@remit/api-openapi-types 0.0.27 → 0.0.29

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@remit/api-openapi-types",
-  "version": "0.0.27",
+  "version": "0.0.29",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "types.d.ts",
   "types": "types.d.ts",

package/types.d.ts

@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ current enum emitter anyway, so the wire contract uses the bare form.
     /**
      * Status of an outbox message in the send queue
      */
-    export type OutboxMessageStatus = "draft" | "queued" | "sending" | "sent" | "failed" | "blocked";
+    export type OutboxMessageStatus = "draft" | "queued" | "sending" | "sent" | "unfiled" | "failed" | "blocked";
     /**
      * Where an attachment is between being promised and being sendable.
 
@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ distinguishable from a network failure without parsing prose.
      * Sync status for message move/delete operations
      */
     export type MessageSyncStatus = "synced" | "pending" | "failed";
+    /**
+     * Sender-authenticity tier for a message, resolved at body-sync from the trusted Authentication-Results header and the sender's pair-keyed standing. First match wins, in tier order: `Impersonation`, `Aligned`, `Authenticated`, `Routine`, `NotChecked`, `Caution`. `NotEvaluated` is the sentinel for a message the derivation has never run on — it is the default and what every message written before this field existed carries, and it is distinct from `NotChecked`, which is a result.
+     */
+    export type AuthenticityVerdict = "NotEvaluated" | "NotChecked" | "Aligned" | "Authenticated" | "Routine" | "Caution" | "Impersonation";
     /**
      * Authentication verdict for a single auth mechanism, as reported in the Authentication-Results header.
      */
@@ -2508,6 +2512,22 @@ standing to persist.
        * Registrable domains (eTLD+1) the body's links point at, excluding the From address's own registrable domain. Present only for a message the provider's own filter already classified as spam; an empty array means every link stayed on the sender's domain, absence means the comparison was never made.
        */
       offDomainLinkDomains?: string[];
+      /**
+       * Registrable domain of the first verified DKIM `header.d` in trusted Authentication-Results order, or the reserved literal `unverified` when no identity could be established. Unlike `dkimDomain`, which is the unverified `d=` claim the sender wrote, this is only set from a signature the trusted Authentication-Results reported as passing. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+       */
+      signerDomain?: string;
+      /**
+       * SPF-checked envelope-from domain (`smtp.mailfrom`, falling back to `smtp.helo`) from the trusted Authentication-Results. Absent when the trusted header carried no SPF clause, or for messages classified before the field existed.
+       */
+      envelopeDomain?: string;
+      /**
+       * Messages this account had already seen for the sender's standing key when this message arrived. A snapshot frozen at derivation time, deliberately not a live read — a message classified when the key stood at 340 always reads 340. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+       */
+      signerMessageCount?: number;
+      /**
+       * Epoch milliseconds this account first saw the sender's standing key, snapshotted at derivation time alongside `signerMessageCount`. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+       */
+      signerFirstSeenAt?: number;
     }
     /**
      * Present only when Remit auto-moved this message on body-sync. Two shapes share this model: a classifier placement move carries `action` + `fromPlacement` (Inbox/Junk direction); a standing-filter move carries `fromMailboxId` + `destinationMailboxId` + `filterId` (an arbitrary destination folder). Absent means the message was not auto-moved by Remit — clients treat absence as no indicator.
@@ -3421,6 +3441,10 @@ either way and cannot tell which it received.
        * Structured sender-authenticity signal derived from DKIM headers at classification time. Absent for messages classified before this field was introduced — absence means no signal.
        */
       authenticity?: MessageAuthenticity;
+      /**
