@resq-systems/security 1.0.5 → 2.0.0

package/lib/threats/rules/protocol.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"protocol.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/protocol.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Protocol- and token-level signatures: HTTP parameter pollution,\n * credential exposure, and JWT tampering.\n *\n * `credential_exposure` inverts the direction of every other category in the catalog.\n * The rest detect a hostile value arriving; these detect the application's own secret\n * *leaving* — in a URL it is about to fetch, or a line it is about to log. Both are\n * outbound sinks, so the context model still fits, but the user-facing message must\n * not accuse the submitter of anything.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/protocol\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region HTTP parameter pollution\n\n/**\n * Parameter pollution.\n *\n * Only the *injected-parameter* half is detectable here. Duplicate-key pollution —\n * `?id=1&id=2` exploiting parser disagreement between ASP.NET, PHP, and Servlet\n * stacks — is not: the engine sees one string and never the parameter map, and\n * duplicate keys are legal and routine (`?tag=a&tag=b`). That half is a parsing\n * decision, documented as such rather than faked with a signature.\n */\nexport const PARAMETER_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PARAM-POLLUTION-PRIVILEGED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"parameter_pollution\",\n\t\t// `url_parameter`, never `url`. In a whole URL `&role=` is ordinary grammar;\n\t\t// inside a single value about to be concatenated into a query string it is an\n\t\t// injected parameter. Attaching these to `url` produced measured false positives\n\t\t// on `?sku=99&color=red` and on OAuth authorize URLs.\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url_parameter\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Injected parameter naming a privilege, price, or credential field\",\n\t\tcwe: 235,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Build query strings with URLSearchParams or encodeURIComponent per value; read parameters through one parser and reject duplicate keys server-side\",\n\t\t// `client_id`, `scope`, `state`, `next`, `redirect`, `callback`, and `lang` are\n\t\t// deliberately absent — that exclusion is what lets nested OAuth URLs pass.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[&;][a-z0-9_.[-]{0,24}(?:role|is_?admin|admin|user_?id|userid|uid|account_?id|amount|price|total|quantity|qty|access_?token|api_?key|apikey|client_?secret|secret|password|passwd|pwd|session_?id|sessionid|signature|hmac|permissions?|privilege|is_?staff|superuser|debug)[\\]\"']{0,2}\\s{0,4}=/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PARAM-POLLUTION-APPEND-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"parameter_pollution\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url_parameter\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Value appends an additional query parameter\",\n\t\tcwe: 235,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Build query strings with URLSearchParams or encodeURIComponent per value; read parameters through one parser and reject duplicate keys server-side\",\n\t\t// `&`-only: including `;` fired on connection strings (`Server=a;Database=b`),\n\t\t// so `;`-separated pollution against a non-privileged name stays undetected.\n\t\t// The `^[^?]{0,256}` guard keeps nested `redirect_uri` values from firing, but\n\t\t// it is positional — a bare sub-query with no leading `?` still matches. Graded\n\t\t// medium/low (1.0) so it never reaches review on its own.\n\t\tpattern: /^[^?]{0,256}&[a-z_][a-z0-9_.-]{1,48}(?:\\[[a-z0-9_.-]{0,32}\\])?\\s{0,4}=/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Credential exposure\n\n/** Repeated across the URL-borne credential rules. */\nconst CRED_URL_CONTROL =\n\t\"Carry credentials in the Authorization header or a POST body, never a query string; set Referrer-Policy: no-referrer and rotate any token that reached a URL\";\n\n/** Repeated across the log-borne credential rules. */\nconst CRED_LOG_CONTROL =\n\t\"Log structured records with an allowlist of loggable fields; redact by key with safeStringify\";\n\n/**\n * Credential material appearing where it will be stored, logged, or sent onward.\n *\n * A generic `password=…` / `api_key: …` assignment rule was written and then dropped:\n * it produced false positives on every realistic log line of the form\n * `\"api_key: required for this endpoint\"` and `\"validation failed: password: too_short\"`.\n * Shipping it weakened would trade the category's credibility for coverage.\n */\nexport const CREDENTIAL_EXPOSURE_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CRED-URL-QUERY-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"credential_exposure\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\", \"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Credential-bearing query parameter — leaks via Referer, proxies, and logs\",\n\t\tcwe: 598,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CRED_URL_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `sid`, `auth`, `key`, and bare `token` are excluded: `?sid=` is routinely a\n\t\t// store identifier. `sig`/`signature`/`X-Amz-*` are excluded because S3\n\t\t// presigned URLs legitimately carry them.