@reinconsole/mock-rails 0.4.0 → 0.5.1

package/dist/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 import { EventEmitter } from "events";
 import { randomBytes } from "crypto";
 
-// ../../packages/core/dist/chunk-AW74KJ6X.js
+// ../../packages/core/dist/chunk-SRKPESD5.js
 import { z } from "zod";
 var ULID_BODY = "[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}";
 function prefixedId(prefix) {
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ var SessionId = prefixedId("ses");
 var GateReceiptId = prefixedId("grc");
 var ApiKeyId = prefixedId("key");
 var ApproverKeyId = prefixedId("apk");
-var ApiKeyScope = z.enum(["read", "evaluate", "approve", "report", "admin"]);
+var ApiKeyScope = z.enum(["read", "evaluate", "approve", "report", "identity", "admin"]);
 var ApiKey = z.object({
   id: ApiKeyId,
   name: z.string().min(1).max(200),
@@ -655,6 +655,14 @@ var Health = z3.object({
   auth: z3.string().optional(),
   approvals: z3.string().optional()
 });
+var ChainVerdict = z3.object({
+  intact: z3.boolean(),
+  /** Decisions this key can see — the same number as `chainLength`. */
+  visible: z3.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  verifiedAt: z3.string(),
+  /** Index of the first bad link. Unscoped keys only. */
+  brokenAt: z3.number().int().nonnegative().optional()
+});
 var EvaluateResponse = z3.object({
   intent: PaymentIntent,
   decision: Decision,

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/ledger.ts","../../../packages/core/src/ids.ts","../../../packages/core/src/api-key.ts","../../../packages/core/src/ulid.ts","../../../packages/core/src/chain.ts","../../../packages/core/src/money.ts","../../../packages/core/src/glob.ts","../../../packages/core/src/agent.ts","../../../packages/core/src/erc8004.ts","../../../packages/core/src/intent.ts","../../../packages/core/src/decision.ts","../../../packages/core/src/canonical.ts","../../../packages/core/src/session.ts","../../../packages/core/src/payment.ts","../../../packages/core/src/receipt.ts","../../../packages/core/src/gate-receipt.ts","../../../packages/core/src/policy.ts","../../../packages/core/src/liveness.ts","../../../packages/core/src/approval.ts","../../../packages/core/src/reputation.ts","../../../packages/core/src/events.ts","../../../packages/sdk/src/errors.ts","../../../packages/sdk/src/client.ts","../../../packages/sdk/src/x402.ts","../../../packages/sdk/src/x402v2.ts","../../../packages/sdk/src/guard.ts","../src/errors.ts","../src/payload.ts","../src/facilitator.ts","../src/indexer.ts","../src/vendor.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';\nimport { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { Chain, Asset, DecimalString } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/**\n * The simulated chain. One MockLedger plays every chain at once: entries carry\n * their `chain` tag instead of living on separate ledgers, which keeps the\n * mock world to a single object.\n *\n * Crucially, ANYONE can call `transfer()` directly — that is the bypass path.\n * An agent that pays a vendor without going through the guard still leaves a\n * ledger entry, and the indexer turns that into a `shadow.spend` event.\n */\nexport interface TransferInput {\n  chain: Chain;\n  asset: Asset;\n  from: string;\n  to: string;\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.01\". */\n  amount: string;\n  /** Opaque settlement memo; the mock facilitator writes the intent id here. */\n  memo?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface LedgerEntry extends TransferInput {\n  txHash: string;\n  blockNumber: bigint;\n  at: Date;\n}\n\nexport class MockLedger {\n  private readonly log: LedgerEntry[] = [];\n  private readonly bus = new EventEmitter();\n  private height = 0n;\n\n  /** Append a confirmed transfer (one entry == one tx in its own block). */\n  transfer(input: TransferInput): LedgerEntry {\n    const entry: LedgerEntry = {\n      ...input,\n      chain: Chain.parse(input.chain),\n      asset: Asset.parse(input.asset),\n      amount: DecimalString.parse(input.amount),\n      txHash: `0x${randomBytes(32).toString('hex')}`,\n      blockNumber: ++this.height,\n      at: new Date(),\n    };\n    this.log.push(entry);\n    this.bus.emit('entry', entry);\n    return entry;\n  }\n\n  /** All transfers, oldest first. */\n  entries(): readonly LedgerEntry[] {\n    return this.log;\n  }\n\n  /** Subscribe to new transfers as they confirm (what the indexer watches). */\n  onEntry(handler: (entry: LedgerEntry) => void): void {\n    this.bus.on('entry', handler);\n  }\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/** Crockford base32 ULID body (26 chars), as produced by `ulid()`. */\nconst ULID_BODY = '[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}';\n\n/**\n * A zod schema for a Stripe-style prefixed ULID, e.g. `agt_01J7...`.\n * Centralizing this keeps id formats consistent across DB rows, API payloads,\n * and SDK types.\n */\nexport function prefixedId(prefix: string) {\n  return z\n    .string()\n    .regex(new RegExp(`^${prefix}_${ULID_BODY}$`), `expected a \"${prefix}_\" prefixed id`);\n}\n\nexport const OrgId = prefixedId('org');\nexport const AgentId = prefixedId('agt');\nexport const PolicyId = prefixedId('pol');\nexport const IntentId = prefixedId('int');\nexport const DecisionId = prefixedId('dec');\nexport const ReceiptId = prefixedId('rcp');\nexport const SessionId = prefixedId('ses');\nexport const GateReceiptId = prefixedId('grc');\nexport const ApiKeyId = prefixedId('key');\nexport const ApproverKeyId = prefixedId('apk');\n\nexport type OrgId = z.infer<typeof OrgId>;\nexport type AgentId = z.infer<typeof AgentId>;\nexport type PolicyId = z.infer<typeof PolicyId>;\nexport type IntentId = z.infer<typeof IntentId>;\nexport type DecisionId = z.infer<typeof DecisionId>;\nexport type ReceiptId = z.infer<typeof ReceiptId>;\nexport type SessionId = z.infer<typeof SessionId>;\nexport type GateReceiptId = z.infer<typeof GateReceiptId>;\nexport type ApiKeyId = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyId>;\nexport type ApproverKeyId = z.infer<typeof ApproverKeyId>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApiKeyId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\n\n/**\n * What a key is allowed to reach. `admin` satisfies every requirement (it is\n * the issuing/rotating key); the rest are least-privilege grants so an agent\n * runtime carrying an `evaluate` key cannot rewrite policy, and an approval\n * relay cannot read the spend history.\n *\n * `report` is the graph's ingestion grant, and it is deliberately NOT folded\n * into `evaluate`: evidence written to the reputation graph is about OTHER\n * subjects, so a fleet key that may spend its own budget has no business\n * moving a vendor's score. The engine's own reporting routes ride `evaluate`\n * because there the reporter IS the spender — that reasoning does not reach\n * across to a shared graph.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyScope = z.enum(['read', 'evaluate', 'approve', 'report', 'admin']);\nexport type ApiKeyScope = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyScope>;\n\n/**\n * The public view of an API key — everything except the secret. This is what\n * the API returns on list/issue; the secret itself is shown exactly once, at\n * issuance, and never persisted in recoverable form (see {@link ApiKeyRecord}).\n */\nexport const ApiKey = z.object({\n  id: ApiKeyId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  scopes: z.array(ApiKeyScope).min(1),\n  /**\n   * The org this key acts inside. ABSENT means unscoped — an operator key that\n   * reads and writes across every org, which is what a self-hosted single-org\n   * deployment and every env-seeded boot secret have always been. That is the\n   * compatibility rule the whole tenancy design rests on: adding tenancy\n   * changed no existing key's behaviour, because no existing key has this\n   * field.\n   *\n   * Present, it is a hard confinement, not a default: the key cannot read,\n   * spend, approve or govern outside the org, and a write it submits is\n   * stamped with this org rather than the one the body asked for.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Narrow an org-scoped key further, to specific agents — what an agent\n   * runtime should carry, so a stolen key spends one agent's budget rather\n   * than the org's. Only meaningful alongside {@link ApiKey.orgId}: agent\n   * narrowing without an org is refused at issuance, because the scope it\n   * would describe has no org to resolve policies and approvers in.\n   *\n   * Capped at 64: a list long enough to need more is a fleet, and a fleet is\n   * what the org scope is for.\n   */\n  agentIds: z.array(AgentId).max(64).optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Last successful authentication, for spotting keys that can be retired. */\n  lastUsedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by revoke(); a revoked key never authenticates again. */\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by rotate(); with `previousSecretExpiresAt` it dates the overlap. */\n  rotatedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Past this instant the key stops authenticating, like a revoked one.\n   * ABSENT means it never expires -- every key before the sandbox, and every\n   * key an operator mints. Only the anonymous sandbox sets it, and a key minted\n   * BY an expiring key inherits the deadline: a sandbox that could mint itself\n   * a permanent key would not be a 7-day sandbox.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKey = z.infer<typeof ApiKey>;\n\n/**\n * SERVER-SIDE ONLY. The stored form: the public record plus sha256 digests of\n * the secrets. Digests, not secrets — a stolen database yields nothing that\n * authenticates. Rotation keeps the outgoing digest alive until\n * `previousSecretExpiresAt` so a running fleet can roll over without a\n * flag-day restart; past that instant only the current secret verifies.\n *\n * This shape never leaves the engine: every route answers with {@link ApiKey}.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyRecord = ApiKey.extend({\n  secretHash: z.string(),\n  previousSecretHash: z.string().optional(),\n  previousSecretExpiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKeyRecord = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyRecord>;\n\n/** Strip the digests: the only sanctioned way to put a key on the wire. */\nexport function toPublicApiKey(record: ApiKeyRecord): ApiKey {\n  const { secretHash, previousSecretHash, previousSecretExpiresAt, ...pub } = record;\n  void secretHash;\n  void previousSecretHash;\n  void previousSecretExpiresAt;\n  return pub;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal ULID generation, dependency-free. ULIDs are lexicographically\n * sortable (time-prefixed) and url-safe, which is why Rein uses them for all\n * primary keys instead of UUIDs. Works in Node 22 and modern browsers/edge via\n * the WebCrypto `globalThis.crypto`.\n */\n\n// Crockford's base32 alphabet (excludes I, L, O, U to avoid ambiguity).\nconst ENCODING = '0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ';\nconst TIME_LEN = 10;\nconst RANDOM_LEN = 16;\n\nfunction randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction encodeTime(now: number): string {\n  let time = now;\n  let out = '';\n  for (let i = TIME_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out = ENCODING.charAt(time % 32) + out;\n    time = Math.floor(time / 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction encodeRandom(): string {\n  let out = '';\n  for (const byte of randomBytes(RANDOM_LEN)) {\n    out += ENCODING.charAt(byte % 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/** Generate a 26-character ULID. */\nexport function ulid(seedTime: number = Date.now()): string {\n  return encodeTime(seedTime) + encodeRandom();\n}\n\n/** Generate a Stripe-style prefixed id, e.g. `newId('agt')` -> `agt_01J...`. */\nexport function newId<P extends string>(prefix: P): `${P}_${string}` {\n  return `${prefix}_${ulid()}`;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Chains Rein observes/governs. x402 is multi-chain; Base and Solana ship\n * first, Polygon and BNB follow. The policy/ledger domain is rail-agnostic —\n * this enum is the only place chains are enumerated.\n */\nexport const Chain = z.enum(['base', 'solana', 'polygon', 'bnb']);\nexport type Chain = z.infer<typeof Chain>;\n\n/** Stablecoins settled over x402. */\nexport const Asset = z.enum(['USDC', 'USDT', 'EURC']);\nexport type Asset = z.infer<typeof Asset>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Monetary amounts in Rein are always non-negative **decimal strings**, never\n * floats. Float arithmetic silently loses precision on values like 0.1 + 0.2,\n * which is unacceptable for money. All comparison/aggregation goes through the\n * BigInt-backed helpers below.\n */\nexport const DecimalString = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/, 'must be a non-negative decimal string, e.g. \"5.00\"');\nexport type DecimalString = z.infer<typeof DecimalString>;\n\nconst DECIMAL_RE = /^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/;\n\nexport function isValidDecimal(value: string): boolean {\n  return DECIMAL_RE.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction assertDecimal(value: string): void {\n  if (!isValidDecimal(value)) {\n    throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal string: ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction fractionLength(value: string): number {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  return dot === -1 ? 0 : value.length - dot - 1;\n}\n\n/** Scale a decimal string into an integer BigInt at a fixed number of fraction digits. */\nfunction toScaled(value: string, scale: number): bigint {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? '' : value.slice(dot + 1);\n  const paddedFrac = (fracPart + '0'.repeat(scale)).slice(0, scale);\n  return BigInt(intPart + paddedFrac);\n}\n\n/** Render a scaled BigInt back to a normalized decimal string (no trailing zeros). */\nfunction fromScaled(scaled: bigint, scale: number): string {\n  if (scale === 0) return scaled.toString();\n  const digits = scaled.toString().padStart(scale + 1, '0');\n  const intPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - scale);\n  const fracPart = digits.slice(digits.length - scale).replace(/0+$/, '');\n  return fracPart.length > 0 ? `${intPart}.${fracPart}` : intPart;\n}\n\n/** Compare two decimal strings. Returns -1 (a<b), 0 (a==b), or 1 (a>b). */\nexport function compareDecimal(a: string, b: string): -1 | 0 | 1 {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  const av = toScaled(a, scale);\n  const bv = toScaled(b, scale);\n  return av < bv ? -1 : av > bv ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/** Sum a list of decimal strings without floating-point error. */\nexport function sumDecimal(values: readonly string[]): string {\n  if (values.length === 0) return '0';\n  let scale = 0;\n  for (const v of values) {\n    assertDecimal(v);\n    scale = Math.max(scale, fractionLength(v));\n  }\n  let total = 0n;\n  for (const v of values) total += toScaled(v, scale);\n  return fromScaled(total, scale);\n}\n\n/**\n * `a - b` for decimal strings, exact. Requires `a >= b`: the one caller is\n * \"how much more settled than was allowed\", and a negative money string is a\n * shape nothing else in the system accepts, so asking for one is a bug here\n * rather than a value to hand on.\n */\nexport function subDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  if (compareDecimal(a, b) < 0) {\n    throw new RangeError(`subDecimal: ${a} is less than ${b}`);\n  }\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  return fromScaled(toScaled(a, scale) - toScaled(b, scale), scale);\n}\n\n/** Multiply two decimal strings exactly (e.g. median * \"3\" for price-sanity). */\nexport function mulDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scaleA = fractionLength(a);\n  const scaleB = fractionLength(b);\n  const product = toScaled(a, scaleA) * toScaled(b, scaleB);\n  return fromScaled(product, scaleA + scaleB);\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a > b. */\nexport function gt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === 1;\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a < b. */\nexport function lt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === -1;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal, safe glob matcher supporting only the `*` wildcard (matches any run\n * of characters, including none). Used for vendor host allowlists\n * (e.g. \"*.trusted.io\"), agent-id targeting (e.g. \"agt_research_*\"), and\n * Gate route pricing (e.g. \"/api/reports/*\").\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a regex from user input — the pattern is escaped so a\n * malicious policy value cannot inject regex behavior (ReDoS, etc.).\n */\nexport function globMatch(pattern: string, value: string): boolean {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&'); // escape regex metachars\n  const withWildcard = escaped.replace(/\\\\\\*/g, '.*'); // re-enable only `*`\n  return new RegExp(`^${withWildcard}$`).test(value);\n}\n\n/** True if `value` matches any pattern in the list. */\nexport function globMatchAny(patterns: readonly string[], value: string): boolean {\n  return patterns.some((p) => globMatch(p, value));\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\n\n/**\n * Enforcement tier of a given agent wallet:\n * - `observed`    — Rein sees spend on-chain but has no control (no SDK either).\n * - `sdk`         — agent uses @reinconsole/sdk; advisory + observability (bypassable).\n * - `session-key` — signer-level scope; out-of-policy txs cannot be signed.\n */\nexport const EnforcementMode = z.enum(['observed', 'sdk', 'session-key']);\nexport type EnforcementMode = z.infer<typeof EnforcementMode>;\n\nexport const AgentWallet = z.object({\n  chain: Chain,\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  mode: EnforcementMode,\n});\nexport type AgentWallet = z.infer<typeof AgentWallet>;\n\nexport const AgentStatus = z.enum(['active', 'frozen']);\nexport type AgentStatus = z.infer<typeof AgentStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A semantic grouping label, e.g. \"research\" or \"prod-trading\". Lowercase\n * slugs only — policy `appliesTo.labels` matches these (with globs), and a\n * case-normalization mismatch would silently un-target a policy.\n */\nexport const AgentLabel = z\n  .string()\n  .max(40)\n  .regex(/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/, 'label must be a lowercase slug like \"research\" or \"prod-trading\"');\nexport type AgentLabel = z.infer<typeof AgentLabel>;\n\nexport const Agent = z.object({\n  id: AgentId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** On-chain ERC-8004 identity, if the agent is registered. */\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Semantic grouping labels — the targets of policy `appliesTo.labels`. */\n  labels: z\n    .array(AgentLabel)\n    .max(16)\n    .refine((ls) => new Set(ls).size === ls.length, { message: 'labels must be unique' })\n    .default([]),\n  wallets: z.array(AgentWallet).default([]),\n  status: AgentStatus.default('active'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Agent = z.infer<typeof Agent>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * The canonical string form of an ERC-8004 agent identity:\n *\n *     eip155:{chainId}:{identityRegistry}/{tokenId}\n *\n * The part before the `/` is the spec's registry reference verbatim (the\n * `agentRegistry` field of a registration file, CAIP-10 account form); the\n * tokenId is the ERC-721 id the Identity Registry minted (`agentId` in the\n * spec). This exact string is what `Agent.erc8004Id` / `Vendor.erc8004Id`\n * carry, AND the reputation-subject id a registered agent's evidence keys by.\n *\n * Casing is load-bearing: reputation subject keys for agent-kind ids are\n * case-sensitive unless they start with `0x` (see @reinconsole/graph\n * `normalizeSubject`), and an eip155 string does not. `formatErc8004Id`\n * therefore always emits the registry address in lowercase, and consumers must\n * never hand-build the string — parse then re-format to normalize.\n */\n\nexport interface Erc8004Ref {\n  /** EIP-155 chain id (e.g. 8453 Base, 84532 Base Sepolia). */\n  chainId: number;\n  /** Identity Registry contract address, lowercase 0x-hex. */\n  registry: string;\n  /** ERC-721 tokenId — the spec's `agentId`. bigint: token ids exceed 2^53. */\n  tokenId: bigint;\n}\n\nconst REGISTRY_PATTERN = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\nconst ID_PATTERN = /^eip155:(\\d+):(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})\\/(\\d+)$/;\n\n/** Build the canonical id string. Throws on a malformed ref (programmer error). */\nexport function formatErc8004Id(ref: Erc8004Ref): string {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ref.chainId) || ref.chainId < 1) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad chainId ${ref.chainId}`);\n  }\n  if (!REGISTRY_PATTERN.test(ref.registry)) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad registry address ${ref.registry}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof ref.tokenId !== 'bigint' || ref.tokenId < 0n) {\n    // The typeof guard matters for plain-JS callers: 1.5 < 0n is legal JS and\n    // false, and would mint the unparseable \"…/1.5\".\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad tokenId ${ref.tokenId}`);\n  }\n  return `eip155:${ref.chainId}:${ref.registry.toLowerCase()}/${ref.tokenId}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a canonical (or hand-written) id string. Accepts any address casing\n * and returns a lowercase ref, or undefined when malformed — so\n * `formatErc8004Id(parseErc8004Id(x)!)` is the normalization step.\n */\nexport function parseErc8004Id(value: string): Erc8004Ref | undefined {\n  const match = ID_PATTERN.exec(value);\n  if (!match) return undefined;\n  const chainId = Number(match[1]);\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(chainId) || chainId < 1) return undefined;\n  return {\n    chainId,\n    registry: match[2]!.toLowerCase(),\n    tokenId: BigInt(match[3]!),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Strict boundary schema for the id string (the fields themselves stay free-form). */\nexport const Erc8004Id = z\n  .string()\n  .refine((value) => parseErc8004Id(value) !== undefined, {\n    message: 'expected \"eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}\"',\n  });\nexport type Erc8004Id = z.infer<typeof Erc8004Id>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\nexport const Vendor = z.object({\n  host: z.string().min(1),\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vendor = z.infer<typeof Vendor>;\n\n/**\n * The observability gold: links every micro-payment back to the task and run\n * that caused it, so finance teams can answer \"what was this spend for?\".\n */\nexport const TaskContext = z.object({\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  parentRunId: z.string().optional(),\n  purpose: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\nexport type TaskContext = z.infer<typeof TaskContext>;\n\n/**\n * A request to spend, submitted to the policy engine BEFORE any signature is\n * released. The `nonce` provides replay protection on the signer path.\n */\nexport const PaymentIntent = z.object({\n  id: IntentId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  vendor: Vendor,\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  nonce: z.string().min(1),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type PaymentIntent = z.infer<typeof PaymentIntent>;\n\n/**\n * Reduce an intent's `resource` to its path for policy matching. The value is\n * vendor-declared and shape-varies: the x402 spec puts a full URL in\n * `requirement.resource`, while the guard falls back to the request pathname\n * when the vendor omits it. Policies match on the PATH so authors never need\n * to know which shape a vendor emits; host targeting stays with\n * `vendorHostIn`, which is derived from the real request URL rather than the\n * vendor's own claim. Query strings do not survive the reduction.\n */\nexport function resourcePathOf(resource: string): string {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(resource);\n    if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') return url.pathname;\n  } catch {\n    // Not a URL — already a bare path.\n  }\n  return resource;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\n\nexport const DecisionOutcome = z.enum(['allow', 'deny', 'escalate']);\nexport type DecisionOutcome = z.infer<typeof DecisionOutcome>;\n\n/**\n * The signed, hash-chained record of a single policy evaluation. Written BEFORE\n * any signature is released. `prevHash` + `hash` form a tamper-evident chain;\n * `signature` is the policy service's signing key over `hash`. The eventual\n * on-chain `txHash` is attached later by the indexer (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const Decision = z.object({\n  id: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /**\n   * sha256 of the intent's canonical content (see canonical.ts). Binds the\n   * decision to the exact transfer it judged — amount, recipient, asset,\n   * chain — so a signer can verify an {intent, decision} pair offline as a\n   * self-contained spend voucher, not just a reference by id.\n   */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** Ids of the rules that fired, for explainability. */\n  matchedRules: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  /** Human-readable explanation surfaced in the dashboard. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  policyVersion: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of the previous decision in the chain (tamper-evident log). */\n  prevHash: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of this decision's canonical content. */\n  hash: z.string(),\n  /** Service signing-key signature over `hash`. */\n  signature: z.string(),\n  latencyMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  decidedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Decision = z.infer<typeof Decision>;\n\n/**\n * A decision as `GET /v1/decisions` serves it (0.3.0): the signed record plus\n * `agentId`, the agent whose intent it judged.\n *\n * `agentId` is an ENVELOPE field -- the engine's own attribution, outside\n * `hash` and `signature`, so a verified chain vouches for nothing about it.\n * Putting it inside would have changed the hash of every future decision and\n * split the chain into two formats. It is here for a reconciler that is not\n * co-located with the agent: `reconcile()` needs an allowed intent's agent,\n * or agent B's payment against A's intent is credited to A (S74), and before\n * this field only `/v1/reconciliation` carried it -- and erases it the moment\n * a settlement lands. Absent on an unattributed (pre-tenancy) row.\n */\nexport const AttributedDecision = Decision.extend({ agentId: AgentId.optional() });\nexport type AttributedDecision = z.infer<typeof AttributedDecision>;\n","import type { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport type { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\nimport type { ApprovalVerdict } from './approval.js';\n\n/**\n * Canonical byte forms shared by the policy engine (which hashes and signs\n * them) and the signer (which verifies them offline). Field order is fixed,\n * dates are ISO strings, and absent optionals are explicit nulls, so the same\n * parsed object always canonicalizes to the same bytes — including after a\n * JSON round-trip over HTTP.\n *\n * These builders are pure (no node:crypto) so @reinconsole/core stays loadable in a\n * browser; services hash the strings with whatever sha256 they have.\n */\n\n/** Canonical form of an intent — what `Decision.intentHash` commits to. */\nexport function canonicalIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    id: intent.id,\n    agentId: intent.agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: intent.vendor.host,\n      address: intent.vendor.address,\n      erc8004Id: intent.vendor.erc8004Id ?? null,\n    },\n    resource: intent.resource,\n    amount: intent.amount,\n    asset: intent.asset,\n    chain: intent.chain,\n    taskContext: {\n      taskId: intent.taskContext.taskId ?? null,\n      parentRunId: intent.taskContext.parentRunId ?? null,\n      purpose: intent.taskContext.purpose ?? null,\n    },\n    nonce: intent.nonce,\n    createdAt: intent.createdAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The decision fields covered by `Decision.hash` (and thus its signature). */\nexport interface DecisionContent {\n  intentId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome;\n  matchedRules: string[];\n  policyId: string;\n  policyVersion: string;\n  prevHash: string;\n  decidedAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Canonical form of a decision — what `Decision.hash` is computed over. */\nexport function canonicalDecision(d: DecisionContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    intentId: d.intentId,\n    intentHash: d.intentHash,\n    outcome: d.outcome,\n    matchedRules: d.matchedRules,\n    policyId: d.policyId,\n    policyVersion: d.policyVersion,\n    prevHash: d.prevHash,\n    decidedAt: d.decidedAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The fields an approval signature commits to. */\nexport interface ApprovalContent {\n  decisionId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an approval — the exact bytes an approver signs.\n *\n * Three properties are deliberate. The leading `rein` domain tag separates\n * this signature space from the decision log's, so a decision signature can\n * never be replayed as an approval or the reverse. `decisionId` makes each\n * challenge single-use: one escalation, one decision id, one signature that\n * means anything. And `verdict` is INSIDE the signed bytes — without it, a\n * captured approval could be resubmitted as a rejection (or vice versa) by\n * anyone who saw it in flight.\n */\nexport function canonicalApproval(a: ApprovalContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    rein: 'approval/v1',\n    decisionId: a.decisionId,\n    intentHash: a.intentHash,\n    verdict: a.verdict,\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * A session-key grant: the signer tier's unit of delegated authority. The\n * agent process holds only the bearer token — the wallet key never leaves the\n * signer — and the stored record keeps a hash of the token, never the token\n * itself (it is returned exactly once, at creation).\n *\n * Caps here are the signer-side backstop UNDER whatever policy says: a\n * signature is released only when the engine allowed the intent AND the\n * session has room. Amounts are decimal strings in the asset's human units.\n */\nexport const Session = z.object({\n  id: SessionId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** sha256 hex of the bearer token. */\n  tokenHash: z.string(),\n  /** Cumulative ceiling across the session's lifetime. Absent = uncapped. */\n  capAmount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Ceiling per individual signature. Absent = uncapped. */\n  maxPerPayment: DecimalString.optional(),\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type Session = z.infer<typeof Session>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * On-chain confirmation of a settled payment, reconciled by the indexer against\n * the originating intent (amount + recipient + nonce, or facilitator webhook).\n */\nexport const SettledPayment = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  txHash: z.string(),\n  chain: Chain,\n  blockNumber: z.coerce.bigint(),\n  facilitator: z.string().optional(),\n  feePaid: DecimalString.optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettledPayment = z.infer<typeof SettledPayment>;\n\n/**\n * A report that an allowed intent's payment actually landed — the settlement\n * half of reconciliation (\"allowed but never settled\", B1).\n *\n * Deliberately looser than {@link SettledPayment}: the on-chain confirmation\n * requires a tx hash and a block, while a REPORT is whatever the observer\n * could see. A vendor's `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` names a transaction but no block;\n * a facilitator webhook may name neither. Demanding the strong shape would\n * mean the weakest observers — the ones a deployment actually has — could\n * report nothing at all, and every allowance would read as a gap.\n *\n * `source` records WHO said so, because the evidence is not all equal: an\n * independent indexer watching the chain is the strong claim, while a guard\n * reporting on its own payment is the agent vouching for itself. Nothing here\n * grants authority — a settlement report can only ever CLOSE a gap in the\n * reconciliation report, never authorize a payment or alter a decision.\n */\nexport const SettlementReport = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** The settling transaction, when the observer saw one. */\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  chain: Chain.optional(),\n  /** The amount as SETTLED, when known — may differ from the amount allowed. */\n  amount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Free-form observer tag, e.g. \"indexer\", \"guard\", \"facilitator\". */\n  source: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettlementReport = z.infer<typeof SettlementReport>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReceiptId, IntentId, DecisionId, AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { TaskContext } from './intent.js';\nimport { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\n\n/**\n * What the SDK reports back after settlement: the `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` header\n * a vendor returns once payment clears. Mock facilitators fill this in v0.1;\n * the indexer reconciles it against on-chain truth later (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const ReceiptSettlement = z.object({\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  networkId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Raw header payload, kept for forensics until the indexer confirms. */\n  raw: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReceiptSettlement = z.infer<typeof ReceiptSettlement>;\n\n/**\n * The SDK-side record of one guarded payment attempt: which request triggered\n * it, what the engine decided, and (if allowed and paid) how it settled.\n * Receipts are the observability primitive — every 402 the guard touches\n * produces exactly one, whether the payment was allowed or blocked.\n */\nexport const Receipt = z.object({\n  id: ReceiptId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** The URL the agent actually fetched (the paywalled resource). */\n  url: z.string(),\n  method: z.string().default('GET'),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  /** Human-readable explanation copied from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Present only once a payment was made and the vendor confirmed it. */\n  settlement: ReceiptSettlement.optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Receipt = z.infer<typeof Receipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { GateReceiptId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * The vendor-side twin of `Receipt`: one settled x402 payment as the GATE saw\n * it — who paid, for which priced route, and the settlement transaction. The\n * agent-side Receipt records what an agent tried to spend; a GateReceipt\n * records what a vendor actually earned.