-
-  async get(key: string): Promise<ConfidentialLogin | undefined> {
-    const storageKey = this.storageKey(key);
-    const value = sessionStorage.getItem(storageKey);
-    if (!value) return undefined;
-    try {
-      return JSON.parse(value) as ConfidentialLogin;
-    } catch {
-      sessionStorage.removeItem(storageKey);
-      return undefined;
-    }
-  }
-
-  async set(key: string, login: ConfidentialLogin): Promise<void> {
-    sessionStorage.setItem(this.storageKey(key), JSON.stringify(login));
-  }
-
-  async delete(key: string): Promise<void> {
-    sessionStorage.removeItem(this.storageKey(key));
-  }
-}
-```
-
-This browser implementation is an integration example, not a universal security
-policy. A stored login contains access and refresh tokens. Treat it as a
-credential, choose storage appropriate to the application's threat model, clear
-it on logout, and never log it. `sessionStorage` remains accessible to JavaScript
-running in the same origin and therefore depends on the application's XSS
-protections.
-
-#### 3.6.4 Quote and execute
-
-Fetch the source token from the normal v2 selector and the destination token from
-the confidential registry. The source may be any v2-supported asset; the
-destination must resolve to a registered confidential withdrawal asset. Do not
-construct `assetId` values from symbols. Amounts are base-unit integer strings.
-
-```ts
-import type {
-  ConfidentialToken,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-const sourceCandidates = await client.getFromTokens({
-  chainId: sourceTokenListChainId,
-});
-const confidentialTokens = await client.getConfidentialTokens();
-const selectedSource = sourceCandidates.find(
-  token => token.address === selectedSourceAddress
-)!;
-
-const sourceToken: ConfidentialToken = {
-  ...selectedSource,
-  swapChain: selectedSource.chain,
-  swapAddress: selectedSource.address,
-};
-
-const destinationToken = confidentialTokens.find(
-  token => token.assetId === selectedDestinationAssetId
-)!;
-
-const sourceIdentity = await funding.getIdentity();
-const linkingIdentity = await linking.getIdentity();
-
-const plan = await client.quoteConfidentialSwap({
-  sourceToken,
-  destinationToken,
-  amount: "1000000",
-  sourceWallet: sourceIdentity,
-  linkingWallet: linkingIdentity,
-  recipients: [destinationAddress],
-  slippageBps: 50,
-});
-
-// Review plan.route, plan.previews, plan.expectedOut, plan.minAmountOut,
-// plan.withdrawFee, and both frozen wallet identities before confirmation.
-const result = await client.confidentialSwap({
-  plan,
-  onProgress(snapshot) {
-    persistPublicProgress(snapshot);
-  },
-  onSignatureProgress(progress) {
-    showSignatureProgress(progress.completed, progress.total);
-  },
-});
-```
-
-Confidential quote fields:
-
-| Field | Required | Meaning |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `sourceToken` | Yes | Source-chain token being spent. It may be outside the confidential registry; include or map its v2 chain/address for a pre-swap. |
-| `destinationToken` | Yes | Confidential-registry token delivered to every recipient. |
-| `amount` | Yes | Source amount as a positive base-unit integer string. |
-| `sourceWallet` | Yes | Frozen funding identity: `{ kind, accountId, chain }`. |
-| `linkingWallet` | Yes for executable quote | Frozen authorization identity returned by a signing adapter. |
-| `recipients` | Yes | Between 1 and 10 unique destination addresses on the destination token's chain. |
-| `slippageBps` | Yes | Slippage in basis points; `50` means 0.5%. |
-| `fundingSource` | No | `"wallet"` by default; `"balance"` spends an existing confidential balance without source funding. |
-| `mode` | No | `"SWAP"` by default. `"TRANSFER"` requires the funding and destination asset to be the same. |
-
-The quote planner matches the multi-chain Trade flow. It prefers a direct
-registered Intents asset, then a same-chain USDC/USDT/USDT0 pre-swap, then a
-cross-chain funding asset. Non-direct paths use this SDK's v2
-quote/build/execute pipeline. The first v2 quote estimates the FLEX input; after
-1Click allocates the deposit address, the SDK obtains a second v2 quote with that
-exact address as recipient.
-
-`ConfidentialToken.assetId` and `blockchain` identify the Intents registry asset.
-Tokens participating in a v2 pre-swap must also resolve to a v2 chain and
-address. Set `swapChain` and `swapAddress` on the token, or provide
-`confidential.preSwap.mapAsset` for registry tokens. A normalized SDK token can
-normally be mapped with `swapChain: token.chain` and
-`swapAddress: token.address`. Do not match or merge assets by symbol alone.
-
-Execution performs these operations in order:
-
-1. Load and freeze the app-fee configuration with the V2 JWT.
-2. Authorize or refresh the linking-wallet session.
-3. Record the complete confidential balance baseline, then re-quote stale funding prices.
-4. Send a direct deposit or execute the v2 pre-swap to the allocated deposit address.
-5. Wait for the actual credited amount and detect the credited Intents token from the full balance delta; quoted output and the v2 token address are not treated as proof of funds.
-6. Re-quote withdrawals from the credited amount and ask the linking wallet to sign each generated intent.
-7. Submit the private withdrawal batch and poll every final deposit address.
-
-Progress snapshots expose `baselineBalances` and `creditedTokenId`. This matters
-for registry entries whose quote asset uses a per-chain `1cs_v1:*` identifier but
-whose confidential balance settles under a `nep141:*.omft.near` identifier. The
-SDK persists the complete pre-funding balance set and uses the token whose balance
-actually increased for the availability check before withdrawal.
-
-`quoteConfidentialSwap()` may allocate deposit addresses but never signs or
-broadcasts. `previewConfidentialSwap()` always returns `executable: false`. A
-preview without `linkingWallet` uses a display-only placeholder and cannot be
-executed. To review first and execute later, pass the real connected
-`linkingWallet` to `previewConfidentialSwap()`, then call
-`prepareConfidentialSwap()` after user confirmation to bind the plan to the
-still-connected signer.
-
-#### 3.6.5 Recovery and durable checkpoints
-
-Execution writes a checkpoint before every irreversible operation. Supply a