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[?&](?:access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|id[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|api[_-]?key|api[_-]?secret|client[_-]?secret|secret[_-]?key|session[_-]?id|session[_-]?token|jsessionid|phpsessid|password|passwd|pwd)=[^&#\\s]{4,256}/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CRED-AUTH-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"credential_exposure\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Authorization header value written to a log\",\n\t\tcwe: 532,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CRED_LOG_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:proxy-)?authorization\\s{0,4}:\\s{0,4}(?:bearer|basic|digest|token|apikey)\\s{0,4}[A-Za-z0-9+/=._~-]{8,512}/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CRED-JWT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"credential_exposure\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\", \"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"JSON Web Token in a URL or log line\",\n\t\tcwe: 522,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CRED_URL_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,400}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,400}\\./,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CRED-PROVIDER-KEY-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"credential_exposure\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\", \"log\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Provider API key or personal access token\",\n\t\tcwe: 532,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Load provider keys from a secret manager, never from source or a URL; rotate immediately on exposure\",\n\t\t// Case-sensitive by design — an `i` flag collides with ordinary hex digests.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b|\\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\\b|\\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,82}\\b|\\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,120}|\\bsk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,64}\\b|\\bsk-(?:ant|proj)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,120}/,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Double encoding\n\n/**\n * Double percent-encoding.\n *\n * `%253Cscript%253E` decodes once to `%3Cscript%3E` and twice to `<script>`. The\n * scanner decodes once, so the payload was invisible to every signature — verified at\n * 0/allow before this rule existed. The traversal case had an explicit\n * `%252e%252e%252f` rule; nothing covered the general class.\n *\n * Its own category rather than a subtype of whatever it eventually decodes to: at scan\n * time the eventual sink is unknown, and the signal — \"this input is shaped to survive\n * one decoding pass\" — is itself the finding. The real fix is to decode exactly once,\n * at a defined boundary, and never again.\n */\nexport const DOUBLE_ENCODING_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\t// The sibling rule below matches the form where only the percent sign is\n\t\t// re-encoded. Encoding the hex digits as well yields the same byte after two\n\t\t// decodes, and is invisible to a pattern that expects those digits to follow the\n\t\t// escaped percent literally. Measured: the half-encoded spelling of a script tag\n\t\t// scored review, while the fully-encoded spelling of the identical payload\n\t\t// scored zero.\n\t\tid: \"ENCODING-DOUBLE-PERCENT-002\",\n\t\ttype: \"double_encoding\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\", \"url_parameter\", \"html\", \"filesystem\", \"sql\", \"http_header\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent sign and its hex digits each encoded separately\",\n\t\tcwe: 177,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Decode exactly once at a defined boundary and never re-decode; reject input that still contains an escape prefix after decoding\",\n\t\tpattern: /%25%[0-9a-f]{2}%[0-9a-f]{2}/i,\n\t},\n\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"ENCODING-DOUBLE-PERCENT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"double_encoding\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\", \"url_parameter\", \"html\", \"filesystem\", \"sql\", \"http_header\", \"xml\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Escape prefix that decodes to a metacharacter only after a second pass\",\n\t\tcwe: 177,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Decode exactly once at a defined boundary and never re-decode; reject input that still contains an escape prefix after decoding\",\n\t\t// Only sequences decoding to a character with syntactic meaning: space, quote,\n\t\t// percent, apostrophe, parens, dot, slash, angle brackets, semicolon, ampersand,\n\t\t// equals, backslash, NUL, CR, LF. A bare `%25` is not enough — \"100%25 off\" is\n\t\t// an ordinary encoded string and must not fire.