\n */\nexport const GateReceipt = z.object({\n  id: GateReceiptId,\n  at: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** The route pattern that priced this request, e.g. \"/api/reports/*\". */\n  route: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The concrete resource paid for (URL path actually requested). */\n  resource: z.string().min(1),\n  method: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The paying wallet address, as asserted by the settled payment. */\n  payer: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.05\". */\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  /** The same amount in the asset's atomic units, e.g. \"50000\". */\n  amountAtomic: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  /** Token symbol or contract address, exactly as quoted in the requirement. */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  network: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Settlement transaction hash (mock ledger or on-chain). */\n  transaction: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type GateReceipt = z.infer<typeof GateReceipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/** A rolling-window spec, e.g. \"24h\", \"1h\", \"30m\", \"7d\". */\nexport const Window = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+[smhd]$/, 'window must be like \"30s\", \"15m\", \"1h\", or \"7d\"');\nexport type Window = z.infer<typeof Window>;\n\n/** A relative multiplier, e.g. \"3x\" (used for price-sanity checks). */\nexport const Multiplier = z.string().regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?x$/, 'multiplier must be like \"3x\"');\nexport type Multiplier = z.infer<typeof Multiplier>;\n\n/**\n * The set of predicates a rule can test. Multiple predicates in one condition\n * are ANDed together. Each maps to an evaluator in the policy engine.\n */\nexport const Condition = z\n  .object({\n    /** Per-transaction amount exceeds this value. */\n    amountGt: DecimalString.optional(),\n    /** Sum of spend in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    rollingSum: z.object({ window: Window, gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** Transaction count in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    txCount: z.object({ window: Window, gt: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).optional(),\n    /** Vendor host matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs). */\n    vendorHostIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Resource PATH matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g.\n     * \"/v1/reports/*\"). A full-URL resource is reduced to its pathname before\n     * matching (see `resourcePathOf`), so the same pattern works whether the\n     * vendor declares \"https://api.x.com/v1/answer\" or \"/v1/answer\". Pair\n     * with `vendorHostIn` to scope a path rule to specific vendors.\n     */\n    resourceIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /** First time Rein has seen this vendor for the agent. */\n    vendorFirstSeen: z.boolean().optional(),\n    /** Vendor reputation score is below this threshold (Phase 3 hook). */\n    vendorReputationLt: z.number().min(0).max(100).optional(),\n    /** Amount is more than `gt`-times the observed median for this resource. */\n    amountVsResourceMedian: z.object({ gt: Multiplier }).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Cumulative spend attributed to THIS intent's `taskContext.taskId`\n     * (prior spend on the task plus this payment) exceeds `gt`. Scopes a\n     * budget to one unit of work rather than to a window: a research run that\n     * is meant to cost a dollar cannot quietly cost fifty, however slowly.\n     *\n     * An intent carrying no `taskId` cannot be attributed to a task, so the\n     * predicate never triggers for one. Requiring attribution is a separate,\n     * deliberate rule (deny on `taskIdMissing`), not a side effect of setting\n     * a budget — otherwise every untagged probe payment would trip every\n     * task budget in the policy.\n     */\n    taskBudget: z.object({ gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** The intent carries no `taskContext.taskId` (or an empty one). */\n    taskIdMissing: z.boolean().optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((c) => Object.values(c).some((v) => v !== undefined), {\n    message: 'a condition must specify at least one predicate',\n  });\nexport type Condition = z.infer<typeof Condition>;\n\n/**\n * A behavioral circuit breaker: one primitive with three tripwires — a window\n * (rate), a transaction count, and a value cap — measured over the agent's\n * own recent activity.\n *\n * A breaker is not a rule. Rules ask about the intent in front of them; a\n * breaker asks whether the agent's BEHAVIOR has left the envelope it was\n * given, and once it has, every subsequent intent ESCALATES for a signed\n * approval. It never denies on its own: an agent that trips a breaker in the\n * middle of a job must be able to be waved through by a human, because a\n * silent deny at the wrong moment strands the work with no path forward and\n * no one told (the failure mode Flash's exit paths taught).\n *\n * Reset happens two ways, and they are one mechanism: the window rolling\n * forward, or a signed approval, which moves the breaker's counting floor to\n * now. Nothing \"un-trips\" a breaker by decree — the activity simply stops\n * being inside the measured span.\n *\n * Targeting is the policy's job: `appliesTo.agents` / `appliesTo.labels`\n * decide WHICH agents carry the breaker. COUNTING is always per agent — a\n * breaker pooled across every agent sharing a label needs a cross-agent\n * aggregate the per-agent spend context cannot express, and is deferred.\n */\nexport const Breaker = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    /** The trailing span the tripwires measure over. */\n    window: Window,\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window would hold MORE than this many transactions.\n     * `10` permits ten in the window and escalates the eleventh.\n     */\n    txCount: z.number().int().positive().optional(),\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window's spend would exceed this total. `\"50.00\"` permits\n     * a window totalling exactly 50.00 and escalates the payment that would\n     * carry it past. Prospective, like every other spend predicate: the\n     * payment that would breach the cap is the one that escalates, rather\n     * than the innocent one after it.\n     */\n    valueCap: DecimalString.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((b) => b.txCount !== undefined || b.valueCap !== undefined, {\n    message: 'a breaker must specify at least one of txCount / valueCap',\n  });\nexport type Breaker = z.infer<typeof Breaker>;\n\n/**\n * A single rule: an id plus exactly one action (allow / deny / escalate) whose\n * value is the condition that triggers it.\n */\nexport const Rule = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    allow: Condition.optional(),\n    deny: Condition.optional(),\n    escalate: Condition.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((r) => [r.allow, r.deny, r.escalate].filter((v) => v !== undefined).length === 1, {\n    message: 'a rule must specify exactly one of allow / deny / escalate',\n  });\nexport type Rule = z.infer<typeof Rule>;\n\nexport const PolicyDefault = z.enum(['allow', 'deny']);\nexport type PolicyDefault = z.infer<typeof PolicyDefault>;\n\nexport const AppliesTo = z.object({\n  /** Agent id patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g. \"agt_research_*\"). */\n  agents: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  /**\n   * Agent label patterns (supports `*` globs) — semantic targeting. Matches\n   * when the agent carries at least one label matching any pattern. Requires\n   * the agent DOCUMENT: an intent from an unregistered agent never matches a\n   * labels-targeted policy (and so fails closed when no other policy applies).\n   */\n  labels: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  chains: z.array(Chain).optional(),\n});\nexport type AppliesTo = z.infer<typeof AppliesTo>;\n\nexport const Escalation = z.object({\n  approvers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  timeoutAction: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  timeoutMin: z.number().int().positive().default(15),\n});\nexport type Escalation = z.infer<typeof Escalation>;\n\n/**\n * A declarative, versioned, immutable-once-active policy. Evaluation order in\n * the engine is: explicit DENY > ESCALATE > ALLOW > `default`.\n */\nexport const Policy = z.object({\n  policyId: z.string().min(1),\n  version: z.string().default('1'),\n  /**\n   * The org this policy governs. ABSENT means GLOBAL — it is considered for\n   * every agent, which is what every policy written before tenancy existed is\n   * and stays.\n   *\n   * This is separate from {@link AppliesTo} on purpose, and it has to be:\n   * `appliesTo: {}` matches every agent, so a tenant's policy carrying the\n   * default targeting would otherwise govern other tenants' agents the moment\n   * it was written. Org scoping is applied BEFORE targeting — a policy whose\n   * `orgId` is not the agent's org is not a candidate at all.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  appliesTo: AppliesTo.default({}),\n  rules: z.array(Rule).default([]),\n  /**\n   * Behavioral breakers evaluated alongside the rules. A tripped breaker\n   * escalates at the same precedence as an `escalate` rule — so an explicit\n   * DENY still wins, and an ALLOW rule cannot wave past a tripped breaker.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(Breaker).default([]),\n  default: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  /** Below this amount, fail-open is permitted during a policy-service outage. */\n  denyFloor: DecimalString.default('0.05'),\n  escalation: Escalation.optional(),\n});\nexport type Policy = z.infer<typeof Policy>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Window } from './policy.js';\n\n/**\n * Dead-man monitoring: the alarm for an agent that stopped (Phase B2).\n *\n * Every other control in Rein answers \"should this payment happen?\". This one\n * answers the question nothing else in the stack asks: an agent that has gone\n * quiet raises no intent, breaks no budget, and trips no breaker — it simply\n * disappears, and a control plane watching only for bad payments will report\n * a perfectly clean month while the work silently stopped being done. (Flash\n * lost four detectors this way, none of which announced anything.)\n *\n * Three rules hold the design honest, and each is the direct mirror of a rule\n * B1 already established:\n *\n * 1. An expectation is DECLARED, never inferred. Most agents are episodic:\n *    they run when there is work. Silence is only evidence for an agent\n *    somebody said should be periodic, so an unwatched agent has no liveness\n *    state at all — the same rule as `taskBudget`, which never fires on an\n *    intent that carries no task id.\n * 2. Silence has an AGE, not a boolean — `late` before `missing` — exactly as\n *    a missing settlement is `in-flight` before it is `unsettled`.\n * 3. The engine never alarms about silence it did not witness. An engine that\n *    was down cannot tell a dead agent from its own outage, so a silence\n *    older than this process reads `unknown` until the process has been up\n *    long enough to certify it. B1 refuses to manufacture gaps out of records\n *    it cannot join; this refuses to manufacture alarms out of downtime.\n *\n * Liveness is observability and carries no authority whatsoever: it cannot\n * deny, escalate, freeze, or alter any decision. A missing agent is news for\n * a human, not an input to policy.\n */\n\n/** How the engine came to know an agent was alive. */\nexport const LivenessSource = z.enum([\n  /** It submitted an intent — ANY outcome, including a denial. */\n  'intent',\n  /** It reported in explicitly, having nothing to buy. */\n  'heartbeat',\n]);\nexport type LivenessSource = z.infer<typeof LivenessSource>;\n\n/** Default slack past the interval before silence becomes an alarm. */\nexport const DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * \"This agent is supposed to check in at least this often.\"\n *\n * `graceMs` is what keeps a jittery-but-healthy agent out of the alert\n * channel: an agent on a 15m cadence that lands at 15m04s is not a dead agent,\n * and an alarm that cries at every wobble is one an operator learns to ignore\n * — which is the failure mode that loses the detector nobody was watching.\n */\nexport const LivenessExpectation = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** Longest silence still considered normal, e.g. '15m'. */\n  interval: Window,\n  /** Extra slack past `interval` before the silence is an alarm. */\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().default(DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS),\n  /**\n   * When watching began. An agent that has NEVER been seen is measured from\n   * here, so a watch on an agent that never starts does raise an alarm — a\n   * detector that never came up is exactly as dead as one that stopped.\n   */\n  since: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** What this agent is supposed to be doing, shown beside the alarm. */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessExpectation = z.infer<typeof LivenessExpectation>;\n\n/** The registration payload; the engine stamps `since`. */\nexport const LivenessWatchInput = LivenessExpectation.omit({ since: true }).extend({\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessWatchInput = z.input<typeof LivenessWatchInput>;\n\n/**\n * An out-of-band \"I am alive\" from an agent with nothing to buy.\n *\n * The engine sees every intent, so a spending agent needs no heartbeat at all.\n * This exists for the agent that is working and simply not paying for\n * anything — without it, a dead-man alarm is really a no-spend alarm, and it\n * would page a human every time an agent had a quiet afternoon.\n *\n * It authorizes nothing. The only thing a heartbeat can change is a row in the\n * liveness report; it cannot lift a breaker, a budget, or a freeze.\n */\nexport const Heartbeat = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** When the agent was alive. Defaults to arrival time. */\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Free-form note from the reporter, e.g. \"poll cycle 41 ok\". */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type Heartbeat = z.infer<typeof Heartbeat>;\n\n/**\n * Where an agent stands against its expectation.\n *\n * - `alive`   — seen within the interval.\n * - `late`    — past the interval, inside the grace. Not yet news.\n * - `missing` — past both, and this process watched it happen. THE alarm.\n * - `unknown` — past both, but the engine has not been up long enough to have\n *               witnessed the silence. Not an alarm: an engine that restarted\n *               five minutes ago knows nothing about the last three days.\n */\nexport const LivenessStatus = z.enum(['alive', 'late', 'missing', 'unknown']);\nexport type LivenessStatus = z.infer<typeof LivenessStatus>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApproverKeyId, DecisionId, IntentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Asset, Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * Human approval of an escalated payment.\n *\n * The load-bearing rule: an approval is a SIGNATURE over the decision, made by\n * a key registered with the engine. The delivery channel (Telegram, email,\n * whatever) is transport, never authority — anyone who compromises the channel\n * gets to show a human a message, not to release funds. There is deliberately\n * no click-to-approve path.\n */\n\nexport const ApprovalVerdict = z.enum(['approve', 'reject']);\nexport type ApprovalVerdict = z.infer<typeof ApprovalVerdict>;\n\n/**\n * `pending` is the only non-terminal state. `expired` is what a TTL lapse\n * converts to — indistinguishable from `rejected` in effect (both deny), but\n * distinguished in the record so \"nobody answered\" and \"somebody said no\" stay\n * separable in an audit.\n */\nexport const ApprovalStatus = z.enum(['pending', 'approved', 'rejected', 'expired']);\nexport type ApprovalStatus = z.infer<typeof ApprovalStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A key whose signature the engine accepts as an approval. Public half only —\n * the private half lives with the human (a hardware token, a laptop, an\n * offline signer) and must never reach the engine.\n */\nexport const ApproverKey = z.object({\n  id: ApproverKeyId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** ed25519 public key, SPKI PEM — the same encoding as the decision log's. */\n  publicKey: z.string().min(1),\n  algorithm: z.literal('ed25519').default('ed25519'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApproverKey = z.infer<typeof ApproverKey>;\n\n/**\n * A parked escalation: the payment the engine refused to allow on its own\n * authority, held open until a signature arrives or the TTL lapses. Keyed by\n * the escalating decision — one decision, at most one approval request.\n *\n * The payment facts are copied in rather than referenced so the challenge a\n * human sees is self-contained: amount, vendor and resource are exactly what\n * they are being asked to authorize.\n */\nexport const ApprovalRequest = z.object({\n  /** The `escalate` decision this request answers (primary key). */\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** Binds the approval to the exact transfer — the signed bytes commit to it. */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /**\n   * The org the escalating agent belongs to, stamped when the request is\n   * parked. ABSENT means the agent was never registered (or the request\n   * predates tenancy), and such a request is answerable only by an unscoped\n   * operator — there is no org to check an approver against, and guessing one\n   * is how a cross-tenant approval happens.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  /**\n   * Task attribution copied from the intent. Carried so an approved payment\n   * still counts against its `taskBudget` — an escalation that lost its task\n   * id on the way through would make the budget silently under-count exactly\n   * the payments a human had to look at.\n   */\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Why policy escalated, verbatim from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Breaker ids whose trip contributed to this escalation. An approval of\n   * this request resets exactly these — moving their counting floor to the\n   * approval instant — so a human waving one payment through also clears the\n   * behavior that stopped it, rather than being asked again immediately.\n   * Empty when ordinary rules did the escalating.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  status: ApprovalStatus,\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Past this instant the request denies, whatever arrives afterwards. */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  resolvedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Which registered key signed — absent when the TTL lapsed instead. */\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * The follow-up decision appended to the chain when this resolved. That\n   * decision, not this record, is the voucher a signer verifies: the original\n   * `escalate` decision is never rewritten.\n   */\n  finalDecisionId: DecisionId.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalRequest = z.infer<typeof ApprovalRequest>;\n\n/** The two byte-strings an approver may sign for a given request. */\nexport const ApprovalChallenges = z.object({\n  approve: z.string(),\n  reject: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalChallenges = z.infer<typeof ApprovalChallenges>;\n\n/**\n * A signed verdict, submitted to the engine by anyone (the signature is the\n * authority, so the carrier does not matter). `signature` is base64 ed25519\n * over `canonicalApproval({ decisionId, intentHash, verdict })`.\n */\nexport const ApprovalGrant = z.object({\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict,\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId,\n  signature: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ApprovalGrant = z.infer<typeof ApprovalGrant>;\n\n/** Terminal statuses — a request in one of these will never change again. */\nexport function isResolved(status: ApprovalStatus): boolean {\n  return status !== 'pending';\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\nexport const ReputationSubject = z.object({\n  kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']),\n  id: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ReputationSubject = z.infer<typeof ReputationSubject>;\n\nexport const ReputationComponents = z.object({\n  volume: z.number(),\n  longevity: z.number(),\n  disputeRate: z.number(),\n  counterpartyQuality: z.number(),\n  settlementReliability: z.number(),\n});\nexport type ReputationComponents = z.infer<typeof ReputationComponents>;\n\n/**\n * A reputation score for an agent or vendor (Phase 3 — Graph). `confidence` is\n * first-class: a thin-history subject returns LOW confidence rather than a\n * misleadingly high score, so policy can avoid both false trust and unfair\n * freezing.\n */\nexport const ReputationScore = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  score: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  components: ReputationComponents,\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  asOf: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Hash-anchored attestation, optionally published on-chain (ERC-8004). */\n  evidenceUri: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReputationScore = z.infer<typeof ReputationScore>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport { Decision } from './decision.js';\nimport { SettledPayment } from './payment.js';\nimport { GateReceipt } from './gate-receipt.js';\nimport { ApprovalRequest } from './approval.js';\nimport { LivenessExpectation, LivenessSource } from './liveness.js';\n\n/**\n * The canonical event envelope published on the bus (NATS in production).\n * `shadow.spend` is emitted when the indexer sees on-chain spend from a managed\n * wallet with NO corresponding ALLOW decision — the bypass signal that catches\n * SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n * `signature.released` / `signature.refused` are that tier's heartbeat: every\n * time the signer does or does not put a key to work, the bus knows why.\n * `gate.*` is the vendor side of the wire: every quote a Gate issues, every\n * payment it accepts, every payment it turns away.\n * `approval.*` is the human-in-the-loop tier: an escalated intent parked for a\n * signature, and the signed (or lapsed) verdict that closed it.\n * `liveness.*` is the dead-man tier (B2), and the only pair here emitted by\n * something NOT happening: a watched agent that went quiet past its expected\n * interval, and the sighting that ended the silence.\n */\nexport const ReinEvent = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('intent.created'), at: z.coerce.date(), intent: PaymentIntent }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('decision.made'), at: z.coerce.date(), decision: Decision }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('payment.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), payment: SettledPayment }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('shadow.spend'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    txHash: z.string(),\n    chain: Chain,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.released'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    sessionId: SessionId,\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    intentId: IntentId,\n    decisionId: DecisionId,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"decision_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/signer). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    sessionId: SessionId.optional(),\n    agentId: AgentId.optional(),\n    intentId: IntentId.optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.quoted'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    method: z.string(),\n    amount: DecimalString,\n    asset: z.string(),\n    network: z.string(),\n  }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('gate.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), receipt: GateReceipt }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.requested'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.resolved'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n    /** The follow-up allow/deny decision this resolution appended. */\n    decision: Decision,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.missing'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n    /** How long the agent has been silent when the alarm was raised. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    /** Last sighting, absent when the agent was never seen at all. */\n    lastSeenAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.recovered'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    /** How long the silence lasted, measured to this sighting. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    source: LivenessSource,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"payment_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/gate). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    /** Known only when the payment header decoded far enough to name a payer. */\n    payer: z.string().optional(),\n  }),\n]);\nexport type ReinEvent = z.infer<typeof ReinEvent>;\n","import type { ApprovalRequest, Decision, PaymentIntent, Receipt } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/** Base class for everything the SDK throws, so callers can catch broadly. */\nexport class ReinError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = new.target.name;\n  }\n}\n\n/** The policy engine answered with a non-2xx status. */\nexport class EngineError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(\n    readonly status: number,\n    readonly body: unknown,\n    message = `policy engine responded ${status}`,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The engine evaluated the intent and did NOT allow it. The payment was never\n * constructed, so no funds moved. Carries the full evidence trail.\n *\n * When the outcome was `escalate`, `approval` carries the parked request — and\n * its `status` says which kind of block this is: `pending` means a signed\n * verdict could still release it (the guard stopped waiting, or was never\n * asked to), while `rejected`/`expired` are final. An absent `approval` on an\n * escalation means the engine has no approval tier at all: nothing can\n * release it.\n */\nexport class PaymentBlockedError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(\n    readonly intent: PaymentIntent,\n    readonly decision: Decision,\n    readonly receipt: Receipt,\n    readonly approval?: ApprovalRequest,\n  ) {\n    super(\n      `rein blocked payment of ${intent.amount} ${intent.asset} to ${intent.vendor.host}: ` +\n        `${decision.outcome}${decision.reason ? ` (${decision.reason})` : ''}` +\n        (approval ? ` [approval ${approval.status}]` : ''),\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The vendor's 402 was x402-shaped but offered no requirement the guard can\n * govern (unknown scheme/network/asset). The guard fails closed rather than\n * letting an ungoverned payment through.\n */\nexport class UnsupportedRequirementError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(readonly url: string) {\n    super(`no supported x402 payment requirement in 402 from ${url}; failing closed`);\n  }\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  Agent,\n  ApiKey,\n  ApprovalChallenges,\n  ApprovalGrant,\n  ApprovalRequest,\n  ApproverKey,\n  AttributedDecision,\n  Breaker,\n  Decision,\n  LivenessExpectation,\n  LivenessSource,\n  LivenessStatus,\n  PaymentIntent,\n  Policy,\n  SettlementReport,\n  type ApiKeyScope,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { EngineError } from './errors.js';\nimport type { IntentSubmission } from './x402.js';\n\n/** Any fetch-compatible function (global fetch, undici, or a test double). */\nexport type FetchLike = (input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;\n\n/**\n * One breaker's standing for one agent, as the engine reports it. Mirrors the\n * engine's `BreakerState`; declared here so the client validates the wire\n * shape rather than trusting it.\n */\nexport const BreakerState = z.object({\n  breaker: Breaker,\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  txCount: z.number(),\n  sum: z.string(),\n  countingFrom: z.number(),\n  resetAt: z.number().optional(),\n  tripped: z.boolean(),\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type BreakerState = z.infer<typeof BreakerState>;\n\n/**\n * Where one watched agent stands against its expectation (B2). Mirrors the\n * engine's `LivenessState`; note `unknown`, which is not an alarm — it means\n * the engine has not been up long enough to have witnessed the silence, and a\n * caller that treats it as `missing` would page someone about a restart.\n */\nexport const LivenessState = z.object({\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n  lastSeenAt: z.number().optional(),\n  lastSource: LivenessSource.optional(),\n  silentSince: z.number(),\n  silentMs: z.number(),\n  dueAt: z.number(),\n  overdueAt: z.number(),\n  status: LivenessStatus,\n  alertedAt: z.number().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessState = z.infer<typeof LivenessState>;\n\nconst Health = z.object({\n  status: z.string(),\n  publicKey: z.string(),\n  /** \"api-key\" once the engine demands a credential; \"none\" while it does not. */\n  auth: z.string().optional(),\n  approvals: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\nconst EvaluateResponse = z.object({\n  intent: PaymentIntent,\n  decision: Decision,\n  /** Present when an escalation was parked for a signed verdict. */\n  approval: ApprovalRequest.optional(),\n});\nexport type EvaluateResponse = z.infer<typeof EvaluateResponse>;\n\n/** A parked escalation plus the bytes to sign and, once resolved, its decision. */\nconst ApprovalView = z.object({\n  request: ApprovalRequest,\n  challenges: ApprovalChallenges,\n  /** The follow-up allow/deny decision, once the request has resolved. */\n  decision: Decision.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalView = z.infer<typeof ApprovalView>;\n\nconst ResolveResponse = z.object({ request: ApprovalRequest, decision: Decision });\nexport type ResolveResponse = z.infer<typeof ResolveResponse>;\n\n/**\n * One allowance the settlement facts disagree with (B1): nothing settled\n * behind it, or — `overspent` — a settlement for more than it allowed, with\n * the amount that moved in `settledAmount`. Mirrors the engine's shape.\n */\nexport const AllowanceGap = z.object({\n  intentId: z.string(),\n  decisionId: z.string().optional(),\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  host: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: z.string(),\n  settledAmount: z.string().optional(),\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  allowedAt: z.number(),\n  ageMs: z.number(),\n  state: z.enum(['in-flight', 'unsettled', 'overspent']),\n});\nexport type AllowanceGap = z.infer<typeof AllowanceGap>;\n\n/**\n * The reconciliation report. Declared here so the client validates the wire\n * shape rather than trusting it — and note `settlementsSeen`: zero means this\n * engine has never been told about a settlement, so the gaps below say more\n * about the deployment's wiring than about its payments.\n */\nexport const ReconciliationReport = z.object({\n  from: z.number(),\n  to: z.number(),\n  window: z.string(),\n  graceMs: z.number(),\n  allowed: z.number(),\n  allowedValue: z.string(),\n  settled: z.number(),\n  settledValue: z.string(),\n  inFlight: z.number(),\n  inFlightValue: z.string(),\n  unsettled: z.number(),\n  unsettledValue: z.string(),\n  // Optional on the wire so a 0.2.0 engine still validates; absent means the\n  // engine predates the check, not that nothing was overspent.\n  overspent: z.number().optional(),\n  overspentValue: z.string().optional(),\n  unattributed: z.number(),\n  settlementsSeen: z.number(),\n  gaps: z.array(AllowanceGap),\n  truncated: z.boolean(),\n});\nexport type ReconciliationReport = z.infer<typeof ReconciliationReport>;\n\nexport interface ReconciliationQuery {\n  /** Trailing span of allowances to cover, e.g. '24h'. */\n  window?: string;\n  /** How long an allowance may go unsettled before it counts as a gap. */\n  graceMs?: number;\n  limit?: number;\n  agentId?: string;\n}\n\nconst IssuedApiKey = z.object({ key: ApiKey, secret: z.string() });\nexport type IssuedApiKey = z.infer<typeof IssuedApiKey>;\n\nexport interface EngineClientOptions {\n  /** Base URL of the policy engine, e.g. \"http://localhost:8787\". */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * API-key secret, sent as `Authorization: Bearer`. Required by any engine\n   * started with one; omit only for a local engine running without auth.\n   */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Override the transport (tests, custom agents). Defaults to global fetch. */\n  fetch?: FetchLike;\n}\n\nexport interface AwaitApprovalOptions {\n  /** Give up after this long and return the still-pending view. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** How often to re-read the request. */\n  pollMs?: number;\n  /** Abort the wait early (an agent loop shutting down). */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * Thin typed client for the policy-engine HTTP API. Every response is parsed\n * through the @reinconsole/core schemas, so wire drift fails loudly at the boundary.\n */\nexport class EngineClient {\n  private readonly baseUrl: string;\n  private readonly fetchImpl: FetchLike;\n  private readonly apiKey: string | undefined;\n\n  constructor(options: EngineClientOptions) {\n    this.baseUrl = options.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    const f = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = (input, init) => f(input, init);\n    this.apiKey = options.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  /** The transport half: everything but parsing, so a caller can read headers. */\n  private async send(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<Response> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (body !== undefined) headers['content-type'] = 'application/json';\n    if (this.apiKey) headers['authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.apiKey}`;\n    const res = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n      method,\n      ...