@reopt-ai/data-contract 0.6.0 → 0.6.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/{chunk-5BRCHDS3.js → chunk-EZ2TA4S6.js} +11 -4
- package/dist/chunk-EZ2TA4S6.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{chunk-6ZJOC4NJ.js → chunk-GCQZNME3.js} +45 -3
- package/dist/{chunk-6ZJOC4NJ.js.map → chunk-GCQZNME3.js.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{chunk-IXPP5K4I.js → chunk-HLQAZ6JW.js} +2 -2
- package/dist/{chunk-IXPP5K4I.js.map → chunk-HLQAZ6JW.js.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{chunk-JHHCT3GA.cjs → chunk-JB4MJQX7.cjs} +2 -2
- package/dist/{chunk-JHHCT3GA.cjs.map → chunk-JB4MJQX7.cjs.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/{chunk-KRJPEMFD.cjs → chunk-PHPTCLRU.cjs} +46 -4
- package/dist/chunk-PHPTCLRU.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{chunk-OGL3P7IH.cjs → chunk-VGB2VJO4.cjs} +13 -6
- package/dist/chunk-VGB2VJO4.cjs.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client.cjs +11 -11
- package/dist/client.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/client.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/client.js +3 -3
- package/dist/control.cjs +1 -1
- package/dist/control.js +1 -1
- package/dist/identity.cjs +13 -3
- package/dist/identity.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/identity.d.cts +31 -2
- package/dist/identity.d.ts +31 -2
- package/dist/identity.js +14 -4
- package/dist/index.cjs +2 -2
- package/dist/index.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/ingest.cjs +6 -4
- package/dist/ingest.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/ingest.d.cts +28 -1
- package/dist/ingest.d.ts +28 -1
- package/dist/ingest.js +5 -3
- package/dist/query.cjs +1 -1
- package/dist/query.d.cts +9 -9
- package/dist/query.d.ts +9 -9
- package/dist/query.js +1 -1
- package/dist/{version-CC4_BBvq.d.cts → version-BzeRTpta.d.cts} +1 -1
- package/dist/{version-CC4_BBvq.d.ts → version-BzeRTpta.d.ts} +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/dist/chunk-5BRCHDS3.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/chunk-KRJPEMFD.cjs.map +0 -1
- package/dist/chunk-OGL3P7IH.cjs.map +0 -1
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import {
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IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN
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/** Always `[]` in `browser` mode, where a bad row fails the whole batch. */
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rejected: z.array(zIngestRejection)
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});
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var zIngestOkResponse = z.object({
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var zIngestResponse = z.discriminatedUnion("status", [zIngestOkResponse, zIngestAcceptedResponse]);
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function reconcileIngestResponse(response, sentCount) {
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/ingest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `POST /api/track` — the ingest contract.\n *\n * The request shape is shared by both credential modes. The *response* shape\n * is where server-ingest differs: it reports per-event rejections instead of\n * failing a whole batch, because a forwarder that stalls on one malformed row\n * stops forwarding forever.\n *\n * Absorbed from the former internal `@reopt/ingest-contract`; that package is\n * now a deprecated re-export of this module.\n */\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\nimport { IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN } from \"./identity.js\";\n\nexport {\n AUTO_EVENT_NAMES,\n AUTO_EVENT_PROPERTIES,\n AUTO_EVENT_ROLLUP_KEYS,\n RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES,\n SCROLL_DEPTH_BUCKETS,\n scrollDepthBucket,\n type AutoEventName,\n type ScrollDepthBucket,\n} from \"./events.js\";\nimport { RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES } from \"./events.js\";\n\n/** Hard cap enforced by the route before the body is even parsed. */\nexport const MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES = 512_000;\n\nconst zClientEventMetadata = {\n /**\n * Client-generated UUID. This is the project-scoped idempotency key stored as\n * `RawEvent.clientEventId`; the server uses a separate globally unique raw\n * event id internally. Re-sending the same eventId to the same project is\n * always safe and always reported as a duplicate.\n */\n eventId: z.uuid(),\n /** Event time, epoch milliseconds. */\n timestamp: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /**\n * The browser device this event belongs to, for events a server records\n * on a visitor's behalf (a form submission, an order). Lets one server\n * batch carry events from many visitors — a forwarder cannot split its\n * batches per device without breaking its failure model and its\n * `accepted + duplicates + rejected === sent` invariant.\n *\n * Honoured in `server` mode only, where it takes precedence over the\n * `reopt-device-id` request header. Ignored in `browser` mode: there the\n * header is authoritative and a body field would be trivially forged.\n * Same character set as every identity id.\n */\n deviceId: z.string().regex(IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN, \"expected an identity id\").optional(),\n};\n\nexport const zTrackPayload = z\n .object({\n name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n properties: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n profileId: z.string().max(500).or(z.number()).optional(),\n })\n .refine((data) => !RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES.includes(data.name as never), {\n message: `Event name cannot be one of the reserved names: ${RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES.join(\", \")}`,\n path: [\"name\"],\n });\n\nexport const zIdentifyPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n firstName: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n lastName: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n email: z.email().max(320).optional(),\n avatar: z.url().max(2000).optional(),\n properties: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zIncrementPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n property: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n value: z.number().positive().optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zDecrementPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n property: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n value: z.number().positive().optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zTrackHandlerPayload = z.discriminatedUnion(\"type\", [\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"track\"), payload: zTrackPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"identify\"), payload: zIdentifyPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"increment\"), payload: zIncrementPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"decrement\"), payload: zDecrementPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n]);\n\nexport type ITrackPayload = z.infer<typeof zTrackPayload>;\nexport type IIdentifyPayload = z.infer<typeof zIdentifyPayload>;\nexport type IIncrementPayload = z.infer<typeof zIncrementPayload>;\nexport type IDecrementPayload = z.infer<typeof zDecrementPayload>;\nexport type ITrackHandlerPayload = z.infer<typeof zTrackHandlerPayload>;\n\n// ─── Ingest mode ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Decided by the credential presented, never by a header the caller sets:\n * `reopt-write-key` alone → `browser`, `reopt-client-id` + `reopt-client-secret`\n * → `server`. A separate mode header could disagree with the credential; this\n * cannot.\n *\n * `browser` keeps the 5-second click dedup and device-scoped sessions.\n * `server` drops both and relies solely on `eventId` idempotency — a server\n * batch legitimately contains the same event name many times within one second,\n * and its \"device\" is a process, not a person.\n */\nexport const INGEST_MODES = [\"browser\", \"server\"] as const;\nexport const zIngestMode = z.enum(INGEST_MODES);\nexport type IngestMode = z.infer<typeof zIngestMode>;\n\n// ─── Response ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Why a single event in a batch was dropped. These are permanent: re-sending\n * the same row produces the same rejection, so a forwarder should count it as\n * skipped and advance its cursor rather than retry.\n */\nexport const INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n /** Failed the zod schema (bad eventId, missing name, wrong types…). */\n \"validation_failed\",\n /** Used one of RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES. */\n \"reserved_name\",\n /** Another row earlier in the same batch already claimed this eventId. */\n \"duplicate_in_batch\",\n] as const;\nexport const zIngestRejectionReason = z.enum(INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS);\nexport type IngestRejectionReason = z.infer<typeof zIngestRejectionReason>;\n\nexport const zIngestRejection = z.object({\n /** May be absent or malformed on `validation_failed` — hence `string`, not `uuid`. */\n eventId: z.string(),\n /** Position in the submitted batch. The only reliable identifier when eventId itself is bad. */\n index: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n reason: zIngestRejectionReason,\n message: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type IngestRejection = z.infer<typeof zIngestRejection>;\n\nconst ingestCounts = {\n /** Raw events newly persisted by this request. */\n accepted: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /**\n * Events the server already had. In `server` mode this is exactly the\n * eventId-idempotency count; in `browser` mode it also includes the\n * 5-second click dedup.