\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t\tpattern: /%25(?:2[0257CEFcef]|3[CEce]|22|26|27|28|29|3[BbDd]|5[Cc]|00|0[ADad])/,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region JWT\n\n/** Repeated across the JWT rules. */\nconst JWT_CONTROL =\n\t\"Verify with an explicit algorithm allowlist (jwtVerify(token, key, { algorithms: ['RS256'] })); never let the token's own header select the algorithm, and reject 'none' unconditionally\";\n\n/**\n * JWT tampering.\n *\n * Scoped to the unsecured-token case alone. `kid`, `jku`, and `x5u` injection are\n * *already covered* — extract the claim and declare its real sink, and the existing\n * rules fire: `kid=../../../../dev/null` with `filesystem` hits PATH-TRAVERSAL-001,\n * `jku=http://169.254.169.254/` with `url` hits SSRF-METADATA-001. Re-scanning a whole\n * opaque token with every detector would be the run-everything-against-everything\n * anti-pattern the engine exists to avoid.\n */\nexport const JWT_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"JWT-ALG-NONE-UNSECURED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"jwt_tampering\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"jwt\", \"http_header\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Unsecured JWT — three segments with an empty signature\",\n\t\tcwe: 347,\n\t\tprimaryControl: JWT_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Structural, not lexical. RFC 7519 §6.1 requires an empty signature segment,\n\t\t// so this is immune to base64 alignment, key ordering, whitespace, and `alg`\n\t\t// casing — all of which change how `\"alg\":\"none\"` encodes (`hbGciOiJub25l`,\n\t\t// `YWxnIjoibm9uZ`, `ImFsZyI6Im5vbmUi`, depending on offset mod 3).\n\t\t// Requiring `eyJ` on *both* segments, not just `ey`, removes false positives on\n\t\t// filenames such as `eyewitness_statement_final.v2.`.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^|[\\s,;=(\"'[])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,2000}\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,4000}\\.(?:$|[\\s,;)\"'\\]&#])/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"JWT-ALG-NONE-HEADER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"jwt_tampering\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"jwt\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Decoded JWT header selecting the 'none' algorithm\",\n\t\tcwe: 347,\n\t\tprimaryControl: JWT_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Covers what the structural rule cannot: `alg:none` carrying a non-empty\n\t\t// signature, which naive verifiers still accept.\n\t\tpattern: /\"alg\"\\s{0,8}:\\s{0,8}\"\\s{0,8}none\\s{0,8}\"/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AA0CA,MAAa,4BAAmD,CAC/D;CACC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CAKN,UAAU,CAAC,eAAe;CAC1B,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBACC;CAGD,SACC;AACF,GACA;CACC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CACN,UAAU,CAAC,eAAe;CAC1B,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBACC;CAMD,SAAS;AACV,CACD;;AAOA,MAAM,mBACL;;;;;;;;;AAcD,MAAa,4BAAmD;CAC/D;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAIhB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;EAChB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SACC;CACF;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBAAgB;EAChB,SAAS;CACV;CACA;EACC,IAAI;EACJ,MAAM;EACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;EACvB,UAAU;EACV,YAAY;EACZ,aAAa;EACb,KAAK;EACL,gBACC;EAED,SACC;CACF;AACD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmBA,MAAa,wBAA+C,CAC3D;CAOC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CACN,UAAU;EAAC;EAAO;EAAiB;EAAQ;EAAc;EAAO;EAAe;CAAK;CACpF,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBACC;CACD,SAAS;AACV,GAEA;CACC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CACN,UAAU;EAAC;EAAO;EAAiB;EAAQ;EAAc;EAAO;EAAe;CAAK;CACpF,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBACC;CAKD,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CAChB,SAAS;AACV,CACD;;AAOA,MAAM,cACL;;;;;;;;;;;AAYD,MAAa,YAAmC,CAC/C;CACC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CACN,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,aAAa;CAC/B,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBAAgB;CAOhB,SACC;AACF,GACA;CACC,IAAI;CACJ,MAAM;CACN,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;CAChB,UAAU;CACV,YAAY;CACZ,aAAa;CACb,KAAK;CACL,gBAAgB;CAGhB,SAAS;AACV,CACD"}

package/lib/threats/rules/system.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { ThreatRule } from "../types.mjs";
+//#region src/threats/rules/system.d.ts
+/** OS command injection. Scoped to the `shell` context — never runs elsewhere. */
+declare const COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/** Directory-traversal and sensitive-path signatures. Scoped to `filesystem`. */
+declare const PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/** Local/remote file inclusion via stream wrappers and alternate schemes. */
+declare const FILE_INCLUSION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/**
+ * Server-side request forgery.
+ *
+ * These signatures cover literal addresses only. A hostname whose DNS record
+ * resolves to `169.254.169.254` passes every rule here — which is exactly why
+ * {@link SSRF_CONTROL} names resolution and egress control as the real defense.