(Object.keys(headers).length > 0 ? { headers } : {}),\n      ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body: JSON.stringify(body) }),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      const payload = await res\n        .clone()\n        .json()\n        .catch(() => res.text().catch(() => undefined));\n      throw new EngineError(res.status, payload);\n    }\n    return res;\n  }\n\n  private async request<T>(\n    method: string,\n    path: string,\n    schema: z.ZodType<T, z.ZodTypeDef, unknown>,\n    body?: unknown,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    const res = await this.send(method, path, body);\n    if (res.status === 204) return schema.parse(undefined);\n    return schema.parse(await res.json());\n  }\n\n  health(): Promise<z.infer<typeof Health>> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/health', Health);\n  }\n\n  registerAgent(input: {\n    orgId: string;\n    name: string;\n    erc8004Id?: string;\n    /** Semantic grouping labels (lowercase slugs) — policy `appliesTo.labels` targets these. */\n    labels?: Agent['labels'];\n    wallets?: Agent['wallets'];\n  }): Promise<Agent> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/agents', Agent, input);\n  }\n\n  listAgents(): Promise<Agent[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/agents', z.array(Agent));\n  }\n\n  freeze(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/freeze`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  unfreeze(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/unfreeze`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where the agent's behavioral breakers stand. Read-only: nothing here can\n   * trip or clear one — a breaker clears when its window rolls forward or\n   * when a signed approval moves its floor.\n   */\n  breakerStates(agentId: string): Promise<BreakerState[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/breakers`, z.array(BreakerState));\n  }\n\n  addPolicy(policy: z.input<typeof Policy>): Promise<Policy> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/policies', Policy, policy);\n  }\n\n  listPolicies(): Promise<Policy[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/policies', z.array(Policy));\n  }\n\n  /** The hot path: submit an intent, get the normalized intent + signed decision. */\n  evaluate(submission: IntentSubmission): Promise<EvaluateResponse> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/evaluate', EvaluateResponse, submission);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The first page of the decision chain (up to 500, the engine's default).\n   *\n   * On a chain longer than that this is a verifying PREFIX, not the whole log\n   * — `prevHash` links check out, but the newest decisions are not here. Use\n   * {@link decisionsPage} when you need to walk to the head.\n   *\n   * Each record carries `agentId` from a 0.3.0 engine -- unsigned, see\n   * AttributedDecision -- and lacks it from an older one.\n   */\n  decisions(): Promise<AttributedDecision[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/decisions', z.array(AttributedDecision));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One page of the decision chain, plus where the next one starts.\n   *\n   * `nextAfter` is `undefined` at the head of the chain, which is the signal to\n   * stop — not an empty page, which a caller polling a live engine would see\n   * constantly and could not tell from \"caught up\". Feed it back as `after` to\n   * continue; concatenating the pages in order reproduces exactly what the\n   * caller is entitled to see, so `verifyDecisionChain` accepts the result.\n   *\n   * `chainLength` is how many decisions this key can see in total, which for\n   * an org-scoped key is its own rows and not the engine's chain.\n   */\n  async decisionsPage(\n    query: { after?: number; limit?: number } = {},\n  ): Promise<{ decisions: AttributedDecision[]; nextAfter?: number; chainLength: number }> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (query.after !== undefined) params.set('after', String(query.after));\n    if (query.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(query.limit));\n    const qs = params.toString();\n    const res = await this.send('GET', `/v1/decisions${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`);\n    const decisions = z.array(AttributedDecision).parse(await res.json());\n    const next = res.headers.get('rein-next-after');\n    const length = res.headers.get('rein-chain-length');\n    return {\n      decisions,\n      ...(next === null ? {} : { nextAfter: Number(next) }),\n      // An engine older than this header still answers the route; fall back to\n      // what the page itself proves rather than reporting a NaN length.\n      chainLength: length === null ? decisions.length : Number(length),\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- Reconciliation (B1) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Tell the engine an allowed payment landed. The engine watches no chain, so\n   * this is how a gap gets closed — by the guard that paid, an indexer, or a\n   * facilitator webhook. It authorizes nothing: the only thing a settlement\n   * report can change is a line in the reconciliation report.\n   */\n  reportSettlement(input: z.input<typeof SettlementReport>): Promise<SettlementReport> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/settlements', SettlementReport, SettlementReport.parse(input));\n  }\n\n  /** Which allowances in the window have no settlement behind them. */\n  reconciliation(query: ReconciliationQuery = {}): Promise<ReconciliationReport> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (query.window !== undefined) params.set('window', query.window);\n    if (query.graceMs !== undefined) params.set('graceMs', String(query.graceMs));\n    if (query.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(query.limit));\n    if (query.agentId !== undefined) params.set('agentId', query.agentId);\n    const qs = params.toString();\n    return this.request(\n      'GET',\n      `/v1/reconciliation${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`,\n      ReconciliationReport,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // --- Dead-man monitoring (B2) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Expect this agent to be active at least every `interval`. Watching is\n   * declared, never inferred: an agent nobody watches has no liveness state,\n   * because silence is only evidence about an agent somebody said should be\n   * periodic.\n   */\n  watchLiveness(\n    agentId: string,\n    expectation: { interval: string; graceMs?: number; note?: string },\n  ): Promise<LivenessExpectation> {\n    return this.request('PUT', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/liveness`, LivenessExpectation, expectation);\n  }\n\n  unwatchLiveness(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('DELETE', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/liveness`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * \"I am alive, I just have nothing to buy.\"\n   *\n   * Only needed by an agent that goes quiet on purpose — every intent is\n   * already a sighting, whatever the engine decided about it. It authorizes\n   * nothing: the only thing it can change is a row in the liveness report.\n   */\n  heartbeat(agentId: string, input: { at?: Date; note?: string } = {}): Promise<LivenessState> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/heartbeat`, LivenessState, {\n      ...(input.at ? { at: input.at.toISOString() } : {}),\n      ...(input.note ? { note: input.note } : {}),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Where every watched agent stands. Worst first. */\n  liveness(): Promise<LivenessState[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/liveness', z.array(LivenessState));\n  }\n\n  // --- API keys (admin scope) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a key. The secret in the response is the only copy that will exist.\n   *\n   * `orgId` confines the new key to one tenant and `agentIds` narrows it\n   * further to named agents — what an agent runtime should carry, so a stolen\n   * key spends one agent's budget rather than the whole org's. Omitting both\n   * mints an unscoped operator key, which is what a single-tenant self-hosted\n   * engine wants and has always had. A caller that is itself org-scoped has\n   * its own org applied regardless of what it asks for here.\n   */\n  issueApiKey(input: {\n    name: string;\n    scopes: ApiKeyScope[];\n    orgId?: string;\n    agentIds?: string[];\n  }): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/keys', IssuedApiKey, input);\n  }\n\n  listApiKeys(): Promise<ApiKey[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/keys', z.array(ApiKey));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a replacement secret. The outgoing one keeps working for `graceMs`\n   * (engine default: 1h) so callers can be redeployed one at a time; pass 0\n   * when the old secret is compromised and must die now.\n   */\n  rotateApiKey(keyId: string, options: { graceMs?: number } = {}): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/keys/${keyId}/rotate`, IssuedApiKey, options);\n  }\n\n  revokeApiKey(keyId: string): Promise<ApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/keys/${keyId}/revoke`, ApiKey);\n  }\n\n  // --- Approvals ---\n\n  /** Register the PUBLIC half of an approver key. The private half never travels. */\n  registerApprover(input: { orgId: string; name: string; publicKey: string }): Promise<ApproverKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/approvers', ApproverKey, input);\n  }\n\n  listApprovers(): Promise<ApproverKey[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/approvers', z.array(ApproverKey));\n  }\n\n  revokeApprover(keyId: string): Promise<ApproverKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/approvers/${keyId}/revoke`, ApproverKey);\n  }\n\n  /** Every escalation still answerable right now. */\n  pendingApprovals(): Promise<ApprovalRequest[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/approvals', z.array(ApprovalRequest));\n  }\n\n  /** One escalation, with the exact bytes to sign for each verdict. */\n  approval(decisionId: string): Promise<ApprovalView> {\n    return this.request('GET', `/v1/approvals/${decisionId}`, ApprovalView);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit a signed verdict. The signature is the authority — this call can be\n   * made by anyone, from anywhere, including a relay that never sees a key.\n   */\n  resolveApproval(grant: ApprovalGrant): Promise<ResolveResponse> {\n    const { decisionId, ...body } = ApprovalGrant.parse(grant);\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/approvals/${decisionId}/resolve`, ResolveResponse, body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Poll until an escalation resolves, times out, or the caller aborts. The\n   * returned view is whatever was true when polling stopped — a caller must\n   * check `request.status` rather than assume it resolved.\n   */\n  async awaitApproval(\n    decisionId: string,\n    options: AwaitApprovalOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<ApprovalView> {\n    const pollMs = options.pollMs ?? 1_000;\n    const deadline = Date.now() + (options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);\n    for (;;) {\n      const view = await this.approval(decisionId);\n      if (view.request.status !== 'pending') return view;\n      if (options.signal?.aborted || Date.now() + pollMs > deadline) return view;\n      await sleep(pollMs, options.signal);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    const timer = setTimeout(done, ms);\n    function done(): void {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      signal?.removeEventListener('abort', done);\n      resolve();\n    }\n    signal?.addEventListener('abort', done, { once: true });\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain, Asset, type TaskContext, type Vendor } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/**\n * x402 wire shapes (spec v1), mock-first: these schemas are what Rein's mock\n * facilitator and tests speak today, and they track the published x402 spec so\n * real vendors parse identically when the live integration lands.\n */\n\n/** One way to pay, as offered inside a 402 response body. */\nexport const PaymentRequirement = z.object({\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  /** Amount in the asset's atomic units (e.g. \"10000\" = 0.01 USDC at 6 decimals). */\n  maxAmountRequired: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  resource: z.string().optional(),\n  description: z.string().optional(),\n  mimeType: z.string().optional(),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  maxTimeoutSeconds: z.number().optional(),\n  /** Token contract address — or, mock-first, a plain symbol like \"USDC\". */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  extra: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequirement = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequirement>;\n\n/** The full 402 body a paywalled vendor returns. */\nexport const PaymentRequired = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.number(),\n  accepts: z.array(PaymentRequirement).min(1),\n  error: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequired = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequired>;\n\n/**\n * x402 network ids → the chains Rein governs. Testnets map to their mainnet.\n * Both v1 names (\"base-sepolia\") and v2 CAIP-2 ids (\"eip155:84532\") appear in\n * the wild, so the guard accepts either.\n */\nconst NETWORK_TO_CHAIN: Record<string, Chain> = {\n  base: 'base',\n  'base-sepolia': 'base',\n  'eip155:8453': 'base',\n  'eip155:84532': 'base',\n  solana: 'solana',\n  'solana-devnet': 'solana',\n  polygon: 'polygon',\n  'polygon-amoy': 'polygon',\n  bnb: 'bnb',\n  bsc: 'bnb',\n};\n\n/** Canonical stablecoin contract addresses (EVM keys lowercased). */\n/**\n * Decimals per asset, from the token contracts -- NOT from the counterparty.\n *\n * `extra.decimals` arrives inside the vendor's own 402 challenge, and it used\n * to be what converted `maxAmountRequired` into the human amount policy is\n * evaluated against. The payer signs the RAW atomic value, so the vendor owned\n * the ratio between the number Rein judged and the number the wallet\n * authorized: quote 500000000 with `decimals: 12` and a 500 USDC charge is\n * evaluated as 0.0005, passes every cap and budget, and settles for 500.\n * Circle's USDC is 6 everywhere it is deployed; USDT and EURC are 6 on Base.\n */\nconst ASSET_DECIMALS: Record<Asset, number> = { USDC: 6, USDT: 6, EURC: 6 };\n\n/** An EVM token address: only the address tables may name one. */\nconst EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\n\nconst KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES: Record<string, Asset> = {\n  '0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913': 'USDC', // USDC on Base\n  '0x036cbd53842c5426634e7929541ec2318f3dcf7e': 'USDC', // USDC on Base Sepolia\n  EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v: 'USDC', // USDC on Solana\n};\n\n/**\n * Known v1 network names → CAIP-2. EVM entries are chain-id math; the Solana\n * ids are what the live facilitator advertises. Unknown names pass through\n * lowercased, so two spellings of an UNKNOWN network still compare equal.\n */\nconst CAIP2_ALIASES: Record<string, string> = {\n  base: 'eip155:8453',\n  'base-sepolia': 'eip155:84532',\n  polygon: 'eip155:137',\n  'polygon-amoy': 'eip155:80002',\n  bnb: 'eip155:56',\n  bsc: 'eip155:56',\n  solana: 'solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp',\n  'solana-devnet': 'solana:EtWTRABZaYq6iMfeYKouRu166VU2xqa1',\n};\n\n/** The CAIP-2 id for a network name, or the lowercased name when unknown. */\nexport function caip2Of(network: string): string {\n  const key = network.toLowerCase();\n  return CAIP2_ALIASES[key] ?? key;\n}\n\n/** Do two network ids name the same chain, across the v1/CAIP-2 divide? */\nexport function sameNetwork(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return caip2Of(a) === caip2Of(b);\n}\n\nexport function networkToChain(network: string): Chain | undefined {\n  return NETWORK_TO_CHAIN[network.toLowerCase()];\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a requirement's asset to a symbol Rein knows. Tries, in order: the\n * asset field as a literal symbol (mock-first), `extra.symbol`, then known\n * contract addresses (exact case for Solana, lowercased for EVM), then any\n * caller-supplied address map.\n */\nexport function resolveAsset(\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  extraAddresses: Record<string, Asset> = {},\n): Asset | undefined {\n  const direct = Asset.safeParse(requirement.asset.toUpperCase());\n  if (direct.success) return direct.data;\n\n  const known =\n    extraAddresses[requirement.asset] ??\n    extraAddresses[requirement.asset.toLowerCase()] ??\n    KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES[requirement.asset] ??\n    KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES[requirement.asset.toLowerCase()];\n  if (known) return known;\n\n  // `extra.symbol` is the counterparty's word for its own token, and it is\n  // consulted LAST and never for an address. It used to come first, so any\n  // EIP-3009 token could present itself as `USDC`: the engine evaluated the\n  // agent's USDC caps and budgets, and the payer then signed a\n  // TransferWithAuthorization against the attacker's chosen contract, spending\n  // a balance no USDC policy was ever written about.\n  if (EVM_ADDRESS.test(requirement.asset)) return undefined;\n  const symbol = requirement.extra?.['symbol'];\n  if (typeof symbol === 'string') {\n    const fromExtra = Asset.safeParse(symbol.toUpperCase());\n    if (fromExtra.success) return fromExtra.data;\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert an atomic-unit amount to a normalized decimal string without floats,\n * e.g. (\"10000\", 6) -> \"0.01\". Stablecoins Rein supports all use 6 decimals;\n * a requirement can override via `extra.decimals`.\n */\nexport function atomicToDecimal(atomic: string, decimals: number): string {\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(atomic)) throw new TypeError(`invalid atomic amount: ${atomic}`);\n  if (decimals === 0) return atomic.replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n  const digits = atomic.padStart(decimals + 1, '0');\n  const intPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - decimals).replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n  const fracPart = digits.slice(digits.length - decimals).replace(/0+$/, '');\n  return fracPart.length > 0 ? `${intPart}.${fracPart}` : intPart;\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse of {@link atomicToDecimal}: a human-unit decimal string to atomic\n * units without floats, e.g. (\"0.05\", 6) -> \"50000\". Throws if the value has\n * more fraction digits than the asset carries (sub-atomic precision is a\n * pricing bug, not something to round silently).\n */\nexport function decimalToAtomic(decimal: string, decimals: number): string {\n  if (!/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/.test(decimal)) throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal amount: ${decimal}`);\n  const dot = decimal.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? decimal : decimal.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? '' : decimal.slice(dot + 1);\n  if (fracPart.length > decimals) {\n    throw new TypeError(`amount ${decimal} has more than ${decimals} fraction digits`);\n  }\n  const atomic = intPart + fracPart.padEnd(decimals, '0');\n  return atomic.replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * The decimals to read `maxAmountRequired` with.\n *\n * Pass the RESOLVED asset and the answer comes from `ASSET_DECIMALS` -- the\n * token's own precision, which the counterparty does not get a vote on. The\n * no-asset form is the legacy one and still honours `extra.decimals`; it must\n * not be used on any path that leads to a signature.\n */\nexport function requirementDecimals(requirement: PaymentRequirement, asset?: Asset): number {\n  if (asset) return ASSET_DECIMALS[asset];\n  const decimals = requirement.extra?.['decimals'];\n  return typeof decimals === 'number' && Number.isInteger(decimals) && decimals >= 0 ? decimals : 6;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the vendor's stated precision match the token's? A disagreement is not\n * an error to correct silently -- it is an offer whose amount we cannot agree\n * on, which makes it ungovernable, so `selectRequirement` skips it.\n */\nexport function decimalsAgree(requirement: PaymentRequirement, asset: Asset): boolean {\n  const stated = requirement.extra?.['decimals'];\n  if (stated === undefined) return true;\n  return stated === ASSET_DECIMALS[asset];\n}\n\n/** A requirement the guard fully understood, mapped into Rein's domain. */\nexport interface ResolvedRequirement {\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement;\n  chain: Chain;\n  asset: Asset;\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.01\". */\n  amount: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pick the first offer the guard can govern: scheme `exact`, a network that\n * maps to a supported chain, an allowed network, and a resolvable asset.\n * Returns undefined when no offer qualifies — callers must treat that as\n * fail-closed.\n *\n * `networks` is the testnet/mainnet boundary, and it has to live HERE rather\n * than downstream of evaluate. `networkToChain` folds a testnet onto its\n * mainnet — `base-sepolia` and `base` both become `'base'` — because policy\n * is written about chains, not deployments. That is right for policy and\n * useless as a safety rail: the engine cannot tell a Sepolia offer from a\n * mainnet one, so a testnet agent handed a mainnet 402 would be allowed by\n * every policy it has and would then sign for real money. Filtering before\n * selection is what makes a network allow-list mean anything.\n */\nexport function selectRequirement(\n  accepts: readonly PaymentRequirement[],\n  extraAddresses: Record<string, Asset> = {},\n  networks?: readonly string[],\n): ResolvedRequirement | undefined {\n  const allowed = networks?.map(caip2Of);\n  for (const requirement of accepts) {\n    if (requirement.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact') continue;\n    const chain = networkToChain(requirement.network);\n    if (!chain) continue;\n    if (allowed && !allowed.includes(caip2Of(requirement.network))) continue;\n    const asset = resolveAsset(requirement, extraAddresses);\n    if (!asset) continue;\n    // Fail closed on a token whose precision the vendor states differently\n    // from the contract: the amount policy would judge and the amount the\n    // wallet would authorize are not the same number.\n    if (!decimalsAgree(requirement, asset)) continue;\n    const amount = atomicToDecimal(\n      requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n      requirementDecimals(requirement, asset),\n    );\n    return { requirement, chain, asset, amount };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** What the guard submits to the policy engine (the `/v1/evaluate` shape). */\nexport interface IntentSubmission {\n  agentId: string;\n  vendor: Vendor;\n  resource: string;\n  amount: string;\n  asset: Asset;\n  chain: Chain;\n  taskContext?: TaskContext;\n}\n\n/** Build the evaluate payload for a resolved offer on a given request URL. */\nexport function toIntentSubmission(\n  resolved: ResolvedRequirement,\n  url: string,\n  agentId: string,\n  taskContext: TaskContext | undefined,\n): IntentSubmission {\n  const parsed = new URL(url);\n  return {\n    agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: parsed.host,\n      address: resolved.requirement.payTo,\n    },\n    resource: resolved.requirement.resource ?? parsed.pathname,\n    amount: resolved.amount,\n    asset: resolved.asset,\n    chain: resolved.chain,\n    taskContext,\n  };\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { caip2Of, PaymentRequirement } from './x402.js';\n\n// caip2Of/sameNetwork LIVE in x402.ts: selectRequirement's network allow-list\n// needs them, and importing them back up from here would close a cycle\n// through this module's zod consts. Re-exported so the v2 dialect still\n// reads as their home.\nexport { caip2Of, sameNetwork } from './x402.js';\n\n/**\n * x402 v2 wire dialect — CAIP-2 network ids, `PAYMENT-REQUIRED` /\n * `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` / `PAYMENT-RESPONSE` headers, base64-JSON payloads.\n * Verified against the published spec (coinbase/x402\n * specs/x402-specification-v2.md + transports-v2/http.md, re-checked 2026-07)\n * and the live facilitator's /supported.\n *\n * Rein's internal requirement shape stays v1 (the zod contract in x402.ts);\n * v2 is a WIRE dialect converted at the edges. Inbound, the guard converts a\n * PAYMENT-REQUIRED quote into internal requirements. Outbound, it REWRAPS the\n * payer's v1 X-PAYMENT envelope into the v2 PaymentPayload: the scheme payload\n * (e.g. the signed EIP-3009 authorization) is byte-identical in both dialects,\n * so every Payer — mock, EIP-3009, session-signer — is v2-capable without\n * knowing v2 exists. The vendor side (@reinconsole/gate) re-exports these\n * helpers rather than owning its own copies.\n */\n\n/** x402 v2 PaymentRequirements (one entry of a 402's `accepts`). */\nexport const PaymentRequirementsV2 = z.object({\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  /** CAIP-2, e.g. \"eip155:84532\". */\n  network: z.string(),\n  /** Atomic units — v2's rename of v1's maxAmountRequired. */\n  amount: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  maxTimeoutSeconds: z.number().optional(),\n  extra: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequirementsV2 = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequirementsV2>;\n\n/** v2 ResourceInfo — resource facts move out of the requirement in v2. */\nexport const ResourceInfoV2 = z.object({\n  url: z.string(),\n  description: z.string().optional(),\n  mimeType: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ResourceInfoV2 = z.infer<typeof ResourceInfoV2>;\n\n/** v2 PaymentRequired — the decoded PAYMENT-REQUIRED header. */\nexport const PaymentRequiredV2 = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(2),\n  error: z.string().optional(),\n  resource: ResourceInfoV2.optional(),\n  accepts: z.array(PaymentRequirementsV2).min(1),\n  extensions: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequiredV2 = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequiredV2>;\n\n/** Convert Rein's internal (v1-shaped) requirement to the v2 wire shape. */\nexport function v2Requirements(requirement: PaymentRequirement): PaymentRequirementsV2 {\n  return {\n    scheme: requirement.scheme,\n    network: caip2Of(requirement.network),\n    amount: requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n    asset: requirement.asset,\n    payTo: requirement.payTo,\n    ...(requirement.maxTimeoutSeconds !== undefined\n      ? { maxTimeoutSeconds: requirement.maxTimeoutSeconds }\n      : {}),\n    ...(requirement.extra ? { extra: requirement.extra } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse: a v2 offer (plus the 402's shared ResourceInfo) as an internal\n * requirement. The CAIP-2 network id is kept verbatim — networkToChain and\n * chainIdForNetwork resolve both dialects, and sameNetwork compares across\n * them, so nothing downstream needs the v1 spelling back.\n */\nexport function requirementFromV2(\n  offer: PaymentRequirementsV2,\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2,\n): PaymentRequirement {\n  return PaymentRequirement.parse({\n    scheme: offer.scheme,\n    network: offer.network,\n    maxAmountRequired: offer.amount,\n    payTo: offer.payTo,\n    asset: offer.asset,\n    ...(resource !== undefined ? { resource: resource.url } : {}),\n    ...(resource?.description !== undefined ? { description: resource.description } : {}),\n    ...(resource?.mimeType !== undefined ? { mimeType: resource.mimeType } : {}),\n    ...(offer.maxTimeoutSeconds !== undefined\n      ? { maxTimeoutSeconds: offer.maxTimeoutSeconds }\n      : {}),\n    ...(offer.extra ? { extra: offer.extra } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The full v2 PaymentRequired for one quoted requirement. */\n/**\n * Build the v2 PaymentRequired a vendor advertises.\n *\n * `extensions` is the spec's open slot for things that are not payment terms\n * -- discovery metadata, for instance. It stays a plain record here rather\n * than a union of known keys: the gate owns what goes in (see\n * `GateRoute.discovery`), and a codec that validated the payload would have\n * to be revised for every extension anyone ever writes. An empty object is\n * still emitted when there is nothing to say, because the field is not\n * optional on the wire.\n */\nexport function buildPaymentRequiredV2(\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  error: string,\n  extensions: Record<string, unknown> = {},\n): PaymentRequiredV2 {\n  return {\n    x402Version: 2,\n    error,\n    ...(requirement.resource\n      ? {\n          resource: {\n            url: requirement.resource,\n            ...(requirement.description ? { description: requirement.description } : {}),\n            ...(requirement.mimeType ? { mimeType: requirement.mimeType } : {}),\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n    accepts: [v2Requirements(requirement)],\n    extensions,\n  };\n}\n\n/** The one codec every x402 header uses: base64 of compact JSON. */\nexport function encodeBase64Json(value: unknown): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(value)).toString('base64');\n}\n\n/** Base64 JSON → value, or undefined when the header is not decodable. */\nfunction decodeBase64Json(raw: string): unknown {\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header. Lenient by design: a missing,\n * undecodable, or non-v2 header returns undefined so callers fall back to the\n * v1 body — a garbled v2 advertisement must not break a dual-stack 402.\n */\nexport function parsePaymentRequiredHeader(raw: string | null): PaymentRequiredV2 | undefined {\n  if (raw === null) return undefined;\n  const parsed = PaymentRequiredV2.safeParse(decodeBase64Json(raw));\n  return parsed.success ? parsed.data : undefined;\n}\n\n/** The v1 X-PAYMENT envelope, as far as the v2 rewrap needs to see it. */\nconst V1Envelope = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(1),\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payload: z.record(z.unknown()),\n});\n\n/**\n * Rewrap a payer's v1 X-PAYMENT header as a v2 PaymentPayload for the\n * PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. The scheme payload transfers verbatim (what the\n * payer signed is envelope-independent); the chosen requirement rides along\n * as `accepted` per the v2 spec. A header that is already a v2 envelope\n * passes through unchanged. Throws TypeError on anything else — a payer\n * returning an unrecognizable header is a programming error, not wire input.\n */\nexport function wrapPaymentV2(\n  paymentHeader: string,\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2,\n): string {\n  const decoded = decodeBase64Json(paymentHeader);\n  if ((decoded as { x402Version?: unknown } | undefined)?.x402Version === 2) {\n    return paymentHeader;\n  }\n  const v1 = V1Envelope.safeParse(decoded);\n  if (!v1.success) {\n    throw new TypeError(`cannot rewrap payment header as x402 v2: ${v1.error.message}`);\n  }\n  return encodeBase64Json({\n    x402Version: 2,\n    ...(resource !== undefined ? { resource } : {}),\n    accepted: v2Requirements(requirement),\n    payload: v1.data.payload,\n    extensions: {},\n  });\n}\n","import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport {\n  AgentId,\n  Receipt,\n  newId,\n  type ApprovalRequest,\n  type Asset,\n  type Decision,\n  type PaymentIntent,\n  type ReceiptSettlement,\n  type TaskContext,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { EngineClient, type FetchLike } from './client.js';\nimport { PaymentBlockedError, UnsupportedRequirementError } from './errors.js';\nimport {\n  PaymentRequired,\n  selectRequirement,\n  toIntentSubmission,\n  type PaymentRequirement,\n  type ResolvedRequirement,\n} from './x402.js';\nimport {\n  encodeBase64Json,\n  parsePaymentRequiredHeader,\n  requirementFromV2,\n  wrapPaymentV2,\n  type PaymentRequiredV2,\n  type ResourceInfoV2,\n} from './x402v2.js';\n\n/**\n * Builds the `X-PAYMENT` header for an allowed intent. Mock payers and the\n * local EIP-3009 payer ignore the decision; the session-key signer tier\n * requires it — the {intent, decision} pair is the engine-signed voucher the\n * signer verifies before any key is put to work.\n */\nexport type Payer = (\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  intent: PaymentIntent,\n  decision: Decision,\n) => string | Promise<string>;\n\nexport interface GuardOptions {\n  /** Policy engine base URL, e.g. \"http://localhost:8787\". */\n  engineUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * API-key secret for the engine. Required by any engine started with one;\n   * without it every call comes back 401 as an EngineError.\n   */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** The agent this guard speaks for (must be registered with the engine). */\n  agentId: string;\n  /** Base fetch the guard wraps by default (vendor-facing). Defaults to global fetch. */\n  fetch?: FetchLike;\n  /** Transport for talking to the policy engine. Defaults to global fetch. */\n  engineFetch?: FetchLike;\n  /** Task context attached to every intent unless overridden via withTask(). */\n  taskContext?: TaskContext;\n  /**\n   * What a blocked payment looks like to the caller: 'throw' (default) raises\n   * PaymentBlockedError; 'respond' returns a synthetic 402 JSON response, for\n   * agent loops that prefer inspecting responses over catching.\n   */\n  onBlocked?: 'throw' | 'respond';\n  /** If set, the guard settles allowed payments itself (pay + retry). */\n  payer?: Payer;\n  /** Extra token-address -> symbol mappings for asset resolution. */\n  assetAddresses?: Record<string, Asset>;\n  /**\n   * The networks this guard will govern payments on, as x402 ids in either\n   * dialect (`base-sepolia`, `eip155:8453`, ...). A 402 offering only\n   * networks outside the list is treated as an ungovernable paywall and\n   * fails closed, BEFORE the engine is asked.\n   *\n   * Omitted means \"any network the SDK maps to a chain\", which is what every\n   * guard got before profiles. Set it on anything holding a real key: the\n   * engine cannot enforce this boundary for you, because policy is written\n   * about chains and `networkToChain` folds `base-sepolia` into `base` (see\n   * selectRequirement). A testnet agent without this list will happily be\n   * allowed to pay a mainnet 402.\n   */\n  networks?: readonly string[];\n  /** Called once per receipt, as it is recorded. */\n  onReceipt?: (receipt: Receipt) => void;\n  /**\n   * How many receipts `receipts()` keeps, oldest evicted first. Default 1000.\n   * The log is a session convenience; `onReceipt` sees every receipt, capped\n   * or not, and is the path for anything that must not lose one. Without a\n   * cap a long-lived guard -- an MCP server -- grows without bound.\n   */\n  maxReceipts?: number;\n  /**\n   * In advisory mode (no `payer`) an allowed 402 is released upward and its\n   * receipt waits for the payment layer's X-PAYMENT retry to settle it. A\n   * retry that never comes would leave that entry forever; after this many\n   * milliseconds it is forgotten and the receipt stays unsettled -- which\n   * reconciliation, not this log, is there to notice. Default 300 000: the\n   * x402 authorization window, after which the retry could not pay anyway.