@resq-systems/security 2.0.0 → 2.1.1

package/lib/threats/rules/system.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"system.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/system.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Host-facing signatures: OS command injection, path traversal, file\n * inclusion, and server-side request forgery.\n *\n * Two of these categories are only weakly served by signatures, and the rules say so\n * in their `primaryControl`:\n *\n * - **Path traversal** is prevented by canonicalizing the candidate path and\n *   verifying it stays beneath the allowed base directory — see `resolveContainedPath`\n *   in `@resq-systems/security/paths`. Detection catches `../`; it does not catch a\n *   symlink, nor an absolute path that happens to resolve inside the base.\n * - **SSRF** is prevented by parsing the URL, resolving the host, rejecting private\n *   and link-local ranges, re-validating after every redirect, and constraining\n *   network egress. A regex over the URL string catches a literal `127.0.0.1` but\n *   never a hostname whose DNS record points there.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/system\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region Command injection\n\n/** Repeated across every command-injection rule. */\nconst CMD_CONTROL =\n\t\"Spawn with an argv array and shell:false; never build a shell string from input\";\n\n/** OS command injection. Scoped to the `shell` context — never runs elsewhere. */\nexport const COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-SUBSTITUTION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell command substitution $(...)\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `(` excluded alongside `)` so a run of `$(` cannot make the engine consume\n\t\t// 200 characters and backtrack at every position. A nested `$(a $(b))` still\n\t\t// matches on the inner substitution.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\([^()]{1,200}\\)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-BACKTICK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Backtick command substitution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /`[^`]{1,200}`/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-CHAIN-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Command separator followed by a state-changing or network command\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[;&|]{1,2}\\s{0,8}(?:rm|del|cat|type|wget|curl|nc|ncat|bash|sh|zsh|powershell|pwsh|python[23]?|perl|ruby|chmod|chown|kill|shutdown|reboot|mkfifo|base64|openssl)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-PIPE-SHELL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Output piped into a shell interpreter\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\|\\s{0,8}(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-REDIRECT-SYSTEM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Redirection into a system directory\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: />\\s{0,8}\\/(?:etc|dev|proc|sys|boot)\\//,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// Commix documents both as filter bypasses against defences that block spaces:\n\t\t// each expands to a word separator, so a command survives a filter that only\n\t\t// looks for whitespace between tokens.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-WORD-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell word-splitting construct standing in for a space\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{IFS\\}|\\{\\s{0,4},\\s{0,4}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// The shell removes an empty quote pair before execution, so a command name split\n\t\t// by one still runs while defeating a literal match on that name.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// Deliberately narrower than Commix's full set: the equivalent backslash form is\n\t\t// NOT matched, because it is indistinguishable from an ordinary Windows-style\n\t\t// relative path, and a rule firing on those would be disabled by the first person\n\t\t// it inconvenienced.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-QUOTE-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Empty quote pair inside a word, removed by the shell before execution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z](?:\"\"|'')[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ENV-EXPANSION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell parameter expansion\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `{` excluded alongside `}` for the same backtracking reason as above.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{[^{}]{1,200}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ARG-NEWLINE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break in a value destined for a command line\",\n\t\tcwe: 88,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Path traversal\n\n/** Repeated across every path-traversal rule. */\nconst PATH_CONTROL =\n\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath); resolve symlinks before use\";\n\n/** Directory-traversal and sensitive-path signatures. Scoped to `filesystem`. */\nexport const PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Parent-directory segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Anchored to segment boundaries so `my..file/` and `v1..v2` do not fire.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.(?:[/\\\\]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The previous catalog wrote `/%2e%2e[%2f%5c]/`, whose character class matches\n\t\t// a single character from {%, 2, f, 5, c} — so it fired on `%2e%2e%` and on\n\t\t// `%2e%2e2`, and expressed nothing about the intended separator alternation.\n\t\tpattern: /%2e%2e(?:%2f|%5c|\\/|\\\\)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-MIXED-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Literal dots with a percent-encoded separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\.\\.(?:%2f|%5c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-DOUBLE-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Double percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%252e%252e(?:%252f|%255c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-OVERLONG-UTF8-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Overlong UTF-8 encoding of a path separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%c0%(?:af|2f)|%e0%80%af|%c1%9c/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-NULL-BYTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"NUL byte, used to truncate a path before its extension check\",\n\t\tcwe: 158,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: matching the NUL byte is this rule's entire purpose\n\t\tpattern: /%00|\\u0000/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-FILTER-STRIP-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Dot run that survives a naive ../ stripping filter\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath). Never sanitize by stripping '../' — stripping is precisely what this payload targets: '....//' becomes '../' after one pass.\",\n\t\t// PATH-TRAVERSAL-001 requires exactly two dots between boundaries, so `....//`\n\t\t// and `.../` walked past it. Bounded at 200 because a longer run is already\n\t\t// reported by the engine's repetition check.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.{3,200}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-PARAM-BYPASS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Path parameter segment used to bypass a gateway path ACL\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Ensure the proxy and the origin agree on path normalization before authorization is applied; resolve and verify containment with resolveContainedPath\",\n\t\t// `..;/` — Tomcat and Spring treat `;` as starting a path parameter, so the\n\t\t// segment normalizes to `..` at the origin while the gateway sees a literal name.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.;[^/\\\\]{0,64}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-UNIX-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Unix path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/(?:etc\\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|proc\\/self|root\\/\\.ssh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-WINDOWS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Windows path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Requires a system subdirectory. The old rule was a bare `/C:\\\\Windows/gi`,\n\t\t// which fired on any documentation that merely mentioned the folder.\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z]:[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:windows|winnt)[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:system32|win\\.ini|repair)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-ABSOLUTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Absolute path where a relative one is expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 36,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^(?:\\/|[a-z]:[\\\\/]|\\\\\\\\)/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region File inclusion\n\n/** Repeated across every file-inclusion rule. */\nconst LFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module or template path from input\";\n\n/** Adds the remote-fetch half of the control, for the RFI rules. */\nconst RFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module, template, or file path from input. Disable remote stream wrappers (PHP allow_url_fopen/allow_url_include) and reject any candidate not relative to the configured base directory\";\n\n/** Local/remote file inclusion via stream wrappers and alternate schemes. */\nexport const FILE_INCLUSION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-PHP-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"PHP stream wrapper used to read or execute source\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\bphp:\\/\\/(?:filter|input|memory|temp|stdin)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alternate stream wrapper capable of loading remote or archived content\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:expect|zip|phar|glob|dict|gopher|netdoc|jar|ogg):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\t// `filesystem` only. The SSRF rules already own `url`; this is about a value\n\t\t// that was supposed to be a *path* and instead names a remote resource.\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Remote scheme where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])(?:https?|ftps?|smb|cifs|nfs|webdav|ssh2|rar|zlib|compress\\.(?:zlib|bzip2)):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-DATA-URI-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"data: URI where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The class is ordered `[a-z0-9+.-]` deliberately: writing `[a-z0-9.+-]` embeds\n\t\t// the literal substring `.+`, which the ReDoS structural test rejects.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])data:(?:\\/\\/)?(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,32}\\/[a-z0-9+.-]{1,32}[a-z0-9;=+.-]{0,32}|;base64|),/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-HOST-PATH-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Protocol-relative or UNC host path where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Re-grades rather than newly detects: PATH-ABSOLUTE-001 already matches these\n\t\t// at low confidence, contributing 1.0 — not enough to leave the allow band.\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:\\/\\/|\\\\\\\\)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(?:\\.[a-z0-9-]{1,63}){1,4}[/\\\\]/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region SSRF\n\n/** Repeated across every SSRF rule. */\nconst SSRF_CONTROL =\n\t\"Gate the request with assertOutboundUrl, re-validate after every redirect, and constrain egress at the network layer\";\n\n/**\n * Server-side request forgery.\n *\n * These signatures cover literal addresses only. A hostname whose DNS record\n * resolves to `169.254.169.254` passes every rule here — which is exactly why\n * {@link SSRF_CONTROL} names resolution and egress control as the real defense.\n */\nexport const SSRF_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-LOOPBACK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[?::1\\]?)(?::\\d{1,5})?