+ */
+declare const SSRF_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+//#endregion
+export { COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES, FILE_INCLUSION_RULES, PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES, SSRF_RULES };
+//# sourceMappingURL=system.d.mts.map

package/lib/threats/rules/system.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"system.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/system.ts"],"mappings":";;;cA4Ca,kCAAkC;;cA8HlC,+BAA+B;;cA2J/B,+BAA+B;;;;;;;;cAiF/B,qBAAqB"}

package/lib/threats/rules/system.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+//#region src/threats/rules/system.ts
+/** Repeated across every command-injection rule. */
+const CMD_CONTROL = "Spawn with an argv array and shell:false; never build a shell string from input";
+/** OS command injection. Scoped to the `shell` context — never runs elsewhere. */
+const COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES = [
+	{
+		id: "CMD-SUBSTITUTION-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Shell command substitution $(...)",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\$\([^()]{1,200}\)/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-BACKTICK-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Backtick command substitution",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /`[^`]{1,200}`/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-CHAIN-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Command separator followed by a state-changing or network command",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /[;&|]{1,2}\s{0,8}(?:rm|del|cat|type|wget|curl|nc|ncat|bash|sh|zsh|powershell|pwsh|python[23]?|perl|ruby|chmod|chown|kill|shutdown|reboot|mkfifo|base64|openssl)\b/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-PIPE-SHELL-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Output piped into a shell interpreter",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\|\s{0,8}(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\b/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-REDIRECT-SYSTEM-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Redirection into a system directory",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: />\s{0,8}\/(?:etc|dev|proc|sys|boot)\//
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-WORD-SPLIT-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Shell word-splitting construct standing in for a space",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\$\{IFS\}|\{\s{0,4},\s{0,4}\}/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-QUOTE-SPLIT-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "medium",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Empty quote pair inside a word, removed by the shell before execution",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /[a-z](?:""|'')[a-z]/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-ENV-EXPANSION-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "medium",
+		confidence: "low",
+		description: "Shell parameter expansion",
+		cwe: 78,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\$\{[^{}]{1,200}\}/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "CMD-ARG-NEWLINE-001",
+		type: "command_injection",
+		contexts: ["shell"],
+		severity: "medium",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Line break in a value destined for a command line",
+		cwe: 88,
+		primaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /[\r\n]/
+	}
+];
+/** Repeated across every path-traversal rule. */
+const PATH_CONTROL = "Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath); resolve symlinks before use";
+/** Directory-traversal and sensitive-path signatures. Scoped to `filesystem`. */
+const PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES = [
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Parent-directory segment",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /(?:^|[/\\])\.\.(?:[/\\]|$)/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-ENCODED-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Percent-encoded parent-directory traversal",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /%2e%2e(?:%2f|%5c|\/|\\)/i,
+		variants: ["raw"]
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-MIXED-ENCODED-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Literal dots with a percent-encoded separator",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\.\.(?:%2f|%5c)/i,
+		variants: ["raw"]
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-DOUBLE-ENCODED-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Double percent-encoded parent-directory traversal",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /%252e%252e(?:%252f|%255c)/i,
+		variants: ["raw"]
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-OVERLONG-UTF8-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Overlong UTF-8 encoding of a path separator",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /%c0%(?:af|2f)|%e0%80%af|%c1%9c/i,
+		variants: ["raw"]
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-NULL-BYTE-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "NUL byte, used to truncate a path before its extension check",
+		cwe: 158,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /%00|\u0000/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-FILTER-STRIP-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Dot run that survives a naive ../ stripping filter",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: "Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath). Never sanitize by stripping '../' — stripping is precisely what this payload targets: '....//' becomes '../' after one pass.",
+		pattern: /(?:^|[/\\])\.{3,200}[/\\]/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-TRAVERSAL-PARAM-BYPASS-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Path parameter segment used to bypass a gateway path ACL",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: "Ensure the proxy and the origin agree on path normalization before authorization is applied; resolve and verify containment with resolveContainedPath",
+		pattern: /(?:^|[/\\])\.\.;[^/\\]{0,64}[/\\]/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-SENSITIVE-UNIX-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Reference to a sensitive Unix path",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/(?:etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|proc\/self|root\/\.ssh)\b/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-SENSITIVE-WINDOWS-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Reference to a sensitive Windows path",
+		cwe: 22,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /[a-z]:[\\/]{1,2}(?:windows|winnt)[\\/]{1,2}(?:system32|win\.ini|repair)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "PATH-ABSOLUTE-001",
+		type: "path_traversal",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "medium",
+		confidence: "low",
+		description: "Absolute path where a relative one is expected",
+		cwe: 36,
+		primaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /^(?:\/|[a-z]:[\\/]|\\\\)/i
+	}
+];
+/** Repeated across every file-inclusion rule. */
+const LFI_CONTROL = "Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module or template path from input";
+/** Adds the remote-fetch half of the control, for the RFI rules. */
+const RFI_CONTROL = "Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module, template, or file path from input. Disable remote stream wrappers (PHP allow_url_fopen/allow_url_include) and reject any candidate not relative to the configured base directory";
+/** Local/remote file inclusion via stream wrappers and alternate schemes. */
+const FILE_INCLUSION_RULES = [
+	{
+		id: "LFI-PHP-WRAPPER-001",
+		type: "file_inclusion",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "PHP stream wrapper used to read or execute source",
+		cwe: 98,
+		primaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\bphp:\/\/(?:filter|input|memory|temp|stdin)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "LFI-WRAPPER-001",
+		type: "file_inclusion",
+		contexts: ["filesystem", "url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Alternate stream wrapper capable of loading remote or archived content",
+		cwe: 98,
+		primaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\b(?:expect|zip|phar|glob|dict|gopher|netdoc|jar|ogg):\/\//i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "RFI-REMOTE-SCHEME-001",
+		type: "file_inclusion",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Remote scheme where a local path was expected",
+		cwe: 98,
+		primaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /(?:^\s{0,8}|[/\\=])(?:https?|ftps?|smb|cifs|nfs|webdav|ssh2|rar|zlib|compress\.(?:zlib|bzip2)):\/\//i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "RFI-DATA-URI-001",
+		type: "file_inclusion",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "data: URI where a local path was expected",
+		cwe: 98,
+		primaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /(?:^\s{0,8}|[/\\=])data:(?:\/\/)?(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,32}\/[a-z0-9+.-]{1,32}[a-z0-9;=+.-]{0,32}|;base64|),/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "RFI-REMOTE-HOST-PATH-001",
+		type: "file_inclusion",
+		contexts: ["filesystem"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Protocol-relative or UNC host path where a local path was expected",
+		cwe: 98,
+		primaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /^\s{0,8}(?:\/\/|\\\\)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(?:\.[a-z0-9-]{1,63}){1,4}[/\\]/i
+	}
+];
+/** Repeated across every SSRF rule. */
+const SSRF_CONTROL = "Gate the request with assertOutboundUrl, re-validate after every redirect, and constrain egress at the network layer";
+/**
+* Server-side request forgery.