\n   */\n  pendingTtlMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Tell the engine when a payment settles, so reconciliation can close the\n   * allowance (B1). On by default: without a report from somewhere, every\n   * allowance the engine made reads as a gap, and the one component that sees\n   * both the decision and the vendor's confirmation is this guard.\n   *\n   * Best-effort by construction — the report is fired and forgotten, and a\n   * failed one never touches the payment. Telemetry must not be able to change\n   * a payment's outcome. Set false where an independent indexer reports\n   * instead, which is the stronger evidence: a guard reporting its own\n   * settlement is the spender vouching for itself.\n   */\n  reportSettlement?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * What to do when policy escalates: by default nothing — the payment blocks\n   * immediately, exactly as a deny does, and a human can still approve it out\n   * of band. Set `await: true` and the guard holds the request open while it\n   * waits for a signed verdict, then proceeds on an approval or blocks on a\n   * rejection/expiry. Only ever wait where a stalled request is acceptable.\n   */\n  escalation?: EscalationOptions;\n}\n\nexport interface EscalationOptions {\n  /** Hold the request open until the escalation resolves. Default: false. */\n  await?: boolean;\n  /** Stop waiting after this long, leaving the request pending. Default 5 min. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** How often to re-read the parked request. Default 1s. */\n  pollMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The Rein guard: wrap an agent's fetch once, and every x402 paywall it hits\n * is policy-checked before any payment exists, with a receipt either way.\n *\n * Layering: the guard wraps the BASE fetch, underneath any x402 payment\n * library. The first (unpaid) request surfaces the 402; the guard evaluates\n * it and either blocks — so the payment layer never sees the paywall — or\n * releases the 402 upward. The payment layer's `X-PAYMENT` retry then flows\n * back through the guard, which attaches the settlement to the receipt.\n * Alternatively, pass a `payer` and the guard completes the payment itself.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIPTS = 1000;\nconst DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS = 300_000;\n\nexport class Guard {\n  readonly client: EngineClient;\n  private readonly options: GuardOptions;\n  private readonly baseFetch: FetchLike;\n  private readonly task = new AsyncLocalStorage<TaskContext>();\n  private readonly log: Receipt[] = [];\n  /** Allowed-but-unsettled receipts awaiting the payment layer's retry, by URL. */\n  private readonly pendingByUrl = new Map<string, Receipt>();\n\n  constructor(options: GuardOptions) {\n    AgentId.parse(options.agentId);\n    this.options = options;\n    const f = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n    this.baseFetch = (input, init) => f(input, init);\n    this.client = new EngineClient({\n      baseUrl: options.engineUrl,\n      ...(options.apiKey ? { apiKey: options.apiKey } : {}),\n      ...(options.engineFetch ? { fetch: options.engineFetch } : {}),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** The most recent `maxReceipts` receipts this guard has recorded, oldest first. */\n  receipts(): readonly Receipt[] {\n    return this.log;\n  }\n\n  /** Run `fn` with a task context attached to every intent submitted inside it. */\n  withTask<T>(context: TaskContext, fn: () => T): T {\n    return this.task.run({ ...this.options.taskContext, ...context }, fn);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The one-liner: returns a fetch-compatible function that enforces policy on\n   * every x402 paywall. Wraps the guard's base fetch unless one is passed.\n   */\n  wrap(fetchImpl?: FetchLike): FetchLike {\n    const inner: FetchLike = fetchImpl ? (input, init) => fetchImpl(input, init) : this.baseFetch;\n\n    return async (input, init) => {\n      const url = requestUrl(input);\n      // A request that already carries a payment (either dialect's header) is\n      // the release leg of an intent this guard allowed — pass it through and\n      // capture settlement.\n      if (\n        readHeader(input, init, 'X-PAYMENT') !== null ||\n        readHeader(input, init, 'PAYMENT-SIGNATURE') !== null\n      ) {\n        const res = await inner(input, init);\n        this.settlePending(url, res);\n        return res;\n      }\n\n      const res = await inner(input, init);\n      if (res.status !== 402) return res;\n\n      const paywall = await parse402(res, this.options.assetAddresses, this.options.networks);\n      // Not an x402 paywall — nothing to govern, hand it back untouched.\n      if (!paywall) return res;\n\n      const { resolved, wire, resource } = paywall;\n      if (!resolved) throw new UnsupportedRequirementError(url);\n\n      const taskContext = this.task.getStore() ?? this.options.taskContext;\n      const submission = toIntentSubmission(resolved, url, this.options.agentId, taskContext);\n      const evaluated = await this.client.evaluate(submission);\n      const intent = evaluated.intent;\n      let decision = evaluated.decision;\n      let approval = evaluated.approval;\n\n      // An escalation is a question, not yet an answer. When the caller has\n      // opted into waiting, hold here until a signed verdict lands — the\n      // decision we continue with is then the engine's FOLLOW-UP decision, the\n      // one a signer will accept as a voucher.\n      if (decision.outcome === 'escalate' && approval && this.options.escalation?.await) {\n        const settled = await this.awaitEscalation(approval);\n        approval = settled.request;\n        if (settled.decision) decision = settled.decision;\n      }\n\n      if (decision.outcome !== 'allow') {\n        const receipt = this.record(intent, decision, url, init);\n        if (this.options.onBlocked === 'respond') return blockedResponse(receipt, approval);\n        throw new PaymentBlockedError(intent, decision, receipt, approval);\n      }\n\n      if (!this.options.payer) {\n        // Advisory mode: release the 402 to the payment layer above us; its\n        // X-PAYMENT retry will come back through and settle the receipt.\n        const receipt = this.record(intent, decision, url, init);\n        this.sweepPending();\n        this.pendingByUrl.set(url, receipt);\n        // Only the offer that was actually evaluated. See ParsedPaywall.narrowed.\n        return paywall.narrowed ?? res;\n      }\n\n      // The payer always produces the v1 envelope it knows; on a v2 paywall\n      // the guard rewraps it (same signed payload, v2 PaymentPayload around\n      // it) and pays on the v2 header. Every payer is v2-capable this way.\n      const paymentHeader = await this.options.payer(resolved.requirement, intent, decision);\n      const retry = await inner(\n        input,\n        wire === 2\n          ? withHeader(\n              input,\n              init,\n              'PAYMENT-SIGNATURE',\n              wrapPaymentV2(paymentHeader, resolved.requirement, resource),\n            )\n          : withHeader(input, init, 'X-PAYMENT', paymentHeader),\n      );\n      this.record(intent, decision, url, init, parseSettlement(retry));\n      return retry;\n    };\n  }\n\n  private record(\n    intent: PaymentIntent,\n    decision: Decision,\n    url: string,\n    init: RequestInit | undefined,\n    settlement?: ReceiptSettlement,\n  ): Receipt {\n    const receipt = Receipt.parse({\n      id: newId('rcp'),\n      agentId: intent.agentId,\n      intentId: intent.id,\n      decisionId: decision.id,\n      outcome: decision.outcome,\n      url,\n      method: init?.method ?? 'GET',\n      vendorHost: intent.vendor.host,\n      amount: intent.amount,\n      asset: intent.asset,\n      chain: intent.chain,\n      taskContext: intent.taskContext,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      settlement,\n      createdAt: new Date(),\n    });\n    this.log.push(receipt);\n    const max = this.options.maxReceipts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIPTS;\n    if (this.log.length > max) this.log.splice(0, this.log.length - max);\n    this.options.onReceipt?.(receipt);\n    if (settlement) this.announceSettlement(receipt);\n    return receipt;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fire-and-forget the settlement fact at the engine. Deliberately silent on\n   * failure: a reconciliation report that never arrives leaves a gap open,\n   * which is the SAFE direction — an operator sees a payment they must check.\n   * Raising here would let telemetry break a payment that already succeeded.\n   *\n   * The amount is not reported: the guard knows what it was asked to pay, not\n   * what the chain moved, and a settlement report should carry only what its\n   * reporter actually observed.\n   */\n  private announceSettlement(receipt: Receipt): void {\n    if (this.options.reportSettlement === false) return;\n    const txHash = receipt.settlement?.txHash;\n    void this.client\n      .reportSettlement({\n        intentId: receipt.intentId,\n        ...(txHash !== undefined ? { txHash } : {}),\n        chain: receipt.chain,\n        source: 'guard',\n        confirmedAt: receipt.createdAt,\n      })\n      .catch(() => undefined);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wait out a parked escalation. Never waits past the request's own TTL:\n   * after that instant the engine can only deny it, so continuing to poll\n   * would just be a slower block.\n   */\n  private async awaitEscalation(request: ApprovalRequest): Promise<ApprovalOutcome> {\n    const options = this.options.escalation ?? {};\n    const untilExpiry = Math.max(0, request.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) + 1_000;\n    const view = await this.client.awaitApproval(request.decisionId, {\n      timeoutMs: Math.min(options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000, untilExpiry),\n      ...(options.pollMs !== undefined ? { pollMs: options.pollMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return { request: view.request, ...(view.decision ? { decision: view.decision } : {}) };\n  }\n\n  /** Drop advisory receipts whose retry window has passed -- see `pendingTtlMs`. */\n  private sweepPending(): void {\n    const cutoff = Date.now() - (this.options.pendingTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS);\n    for (const [url, receipt] of this.pendingByUrl) {\n      if (receipt.createdAt.getTime() < cutoff) this.pendingByUrl.delete(url);\n    }\n  }\n\n  private settlePending(url: string, res: Response): void {\n    this.sweepPending();\n    const receipt = this.pendingByUrl.get(url);\n    if (!receipt || !res.ok) return;\n    const settlement = parseSettlement(res);\n    if (settlement) {\n      receipt.settlement = settlement;\n      this.announceSettlement(receipt);\n    }\n    this.pendingByUrl.delete(url);\n  }\n}\n\n/** How a waited-on escalation came out. */\ninterface ApprovalOutcome {\n  request: ApprovalRequest;\n  /** The follow-up allow/deny decision, absent while still pending. */\n  decision?: Decision;\n}\n\n/** Convenience factory mirroring the docs: `const guard = createGuard({...})`. */\nexport function createGuard(options: GuardOptions): Guard {\n  return new Guard(options);\n}\n\n/** What a 402 offered, in whichever dialect the guard could govern. */\ninterface ParsedPaywall {\n  /** The offer the guard selected, or undefined when none qualifies. */\n  resolved: ResolvedRequirement | undefined;\n  /** Which wire dialect to pay on: 2 = PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, 1 = X-PAYMENT. */\n  wire: 1 | 2;\n  /** The v2 402's shared resource info, echoed into the payment envelope. */\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2;\n  /**\n   * The same 402 carrying ONLY the offer the guard evaluated.\n   *\n   * In advisory mode the guard does not pay; it hands the 402 back to the\n   * payment layer above, which holds the key. Releasing the vendor's body\n   * verbatim meant that layer chose from the FULL `accepts` list -- including\n   * the offers the network allow-list had just rejected. A hostile 402 that\n   * lists a 0.001 Sepolia offer and a 250 USDC mainnet one gets the cheap one\n   * evaluated and allowed, and the expensive one paid, while the receipt and\n   * the engine record the cheap one. Narrowing the body is what makes the\n   * testnet pin structural rather than advisory.\n   */\n  narrowed?: Response;\n}\n\n/** Rebuild a 402 carrying a single offer, in whichever dialects it used. */\nfunction narrow402(\n  res: Response,\n  body: unknown,\n  v2: PaymentRequiredV2 | undefined,\n  keepV1: PaymentRequirement | undefined,\n  keepV2Index: number | undefined,\n): Response {\n  const headers = new Headers(res.headers);\n  if (v2 && keepV2Index !== undefined) {\n    const offer = v2.accepts[keepV2Index];\n    if (offer) headers.set('PAYMENT-REQUIRED', encodeBase64Json({ ...v2, accepts: [offer] }));\n  }\n  let text: string | undefined;\n  if (keepV1 && body && typeof body === 'object') {\n    text = JSON.stringify({ ...(body as Record<string, unknown>), accepts: [keepV1] });\n    headers.delete('content-length');\n  }\n  return new Response(text ?? res.body, {\n    status: res.status,\n    statusText: res.statusText,\n    headers,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a 402 in both dialects. v2 (the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header) is preferred\n * when it carries an offer the guard can govern; otherwise the v1 body gets\n * its chance — a dual-stack vendor is served on whichever channel works.\n * Returns undefined when neither channel is x402 at all (not a paywall).\n */\nasync function parse402(\n  res: Response,\n  assetAddresses: Record<string, Asset> | undefined,\n  networks: readonly string[] | undefined,\n): Promise<ParsedPaywall | undefined> {\n  const v2 = parsePaymentRequiredHeader(res.headers.get('PAYMENT-REQUIRED'));\n  const body = await res\n    .clone()\n    .json()\n    .catch(() => undefined);\n  const parsed = PaymentRequired.safeParse(body);\n\n  // Which v1 offer (if the body is v1) the guard would govern. Computed even\n  // on the v2 path, because a dual-stack 402 answers both and a v1-only layer\n  // above would otherwise still read the unfiltered body.\n  const v1Resolved = parsed.success\n    ? selectRequirement(parsed.data.accepts, assetAddresses, networks)\n    : undefined;\n\n  if (v2) {\n    const asRequirements = v2.accepts.map((offer) => requirementFromV2(offer, v2.resource));\n    const resolved = selectRequirement(asRequirements, assetAddresses, networks);\n    if (resolved) {\n      const index = asRequirements.indexOf(resolved.requirement);\n      const narrowed = narrow402(res, body, v2, v1Resolved?.requirement, index);\n      return v2.resource !== undefined\n        ? { resolved, wire: 2, resource: v2.resource, narrowed }\n        : { resolved, wire: 2, narrowed };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.success) {\n    return {\n      resolved: v1Resolved,\n      wire: 1,\n      ...(v1Resolved\n        ? { narrowed: narrow402(res, body, v2, v1Resolved.requirement, undefined) }\n        : {}),\n    };\n  }\n  // A v2 header alone still marks this as a paywall — one the guard must\n  // fail closed on if nothing in it was governable.\n  return v2 ? { resolved: undefined, wire: 2 } : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction requestUrl(input: string | URL | Request): string {\n  if (typeof input === 'string') return input;\n  if (input instanceof URL) return input.toString();\n  return input.url;\n}\n\nfunction readHeader(\n  input: string | URL | Request,\n  init: RequestInit | undefined,\n  name: string,\n): string | null {\n  const source = init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined);\n  return source === undefined ? null : new Headers(source).get(name);\n}\n\nfunction withHeader(\n  input: string | URL | Request,\n  init: RequestInit | undefined,\n  name: string,\n  value: string,\n): RequestInit {\n  const headers = new Headers(\n    init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined),\n  );\n  headers.set(name, value);\n  return { ...init, headers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode the vendor's settlement header — `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (v1) or\n * `PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (v2); base64 JSON per the x402 spec, plain JSON\n * tolerated mock-first. Absent or undecodable -> undefined.\n */\nfunction parseSettlement(res: Response): ReceiptSettlement | undefined {\n  const raw = res.headers.get('X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE') ?? res.headers.get('PAYMENT-RESPONSE');\n  if (raw === null) return undefined;\n  let payload: unknown;\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    try {\n      payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n    } catch {\n      return { raw };\n    }\n  }\n  const record =\n    typeof payload === 'object' && payload !== null ? (payload as Record<string, unknown>) : {};\n  return {\n    // A failed v2 settle carries transaction: \"\" — no tx is no txHash.\n    txHash:\n      typeof record['transaction'] === 'string' && record['transaction'] !== ''\n        ? record['transaction']\n        : undefined,\n    networkId: typeof record['network'] === 'string' ? record['network'] : undefined,\n    raw,\n  };\n}\n\nfunction blockedResponse(receipt: Receipt, approval?: ApprovalRequest): Response {\n  return new Response(\n    JSON.stringify({\n      error: 'payment_blocked_by_rein',\n      outcome: receipt.outcome,\n      reason: receipt.reason,\n      intentId: receipt.intentId,\n      decisionId: receipt.decisionId,\n      receiptId: receipt.id,\n      // `pending` here means a signed verdict could still release this\n      // payment; anything else is final.\n      ...(approval\n        ? {\n            approval: {\n              status: approval.status,\n              decisionId: approval.decisionId,\n              expiresAt: approval.expiresAt.toISOString(),\n            },\n          }\n        : {}),\n    }),\n    {\n      status: 402,\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-rein-outcome': receipt.outcome },\n    },\n  );\n}\n","export type FacilitatorErrorCode =\n  | 'malformed_payment'\n  | 'unsupported_scheme'\n  | 'unsupported_network'\n  | 'unsupported_asset'\n  | 'network_mismatch'\n  | 'amount_mismatch'\n  | 'recipient_mismatch';\n\n/** A payment the facilitator refused to settle, with a machine-readable code. */\nexport class FacilitatorError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    readonly code: FacilitatorErrorCode,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'FacilitatorError';\n  }\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\n\n/**\n * Wire codecs for the two x402 headers the mock rails speak: `X-PAYMENT`\n * (agent -> vendor -> facilitator) and `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (vendor -> agent).\n * Both are base64-encoded JSON per the x402 spec.\n */\n\n/** The mock `exact` scheme payload carried inside X-PAYMENT. */\nexport const MockExactPayload = z.object({\n  from: z.string().min(1),\n  to: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Atomic-unit amount, mirroring the requirement's maxAmountRequired. */\n  value: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  /**\n   * Rein linkage: the guard's payer stamps the intent id here, the facilitator\n   * memos it onto the ledger entry, and the indexer reconciles exactly. A real\n   * x402 transfer authorization carries a nonce that serves the same role.\n   */\n  intentId: z.string().optional(),\n  nonce: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type MockExactPayload = z.infer<typeof MockExactPayload>;\n\n/** The full X-PAYMENT header body (x402 spec v1 envelope). */\nexport const MockPaymentHeader = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(1),\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payload: MockExactPayload,\n});\nexport type MockPaymentHeader = z.infer<typeof MockPaymentHeader>;\n\n/**\n * The v2 envelope (PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header): scheme/network live inside\n * `accepted` — the requirement the payer chose — around the SAME scheme\n * payload. `.passthrough()` keeps resource/extensions intact.\n */\nexport const MockPaymentHeaderV2 = z\n  .object({\n    x402Version: z.literal(2),\n    accepted: z\n      .object({\n        scheme: z.string(),\n        network: z.string(),\n        amount: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n        asset: z.string().min(1),\n        payTo: z.string().min(1),\n      })\n      .passthrough(),\n    payload: MockExactPayload,\n  })\n  .passthrough();\nexport type MockPaymentHeaderV2 = z.infer<typeof MockPaymentHeaderV2>;\n\n/** A payment as the facilitator sees it, whichever dialect it arrived in. */\nexport interface DecodedPayment {\n  version: 1 | 2;\n  scheme: string;\n  network: string;\n  payload: MockExactPayload;\n}\n\nexport function encodePaymentHeader(header: MockPaymentHeader): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(header)).toString('base64');\n}\n\nexport function decodePaymentHeader(raw: string): DecodedPayment {\n  let json: unknown;\n  try {\n    json = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    throw new FacilitatorError('malformed_payment', 'X-PAYMENT is not base64-encoded JSON');\n  }\n\n  if ((json as { x402Version?: unknown } | null)?.x402Version === 2) {\n    const parsed = MockPaymentHeaderV2.safeParse(json);\n    if (!parsed.success) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'malformed_payment',\n        `invalid v2 payment envelope: ${parsed.error.message}`,\n      );\n    }\n    // A self-contradictory envelope (accepted terms vs transfer payload) is\n    // malformed on its face — mirroring the gate's inspection.\n    if (parsed.data.payload.value !== parsed.data.accepted.amount) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'malformed_payment',\n        `v2 envelope contradicts itself: accepted.amount ${parsed.data.accepted.amount} vs payload value ${parsed.data.payload.value}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return {\n      version: 2,\n      scheme: parsed.data.accepted.scheme,\n      network: parsed.data.accepted.network,\n      payload: parsed.data.payload,\n    };\n  }\n\n  const parsed = MockPaymentHeader.safeParse(json);\n  if (!parsed.success) {\n    throw new FacilitatorError('malformed_payment', `invalid X-PAYMENT body: ${parsed.error.message}`);\n  }\n  return {\n    version: 1,\n    scheme: parsed.data.scheme,\n    network: parsed.data.network,\n    payload: parsed.data.payload,\n  };\n}\n\n/** What the facilitator returns on settle; the vendor base64s it into X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE. */\nexport const SettlementResponse = z.object({\n  success: z.boolean(),\n  /** The tx hash on the mock ledger (the guard surfaces this on the receipt). */\n  transaction: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payer: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type SettlementResponse = z.infer<typeof SettlementResponse>;\n\nexport function encodeSettlementHeader(response: SettlementResponse): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(response)).toString('base64');\n}\n","import type { Asset } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport {\n  atomicToDecimal,\n  networkToChain,\n  requirementDecimals,\n  resolveAsset,\n  sameNetwork,\n  type PaymentRequirement,\n  type Payer,\n} from '@reinconsole/sdk';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\nimport { MockLedger, type LedgerEntry } from './ledger.js';\nimport {\n  decodePaymentHeader,\n  encodePaymentHeader,\n  encodeSettlementHeader,\n  type DecodedPayment,\n  type SettlementResponse,\n} from './payload.js';\n\nexport interface MockFacilitatorOptions {\n  ledger: MockLedger;\n  /** Recorded on settled payments (shows up in SettledPayment.facilitator). */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Extra token-address -> symbol mappings, mirroring the guard's option. */\n  assetAddresses?: Record<string, Asset>;\n}\n\nexport interface SettleResult {\n  response: SettlementResponse;\n  /** Ready-made value for the vendor's X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE header. */\n  header: string;\n  /** The transfer as written on the mock chain. */\n  entry: LedgerEntry;\n}\n\n/**\n * The mock x402 facilitator: verifies X-PAYMENT headers and \"settles\" them by\n * writing transfers onto the mock ledger. Plays the role Coinbase's hosted\n * facilitator plays in production — vendors call `settle()`, agents pay via\n * `payerFor()`, and nothing here is Rein-privileged: settlement happens\n * whether or not a policy engine ever saw the payment. Catching the ones it\n * didn't see is the indexer's job.\n */\nexport class MockFacilitator {\n  readonly name: string;\n  private readonly ledger: MockLedger;\n  private readonly assetAddresses: Record<string, Asset>;\n\n  constructor(options: MockFacilitatorOptions) {\n    this.ledger = options.ledger;\n    this.name = options.name ?? 'mock-facilitator';\n    this.assetAddresses = options.assetAddresses ?? {};\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A `Payer` for the SDK guard: builds the X-PAYMENT header for an allowed\n   * intent, stamping the intent id so settlement reconciles exactly. This is\n   * the plug-in point the real x402 signer replaces.\n   */\n  payerFor(fromAddress: string): Payer {\n    return (requirement, intent) =>\n      encodePaymentHeader({\n        x402Version: 1,\n        scheme: requirement.scheme,\n        network: requirement.network,\n        payload: {\n          from: fromAddress,\n          to: requirement.payTo,\n          value: requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n          asset: requirement.asset,\n          intentId: intent.id,\n          nonce: intent.nonce,\n        },\n      });\n  }\n\n  /** Verify a payment header (either dialect) against the requirement it\n   *  claims to satisfy. */\n  verify(paymentHeader: string, requirement: PaymentRequirement): DecodedPayment {\n    const header = decodePaymentHeader(paymentHeader);\n    if (header.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact' || requirement.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact') {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'unsupported_scheme',\n        `mock facilitator only settles \"exact\", got \"${header.scheme}\"/\"${requirement.scheme}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    // Compared through CAIP-2 normalization: a v2 envelope naming\n    // \"eip155:8453\" satisfies a requirement quoted as v1's \"base\".\n    if (!sameNetwork(header.network, requirement.network)) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'network_mismatch',\n        `payment is on \"${header.network}\" but the requirement wants \"${requirement.network}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!networkToChain(header.network)) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_network', `unknown network \"${header.network}\"`);\n    }\n    if (header.payload.value !== requirement.maxAmountRequired) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'amount_mismatch',\n        `payment of ${header.payload.value} does not match required ${requirement.maxAmountRequired}`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (header.payload.to !== requirement.payTo) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'recipient_mismatch',\n        `payment pays \"${header.payload.to}\" but the requirement pays \"${requirement.payTo}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    return header;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify, then settle: write the transfer on the mock chain and return the\n   * settlement response the vendor relays via X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE.\n   */\n  settle(paymentHeader: string, requirement: PaymentRequirement): SettleResult {\n    const header = this.verify(paymentHeader, requirement);\n    const chain = networkToChain(header.network);\n    if (!chain) throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_network', `unknown network \"${header.network}\"`);\n    const asset = resolveAsset(requirement, this.assetAddresses);\n    if (!asset) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_asset', `cannot resolve asset \"${requirement.asset}\"`);\n    }\n    const entry = this.ledger.transfer({\n      chain,\n      asset,\n      from: header.payload.from,\n      to: header.payload.to,\n      amount: atomicToDecimal(header.payload.value, requirementDecimals(requirement)),\n      memo: header.payload.intentId,\n    });\n    const response: SettlementResponse = {\n      success: true,\n      transaction: entry.txHash,\n      network: header.network,\n      payer: header.payload.from,\n    };\n    return { response, header: encodeSettlementHeader(response), entry };\n  }\n}\n","import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';\nimport {\n  ReinEvent,\n  compareDecimal,\n  type Agent,\n  type PaymentIntent,\n  type SettledPayment,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport type { LedgerEntry, MockLedger } from './ledger.js';\n\n/** The slice of the policy engine the indexer subscribes to (NATS in prod). */\nexport interface EngineEvents {\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void;\n}\n\nexport interface MockIndexerOptions {\n  ledger: MockLedger;\n  /**\n   * Directory of managed agents and their wallets (the agents service in\n   * prod). Called per ledger entry, so agents registered later are still seen.\n   */\n  agents: () => readonly Agent[];\n  /** Recorded as SettledPayment.facilitator on reconciled payments. */\n  facilitator?: string;\n}\n\n/** A `shadow.spend` event, extracted for convenience accessors. */\nexport type ShadowSpend = Extract<ReinEvent, { type: 'shadow.spend' }>;\n\n/**\n * The mock indexer: watches the ledger and classifies every transfer that\n * leaves a managed agent wallet.\n *\n * - Matches an allowed, unsettled intent -> `payment.settled` (reconciled).\n * - No ALLOW decision behind it -> `shadow.spend` — the bypass signal that\n *   catches SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n *\n * Reconciliation is memo-first (the facilitator stamps the intent id onto the\n * transfer), with a fallback match on chain+asset+amount+recipient for\n * transfers that arrive without a memo. A memo that does NOT resolve to an\n * allowed unsettled intent (denied, unknown, or already settled — a replay)\n * is never fuzzy-matched: it stays a shadow spend.\n */\nexport class MockIndexer {\n  private readonly options: MockIndexerOptions;\n  private readonly bus = new EventEmitter();\n  private readonly emitted: ReinEvent[] = [];\n  /** Every intent the engine has seen, by id (from `intent.created`). */\n  private readonly intents = new Map<string, PaymentIntent>();\n  /** Intents with an ALLOW decision, by id. */\n  private readonly allowed = new Map<string, PaymentIntent>();\n  private readonly settledIntents = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(options: MockIndexerOptions) {\n    this.options = options;\n    options.ledger.onEntry((entry) => this.observe(entry));\n  }\n\n  /** Subscribe to a policy engine's event stream to learn which intents were allowed. */\n  connectEngine(engine: EngineEvents): void {\n    engine.onEvent((event) => {\n      if (event.type === 'intent.created') {\n        this.intents.set(event.intent.id, event.intent);\n      } else if (event.type === 'decision.made' && event.decision.outcome === 'allow') {\n        const intent = this.intents.get(event.decision.intentId);\n        if (intent) this.allowed.set(intent.id, intent);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void {\n    this.bus.on('event', handler);\n  }\n\n  /** Everything the indexer has emitted, oldest first. */\n  events(): readonly ReinEvent[] {\n    return this.emitted;\n  }\n\n  settledPayments(): SettledPayment[] {\n    return this.emitted.flatMap((e) => (e.type === 'payment.settled' ? [e.payment] : []));\n  }\n\n  shadowSpends(): ShadowSpend[] {\n    return this.emitted.filter((e): e is ShadowSpend => e.type === 'shadow.spend');\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: ReinEvent): void {\n    const parsed = ReinEvent.parse(event);\n    this.emitted.push(parsed);\n    this.bus.emit('event', parsed);\n  }\n\n  private agentFor(entry: LedgerEntry): string | undefined {\n    for (const agent of this.options.agents()) {\n      const owns = agent.wallets.some(\n        (w) => w.chain === entry.chain && sameAddress(w.address, entry.from),\n      );\n      if (owns) return agent.id;\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  private observe(entry: LedgerEntry): void {\n    const agentId = this.agentFor(entry);\n    // Spend from a wallet Rein does not manage is someone else's problem.\n    if (!agentId) return;\n\n    const intent = this.reconcile(entry, agentId);\n    if (intent) {\n      this.settledIntents.add(intent.id);\n      this.emit({\n        type: 'payment.settled',\n        at: entry.at,\n        payment: {\n          intentId: intent.id,\n          txHash: entry.txHash,\n          chain: entry.chain,\n          blockNumber: entry.blockNumber,\n          facilitator: this.options.facilitator,\n          confirmedAt: entry.at,\n        },\n      });\n      return;\n    }\n\n    this.emit({\n      type: 'shadow.spend',\n      at: entry.at,\n      agentId,\n      txHash: entry.txHash,\n      chain: entry.chain,\n      amount: entry.amount,\n    });\n  }\n\n  private reconcile(entry: LedgerEntry, agentId: string): PaymentIntent | undefined {\n    if (entry.memo !== undefined) {\n      const intent = this.allowed.get(entry.memo);\n      return intent && intent.agentId === agentId && !this.settledIntents.has(intent.id)\n        ? intent\n        : undefined;\n    }\n    for (const intent of this.allowed.values()) {\n      if (this.settledIntents.has(intent.id)) continue;\n      if (intent.agentId !== agentId) continue;\n      if (intent.chain !== entry.chain || intent.asset !== entry.asset) continue;\n      if (intent.vendor.address !== entry.to) continue;\n      if (compareDecimal(intent.amount, entry.amount) !== 0) continue;\n      return intent;\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/** EVM addresses compare case-insensitively; everything else compares exact. */\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a === b) return true;\n  return a.startsWith('0x') && b.startsWith('0x') && a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n","import {\n  PaymentRequirement,\n  buildPaymentRequiredV2,\n  encodeBase64Json,\n  type FetchLike,\n} from '@reinconsole/sdk';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\nimport type { MockFacilitator } from './facilitator.js';\n\nexport interface MockVendorOptions {\n  facilitator: MockFacilitator;\n  /** Price in atomic units (e.g. \"10000\" = 0.01 USDC at 6 decimals). */\n  atomicPrice: string;\n  /** Where the vendor wants to be paid. */\n  payTo: string;\n  network?: string;\n  asset?: string;\n  scheme?: string;\n  /** JSON body served once payment settles. */\n  body?: unknown;\n  /**\n   * Which x402 dialect the vendor's 402s advertise. 