@remnux/mcp-server 0.1.30 → 0.1.31

package/README.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The server gives AI assistants structured access to REMnux tools with features p
 
 - **Unified connection layer** — Docker exec, SSH, and local execution behind one interface. Switch deployment scenarios without changing how your AI assistant interacts with tools.
 - **File-type-aware analysis** — `analyze_file` detects file types and runs the appropriate tool chain automatically, returning structured output with IOC extraction. `suggest_tools` lets the AI agent request recommendations and decide what to run.
-- **Defense-in-depth guardrails** — Pattern blocking catches common AI hallucinations such as `curl | bash` or `eval`. Optional path sandboxing (`--sandbox`) restricts file operations to the samples and output directories. These complement the container or VM isolation that serves as the primary security boundary.
+- **Defense-in-depth guardrails** — Pattern blocking catches prompt injection via command substitution (`$()`, backticks, `${}`). Optional path sandboxing (`--sandbox`) restricts file operations to the samples and output directories. These complement the container or VM isolation that serves as the primary security boundary.
 - **Browsable tool registry** — MCP resources at `remnux://tools`, `remnux://tools/by-tag/{tag}`, and `remnux://tools/{name}` let the AI agent discover available tools and their metadata without external lookups.
 
 ## Architecture
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ All three connection modes (docker, ssh, local) execute commands inside a dispos
 
 | Threat | Target | Defense |
 |--------|--------|---------|
-| Command injection (prompt injection tricks AI into shell execution) | Analyst's workflow | Anti-injection patterns (`eval`, `$()`, backticks, etc.) |
+| Command injection (prompt injection tricks AI into shell execution) | Analyst's workflow | Anti-injection patterns (`$()`, backticks, `${}`, etc.) |
 | Dangerous pipes (attacker code piped to interpreters) | Analyst's workflow | Container/VM isolation; AI system prompt guidance |
 | Catastrophic commands (`rm -rf /`, `mkfs`) | Analysis session | Narrow pattern guards for root wipes and filesystem formatting |
 | Resource exhaustion (tools hang or consume excessive resources) | AI assistant / analysis session | Timeout enforcement (default 5 min), output budgets (40KB/tool default, 120KB total) |
@@ -566,10 +566,10 @@ All three connection modes (docker, ssh, local) execute commands inside a dispos
 
 **Blocked command patterns (anti-injection):**
 - Null bytes (truncate paths in C functions)
-- Shell escape: `eval`, `exec`, backticks, `$()`, `${}`, process substitution `<()` `>()`
-- Shell sourcing: `source`
+- Shell escape: backticks, `$()`, `${}`, process substitution `<()` `>()`
 
 **Deliberately NOT blocked (legitimate shell syntax):**
+- `eval`, `exec`, `source` — same threat class as pipe-to-interpreter (already allowed); without `$()` or backticks, these only operate on literal strings; container/VM isolation handles residual risk
 - Simple `$VAR` references (needed for shell loops: `for f in *; do file "$f"; done`)
 - Newlines/carriage returns (enables multi-line scripts; container isolation is the security boundary)
 
@@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ These commands are intentionally allowed because REMnux is disposable and contai
 | `dd` | Legitimate forensics tool for disk/memory carving |
 | `curl`, `wget` | Network tools needed for analysis |
 | `\| python`, `\| bash`, `\| perl`, etc. | Container isolation handles code execution; blocking prevented legitimate workflows |
+| `eval`, `exec`, `source` | Same threat class as pipe-to-interpreter; `$()` blocking already covers injection vectors |
 | `/etc/`, `/proc/`, `/sys/`, `/dev/` | Container's own filesystem; useful for forensics |
 | `crontab`, `nohup`, `screen`, `tmux` | Ephemeral environment; timeouts still apply |
 | `tee`, `xargs` | Essential for saving output and batch operations |
@@ -606,12 +607,11 @@ These commands are intentionally allowed because REMnux is disposable and contai
 ### Defense in Depth
 