(?:[/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-PRIVATE-RANGE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is in an RFC 1918 private range\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\/\\/(?:10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL targets a cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|metadata\\.google\\.internal|metadata\\.goog)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-ALT-IP-ENCODING-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Host written as a decimal, octal, or hex integer to evade address filters\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:0x[0-9a-f]{6,8}|0\\d{6,11}|\\d{8,10})(?:[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Userinfo segment, used to disguise the true host\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/[^/@\\s]{1,128}@/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-NON-HTTP-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Non-HTTP scheme in a fetchable URL\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:file|gopher|dict|tftp|ldaps?|jar|netdoc|sftp):/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-INTERNAL-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Internal address in the host position behind a userinfo segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The textbook bypass. SSRF-LOOPBACK-001 and SSRF-METADATA-001 both anchor on\n\t\t// `//` immediately before the address, so `http://good.com@169.254.169.254/`\n\t\t// matched only the generic userinfo rule and scored 2.0 — an allow verdict on a\n\t\t// cloud-credential read.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/@(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})(?=[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SUFFIXED-LOOPBACK-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Loopback literal used as a hostname prefix\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0)\\.[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-ALT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alibaba Cloud or Oracle Cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:100\\.100\\.100\\.200|192\\.0\\.0\\.192)(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV6-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv6 loopback, unique-local, or link-local literal\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[(?:::|(?:0{1,4}:){2,7}0{0,3}[01]|f[cd][0-9a-f]{0,2}:[0-9a-f:]{0,32}|fe[89ab][0-9a-f]?:[0-9a-f:]{0,32})\\]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV4-MAPPED-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal carrying an internal address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[::ffff:(?:127\\.|10\\.|169\\.254\\.|192\\.168\\.|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.|7f[0-9a-f]{2}:|a9fe:|c0a8:)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SHORT-IP-FORM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Abbreviated or octal IPv4 form resolving to a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `127.1`, `0`, and `0177.0.0.1` all resolve to loopback through inet_aton.\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127\\.\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3})?|0|0\\d{2,3}(?:\\.0*\\d{1,3}){3})(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-WILDCARD-DNS-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Wildcard-DNS service that resolves an arbitrary address from the hostname\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Coverage is incomplete by construction — a new wildcard-DNS service needs a\n\t\t// catalog edit. 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+{"version":3,"file":"system.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/system.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Host-facing signatures: OS command injection, path traversal, file\n * inclusion, and server-side request forgery.\n *\n * Two of these categories are only weakly served by signatures, and the rules say so\n * in their `primaryControl`:\n *\n * - **Path traversal** is prevented by canonicalizing the candidate path and\n *   verifying it stays beneath the allowed base directory — see `resolveContainedPath`\n *   in `@resq-systems/security/paths`. Detection catches `../`; it does not catch a\n *   symlink, nor an absolute path that happens to resolve inside the base.\n * - **SSRF** is prevented by parsing the URL, resolving the host, rejecting private\n *   and link-local ranges, re-validating after every redirect, and constraining\n *   network egress. A regex over the URL string catches a literal `127.0.0.1` but\n *   never a hostname whose DNS record points there.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/system\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region Command injection\n\n/** Repeated across every command-injection rule. */\nconst CMD_CONTROL =\n\t\"Spawn with an argv array and shell:false; never build a shell string from input\";\n\n/** OS command injection. Scoped to the `shell` context — never runs elsewhere. */\nexport const COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-SUBSTITUTION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell command substitution $(...)\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `(` excluded alongside `)` so a run of `$(` cannot make the engine consume\n\t\t// 200 characters and backtrack at every position. A nested `$(a $(b))` still\n\t\t// matches on the inner substitution.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\([^()]{1,200}\\)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-BACKTICK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Backtick command substitution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /`[^`]{1,200}`/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-CHAIN-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Command separator followed by a state-changing or network command\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[;&|]{1,2}\\s{0,8}(?:rm|del|cat|type|wget|curl|nc|ncat|bash|sh|zsh|powershell|pwsh|python[23]?|perl|ruby|chmod|chown|kill|shutdown|reboot|mkfifo|base64|openssl)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-PIPE-SHELL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Output piped into a shell interpreter\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\|\\s{0,8}(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-REDIRECT-SYSTEM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Redirection into a system directory\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: />\\s{0,8}\\/(?:etc|dev|proc|sys|boot)\\//,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// Commix documents both as filter bypasses against defences that block spaces:\n\t\t// each expands to a word separator, so a command survives a filter that only\n\t\t// looks for whitespace between tokens.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-WORD-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell word-splitting construct standing in for a space\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{IFS\\}|\\{\\s{0,4},\\s{0,4}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// The shell removes an empty quote pair before execution, so a command name split\n\t\t// by one still runs while defeating a literal match on that name.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// Deliberately narrower than Commix's full set: the equivalent backslash form is\n\t\t// NOT matched, because it is indistinguishable from an ordinary Windows-style\n\t\t// relative path, and a rule firing on those would be disabled by the first person\n\t\t// it inconvenienced.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-QUOTE-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Empty quote pair inside a word, removed by the shell before execution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z](?:\"\"|'')[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ENV-EXPANSION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell parameter expansion\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `{` excluded alongside `}` for the same backtracking reason as above.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{[^{}]{1,200}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ARG-NEWLINE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break in a value destined for a command line\",\n\t\tcwe: 88,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Path traversal\n\n/** Repeated across every path-traversal rule. */\nconst PATH_CONTROL =\n\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath); resolve symlinks before use\";\n\n/** Directory-traversal and sensitive-path signatures. Scoped to `filesystem`. */\nexport const PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Parent-directory segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Anchored to segment boundaries so `my..file/` and `v1..v2` do not fire.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.(?:[/\\\\]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The previous catalog wrote `/%2e%2e[%2f%5c]/`, whose character class matches\n\t\t// a single character from {%, 2, f, 5, c} — so it fired on `%2e%2e%` and on\n\t\t// `%2e%2e2`, and expressed nothing about the intended separator alternation.\n\t\tpattern: /%2e%2e(?:%2f|%5c|\\/|\\\\)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-MIXED-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Literal dots with a percent-encoded separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\.\\.(?:%2f|%5c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-DOUBLE-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Double percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%252e%252e(?:%252f|%255c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-OVERLONG-UTF8-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Overlong UTF-8 encoding of a path separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%c0%(?:af|2f)|%e0%80%af|%c1%9c/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-NULL-BYTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"NUL byte, used to truncate a path before its extension check\",\n\t\tcwe: 158,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: matching the NUL byte is this rule's entire purpose\n\t\tpattern: /%00|\\u0000/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-FILTER-STRIP-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Dot run that survives a naive ../ stripping filter\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath). Never sanitize by stripping '../' — stripping is precisely what this payload targets: '....//' becomes '../' after one pass.\",\n\t\t// PATH-TRAVERSAL-001 requires exactly two dots between boundaries, so `....//`\n\t\t// and `.../` walked past it. Bounded at 200 because a longer run is already\n\t\t// reported by the engine's repetition check.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.{3,200}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-PARAM-BYPASS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Path parameter segment used to bypass a gateway path ACL\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Ensure the proxy and the origin agree on path normalization before authorization is applied; resolve and verify containment with resolveContainedPath\",\n\t\t// `..;/` — Tomcat and Spring treat `;` as starting a path parameter, so the\n\t\t// segment normalizes to `..` at the origin while the gateway sees a literal name.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.;[^/\\\\]{0,64}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-UNIX-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Unix path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/(?:etc\\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|proc\\/self|root\\/\\.ssh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-WINDOWS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Windows path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Requires a system subdirectory. The old rule was a bare `/C:\\\\Windows/gi`,\n\t\t// which fired on any documentation that merely mentioned the folder.