'v1' (default) is the\n   * classic JSON body; 'dual' adds the v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header beside it;\n   * 'v2' advertises ONLY the header (the body is not x402) — a strict v2\n   * vendor for proving clients need no v1 fallback. Payments are ACCEPTED in\n   * both dialects (PAYMENT-SIGNATURE or X-PAYMENT) regardless of this option,\n   * mirroring the gate.\n   */\n  advertise?: 'v1' | 'dual' | 'v2';\n}\n\nexport interface VendorCall {\n  url: string;\n  payment: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface MockVendor {\n  /** Drop-in fetch for the guard's vendor-facing side. */\n  fetch: FetchLike;\n  /** Every request the vendor saw, in order. */\n  calls: VendorCall[];\n  /** The payment requirement this vendor quotes for a given URL. */\n  requirementFor(url: string): PaymentRequirement;\n}\n\n/**\n * An in-process x402 vendor wired to the mock facilitator: quotes a 402 with\n * payment requirements until the request carries a payment, then settles\n * through the facilitator (writing the transfer on the mock ledger) and serves\n * the content with the settlement in the response headers. The third leg of\n * the mock rails — guard pays it, indexer watches the ledger behind it.\n */\nexport function createMockVendor(options: MockVendorOptions): MockVendor {\n  const calls: VendorCall[] = [];\n  const advertise = options.advertise ?? 'v1';\n\n  const requirementFor = (url: string): PaymentRequirement =>\n    PaymentRequirement.parse({\n      scheme: options.scheme ?? 'exact',\n      network: options.network ?? 'base',\n      maxAmountRequired: options.atomicPrice,\n      resource: new URL(url).pathname,\n      payTo: options.payTo,\n      asset: options.asset ?? 'USDC',\n    });\n\n  const paymentRequired = (url: string, error: string): Response => {\n    const requirement = requirementFor(url);\n    // A strict v2 vendor's body is deliberately NOT x402 — everything the\n    // protocol needs rides the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header.\n    const body =\n      advertise === 'v2'\n        ? { error }\n        : { x402Version: 1, accepts: [requirement], error };\n    return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n      status: 402,\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        ...(advertise !== 'v1'\n          ? {\n              'PAYMENT-REQUIRED': encodeBase64Json(buildPaymentRequiredV2(requirement, error)),\n            }\n          : {}),\n      },\n    });\n  };\n\n  const fetch: FetchLike = async (input, init) => {\n    const url =\n      typeof input === 'string' ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.toString() : input.url;\n    const headers = new Headers(\n      init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined),\n    );\n    // Dual-stack: v2 payers send PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, v1 payers X-PAYMENT.\n    const payment = headers.get('PAYMENT-SIGNATURE') ?? headers.get('X-PAYMENT');\n    calls.push({ url, payment });\n\n    if (payment === null) return paymentRequired(url, 'payment is required');\n\n    let settled;\n    try {\n      settled = options.facilitator.settle(payment, requirementFor(url));\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof FacilitatorError) return paymentRequired(url, err.message);\n      throw err;\n    }\n    return new Response(JSON.stringify(options.body ?? { ok: true }), {\n      status: 200,\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        // Both dialect names carry the same base64 settlement object; the\n        // strict v2 vendor sets ONLY the v2 name.\n        ...(advertise !== 'v2' ? { 'X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE': settled.header } : {}),\n        'PAYMENT-RESPONSE': settled.header,\n      },\n    });\n  };\n\n  return { fetch, calls, requirementFor 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This is what\n * the API returns on list/issue; the secret itself is shown exactly once, at\n * issuance, and never persisted in recoverable form (see {@link ApiKeyRecord}).\n */\nexport const ApiKey = z.object({\n  id: ApiKeyId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  scopes: z.array(ApiKeyScope).min(1),\n  /**\n   * The org this key acts inside. ABSENT means unscoped — an operator key that\n   * reads and writes across every org, which is what a self-hosted single-org\n   * deployment and every env-seeded boot secret have always been. That is the\n   * compatibility rule the whole tenancy design rests on: adding tenancy\n   * changed no existing key's behaviour, because no existing key has this\n   * field.\n   *\n   * Present, it is a hard confinement, not a default: the key cannot read,\n   * spend, approve or govern outside the org, and a write it submits is\n   * stamped with this org rather than the one the body asked for.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Narrow an org-scoped key further, to specific agents — what an agent\n   * runtime should carry, so a stolen key spends one agent's budget rather\n   * than the org's. Only meaningful alongside {@link ApiKey.orgId}: agent\n   * narrowing without an org is refused at issuance, because the scope it\n   * would describe has no org to resolve policies and approvers in.\n   *\n   * Capped at 64: a list long enough to need more is a fleet, and a fleet is\n   * what the org scope is for.\n   */\n  agentIds: z.array(AgentId).max(64).optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Last successful authentication, for spotting keys that can be retired. */\n  lastUsedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by revoke(); a revoked key never authenticates again. */\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by rotate(); with `previousSecretExpiresAt` it dates the overlap. */\n  rotatedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Past this instant the key stops authenticating, like a revoked one.\n   * ABSENT means it never expires -- every key before the sandbox, and every\n   * key an operator mints. Only the anonymous sandbox sets it, and a key minted\n   * BY an expiring key inherits the deadline: a sandbox that could mint itself\n   * a permanent key would not be a 7-day sandbox.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKey = z.infer<typeof ApiKey>;\n\n/**\n * SERVER-SIDE ONLY. The stored form: the public record plus sha256 digests of\n * the secrets. Digests, not secrets — a stolen database yields nothing that\n * authenticates. Rotation keeps the outgoing digest alive until\n * `previousSecretExpiresAt` so a running fleet can roll over without a\n * flag-day restart; past that instant only the current secret verifies.\n *\n * This shape never leaves the engine: every route answers with {@link ApiKey}.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyRecord = ApiKey.extend({\n  secretHash: z.string(),\n  previousSecretHash: z.string().optional(),\n  previousSecretExpiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKeyRecord = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyRecord>;\n\n/** Strip the digests: the only sanctioned way to put a key on the wire. */\nexport function toPublicApiKey(record: ApiKeyRecord): ApiKey {\n  const { secretHash, previousSecretHash, previousSecretExpiresAt, ...pub } = record;\n  void secretHash;\n  void previousSecretHash;\n  void previousSecretExpiresAt;\n  return pub;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal ULID generation, dependency-free. 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Works in Node 22 and modern browsers/edge via\n * the WebCrypto `globalThis.crypto`.\n */\n\n// Crockford's base32 alphabet (excludes I, L, O, U to avoid ambiguity).\nconst ENCODING = '0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ';\nconst TIME_LEN = 10;\nconst RANDOM_LEN = 16;\n\nfunction randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction encodeTime(now: number): string {\n  let time = now;\n  let out = '';\n  for (let i = TIME_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out = ENCODING.charAt(time % 32) + out;\n    time = Math.floor(time / 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction encodeRandom(): string {\n  let out = '';\n  for (const byte of randomBytes(RANDOM_LEN)) {\n    out += ENCODING.charAt(byte % 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/** Generate a 26-character ULID. */\nexport function ulid(seedTime: number = Date.now()): string {\n  return encodeTime(seedTime) + encodeRandom();\n}\n\n/** Generate a Stripe-style prefixed id, e.g. `newId('agt')` -> `agt_01J...`. */\nexport function newId<P extends string>(prefix: P): `${P}_${string}` {\n  return `${prefix}_${ulid()}`;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Chains Rein observes/governs. x402 is multi-chain; Base and Solana ship\n * first, Polygon and BNB follow. 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All comparison/aggregation goes through the\n * BigInt-backed helpers below.\n */\nexport const DecimalString = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/, 'must be a non-negative decimal string, e.g. \"5.00\"');\nexport type DecimalString = z.infer<typeof DecimalString>;\n\nconst DECIMAL_RE = /^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/;\n\nexport function isValidDecimal(value: string): boolean {\n  return DECIMAL_RE.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction assertDecimal(value: string): void {\n  if (!isValidDecimal(value)) {\n    throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal string: ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction fractionLength(value: string): number {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  return dot === -1 ? 0 : value.length - dot - 1;\n}\n\n/** Scale a decimal string into an integer BigInt at a fixed number of fraction digits. */\nfunction toScaled(value: string, scale: number): bigint {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? 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Returns -1 (a<b), 0 (a==b), or 1 (a>b). */\nexport function compareDecimal(a: string, b: string): -1 | 0 | 1 {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  const av = toScaled(a, scale);\n  const bv = toScaled(b, scale);\n  return av < bv ? -1 : av > bv ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/** Sum a list of decimal strings without floating-point error. */\nexport function sumDecimal(values: readonly string[]): string {\n  if (values.length === 0) return '0';\n  let scale = 0;\n  for (const v of values) {\n    assertDecimal(v);\n    scale = Math.max(scale, fractionLength(v));\n  }\n  let total = 0n;\n  for (const v of values) total += toScaled(v, scale);\n  return fromScaled(total, scale);\n}\n\n/**\n * `a - b` for decimal strings, exact. Requires `a >= b`: the one caller is\n * \"how much more settled than was allowed\", and a negative money string is a\n * shape nothing else in the system accepts, so asking for one is a bug here\n * rather than a value to hand on.\n */\nexport function subDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  if (compareDecimal(a, b) < 0) {\n    throw new RangeError(`subDecimal: ${a} is less than ${b}`);\n  }\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  return fromScaled(toScaled(a, scale) - toScaled(b, scale), scale);\n}\n\n/** Multiply two decimal strings exactly (e.g. median * \"3\" for price-sanity). */\nexport function mulDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scaleA = fractionLength(a);\n  const scaleB = fractionLength(b);\n  const product = toScaled(a, scaleA) * toScaled(b, scaleB);\n  return fromScaled(product, scaleA + scaleB);\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a > b. */\nexport function gt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === 1;\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a < b. */\nexport function lt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === -1;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal, safe glob matcher supporting only the `*` wildcard (matches any run\n * of characters, including none). Used for vendor host allowlists\n * (e.g. \"*.trusted.io\"), agent-id targeting (e.g. \"agt_research_*\"), and\n * Gate route pricing (e.g. \"/api/reports/*\").\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a regex from user input — the pattern is escaped so a\n * malicious policy value cannot inject regex behavior (ReDoS, etc.).\n */\nexport function globMatch(pattern: string, value: string): boolean {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&'); // escape regex metachars\n  const withWildcard = escaped.replace(/\\\\\\*/g, '.*'); // re-enable only `*`\n  return new RegExp(`^${withWildcard}$`).test(value);\n}\n\n/** True if `value` matches any pattern in the list. */\nexport function globMatchAny(patterns: readonly string[], value: string): boolean {\n  return patterns.some((p) => globMatch(p, value));\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\n\n/**\n * Enforcement tier of a given agent wallet:\n * - `observed`    — Rein sees spend on-chain but has no control (no SDK either).\n * - `sdk`         — agent uses @reinconsole/sdk; advisory + observability (bypassable).\n * - `session-key` — signer-level scope; out-of-policy txs cannot be signed.\n */\nexport const EnforcementMode = z.enum(['observed', 'sdk', 'session-key']);\nexport type EnforcementMode = z.infer<typeof EnforcementMode>;\n\nexport const AgentWallet = z.object({\n  chain: Chain,\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  mode: EnforcementMode,\n});\nexport type AgentWallet = z.infer<typeof AgentWallet>;\n\nexport const AgentStatus = z.enum(['active', 'frozen']);\nexport type AgentStatus = z.infer<typeof AgentStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A semantic grouping label, e.g. \"research\" or \"prod-trading\". Lowercase\n * slugs only — policy `appliesTo.labels` matches these (with globs), and a\n * case-normalization mismatch would silently un-target a policy.\n */\nexport const AgentLabel = z\n  .string()\n  .max(40)\n  .regex(/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/, 'label must be a lowercase slug like \"research\" or \"prod-trading\"');\nexport type AgentLabel = z.infer<typeof AgentLabel>;\n\nexport const Agent = z.object({\n  id: AgentId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** On-chain ERC-8004 identity, if the agent is registered. */\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Semantic grouping labels — the targets of policy `appliesTo.labels`. */\n  labels: z\n    .array(AgentLabel)\n    .max(16)\n    .refine((ls) => new Set(ls).size === ls.length, { message: 'labels must be unique' })\n    .default([]),\n  wallets: z.array(AgentWallet).default([]),\n  status: AgentStatus.default('active'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Agent = z.infer<typeof Agent>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * The canonical string form of an ERC-8004 agent identity:\n *\n *     eip155:{chainId}:{identityRegistry}/{tokenId}\n *\n * The part before the `/` is the spec's registry reference verbatim (the\n * `agentRegistry` field of a registration file, CAIP-10 account form); the\n * tokenId is the ERC-721 id the Identity Registry minted (`agentId` in the\n * spec). This exact string is what `Agent.erc8004Id` / `Vendor.erc8004Id`\n * carry, AND the reputation-subject id a registered agent's evidence keys by.\n *\n * Casing is load-bearing: reputation subject keys for agent-kind ids are\n * case-sensitive unless they start with `0x` (see @reinconsole/graph\n * `normalizeSubject`), and an eip155 string does not. `formatErc8004Id`\n * therefore always emits the registry address in lowercase, and consumers must\n * never hand-build the string — parse then re-format to normalize.\n */\n\nexport interface Erc8004Ref {\n  /** EIP-155 chain id (e.g. 8453 Base, 84532 Base Sepolia). */\n  chainId: number;\n  /** Identity Registry contract address, lowercase 0x-hex. */\n  registry: string;\n  /** ERC-721 tokenId — the spec's `agentId`. bigint: token ids exceed 2^53. */\n  tokenId: bigint;\n}\n\nconst REGISTRY_PATTERN = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\nconst ID_PATTERN = /^eip155:(\\d+):(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})\\/(\\d+)$/;\n\n/** Build the canonical id string. Throws on a malformed ref (programmer error). */\nexport function formatErc8004Id(ref: Erc8004Ref): string {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ref.chainId) || ref.chainId < 1) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad chainId ${ref.chainId}`);\n  }\n  if (!REGISTRY_PATTERN.test(ref.registry)) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad registry address ${ref.registry}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof ref.tokenId !== 'bigint' || ref.tokenId < 0n) {\n    // The typeof guard matters for plain-JS callers: 1.5 < 0n is legal JS and\n    // false, and would mint the unparseable \"…/1.5\".\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad tokenId ${ref.tokenId}`);\n  }\n  return `eip155:${ref.chainId}:${ref.registry.toLowerCase()}/${ref.tokenId}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a canonical (or hand-written) id string. Accepts any address casing\n * and returns a lowercase ref, or undefined when malformed — so\n * `formatErc8004Id(parseErc8004Id(x)!)` is the normalization step.\n */\nexport function parseErc8004Id(value: string): Erc8004Ref | undefined {\n  const match = ID_PATTERN.exec(value);\n  if (!match) return undefined;\n  const chainId = Number(match[1]);\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(chainId) || chainId < 1) return undefined;\n  return {\n    chainId,\n    registry: match[2]!.toLowerCase(),\n    tokenId: BigInt(match[3]!),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Strict boundary schema for the id string (the fields themselves stay free-form). */\nexport const Erc8004Id = z\n  .string()\n  .refine((value) => parseErc8004Id(value) !== undefined, {\n    message: 'expected \"eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}\"',\n  });\nexport type Erc8004Id = z.infer<typeof Erc8004Id>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\nexport const Vendor = z.object({\n  host: z.string().min(1),\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vendor = z.infer<typeof Vendor>;\n\n/**\n * The observability gold: links every micro-payment back to the task and run\n * that caused it, so finance teams can answer \"what was this spend for?\".\n */\nexport const TaskContext = z.object({\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  parentRunId: z.string().optional(),\n  purpose: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\nexport type TaskContext = z.infer<typeof TaskContext>;\n\n/**\n * A request to spend, submitted to the policy engine BEFORE any signature is\n * released. The `nonce` provides replay protection on the signer path.\n */\nexport const PaymentIntent = z.object({\n  id: IntentId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  vendor: Vendor,\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  nonce: z.string().min(1),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type PaymentIntent = z.infer<typeof PaymentIntent>;\n\n/**\n * Reduce an intent's `resource` to its path for policy matching. The value is\n * vendor-declared and shape-varies: the x402 spec puts a full URL in\n * `requirement.resource`, while the guard falls back to the request pathname\n * when the vendor omits it. Policies match on the PATH so authors never need\n * to know which shape a vendor emits; host targeting stays with\n * `vendorHostIn`, which is derived from the real request URL rather than the\n * vendor's own claim. Query strings do not survive the reduction.\n */\nexport function resourcePathOf(resource: string): string {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(resource);\n    if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') return url.pathname;\n  } catch {\n    // Not a URL — already a bare path.\n  }\n  return resource;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\n\nexport const DecisionOutcome = z.enum(['allow', 'deny', 'escalate']);\nexport type DecisionOutcome = z.infer<typeof DecisionOutcome>;\n\n/**\n * The signed, hash-chained record of a single policy evaluation. Written BEFORE\n * any signature is released. `prevHash` + `hash` form a tamper-evident chain;\n * `signature` is the policy service's signing key over `hash`. The eventual\n * on-chain `txHash` is attached later by the indexer (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const Decision = z.object({\n  id: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /**\n   * sha256 of the intent's canonical content (see canonical.ts). Binds the\n   * decision to the exact transfer it judged — amount, recipient, asset,\n   * chain — so a signer can verify an {intent, decision} pair offline as a\n   * self-contained spend voucher, not just a reference by id.\n   */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** Ids of the rules that fired, for explainability. */\n  matchedRules: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  /** Human-readable explanation surfaced in the dashboard. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  policyVersion: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of the previous decision in the chain (tamper-evident log). */\n  prevHash: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of this decision's canonical content. */\n  hash: z.string(),\n  /** Service signing-key signature over `hash`. */\n  signature: z.string(),\n  latencyMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  decidedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Decision = z.infer<typeof Decision>;\n\n/**\n * A decision as `GET /v1/decisions` serves it (0.3.0): the signed record plus\n * `agentId`, the agent whose intent it judged.\n *\n * `agentId` is an ENVELOPE field -- the engine's own attribution, outside\n * `hash` and `signature`, so a verified chain vouches for nothing about it.\n * Putting it inside would have changed the hash of every future decision and\n * split the chain into two formats. It is here for a reconciler that is not\n * co-located with the agent: `reconcile()` needs an allowed intent's agent,\n * or agent B's payment against A's intent is credited to A (S74), and before\n * this field only `/v1/reconciliation` carried it -- and erases it the moment\n * a settlement lands. Absent on an unattributed (pre-tenancy) row.\n */\nexport const AttributedDecision = Decision.extend({ agentId: AgentId.optional() });\nexport type AttributedDecision = z.infer<typeof AttributedDecision>;\n","import type { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport type { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\nimport type { ApprovalVerdict } from './approval.js';\n\n/**\n * Canonical byte forms shared by the policy engine (which hashes and signs\n * them) and the signer (which verifies them offline). Field order is fixed,\n * dates are ISO strings, and absent optionals are explicit nulls, so the same\n * parsed object always canonicalizes to the same bytes — including after a\n * JSON round-trip over HTTP.\n *\n * These builders are pure (no node:crypto) so @reinconsole/core stays loadable in a\n * browser; services hash the strings with whatever sha256 they have.\n */\n\n/** Canonical form of an intent — what `Decision.intentHash` commits to. */\nexport function canonicalIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    id: intent.id,\n    agentId: intent.agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: intent.vendor.host,\n      address: intent.vendor.address,\n      erc8004Id: intent.vendor.erc8004Id ?? null,\n    },\n    resource: intent.resource,\n    amount: intent.amount,\n    asset: intent.asset,\n    chain: intent.chain,\n    taskContext: {\n      taskId: intent.taskContext.taskId ?? null,\n      parentRunId: intent.taskContext.parentRunId ?? null,\n      purpose: intent.taskContext.purpose ?? null,\n    },\n    nonce: intent.nonce,\n    createdAt: intent.createdAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The decision fields covered by `Decision.hash` (and thus its signature). */\nexport interface DecisionContent {\n  intentId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome;\n  matchedRules: string[];\n  policyId: string;\n  policyVersion: string;\n  prevHash: string;\n  decidedAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Canonical form of a decision — what `Decision.hash` is computed over. */\nexport function canonicalDecision(d: DecisionContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    intentId: d.intentId,\n    intentHash: d.intentHash,\n    outcome: d.outcome,\n    matchedRules: d.matchedRules,\n    policyId: d.policyId,\n    policyVersion: d.policyVersion,\n    prevHash: d.prevHash,\n    decidedAt: d.decidedAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The fields an approval signature commits to. */\nexport interface ApprovalContent {\n  decisionId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an approval — the exact bytes an approver signs.\n *\n * Three properties are deliberate. The leading `rein` domain tag separates\n * this signature space from the decision log's, so a decision signature can\n * never be replayed as an approval or the reverse. `decisionId` makes each\n * challenge single-use: one escalation, one decision id, one signature that\n * means anything. And `verdict` is INSIDE the signed bytes — without it, a\n * captured approval could be resubmitted as a rejection (or vice versa) by\n * anyone who saw it in flight.\n */\nexport function canonicalApproval(a: ApprovalContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    rein: 'approval/v1',\n    decisionId: a.decisionId,\n    intentHash: a.intentHash,\n    verdict: a.verdict,\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * A session-key grant: the signer tier's unit of delegated authority. The\n * agent process holds only the bearer token — the wallet key never leaves the\n * signer — and the stored record keeps a hash of the token, never the token\n * itself (it is returned exactly once, at creation).\n *\n * Caps here are the signer-side backstop UNDER whatever policy says: a\n * signature is released only when the engine allowed the intent AND the\n * session has room. Amounts are decimal strings in the asset's human units.\n */\nexport const Session = z.object({\n  id: SessionId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** sha256 hex of the bearer token. */\n  tokenHash: z.string(),\n  /** Cumulative ceiling across the session's lifetime. Absent = uncapped. */\n  capAmount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Ceiling per individual signature. Absent = uncapped. */\n  maxPerPayment: DecimalString.optional(),\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type Session = z.infer<typeof Session>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * On-chain confirmation of a settled payment, reconciled by the indexer against\n * the originating intent (amount + recipient + nonce, or facilitator webhook).\n */\nexport const SettledPayment = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  txHash: z.string(),\n  chain: Chain,\n  blockNumber: z.coerce.bigint(),\n  facilitator: z.string().optional(),\n  feePaid: DecimalString.optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettledPayment = z.infer<typeof SettledPayment>;\n\n/**\n * A report that an allowed intent's payment actually landed — the settlement\n * half of reconciliation (\"allowed but never settled\", B1).\n *\n * Deliberately looser than {@link SettledPayment}: the on-chain confirmation\n * requires a tx hash and a block, while a REPORT is whatever the observer\n * could see. A vendor's `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` names a transaction but no block;\n * a facilitator webhook may name neither. Demanding the strong shape would\n * mean the weakest observers — the ones a deployment actually has — could\n * report nothing at all, and every allowance would read as a gap.\n *\n * `source` records WHO said so, because the evidence is not all equal: an\n * independent indexer watching the chain is the strong claim, while a guard\n * reporting on its own payment is the agent vouching for itself. Nothing here\n * grants authority — a settlement report can only ever CLOSE a gap in the\n * reconciliation report, never authorize a payment or alter a decision.\n */\nexport const SettlementReport = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** The settling transaction, when the observer saw one. */\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  chain: Chain.optional(),\n  /** The amount as SETTLED, when known — may differ from the amount allowed. */\n  amount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Free-form observer tag, e.g. \"indexer\", \"guard\", \"facilitator\". */\n  source: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettlementReport = z.infer<typeof SettlementReport>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReceiptId, IntentId, DecisionId, AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { TaskContext } from './intent.js';\nimport { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\n\n/**\n * What the SDK reports back after settlement: the `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` header\n * a vendor returns once payment clears. Mock facilitators fill this in v0.1;\n * the indexer reconciles it against on-chain truth later (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const ReceiptSettlement = z.object({\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  networkId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Raw header payload, kept for forensics until the indexer confirms. */\n  raw: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReceiptSettlement = z.infer<typeof ReceiptSettlement>;\n\n/**\n * The SDK-side record of one guarded payment attempt: which request triggered\n * it, what the engine decided, and (if allowed and paid) how it settled.\n * Receipts are the observability primitive — every 402 the guard touches\n * produces exactly one, whether the payment was allowed or blocked.\n */\nexport const Receipt = z.object({\n  id: ReceiptId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** The URL the agent actually fetched (the paywalled resource). */\n  url: z.string(),\n  method: z.string().default('GET'),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  /** Human-readable explanation copied from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Present only once a payment was made and the vendor confirmed it. */\n  settlement: ReceiptSettlement.optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Receipt = z.infer<typeof Receipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { GateReceiptId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * The vendor-side twin of `Receipt`: one settled x402 payment as the GATE saw\n * it — who paid, for which priced route, and the settlement transaction. The\n * agent-side Receipt records what an agent tried to spend; a GateReceipt\n * records what a vendor actually earned.\n */\nexport const GateReceipt = z.object({\n  id: GateReceiptId,\n  at: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** The route pattern that priced this request, e.g. \"/api/reports/*\". */\n  route: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The concrete resource paid for (URL path actually requested). */\n  resource: z.string().min(1),\n  method: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The paying wallet address, as asserted by the settled payment. */\n  payer: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.05\". */\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  /** The same amount in the asset's atomic units, e.g. \"50000\". */\n  amountAtomic: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  /** Token symbol or contract address, exactly as quoted in the requirement. */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  network: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Settlement transaction hash (mock ledger or on-chain). */\n  transaction: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type GateReceipt = z.infer<typeof GateReceipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/** A rolling-window spec, e.g. \"24h\", \"1h\", \"30m\", \"7d\". */\nexport const Window = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+[smhd]$/, 'window must be like \"30s\", \"15m\", \"1h\", or \"7d\"');\nexport type Window = z.infer<typeof Window>;\n\n/** A relative multiplier, e.g. \"3x\" (used for price-sanity checks). */\nexport const Multiplier = z.string().regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?x$/, 'multiplier must be like \"3x\"');\nexport type Multiplier = z.infer<typeof Multiplier>;\n\n/**\n * The set of predicates a rule can test. Multiple predicates in one condition\n * are ANDed together. Each maps to an evaluator in the policy engine.\n */\nexport const Condition = z\n  .object({\n    /** Per-transaction amount exceeds this value. */\n    amountGt: DecimalString.optional(),\n    /** Sum of spend in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    rollingSum: z.object({ window: Window, gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** Transaction count in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    txCount: z.object({ window: Window, gt: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).optional(),\n    /** Vendor host matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs). */\n    vendorHostIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Resource PATH matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g.\n     * \"/v1/reports/*\"). A full-URL resource is reduced to its pathname before\n     * matching (see `resourcePathOf`), so the same pattern works whether the\n     * vendor declares \"https://api.x.com/v1/answer\" or \"/v1/answer\". Pair\n     * with `vendorHostIn` to scope a path rule to specific vendors.\n     */\n    resourceIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /** First time Rein has seen this vendor for the agent. */\n    vendorFirstSeen: z.boolean().optional(),\n    /** Vendor reputation score is below this threshold (Phase 3 hook). */\n    vendorReputationLt: z.number().min(0).max(100).optional(),\n    /** Amount is more than `gt`-times the observed median for this resource. */\n    amountVsResourceMedian: z.object({ gt: Multiplier }).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Cumulative spend attributed to THIS intent's `taskContext.taskId`\n     * (prior spend on the task plus this payment) exceeds `gt`. Scopes a\n     * budget to one unit of work rather than to a window: a research run that\n     * is meant to cost a dollar cannot quietly cost fifty, however slowly.\n     *\n     * An intent carrying no `taskId` cannot be attributed to a task, so the\n     * predicate never triggers for one. Requiring attribution is a separate,\n     * deliberate rule (deny on `taskIdMissing`), not a side effect of setting\n     * a budget — otherwise every untagged probe payment would trip every\n     * task budget in the policy.