\n */\n duplicates: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /** Always `[]` in `browser` mode, where a bad row fails the whole batch. */\n rejected: z.array(zIngestRejection),\n};\n\n/**\n * The session ingest filed this batch under, with the token that lets the\n * browser (or a server acting for it) join the same session later with\n * authority — see `signSessionToken` in `./identity`. Browser mode only;\n * absent when the batch carried no sessionable event.\n */\nexport const zSessionCredential = z.object({\n id: z.string().regex(IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN),\n token: z.string().regex(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/),\n});\nexport type SessionCredential = z.infer<typeof zSessionCredential>;\n\n/** 200 — accepted and handed to the materialize queue. */\nexport const zIngestOkResponse = z.object({\n status: z.literal(\"ok\"),\n requestId: z.string(),\n mode: zIngestMode,\n ...ingestCounts,\n queued: z.boolean(),\n session: zSessionCredential.optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * 202 — raw events landed, but enqueueing the materialize task failed. No data\n * is lost: the `replay-unmaterialized` cron picks these up. A forwarder should\n * treat this as success and advance its cursor. Carries the same counts as 200\n * so the reconciliation below works here too.\n */\nexport const zIngestAcceptedResponse = z.object({\n status: z.literal(\"accepted\"),\n requestId: z.string(),\n mode: zIngestMode,\n ...ingestCounts,\n backgroundQueued: z.literal(false),\n replay: z.literal(\"unmaterialized-raw-events\"),\n session: zSessionCredential.optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zIngestResponse = z.discriminatedUnion(\"status\", [zIngestOkResponse, zIngestAcceptedResponse]);\n\nexport type IngestOkResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestOkResponse>;\nexport type IngestAcceptedResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestAcceptedResponse>;\nexport type IngestResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestResponse>;\n\n/**\n * The reconciliation a forwarder runs on every 2xx:\n *\n * accepted + duplicates + rejected.length === events sent\n *\n * A mismatch means the server silently dropped something, which is exactly the\n * failure mode this contract exists to make impossible to miss.\n */\nexport function reconcileIngestResponse(response: IngestResponse, sentCount: number): boolean {\n return response.accepted + response.duplicates + response.rejected.length === sentCount;\n}\n\n// ─── Errors ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Stable machine-readable codes. Branch on these, never on `error`/`message`,\n * which are prose and may be reworded.\n */\nexport const INGEST_ERROR_CODES = [\n /** 401 — unknown or mismatched credentials. Stop and alert; do not retry. */\n \"unauthorized\",\n /** 400 — body was not valid JSON. */\n \"invalid_json\",\n /** 400 — request exceeded MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES. Split the batch. */\n \"payload_too_large\",\n /** 400 — zero events submitted. */\n \"empty_batch\",\n /** 400 — batch contained a `type: \"alias\"` event, which is not supported. */\n \"alias_unsupported\",\n /** 400 — the project has no organization; it cannot be billed or quota-checked. */\n \"project_without_organization\",\n /** 400 — `browser` mode only: a row failed validation. `server` mode reports these in `rejected[]`. */\n \"validation_failed\",\n /** 429 — per-project request rate limit. `Retry-After` set. Pause this tick, keep the cursor. */\n \"rate_limited\",\n /** 429 — the organization's monthly event quota is exhausted. `Retry-After` set (capped at 1h). Alert: a human must raise the limit. */\n \"quota_exceeded\",\n /** 410 — the project is being deleted. Permanent; stop sending. */\n \"project_purging\",\n /** 500 — unexpected server failure. 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@@ -92,6 +92,43 @@ function serializeConsentCookie(state) {
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function isOptedOut(consent) {
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return consent?.[OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY] === false;
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}
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var SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR = ".";
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function formatSessionHeader(credential) {
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return `${credential.id}${SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR}${credential.token}`;
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}
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function parseSessionHeader(value) {
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if (!value) return null;
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const at = value.lastIndexOf(SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR);
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if (at <= 0 || at === value.length - 1) return null;
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const id = value.slice(0, at);
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const token = value.slice(at + 1);
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return isValidIdentityId(id) && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(token) ? { id, token } : null;
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}
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var encoder = new TextEncoder();
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function base64url(bytes) {
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let binary = "";
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for (const byte of new Uint8Array(bytes)) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
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const b64 = typeof btoa === "function" ? btoa(binary) : Buffer.from(binary, "binary").toString("base64");
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return b64.replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
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}
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async function hmacKey(secret) {
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return crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", encoder.encode(secret), { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign"]);
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}
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async function signSessionToken(secret, sessionId) {
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if (!secret) throw new Error("[reopt] a session signing secret is required");
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const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), encoder.encode(sessionId));
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return base64url(signature);
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}
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async function verifySessionToken(secret, credential) {
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if (!secret || !credential) return false;
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const expected = await signSessionToken(secret, credential.id);
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if (expected.length !== credential.token.length) return false;
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let diff = 0;
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for (let index = 0; index < expected.length; index++) {
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diff |= expected.charCodeAt(index) ^ credential.token.charCodeAt(index);
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}
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return diff === 0;
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}
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export {
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SESSION_ID_HEADER,
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@@ -106,6 +143,11 @@ export {
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serializeDeviceCookie,
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parseConsentCookie,
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serializeConsentCookie,
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isOptedOut
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isOptedOut,
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SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR,
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formatSessionHeader,
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parseSessionHeader,
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signSessionToken,
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verifySessionToken
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};
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-
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-
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//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GCQZNME3.js.map