\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z]:[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:windows|winnt)[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:system32|win\\.ini|repair)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-ABSOLUTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Absolute path where a relative one is expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 36,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^(?:\\/|[a-z]:[\\\\/]|\\\\\\\\)/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region File inclusion\n\n/** Repeated across every file-inclusion rule. */\nconst LFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module or template path from input\";\n\n/** Adds the remote-fetch half of the control, for the RFI rules. */\nconst RFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module, template, or file path from input. Disable remote stream wrappers (PHP allow_url_fopen/allow_url_include) and reject any candidate not relative to the configured base directory\";\n\n/** Local/remote file inclusion via stream wrappers and alternate schemes. */\nexport const FILE_INCLUSION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-PHP-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"PHP stream wrapper used to read or execute source\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\bphp:\\/\\/(?:filter|input|memory|temp|stdin)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alternate stream wrapper capable of loading remote or archived content\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:expect|zip|phar|glob|dict|gopher|netdoc|jar|ogg):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\t// `filesystem` only. The SSRF rules already own `url`; this is about a value\n\t\t// that was supposed to be a *path* and instead names a remote resource.\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Remote scheme where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])(?:https?|ftps?|smb|cifs|nfs|webdav|ssh2|rar|zlib|compress\\.(?:zlib|bzip2)):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-DATA-URI-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"data: URI where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The class is ordered `[a-z0-9+.-]` deliberately: writing `[a-z0-9.+-]` embeds\n\t\t// the literal substring `.+`, which the ReDoS structural test rejects.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])data:(?:\\/\\/)?(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,32}\\/[a-z0-9+.-]{1,32}[a-z0-9;=+.-]{0,32}|;base64|),/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-HOST-PATH-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Protocol-relative or UNC host path where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Re-grades rather than newly detects: PATH-ABSOLUTE-001 already matches these\n\t\t// at low confidence, contributing 1.0 — not enough to leave the allow band.\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:\\/\\/|\\\\\\\\)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(?:\\.[a-z0-9-]{1,63}){1,4}[/\\\\]/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region SSRF\n\n/** Repeated across every SSRF rule. */\nconst SSRF_CONTROL =\n\t\"Gate the request with assertOutboundUrl, re-validate after every redirect, and constrain egress at the network layer\";\n\n/**\n * Server-side request forgery.\n *\n * These signatures cover literal addresses only. A hostname whose DNS record\n * resolves to `169.254.169.254` passes every rule here — which is exactly why\n * {@link SSRF_CONTROL} names resolution and egress control as the real defense.\n */\nexport const SSRF_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-LOOPBACK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[?::1\\]?)(?::\\d{1,5})?(?:[/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-PRIVATE-RANGE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is in an RFC 1918 private range\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\/\\/(?:10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL targets a cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|metadata\\.google\\.internal|metadata\\.goog)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-ALT-IP-ENCODING-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Host written as a decimal, octal, or hex integer to evade address filters\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:0x[0-9a-f]{6,8}|0\\d{6,11}|\\d{8,10})(?:[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Userinfo segment, used to disguise the true host\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/[^/@\\s]{1,128}@/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-NON-HTTP-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Non-HTTP scheme in a fetchable URL\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:file|gopher|dict|tftp|ldaps?|jar|netdoc|sftp):/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-INTERNAL-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Internal address in the host position behind a userinfo segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The textbook bypass. SSRF-LOOPBACK-001 and SSRF-METADATA-001 both anchor on\n\t\t// `//` immediately before the address, so `http://good.com@169.254.169.254/`\n\t\t// matched only the generic userinfo rule and scored 2.0 — an allow verdict on a\n\t\t// cloud-credential read.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/@(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})(?=[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SUFFIXED-LOOPBACK-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Loopback literal used as a hostname prefix\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0)\\.[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-ALT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alibaba Cloud or Oracle Cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:100\\.100\\.100\\.200|192\\.0\\.0\\.192)(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV6-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv6 loopback, unique-local, or link-local literal\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[(?:::|(?:0{1,4}:){2,7}0{0,3}[01]|f[cd][0-9a-f]{0,2}:[0-9a-f:]{0,32}|fe[89ab][0-9a-f]?:[0-9a-f:]{0,32})\\]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV4-MAPPED-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal carrying an internal address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[::ffff:(?:127\\.|10\\.|169\\.254\\.|192\\.168\\.|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.|7f[0-9a-f]{2}:|a9fe:|c0a8:)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SHORT-IP-FORM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Abbreviated or octal IPv4 form resolving to a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `127.1`, `0`, and `0177.0.0.1` all resolve to loopback through inet_aton.\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127\\.\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3})?|0|0\\d{2,3}(?:\\.0*\\d{1,3}){3})(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-WILDCARD-DNS-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Wildcard-DNS service that resolves an arbitrary address from the hostname\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Coverage is incomplete by construction — a new wildcard-DNS service needs a\n\t\t// catalog edit. Host resolution plus egress control is what actually holds.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\/\\/(?:[^/\\s]{0,64}\\.)?(?:nip\\.io|sslip\\.io|localtest\\.me|lvh\\.me|vcap\\.me|xip\\.io|localho\\.st|traefik\\.me)(?=[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n"],"mappings":";;AAyCA,MAAM,cACL;;AAGD,MAAa,0BAAiD;CAC7D;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAIhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EAIC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EAQC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAEhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO;EAClB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;AACD;;AAOA,MAAM,eACL;;AAGD,MAAa,uBAA8C;CAC1D;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAEhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAIhB,SAAS;EACT,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CACjB;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EACT,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CACjB;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EACT,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CACjB;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;EACT,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CACjB;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAEhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBACC;EAID,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBACC;EAGD,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAGhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;AACD;;AAOA,MAAM,cACL;;AAGD,MAAM,cACL;;AAGD,MAAa,uBAA8C;CAC1D;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK;EAC9B,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EAGN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAGhB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAGhB,SAAS;CACV;AACD;;AAOA,MAAM,eACL;;;;;;;;AASD,MAAa,aAAoC;CAChD;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAKhB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAEhB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAGhB,SACC;CACF;AACD"}

package/lib/threats/rules/web.d.mts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { ThreatRule } from "../types.mjs";
 //#region src/threats/rules/web.d.ts
 /** XSS signatures. Meaningful only where the value is interpolated into markup. */
-declare const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+export declare const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
 /**
  * Prototype-pollution signatures.
  *
@@ -14,13 +14,12 @@ declare const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
  * notation or as a quoted JSON key is caught while prose that merely mentions the
  * word is not.
  */
-declare const PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+export declare const PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
 /** CRLF injection into HTTP or SMTP header values (response splitting). */
-declare const HEADER_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+export declare const HEADER_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
 /** CSV/XLSX formula injection — the payload executes in the *recipient's* spreadsheet. */
-declare const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+export declare const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
 /** Log injection — forged entries, and terminal escape sequences in logged content. */
-declare const LOG_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+export declare const LOG_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
 //#endregion
-export { FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES, HEADER_INJECTION_RULES, LOG_INJECTION_RULES, PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES, XSS_RULES };
 //# sourceMappingURL=web.d.mts.map

package/lib/threats/rules/web.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"web.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/web.ts"],"mappings":";;;cAqCa,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;;;;;;cAuQpB,oCAAoC;;cAgDpC,iCAAiC;;cA4EjC,kCAAkC;;cAmClC,8BAA8B"}
+{"version":3,"file":"web.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/web.ts"],"mappings":";;;qBAsCa,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAuQpB,oCAAoC;;qBAgDpC,iCAAiC;;qBA4EjC,kCAAkC;;qBAyClC,8BAA8B"}

package/lib/threats/rules/web.mjs

@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES = [{
 	description: "Cell value begins with a formula-trigger character",
 	cwe: 1236,
 	primaryControl: FORMULA_CONTROL,
-	pattern: /^[\s'"]{0,8}[=+\-@\t\r]/
+	pattern: /^[\s\x1c-\x1f\x85'"]*[=+\-@\t\r\n\uff1d\uff0b\uff0d\uff20]/
 }, {
 	id: "CSV-DDE-001",
 	type: "formula_injection",