-durable `ConfidentialExecutionStore` in production, persist each `onProgress`
-snapshot for user-facing status, and resume an interrupted execution without
-repeating confirmed funding:
-
-```ts
-const pending = await client.listRecoverableConfidentialExecutions();
-for (const execution of pending) {
-  const resumed = await client.resumeConfidentialSwap(execution.id, {
-    onProgress: persistPublicProgress,
-  });
-  console.log(resumed.stage);
-}
-```
-
-The default `MemoryExecutionStore` lasts only for the client lifetime. An
-`ExecutionStore` must implement `get(id)`, `set(snapshot)`, and `list()`. Do not
-store snapshots in untrusted client-controlled storage without integrity and
-access controls. Although snapshots exclude session tokens and signed intent
-payloads, they contain transaction metadata and addresses and should still be
-treated as sensitive application data.
-
-`HttpConfidentialApi.environment` is the configured Intents contract (by default
-`intents.near`), so changing API or RPC URLs no longer invalidates sessions and
-execution lookups. When upgrading from a build that used service URLs as the
-environment, old login keys are not reused and the wallet may be asked to
-authorize again. Finish or reconcile unfinished checkpoints with the old build
-before rollout; do not rewrite their `environment` fields because plans and
-snapshots are integrity checked.
-
-Timeout or cancellation stops local waiting; it cannot undo an already broadcast
-transaction. Keep the `executionId` from `ConfidentialSwapError.executionId` and
-resume it. A checkpoint ending in `_pending_confirmation` represents an
-ambiguous write and is deliberately not rebroadcast. Configure the corresponding
-read-only `FundingAdapter.reconcile` callback for direct transfers when the
-application can look up an existing transaction by execution ID or deposit
-address. For the built-in v2 path, resume checks the confidential deposit status
-before requiring manual confirmation; an unresolved pre-swap or report write
-must be reconciled operationally and is never sent again automatically.
-
-Executions funded from an existing confidential balance intentionally remain in
-process memory even when `executionStore` is durable. They cannot be recovered
-after a reload because there is no source-funding transaction with which to
-reconcile ownership of the reserved balance.
-
-If credited funds need a new price review, call
-`refreshConfidentialWithdrawalReview(executionId)`, display the returned plan,
-then call `resumeConfidentialSwap(executionId)`. Use
-`discardPreparedConfidentialSwap()` only before funding has been attempted; it
-marks that checkpoint as failed so it is no longer recoverable. Use
-`abandonInterruptedConfidentialSwap()` only after the application has handled
-the remaining confidential funds through another path and intentionally wants
-to stop offering resume for that execution.
-
-For non-direct funding, normal automatic reporting is suppressed for the source
-execution. The confidential flow submits one `confidentiality: "advanced"`
-report and polls `/api/swap/order-status?recordId=...` before confirming deposit
-credit.
-
-#### 3.6.6 Public confidential methods
-
-All methods below require `SwapClientConfig.confidential` except the constructor
-itself. Passing an `AbortSignal` cancels only unfinished local/API work.
-
-| Method | Purpose |
-| --- | --- |
-| `getConfidentialTokens(signal?)` | Load the confidential asset registry. |
-| `getConfidentialAppFee(options?)` | Load and validate the current app ID, recipient and fee basis points using the V2 JWT. |
-| `previewConfidentialSwap(request, options?)` | Build a display-only plan; a linking identity is optional and the result cannot be executed. |
-| `quoteConfidentialSwap(request, options?)` | Build an executable plan bound to source and linking identities. |
-| `prepareConfidentialSwap(plan, options?)` | Bind a reviewed preview to the currently connected linking signer. |
-| `requiresConfidentialAuthentication(identity, options?)` | Check or refresh a stored session without prompting the wallet. |
-| `authenticateConfidentialWallet(identity, options?)` | Explicitly authorize the confidential account and return its login/session. |
-| `logoutConfidentialWallet(identity)` | Delete the locally stored session for the identity. |
-| `getConfidentialBalances(identity, options?)` | Return registered confidential balances, authenticating when required. |
-| `confidentialSwap({ plan, ...options })` | Run authorization, funding, deposit confirmation, withdrawal signing and final polling. |
-| `resumeConfidentialSwap(id, options?)` | Continue from a saved checkpoint without repeating completed operations. |
-| `getConfidentialExecution(id)` | Load one execution snapshot. |
-| `listConfidentialExecutions()` | List all snapshots visible to the configured store. |
-| `listRecoverableConfidentialExecutions()` | List unfinished executions that can be resumed. |
-| `refreshConfidentialWithdrawalReview(id, options?)` | Re-quote an already credited, unsubmitted withdrawal for renewed review. |
-| `discardPreparedConfidentialSwap(id)` | Mark a created, unfunded checkpoint as failed so it is no longer recoverable. |
-| `abandonInterruptedConfidentialSwap(id)` | Mark an interrupted execution as failed after its remaining funds were handled through another path. |
-
-Common confidential error codes include `USER_REJECTED`, `WALLET_CHANGED`,
-`MISSING_WALLET`, `QUOTE_EXPIRED`, `UNAUTHORIZED`, `TIMEOUT`, `ABORTED`,
-`BUSY`, `CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED`, and `TERMINAL_FAILURE`:
-
-```ts
-import {
-  ConfidentialSwapError,
-} from "@rhea-finance/cross-chain-aggregation-dex";
-
-try {
-  await client.confidentialSwap({ plan });
-} catch (error) {
-  if (error instanceof ConfidentialSwapError) {
-    showConfidentialError(error.code);
-    if (error.executionId) saveExecutionId(error.executionId);
-  }
-  throw error;
-}
-```
-
-This flow provides confidential-account orchestration, not a guarantee of
-end-to-end anonymity. Source funding transactions, withdrawals, reused recipient
-addresses and backend reporting may expose associations. Never log session
-tokens, complete signed intents, or raw wallet-provider errors.
-
 ## 4. Simple-flow field reference
 