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/identity.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `@reopt-ai/data-contract/identity` — the names and encodings that carry a\n * visitor's identity between the browser SDK, the server SDK, the Next.js\n * proxy and the ingest pipeline.\n *\n * Every one of those parties reads or writes the same cookies and headers.\n * None of them depends on another (ingest does not import the SDKs), so this\n * module is the only place a name may be spelled out. 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Plain JSON — it crosses the\n * RSC → client component boundary as a prop.\n */\nexport interface ReoptBootstrap {\n /** From the device cookie (seeded by the proxy on first visit). */\n deviceId: string;\n /** Session hint, or `null` when the browser has not started one. */\n sessionId: string | null;\n /** Result of the server's `getProfileId` resolver, or `null`. */\n profileId: string | null;\n consent: ConsentCookieState;\n /** Server clock at render time, so a skewed device clock can be corrected. */\n serverTimeMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ids are opaque, but a cookie is attacker-controlled input (a sibling\n * subdomain can set one). The value ends up in an HTTP header, and\n * `Headers.set` throws on anything outside ISO-8859-1 — so a single odd\n * cookie would break every `fetch` the tracing patch touches. Only the URL\n * \"unreserved\" set is accepted; every id this SDK mints is a UUID.\n */\nexport const IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{1,200}$/;\n\nexport function isValidIdentityId(value: unknown): value is string {\n return typeof value === \"string\" && IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction decode(raw: string): string {\n try {\n return decodeURIComponent(raw);\n } catch {\n return raw;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads a device cookie value. Accepts the JSON envelope written by\n * `serializeDeviceCookie` and, for cookies seeded before the envelope existed,\n * a bare device id. 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1
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/identity.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `@reopt-ai/data-contract/identity` — the names and encodings that carry a\n * visitor's identity between the browser SDK, the server SDK, the Next.js\n * proxy and the ingest pipeline.\n *\n * Every one of those parties reads or writes the same cookies and headers.\n * None of them depends on another (ingest does not import the SDKs), so this\n * module is the only place a name may be spelled out. A party that hardcodes\n * `reopt_<key>_device` instead of calling `deviceCookieName()` fails silently:\n * the browser sets one cookie, the server looks for another, and every\n * visitor is counted as new. `packages/db/src/__tests__/redis-namespace.test.ts`\n * guards Redis key prefixes for exactly the same reason.\n *\n * Nothing here touches `document`, `fetch` or Node built-ins — it runs in\n * browsers, edge runtimes and Node alike.\n */\nimport { DEVICE_ID_HEADER } from \"./version.js\";\n\nexport {\n CLIENT_ID_HEADER,\n CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER,\n CONTRACT_VERSION,\n CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER,\n DEVICE_ID_HEADER,\n REQUEST_ID_HEADER,\n WRITE_KEY_HEADER,\n} from \"./version.js\";\n\n/**\n * Request header carrying the browser's current session id. The browser SDK\n * adds it to same-origin requests so a server-side `track()` can land in the\n * session the user is actually in; the server SDK forwards it to ingest.\n *\n * Ingest treats it as a *hint*, never as authority — a browser can put any\n * value here.\n */\nexport const SESSION_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-session-id\";\n\n/** Every request header the identity protocol may carry, for CORS allow-lists. */\nexport const IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS = [DEVICE_ID_HEADER, SESSION_ID_HEADER] as const;\n\n/**\n * 400 days — the longest lifetime Chrome will honour. Anything longer is\n * silently clamped to this, so asking for more only hides the real expiry.\n */\nexport const COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 400 * 24 * 60 * 60;\n\n/** Consent category whose refusal means \"send nothing at all\". */\nexport const OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY = \"analytics\";\n\nconst COOKIE_PREFIX = \"reopt_\";\n\n/**\n * Cookie names may not contain separators (`=`, `;`, `,`, whitespace) or\n * control characters. A write key is opaque to us, so anything outside the\n * safe set is folded to `_` — deterministically, so both ends agree.\n */\nfunction cookieSafe(writeKey: string): string {\n if (!writeKey) {\n throw new Error(\"[reopt] writeKey is required to derive cookie names\");\n }\n return writeKey.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, \"_\");\n}\n\n/** `reopt_<writeKey>_device` — device id plus session/profile hints. */\nexport function deviceCookieName(writeKey: string): string {\n return `${COOKIE_PREFIX}${cookieSafe(writeKey)}_device`;\n}\n\n/** `reopt_<writeKey>_consent` — per-category consent decisions. */\nexport function consentCookieName(writeKey: string): string {\n return `${COOKIE_PREFIX}${cookieSafe(writeKey)}_consent`;\n}\n\n/** Everything the device cookie may carry. Only `deviceId` is required. */\nexport interface DeviceCookieState {\n deviceId: string;\n /** Current session, if the browser has one. */\n sessionId?: string;\n /** Last identified profile. A hint for the server SDK, never trusted by ingest. */\n profileId?: string;\n}\n\n/** Per-category consent. `false` withdraws, `true` grants, absent = undecided. */\nexport type ConsentCookieState = Record<string, boolean>;\n\n/**\n * What the server hands the browser SDK so the first render already agrees\n * with the server about who the visitor is. Plain JSON — it crosses the\n * RSC → client component boundary as a prop.\n */\nexport interface ReoptBootstrap {\n /** From the device cookie (seeded by the proxy on first visit). */\n deviceId: string;\n /** Session hint, or `null` when the browser has not started one. */\n sessionId: string | null;\n /** Result of the server's `getProfileId` resolver, or `null`. */\n profileId: string | null;\n consent: ConsentCookieState;\n /** Server clock at render time, so a skewed device clock can be corrected. */\n serverTimeMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ids are opaque, but a cookie is attacker-controlled input (a sibling\n * subdomain can set one). The value ends up in an HTTP header, and\n * `Headers.set` throws on anything outside ISO-8859-1 — so a single odd\n * cookie would break every `fetch` the tracing patch touches. Only the URL\n * \"unreserved\" set is accepted; every id this SDK mints is a UUID.\n */\nexport const IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{1,200}$/;\n\nexport function isValidIdentityId(value: unknown): value is string {\n return typeof value === \"string\" && IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction decode(raw: string): string {\n try {\n return decodeURIComponent(raw);\n } catch {\n return raw;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads a device cookie value. Accepts the JSON envelope written by\n * `serializeDeviceCookie` and, for cookies seeded before the envelope existed,\n * a bare device id. Returns `null` for anything else — a malformed cookie is\n * treated as absent, never as an error, so a corrupted value cannot take the\n * page down.\n */\nexport function parseDeviceCookie(raw: string | null | undefined): DeviceCookieState | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n const text = decode(raw.trim());\n if (!text) return null;\n\n if (!text.startsWith(\"{\")) {\n return isValidIdentityId(text) ? { deviceId: text } : null;\n }\n\n let parsed: unknown;\n try {\n parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n if (typeof parsed !== \"object\" || parsed === null) return null;\n\n const candidate = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n if (!isValidIdentityId(candidate.deviceId)) return null;\n\n const state: DeviceCookieState = { deviceId: candidate.deviceId };\n if (isValidIdentityId(candidate.sessionId)) state.sessionId = candidate.sessionId;\n if (isValidIdentityId(candidate.profileId)) state.profileId = candidate.profileId;\n return state;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cookie values may not contain `;`, `,` or whitespace, and JSON contains\n * quotes and commas. The envelope is therefore URI-encoded; `parseDeviceCookie`\n * reverses it. Optional fields are omitted rather than written as `null` so\n * the cookie stays as small as the state it carries.\n */\nexport function serializeDeviceCookie(state: DeviceCookieState): string {\n if (!isValidIdentityId(state.deviceId)) {\n throw new Error(\"[reopt] deviceId must be a non-empty string without control characters\");\n }\n const envelope: DeviceCookieState = { deviceId: state.deviceId };\n if (isValidIdentityId(state.sessionId)) envelope.sessionId = state.sessionId;\n if (isValidIdentityId(state.profileId)) envelope.profileId = state.profileId;\n return encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(envelope));\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads a consent cookie. Only boolean entries survive; anything else in the\n * object is dropped rather than failing the whole cookie, because one odd key\n * must not erase a user's recorded opt-out.\n */\nexport function parseConsentCookie(raw: string | null | undefined): ConsentCookieState | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n const text = decode(raw.trim());\n if (!text.startsWith(\"{\")) return null;\n\n let parsed: unknown;\n try {\n parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n if (typeof parsed !== \"object\" || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) return null;\n\n const state: ConsentCookieState = {};\n for (const [category, decision] of Object.entries(parsed as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n if (typeof decision === \"boolean\" && isValidIdentityId(category)) {\n state[category] = decision;\n }\n }\n return state;\n}\n\nexport function serializeConsentCookie(state: ConsentCookieState): string {\n const clean: ConsentCookieState = {};\n for (const [category, decision] of Object.entries(state)) {\n if (typeof decision === \"boolean\" && isValidIdentityId(category)) {\n clean[category] = decision;\n }\n }\n return encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(clean));\n}\n\n/**\n * \"Opted out\" means the visitor refused the `analytics` category. An absent\n * cookie or an undecided category is *not* an opt-out — it is the default\n * state of every first visit, and treating it as refusal would make consent\n * banners mandatory for every integration.