package/lib/threats/rules/web.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"web.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/web.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Browser- and protocol-facing signatures: XSS, prototype pollution,\n * HTTP/SMTP header injection (CRLF), spreadsheet formula injection, and log forging.\n *\n * None of these rules is the control that stops the attack. XSS is stopped by\n * context-correct output encoding plus a parser-based sanitizer; prototype pollution\n * by schema validation that rejects unknown keys and by null-prototype dictionaries;\n * header injection by a header API that refuses CR/LF; formula injection by prefixing\n * exported cells; log forging by structured logging that encodes field values.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/web\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region Cross-site scripting\n\n/** Repeated across every XSS rule — the control that actually prevents the weakness. */\nconst XSS_CONTROL = \"Escape at the HTML sink; sanitize rich HTML with DOMPurify\";\n\n/** XSS signatures. Meaningful only where the value is interpolated into markup. */\nexport const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-SCRIPT-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Opening <script> tag\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Opening tag only — a greedy `<script>[\\s\\S]*</script>` invites backtracking\n\t\t// blowups on crafted input and adds no detection value.\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s*script\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Inline event handler attribute inside a tag\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /<[a-z][^>]{0,300}\\bon[a-z]{3,20}\\s{0,8}=/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Event-handler-shaped assignment to a quoted value\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bon(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12})\\s{0,8}=\\s{0,8}[\"'`]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-URI-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Script-bearing URI scheme\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Allowlist the URL scheme before rendering or navigating\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:javascript|vbscript|livescript|mocha)\\s{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DATA-URI-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"data: URI carrying an active content type\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Allowlist the URL scheme before rendering or navigating\",\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bdata\\s{0,8}:\\s{0,8}(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg\\+xml|application\\/(?:javascript|xhtml\\+xml|ecmascript))/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DANGEROUS-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\t// High rather than medium: these tags load or reframe active content, which\n\t\t// buys clickjacking, phishing overlays, and drive-by loads even without script\n\t\t// execution. Confidence stays medium because a rich-text field may legitimately\n\t\t// permit some of them — that is what `excludeRuleIds` is for.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Tag that can load or reframe active content\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}(?:iframe|object|embed|applet|base|meta|link|svg|math|portal|frameset)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-STYLE-EXPRESSION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"CSS expression() — legacy IE script execution vector\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\bexpression\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DOM-SINK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a credential- or navigation-bearing DOM property\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:document|window)\\s{0,8}\\.\\s{0,8}(?:cookie|domain|write|writeln|location|open)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DOM-SINK-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Assignment to a raw-markup DOM sink\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Assign via textContent, or sanitize with DOMPurify first\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:innerHTML|outerHTML|srcdoc)\\s{0,8}=|\\binsertAdjacentHTML\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Dynamic code evaluation (eval / Function constructor)\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\beval\\s{0,8}\\(|\\bnew\\s+Function\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-URI-SCHEME-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Script-bearing URI scheme split by tab, CR, or LF\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Allowlist the URL scheme after canonicalization: decode HTML character references, strip ASCII tab/CR/LF, then compare against an allowlist (http, https, mailto)\",\n\t\t// XSS-URI-SCHEME-001 allows whitespace only *between* the token and the colon,\n\t\t// so `jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)` scanned clean and still executes in current\n\t\t// browsers — the WHATWG URL parser strips exactly tab, CR, and LF from a scheme.\n\t\t// The leading lookahead requires an intra-token separator, so a plain\n\t\t// `javascript:` is not double-scored by this rule and -001 together.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?=[a-z\\t\\n\\r]{0,16}[\\t\\n\\r])j[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}a[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}v[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}a[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}s[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}c[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}r[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}i[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}p[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}t[\\t\\n\\r ]{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\t// Graded to match XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-001: a string-argument timer is\n\t\t// eval-equivalent, so the same severity applies. Confidence stays medium\n\t\t// because the token appears in ordinary code discussion.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"String-argument timer or Function call — an implicit eval sink\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:setTimeout|setInterval|setImmediate|Function)\\s{0,8}\\(\\s{0,8}[\"'`]|\\bexecScript\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-003\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"constructor.constructor chain used to reach the Function constructor\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\bconstructor\\s{0,8}(?:\\.\\s{0,8}constructor|\\[\\s{0,8}[\"'`]constructor)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-003\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Event handler introduced by breaking out of a quoted attribute\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-001 needs a preceding `<tag`; -002 needs a quote *after*\n\t\t// the `=`. An attribute-breakout payload (`\" onmouseover=alert(1) x=\"`) has\n\t\t// neither, so it scanned clean while its quoted twin scored 2 — the pair was\n\t\t// inconsistent precisely on the harder case.\n\t\t// Handler names are an explicit allowlist rather than `on[a-z]{3,20}`, so\n\t\t// `\"onboarding=\"` and `\"onlineStatus=\"` cannot trip it.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[\"'`]\\s{0,8}on(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|wheel|scroll|input|select|paste|copy|cut|contextmenu|auxclick|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12}|drag[a-z]{0,10}|touch[a-z]{2,10})\\s{0,8}=/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-004\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\t// High, matching every other event-handler rule: an inline handler assigned a\n\t\t// call expression *is* script execution. Confidence stays medium because the\n\t\t// same text appears in escaped documentation.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unquoted event handler assigned a callable expression\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The `(?:^|[^.\\w-])` prefix is a consuming class rather than a lookbehind, to\n\t\t// match catalog style; it excludes ordinary property assignment (`el.onclick=`).\n\t\t// Whitespace before `=` is forbidden, which kills prose false positives such as\n\t\t// \"onload = init()\" at the cost of missing spaced payloads into unquoted sinks.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^|[^.\\w-])on(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|wheel|scroll|input|select|paste|copy|cut|contextmenu|auxclick|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12}|drag[a-z]{0,10}|touch[a-z]{2,10})=\\s{0,8}[\\w$.[\\]]{1,40}\\s{0,8}[(`]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-FORM-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Injected form or input element — credential-harvesting overlay\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Must exclude `html_decoded`: without that it fires on any CMS body that\n\t\t// documents HTML in escaped form (`&lt;form action=\"/login\"&gt;`). An\n\t\t// entity-encoded form tag is already neutralized — the encoding *is* the\n\t\t// control. Percent-encoded evasion stays covered.\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\", \"nfc\", \"nfkc\", \"percent_decoded\"],\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}(?:form|input|textarea|button|select|keygen|isindex)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-STYLE-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Injected style element\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\", \"nfc\", \"nfkc\", \"percent_decoded\"],\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}style\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DANGLING-MARKUP-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unterminated resource attribute — exfiltrates the following markup\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:src|href|action|formaction|poster|background)\\s{0,8}=\\s{0,8}[\"'][^\"'<>]{0,300}$/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Prototype pollution\n\n/** Repeated across the prototype-pollution rules. */\nconst PROTO_CONTROL =\n\t\"Reject unknown keys via schema validation; use Object.create(null) maps and a merge that skips __proto__/constructor/prototype\";\n\n/**\n * Prototype-pollution signatures.\n *\n * Deliberately its own {@link ThreatRule.type} rather than a subcategory of XSS:\n * this is an object-graph manipulation weakness, not a markup one, and it is fixed\n * by different controls (`Object.create(null)` dictionaries, schema validation that\n * rejects unknown keys, merge helpers that skip inherited and forbidden keys).\n *\n * The patterns match structural property paths, so `__proto__` reached via bracket\n * notation or as a quoted JSON key is caught while prose that merely mentions the\n * word is not.\n */\nexport const PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-PROTO-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"__proto__ used as a structural property path segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[.[\\]\"'])__proto__(?:$|[.[\\]\"'])/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-PROTOTYPE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"'prototype' used as a structural property path segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[.[\\]\"'])prototype(?:$|[.[\\]\"'])/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-CONSTRUCTOR-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"constructor.prototype access chain\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Two shapes: property/bracket access (`constructor.prototype`,\n\t\t// `constructor[\"prototype\"]`) and the nested-object form that arrives through\n\t\t// a JSON body or query-string expansion (`\"constructor\":{\"prototype\":…}`).\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bconstructor\\s{0,8}(?:\\.|\\[)\\s{0,8}[\"']?prototype\\b|[\"']constructor[\"']\\s{0,8}:\\s{0,8}\\{\\s{0,8}[\"']prototype[\"']/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Header injection\n\n/** Repeated across the header-injection rules. */\nconst HEADER_CONTROL = \"Use a header API that rejects CR/LF; never concatenate raw header strings\";\n\n/** CRLF injection into HTTP or SMTP header values (response splitting). */\nexport const HEADER_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Raw CR or LF in a header value\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent-encoded CR/LF or NUL, decodable into a header break\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%0d|%0a|%00/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-SMUGGLED-NAME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break followed by a security-relevant header name\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[\\r\\n]\\s{0,8}(?:set-cookie|location|content-length|transfer-encoding|host|authorization|bcc|cc|to)\\s{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-UNICODE-LINEBREAK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unicode line break — treated as a newline by some parsers and loggers\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\t// U+2028 LINE SEPARATOR, U+2029 PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR, U+0085 NEL. None is matched\n\t\t// by `[\\r\\n]`, yet each terminates a line in JS string literals, in several log\n\t\t// processors, and in some header parsers. All three scanned clean before this.