\n     */\n    taskBudget: z.object({ gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** The intent carries no `taskContext.taskId` (or an empty one). */\n    taskIdMissing: z.boolean().optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((c) => Object.values(c).some((v) => v !== undefined), {\n    message: 'a condition must specify at least one predicate',\n  });\nexport type Condition = z.infer<typeof Condition>;\n\n/**\n * A behavioral circuit breaker: one primitive with three tripwires — a window\n * (rate), a transaction count, and a value cap — measured over the agent's\n * own recent activity.\n *\n * A breaker is not a rule. Rules ask about the intent in front of them; a\n * breaker asks whether the agent's BEHAVIOR has left the envelope it was\n * given, and once it has, every subsequent intent ESCALATES for a signed\n * approval. It never denies on its own: an agent that trips a breaker in the\n * middle of a job must be able to be waved through by a human, because a\n * silent deny at the wrong moment strands the work with no path forward and\n * no one told (the failure mode Flash's exit paths taught).\n *\n * Reset happens two ways, and they are one mechanism: the window rolling\n * forward, or a signed approval, which moves the breaker's counting floor to\n * now. Nothing \"un-trips\" a breaker by decree — the activity simply stops\n * being inside the measured span.\n *\n * Targeting is the policy's job: `appliesTo.agents` / `appliesTo.labels`\n * decide WHICH agents carry the breaker. COUNTING is always per agent — a\n * breaker pooled across every agent sharing a label needs a cross-agent\n * aggregate the per-agent spend context cannot express, and is deferred.\n */\nexport const Breaker = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    /** The trailing span the tripwires measure over. */\n    window: Window,\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window would hold MORE than this many transactions.\n     * `10` permits ten in the window and escalates the eleventh.\n     */\n    txCount: z.number().int().positive().optional(),\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window's spend would exceed this total. `\"50.00\"` permits\n     * a window totalling exactly 50.00 and escalates the payment that would\n     * carry it past. Prospective, like every other spend predicate: the\n     * payment that would breach the cap is the one that escalates, rather\n     * than the innocent one after it.\n     */\n    valueCap: DecimalString.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((b) => b.txCount !== undefined || b.valueCap !== undefined, {\n    message: 'a breaker must specify at least one of txCount / valueCap',\n  });\nexport type Breaker = z.infer<typeof Breaker>;\n\n/**\n * A single rule: an id plus exactly one action (allow / deny / escalate) whose\n * value is the condition that triggers it.\n */\nexport const Rule = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    allow: Condition.optional(),\n    deny: Condition.optional(),\n    escalate: Condition.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((r) => [r.allow, r.deny, r.escalate].filter((v) => v !== undefined).length === 1, {\n    message: 'a rule must specify exactly one of allow / deny / escalate',\n  });\nexport type Rule = z.infer<typeof Rule>;\n\nexport const PolicyDefault = z.enum(['allow', 'deny']);\nexport type PolicyDefault = z.infer<typeof PolicyDefault>;\n\nexport const AppliesTo = z.object({\n  /** Agent id patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g. \"agt_research_*\"). */\n  agents: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  /**\n   * Agent label patterns (supports `*` globs) — semantic targeting. Matches\n   * when the agent carries at least one label matching any pattern. Requires\n   * the agent DOCUMENT: an intent from an unregistered agent never matches a\n   * labels-targeted policy (and so fails closed when no other policy applies).\n   */\n  labels: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  chains: z.array(Chain).optional(),\n});\nexport type AppliesTo = z.infer<typeof AppliesTo>;\n\nexport const Escalation = z.object({\n  approvers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  timeoutAction: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  timeoutMin: z.number().int().positive().default(15),\n});\nexport type Escalation = z.infer<typeof Escalation>;\n\n/**\n * A declarative, versioned, immutable-once-active policy. Evaluation order in\n * the engine is: explicit DENY > ESCALATE > ALLOW > `default`.\n */\nexport const Policy = z.object({\n  policyId: z.string().min(1),\n  version: z.string().default('1'),\n  /**\n   * The org this policy governs. ABSENT means GLOBAL — it is considered for\n   * every agent, which is what every policy written before tenancy existed is\n   * and stays.\n   *\n   * This is separate from {@link AppliesTo} on purpose, and it has to be:\n   * `appliesTo: {}` matches every agent, so a tenant's policy carrying the\n   * default targeting would otherwise govern other tenants' agents the moment\n   * it was written. Org scoping is applied BEFORE targeting — a policy whose\n   * `orgId` is not the agent's org is not a candidate at all.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  appliesTo: AppliesTo.default({}),\n  rules: z.array(Rule).default([]),\n  /**\n   * Behavioral breakers evaluated alongside the rules. A tripped breaker\n   * escalates at the same precedence as an `escalate` rule — so an explicit\n   * DENY still wins, and an ALLOW rule cannot wave past a tripped breaker.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(Breaker).default([]),\n  default: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  /** Below this amount, fail-open is permitted during a policy-service outage. */\n  denyFloor: DecimalString.default('0.05'),\n  escalation: Escalation.optional(),\n});\nexport type Policy = z.infer<typeof Policy>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Window } from './policy.js';\n\n/**\n * Dead-man monitoring: the alarm for an agent that stopped (Phase B2).\n *\n * Every other control in Rein answers \"should this payment happen?\". This one\n * answers the question nothing else in the stack asks: an agent that has gone\n * quiet raises no intent, breaks no budget, and trips no breaker — it simply\n * disappears, and a control plane watching only for bad payments will report\n * a perfectly clean month while the work silently stopped being done. (Flash\n * lost four detectors this way, none of which announced anything.)\n *\n * Three rules hold the design honest, and each is the direct mirror of a rule\n * B1 already established:\n *\n * 1. An expectation is DECLARED, never inferred. Most agents are episodic:\n *    they run when there is work. Silence is only evidence for an agent\n *    somebody said should be periodic, so an unwatched agent has no liveness\n *    state at all — the same rule as `taskBudget`, which never fires on an\n *    intent that carries no task id.\n * 2. Silence has an AGE, not a boolean — `late` before `missing` — exactly as\n *    a missing settlement is `in-flight` before it is `unsettled`.\n * 3. The engine never alarms about silence it did not witness. An engine that\n *    was down cannot tell a dead agent from its own outage, so a silence\n *    older than this process reads `unknown` until the process has been up\n *    long enough to certify it. B1 refuses to manufacture gaps out of records\n *    it cannot join; this refuses to manufacture alarms out of downtime.\n *\n * Liveness is observability and carries no authority whatsoever: it cannot\n * deny, escalate, freeze, or alter any decision. A missing agent is news for\n * a human, not an input to policy.\n */\n\n/** How the engine came to know an agent was alive. */\nexport const LivenessSource = z.enum([\n  /** It submitted an intent — ANY outcome, including a denial. */\n  'intent',\n  /** It reported in explicitly, having nothing to buy. */\n  'heartbeat',\n]);\nexport type LivenessSource = z.infer<typeof LivenessSource>;\n\n/** Default slack past the interval before silence becomes an alarm. */\nexport const DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * \"This agent is supposed to check in at least this often.\"\n *\n * `graceMs` is what keeps a jittery-but-healthy agent out of the alert\n * channel: an agent on a 15m cadence that lands at 15m04s is not a dead agent,\n * and an alarm that cries at every wobble is one an operator learns to ignore\n * — which is the failure mode that loses the detector nobody was watching.\n */\nexport const LivenessExpectation = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** Longest silence still considered normal, e.g. '15m'. */\n  interval: Window,\n  /** Extra slack past `interval` before the silence is an alarm. */\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().default(DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS),\n  /**\n   * When watching began. An agent that has NEVER been seen is measured from\n   * here, so a watch on an agent that never starts does raise an alarm — a\n   * detector that never came up is exactly as dead as one that stopped.\n   */\n  since: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** What this agent is supposed to be doing, shown beside the alarm. */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessExpectation = z.infer<typeof LivenessExpectation>;\n\n/** The registration payload; the engine stamps `since`. */\nexport const LivenessWatchInput = LivenessExpectation.omit({ since: true }).extend({\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessWatchInput = z.input<typeof LivenessWatchInput>;\n\n/**\n * An out-of-band \"I am alive\" from an agent with nothing to buy.\n *\n * The engine sees every intent, so a spending agent needs no heartbeat at all.\n * This exists for the agent that is working and simply not paying for\n * anything — without it, a dead-man alarm is really a no-spend alarm, and it\n * would page a human every time an agent had a quiet afternoon.\n *\n * It authorizes nothing. The only thing a heartbeat can change is a row in the\n * liveness report; it cannot lift a breaker, a budget, or a freeze.\n */\nexport const Heartbeat = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** When the agent was alive. Defaults to arrival time. */\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Free-form note from the reporter, e.g. \"poll cycle 41 ok\". */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type Heartbeat = z.infer<typeof Heartbeat>;\n\n/**\n * Where an agent stands against its expectation.\n *\n * - `alive`   — seen within the interval.\n * - `late`    — past the interval, inside the grace. Not yet news.\n * - `missing` — past both, and this process watched it happen. THE alarm.\n * - `unknown` — past both, but the engine has not been up long enough to have\n *               witnessed the silence. Not an alarm: an engine that restarted\n *               five minutes ago knows nothing about the last three days.\n */\nexport const LivenessStatus = z.enum(['alive', 'late', 'missing', 'unknown']);\nexport type LivenessStatus = z.infer<typeof LivenessStatus>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApproverKeyId, DecisionId, IntentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Asset, Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * Human approval of an escalated payment.\n *\n * The load-bearing rule: an approval is a SIGNATURE over the decision, made by\n * a key registered with the engine. The delivery channel (Telegram, email,\n * whatever) is transport, never authority — anyone who compromises the channel\n * gets to show a human a message, not to release funds. There is deliberately\n * no click-to-approve path.\n */\n\nexport const ApprovalVerdict = z.enum(['approve', 'reject']);\nexport type ApprovalVerdict = z.infer<typeof ApprovalVerdict>;\n\n/**\n * `pending` is the only non-terminal state. `expired` is what a TTL lapse\n * converts to — indistinguishable from `rejected` in effect (both deny), but\n * distinguished in the record so \"nobody answered\" and \"somebody said no\" stay\n * separable in an audit.\n */\nexport const ApprovalStatus = z.enum(['pending', 'approved', 'rejected', 'expired']);\nexport type ApprovalStatus = z.infer<typeof ApprovalStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A key whose signature the engine accepts as an approval. Public half only —\n * the private half lives with the human (a hardware token, a laptop, an\n * offline signer) and must never reach the engine.\n */\nexport const ApproverKey = z.object({\n  id: ApproverKeyId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** ed25519 public key, SPKI PEM — the same encoding as the decision log's. */\n  publicKey: z.string().min(1),\n  algorithm: z.literal('ed25519').default('ed25519'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApproverKey = z.infer<typeof ApproverKey>;\n\n/**\n * A parked escalation: the payment the engine refused to allow on its own\n * authority, held open until a signature arrives or the TTL lapses. Keyed by\n * the escalating decision — one decision, at most one approval request.\n *\n * The payment facts are copied in rather than referenced so the challenge a\n * human sees is self-contained: amount, vendor and resource are exactly what\n * they are being asked to authorize.\n */\nexport const ApprovalRequest = z.object({\n  /** The `escalate` decision this request answers (primary key). */\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** Binds the approval to the exact transfer — the signed bytes commit to it. */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /**\n   * The org the escalating agent belongs to, stamped when the request is\n   * parked. ABSENT means the agent was never registered (or the request\n   * predates tenancy), and such a request is answerable only by an unscoped\n   * operator — there is no org to check an approver against, and guessing one\n   * is how a cross-tenant approval happens.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  /**\n   * Task attribution copied from the intent. Carried so an approved payment\n   * still counts against its `taskBudget` — an escalation that lost its task\n   * id on the way through would make the budget silently under-count exactly\n   * the payments a human had to look at.\n   */\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Why policy escalated, verbatim from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Breaker ids whose trip contributed to this escalation. An approval of\n   * this request resets exactly these — moving their counting floor to the\n   * approval instant — so a human waving one payment through also clears the\n   * behavior that stopped it, rather than being asked again immediately.\n   * Empty when ordinary rules did the escalating.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  status: ApprovalStatus,\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Past this instant the request denies, whatever arrives afterwards. */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  resolvedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Which registered key signed — absent when the TTL lapsed instead. */\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * The follow-up decision appended to the chain when this resolved. That\n   * decision, not this record, is the voucher a signer verifies: the original\n   * `escalate` decision is never rewritten.\n   */\n  finalDecisionId: DecisionId.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalRequest = z.infer<typeof ApprovalRequest>;\n\n/** The two byte-strings an approver may sign for a given request. */\nexport const ApprovalChallenges = z.object({\n  approve: z.string(),\n  reject: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalChallenges = z.infer<typeof ApprovalChallenges>;\n\n/**\n * A signed verdict, submitted to the engine by anyone (the signature is the\n * authority, so the carrier does not matter). `signature` is base64 ed25519\n * over `canonicalApproval({ decisionId, intentHash, verdict })`.\n */\nexport const ApprovalGrant = z.object({\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict,\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId,\n  signature: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ApprovalGrant = z.infer<typeof ApprovalGrant>;\n\n/** Terminal statuses — a request in one of these will never change again. */\nexport function isResolved(status: ApprovalStatus): boolean {\n  return status !== 'pending';\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\nexport const ReputationSubject = z.object({\n  kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']),\n  id: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ReputationSubject = z.infer<typeof ReputationSubject>;\n\nexport const ReputationComponents = z.object({\n  volume: z.number(),\n  longevity: z.number(),\n  disputeRate: z.number(),\n  counterpartyQuality: z.number(),\n  settlementReliability: z.number(),\n});\nexport type ReputationComponents = z.infer<typeof ReputationComponents>;\n\n/**\n * A reputation score for an agent or vendor (Phase 3 — Graph). `confidence` is\n * first-class: a thin-history subject returns LOW confidence rather than a\n * misleadingly high score, so policy can avoid both false trust and unfair\n * freezing.\n */\nexport const ReputationScore = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  score: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  components: ReputationComponents,\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  asOf: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Hash-anchored attestation, optionally published on-chain (ERC-8004). */\n  evidenceUri: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReputationScore = z.infer<typeof ReputationScore>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport { Decision } from './decision.js';\nimport { SettledPayment } from './payment.js';\nimport { GateReceipt } from './gate-receipt.js';\nimport { ApprovalRequest } from './approval.js';\nimport { LivenessExpectation, LivenessSource } from './liveness.js';\n\n/**\n * The canonical event envelope published on the bus (NATS in production).\n * `shadow.spend` is emitted when the indexer sees on-chain spend from a managed\n * wallet with NO corresponding ALLOW decision — the bypass signal that catches\n * SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n * `signature.released` / `signature.refused` are that tier's heartbeat: every\n * time the signer does or does not put a key to work, the bus knows why.\n * `gate.*` is the vendor side of the wire: every quote a Gate issues, every\n * payment it accepts, every payment it turns away.\n * `approval.*` is the human-in-the-loop tier: an escalated intent parked for a\n * signature, and the signed (or lapsed) verdict that closed it.\n * `liveness.*` is the dead-man tier (B2), and the only pair here emitted by\n * something NOT happening: a watched agent that went quiet past its expected\n * interval, and the sighting that ended the silence.\n */\nexport const ReinEvent = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('intent.created'), at: z.coerce.date(), intent: PaymentIntent }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('decision.made'), at: z.coerce.date(), decision: Decision }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('payment.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), payment: SettledPayment }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('shadow.spend'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    txHash: z.string(),\n    chain: Chain,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.released'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    sessionId: SessionId,\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    intentId: IntentId,\n    decisionId: DecisionId,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"decision_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/signer). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    sessionId: SessionId.optional(),\n    agentId: AgentId.optional(),\n    intentId: IntentId.optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.quoted'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    method: z.string(),\n    amount: DecimalString,\n    asset: z.string(),\n    network: z.string(),\n  }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('gate.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), receipt: GateReceipt }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.requested'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.resolved'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n    /** The follow-up allow/deny decision this resolution appended. */\n    decision: Decision,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.missing'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n    /** How long the agent has been silent when the alarm was raised. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    /** Last sighting, absent when the agent was never seen at all. */\n    lastSeenAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.recovered'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    /** How long the silence lasted, measured to this sighting. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    source: LivenessSource,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"payment_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/gate). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    /** Known only when the payment header decoded far enough to name a payer. */\n    payer: z.string().optional(),\n  }),\n]);\nexport type ReinEvent = z.infer<typeof ReinEvent>;\n","import type { ApprovalRequest, Decision, PaymentIntent, Receipt } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/** Base class for everything the SDK throws, so callers can catch broadly. */\nexport class ReinError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = new.target.name;\n  }\n}\n\n/** The policy engine answered with a non-2xx status. */\nexport class EngineError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(\n    readonly status: number,\n    readonly body: unknown,\n    message = `policy engine responded ${status}`,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The engine evaluated the intent and did NOT allow it. The payment was never\n * constructed, so no funds moved. Carries the full evidence trail.\n *\n * When the outcome was `escalate`, `approval` carries the parked request — and\n * its `status` says which kind of block this is: `pending` means a signed\n * verdict could still release it (the guard stopped waiting, or was never\n * asked to), while `rejected`/`expired` are final. An absent `approval` on an\n * escalation means the engine has no approval tier at all: nothing can\n * release it.\n */\nexport class PaymentBlockedError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(\n    readonly intent: PaymentIntent,\n    readonly decision: Decision,\n    readonly receipt: Receipt,\n    readonly approval?: ApprovalRequest,\n  ) {\n    super(\n      `rein blocked payment of ${intent.amount} ${intent.asset} to ${intent.vendor.host}: ` +\n        `${decision.outcome}${decision.reason ? ` (${decision.reason})` : ''}` +\n        (approval ? ` [approval ${approval.status}]` : ''),\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The vendor's 402 was x402-shaped but offered no requirement the guard can\n * govern (unknown scheme/network/asset). The guard fails closed rather than\n * letting an ungoverned payment through.\n */\nexport class UnsupportedRequirementError extends ReinError {\n  constructor(readonly url: string) {\n    super(`no supported x402 payment requirement in 402 from ${url}; failing closed`);\n  }\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  Agent,\n  ApiKey,\n  ApprovalChallenges,\n  ApprovalGrant,\n  ApprovalRequest,\n  ApproverKey,\n  AttributedDecision,\n  Breaker,\n  Decision,\n  LivenessExpectation,\n  LivenessSource,\n  LivenessStatus,\n  PaymentIntent,\n  Policy,\n  SettlementReport,\n  type ApiKeyScope,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { EngineError } from './errors.js';\nimport type { IntentSubmission } from './x402.js';\n\n/** Any fetch-compatible function (global fetch, undici, or a test double). */\nexport type FetchLike = (input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;\n\n/**\n * One breaker's standing for one agent, as the engine reports it. Mirrors the\n * engine's `BreakerState`; declared here so the client validates the wire\n * shape rather than trusting it.\n */\nexport const BreakerState = z.object({\n  breaker: Breaker,\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  txCount: z.number(),\n  sum: z.string(),\n  countingFrom: z.number(),\n  resetAt: z.number().optional(),\n  tripped: z.boolean(),\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type BreakerState = z.infer<typeof BreakerState>;\n\n/**\n * Where one watched agent stands against its expectation (B2). Mirrors the\n * engine's `LivenessState`; note `unknown`, which is not an alarm — it means\n * the engine has not been up long enough to have witnessed the silence, and a\n * caller that treats it as `missing` would page someone about a restart.\n */\nexport const LivenessState = z.object({\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n  lastSeenAt: z.number().optional(),\n  lastSource: LivenessSource.optional(),\n  silentSince: z.number(),\n  silentMs: z.number(),\n  dueAt: z.number(),\n  overdueAt: z.number(),\n  status: LivenessStatus,\n  alertedAt: z.number().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessState = z.infer<typeof LivenessState>;\n\nconst Health = z.object({\n  status: z.string(),\n  publicKey: z.string(),\n  /** \"api-key\" once the engine demands a credential; \"none\" while it does not. */\n  auth: z.string().optional(),\n  approvals: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\n/** What `GET /v1/chain/verify` answers — see {@link EngineClient.verifyChain}. */\nexport const ChainVerdict = z.object({\n  intact: z.boolean(),\n  /** Decisions this key can see — the same number as `chainLength`. */\n  visible: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  verifiedAt: z.string(),\n  /** Index of the first bad link. Unscoped keys only. */\n  brokenAt: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n});\nexport type ChainVerdict = z.infer<typeof ChainVerdict>;\n\nconst EvaluateResponse = z.object({\n  intent: PaymentIntent,\n  decision: Decision,\n  /** Present when an escalation was parked for a signed verdict. */\n  approval: ApprovalRequest.optional(),\n});\nexport type EvaluateResponse = z.infer<typeof EvaluateResponse>;\n\n/** A parked escalation plus the bytes to sign and, once resolved, its decision. */\nconst ApprovalView = z.object({\n  request: ApprovalRequest,\n  challenges: ApprovalChallenges,\n  /** The follow-up allow/deny decision, once the request has resolved. */\n  decision: Decision.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalView = z.infer<typeof ApprovalView>;\n\nconst ResolveResponse = z.object({ request: ApprovalRequest, decision: Decision });\nexport type ResolveResponse = z.infer<typeof ResolveResponse>;\n\n/**\n * One allowance the settlement facts disagree with (B1): nothing settled\n * behind it, or — `overspent` — a settlement for more than it allowed, with\n * the amount that moved in `settledAmount`. Mirrors the engine's shape.\n */\nexport const AllowanceGap = z.object({\n  intentId: z.string(),\n  decisionId: z.string().optional(),\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  host: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: z.string(),\n  settledAmount: z.string().optional(),\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  allowedAt: z.number(),\n  ageMs: z.number(),\n  state: z.enum(['in-flight', 'unsettled', 'overspent']),\n});\nexport type AllowanceGap = z.infer<typeof AllowanceGap>;\n\n/**\n * The reconciliation report. Declared here so the client validates the wire\n * shape rather than trusting it — and note `settlementsSeen`: zero means this\n * engine has never been told about a settlement, so the gaps below say more\n * about the deployment's wiring than about its payments.\n */\nexport const ReconciliationReport = z.object({\n  from: z.number(),\n  to: z.number(),\n  window: z.string(),\n  graceMs: z.number(),\n  allowed: z.number(),\n  allowedValue: z.string(),\n  settled: z.number(),\n  settledValue: z.string(),\n  inFlight: z.number(),\n  inFlightValue: z.string(),\n  unsettled: z.number(),\n  unsettledValue: z.string(),\n  // Optional on the wire so a 0.2.0 engine still validates; absent means the\n  // engine predates the check, not that nothing was overspent.\n  overspent: z.number().optional(),\n  overspentValue: z.string().optional(),\n  unattributed: z.number(),\n  settlementsSeen: z.number(),\n  gaps: z.array(AllowanceGap),\n  truncated: z.boolean(),\n});\nexport type ReconciliationReport = z.infer<typeof ReconciliationReport>;\n\nexport interface ReconciliationQuery {\n  /** Trailing span of allowances to cover, e.g. '24h'. */\n  window?: string;\n  /** How long an allowance may go unsettled before it counts as a gap. */\n  graceMs?: number;\n  limit?: number;\n  agentId?: string;\n}\n\nconst IssuedApiKey = z.object({ key: ApiKey, secret: z.string() });\nexport type IssuedApiKey = z.infer<typeof IssuedApiKey>;\n\nexport interface EngineClientOptions {\n  /** Base URL of the policy engine, e.g. \"http://localhost:8787\". */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * API-key secret, sent as `Authorization: Bearer`. Required by any engine\n   * started with one; omit only for a local engine running without auth.\n   */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** Override the transport (tests, custom agents). Defaults to global fetch. */\n  fetch?: FetchLike;\n}\n\nexport interface AwaitApprovalOptions {\n  /** Give up after this long and return the still-pending view. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** How often to re-read the request. */\n  pollMs?: number;\n  /** Abort the wait early (an agent loop shutting down). */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * Thin typed client for the policy-engine HTTP API. Every response is parsed\n * through the @reinconsole/core schemas, so wire drift fails loudly at the boundary.\n */\nexport class EngineClient {\n  private readonly baseUrl: string;\n  private readonly fetchImpl: FetchLike;\n  private readonly apiKey: string | undefined;\n\n  constructor(options: EngineClientOptions) {\n    this.baseUrl = options.baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n    const f = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n    this.fetchImpl = (input, init) => f(input, init);\n    this.apiKey = options.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  /** The transport half: everything but parsing, so a caller can read headers. */\n  private async send(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<Response> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (body !== undefined) headers['content-type'] = 'application/json';\n    if (this.apiKey) headers['authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.apiKey}`;\n    const res = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n      method,\n      ...(Object.keys(headers).length > 0 ? { headers } : {}),\n      ...(body === undefined ? {} : { body: JSON.stringify(body) }),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      const payload = await res\n        .clone()\n        .json()\n        .catch(() => res.text().catch(() => undefined));\n      throw new EngineError(res.status, payload);\n    }\n    return res;\n  }\n\n  private async request<T>(\n    method: string,\n    path: string,\n    schema: z.ZodType<T, z.ZodTypeDef, unknown>,\n    body?: unknown,\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    const res = await this.send(method, path, body);\n    if (res.status === 204) return schema.parse(undefined);\n    return schema.parse(await res.json());\n  }\n\n  health(): Promise<z.infer<typeof Health>> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/health', Health);\n  }\n\n  registerAgent(input: {\n    orgId: string;\n    name: string;\n    erc8004Id?: string;\n    /** Semantic grouping labels (lowercase slugs) — policy `appliesTo.labels` targets these. */\n    labels?: Agent['labels'];\n    wallets?: Agent['wallets'];\n  }): Promise<Agent> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/agents', Agent, input);\n  }\n\n  listAgents(): Promise<Agent[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/agents', z.array(Agent));\n  }\n\n  freeze(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/freeze`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  unfreeze(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/unfreeze`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Where the agent's behavioral breakers stand. Read-only: nothing here can\n   * trip or clear one — a breaker clears when its window rolls forward or\n   * when a signed approval moves its floor.\n   */\n  breakerStates(agentId: string): Promise<BreakerState[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/breakers`, z.array(BreakerState));\n  }\n\n  addPolicy(policy: z.input<typeof Policy>): Promise<Policy> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/policies', Policy, policy);\n  }\n\n  listPolicies(): Promise<Policy[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/policies', z.array(Policy));\n  }\n\n  /** The hot path: submit an intent, get the normalized intent + signed decision. */\n  evaluate(submission: IntentSubmission): Promise<EvaluateResponse> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/evaluate', EvaluateResponse, submission);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The first page of the decision chain (up to 500, the engine's default).\n   *\n   * On a chain longer than that this is a verifying PREFIX, not the whole log\n   * — `prevHash` links check out, but the newest decisions are not here. Use\n   * {@link decisionsPage} when you need to walk to the head.\n   *\n   * Each record carries `agentId` from a 0.3.0 engine -- unsigned, see\n   * AttributedDecision -- and lacks it from an older one.\n   */\n  decisions(): Promise<AttributedDecision[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/decisions', z.array(AttributedDecision));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One page of the decision chain, plus where the next one starts.\n   *\n   * `nextAfter` is `undefined` at the head of the chain, which is the signal to\n   * stop — not an empty page, which a caller polling a live engine would see\n   * constantly and could not tell from \"caught up\". Feed it back as `after` to\n   * continue; concatenating the pages in order reproduces exactly what the\n   * caller is entitled to see, so `verifyDecisionChain` accepts the result.\n   *\n   * `chainLength` is how many decisions this key can see in total, which for\n   * an org-scoped key is its own rows and not the engine's chain.\n   */\n  async decisionsPage(\n    query: { after?: number; limit?: number } = {},\n  ): Promise<{ decisions: AttributedDecision[]; nextAfter?: number; chainLength: number }> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (query.after !== undefined) params.set('after', String(query.after));\n    if (query.