\n */\nexport function isOptedOut(consent: ConsentCookieState | null | undefined): boolean {\n return consent?.[OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY] === false;\n}\n\n// ─── Session tokens ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Sessions are assigned by ingest, not by the browser. To let a later request\n * — from the same browser, or from a server acting for it — join that session\n * with authority, ingest hands the browser its session id together with an\n * HMAC over it, and the browser sends both back as `reopt-session-id`. An\n * unsigned or wrongly signed value is a hint at most: ingest falls back to\n * deciding the session from the device, exactly as if the header were absent.\n *\n * The token is `base64url(HMAC-SHA256(secret, sessionId))`. The secret is\n * per project and never leaves the server. WebCrypto only, so this runs in\n * browsers, edge runtimes and Node alike.\n */\nexport const SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR = \".\";\n\nexport interface SessionCredential {\n id: string;\n token: string;\n}\n\n/** `<id>.<token>` — what travels in `reopt-session-id`. */\nexport function formatSessionHeader(credential: SessionCredential): string {\n return `${credential.id}${SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR}${credential.token}`;\n}\n\n/** Splits a `reopt-session-id` value. `null` unless both parts are well-formed. */\nexport function parseSessionHeader(value: string | null | undefined): SessionCredential | null {\n if (!value) return null;\n const at = value.lastIndexOf(SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR);\n if (at <= 0 || at === value.length - 1) return null;\n const id = value.slice(0, at);\n const token = value.slice(at + 1);\n return isValidIdentityId(id) && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(token) ? { id, token } : null;\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\n\nfunction base64url(bytes: ArrayBuffer): string {\n let binary = \"\";\n for (const byte of new Uint8Array(bytes)) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n const b64 = typeof btoa === \"function\" ? btoa(binary) : Buffer.from(binary, \"binary\").toString(\"base64\");\n return b64.replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nasync function hmacKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n return crypto.subtle.importKey(\"raw\", encoder.encode(secret), { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\"sign\"]);\n}\n\n/** Issues the token for `sessionId`. Server-side only — needs the project secret. */\nexport async function signSessionToken(secret: string, sessionId: string): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error(\"[reopt] a session signing secret is required\");\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", await hmacKey(secret), encoder.encode(sessionId));\n return base64url(signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time check of a presented token. Recomputes and compares the\n * digests byte by byte rather than using `subtle.verify` with a decoded\n * token, so a malformed token can never throw its way past the check.\n */\nexport async function verifySessionToken(secret: string, credential: SessionCredential): Promise<boolean> {\n if (!secret || !credential) return false;\n const expected = await signSessionToken(secret, credential.id);\n if (expected.length !== credential.token.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let index = 0; index < expected.length; index++) {\n diff |= expected.charCodeAt(index) ^ credential.token.charCodeAt(index);\n }\n return diff === 0;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAoCO,IAAM,oBAAoB;AAG1B,IAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC,kBAAkB,iBAAiB;AAMrE,IAAM,yBAAyB,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAG/C,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAExC,IAAM,gBAAgB;AAOtB,SAAS,WAAW,UAA0B;AAC5C,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qDAAqD;AAAA,EACvE;AACA,SAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAChD;AAGO,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAA0B;AACzD,SAAO,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC;AAChD;AAGO,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAA0B;AAC1D,SAAO,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC;AAChD;AAsCO,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAE5B,SAAS,kBAAkB,OAAiC;AACjE,SAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK;AACpE;AAEA,SAAS,OAAO,KAAqB;AACnC,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAAA,EAC/B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AASO,SAAS,kBAAkB,KAA0D;AAC1F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AACjB,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO;AAElB,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AACzB,WAAO,kBAAkB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EACxD;AAEA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,aAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC1B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW,KAAM,QAAO;AAE1D,QAAM,YAAY;AAClB,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,UAAU,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAEnD,QAAM,QAA2B,EAAE,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS;AAChE,MAAI,kBAAkB,UAAU,SAAS,EAAG,OAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AACxE,MAAI,kBAAkB,UAAU,SAAS,EAAG,OAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AACxE,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAkC;AACtE,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AACtC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wEAAwE;AAAA,EAC1F;AACA,QAAM,WAA8B,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;AAC/D,MAAI,kBAAkB,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,UAAS,YAAY,MAAM;AACnE,MAAI,kBAAkB,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,UAAS,YAAY,MAAM;AACnE,SAAO,mBAAmB,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC;AACpD;AAOO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAA2D;AAC5F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AACjB,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AAElC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,aAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC1B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AAEnF,QAAM,QAA4B,CAAC;AACnC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAiC,GAAG;AACpF,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa,aAAa,kBAAkB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChE,YAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEO,SAAS,uBAAuB,OAAmC;AACxE,QAAM,QAA4B,CAAC;AACnC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxD,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa,aAAa,kBAAkB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChE,YAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,mBAAmB,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AACjD;AAQO,SAAS,WAAW,SAAyD;AAClF,SAAO,UAAU,wBAAwB,MAAM;AACjD;AAgBO,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAQjC,SAAS,oBAAoB,YAAuC;AACzE,SAAO,GAAG,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,wBAAwB,GAAG,WAAW,KAAK;AACvE;AAGO,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAA4D;AAC7F,MAAI,CAAC,MAAO,QAAO;AACnB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,wBAAwB;AACrD,MAAI,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO;AAC/C,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AAC5B,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAChC,SAAO,kBAAkB,EAAE,KAAK,sBAAsB,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI;AACtF;AAEA,IAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY;AAEhC,SAAS,UAAU,OAA4B;AAC7C,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,aAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,EAAG,WAAU,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI;AAC5E,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ;AACvG,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AACtE;AAEA,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAoC;AACzD,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;AAClH;AAGA,eAAsB,iBAAiB,QAAgB,WAAoC;AACzF,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8CAA8C;AAC3E,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACnG,SAAO,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B;AAOA,eAAsB,mBAAmB,QAAgB,YAAiD;AACxG,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,WAAY,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WAAW,EAAE;AAC7D,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW,WAAW,MAAM,OAAQ,QAAO;AACxD,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,WAAS,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS;AACpD,YAAQ,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EACxE;AACA,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;","names":[]}
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var CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER = "x-reopt-contract-version";
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var CLIENT_ID_HEADER = "reopt-client-id";
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/version.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Wire version and header names — the part of the contract every party\n * needs and none of them should pay zod for. Both `.` and `./identity`\n * re-export these; browser bundles import them through `./identity` so the\n * schema modules stay out of the client graph.\n */\n\n/**\n * Contract version. Bumped on any breaking change to a schema in this package.\n * The server echoes the version it was built against in `x-reopt-contract-version`;\n * `createDataClient` surfaces a mismatch rather than guessing.\n *\n * Must equal the package version (`package-identity.test.ts` enforces it), so\n * every publish is a wire bump: consumers that check for exact equality —\n * every SDK — must upgrade in lockstep with the server.\n */\nexport const CONTRACT_VERSION = \"0.6.