\n\t\tpattern: /[\\u2028\\u2029\\u0085]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-OVERLONG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Overlong or Unicode-squeezed encoding of CR/LF\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `%e5%98%8a` is U+560A, whose low byte is 0x0A: any component that narrows\n\t\t// UTF-16 to a byte emits a bare LF. `%c0%8a` is the overlong UTF-8 form of the\n\t\t// same byte. Both slip past a filter that only looks for `%0a`.\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t\tpattern: /%e5%98%8[ad]|%c0%8[ad]|%c1%8[ad]/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Spreadsheet formula injection\n\n/** Repeated across the formula-injection rules. */\nconst FORMULA_CONTROL =\n\t\"Escape exported cells with escapeCsvField / toCsvRow before writing the file\";\n\n/** CSV/XLSX formula injection — the payload executes in the *recipient's* spreadsheet. */\nexport const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CSV-FORMULA-LEAD-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"formula_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"spreadsheet\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Cell value begins with a formula-trigger character\",\n\t\tcwe: 1236,\n\t\tprimaryControl: FORMULA_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^[\\s'\"]{0,8}[=+\\-@\\t\\r]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CSV-DDE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"formula_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"spreadsheet\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Spreadsheet function capable of remote fetch or command execution\",\n\t\tcwe: 1236,\n\t\tprimaryControl: FORMULA_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:DDE|DDEAUTO|WEBSERVICE|HYPERLINK|IMPORTXML|IMPORTDATA|IMPORTFEED|IMPORTHTML|IMPORTRANGE|RTD)\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Log forging\n\n/** Repeated across the log-injection rules. */\nconst LOG_CONTROL =\n\t\"Log structured records; encode field values with encodeLogValue before writing them\";\n\n/** Log injection — forged entries, and terminal escape sequences in logged content. */\nexport const LOG_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-CRLF-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break in a value written to a line-based log\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LOG_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-FORGED-ENTRY-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break followed by a forged log-level marker\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LOG_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]\\s{0,8}[[{(]?\\s{0,8}(?:INFO|WARN|WARNING|ERROR|DEBUG|FATAL|TRACE|CRITICAL)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-ANSI-ESCAPE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"ANSI/terminal escape sequence in logged content\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Encode with encodeLogValue, or strip with stripAnsi when the rendering matters more than the record\",\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: ANSI sequences are defined by the ESC control character\n\t\tpattern: 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+{"version":3,"file":"web.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/web.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Browser- and protocol-facing signatures: XSS, prototype pollution,\n * HTTP/SMTP header injection (CRLF), spreadsheet formula injection, and log forging.\n *\n * None of these rules is the control that stops the attack. XSS is stopped by\n * context-correct output encoding plus a parser-based sanitizer; prototype pollution\n * by schema validation that rejects unknown keys and by null-prototype dictionaries;\n * header injection by a header API that refuses CR/LF; formula injection by prefixing\n * exported cells; log forging by structured logging that encodes field values.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/web\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region Cross-site scripting\n\n/** Repeated across every XSS rule — the control that actually prevents the weakness. */\nconst XSS_CONTROL = \"Escape at the HTML sink; sanitize rich HTML with DOMPurify\";\n\n/** XSS signatures. Meaningful only where the value is interpolated into markup. */\nexport const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-SCRIPT-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Opening <script> tag\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Opening tag only — a greedy `<script>[\\s\\S]*</script>` invites backtracking\n\t\t// blowups on crafted input and adds no detection value.\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s*script\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Inline event handler attribute inside a tag\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /<[a-z][^>]{0,300}\\bon[a-z]{3,20}\\s{0,8}=/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Event-handler-shaped assignment to a quoted value\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bon(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12})\\s{0,8}=\\s{0,8}[\"'`]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-URI-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Script-bearing URI scheme\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Allowlist the URL scheme before rendering or navigating\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:javascript|vbscript|livescript|mocha)\\s{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DATA-URI-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"data: URI carrying an active content type\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Allowlist the URL scheme before rendering or navigating\",\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bdata\\s{0,8}:\\s{0,8}(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg\\+xml|application\\/(?:javascript|xhtml\\+xml|ecmascript))/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DANGEROUS-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"xml\"],\n\t\t// High rather than medium: these tags load or reframe active content, which\n\t\t// buys clickjacking, phishing overlays, and drive-by loads even without script\n\t\t// execution. Confidence stays medium because a rich-text field may legitimately\n\t\t// permit some of them — that is what `excludeRuleIds` is for.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Tag that can load or reframe active content\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}(?:iframe|object|embed|applet|base|meta|link|svg|math|portal|frameset)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-STYLE-EXPRESSION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"CSS expression() — legacy IE script execution vector\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\bexpression\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DOM-SINK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a credential- or navigation-bearing DOM property\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:document|window)\\s{0,8}\\.\\s{0,8}(?:cookie|domain|write|writeln|location|open)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DOM-SINK-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Assignment to a raw-markup DOM sink\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Assign via textContent, or sanitize with DOMPurify first\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:innerHTML|outerHTML|srcdoc)\\s{0,8}=|\\binsertAdjacentHTML\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Dynamic code evaluation (eval / Function constructor)\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\beval\\s{0,8}\\(|\\bnew\\s+Function\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-URI-SCHEME-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Script-bearing URI scheme split by tab, CR, or LF\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Allowlist the URL scheme after canonicalization: decode HTML character references, strip ASCII tab/CR/LF, then compare against an allowlist (http, https, mailto)\",\n\t\t// XSS-URI-SCHEME-001 allows whitespace only *between* the token and the colon,\n\t\t// so `jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)` scanned clean and still executes in current\n\t\t// browsers — the WHATWG URL parser strips exactly tab, CR, and LF from a scheme.\n\t\t// The leading lookahead requires an intra-token separator, so a plain\n\t\t// `javascript:` is not double-scored by this rule and -001 together.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?=[a-z\\t\\n\\r]{0,16}[\\t\\n\\r])j[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}a[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}v[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}a[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}s[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}c[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}r[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}i[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}p[\\t\\n\\r]{0,8}t[\\t\\n\\r ]{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\t// Graded to match XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-001: a string-argument timer is\n\t\t// eval-equivalent, so the same severity applies. Confidence stays medium\n\t\t// because the token appears in ordinary code discussion.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"String-argument timer or Function call — an implicit eval sink\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:setTimeout|setInterval|setImmediate|Function)\\s{0,8}\\(\\s{0,8}[\"'`]|\\bexecScript\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DYNAMIC-EVAL-003\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"constructor.constructor chain used to reach the Function constructor\",\n\t\tcwe: 95,\n\t\tprimaryControl: \"Never evaluate strings; a CSP without 'unsafe-eval' blocks this\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\bconstructor\\s{0,8}(?:\\.\\s{0,8}constructor|\\[\\s{0,8}[\"'`]constructor)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-003\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Event handler introduced by breaking out of a quoted attribute\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-001 needs a preceding `<tag`; -002 needs a quote *after*\n\t\t// the `=`. An attribute-breakout payload (`\" onmouseover=alert(1) x=\"`) has\n\t\t// neither, so it scanned clean while its quoted twin scored 2 — the pair was\n\t\t// inconsistent precisely on the harder case.\n\t\t// Handler names are an explicit allowlist rather than `on[a-z]{3,20}`, so\n\t\t// `\"onboarding=\"` and `\"onlineStatus=\"` cannot trip it.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[\"'`]\\s{0,8}on(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|wheel|scroll|input|select|paste|copy|cut|contextmenu|auxclick|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12}|drag[a-z]{0,10}|touch[a-z]{2,10})\\s{0,8}=/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-EVENT-HANDLER-004\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\t// High, matching every other event-handler rule: an inline handler assigned a\n\t\t// call expression *is* script execution. Confidence stays medium because the\n\t\t// same text appears in escaped documentation.\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unquoted event handler assigned a callable expression\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The `(?:^|[^.\\w-])` prefix is a consuming class rather than a lookbehind, to\n\t\t// match catalog style; it excludes ordinary property assignment (`el.onclick=`).\n\t\t// Whitespace before `=` is forbidden, which kills prose false positives such as\n\t\t// \"onload = init()\" at the cost of missing spaced payloads into unquoted sinks.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^|[^.