+       * Sender-authenticity tier resolved at body-sync. Defaults to `NotEvaluated`, the named pending state every message written before the derivation existed carries. Top-level rather than a member of `authenticity` on purpose: that blob is absent for all unsigned mail, so a guard keyed on its absence cannot tell "never derived" from "nothing to derive" and would re-derive unsigned mail forever.
+       */
+      authenticityVerdict: AuthenticityVerdict;
       /**
        * Provider authentication-results signal parsed from Authentication-Results header. Absent for messages synced before this field was introduced.
        */
@@ -4327,6 +4351,56 @@ locally".
       createdAt: number;
       updatedAt: number;
     }
+    /**
+     * How often this account has seen mail from one sender arrive under one DKIM
+signing identity. A third-party signer is not suspicious in itself — an ESP
+signing for its own domain on behalf of a customer is the ordinary shape of
+bulk mail — so what the authenticity derivation asks is whether this sender
+has been seen arriving this way before.
+
+`senderKey` carries two scopes, disambiguated by `signerDomain`: the From
+domain when the signer is a real verified identity, and the full From address
+when `signerDomain` is the reserved literal `unverified`. Address granularity
+on the unverified pseudo-pair is a security boundary — a domain-wide key would
+let one unverifiable message from any address at a domain earn quiet treatment
+for every forged sender at it.
+
+Standing is a noise filter, not an anti-spoofing control. It narrows the
+attack from "rent any established relay" to "rent the relay this specific From
+domain already uses"; it does not close it.
+     */
+    export interface SenderSignerStanding {
+      /**
+       * Owning account configuration. Standing is never shared between accounts.
+       */
+      accountConfigId: UUID;
+      /**
+       * Lowercased From domain when `signerDomain` names a real verified signer; the full lowercased From address when `signerDomain` is the reserved literal `unverified`.
+       */
+      senderKey: String256;
+      /**
+       * Registrable domain of the first verified DKIM `header.d` in trusted Authentication-Results order, or the reserved literal `unverified` when no identity could be established. `unverified` is rejected as a real signer domain on write.
+       */
+      signerDomain: String256;
+      /**
+       * Messages observed for this key. One increment per message.
+       */
+      messageCount: number;
+      /**
+       * Epoch milliseconds of the first observation. Immutable after creation — the conflict path of the upsert deliberately omits it, so a later message can never reset the key's age.
+       */
+      firstSeenAt: number;
+      /**
+       * Epoch milliseconds of the most recent observation.
+       */
+      lastSeenAt: number;
+      /**
+       * Epoch milliseconds the user affirmed knowing this sender, promoting `Caution` to `Routine` for the pair. `0` means never affirmed, which is the state of every row until a user acts.
+       */
+      userAffirmedAt: number;
+      createdAt: number;
+      updatedAt: number;
+    }
     /**
      * Content-Type and other MIME parameters (CHARSET, BOUNDARY, NAME, etc.)
      */
@@ -6351,6 +6425,7 @@ export type MessageFlag = Components.Schemas.MessageFlag;
 export type MessagePlacementMove = Components.Schemas.MessagePlacementMove;
 export type MessageFlagPush = Components.Schemas.MessageFlagPush;
 export type Envelope = Components.Schemas.Envelope;
+export type SenderSignerStanding = Components.Schemas.SenderSignerStanding;
 export type BodyPartParameter = Components.Schemas.BodyPartParameter;
 export type RawMessageStorage = Components.Schemas.RawMessageStorage;
 export type BodyPartStorage = Components.Schemas.BodyPartStorage;
@@ -6393,6 +6468,7 @@ export type OutboxAttachmentState = Components.Schemas.OutboxAttachmentState;
 export type OutboxAttachmentRejectionReason = Components.Schemas.OutboxAttachmentRejectionReason;
 export type MessageStatus = Components.Schemas.MessageStatus;
 export type MessageSyncStatus = Components.Schemas.MessageSyncStatus;
+export type AuthenticityVerdict = Components.Schemas.AuthenticityVerdict;
 export type AuthResultVerdict = Components.Schemas.AuthResultVerdict;
 export type PlacementConfidence = Components.Schemas.PlacementConfidence;
 export type AddressRole = Components.Schemas.AddressRole;