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/version.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Wire version and header names — the part of the contract every party\n * needs and none of them should pay zod for. Both `.` and `./identity`\n * re-export these; browser bundles import them through `./identity` so the\n * schema modules stay out of the client graph.\n */\n\n/**\n * Contract version. Bumped on any breaking change to a schema in this package.\n * The server echoes the version it was built against in `x-reopt-contract-version`;\n * `createDataClient` surfaces a mismatch rather than guessing.\n *\n * Must equal the package version (`package-identity.test.ts` enforces it), so\n * every publish is a wire bump: consumers that check for exact equality —\n * every SDK — must upgrade in lockstep with the server.\n */\nexport const CONTRACT_VERSION = \"0.6.1\";\n\n/** Response header carrying the server's contract version. */\nexport const CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER = \"x-reopt-contract-version\";\n\n/** Request header names shared by the ingest and query planes. */\nexport const CLIENT_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-client-id\";\nexport const CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER = \"reopt-client-secret\";\nexport const WRITE_KEY_HEADER = \"reopt-write-key\";\nexport const DEVICE_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-device-id\";\nexport const REQUEST_ID_HEADER = \"x-request-id\";\n"],"mappings":";AAgBO,IAAM,mBAAmB;AAGzB,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAGhC,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,oBAAoB;","names":[]}
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"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {value: true});// src/version.ts
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var CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER = "x-reopt-contract-version";
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exports.CONTRACT_VERSION = CONTRACT_VERSION; exports.CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER = CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER; exports.CLIENT_ID_HEADER = CLIENT_ID_HEADER; exports.CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER = CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER; exports.WRITE_KEY_HEADER = WRITE_KEY_HEADER; exports.DEVICE_ID_HEADER = DEVICE_ID_HEADER; exports.REQUEST_ID_HEADER = REQUEST_ID_HEADER;
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{"version":3,"sources":["/Users/eric/reopt-ai/reopt-data/packages/data-contract/dist/chunk-
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{"version":3,"sources":["/Users/eric/reopt-ai/reopt-data/packages/data-contract/dist/chunk-JB4MJQX7.cjs","../src/version.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;ACgBO,IAAM,iBAAA,EAAmB,OAAA;AAGzB,IAAM,wBAAA,EAA0B,0BAAA;AAGhC,IAAM,iBAAA,EAAmB,iBAAA;AACzB,IAAM,qBAAA,EAAuB,qBAAA;AAC7B,IAAM,iBAAA,EAAmB,iBAAA;AACzB,IAAM,iBAAA,EAAmB,iBAAA;AACzB,IAAM,kBAAA,EAAoB,cAAA;ADlBjC;AACA;AACE;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACF,kVAAC","file":"/Users/eric/reopt-ai/reopt-data/packages/data-contract/dist/chunk-JB4MJQX7.cjs","sourcesContent":[null,"/**\n * Wire version and header names — the part of the contract every party\n * needs and none of them should pay zod for. Both `.` and `./identity`\n * re-export these; browser bundles import them through `./identity` so the\n * schema modules stay out of the client graph.\n */\n\n/**\n * Contract version. Bumped on any breaking change to a schema in this package.\n * The server echoes the version it was built against in `x-reopt-contract-version`;\n * `createDataClient` surfaces a mismatch rather than guessing.\n *\n * Must equal the package version (`package-identity.test.ts` enforces it), so\n * every publish is a wire bump: consumers that check for exact equality —\n * every SDK — must upgrade in lockstep with the server.\n */\nexport const CONTRACT_VERSION = \"0.6.1\";\n\n/** Response header carrying the server's contract version. */\nexport const CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER = \"x-reopt-contract-version\";\n\n/** Request header names shared by the ingest and query planes. */\nexport const CLIENT_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-client-id\";\nexport const CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER = \"reopt-client-secret\";\nexport const WRITE_KEY_HEADER = \"reopt-write-key\";\nexport const DEVICE_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-device-id\";\nexport const REQUEST_ID_HEADER = \"x-request-id\";\n"]}
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"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {value: true}); function _optionalChain(ops) { let lastAccessLHS = undefined; let value = ops[0]; let i = 1; while (i < ops.length) { const op = ops[i]; const fn = ops[i + 1]; i += 2; if ((op === 'optionalAccess' || op === 'optionalCall') && value == null) { return undefined; } if (op === 'access' || op === 'optionalAccess') { lastAccessLHS = value; value = fn(value); } else if (op === 'call' || op === 'optionalCall') { value = fn((...args) => value.call(lastAccessLHS, ...args)); lastAccessLHS = undefined; } } return value; }
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var IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS = [_chunkJB4MJQX7cjs.DEVICE_ID_HEADER, SESSION_ID_HEADER];
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diff |= expected.charCodeAt(index) ^ credential.token.charCodeAt(index);
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exports.SESSION_ID_HEADER = SESSION_ID_HEADER; exports.IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS = IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS; exports.COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS; exports.OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY = OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY; exports.deviceCookieName = deviceCookieName; exports.consentCookieName = consentCookieName; exports.IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN = IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN; exports.isValidIdentityId = isValidIdentityId; exports.parseDeviceCookie = parseDeviceCookie; exports.serializeDeviceCookie = serializeDeviceCookie; exports.parseConsentCookie = parseConsentCookie; exports.serializeConsentCookie = serializeConsentCookie; exports.isOptedOut = isOptedOut;
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exports.SESSION_ID_HEADER = SESSION_ID_HEADER; exports.IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS = IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS; exports.COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS; exports.OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY = OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY; exports.deviceCookieName = deviceCookieName; exports.consentCookieName = consentCookieName; exports.IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN = IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN; exports.isValidIdentityId = isValidIdentityId; exports.parseDeviceCookie = parseDeviceCookie; exports.serializeDeviceCookie = serializeDeviceCookie; exports.parseConsentCookie = parseConsentCookie; exports.serializeConsentCookie = serializeConsentCookie; exports.isOptedOut = isOptedOut; exports.SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR = SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR; exports.formatSessionHeader = formatSessionHeader; exports.parseSessionHeader = parseSessionHeader; exports.signSessionToken = signSessionToken; exports.verifySessionToken = verifySessionToken;