 1. **Container/VM isolation**: REMnux runs isolated — the primary security boundary (user responsibility)
-2. **Anti-injection**: Shell escape patterns block prompt injection from executing arbitrary code
-3. **Pipe validation**: Pipes to code interpreters blocked
-4. **Shell escaping**: Proper single-quote escaping for SSH commands
-5. **Timeouts**: Long-running processes terminated (default 5 min)
-6. **Output budgets**: Per-tool (40KB default) and total (120KB) limits prevent AI context exhaustion
-7. **Path sandboxing** (opt-in via `--sandbox`): Restricts file operations to samples/output dirs
+2. **Anti-injection**: Shell escape patterns block prompt injection from executing arbitrary code via `$()`, backticks, `${}`, and process substitution
+3. **Shell escaping**: Proper single-quote escaping for SSH commands
+4. **Timeouts**: Long-running processes terminated (default 5 min)
+5. **Output budgets**: Per-tool (40KB default) and total (120KB) limits prevent AI context exhaustion
+6. **Path sandboxing** (opt-in via `--sandbox`): Restricts file operations to samples/output dirs
 
 ### Prompt Injection from Malware
 
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ This server is self-sufficient for most workflows: `suggest_tools` recommends th
 ### Why blocklist-only (no allowlist)?
 
 - **Container isolation** is the real security boundary, not this server's guardrails
-- **Anti-injection patterns** prevent prompt injection from triggering arbitrary code execution (e.g., `eval`, `$(cmd)`, `| bash`)
+- **Anti-injection patterns** prevent prompt injection from triggering arbitrary code execution via `$(cmd)`, backticks, `${}`, and process substitution
 - **Simpler maintenance**: No need to parse salt-states or fetch remote tool lists
 - **Works offline**: No dependency on docs.remnux.org for tool validation
 - **Flexible**: Any installed tool can be used without updating an allowlist

package/dist/security/blocklist.d.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,12 @@
  *
  * This module prevents:
  * 1. Shell injection — malware output containing prompt injection could trick
- *    the AI into executing arbitrary code via eval, $(), backticks, etc.
- * 2. Dangerous pipes — pipes to interpreters (| bash, | python) blocked.
+ *    the AI into executing arbitrary code via $(), backticks, ${}, etc.
+ *
+ * eval/exec/source are NOT blocked (removed 2026-02): same threat class as
+ * pipe-to-interpreter (already allowed). Without $() or backticks, these can
+ * only operate on literal strings — equivalent to typing commands directly.
+ * Container/VM isolation handles the residual risk.
  *
  * Path sandboxing (isPathSafe, validateFilePath) is available as an opt-in
  * workflow aid via --sandbox, not as a security control.

package/dist/security/blocklist.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/security/blocklist.js

@@ -7,8 +7,12 @@
  *
  * This module prevents:
  * 1. Shell injection — malware output containing prompt injection could trick
- *    the AI into executing arbitrary code via eval, $(), backticks, etc.
- * 2. Dangerous pipes — pipes to interpreters (| bash, | python) blocked.
+ *    the AI into executing arbitrary code via $(), backticks, ${}, etc.
+ *
+ * eval/exec/source are NOT blocked (removed 2026-02): same threat class as
+ * pipe-to-interpreter (already allowed). Without $() or backticks, these can
+ * only operate on literal strings — equivalent to typing commands directly.
+ * Container/VM isolation handles the residual risk.
  *
  * Path sandboxing (isPathSafe, validateFilePath) is available as an opt-in
  * workflow aid via --sandbox, not as a security control.
@@ -20,8 +24,6 @@ export const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
     // Newlines allowed: enables multi-line scripts; container isolation is security boundary
     { pattern: /\x00/, category: "null byte injection" },
     // Shell escape / code execution — prevents prompt injection from triggering arbitrary code
-    { pattern: /\beval\b/i, category: "shell escape" },
-    { pattern: /(?<!-)\bexec\b/i, category: "shell escape" },
     { pattern: /`[^`]+`/, category: "shell escape (backtick)" },
     { pattern: /\$\([^)]+\)/, category: "shell escape (command substitution)" },
     { pattern: /\$\{[^}]+\}/, category: "shell escape (variable expansion)" },
@@ -30,8 +32,6 @@ export const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
     { pattern: /\$[0-9?$!@#]/, category: "shell escape (special variable)" },
     // Process substitution
     { pattern: /[<>]\s*\(/, category: "process substitution" },
-    // Shell sourcing
-    { pattern: /\bsource\b/i, category: "shell escape" },
     // Catastrophic command guard — prevents AI from accidentally destroying the analysis session
     // Only blocks root-level wipes (rm -rf /), not targeted deletes (rm -rf subdir/)
     { pattern: /rm\s+-[rR].*\s\/\s*$/, category: "catastrophic command (root wipe)" },

package/dist/security/blocklist.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@remnux/mcp-server",
-  "version": "0.1.30",
+  "version": "0.1.31",
   "description": "MCP server for using the REMnux malware analysis toolkit via AI assistants",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",