\\w-])on(?:error|load|click|focus|blur|submit|change|toggle|wheel|scroll|input|select|paste|copy|cut|contextmenu|auxclick|mouse[a-z]{2,12}|key[a-z]{2,6}|animation[a-z]{3,10}|pointer[a-z]{2,12}|drag[a-z]{0,10}|touch[a-z]{2,10})=\\s{0,8}[\\w$.[\\]]{1,40}\\s{0,8}[(`]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-FORM-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Injected form or input element — credential-harvesting overlay\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Must exclude `html_decoded`: without that it fires on any CMS body that\n\t\t// documents HTML in escaped form (`&lt;form action=\"/login\"&gt;`). An\n\t\t// entity-encoded form tag is already neutralized — the encoding *is* the\n\t\t// control. Percent-encoded evasion stays covered.\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\", \"nfc\", \"nfkc\", \"percent_decoded\"],\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}(?:form|input|textarea|button|select|keygen|isindex)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-STYLE-TAG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Injected style element\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\", \"nfc\", \"nfkc\", \"percent_decoded\"],\n\t\tpattern: /<\\s{0,8}style\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"XSS-DANGLING-MARKUP-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"xss\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"html\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unterminated resource attribute — exfiltrates the following markup\",\n\t\tcwe: 79,\n\t\tprimaryControl: XSS_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:src|href|action|formaction|poster|background)\\s{0,8}=\\s{0,8}[\"'][^\"'<>]{0,300}$/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Prototype pollution\n\n/** Repeated across the prototype-pollution rules. */\nconst PROTO_CONTROL =\n\t\"Reject unknown keys via schema validation; use Object.create(null) maps and a merge that skips __proto__/constructor/prototype\";\n\n/**\n * Prototype-pollution signatures.\n *\n * Deliberately its own {@link ThreatRule.type} rather than a subcategory of XSS:\n * this is an object-graph manipulation weakness, not a markup one, and it is fixed\n * by different controls (`Object.create(null)` dictionaries, schema validation that\n * rejects unknown keys, merge helpers that skip inherited and forbidden keys).\n *\n * The patterns match structural property paths, so `__proto__` reached via bracket\n * notation or as a quoted JSON key is caught while prose that merely mentions the\n * word is not.\n */\nexport const PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-PROTO-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"__proto__ used as a structural property path segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[.[\\]\"'])__proto__(?:$|[.[\\]\"'])/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-PROTOTYPE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"'prototype' used as a structural property path segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[.[\\]\"'])prototype(?:$|[.[\\]\"'])/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PROTO-POLLUTION-CONSTRUCTOR-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"prototype_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"object_merge\", \"nosql\", \"url\", \"template\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"constructor.prototype access chain\",\n\t\tcwe: 1321,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PROTO_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Two shapes: property/bracket access (`constructor.prototype`,\n\t\t// `constructor[\"prototype\"]`) and the nested-object form that arrives through\n\t\t// a JSON body or query-string expansion (`\"constructor\":{\"prototype\":…}`).\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\bconstructor\\s{0,8}(?:\\.|\\[)\\s{0,8}[\"']?prototype\\b|[\"']constructor[\"']\\s{0,8}:\\s{0,8}\\{\\s{0,8}[\"']prototype[\"']/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Header injection\n\n/** Repeated across the header-injection rules. */\nconst HEADER_CONTROL = \"Use a header API that rejects CR/LF; never concatenate raw header strings\";\n\n/** CRLF injection into HTTP or SMTP header values (response splitting). */\nexport const HEADER_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Raw CR or LF in a header value\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent-encoded CR/LF or NUL, decodable into a header break\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%0d|%0a|%00/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-SMUGGLED-NAME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break followed by a security-relevant header name\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[\\r\\n]\\s{0,8}(?:set-cookie|location|content-length|transfer-encoding|host|authorization|bcc|cc|to)\\s{0,8}:/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-UNICODE-LINEBREAK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unicode line break — treated as a newline by some parsers and loggers\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\t// U+2028 LINE SEPARATOR, U+2029 PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR, U+0085 NEL. None is matched\n\t\t// by `[\\r\\n]`, yet each terminates a line in JS string literals, in several log\n\t\t// processors, and in some header parsers. All three scanned clean before this.\n\t\tpattern: /[\\u2028\\u2029\\u0085]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"HEADER-CRLF-OVERLONG-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"header_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"http_header\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Overlong or Unicode-squeezed encoding of CR/LF\",\n\t\tcwe: 113,\n\t\tprimaryControl: HEADER_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `%e5%98%8a` is U+560A, whose low byte is 0x0A: any component that narrows\n\t\t// UTF-16 to a byte emits a bare LF. `%c0%8a` is the overlong UTF-8 form of the\n\t\t// same byte. Both slip past a filter that only looks for `%0a`.\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t\tpattern: /%e5%98%8[ad]|%c0%8[ad]|%c1%8[ad]/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Spreadsheet formula injection\n\n/** Repeated across the formula-injection rules. */\nconst FORMULA_CONTROL =\n\t\"Escape exported cells with escapeCsvField / toCsvRow before writing the file\";\n\n/** CSV/XLSX formula injection — the payload executes in the *recipient's* spreadsheet. */\nexport const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CSV-FORMULA-LEAD-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"formula_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"spreadsheet\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Cell value begins with a formula-trigger character\",\n\t\tcwe: 1236,\n\t\tprimaryControl: FORMULA_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Unbounded, like `escapeCsvField`: a reader that strips the leading run strips all\n\t\t// of it. One anchored character class under `*` backtracks linearly. The run adds\n\t\t// U+001C to U+001F and U+0085 to `\\s`, since Python's `strip()`, .NET's `Trim()` and\n\t\t// Java's `trim()` remove some or all of them. The triggers are the OWASP list, LF and\n\t\t// the full-width `=` `+` `-` `@` included.\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: U+001C to U+001F are whitespace to the readers that trim them\n\t\tpattern: /^[\\s\\x1c-\\x1f\\x85'\"]*[=+\\-@\\t\\r\\n\\uff1d\\uff0b\\uff0d\\uff20]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CSV-DDE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"formula_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"spreadsheet\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Spreadsheet function capable of remote fetch or command execution\",\n\t\tcwe: 1236,\n\t\tprimaryControl: FORMULA_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:DDE|DDEAUTO|WEBSERVICE|HYPERLINK|IMPORTXML|IMPORTDATA|IMPORTFEED|IMPORTHTML|IMPORTRANGE|RTD)\\s{0,8}\\(/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Log forging\n\n/** Repeated across the log-injection rules. */\nconst LOG_CONTROL =\n\t\"Log structured records; encode field values with encodeLogValue before writing them\";\n\n/** Log injection — forged entries, and terminal escape sequences in logged content. */\nexport const LOG_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-CRLF-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break in a value written to a line-based log\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LOG_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-FORGED-ENTRY-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break followed by a forged log-level marker\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LOG_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]\\s{0,8}[[{(]?\\s{0,8}(?:INFO|WARN|WARNING|ERROR|DEBUG|FATAL|TRACE|CRITICAL)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LOG-ANSI-ESCAPE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"log_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"ANSI/terminal escape sequence in logged content\",\n\t\tcwe: 117,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Encode with encodeLogValue, or strip with stripAnsi when the rendering matters more than the record\",\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: ANSI sequences are defined by the ESC control character\n\t\tpattern: 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package/lib/threats/scoring.d.mts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { ThreatFinding, ThreatPolicy, ThreatType, ThreatVerdict } from "./types.
  * @param finding - The finding to weigh.
  * @returns A non-negative score contribution.
  */
-declare function scoreForFinding(finding: ThreatFinding): number;
+export declare function scoreForFinding(finding: ThreatFinding): number;
 /**
  * Total anomaly score for a set of findings.
  *
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ declare function scoreForFinding(finding: ThreatFinding): number;
  * calculateThreatScore(findings); // 7
  * ```
  */
-declare function calculateThreatScore(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): number;
+export declare function calculateThreatScore(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): number;
 /**
  * Map a score onto a policy band.
  *
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ declare function calculateThreatScore(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): numbe
  *   at 4, `block` at 8.
  * @returns `"allow"`, `"review"`, or `"block"`.
  */
-declare function verdictForScore(score: number, policy?: ThreatPolicy): ThreatVerdict;
+export declare function verdictForScore(score: number, policy?: ThreatPolicy): ThreatVerdict;
 /** One category's contribution to a scan result. */
-interface ThreatTypeSummary {
+export interface ThreatTypeSummary {
   /** The weakness category. */
   readonly type: ThreatType;
   /** How many findings carried this category. */
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ interface ThreatTypeSummary {
  * @returns Category totals sorted by descending score, then by category name so ties
  *   are ordered deterministically.
  */
-declare function summarizeByType(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): readonly ThreatTypeSummary[];
+export declare function summarizeByType(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): readonly ThreatTypeSummary[];
 //#endregion
-export { ThreatTypeSummary, calculateThreatScore, scoreForFinding, summarizeByType, verdictForScore };
 //# sourceMappingURL=scoring.d.mts.map

package/lib/threats/scoring.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"scoring.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/threats/scoring.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;wBAiDgB,gBAAgB,SAAS;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAqBzB,qBAAqB,mBAAmB;;;;;;;;;wBA8BxC,gBACf,eACA,SAAQ,eACN;;iBAOc;;WAEP,MAAM;;WAEN;;WAEA;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAaM,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,2BAA2B"}

package/lib/threats/scoring.mjs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS, DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY, SEVERITY_WEIGHTS } from
 //#region src/threats/scoring.ts
 /**
 * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.
+* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.