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A party that hardcodes\n * `reopt_<key>_device` instead of calling `deviceCookieName()` fails silently:\n * the browser sets one cookie, the server looks for another, and every\n * visitor is counted as new. `packages/db/src/__tests__/redis-namespace.test.ts`\n * guards Redis key prefixes for exactly the same reason.\n *\n * Nothing here touches `document`, `fetch` or Node built-ins — it runs in\n * browsers, edge runtimes and Node alike.\n */\nimport { DEVICE_ID_HEADER } from \"./version.js\";\n\nexport {\n CLIENT_ID_HEADER,\n CLIENT_SECRET_HEADER,\n CONTRACT_VERSION,\n CONTRACT_VERSION_HEADER,\n DEVICE_ID_HEADER,\n REQUEST_ID_HEADER,\n WRITE_KEY_HEADER,\n} from \"./version.js\";\n\n/**\n * Request header carrying the browser's current session id. The browser SDK\n * adds it to same-origin requests so a server-side `track()` can land in the\n * session the user is actually in; the server SDK forwards it to ingest.\n *\n * Ingest treats it as a *hint*, never as authority — a browser can put any\n * value here.\n */\nexport const SESSION_ID_HEADER = \"reopt-session-id\";\n\n/** Every request header the identity protocol may carry, for CORS allow-lists. */\nexport const IDENTITY_REQUEST_HEADERS = [DEVICE_ID_HEADER, SESSION_ID_HEADER] as const;\n\n/**\n * 400 days — the longest lifetime Chrome will honour. Anything longer is\n * silently clamped to this, so asking for more only hides the real expiry.\n */\nexport const COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 400 * 24 * 60 * 60;\n\n/** Consent category whose refusal means \"send nothing at all\". */\nexport const OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY = \"analytics\";\n\nconst COOKIE_PREFIX = \"reopt_\";\n\n/**\n * Cookie names may not contain separators (`=`, `;`, `,`, whitespace) or\n * control characters. A write key is opaque to us, so anything outside the\n * safe set is folded to `_` — deterministically, so both ends agree.\n */\nfunction cookieSafe(writeKey: string): string {\n if (!writeKey) {\n throw new Error(\"[reopt] writeKey is required to derive cookie names\");\n }\n return writeKey.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, \"_\");\n}\n\n/** `reopt_<writeKey>_device` — device id plus session/profile hints. */\nexport function deviceCookieName(writeKey: string): string {\n return `${COOKIE_PREFIX}${cookieSafe(writeKey)}_device`;\n}\n\n/** `reopt_<writeKey>_consent` — per-category consent decisions. */\nexport function consentCookieName(writeKey: string): string {\n return `${COOKIE_PREFIX}${cookieSafe(writeKey)}_consent`;\n}\n\n/** Everything the device cookie may carry. Only `deviceId` is required. */\nexport interface DeviceCookieState {\n deviceId: string;\n /** Current session, if the browser has one. */\n sessionId?: string;\n /** Last identified profile. A hint for the server SDK, never trusted by ingest. */\n profileId?: string;\n}\n\n/** Per-category consent. `false` withdraws, `true` grants, absent = undecided. */\nexport type ConsentCookieState = Record<string, boolean>;\n\n/**\n * What the server hands the browser SDK so the first render already agrees\n * with the server about who the visitor is. Plain JSON — it crosses the\n * RSC → client component boundary as a prop.\n */\nexport interface ReoptBootstrap {\n /** From the device cookie (seeded by the proxy on first visit). */\n deviceId: string;\n /** Session hint, or `null` when the browser has not started one. */\n sessionId: string | null;\n /** Result of the server's `getProfileId` resolver, or `null`. */\n profileId: string | null;\n consent: ConsentCookieState;\n /** Server clock at render time, so a skewed device clock can be corrected. */\n serverTimeMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ids are opaque, but a cookie is attacker-controlled input (a sibling\n * subdomain can set one). The value ends up in an HTTP header, and\n * `Headers.set` throws on anything outside ISO-8859-1 — so a single odd\n * cookie would break every `fetch` the tracing patch touches. Only the URL\n * \"unreserved\" set is accepted; every id this SDK mints is a UUID.\n */\nexport const IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{1,200}$/;\n\nexport function isValidIdentityId(value: unknown): value is string {\n return typeof value === \"string\" && IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction decode(raw: string): string {\n try {\n return decodeURIComponent(raw);\n } catch {\n return raw;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads a device cookie value. Accepts the JSON envelope written by\n * `serializeDeviceCookie` and, for cookies seeded before the envelope existed,\n * a bare device id. Returns `null` for anything else — a malformed cookie is\n * treated as absent, never as an error, so a corrupted value cannot take the\n * page down.\n */\nexport function parseDeviceCookie(raw: string | null | undefined): DeviceCookieState | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n const text = decode(raw.trim());\n if (!text) return null;\n\n if (!text.startsWith(\"{\")) {\n return isValidIdentityId(text) ? { deviceId: text } : null;\n }\n\n let parsed: unknown;\n try {\n parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n if (typeof parsed !== \"object\" || parsed === null) return null;\n\n const candidate = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n if (!isValidIdentityId(candidate.deviceId)) return null;\n\n const state: DeviceCookieState = { deviceId: candidate.deviceId };\n if (isValidIdentityId(candidate.sessionId)) state.sessionId = candidate.sessionId;\n if (isValidIdentityId(candidate.profileId)) state.profileId = candidate.profileId;\n return state;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cookie values may not contain `;`, `,` or whitespace, and JSON contains\n * quotes and commas. The envelope is therefore URI-encoded; `parseDeviceCookie`\n * reverses it. Optional fields are omitted rather than written as `null` so\n * the cookie stays as small as the state it carries.\n */\nexport function serializeDeviceCookie(state: DeviceCookieState): string {\n if (!isValidIdentityId(state.deviceId)) {\n throw new Error(\"[reopt] deviceId must be a non-empty string without control characters\");\n }\n const envelope: DeviceCookieState = { deviceId: state.deviceId };\n if (isValidIdentityId(state.sessionId)) envelope.sessionId = state.sessionId;\n if (isValidIdentityId(state.profileId)) envelope.profileId = state.profileId;\n return encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(envelope));\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads a consent cookie. Only boolean entries survive; anything else in the\n * object is dropped rather than failing the whole cookie, because one odd key\n * must not erase a user's recorded opt-out.\n */\nexport function parseConsentCookie(raw: string | null | undefined): ConsentCookieState | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n const text = decode(raw.trim());\n if (!text.startsWith(\"{\")) return null;\n\n let parsed: unknown;\n try {\n parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n if (typeof parsed !== \"object\" || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) return null;\n\n const state: ConsentCookieState = {};\n for (const [category, decision] of Object.entries(parsed as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n if (typeof decision === \"boolean\" && isValidIdentityId(category)) {\n state[category] = decision;\n }\n }\n return state;\n}\n\nexport function serializeConsentCookie(state: ConsentCookieState): string {\n const clean: ConsentCookieState = {};\n for (const [category, decision] of Object.entries(state)) {\n if (typeof decision === \"boolean\" && isValidIdentityId(category)) {\n clean[category] = decision;\n }\n }\n return encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(clean));\n}\n\n/**\n * \"Opted out\" means the visitor refused the `analytics` category. An absent\n * cookie or an undecided category is *not* an opt-out — it is the default\n * state of every first visit, and treating it as refusal would make consent\n * banners mandatory for every integration.\n */\nexport function isOptedOut(consent: ConsentCookieState | null | undefined): boolean {\n return consent?.[OPT_OUT_CONSENT_CATEGORY] === false;\n}\n\n// ─── Session tokens ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Sessions are assigned by ingest, not by the browser. To let a later request\n * — from the same browser, or from a server acting for it — join that session\n * with authority, ingest hands the browser its session id together with an\n * HMAC over it, and the browser sends both back as `reopt-session-id`. An\n * unsigned or wrongly signed value is a hint at most: ingest falls back to\n * deciding the session from the device, exactly as if the header were absent.