 ### 4.1 SwapClientConfig
@@ -933,14 +438,12 @@ tokens, complete signed intents, or raw wallet-provider errors.
 | `baseUrl` | `string` | Yes | API base URL, for example `https://api.rhea.finance`. A trailing `/` is removed. |
 | `apiKey` | `string` | No | Static API credential sent with requests. Request one through the [RHEA Boss portal](https://boss.rhea.finance/#/login). |
 | `getAccessToken` | `() => string \| Promise<string>` | No | Reads an access token before each request. Use this for refreshable sessions. |
-| `fetch` | `typeof globalThis.fetch` | No | Custom fetch implementation. The SDK binds its invocation context to avoid browser `Illegal invocation` errors. |
+| `fetch` | `typeof globalThis.fetch` | No | Custom fetch implementation. The SDK binds its invocation context to avoid browser `Illegal invocation` errors. It is normally required on Node.js 16. |
 | `headers` | `Record<string,string>` or function | No | Additional request headers. The function form may return a promise. |
 | `timeoutMs` | `number` | No | Timeout for each HTTP request in milliseconds. Default: `15000`. |
-| `retry` | `Partial<RetryConfig>` | No | Retry policy for retryable quote/read operations. Defaults: 2 retries, 250ms base delay, 2000ms maximum delay, and jitter enabled. |
-| `logger` | `SdkLogger` | No | Receives structured `api.request`, `api.response`, and `api.retry` entries. |
+| `logger` | `SdkLogger` | No | Receives structured `api.request` and `api.response` entries. |
 | `executors` | `readonly ChainExecutor[]` | Required for execution | Wallet executors. May be omitted when only calling `quote()` or `buildSwap()`. |
 | `tokenListCacheTtlMs` | `number` | No | Successful token-list cache lifetime in milliseconds. Default: `600000` (10 minutes). Set to `0` to disable. |
-| `confidential` | `ConfidentialSwapConfig` | No | Enables complete confidential pre-swap, deposit, withdrawal, and recovery methods. |
 | `reportMode` | `"auto" \| "manual" \| "disabled"` | No | Reporting policy. Default: `"auto"`. A reporting failure does not turn a submitted swap into a failed swap. |
 | `onEvent` | `(event) => void` | No | Receives all lifecycle events. |
 | `now` | `() => number` | No | Custom millisecond clock, mainly for testing. Default: `Date.now`. |
@@ -1274,18 +777,12 @@ await promise;
 
