@remit/api-http-client 0.0.26 → 0.0.27

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@remit/api-http-client",
-  "version": "0.0.26",
+  "version": "0.0.27",
   "type": "module",
   "exports": {
     ".": "./index.ts",

package/types.gen.ts

@@ -1291,6 +1291,22 @@ export type RemitImapMessageAuthenticity = {
      * Registrable domains (eTLD+1) the body's links point at, excluding the From address's own registrable domain. Present only for a message the provider's own filter already classified as spam; an empty array means every link stayed on the sender's domain, absence means the comparison was never made.
      */
     offDomainLinkDomains?: Array<string>;
+    /**
+     * Registrable domain of the first verified DKIM `header.d` in trusted Authentication-Results order, or the reserved literal `unverified` when no identity could be established. Unlike `dkimDomain`, which is the unverified `d=` claim the sender wrote, this is only set from a signature the trusted Authentication-Results reported as passing. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+     */
+    signerDomain?: string;
+    /**
+     * SPF-checked envelope-from domain (`smtp.mailfrom`, falling back to `smtp.helo`) from the trusted Authentication-Results. Absent when the trusted header carried no SPF clause, or for messages classified before the field existed.
+     */
+    envelopeDomain?: string;
+    /**
+     * Messages this account had already seen for the sender's standing key when this message arrived. A snapshot frozen at derivation time, deliberately not a live read — a message classified when the key stood at 340 always reads 340. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+     */
+    signerMessageCount?: number;
+    /**
+     * Epoch milliseconds this account first saw the sender's standing key, snapshotted at derivation time alongside `signerMessageCount`. Absent for messages classified before the field existed.
+     */
+    signerFirstSeenAt?: number;
 };
 
 /**