\n *\n * The token is `base64url(HMAC-SHA256(secret, sessionId))`. The secret is\n * per project and never leaves the server. WebCrypto only, so this runs in\n * browsers, edge runtimes and Node alike.\n */\nexport const SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR = \".\";\n\nexport interface SessionCredential {\n id: string;\n token: string;\n}\n\n/** `<id>.<token>` — what travels in `reopt-session-id`. */\nexport function formatSessionHeader(credential: SessionCredential): string {\n return `${credential.id}${SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR}${credential.token}`;\n}\n\n/** Splits a `reopt-session-id` value. `null` unless both parts are well-formed. */\nexport function parseSessionHeader(value: string | null | undefined): SessionCredential | null {\n if (!value) return null;\n const at = value.lastIndexOf(SESSION_HEADER_SEPARATOR);\n if (at <= 0 || at === value.length - 1) return null;\n const id = value.slice(0, at);\n const token = value.slice(at + 1);\n return isValidIdentityId(id) && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(token) ? { id, token } : null;\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\n\nfunction base64url(bytes: ArrayBuffer): string {\n let binary = \"\";\n for (const byte of new Uint8Array(bytes)) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n const b64 = typeof btoa === \"function\" ? btoa(binary) : Buffer.from(binary, \"binary\").toString(\"base64\");\n return b64.replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nasync function hmacKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n return crypto.subtle.importKey(\"raw\", encoder.encode(secret), { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\"sign\"]);\n}\n\n/** Issues the token for `sessionId`. Server-side only — needs the project secret. */\nexport async function signSessionToken(secret: string, sessionId: string): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error(\"[reopt] a session signing secret is required\");\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", await hmacKey(secret), encoder.encode(sessionId));\n return base64url(signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time check of a presented token. Recomputes and compares the\n * digests byte by byte rather than using `subtle.verify` with a decoded\n * token, so a malformed token can never throw its way past the check.\n */\nexport async function verifySessionToken(secret: string, credential: SessionCredential): Promise<boolean> {\n if (!secret || !credential) return false;\n const expected = await signSessionToken(secret, credential.id);\n if (expected.length !== credential.token.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let index = 0; index < expected.length; index++) {\n diff |= expected.charCodeAt(index) ^ credential.token.charCodeAt(index);\n }\n return diff === 0;\n}\n"]}
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exports.MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES = MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES; exports.zTrackPayload = zTrackPayload; exports.zIdentifyPayload = zIdentifyPayload; exports.zIncrementPayload = zIncrementPayload; exports.zDecrementPayload = zDecrementPayload; exports.zTrackHandlerPayload = zTrackHandlerPayload; exports.INGEST_MODES = INGEST_MODES; exports.zIngestMode = zIngestMode; exports.INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS = INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS; exports.zIngestRejectionReason = zIngestRejectionReason; exports.zIngestRejection = zIngestRejection; exports.zSessionCredential = zSessionCredential; exports.zIngestOkResponse = zIngestOkResponse; exports.zIngestAcceptedResponse = zIngestAcceptedResponse; exports.zIngestResponse = zIngestResponse; exports.reconcileIngestResponse = reconcileIngestResponse; exports.INGEST_ERROR_CODES = INGEST_ERROR_CODES; exports.zIngestErrorCode = zIngestErrorCode; exports.zIngestError = zIngestError;
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The *response* shape\n * is where server-ingest differs: it reports per-event rejections instead of\n * failing a whole batch, because a forwarder that stalls on one malformed row\n * stops forwarding forever.\n *\n * Absorbed from the former internal `@reopt/ingest-contract`; that package is\n * now a deprecated re-export of this module.\n */\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\nimport { IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN } from \"./identity.js\";\n\nexport {\n AUTO_EVENT_NAMES,\n AUTO_EVENT_PROPERTIES,\n AUTO_EVENT_ROLLUP_KEYS,\n RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES,\n SCROLL_DEPTH_BUCKETS,\n scrollDepthBucket,\n type AutoEventName,\n type ScrollDepthBucket,\n} from \"./events.js\";\nimport { RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES } from \"./events.js\";\n\n/** Hard cap enforced by the route before the body is even parsed. */\nexport const MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES = 512_000;\n\nconst zClientEventMetadata = {\n /**\n * Client-generated UUID. This is the project-scoped idempotency key stored as\n * `RawEvent.clientEventId`; the server uses a separate globally unique raw\n * event id internally. Re-sending the same eventId to the same project is\n * always safe and always reported as a duplicate.\n */\n eventId: z.uuid(),\n /** Event time, epoch milliseconds. */\n timestamp: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /**\n * The browser device this event belongs to, for events a server records\n * on a visitor's behalf (a form submission, an order). Lets one server\n * batch carry events from many visitors — a forwarder cannot split its\n * batches per device without breaking its failure model and its\n * `accepted + duplicates + rejected === sent` invariant.\n *\n * Honoured in `server` mode only, where it takes precedence over the\n * `reopt-device-id` request header. Ignored in `browser` mode: there the\n * header is authoritative and a body field would be trivially forged.\n * Same character set as every identity id.\n */\n deviceId: z.string().regex(IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN, \"expected an identity id\").optional(),\n};\n\nexport const zTrackPayload = z\n .object({\n name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n properties: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n profileId: z.string().max(500).or(z.number()).optional(),\n })\n .refine((data) => !RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES.includes(data.name as never), {\n message: `Event name cannot be one of the reserved names: ${RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES.join(\", \")}`,\n path: [\"name\"],\n });\n\nexport const zIdentifyPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n firstName: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n lastName: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n email: z.email().max(320).optional(),\n avatar: z.url().max(2000).optional(),\n properties: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zIncrementPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n property: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n value: z.number().positive().optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zDecrementPayload = z.object({\n profileId: z.string().min(1).max(500).or(z.number()),\n property: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n value: z.number().positive().optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zTrackHandlerPayload = z.discriminatedUnion(\"type\", [\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"track\"), payload: zTrackPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"identify\"), payload: zIdentifyPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"increment\"), payload: zIncrementPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n z.object({ type: z.literal(\"decrement\"), payload: zDecrementPayload, ...zClientEventMetadata }),\n]);\n\nexport type ITrackPayload = z.infer<typeof zTrackPayload>;\nexport type IIdentifyPayload = z.infer<typeof zIdentifyPayload>;\nexport type IIncrementPayload = z.infer<typeof zIncrementPayload>;\nexport type IDecrementPayload = z.infer<typeof zDecrementPayload>;\nexport type ITrackHandlerPayload = z.infer<typeof zTrackHandlerPayload>;\n\n// ─── Ingest mode ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Decided by the credential presented, never by a header the caller sets:\n * `reopt-write-key` alone → `browser`, `reopt-client-id` + `reopt-client-secret`\n * → `server`. A separate mode header could disagree with the credential; this\n * cannot.