+*
+* These signatures cover literal addresses only. A hostname whose DNS record
+* resolves to `169.254.169.254` passes every rule here — which is exactly why
+* {@link SSRF_CONTROL} names resolution and egress control as the real defense.
+*/
+const SSRF_RULES = [
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-LOOPBACK-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "URL host is a loopback address",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:127(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\.0\.0\.0|\[?::1\]?)(?::\d{1,5})?(?:[/?#]|$)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-PRIVATE-RANGE-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "URL host is in an RFC 1918 private range",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:10(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}|192\.168(?:\.\d{1,3}){2}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])(?:\.\d{1,3}){2})/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-METADATA-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "URL targets a cloud instance metadata endpoint",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:169\.254(?:\.\d{1,3}){2}|metadata\.google\.internal|metadata\.goog)\b/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-ALT-IP-ENCODING-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Host written as a decimal, octal, or hex integer to evade address filters",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:0x[0-9a-f]{6,8}|0\d{6,11}|\d{8,10})(?:[:/?#]|$)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-USERINFO-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "medium",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Userinfo segment, used to disguise the true host",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/[^/@\s]{1,128}@/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-NON-HTTP-SCHEME-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Non-HTTP scheme in a fetchable URL",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /^\s{0,8}(?:file|gopher|dict|tftp|ldaps?|jar|netdoc|sftp):/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-USERINFO-INTERNAL-HOST-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Internal address in the host position behind a userinfo segment",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /@(?:127(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\.0\.0\.0|169\.254(?:\.\d{1,3}){2}|10(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}|192\.168(?:\.\d{1,3}){2}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])(?:\.\d{1,3}){2})(?=[:/?#]|$)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-SUFFIXED-LOOPBACK-HOST-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Loopback literal used as a hostname prefix",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:127(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\.0\.0\.0)\.[a-z]/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-METADATA-ALT-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "critical",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Alibaba Cloud or Oracle Cloud instance metadata endpoint",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:100\.100\.100\.200|192\.0\.0\.192)(?=[:/?#]|$)/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-IPV6-INTERNAL-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "IPv6 loopback, unique-local, or link-local literal",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /(?:\/\/|@)\[(?:::|(?:0{1,4}:){2,7}0{0,3}[01]|f[cd][0-9a-f]{0,2}:[0-9a-f:]{0,32}|fe[89ab][0-9a-f]?:[0-9a-f:]{0,32})\]/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-IPV4-MAPPED-INTERNAL-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal carrying an internal address",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /(?:\/\/|@)\[::ffff:(?:127\.|10\.|169\.254\.|192\.168\.|0\.0\.0\.0|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|7f[0-9a-f]{2}:|a9fe:|c0a8:)/i
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-SHORT-IP-FORM-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "medium",
+		description: "Abbreviated or octal IPv4 form resolving to a loopback address",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:127\.\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3})?|0|0\d{2,3}(?:\.0*\d{1,3}){3})(?=[:/?#]|$)/
+	},
+	{
+		id: "SSRF-WILDCARD-DNS-HOST-001",
+		type: "ssrf",
+		contexts: ["url"],
+		severity: "high",
+		confidence: "high",
+		description: "Wildcard-DNS service that resolves an arbitrary address from the hostname",
+		cwe: 918,
+		primaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,
+		pattern: /\/\/(?:[^/\s]{0,64}\.)?(?:nip\.io|sslip\.io|localtest\.me|lvh\.me|vcap\.me|xip\.io|localho\.st|traefik\.me)(?=[:/?#]|$)/i
+	}
+];
+//#endregion
+export { COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES, FILE_INCLUSION_RULES, PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES, SSRF_RULES };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=system.mjs.map

package/lib/threats/rules/system.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"system.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/threats/rules/system.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Copyright 2026 ResQ Systems, Inc.\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * @fileoverview Host-facing signatures: OS command injection, path traversal, file\n * inclusion, and server-side request forgery.\n *\n * Two of these categories are only weakly served by signatures, and the rules say so\n * in their `primaryControl`:\n *\n * - **Path traversal** is prevented by canonicalizing the candidate path and\n *   verifying it stays beneath the allowed base directory — see `resolveContainedPath`\n *   in `@resq-systems/security/paths`. Detection catches `../`; it does not catch a\n *   symlink, nor an absolute path that happens to resolve inside the base.\n * - **SSRF** is prevented by parsing the URL, resolving the host, rejecting private\n *   and link-local ranges, re-validating after every redirect, and constraining\n *   network egress. A regex over the URL string catches a literal `127.0.0.1` but\n *   never a hostname whose DNS record points there.