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(query.limit));\n    const qs = params.toString();\n    const res = await this.send('GET', `/v1/decisions${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`);\n    const decisions = z.array(AttributedDecision).parse(await res.json());\n    const next = res.headers.get('rein-next-after');\n    const length = res.headers.get('rein-chain-length');\n    return {\n      decisions,\n      ...(next === null ? {} : { nextAfter: Number(next) }),\n      // An engine older than this header still answers the route; fall back to\n      // what the page itself proves rather than reporting a NaN length.\n      chainLength: length === null ? decisions.length : Number(length),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The engine's own verdict on its WHOLE decision chain.\n   *\n   * An org-scoped key reads a SUBSEQUENCE of one chain from `decisionsPage`,\n   * whose `prevHash` links lead to rows the key cannot see, so running\n   * `verifyDecisionChain` over those pages proves only the links between\n   * visible rows. This is the engine verifying every link, including the ones\n   * between other tenants' rows, and answering `intact` without showing them.\n   * Needs a 0.6.0 engine; an older one answers 404.\n   */\n  verifyChain(): Promise<ChainVerdict> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/chain/verify', ChainVerdict);\n  }\n\n  // --- Reconciliation (B1) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Tell the engine an allowed payment landed. The engine watches no chain, so\n   * this is how a gap gets closed — by the guard that paid, an indexer, or a\n   * facilitator webhook. It authorizes nothing: the only thing a settlement\n   * report can change is a line in the reconciliation report.\n   */\n  reportSettlement(input: z.input<typeof SettlementReport>): Promise<SettlementReport> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/settlements', SettlementReport, SettlementReport.parse(input));\n  }\n\n  /** Which allowances in the window have no settlement behind them. */\n  reconciliation(query: ReconciliationQuery = {}): Promise<ReconciliationReport> {\n    const params = new URLSearchParams();\n    if (query.window !== undefined) params.set('window', query.window);\n    if (query.graceMs !== undefined) params.set('graceMs', String(query.graceMs));\n    if (query.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(query.limit));\n    if (query.agentId !== undefined) params.set('agentId', query.agentId);\n    const qs = params.toString();\n    return this.request(\n      'GET',\n      `/v1/reconciliation${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`,\n      ReconciliationReport,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // --- Dead-man monitoring (B2) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Expect this agent to be active at least every `interval`. Watching is\n   * declared, never inferred: an agent nobody watches has no liveness state,\n   * because silence is only evidence about an agent somebody said should be\n   * periodic.\n   */\n  watchLiveness(\n    agentId: string,\n    expectation: { interval: string; graceMs?: number; note?: string },\n  ): Promise<LivenessExpectation> {\n    return this.request('PUT', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/liveness`, LivenessExpectation, expectation);\n  }\n\n  unwatchLiveness(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n    return this.request('DELETE', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/liveness`, z.void());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * \"I am alive, I just have nothing to buy.\"\n   *\n   * Only needed by an agent that goes quiet on purpose — every intent is\n   * already a sighting, whatever the engine decided about it. It authorizes\n   * nothing: the only thing it can change is a row in the liveness report.\n   */\n  heartbeat(agentId: string, input: { at?: Date; note?: string } = {}): Promise<LivenessState> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/agents/${agentId}/heartbeat`, LivenessState, {\n      ...(input.at ? { at: input.at.toISOString() } : {}),\n      ...(input.note ? { note: input.note } : {}),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Where every watched agent stands. Worst first. */\n  liveness(): Promise<LivenessState[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/liveness', z.array(LivenessState));\n  }\n\n  // --- API keys (admin scope) ---\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a key. The secret in the response is the only copy that will exist.\n   *\n   * `orgId` confines the new key to one tenant and `agentIds` narrows it\n   * further to named agents — what an agent runtime should carry, so a stolen\n   * key spends one agent's budget rather than the whole org's. Omitting both\n   * mints an unscoped operator key, which is what a single-tenant self-hosted\n   * engine wants and has always had. A caller that is itself org-scoped has\n   * its own org applied regardless of what it asks for here.\n   */\n  issueApiKey(input: {\n    name: string;\n    scopes: ApiKeyScope[];\n    orgId?: string;\n    agentIds?: string[];\n  }): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/keys', IssuedApiKey, input);\n  }\n\n  listApiKeys(): Promise<ApiKey[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/keys', z.array(ApiKey));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a replacement secret. The outgoing one keeps working for `graceMs`\n   * (engine default: 1h) so callers can be redeployed one at a time; pass 0\n   * when the old secret is compromised and must die now.\n   */\n  rotateApiKey(keyId: string, options: { graceMs?: number } = {}): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/keys/${keyId}/rotate`, IssuedApiKey, options);\n  }\n\n  revokeApiKey(keyId: string): Promise<ApiKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/keys/${keyId}/revoke`, ApiKey);\n  }\n\n  // --- Approvals ---\n\n  /** Register the PUBLIC half of an approver key. The private half never travels. */\n  registerApprover(input: { orgId: string; name: string; publicKey: string }): Promise<ApproverKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', '/v1/approvers', ApproverKey, input);\n  }\n\n  listApprovers(): Promise<ApproverKey[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/approvers', z.array(ApproverKey));\n  }\n\n  revokeApprover(keyId: string): Promise<ApproverKey> {\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/approvers/${keyId}/revoke`, ApproverKey);\n  }\n\n  /** Every escalation still answerable right now. */\n  pendingApprovals(): Promise<ApprovalRequest[]> {\n    return this.request('GET', '/v1/approvals', z.array(ApprovalRequest));\n  }\n\n  /** One escalation, with the exact bytes to sign for each verdict. */\n  approval(decisionId: string): Promise<ApprovalView> {\n    return this.request('GET', `/v1/approvals/${decisionId}`, ApprovalView);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Submit a signed verdict. The signature is the authority — this call can be\n   * made by anyone, from anywhere, including a relay that never sees a key.\n   */\n  resolveApproval(grant: ApprovalGrant): Promise<ResolveResponse> {\n    const { decisionId, ...body } = ApprovalGrant.parse(grant);\n    return this.request('POST', `/v1/approvals/${decisionId}/resolve`, ResolveResponse, body);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Poll until an escalation resolves, times out, or the caller aborts. The\n   * returned view is whatever was true when polling stopped — a caller must\n   * check `request.status` rather than assume it resolved.\n   */\n  async awaitApproval(\n    decisionId: string,\n    options: AwaitApprovalOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<ApprovalView> {\n    const pollMs = options.pollMs ?? 1_000;\n    const deadline = Date.now() + (options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);\n    for (;;) {\n      const view = await this.approval(decisionId);\n      if (view.request.status !== 'pending') return view;\n      if (options.signal?.aborted || Date.now() + pollMs > deadline) return view;\n      await sleep(pollMs, options.signal);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    const timer = setTimeout(done, ms);\n    function done(): void {\n      clearTimeout(timer);\n      signal?.removeEventListener('abort', done);\n      resolve();\n    }\n    signal?.addEventListener('abort', done, { once: true });\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain, Asset, type TaskContext, type Vendor } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/**\n * x402 wire shapes (spec v1), mock-first: these schemas are what Rein's mock\n * facilitator and tests speak today, and they track the published x402 spec so\n * real vendors parse identically when the live integration lands.\n */\n\n/** One way to pay, as offered inside a 402 response body. */\nexport const PaymentRequirement = z.object({\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  /** Amount in the asset's atomic units (e.g. \"10000\" = 0.01 USDC at 6 decimals). */\n  maxAmountRequired: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  resource: z.string().optional(),\n  description: z.string().optional(),\n  mimeType: z.string().optional(),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  maxTimeoutSeconds: z.number().optional(),\n  /** Token contract address — or, mock-first, a plain symbol like \"USDC\". */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  extra: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequirement = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequirement>;\n\n/** The full 402 body a paywalled vendor returns. */\nexport const PaymentRequired = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.number(),\n  accepts: z.array(PaymentRequirement).min(1),\n  error: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequired = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequired>;\n\n/**\n * x402 network ids → the chains Rein governs. Testnets map to their mainnet.\n * Both v1 names (\"base-sepolia\") and v2 CAIP-2 ids (\"eip155:84532\") appear in\n * the wild, so the guard accepts either.\n */\nconst NETWORK_TO_CHAIN: Record<string, Chain> = {\n  base: 'base',\n  'base-sepolia': 'base',\n  'eip155:8453': 'base',\n  'eip155:84532': 'base',\n  solana: 'solana',\n  'solana-devnet': 'solana',\n  polygon: 'polygon',\n  'polygon-amoy': 'polygon',\n  bnb: 'bnb',\n  bsc: 'bnb',\n};\n\n/** Canonical stablecoin contract addresses (EVM keys lowercased). */\n/**\n * Decimals per asset, from the token contracts -- NOT from the counterparty.\n *\n * `extra.decimals` arrives inside the vendor's own 402 challenge, and it used\n * to be what converted `maxAmountRequired` into the human amount policy is\n * evaluated against. The payer signs the RAW atomic value, so the vendor owned\n * the ratio between the number Rein judged and the number the wallet\n * authorized: quote 500000000 with `decimals: 12` and a 500 USDC charge is\n * evaluated as 0.0005, passes every cap and budget, and settles for 500.\n * Circle's USDC is 6 everywhere it is deployed; USDT and EURC are 6 on Base.\n */\nconst ASSET_DECIMALS: Record<Asset, number> = { USDC: 6, USDT: 6, EURC: 6 };\n\n/** An EVM token address: only the address tables may name one. */\nconst EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\n\nconst KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES: Record<string, Asset> = {\n  '0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913': 'USDC', // USDC on Base\n  '0x036cbd53842c5426634e7929541ec2318f3dcf7e': 'USDC', // USDC on Base Sepolia\n  EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v: 'USDC', // USDC on Solana\n};\n\n/**\n * Known v1 network names → CAIP-2. EVM entries are chain-id math; the Solana\n * ids are what the live facilitator advertises. Unknown names pass through\n * lowercased, so two spellings of an UNKNOWN network still compare equal.\n */\nconst CAIP2_ALIASES: Record<string, string> = {\n  base: 'eip155:8453',\n  'base-sepolia': 'eip155:84532',\n  polygon: 'eip155:137',\n  'polygon-amoy': 'eip155:80002',\n  bnb: 'eip155:56',\n  bsc: 'eip155:56',\n  solana: 'solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp',\n  'solana-devnet': 'solana:EtWTRABZaYq6iMfeYKouRu166VU2xqa1',\n};\n\n/** The CAIP-2 id for a network name, or the lowercased name when unknown. */\nexport function caip2Of(network: string): string {\n  const key = network.toLowerCase();\n  return CAIP2_ALIASES[key] ?? key;\n}\n\n/** Do two network ids name the same chain, across the v1/CAIP-2 divide? */\nexport function sameNetwork(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return caip2Of(a) === caip2Of(b);\n}\n\nexport function networkToChain(network: string): Chain | undefined {\n  return NETWORK_TO_CHAIN[network.toLowerCase()];\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a requirement's asset to a symbol Rein knows. Tries, in order: the\n * asset field as a literal symbol (mock-first), `extra.symbol`, then known\n * contract addresses (exact case for Solana, lowercased for EVM), then any\n * caller-supplied address map.\n */\nexport function resolveAsset(\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  extraAddresses: Record<string, Asset> = {},\n): Asset | undefined {\n  const direct = Asset.safeParse(requirement.asset.toUpperCase());\n  if (direct.success) return direct.data;\n\n  const known =\n    extraAddresses[requirement.asset] ??\n    extraAddresses[requirement.asset.toLowerCase()] ??\n    KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES[requirement.asset] ??\n    KNOWN_ASSET_ADDRESSES[requirement.asset.toLowerCase()];\n  if (known) return known;\n\n  // `extra.symbol` is the counterparty's word for its own token, and it is\n  // consulted LAST and never for an address. It used to come first, so any\n  // EIP-3009 token could present itself as `USDC`: the engine evaluated the\n  // agent's USDC caps and budgets, and the payer then signed a\n  // TransferWithAuthorization against the attacker's chosen contract, spending\n  // a balance no USDC policy was ever written about.\n  if (EVM_ADDRESS.test(requirement.asset)) return undefined;\n  const symbol = requirement.extra?.['symbol'];\n  if (typeof symbol === 'string') {\n    const fromExtra = Asset.safeParse(symbol.toUpperCase());\n    if (fromExtra.success) return fromExtra.data;\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert an atomic-unit amount to a normalized decimal string without floats,\n * e.g. (\"10000\", 6) -> \"0.01\". Stablecoins Rein supports all use 6 decimals;\n * a requirement can override via `extra.decimals`.\n */\nexport function atomicToDecimal(atomic: string, decimals: number): string {\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(atomic)) throw new TypeError(`invalid atomic amount: ${atomic}`);\n  if (decimals === 0) return atomic.replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n  const digits = atomic.padStart(decimals + 1, '0');\n  const intPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - decimals).replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n  const fracPart = digits.slice(digits.length - decimals).replace(/0+$/, '');\n  return fracPart.length > 0 ? `${intPart}.${fracPart}` : intPart;\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse of {@link atomicToDecimal}: a human-unit decimal string to atomic\n * units without floats, e.g. (\"0.05\", 6) -> \"50000\". Throws if the value has\n * more fraction digits than the asset carries (sub-atomic precision is a\n * pricing bug, not something to round silently).\n */\nexport function decimalToAtomic(decimal: string, decimals: number): string {\n  if (!/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/.test(decimal)) throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal amount: ${decimal}`);\n  const dot = decimal.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? decimal : decimal.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? '' : decimal.slice(dot + 1);\n  if (fracPart.length > decimals) {\n    throw new TypeError(`amount ${decimal} has more than ${decimals} fraction digits`);\n  }\n  const atomic = intPart + fracPart.padEnd(decimals, '0');\n  return atomic.replace(/^0+(?=\\d)/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * The decimals to read `maxAmountRequired` with.\n *\n * Pass the RESOLVED asset and the answer comes from `ASSET_DECIMALS` -- the\n * token's own precision, which the counterparty does not get a vote on. The\n * no-asset form is the legacy one and still honours `extra.decimals`; it must\n * not be used on any path that leads to a signature.\n */\nexport function requirementDecimals(requirement: PaymentRequirement, asset?: Asset): number {\n  if (asset) return ASSET_DECIMALS[asset];\n  const decimals = requirement.extra?.['decimals'];\n  return typeof decimals === 'number' && Number.isInteger(decimals) && decimals >= 0 ? decimals : 6;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the vendor's stated precision match the token's? A disagreement is not\n * an error to correct silently -- it is an offer whose amount we cannot agree\n * on, which makes it ungovernable, so `selectRequirement` skips it.\n */\nexport function decimalsAgree(requirement: PaymentRequirement, asset: Asset): boolean {\n  const stated = requirement.extra?.['decimals'];\n  if (stated === undefined) return true;\n  return stated === ASSET_DECIMALS[asset];\n}\n\n/** A requirement the guard fully understood, mapped into Rein's domain. */\nexport interface ResolvedRequirement {\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement;\n  chain: Chain;\n  asset: Asset;\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.01\". */\n  amount: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pick the first offer the guard can govern: scheme `exact`, a network that\n * maps to a supported chain, an allowed network, and a resolvable asset.\n * Returns undefined when no offer qualifies — callers must treat that as\n * fail-closed.\n *\n * `networks` is the testnet/mainnet boundary, and it has to live HERE rather\n * than downstream of evaluate. `networkToChain` folds a testnet onto its\n * mainnet — `base-sepolia` and `base` both become `'base'` — because policy\n * is written about chains, not deployments. That is right for policy and\n * useless as a safety rail: the engine cannot tell a Sepolia offer from a\n * mainnet one, so a testnet agent handed a mainnet 402 would be allowed by\n * every policy it has and would then sign for real money. Filtering before\n * selection is what makes a network allow-list mean anything.\n */\nexport function selectRequirement(\n  accepts: readonly PaymentRequirement[],\n  extraAddresses: Record<string, Asset> = {},\n  networks?: readonly string[],\n): ResolvedRequirement | undefined {\n  const allowed = networks?.map(caip2Of);\n  for (const requirement of accepts) {\n    if (requirement.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact') continue;\n    const chain = networkToChain(requirement.network);\n    if (!chain) continue;\n    if (allowed && !allowed.includes(caip2Of(requirement.network))) continue;\n    const asset = resolveAsset(requirement, extraAddresses);\n    if (!asset) continue;\n    // Fail closed on a token whose precision the vendor states differently\n    // from the contract: the amount policy would judge and the amount the\n    // wallet would authorize are not the same number.\n    if (!decimalsAgree(requirement, asset)) continue;\n    const amount = atomicToDecimal(\n      requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n      requirementDecimals(requirement, asset),\n    );\n    return { requirement, chain, asset, amount };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** What the guard submits to the policy engine (the `/v1/evaluate` shape). */\nexport interface IntentSubmission {\n  agentId: string;\n  vendor: Vendor;\n  resource: string;\n  amount: string;\n  asset: Asset;\n  chain: Chain;\n  taskContext?: TaskContext;\n}\n\n/** Build the evaluate payload for a resolved offer on a given request URL. */\nexport function toIntentSubmission(\n  resolved: ResolvedRequirement,\n  url: string,\n  agentId: string,\n  taskContext: TaskContext | undefined,\n): IntentSubmission {\n  const parsed = new URL(url);\n  return {\n    agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: parsed.host,\n      address: resolved.requirement.payTo,\n    },\n    resource: resolved.requirement.resource ?? parsed.pathname,\n    amount: resolved.amount,\n    asset: resolved.asset,\n    chain: resolved.chain,\n    taskContext,\n  };\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { caip2Of, PaymentRequirement } from './x402.js';\n\n// caip2Of/sameNetwork LIVE in x402.ts: selectRequirement's network allow-list\n// needs them, and importing them back up from here would close a cycle\n// through this module's zod consts. Re-exported so the v2 dialect still\n// reads as their home.\nexport { caip2Of, sameNetwork } from './x402.js';\n\n/**\n * x402 v2 wire dialect — CAIP-2 network ids, `PAYMENT-REQUIRED` /\n * `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` / `PAYMENT-RESPONSE` headers, base64-JSON payloads.\n * Verified against the published spec (coinbase/x402\n * specs/x402-specification-v2.md + transports-v2/http.md, re-checked 2026-07)\n * and the live facilitator's /supported.\n *\n * Rein's internal requirement shape stays v1 (the zod contract in x402.ts);\n * v2 is a WIRE dialect converted at the edges. Inbound, the guard converts a\n * PAYMENT-REQUIRED quote into internal requirements. Outbound, it REWRAPS the\n * payer's v1 X-PAYMENT envelope into the v2 PaymentPayload: the scheme payload\n * (e.g. the signed EIP-3009 authorization) is byte-identical in both dialects,\n * so every Payer — mock, EIP-3009, session-signer — is v2-capable without\n * knowing v2 exists. The vendor side (@reinconsole/gate) re-exports these\n * helpers rather than owning its own copies.\n */\n\n/** x402 v2 PaymentRequirements (one entry of a 402's `accepts`). */\nexport const PaymentRequirementsV2 = z.object({\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  /** CAIP-2, e.g. \"eip155:84532\". */\n  network: z.string(),\n  /** Atomic units — v2's rename of v1's maxAmountRequired. */\n  amount: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  maxTimeoutSeconds: z.number().optional(),\n  extra: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequirementsV2 = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequirementsV2>;\n\n/** v2 ResourceInfo — resource facts move out of the requirement in v2. */\nexport const ResourceInfoV2 = z.object({\n  url: z.string(),\n  description: z.string().optional(),\n  mimeType: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ResourceInfoV2 = z.infer<typeof ResourceInfoV2>;\n\n/** v2 PaymentRequired — the decoded PAYMENT-REQUIRED header. */\nexport const PaymentRequiredV2 = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(2),\n  error: z.string().optional(),\n  resource: ResourceInfoV2.optional(),\n  accepts: z.array(PaymentRequirementsV2).min(1),\n  extensions: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\nexport type PaymentRequiredV2 = z.infer<typeof PaymentRequiredV2>;\n\n/** Convert Rein's internal (v1-shaped) requirement to the v2 wire shape. */\nexport function v2Requirements(requirement: PaymentRequirement): PaymentRequirementsV2 {\n  return {\n    scheme: requirement.scheme,\n    network: caip2Of(requirement.network),\n    amount: requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n    asset: requirement.asset,\n    payTo: requirement.payTo,\n    ...(requirement.maxTimeoutSeconds !== undefined\n      ? { maxTimeoutSeconds: requirement.maxTimeoutSeconds }\n      : {}),\n    ...(requirement.extra ? { extra: requirement.extra } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse: a v2 offer (plus the 402's shared ResourceInfo) as an internal\n * requirement. The CAIP-2 network id is kept verbatim — networkToChain and\n * chainIdForNetwork resolve both dialects, and sameNetwork compares across\n * them, so nothing downstream needs the v1 spelling back.\n */\nexport function requirementFromV2(\n  offer: PaymentRequirementsV2,\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2,\n): PaymentRequirement {\n  return PaymentRequirement.parse({\n    scheme: offer.scheme,\n    network: offer.network,\n    maxAmountRequired: offer.amount,\n    payTo: offer.payTo,\n    asset: offer.asset,\n    ...(resource !== undefined ? { resource: resource.url } : {}),\n    ...(resource?.description !== undefined ? { description: resource.description } : {}),\n    ...(resource?.mimeType !== undefined ? { mimeType: resource.mimeType } : {}),\n    ...(offer.maxTimeoutSeconds !== undefined\n      ? { maxTimeoutSeconds: offer.maxTimeoutSeconds }\n      : {}),\n    ...(offer.extra ? { extra: offer.extra } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The full v2 PaymentRequired for one quoted requirement. */\n/**\n * Build the v2 PaymentRequired a vendor advertises.\n *\n * `extensions` is the spec's open slot for things that are not payment terms\n * -- discovery metadata, for instance. It stays a plain record here rather\n * than a union of known keys: the gate owns what goes in (see\n * `GateRoute.discovery`), and a codec that validated the payload would have\n * to be revised for every extension anyone ever writes. An empty object is\n * still emitted when there is nothing to say, because the field is not\n * optional on the wire.\n */\nexport function buildPaymentRequiredV2(\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  error: string,\n  extensions: Record<string, unknown> = {},\n): PaymentRequiredV2 {\n  return {\n    x402Version: 2,\n    error,\n    ...(requirement.resource\n      ? {\n          resource: {\n            url: requirement.resource,\n            ...(requirement.description ? { description: requirement.description } : {}),\n            ...(requirement.mimeType ? { mimeType: requirement.mimeType } : {}),\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n    accepts: [v2Requirements(requirement)],\n    extensions,\n  };\n}\n\n/** The one codec every x402 header uses: base64 of compact JSON. */\nexport function encodeBase64Json(value: unknown): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(value)).toString('base64');\n}\n\n/** Base64 JSON → value, or undefined when the header is not decodable. */\nfunction decodeBase64Json(raw: string): unknown {\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header. Lenient by design: a missing,\n * undecodable, or non-v2 header returns undefined so callers fall back to the\n * v1 body — a garbled v2 advertisement must not break a dual-stack 402.\n */\nexport function parsePaymentRequiredHeader(raw: string | null): PaymentRequiredV2 | undefined {\n  if (raw === null) return undefined;\n  const parsed = PaymentRequiredV2.safeParse(decodeBase64Json(raw));\n  return parsed.success ? parsed.data : undefined;\n}\n\n/** The v1 X-PAYMENT envelope, as far as the v2 rewrap needs to see it. */\nconst V1Envelope = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(1),\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payload: z.record(z.unknown()),\n});\n\n/**\n * Rewrap a payer's v1 X-PAYMENT header as a v2 PaymentPayload for the\n * PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. The scheme payload transfers verbatim (what the\n * payer signed is envelope-independent); the chosen requirement rides along\n * as `accepted` per the v2 spec. A header that is already a v2 envelope\n * passes through unchanged. Throws TypeError on anything else — a payer\n * returning an unrecognizable header is a programming error, not wire input.\n */\nexport function wrapPaymentV2(\n  paymentHeader: string,\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2,\n): string {\n  const decoded = decodeBase64Json(paymentHeader);\n  if ((decoded as { x402Version?: unknown } | undefined)?.x402Version === 2) {\n    return paymentHeader;\n  }\n  const v1 = V1Envelope.safeParse(decoded);\n  if (!v1.success) {\n    throw new TypeError(`cannot rewrap payment header as x402 v2: ${v1.error.message}`);\n  }\n  return encodeBase64Json({\n    x402Version: 2,\n    ...(resource !== undefined ? { resource } : {}),\n    accepted: v2Requirements(requirement),\n    payload: v1.data.payload,\n    extensions: {},\n  });\n}\n","import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport {\n  AgentId,\n  Receipt,\n  newId,\n  type ApprovalRequest,\n  type Asset,\n  type Decision,\n  type PaymentIntent,\n  type ReceiptSettlement,\n  type TaskContext,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { EngineClient, type FetchLike } from './client.js';\nimport { PaymentBlockedError, UnsupportedRequirementError } from './errors.js';\nimport {\n  PaymentRequired,\n  selectRequirement,\n  toIntentSubmission,\n  type PaymentRequirement,\n  type ResolvedRequirement,\n} from './x402.js';\nimport {\n  encodeBase64Json,\n  parsePaymentRequiredHeader,\n  requirementFromV2,\n  wrapPaymentV2,\n  type PaymentRequiredV2,\n  type ResourceInfoV2,\n} from './x402v2.js';\n\n/**\n * Builds the `X-PAYMENT` header for an allowed intent. Mock payers and the\n * local EIP-3009 payer ignore the decision; the session-key signer tier\n * requires it — the {intent, decision} pair is the engine-signed voucher the\n * signer verifies before any key is put to work.\n */\nexport type Payer = (\n  requirement: PaymentRequirement,\n  intent: PaymentIntent,\n  decision: Decision,\n) => string | Promise<string>;\n\nexport interface GuardOptions {\n  /** Policy engine base URL, e.g. \"http://localhost:8787\". */\n  engineUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * API-key secret for the engine. Required by any engine started with one;\n   * without it every call comes back 401 as an EngineError.\n   */\n  apiKey?: string;\n  /** The agent this guard speaks for (must be registered with the engine). */\n  agentId: string;\n  /** Base fetch the guard wraps by default (vendor-facing). Defaults to global fetch. */\n  fetch?: FetchLike;\n  /** Transport for talking to the policy engine. Defaults to global fetch. */\n  engineFetch?: FetchLike;\n  /** Task context attached to every intent unless overridden via withTask(). */\n  taskContext?: TaskContext;\n  /**\n   * What a blocked payment looks like to the caller: 'throw' (default) raises\n   * PaymentBlockedError; 'respond' returns a synthetic 402 JSON response, for\n   * agent loops that prefer inspecting responses over catching.\n   */\n  onBlocked?: 'throw' | 'respond';\n  /** If set, the guard settles allowed payments itself (pay + retry). */\n  payer?: Payer;\n  /** Extra token-address -> symbol mappings for asset resolution. */\n  assetAddresses?: Record<string, Asset>;\n  /**\n   * The networks this guard will govern payments on, as x402 ids in either\n   * dialect (`base-sepolia`, `eip155:8453`, ...). A 402 offering only\n   * networks outside the list is treated as an ungovernable paywall and\n   * fails closed, BEFORE the engine is asked.\n   *\n   * Omitted means \"any network the SDK maps to a chain\", which is what every\n   * guard got before profiles. Set it on anything holding a real key: the\n   * engine cannot enforce this boundary for you, because policy is written\n   * about chains and `networkToChain` folds `base-sepolia` into `base` (see\n   * selectRequirement). A testnet agent without this list will happily be\n   * allowed to pay a mainnet 402.\n   */\n  networks?: readonly string[];\n  /** Called once per receipt, as it is recorded. */\n  onReceipt?: (receipt: Receipt) => void;\n  /**\n   * How many receipts `receipts()` keeps, oldest evicted first. Default 1000.\n   * The log is a session convenience; `onReceipt` sees every receipt, capped\n   * or not, and is the path for anything that must not lose one. Without a\n   * cap a long-lived guard -- an MCP server -- grows without bound.\n   */\n  maxReceipts?: number;\n  /**\n   * In advisory mode (no `payer`) an allowed 402 is released upward and its\n   * receipt waits for the payment layer's X-PAYMENT retry to settle it. A\n   * retry that never comes would leave that entry forever; after this many\n   * milliseconds it is forgotten and the receipt stays unsettled -- which\n   * reconciliation, not this log, is there to notice. Default 300 000: the\n   * x402 authorization window, after which the retry could not pay anyway.\n   */\n  pendingTtlMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Tell the engine when a payment settles, so reconciliation can close the\n   * allowance (B1). On by default: without a report from somewhere, every\n   * allowance the engine made reads as a gap, and the one component that sees\n   * both the decision and the vendor's confirmation is this guard.\n   *\n   * Best-effort by construction — the report is fired and forgotten, and a\n   * failed one never touches the payment. Telemetry must not be able to change\n   * a payment's outcome. Set false where an independent indexer reports\n   * instead, which is the stronger evidence: a guard reporting its own\n   * settlement is the spender vouching for itself.\n   */\n  reportSettlement?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * What to do when policy escalates: by default nothing — the payment blocks\n   * immediately, exactly as a deny does, and a human can still approve it out\n   * of band. Set `await: true` and the guard holds the request open while it\n   * waits for a signed verdict, then proceeds on an approval or blocks on a\n   * rejection/expiry. Only ever wait where a stalled request is acceptable.\n   */\n  escalation?: EscalationOptions;\n}\n\nexport interface EscalationOptions {\n  /** Hold the request open until the escalation resolves. Default: false. */\n  await?: boolean;\n  /** Stop waiting after this long, leaving the request pending. Default 5 min. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** How often to re-read the parked request. Default 1s. */\n  pollMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * The Rein guard: wrap an agent's fetch once, and every x402 paywall it hits\n * is policy-checked before any payment exists, with a receipt either way.\n *\n * Layering: the guard wraps the BASE fetch, underneath any x402 payment\n * library. The first (unpaid) request surfaces the 402; the guard evaluates\n * it and either blocks — so the payment layer never sees the paywall — or\n * releases the 402 upward. The payment layer's `X-PAYMENT` retry then flows\n * back through the guard, which attaches the settlement to the receipt.\n * Alternatively, pass a `payer` and the guard completes the payment itself.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIPTS = 1000;\nconst DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS = 300_000;\n\nexport class Guard {\n  readonly client: EngineClient;\n  private readonly options: GuardOptions;\n  private readonly baseFetch: FetchLike;\n  private readonly task = new AsyncLocalStorage<TaskContext>();\n  private readonly log: Receipt[] = [];\n  /** Allowed-but-unsettled receipts awaiting the payment layer's retry, by URL. */\n  private readonly pendingByUrl = new Map<string, Receipt>();\n\n  constructor(options: GuardOptions) {\n    AgentId.parse(options.agentId);\n    this.options = options;\n    const f = options.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch;\n    this.baseFetch = (input, init) => f(input, init);\n    this.client = new EngineClient({\n      baseUrl: options.engineUrl,\n      ...