\n *\n * `browser` keeps the 5-second click dedup and device-scoped sessions.\n * `server` drops both and relies solely on `eventId` idempotency — a server\n * batch legitimately contains the same event name many times within one second,\n * and its \"device\" is a process, not a person.\n */\nexport const INGEST_MODES = [\"browser\", \"server\"] as const;\nexport const zIngestMode = z.enum(INGEST_MODES);\nexport type IngestMode = z.infer<typeof zIngestMode>;\n\n// ─── Response ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Why a single event in a batch was dropped. These are permanent: re-sending\n * the same row produces the same rejection, so a forwarder should count it as\n * skipped and advance its cursor rather than retry.\n */\nexport const INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n /** Failed the zod schema (bad eventId, missing name, wrong types…). */\n \"validation_failed\",\n /** Used one of RESERVED_EVENT_NAMES. */\n \"reserved_name\",\n /** Another row earlier in the same batch already claimed this eventId. */\n \"duplicate_in_batch\",\n] as const;\nexport const zIngestRejectionReason = z.enum(INGEST_REJECTION_REASONS);\nexport type IngestRejectionReason = z.infer<typeof zIngestRejectionReason>;\n\nexport const zIngestRejection = z.object({\n /** May be absent or malformed on `validation_failed` — hence `string`, not `uuid`. */\n eventId: z.string(),\n /** Position in the submitted batch. The only reliable identifier when eventId itself is bad. */\n index: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n reason: zIngestRejectionReason,\n message: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type IngestRejection = z.infer<typeof zIngestRejection>;\n\nconst ingestCounts = {\n /** Raw events newly persisted by this request. */\n accepted: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /**\n * Events the server already had. In `server` mode this is exactly the\n * eventId-idempotency count; in `browser` mode it also includes the\n * 5-second click dedup.\n */\n duplicates: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n /** Always `[]` in `browser` mode, where a bad row fails the whole batch. */\n rejected: z.array(zIngestRejection),\n};\n\n/**\n * The session ingest filed this batch under, with the token that lets the\n * browser (or a server acting for it) join the same session later with\n * authority — see `signSessionToken` in `./identity`. Browser mode only;\n * absent when the batch carried no sessionable event.\n */\nexport const zSessionCredential = z.object({\n id: z.string().regex(IDENTITY_ID_PATTERN),\n token: z.string().regex(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/),\n});\nexport type SessionCredential = z.infer<typeof zSessionCredential>;\n\n/** 200 — accepted and handed to the materialize queue. */\nexport const zIngestOkResponse = z.object({\n status: z.literal(\"ok\"),\n requestId: z.string(),\n mode: zIngestMode,\n ...ingestCounts,\n queued: z.boolean(),\n session: zSessionCredential.optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * 202 — raw events landed, but enqueueing the materialize task failed. No data\n * is lost: the `replay-unmaterialized` cron picks these up. A forwarder should\n * treat this as success and advance its cursor. Carries the same counts as 200\n * so the reconciliation below works here too.\n */\nexport const zIngestAcceptedResponse = z.object({\n status: z.literal(\"accepted\"),\n requestId: z.string(),\n mode: zIngestMode,\n ...ingestCounts,\n backgroundQueued: z.literal(false),\n replay: z.literal(\"unmaterialized-raw-events\"),\n session: zSessionCredential.optional(),\n});\n\nexport const zIngestResponse = z.discriminatedUnion(\"status\", [zIngestOkResponse, zIngestAcceptedResponse]);\n\nexport type IngestOkResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestOkResponse>;\nexport type IngestAcceptedResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestAcceptedResponse>;\nexport type IngestResponse = z.infer<typeof zIngestResponse>;\n\n/**\n * The reconciliation a forwarder runs on every 2xx:\n *\n * accepted + duplicates + rejected.length === events sent\n *\n * A mismatch means the server silently dropped something, which is exactly the\n * failure mode this contract exists to make impossible to miss.\n */\nexport function reconcileIngestResponse(response: IngestResponse, sentCount: number): boolean {\n return response.accepted + response.duplicates + response.rejected.length === sentCount;\n}\n\n// ─── Errors ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Stable machine-readable codes. Branch on these, never on `error`/`message`,\n * which are prose and may be reworded.\n */\nexport const INGEST_ERROR_CODES = [\n /** 401 — unknown or mismatched credentials. Stop and alert; do not retry. */\n \"unauthorized\",\n /** 400 — body was not valid JSON. */\n \"invalid_json\",\n /** 400 — request exceeded MAX_TRACK_PAYLOAD_BYTES. Split the batch. */\n \"payload_too_large\",\n /** 400 — zero events submitted. */\n \"empty_batch\",\n /** 400 — batch contained a `type: \"alias\"` event, which is not supported. */\n \"alias_unsupported\",\n /** 400 — the project has no organization; it cannot be billed or quota-checked. */\n \"project_without_organization\",\n /** 400 — `browser` mode only: a row failed validation. `server` mode reports these in `rejected[]`. */\n \"validation_failed\",\n /** 429 — per-project request rate limit. `Retry-After` set. Pause this tick, keep the cursor. */\n \"rate_limited\",\n /** 429 — the organization's monthly event quota is exhausted. `Retry-After` set (capped at 1h). Alert: a human must raise the limit. */\n \"quota_exceeded\",\n /** 410 — the project is being deleted. Permanent; stop sending. */\n \"project_purging\",\n /** 500 — unexpected server failure. Back off and retry. */\n \"internal_error\",\n] as const;\nexport const zIngestErrorCode = z.enum(INGEST_ERROR_CODES);\nexport type IngestErrorCode = z.infer<typeof zIngestErrorCode>;\n\nexport const zIngestError = z.object({\n status: z.number().int(),\n code: zIngestErrorCode,\n error: z.string(),\n message: z.string().optional(),\n /** zod issues, when `code === \"validation_failed\"`. */\n errors: z.unknown().optional(),\n requestId: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type IngestError = z.infer<typeof zIngestError>;\n"]}
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"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {value: true}); function _nullishCoalesce(lhs, rhsFn) { if (lhs != null) { return lhs; } else { return rhsFn(); } } function _optionalChain(ops) { let lastAccessLHS = undefined; let value = ops[0]; let i = 1; while (i < ops.length) { const op = ops[i]; const fn = ops[i + 1]; i += 2; if ((op === 'optionalAccess' || op === 'optionalCall') && value == null) { return undefined; } if (op === 'access' || op === 'optionalAccess') { lastAccessLHS = value; value = fn(value); } else if (op === 'call' || op === 'optionalCall') { value = fn((...args) => value.call(lastAccessLHS, ...args)); lastAccessLHS = undefined; } } return value; }
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import { CreateOrganizationInput, CreateOrganizationResponse, RotateOrganizationKeyResponse, UpdateOrganizationQuotaInput, UpdateOrganizationQuotaResponse, CreateProjectInput, CreateProjectResponse, RotateClientSecretResponse, DeleteProjectInput, DeleteProjectResponse, UpsertEventMetaInput, EventMetaResponse } from './control.cjs';
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import { CreateOrganizationInput, CreateOrganizationResponse, RotateOrganizationKeyResponse, UpdateOrganizationQuotaInput, UpdateOrganizationQuotaResponse, CreateProjectInput, CreateProjectResponse, RotateClientSecretResponse, DeleteProjectInput, DeleteProjectResponse, UpsertEventMetaInput, EventMetaResponse } from './control.js';
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|
REQUEST_ID_HEADER
|
|
34
|
-
} from "./chunk-
|
|
34
|
+
} from "./chunk-HLQAZ6JW.js";
|
|
35
35
|
import "./chunk-FP2X3PRK.js";
|
|
36
36
|
|
|
37
37
|
// src/client.ts
|
package/dist/control.cjs
CHANGED
package/dist/control.js
CHANGED