\n *\n * @module @resq-systems/security/threats/rules/system\n */\n\nimport type { ThreatRule } from \"../types.js\";\n\n//#region Command injection\n\n/** Repeated across every command-injection rule. */\nconst CMD_CONTROL =\n\t\"Spawn with an argv array and shell:false; never build a shell string from input\";\n\n/** OS command injection. Scoped to the `shell` context — never runs elsewhere. */\nexport const COMMAND_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-SUBSTITUTION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell command substitution $(...)\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `(` excluded alongside `)` so a run of `$(` cannot make the engine consume\n\t\t// 200 characters and backtrack at every position. A nested `$(a $(b))` still\n\t\t// matches on the inner substitution.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\([^()]{1,200}\\)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-BACKTICK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Backtick command substitution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /`[^`]{1,200}`/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-CHAIN-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Command separator followed by a state-changing or network command\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/[;&|]{1,2}\\s{0,8}(?:rm|del|cat|type|wget|curl|nc|ncat|bash|sh|zsh|powershell|pwsh|python[23]?|perl|ruby|chmod|chown|kill|shutdown|reboot|mkfifo|base64|openssl)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-PIPE-SHELL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Output piped into a shell interpreter\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\|\\s{0,8}(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|cmd|powershell|pwsh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-REDIRECT-SYSTEM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Redirection into a system directory\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: />\\s{0,8}\\/(?:etc|dev|proc|sys|boot)\\//,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// Commix documents both as filter bypasses against defences that block spaces:\n\t\t// each expands to a word separator, so a command survives a filter that only\n\t\t// looks for whitespace between tokens.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-WORD-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell word-splitting construct standing in for a space\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{IFS\\}|\\{\\s{0,4},\\s{0,4}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\t// The shell removes an empty quote pair before execution, so a command name split\n\t\t// by one still runs while defeating a literal match on that name.\n\t\t//\n\t\t// Deliberately narrower than Commix's full set: the equivalent backslash form is\n\t\t// NOT matched, because it is indistinguishable from an ordinary Windows-style\n\t\t// relative path, and a rule firing on those would be disabled by the first person\n\t\t// it inconvenienced.\n\t\tid: \"CMD-QUOTE-SPLIT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Empty quote pair inside a word, removed by the shell before execution\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z](?:\"\"|'')[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ENV-EXPANSION-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Shell parameter expansion\",\n\t\tcwe: 78,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `{` excluded alongside `}` for the same backtracking reason as above.\n\t\tpattern: /\\$\\{[^{}]{1,200}\\}/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"CMD-ARG-NEWLINE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"command_injection\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"shell\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Line break in a value destined for a command line\",\n\t\tcwe: 88,\n\t\tprimaryControl: CMD_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /[\\r\\n]/,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region Path traversal\n\n/** Repeated across every path-traversal rule. */\nconst PATH_CONTROL =\n\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath); resolve symlinks before use\";\n\n/** Directory-traversal and sensitive-path signatures. Scoped to `filesystem`. */\nexport const PATH_TRAVERSAL_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Parent-directory segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Anchored to segment boundaries so `my..file/` and `v1..v2` do not fire.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.(?:[/\\\\]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The previous catalog wrote `/%2e%2e[%2f%5c]/`, whose character class matches\n\t\t// a single character from {%, 2, f, 5, c} — so it fired on `%2e%2e%` and on\n\t\t// `%2e%2e2`, and expressed nothing about the intended separator alternation.\n\t\tpattern: /%2e%2e(?:%2f|%5c|\\/|\\\\)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-MIXED-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Literal dots with a percent-encoded separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\.\\.(?:%2f|%5c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-DOUBLE-ENCODED-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Double percent-encoded parent-directory traversal\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%252e%252e(?:%252f|%255c)/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-OVERLONG-UTF8-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Overlong UTF-8 encoding of a path separator\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /%c0%(?:af|2f)|%e0%80%af|%c1%9c/i,\n\t\tvariants: [\"raw\"],\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-NULL-BYTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"NUL byte, used to truncate a path before its extension check\",\n\t\tcwe: 158,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: matching the NUL byte is this rule's entire purpose\n\t\tpattern: /%00|\\u0000/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-FILTER-STRIP-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Dot run that survives a naive ../ stripping filter\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Resolve the candidate against the base directory and verify containment (resolveContainedPath). Never sanitize by stripping '../' — stripping is precisely what this payload targets: '....