package/lib/threats/scoring.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"scoring.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/threats/scoring.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Anomaly scoring — turns a list of findings into a number and a\n * policy verdict.\n *\n * The point of scoring is that no single signature is trustworthy enough to reject a\n * request on its own. A lone low-confidence hit should raise a signal; a cluster of\n * high-confidence hits should stop the request. This is the model OWASP CRS uses —\n * anomaly score plus tunable thresholds — rather than one-rule-one-block, and it is\n * what makes per-route tuning possible: an operator raises `blockAt` for a field that\n * legitimately carries code samples instead of disabling detection wholesale.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/scoring\n */\n\nimport {\n\tCONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS,\n\tDEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY,\n\tSEVERITY_WEIGHTS,\n\ttype ThreatFinding,\n\ttype ThreatPolicy,\n\ttype ThreatType,\n\ttype ThreatVerdict,\n} from \"./types.js\";\n\n//#region Scoring\n\n/**\n * Points a single finding contributes: severity weight scaled by confidence.\n *\n * @param finding - The finding to weigh.\n * @returns A non-negative score contribution.\n */\nexport function scoreForFinding(finding: ThreatFinding): number {\n\treturn SEVERITY_WEIGHTS[finding.severity] * CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS[finding.confidence];\n}\n\n/**\n * Total anomaly score for a set of findings.\n *\n * Each **rule** counts once no matter how many variants it matched in. Without that\n * collapse a payload written as `%3Cscript%3E` would score twice — once for `raw` and\n * once for `percent_decoded` — penalizing an input for being encoded rather than for\n * what it contains.\n *\n * @param findings - Findings from one scan.\n * @returns The summed score; `0` for an empty list.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // one high/high finding (4 × 1.5) plus one medium/low finding (2 × 0.5)\n * calculateThreatScore(findings); // 7\n * ```\n */\nexport function calculateThreatScore(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): number {\n\tconst bestPerRule = new Map<string, number>();\n\n\tfor (const finding of findings) {\n\t\tconst score = scoreForFinding(finding);\n\t\tconst existing = bestPerRule.get(finding.ruleId);\n\t\tif (existing === undefined || score > existing) {\n\t\t\tbestPerRule.set(finding.ruleId, score);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlet total = 0;\n\tfor (const score of bestPerRule.values()) {\n\t\ttotal += score;\n\t}\n\treturn total;\n}\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Policy\n\n/**\n * Map a score onto a policy band.\n *\n * @param score - Output of {@link calculateThreatScore}.\n * @param policy - Thresholds. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY} — `review`\n *   at 4, `block` at 8.\n * @returns `\"allow\"`, `\"review\"`, or `\"block\"`.\n */\nexport function verdictForScore(\n\tscore: number,\n\tpolicy: ThreatPolicy = DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY,\n): ThreatVerdict {\n\tif (score >= policy.blockAt) return \"block\";\n\tif (score >= policy.reviewAt) return \"review\";\n\treturn \"allow\";\n}\n\n/** One category's contribution to a scan result. */\nexport interface ThreatTypeSummary {\n\t/** The weakness category. */\n\treadonly type: ThreatType;\n\t/** How many findings carried this category. */\n\treadonly count: number;\n\t/** Summed score contribution, before per-rule deduplication. */\n\treadonly score: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Summarize findings by weakness category, highest score first.\n *\n * Useful for dashboards and alert routing, where \"three SQL findings and one XSS\n * finding\" is more actionable than a flat list.\n *\n * @param findings - Findings from one scan.\n * @returns Category totals sorted by descending score, then by category name so ties\n *   are ordered deterministically.\n */\nexport function summarizeByType(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): readonly ThreatTypeSummary[] {\n\tconst totals = new Map<ThreatType, { count: number; score: number }>();\n\n\tfor (const finding of findings) {\n\t\tconst entry = totals.get(finding.type) ?? { count: 0, score: 0 };\n\t\tentry.count += 1;\n\t\tentry.score += scoreForFinding(finding);\n\t\ttotals.set(finding.type, entry);\n\t}\n\n\treturn [...totals.entries()]\n\t\t.map(([type, entry]) => ({ type, count: entry.count, score: entry.score }))\n\t\t.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score || a.type.localeCompare(b.type));\n}\n\n//#endregion\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgDA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,SAAgC;CAC/D,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,YAAY,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AAC5E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmBA,SAAgB,qBAAqB,UAA4C;CAChF,MAAM,8BAAc,IAAI,IAAoB;CAE5C,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;EAC/B,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,OAAO;EACrC,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;EAC/C,IAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,QAAQ,UACrC,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;CAEvC;CAEA,IAAI,QAAQ;CACZ,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,GACtC,SAAS;CAEV,OAAO;AACR;;;;;;;;;AAcA,SAAgB,gBACf,OACA,SAAuB,uBACP;CAChB,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;CACpC,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO;CACrC,OAAO;AACR;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,UAAkE;CACjG,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,IAAkD;CAErE,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;EAC/B,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;GAAE,OAAO;GAAG,OAAO;EAAE;EAC/D,MAAM,SAAS;EACf,MAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAO;EACtC,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK;CAC/B;CAEA,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAC1B,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY;EAAE;EAAM,OAAO,MAAM;EAAO,OAAO,MAAM;CAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAC1E,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AACnE"}
+{"version":3,"file":"scoring.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/threats/scoring.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Anomaly scoring — turns a list of findings into a number and a\n * policy verdict.\n *\n * The point of scoring is that no single signature is trustworthy enough to reject a\n * request on its own. A lone low-confidence hit should raise a signal; a cluster of\n * high-confidence hits should stop the request. This is the model OWASP CRS uses —\n * anomaly score plus tunable thresholds — rather than one-rule-one-block, and it is\n * what makes per-route tuning possible: an operator raises `blockAt` for a field that\n * legitimately carries code samples instead of disabling detection wholesale.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/scoring\n */\n\nimport {\n\tCONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS,\n\tDEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY,\n\tSEVERITY_WEIGHTS,\n\ttype ThreatFinding,\n\ttype ThreatPolicy,\n\ttype ThreatType,\n\ttype ThreatVerdict,\n} from \"./types.js\";\n\n//#region Scoring\n\n/**\n * Points a single finding contributes: severity weight scaled by confidence.\n *\n * @param finding - The finding to weigh.\n * @returns A non-negative score contribution.\n */\nexport function scoreForFinding(finding: ThreatFinding): number {\n\treturn SEVERITY_WEIGHTS[finding.severity] * CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS[finding.confidence];\n}\n\n/**\n * Total anomaly score for a set of findings.\n *\n * Each **rule** counts once no matter how many variants it matched in. Without that\n * collapse a payload written as `%3Cscript%3E` would score twice — once for `raw` and\n * once for `percent_decoded` — penalizing an input for being encoded rather than for\n * what it contains.\n *\n * @param findings - Findings from one scan.\n * @returns The summed score; `0` for an empty list.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // one high/high finding (4 × 1.5) plus one medium/low finding (2 × 0.5)\n * calculateThreatScore(findings); // 7\n * ```\n */\nexport function calculateThreatScore(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): number {\n\tconst bestPerRule = new Map<string, number>();\n\n\tfor (const finding of findings) {\n\t\tconst score = scoreForFinding(finding);\n\t\tconst existing = bestPerRule.get(finding.ruleId);\n\t\tif (existing === undefined || score > existing) {\n\t\t\tbestPerRule.set(finding.ruleId, score);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlet total = 0;\n\tfor (const score of bestPerRule.values()) {\n\t\ttotal += score;\n\t}\n\treturn total;\n}\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Policy\n\n/**\n * Map a score onto a policy band.\n *\n * @param score - Output of {@link calculateThreatScore}.\n * @param policy - Thresholds. Defaults to {@link DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY} — `review`\n *   at 4, `block` at 8.\n * @returns `\"allow\"`, `\"review\"`, or `\"block\"`.\n */\nexport function verdictForScore(\n\tscore: number,\n\tpolicy: ThreatPolicy = DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY,\n): ThreatVerdict {\n\tif (score >= policy.blockAt) return \"block\";\n\tif (score >= policy.reviewAt) return \"review\";\n\treturn \"allow\";\n}\n\n/** One category's contribution to a scan result. */\nexport interface ThreatTypeSummary {\n\t/** The weakness category. */\n\treadonly type: ThreatType;\n\t/** How many findings carried this category. */\n\treadonly count: number;\n\t/** Summed score contribution, before per-rule deduplication. */\n\treadonly score: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Summarize findings by weakness category, highest score first.\n *\n * Useful for dashboards and alert routing, where \"three SQL findings and one XSS\n * finding\" is more actionable than a flat list.\n *\n * @param findings - Findings from one scan.\n * @returns Category totals sorted by descending score, then by category name so ties\n *   are ordered deterministically.\n */\nexport function summarizeByType(findings: readonly ThreatFinding[]): readonly ThreatTypeSummary[] {\n\tconst totals = new Map<ThreatType, { count: number; score: number }>();\n\n\tfor (const finding of findings) {\n\t\tconst entry = totals.get(finding.type) ?? { count: 0, score: 0 };\n\t\tentry.count += 1;\n\t\tentry.score += scoreForFinding(finding);\n\t\ttotals.set(finding.type, entry);\n\t}\n\n\treturn [...totals.entries()]\n\t\t.map(([type, entry]) => ({ type, count: entry.count, score: entry.score }))\n\t\t.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score || a.type.localeCompare(b.type));\n}\n\n//#endregion\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiDA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,SAAgC;CAC/D,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,YAAY,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AAC5E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmBA,SAAgB,qBAAqB,UAA4C;CAChF,MAAM,8BAAc,IAAI,IAAoB;CAE5C,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;EAC/B,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,OAAO;EACrC,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;EAC/C,IAAI,aAAa,KAAA,KAAa,QAAQ,UACrC,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;CAEvC;CAEA,IAAI,QAAQ;CACZ,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,GACtC,SAAS;CAEV,OAAO;AACR;;;;;;;;;AAcA,SAAgB,gBACf,OACA,SAAuB,uBACP;CAChB,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;CACpC,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO;CACrC,OAAO;AACR;;;;;;;;;;;AAsBA,SAAgB,gBAAgB,UAAkE;CACjG,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,IAAkD;CAErE,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;EAC/B,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;GAAE,OAAO;GAAG,OAAO;EAAE;EAC/D,MAAM,SAAS;EACf,MAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAO;EACtC,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK;CAC/B;CAEA,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAC1B,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY;EAAE;EAAM,OAAO,MAAM;EAAO,OAAO,MAAM;CAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAC1E,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AACnE"}

package/lib/threats/types.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 //#region src/threats/types.d.ts
 /**
  * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@
  * Categories follow the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide's input-validation chapter
  * so findings map onto an established taxonomy rather than package-local names.