 Cancellation only stops the SDK's current work. It cannot revert an approval, signature, or transaction that has already been submitted.
 
-## 10. Retries, logging, and credentials
+## 10. Logging and credentials
 
 ```ts
 const client = new SwapClient({
   baseUrl: "https://api.rhea.finance",
   getAccessToken: async () => authStore.getToken(),
-  retry: {
-    maxRetries: 2,
-    baseDelayMs: 250,
-    maxDelayMs: 2000,
-    jitter: true,
-  },
   logger: {
     log(entry) {
       console.log("SDK API", entry);
@@ -1294,7 +791,7 @@ const client = new SwapClient({
 });
 ```
 
-The SDK automatically retries only retryable quote/read operations. It does not automatically retry build, broadcast, or order-submission operations that could execute twice. Network failures preserve the underlying error name and message to help diagnose CORS failures, connection resets, timeouts, or fetch invocation problems.
+The SDK does not automatically retry HTTP requests. Callers that need retries should handle them outside the SDK. Network failures preserve the underlying error name and message to help diagnose CORS failures, connection resets, timeouts, or fetch invocation problems. Errors may still expose a `retryable` flag as guidance for application-level handling.
 
 ## 11. Raw API, reporting, and history
 

package/dist/executors/aptos.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface AptosWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/aptos.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface AptosWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/bitcoin.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface BitcoinWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/bitcoin.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface BitcoinWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/evm.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, a5 as EvmTx, af as TransactionSubmission, a7 as EvmSigningRequest, a6 as EvmApproval, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, a4 as EvmTx, ae as TransactionSubmission, a6 as EvmSigningRequest, a5 as EvmApproval, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface EvmWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     sendTransaction(tx: EvmTx, options: {

package/dist/executors/evm.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, a5 as EvmTx, af as TransactionSubmission, a7 as EvmSigningRequest, a6 as EvmApproval, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, a4 as EvmTx, ae as TransactionSubmission, a6 as EvmSigningRequest, a5 as EvmApproval, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface EvmWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     sendTransaction(tx: EvmTx, options: {

package/dist/executors/near.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, N as NearTransaction, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, N as NearTransaction, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface NearWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/near.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, N as NearTransaction, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, N as NearTransaction, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface NearWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/solana.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, a8 as SolanaMetadata, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, a7 as SolanaMetadata, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface SolanaWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/solana.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, a8 as SolanaMetadata, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, a7 as SolanaMetadata, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface SolanaWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/sui.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface SuiWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/sui.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.js';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.js';
 
 interface SuiWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;

package/dist/executors/tron.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { ae as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, af as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, x as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-CY6qp3wS.mjs';
+import { ad as ExecutorErrorAdapter, C as ChainRef, ae as TransactionSubmission, T as TransactionConfirmation, w as ChainExecutor } from '../shared-DpC8G2U4.mjs';
 
 interface TronWalletAdapter extends ExecutorErrorAdapter {
     getChain(): ChainRef | Promise<ChainRef>;