//' becomes '../' after one pass.\",\n\t\t// PATH-TRAVERSAL-001 requires exactly two dots between boundaries, so `....//`\n\t\t// and `.../` walked past it. Bounded at 200 because a longer run is already\n\t\t// reported by the engine's repetition check.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.{3,200}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-TRAVERSAL-PARAM-BYPASS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Path parameter segment used to bypass a gateway path ACL\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl:\n\t\t\t\"Ensure the proxy and the origin agree on path normalization before authorization is applied; resolve and verify containment with resolveContainedPath\",\n\t\t// `..;/` — Tomcat and Spring treat `;` as starting a path parameter, so the\n\t\t// segment normalizes to `..` at the origin while the gateway sees a literal name.\n\t\tpattern: /(?:^|[/\\\\])\\.\\.;[^/\\\\]{0,64}[/\\\\]/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-UNIX-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Unix path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/(?:etc\\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|hosts)|proc\\/self|root\\/\\.ssh)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-SENSITIVE-WINDOWS-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Reference to a sensitive Windows path\",\n\t\tcwe: 22,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Requires a system subdirectory. The old rule was a bare `/C:\\\\Windows/gi`,\n\t\t// which fired on any documentation that merely mentioned the folder.\n\t\tpattern: /[a-z]:[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:windows|winnt)[\\\\/]{1,2}(?:system32|win\\.ini|repair)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"PATH-ABSOLUTE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"path_traversal\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"low\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Absolute path where a relative one is expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 36,\n\t\tprimaryControl: PATH_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^(?:\\/|[a-z]:[\\\\/]|\\\\\\\\)/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region File inclusion\n\n/** Repeated across every file-inclusion rule. */\nconst LFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module or template path from input\";\n\n/** Adds the remote-fetch half of the control, for the RFI rules. */\nconst RFI_CONTROL =\n\t\"Map the request to a fixed allowlist of loadable resources; never derive a module, template, or file path from input. Disable remote stream wrappers (PHP allow_url_fopen/allow_url_include) and reject any candidate not relative to the configured base directory\";\n\n/** Local/remote file inclusion via stream wrappers and alternate schemes. */\nexport const FILE_INCLUSION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-PHP-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"PHP stream wrapper used to read or execute source\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\bphp:\\/\\/(?:filter|input|memory|temp|stdin)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"LFI-WRAPPER-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\", \"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alternate stream wrapper capable of loading remote or archived content\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: LFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:expect|zip|phar|glob|dict|gopher|netdoc|jar|ogg):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\t// `filesystem` only. The SSRF rules already own `url`; this is about a value\n\t\t// that was supposed to be a *path* and instead names a remote resource.\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Remote scheme where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])(?:https?|ftps?|smb|cifs|nfs|webdav|ssh2|rar|zlib|compress\\.(?:zlib|bzip2)):\\/\\//i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-DATA-URI-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"data: URI where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The class is ordered `[a-z0-9+.-]` deliberately: writing `[a-z0-9.+-]` embeds\n\t\t// the literal substring `.+`, which the ReDoS structural test rejects.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:^\\s{0,8}|[/\\\\=])data:(?:\\/\\/)?(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,32}\\/[a-z0-9+.-]{1,32}[a-z0-9;=+.-]{0,32}|;base64|),/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"RFI-REMOTE-HOST-PATH-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"file_inclusion\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"filesystem\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Protocol-relative or UNC host path where a local path was expected\",\n\t\tcwe: 98,\n\t\tprimaryControl: RFI_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Re-grades rather than newly detects: PATH-ABSOLUTE-001 already matches these\n\t\t// at low confidence, contributing 1.0 — not enough to leave the allow band.\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:\\/\\/|\\\\\\\\)[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(?:\\.[a-z0-9-]{1,63}){1,4}[/\\\\]/i,\n\t},\n];\n\n//#endregion\n\n//#region SSRF\n\n/** Repeated across every SSRF rule. */\nconst SSRF_CONTROL =\n\t\"Gate the request with assertOutboundUrl, re-validate after every redirect, and constrain egress at the network layer\";\n\n/**\n * Server-side request forgery.\n *\n * These signatures cover literal addresses only. A hostname whose DNS record\n * resolves to `169.254.169.254` passes every rule here — which is exactly why\n * {@link SSRF_CONTROL} names resolution and egress control as the real defense.