  */
-type ThreatType = "xss" | "sql_injection" | "nosql_injection" | "command_injection" | "path_traversal" | "prototype_pollution" | "homoglyph" | "header_injection" | "ldap_injection" | "xpath_injection" | "xml_injection" | "template_injection" | "file_inclusion" | "ssrf" | "formula_injection" | "log_injection" | "prompt_injection" | "parameter_pollution" | "credential_exposure" | "jwt_tampering" | "double_encoding" | "resource_abuse";
+export type ThreatType = "xss" | "sql_injection" | "nosql_injection" | "command_injection" | "path_traversal" | "prototype_pollution" | "homoglyph" | "header_injection" | "ldap_injection" | "xpath_injection" | "xml_injection" | "template_injection" | "file_inclusion" | "ssrf" | "formula_injection" | "log_injection" | "prompt_injection" | "parameter_pollution" | "credential_exposure" | "jwt_tampering" | "double_encoding" | "resource_abuse";
 /**
  * The sink a value is destined for. Rules declare which contexts they apply to, and
  * the scanner only evaluates rules matching the caller's declared contexts.
@@ -78,14 +79,14 @@ type ThreatType = "xss" | "sql_injection" | "nosql_injection" | "command_injecti
  * - `log` — written to a line-based or structured log sink.
  * - `llm_prompt` — concatenated into an LLM prompt or reachable by a tool-using agent.
  */
-type ThreatContext = "general_text" | "html" | "sql" | "nosql" | "shell" | "filesystem" | "url" | "url_parameter" | "http_header" | "jwt" | "identifier" | "object_merge" | "template" | "xml" | "ldap" | "xpath" | "spreadsheet" | "log" | "llm_prompt";
+export type ThreatContext = "general_text" | "html" | "sql" | "nosql" | "shell" | "filesystem" | "url" | "url_parameter" | "http_header" | "jwt" | "identifier" | "object_merge" | "template" | "xml" | "ldap" | "xpath" | "spreadsheet" | "log" | "llm_prompt";
 /** Every {@link ThreatContext} value, for iteration and "scan every sink" callers. */
-declare const ALL_THREAT_CONTEXTS: readonly ["general_text", "html", "sql", "nosql", "shell", "filesystem", "url", "url_parameter", "http_header", "jwt", "identifier", "object_merge", "template", "xml", "ldap", "xpath", "spreadsheet", "log", "llm_prompt"];
+export declare const ALL_THREAT_CONTEXTS: readonly ["general_text", "html", "sql", "nosql", "shell", "filesystem", "url", "url_parameter", "http_header", "jwt", "identifier", "object_merge", "template", "xml", "ldap", "xpath", "spreadsheet", "log", "llm_prompt"];
 /**
  * How bad the weakness is if the match is a true positive. Independent of how
  * likely the match is to *be* a true positive — that is {@link ThreatConfidence}.
  */
-type ThreatSeverity = "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
+export type ThreatSeverity = "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
 /**
  * How likely a match is to be a real attack rather than benign content that
  * happens to look like one.
@@ -94,13 +95,13 @@ type ThreatSeverity = "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
  * - `medium` — unusual in ordinary content but not impossible.
  * - `high` — has essentially no benign explanation in the declared context.
  */
-type ThreatConfidence = "low" | "medium" | "high";
+export type ThreatConfidence = "low" | "medium" | "high";
 /** Base anomaly points contributed by a finding, before the confidence multiplier. */
-declare const SEVERITY_WEIGHTS: Readonly<Record<ThreatSeverity, number>>;
+export declare const SEVERITY_WEIGHTS: Readonly<Record<ThreatSeverity, number>>;
 /** Scales {@link SEVERITY_WEIGHTS} by how trustworthy the signature is. */
-declare const CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS: Readonly<Record<ThreatConfidence, number>>;
+export declare const CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS: Readonly<Record<ThreatConfidence, number>>;
 /** Ordering helper for `minSeverity` filtering. Higher is worse. */
-declare const SEVERITY_ORDER: Readonly<Record<ThreatSeverity, number>>;
+export declare const SEVERITY_ORDER: Readonly<Record<ThreatSeverity, number>>;
 /**
  * Which representation of the input a rule matched against.
  *
@@ -110,9 +111,9 @@ declare const SEVERITY_ORDER: Readonly<Record<ThreatSeverity, number>>;
  * `../`" apart from "the request contained `%2e%2e%2f`, which only becomes `../` if
  * a downstream component decodes it".
  */
-type InputVariantKind = "raw" | "nfc" | "nfkc" | "percent_decoded" | "html_decoded";
+export type InputVariantKind = "raw" | "nfc" | "nfkc" | "percent_decoded" | "html_decoded";
 /** One representation of the scanned input. */
-interface InputVariant {
+export interface InputVariant {
   /** Which transformation produced {@link InputVariant.value}. */
   readonly kind: InputVariantKind;
   /** The transformed string. */
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ interface InputVariant {
  * and shared across every call — a stateful rule would silently skip matches on
  * alternating invocations. `assertRuleCatalogIsValid` enforces this at load time.
  */
-interface ThreatRule {
+export interface ThreatRule {
   /** Stable identifier (e.g. `PATH-TRAVERSAL-ENCODED-001`). Never reused once retired. */
   readonly id: string;
   /** Weakness category this rule evidences. */
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ interface ThreatRule {
   readonly variants?: readonly InputVariantKind[];
 }
 /** A rule that matched, plus where and in which representation. */
-interface ThreatFinding {
+export interface ThreatFinding {
   /** {@link ThreatRule.id} of the rule that fired. */
   readonly ruleId: string;
   /** Copied from the rule — the weakness category. */
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ interface ThreatFinding {
  * bound to a SQL query" is a bug report, while "SQL keywords arriving in a query
  * parameter from one account, forty times in a minute" is an incident.
  */
-type InputSource = "http.query" | "http.body" | "http.header" | "http.path" | "http.cookie" | "websocket.message" | "cli.argument" | "file.upload" | "database" | "external.api" | "internal";
+export type InputSource = "http.query" | "http.body" | "http.header" | "http.path" | "http.cookie" | "websocket.message" | "cli.argument" | "file.upload" | "database" | "external.api" | "internal";
 /**
  * Who and what a scan belongs to, carried through so findings can be correlated.
  *
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ type InputSource = "http.query" | "http.body" | "http.header" | "http.path" | "h
  * an opaque identifier rather than an email address, or redact downstream with
  * `sanitizeForLogging`.
  */
-interface EventContext {
+export interface EventContext {
   /** Correlates every finding raised while handling one request. */
   readonly requestId?: string;
   /** The authenticated principal, if any. Opaque — never an email address. */
@@ -230,16 +231,15 @@ interface EventContext {
  * not reject a form submission. This mirrors how OWASP CRS uses anomaly scoring with
  * tunable thresholds instead of one-rule-one-block.
  */
-type ThreatVerdict = "allow" | "review" | "block";
+export type ThreatVerdict = "allow" | "review" | "block";
 /** Score thresholds separating {@link ThreatVerdict} bands. */
-interface ThreatPolicy {
+export interface ThreatPolicy {
   /** Score at or above which the verdict becomes `review`. Default `4`. */
   readonly reviewAt: number;
   /** Score at or above which the verdict becomes `block`. Default `8`. */
   readonly blockAt: number;
 }
 /** Default thresholds: one high/high finding reviews, one critical finding blocks. */
-declare const DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY: ThreatPolicy;
+export declare const DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY: ThreatPolicy;
 //#endregion
-export { ALL_THREAT_CONTEXTS, CONFIDENCE_MULTIPLIERS, DEFAULT_THREAT_POLICY, EventContext, InputSource, InputVariant, InputVariantKind, SEVERITY_ORDER, SEVERITY_WEIGHTS, ThreatConfidence, ThreatContext, ThreatFinding, ThreatPolicy, ThreatRule, ThreatSeverity, ThreatType, ThreatVerdict };
 //# sourceMappingURL=types.d.mts.map

package/lib/threats/types.d.mts.map

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