\n */\nexport const SSRF_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-LOOPBACK-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[?::1\\]?)(?::\\d{1,5})?(?:[/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-PRIVATE-RANGE-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL host is in an RFC 1918 private range\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/\\/\\/(?:10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"URL targets a cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|metadata\\.google\\.internal|metadata\\.goog)\\b/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-ALT-IP-ENCODING-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Host written as a decimal, octal, or hex integer to evade address filters\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:0x[0-9a-f]{6,8}|0\\d{6,11}|\\d{8,10})(?:[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"medium\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Userinfo segment, used to disguise the true host\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/[^/@\\s]{1,128}@/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-NON-HTTP-SCHEME-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Non-HTTP scheme in a fetchable URL\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /^\\s{0,8}(?:file|gopher|dict|tftp|ldaps?|jar|netdoc|sftp):/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-USERINFO-INTERNAL-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Internal address in the host position behind a userinfo segment\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// The textbook bypass. SSRF-LOOPBACK-001 and SSRF-METADATA-001 both anchor on\n\t\t// `//` immediately before the address, so `http://good.com@169.254.169.254/`\n\t\t// matched only the generic userinfo rule and scored 2.0 — an allow verdict on a\n\t\t// cloud-credential read.\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/@(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|169\\.254(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|10(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|192\\.168(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){2})(?=[:/?#]|$)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SUFFIXED-LOOPBACK-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Loopback literal used as a hostname prefix\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3}|localhost|0\\.0\\.0\\.0)\\.[a-z]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-METADATA-ALT-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"critical\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Alibaba Cloud or Oracle Cloud instance metadata endpoint\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:100\\.100\\.100\\.200|192\\.0\\.0\\.192)(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV6-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv6 loopback, unique-local, or link-local literal\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[(?:::|(?:0{1,4}:){2,7}0{0,3}[01]|f[cd][0-9a-f]{0,2}:[0-9a-f:]{0,32}|fe[89ab][0-9a-f]?:[0-9a-f:]{0,32})\\]/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-IPV4-MAPPED-INTERNAL-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal carrying an internal address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\tpattern:\n\t\t\t/(?:\\/\\/|@)\\[::ffff:(?:127\\.|10\\.|169\\.254\\.|192\\.168\\.|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.|7f[0-9a-f]{2}:|a9fe:|c0a8:)/i,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-SHORT-IP-FORM-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"medium\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Abbreviated or octal IPv4 form resolving to a loopback address\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// `127.1`, `0`, and `0177.0.0.1` all resolve to loopback through inet_aton.\n\t\tpattern: /\\/\\/(?:127\\.\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3})?|0|0\\d{2,3}(?:\\.0*\\d{1,3}){3})(?=[:/?#]|$)/,\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tid: \"SSRF-WILDCARD-DNS-HOST-001\",\n\t\ttype: \"ssrf\",\n\t\tcontexts: [\"url\"],\n\t\tseverity: \"high\",\n\t\tconfidence: \"high\",\n\t\tdescription: \"Wildcard-DNS service that resolves an arbitrary address from the hostname\",\n\t\tcwe: 918,\n\t\tprimaryControl: SSRF_CONTROL,\n\t\t// Coverage is incomplete by construction — a new wildcard-DNS service needs a\n\t\t// catalog edit. 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package/lib/threats/rules/web.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { ThreatRule } from "../types.mjs";
+//#region src/threats/rules/web.d.ts
+/** XSS signatures. Meaningful only where the value is interpolated into markup. */
+declare const XSS_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/**
+ * Prototype-pollution signatures.
+ *
+ * Deliberately its own {@link ThreatRule.type} rather than a subcategory of XSS:
+ * this is an object-graph manipulation weakness, not a markup one, and it is fixed
+ * by different controls (`Object.create(null)` dictionaries, schema validation that
+ * rejects unknown keys, merge helpers that skip inherited and forbidden keys).
+ *
+ * The patterns match structural property paths, so `__proto__` reached via bracket
+ * notation or as a quoted JSON key is caught while prose that merely mentions the
+ * word is not.
+ */
+declare const PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/** CRLF injection into HTTP or SMTP header values (response splitting). */
+declare const HEADER_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/** CSV/XLSX formula injection — the payload executes in the *recipient's* spreadsheet. */
+declare const FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+/** Log injection — forged entries, and terminal escape sequences in logged content. */
+declare const LOG_INJECTION_RULES: readonly ThreatRule[];
+//#endregion
+export { FORMULA_INJECTION_RULES, HEADER_INJECTION_RULES, LOG_INJECTION_RULES, PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION_RULES, XSS_RULES };
+//# sourceMappingURL=web.d.mts.map

package/lib/threats/rules/web.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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