(options.apiKey ? { apiKey: options.apiKey } : {}),\n      ...(options.engineFetch ? { fetch: options.engineFetch } : {}),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** The most recent `maxReceipts` receipts this guard has recorded, oldest first. */\n  receipts(): readonly Receipt[] {\n    return this.log;\n  }\n\n  /** Run `fn` with a task context attached to every intent submitted inside it. */\n  withTask<T>(context: TaskContext, fn: () => T): T {\n    return this.task.run({ ...this.options.taskContext, ...context }, fn);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The one-liner: returns a fetch-compatible function that enforces policy on\n   * every x402 paywall. Wraps the guard's base fetch unless one is passed.\n   */\n  wrap(fetchImpl?: FetchLike): FetchLike {\n    const inner: FetchLike = fetchImpl ? (input, init) => fetchImpl(input, init) : this.baseFetch;\n\n    return async (input, init) => {\n      const url = requestUrl(input);\n      // A request that already carries a payment (either dialect's header) is\n      // the release leg of an intent this guard allowed — pass it through and\n      // capture settlement.\n      if (\n        readHeader(input, init, 'X-PAYMENT') !== null ||\n        readHeader(input, init, 'PAYMENT-SIGNATURE') !== null\n      ) {\n        const res = await inner(input, init);\n        this.settlePending(url, res);\n        return res;\n      }\n\n      const res = await inner(input, init);\n      if (res.status !== 402) return res;\n\n      const paywall = await parse402(res, this.options.assetAddresses, this.options.networks);\n      // Not an x402 paywall — nothing to govern, hand it back untouched.\n      if (!paywall) return res;\n\n      const { resolved, wire, resource } = paywall;\n      if (!resolved) throw new UnsupportedRequirementError(url);\n\n      const taskContext = this.task.getStore() ?? this.options.taskContext;\n      const submission = toIntentSubmission(resolved, url, this.options.agentId, taskContext);\n      const evaluated = await this.client.evaluate(submission);\n      const intent = evaluated.intent;\n      let decision = evaluated.decision;\n      let approval = evaluated.approval;\n\n      // An escalation is a question, not yet an answer. When the caller has\n      // opted into waiting, hold here until a signed verdict lands — the\n      // decision we continue with is then the engine's FOLLOW-UP decision, the\n      // one a signer will accept as a voucher.\n      if (decision.outcome === 'escalate' && approval && this.options.escalation?.await) {\n        const settled = await this.awaitEscalation(approval);\n        approval = settled.request;\n        if (settled.decision) decision = settled.decision;\n      }\n\n      if (decision.outcome !== 'allow') {\n        const receipt = this.record(intent, decision, url, init);\n        if (this.options.onBlocked === 'respond') return blockedResponse(receipt, approval);\n        throw new PaymentBlockedError(intent, decision, receipt, approval);\n      }\n\n      if (!this.options.payer) {\n        // Advisory mode: release the 402 to the payment layer above us; its\n        // X-PAYMENT retry will come back through and settle the receipt.\n        const receipt = this.record(intent, decision, url, init);\n        this.sweepPending();\n        this.pendingByUrl.set(url, receipt);\n        // Only the offer that was actually evaluated. See ParsedPaywall.narrowed.\n        return paywall.narrowed ?? res;\n      }\n\n      // The payer always produces the v1 envelope it knows; on a v2 paywall\n      // the guard rewraps it (same signed payload, v2 PaymentPayload around\n      // it) and pays on the v2 header. Every payer is v2-capable this way.\n      const paymentHeader = await this.options.payer(resolved.requirement, intent, decision);\n      const retry = await inner(\n        input,\n        wire === 2\n          ? withHeader(\n              input,\n              init,\n              'PAYMENT-SIGNATURE',\n              wrapPaymentV2(paymentHeader, resolved.requirement, resource),\n            )\n          : withHeader(input, init, 'X-PAYMENT', paymentHeader),\n      );\n      this.record(intent, decision, url, init, parseSettlement(retry));\n      return retry;\n    };\n  }\n\n  private record(\n    intent: PaymentIntent,\n    decision: Decision,\n    url: string,\n    init: RequestInit | undefined,\n    settlement?: ReceiptSettlement,\n  ): Receipt {\n    const receipt = Receipt.parse({\n      id: newId('rcp'),\n      agentId: intent.agentId,\n      intentId: intent.id,\n      decisionId: decision.id,\n      outcome: decision.outcome,\n      url,\n      method: init?.method ?? 'GET',\n      vendorHost: intent.vendor.host,\n      amount: intent.amount,\n      asset: intent.asset,\n      chain: intent.chain,\n      taskContext: intent.taskContext,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      settlement,\n      createdAt: new Date(),\n    });\n    this.log.push(receipt);\n    const max = this.options.maxReceipts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_RECEIPTS;\n    if (this.log.length > max) this.log.splice(0, this.log.length - max);\n    this.options.onReceipt?.(receipt);\n    if (settlement) this.announceSettlement(receipt);\n    return receipt;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fire-and-forget the settlement fact at the engine. Deliberately silent on\n   * failure: a reconciliation report that never arrives leaves a gap open,\n   * which is the SAFE direction — an operator sees a payment they must check.\n   * Raising here would let telemetry break a payment that already succeeded.\n   *\n   * The amount is not reported: the guard knows what it was asked to pay, not\n   * what the chain moved, and a settlement report should carry only what its\n   * reporter actually observed.\n   */\n  private announceSettlement(receipt: Receipt): void {\n    if (this.options.reportSettlement === false) return;\n    const txHash = receipt.settlement?.txHash;\n    void this.client\n      .reportSettlement({\n        intentId: receipt.intentId,\n        ...(txHash !== undefined ? { txHash } : {}),\n        chain: receipt.chain,\n        source: 'guard',\n        confirmedAt: receipt.createdAt,\n      })\n      .catch(() => undefined);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wait out a parked escalation. Never waits past the request's own TTL:\n   * after that instant the engine can only deny it, so continuing to poll\n   * would just be a slower block.\n   */\n  private async awaitEscalation(request: ApprovalRequest): Promise<ApprovalOutcome> {\n    const options = this.options.escalation ?? {};\n    const untilExpiry = Math.max(0, request.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) + 1_000;\n    const view = await this.client.awaitApproval(request.decisionId, {\n      timeoutMs: Math.min(options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000, untilExpiry),\n      ...(options.pollMs !== undefined ? { pollMs: options.pollMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return { request: view.request, ...(view.decision ? { decision: view.decision } : {}) };\n  }\n\n  /** Drop advisory receipts whose retry window has passed -- see `pendingTtlMs`. */\n  private sweepPending(): void {\n    const cutoff = Date.now() - (this.options.pendingTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS);\n    for (const [url, receipt] of this.pendingByUrl) {\n      if (receipt.createdAt.getTime() < cutoff) this.pendingByUrl.delete(url);\n    }\n  }\n\n  private settlePending(url: string, res: Response): void {\n    this.sweepPending();\n    const receipt = this.pendingByUrl.get(url);\n    if (!receipt || !res.ok) return;\n    const settlement = parseSettlement(res);\n    if (settlement) {\n      receipt.settlement = settlement;\n      this.announceSettlement(receipt);\n    }\n    this.pendingByUrl.delete(url);\n  }\n}\n\n/** How a waited-on escalation came out. */\ninterface ApprovalOutcome {\n  request: ApprovalRequest;\n  /** The follow-up allow/deny decision, absent while still pending. */\n  decision?: Decision;\n}\n\n/** Convenience factory mirroring the docs: `const guard = createGuard({...})`. */\nexport function createGuard(options: GuardOptions): Guard {\n  return new Guard(options);\n}\n\n/** What a 402 offered, in whichever dialect the guard could govern. */\ninterface ParsedPaywall {\n  /** The offer the guard selected, or undefined when none qualifies. */\n  resolved: ResolvedRequirement | undefined;\n  /** Which wire dialect to pay on: 2 = PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, 1 = X-PAYMENT. */\n  wire: 1 | 2;\n  /** The v2 402's shared resource info, echoed into the payment envelope. */\n  resource?: ResourceInfoV2;\n  /**\n   * The same 402 carrying ONLY the offer the guard evaluated.\n   *\n   * In advisory mode the guard does not pay; it hands the 402 back to the\n   * payment layer above, which holds the key. Releasing the vendor's body\n   * verbatim meant that layer chose from the FULL `accepts` list -- including\n   * the offers the network allow-list had just rejected. A hostile 402 that\n   * lists a 0.001 Sepolia offer and a 250 USDC mainnet one gets the cheap one\n   * evaluated and allowed, and the expensive one paid, while the receipt and\n   * the engine record the cheap one. Narrowing the body is what makes the\n   * testnet pin structural rather than advisory.\n   */\n  narrowed?: Response;\n}\n\n/** Rebuild a 402 carrying a single offer, in whichever dialects it used. */\nfunction narrow402(\n  res: Response,\n  body: unknown,\n  v2: PaymentRequiredV2 | undefined,\n  keepV1: PaymentRequirement | undefined,\n  keepV2Index: number | undefined,\n): Response {\n  const headers = new Headers(res.headers);\n  if (v2 && keepV2Index !== undefined) {\n    const offer = v2.accepts[keepV2Index];\n    if (offer) headers.set('PAYMENT-REQUIRED', encodeBase64Json({ ...v2, accepts: [offer] }));\n  }\n  let text: string | undefined;\n  if (keepV1 && body && typeof body === 'object') {\n    text = JSON.stringify({ ...(body as Record<string, unknown>), accepts: [keepV1] });\n    headers.delete('content-length');\n  }\n  return new Response(text ?? res.body, {\n    status: res.status,\n    statusText: res.statusText,\n    headers,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a 402 in both dialects. v2 (the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header) is preferred\n * when it carries an offer the guard can govern; otherwise the v1 body gets\n * its chance — a dual-stack vendor is served on whichever channel works.\n * Returns undefined when neither channel is x402 at all (not a paywall).\n */\nasync function parse402(\n  res: Response,\n  assetAddresses: Record<string, Asset> | undefined,\n  networks: readonly string[] | undefined,\n): Promise<ParsedPaywall | undefined> {\n  const v2 = parsePaymentRequiredHeader(res.headers.get('PAYMENT-REQUIRED'));\n  const body = await res\n    .clone()\n    .json()\n    .catch(() => undefined);\n  const parsed = PaymentRequired.safeParse(body);\n\n  // Which v1 offer (if the body is v1) the guard would govern. Computed even\n  // on the v2 path, because a dual-stack 402 answers both and a v1-only layer\n  // above would otherwise still read the unfiltered body.\n  const v1Resolved = parsed.success\n    ? selectRequirement(parsed.data.accepts, assetAddresses, networks)\n    : undefined;\n\n  if (v2) {\n    const asRequirements = v2.accepts.map((offer) => requirementFromV2(offer, v2.resource));\n    const resolved = selectRequirement(asRequirements, assetAddresses, networks);\n    if (resolved) {\n      const index = asRequirements.indexOf(resolved.requirement);\n      const narrowed = narrow402(res, body, v2, v1Resolved?.requirement, index);\n      return v2.resource !== undefined\n        ? { resolved, wire: 2, resource: v2.resource, narrowed }\n        : { resolved, wire: 2, narrowed };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.success) {\n    return {\n      resolved: v1Resolved,\n      wire: 1,\n      ...(v1Resolved\n        ? { narrowed: narrow402(res, body, v2, v1Resolved.requirement, undefined) }\n        : {}),\n    };\n  }\n  // A v2 header alone still marks this as a paywall — one the guard must\n  // fail closed on if nothing in it was governable.\n  return v2 ? { resolved: undefined, wire: 2 } : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction requestUrl(input: string | URL | Request): string {\n  if (typeof input === 'string') return input;\n  if (input instanceof URL) return input.toString();\n  return input.url;\n}\n\nfunction readHeader(\n  input: string | URL | Request,\n  init: RequestInit | undefined,\n  name: string,\n): string | null {\n  const source = init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined);\n  return source === undefined ? null : new Headers(source).get(name);\n}\n\nfunction withHeader(\n  input: string | URL | Request,\n  init: RequestInit | undefined,\n  name: string,\n  value: string,\n): RequestInit {\n  const headers = new Headers(\n    init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined),\n  );\n  headers.set(name, value);\n  return { ...init, headers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode the vendor's settlement header — `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (v1) or\n * `PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (v2); base64 JSON per the x402 spec, plain JSON\n * tolerated mock-first. Absent or undecodable -> undefined.\n */\nfunction parseSettlement(res: Response): ReceiptSettlement | undefined {\n  const raw = res.headers.get('X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE') ?? res.headers.get('PAYMENT-RESPONSE');\n  if (raw === null) return undefined;\n  let payload: unknown;\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(raw);\n  } catch {\n    try {\n      payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n    } catch {\n      return { raw };\n    }\n  }\n  const record =\n    typeof payload === 'object' && payload !== null ? (payload as Record<string, unknown>) : {};\n  return {\n    // A failed v2 settle carries transaction: \"\" — no tx is no txHash.\n    txHash:\n      typeof record['transaction'] === 'string' && record['transaction'] !== ''\n        ? record['transaction']\n        : undefined,\n    networkId: typeof record['network'] === 'string' ? record['network'] : undefined,\n    raw,\n  };\n}\n\nfunction blockedResponse(receipt: Receipt, approval?: ApprovalRequest): Response {\n  return new Response(\n    JSON.stringify({\n      error: 'payment_blocked_by_rein',\n      outcome: receipt.outcome,\n      reason: receipt.reason,\n      intentId: receipt.intentId,\n      decisionId: receipt.decisionId,\n      receiptId: receipt.id,\n      // `pending` here means a signed verdict could still release this\n      // payment; anything else is final.\n      ...(approval\n        ? {\n            approval: {\n              status: approval.status,\n              decisionId: approval.decisionId,\n              expiresAt: approval.expiresAt.toISOString(),\n            },\n          }\n        : {}),\n    }),\n    {\n      status: 402,\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-rein-outcome': receipt.outcome },\n    },\n  );\n}\n","export type FacilitatorErrorCode =\n  | 'malformed_payment'\n  | 'unsupported_scheme'\n  | 'unsupported_network'\n  | 'unsupported_asset'\n  | 'network_mismatch'\n  | 'amount_mismatch'\n  | 'recipient_mismatch';\n\n/** A payment the facilitator refused to settle, with a machine-readable code. */\nexport class FacilitatorError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    readonly code: FacilitatorErrorCode,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'FacilitatorError';\n  }\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\n\n/**\n * Wire codecs for the two x402 headers the mock rails speak: `X-PAYMENT`\n * (agent -> vendor -> facilitator) and `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` (vendor -> agent).\n * Both are base64-encoded JSON per the x402 spec.\n */\n\n/** The mock `exact` scheme payload carried inside X-PAYMENT. */\nexport const MockExactPayload = z.object({\n  from: z.string().min(1),\n  to: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Atomic-unit amount, mirroring the requirement's maxAmountRequired. */\n  value: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  /**\n   * Rein linkage: the guard's payer stamps the intent id here, the facilitator\n   * memos it onto the ledger entry, and the indexer reconciles exactly. A real\n   * x402 transfer authorization carries a nonce that serves the same role.\n   */\n  intentId: z.string().optional(),\n  nonce: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type MockExactPayload = z.infer<typeof MockExactPayload>;\n\n/** The full X-PAYMENT header body (x402 spec v1 envelope). */\nexport const MockPaymentHeader = z.object({\n  x402Version: z.literal(1),\n  scheme: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payload: MockExactPayload,\n});\nexport type MockPaymentHeader = z.infer<typeof MockPaymentHeader>;\n\n/**\n * The v2 envelope (PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header): scheme/network live inside\n * `accepted` — the requirement the payer chose — around the SAME scheme\n * payload. `.passthrough()` keeps resource/extensions intact.\n */\nexport const MockPaymentHeaderV2 = z\n  .object({\n    x402Version: z.literal(2),\n    accepted: z\n      .object({\n        scheme: z.string(),\n        network: z.string(),\n        amount: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n        asset: z.string().min(1),\n        payTo: z.string().min(1),\n      })\n      .passthrough(),\n    payload: MockExactPayload,\n  })\n  .passthrough();\nexport type MockPaymentHeaderV2 = z.infer<typeof MockPaymentHeaderV2>;\n\n/** A payment as the facilitator sees it, whichever dialect it arrived in. */\nexport interface DecodedPayment {\n  version: 1 | 2;\n  scheme: string;\n  network: string;\n  payload: MockExactPayload;\n}\n\nexport function encodePaymentHeader(header: MockPaymentHeader): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(header)).toString('base64');\n}\n\nexport function decodePaymentHeader(raw: string): DecodedPayment {\n  let json: unknown;\n  try {\n    json = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(raw, 'base64').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    throw new FacilitatorError('malformed_payment', 'X-PAYMENT is not base64-encoded JSON');\n  }\n\n  if ((json as { x402Version?: unknown } | null)?.x402Version === 2) {\n    const parsed = MockPaymentHeaderV2.safeParse(json);\n    if (!parsed.success) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'malformed_payment',\n        `invalid v2 payment envelope: ${parsed.error.message}`,\n      );\n    }\n    // A self-contradictory envelope (accepted terms vs transfer payload) is\n    // malformed on its face — mirroring the gate's inspection.\n    if (parsed.data.payload.value !== parsed.data.accepted.amount) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'malformed_payment',\n        `v2 envelope contradicts itself: accepted.amount ${parsed.data.accepted.amount} vs payload value ${parsed.data.payload.value}`,\n      );\n    }\n    return {\n      version: 2,\n      scheme: parsed.data.accepted.scheme,\n      network: parsed.data.accepted.network,\n      payload: parsed.data.payload,\n    };\n  }\n\n  const parsed = MockPaymentHeader.safeParse(json);\n  if (!parsed.success) {\n    throw new FacilitatorError('malformed_payment', `invalid X-PAYMENT body: ${parsed.error.message}`);\n  }\n  return {\n    version: 1,\n    scheme: parsed.data.scheme,\n    network: parsed.data.network,\n    payload: parsed.data.payload,\n  };\n}\n\n/** What the facilitator returns on settle; the vendor base64s it into X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE. */\nexport const SettlementResponse = z.object({\n  success: z.boolean(),\n  /** The tx hash on the mock ledger (the guard surfaces this on the receipt). */\n  transaction: z.string(),\n  network: z.string(),\n  payer: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type SettlementResponse = z.infer<typeof SettlementResponse>;\n\nexport function encodeSettlementHeader(response: SettlementResponse): string {\n  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(response)).toString('base64');\n}\n","import type { Asset } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport {\n  atomicToDecimal,\n  networkToChain,\n  requirementDecimals,\n  resolveAsset,\n  sameNetwork,\n  type PaymentRequirement,\n  type Payer,\n} from '@reinconsole/sdk';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\nimport { MockLedger, type LedgerEntry } from './ledger.js';\nimport {\n  decodePaymentHeader,\n  encodePaymentHeader,\n  encodeSettlementHeader,\n  type DecodedPayment,\n  type SettlementResponse,\n} from './payload.js';\n\nexport interface MockFacilitatorOptions {\n  ledger: MockLedger;\n  /** Recorded on settled payments (shows up in SettledPayment.facilitator). */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Extra token-address -> symbol mappings, mirroring the guard's option. */\n  assetAddresses?: Record<string, Asset>;\n}\n\nexport interface SettleResult {\n  response: SettlementResponse;\n  /** Ready-made value for the vendor's X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE header. */\n  header: string;\n  /** The transfer as written on the mock chain. */\n  entry: LedgerEntry;\n}\n\n/**\n * The mock x402 facilitator: verifies X-PAYMENT headers and \"settles\" them by\n * writing transfers onto the mock ledger. Plays the role Coinbase's hosted\n * facilitator plays in production — vendors call `settle()`, agents pay via\n * `payerFor()`, and nothing here is Rein-privileged: settlement happens\n * whether or not a policy engine ever saw the payment. Catching the ones it\n * didn't see is the indexer's job.\n */\nexport class MockFacilitator {\n  readonly name: string;\n  private readonly ledger: MockLedger;\n  private readonly assetAddresses: Record<string, Asset>;\n\n  constructor(options: MockFacilitatorOptions) {\n    this.ledger = options.ledger;\n    this.name = options.name ?? 'mock-facilitator';\n    this.assetAddresses = options.assetAddresses ?? {};\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * A `Payer` for the SDK guard: builds the X-PAYMENT header for an allowed\n   * intent, stamping the intent id so settlement reconciles exactly. This is\n   * the plug-in point the real x402 signer replaces.\n   */\n  payerFor(fromAddress: string): Payer {\n    return (requirement, intent) =>\n      encodePaymentHeader({\n        x402Version: 1,\n        scheme: requirement.scheme,\n        network: requirement.network,\n        payload: {\n          from: fromAddress,\n          to: requirement.payTo,\n          value: requirement.maxAmountRequired,\n          asset: requirement.asset,\n          intentId: intent.id,\n          nonce: intent.nonce,\n        },\n      });\n  }\n\n  /** Verify a payment header (either dialect) against the requirement it\n   *  claims to satisfy. */\n  verify(paymentHeader: string, requirement: PaymentRequirement): DecodedPayment {\n    const header = decodePaymentHeader(paymentHeader);\n    if (header.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact' || requirement.scheme.toLowerCase() !== 'exact') {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'unsupported_scheme',\n        `mock facilitator only settles \"exact\", got \"${header.scheme}\"/\"${requirement.scheme}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    // Compared through CAIP-2 normalization: a v2 envelope naming\n    // \"eip155:8453\" satisfies a requirement quoted as v1's \"base\".\n    if (!sameNetwork(header.network, requirement.network)) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'network_mismatch',\n        `payment is on \"${header.network}\" but the requirement wants \"${requirement.network}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!networkToChain(header.network)) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_network', `unknown network \"${header.network}\"`);\n    }\n    if (header.payload.value !== requirement.maxAmountRequired) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'amount_mismatch',\n        `payment of ${header.payload.value} does not match required ${requirement.maxAmountRequired}`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (header.payload.to !== requirement.payTo) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError(\n        'recipient_mismatch',\n        `payment pays \"${header.payload.to}\" but the requirement pays \"${requirement.payTo}\"`,\n      );\n    }\n    return header;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Verify, then settle: write the transfer on the mock chain and return the\n   * settlement response the vendor relays via X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE.\n   */\n  settle(paymentHeader: string, requirement: PaymentRequirement): SettleResult {\n    const header = this.verify(paymentHeader, requirement);\n    const chain = networkToChain(header.network);\n    if (!chain) throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_network', `unknown network \"${header.network}\"`);\n    const asset = resolveAsset(requirement, this.assetAddresses);\n    if (!asset) {\n      throw new FacilitatorError('unsupported_asset', `cannot resolve asset \"${requirement.asset}\"`);\n    }\n    const entry = this.ledger.transfer({\n      chain,\n      asset,\n      from: header.payload.from,\n      to: header.payload.to,\n      amount: atomicToDecimal(header.payload.value, requirementDecimals(requirement)),\n      memo: header.payload.intentId,\n    });\n    const response: SettlementResponse = {\n      success: true,\n      transaction: entry.txHash,\n      network: header.network,\n      payer: header.payload.from,\n    };\n    return { response, header: encodeSettlementHeader(response), entry };\n  }\n}\n","import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';\nimport {\n  ReinEvent,\n  compareDecimal,\n  type Agent,\n  type PaymentIntent,\n  type SettledPayment,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport type { LedgerEntry, MockLedger } from './ledger.js';\n\n/** The slice of the policy engine the indexer subscribes to (NATS in prod). */\nexport interface EngineEvents {\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void;\n}\n\nexport interface MockIndexerOptions {\n  ledger: MockLedger;\n  /**\n   * Directory of managed agents and their wallets (the agents service in\n   * prod). Called per ledger entry, so agents registered later are still seen.\n   */\n  agents: () => readonly Agent[];\n  /** Recorded as SettledPayment.facilitator on reconciled payments. */\n  facilitator?: string;\n}\n\n/** A `shadow.spend` event, extracted for convenience accessors. */\nexport type ShadowSpend = Extract<ReinEvent, { type: 'shadow.spend' }>;\n\n/**\n * The mock indexer: watches the ledger and classifies every transfer that\n * leaves a managed agent wallet.\n *\n * - Matches an allowed, unsettled intent -> `payment.settled` (reconciled).\n * - No ALLOW decision behind it -> `shadow.spend` — the bypass signal that\n *   catches SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n *\n * Reconciliation is memo-first (the facilitator stamps the intent id onto the\n * transfer), with a fallback match on chain+asset+amount+recipient for\n * transfers that arrive without a memo. A memo that does NOT resolve to an\n * allowed unsettled intent (denied, unknown, or already settled — a replay)\n * is never fuzzy-matched: it stays a shadow spend.\n */\nexport class MockIndexer {\n  private readonly options: MockIndexerOptions;\n  private readonly bus = new EventEmitter();\n  private readonly emitted: ReinEvent[] = [];\n  /** Every intent the engine has seen, by id (from `intent.created`). */\n  private readonly intents = new Map<string, PaymentIntent>();\n  /** Intents with an ALLOW decision, by id. */\n  private readonly allowed = new Map<string, PaymentIntent>();\n  private readonly settledIntents = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(options: MockIndexerOptions) {\n    this.options = options;\n    options.ledger.onEntry((entry) => this.observe(entry));\n  }\n\n  /** Subscribe to a policy engine's event stream to learn which intents were allowed. */\n  connectEngine(engine: EngineEvents): void {\n    engine.onEvent((event) => {\n      if (event.type === 'intent.created') {\n        this.intents.set(event.intent.id, event.intent);\n      } else if (event.type === 'decision.made' && event.decision.outcome === 'allow') {\n        const intent = this.intents.get(event.decision.intentId);\n        if (intent) this.allowed.set(intent.id, intent);\n      }\n    });\n  }\n\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void {\n    this.bus.on('event', handler);\n  }\n\n  /** Everything the indexer has emitted, oldest first. */\n  events(): readonly ReinEvent[] {\n    return this.emitted;\n  }\n\n  settledPayments(): SettledPayment[] {\n    return this.emitted.flatMap((e) => (e.type === 'payment.settled' ? [e.payment] : []));\n  }\n\n  shadowSpends(): ShadowSpend[] {\n    return this.emitted.filter((e): e is ShadowSpend => e.type === 'shadow.spend');\n  }\n\n  private emit(event: ReinEvent): void {\n    const parsed = ReinEvent.parse(event);\n    this.emitted.push(parsed);\n    this.bus.emit('event', parsed);\n  }\n\n  private agentFor(entry: LedgerEntry): string | undefined {\n    for (const agent of this.options.agents()) {\n      const owns = agent.wallets.some(\n        (w) => w.chain === entry.chain && sameAddress(w.address, entry.from),\n      );\n      if (owns) return agent.id;\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  private observe(entry: LedgerEntry): void {\n    const agentId = this.agentFor(entry);\n    // Spend from a wallet Rein does not manage is someone else's problem.\n    if (!agentId) return;\n\n    const intent = this.reconcile(entry, agentId);\n    if (intent) {\n      this.settledIntents.add(intent.id);\n      this.emit({\n        type: 'payment.settled',\n        at: entry.at,\n        payment: {\n          intentId: intent.id,\n          txHash: entry.txHash,\n          chain: entry.chain,\n          blockNumber: entry.blockNumber,\n          facilitator: this.options.facilitator,\n          confirmedAt: entry.at,\n        },\n      });\n      return;\n    }\n\n    this.emit({\n      type: 'shadow.spend',\n      at: entry.at,\n      agentId,\n      txHash: entry.txHash,\n      chain: entry.chain,\n      amount: entry.amount,\n    });\n  }\n\n  private reconcile(entry: LedgerEntry, agentId: string): PaymentIntent | undefined {\n    if (entry.memo !== undefined) {\n      const intent = this.allowed.get(entry.memo);\n      return intent && intent.agentId === agentId && !this.settledIntents.has(intent.id)\n        ? intent\n        : undefined;\n    }\n    for (const intent of this.allowed.values()) {\n      if (this.settledIntents.has(intent.id)) continue;\n      if (intent.agentId !== agentId) continue;\n      if (intent.chain !== entry.chain || intent.asset !== entry.asset) continue;\n      if (intent.vendor.address !== entry.to) continue;\n      if (compareDecimal(intent.amount, entry.amount) !== 0) continue;\n      return intent;\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/** EVM addresses compare case-insensitively; everything else compares exact. */\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a === b) return true;\n  return a.startsWith('0x') && b.startsWith('0x') && a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n","import {\n  PaymentRequirement,\n  buildPaymentRequiredV2,\n  encodeBase64Json,\n  type FetchLike,\n} from '@reinconsole/sdk';\nimport { FacilitatorError } from './errors.js';\nimport type { MockFacilitator } from './facilitator.js';\n\nexport interface MockVendorOptions {\n  facilitator: MockFacilitator;\n  /** Price in atomic units (e.g. \"10000\" = 0.01 USDC at 6 decimals). */\n  atomicPrice: string;\n  /** Where the vendor wants to be paid. */\n  payTo: string;\n  network?: string;\n  asset?: string;\n  scheme?: string;\n  /** JSON body served once payment settles. */\n  body?: unknown;\n  /**\n   * Which x402 dialect the vendor's 402s advertise. 'v1' (default) is the\n   * classic JSON body; 'dual' adds the v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header beside it;\n   * 'v2' advertises ONLY the header (the body is not x402) — a strict v2\n   * vendor for proving clients need no v1 fallback. Payments are ACCEPTED in\n   * both dialects (PAYMENT-SIGNATURE or X-PAYMENT) regardless of this option,\n   * mirroring the gate.\n   */\n  advertise?: 'v1' | 'dual' | 'v2';\n}\n\nexport interface VendorCall {\n  url: string;\n  payment: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface MockVendor {\n  /** Drop-in fetch for the guard's vendor-facing side. */\n  fetch: FetchLike;\n  /** Every request the vendor saw, in order. */\n  calls: VendorCall[];\n  /** The payment requirement this vendor quotes for a given URL. */\n  requirementFor(url: string): PaymentRequirement;\n}\n\n/**\n * An in-process x402 vendor wired to the mock facilitator: quotes a 402 with\n * payment requirements until the request carries a payment, then settles\n * through the facilitator (writing the transfer on the mock ledger) and serves\n * the content with the settlement in the response headers. The third leg of\n * the mock rails — guard pays it, indexer watches the ledger behind it.\n */\nexport function createMockVendor(options: MockVendorOptions): MockVendor {\n  const calls: VendorCall[] = [];\n  const advertise = options.advertise ?? 'v1';\n\n  const requirementFor = (url: string): PaymentRequirement =>\n    PaymentRequirement.parse({\n      scheme: options.scheme ?? 'exact',\n      network: options.network ?? 'base',\n      maxAmountRequired: options.atomicPrice,\n      resource: new URL(url).pathname,\n      payTo: options.payTo,\n      asset: options.asset ?? 'USDC',\n    });\n\n  const paymentRequired = (url: string, error: string): Response => {\n    const requirement = requirementFor(url);\n    // A strict v2 vendor's body is deliberately NOT x402 — everything the\n    // protocol needs rides the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header.\n    const body =\n      advertise === 'v2'\n        ? { error }\n        : { x402Version: 1, accepts: [requirement], error };\n    return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n      status: 402,\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        ...(advertise !== 'v1'\n          ? {\n              'PAYMENT-REQUIRED': encodeBase64Json(buildPaymentRequiredV2(requirement, error)),\n            }\n          : {}),\n      },\n    });\n  };\n\n  const fetch: FetchLike = async (input, init) => {\n    const url =\n      typeof input === 'string' ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.toString() : input.url;\n    const headers = new Headers(\n      init?.headers ?? (input instanceof Request ? input.headers : undefined),\n    );\n    // Dual-stack: v2 payers send PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, v1 payers X-PAYMENT.\n    const payment = headers.get('PAYMENT-SIGNATURE') ?? headers.get('X-PAYMENT');\n    calls.push({ url, payment });\n\n    if (payment === null) return paymentRequired(url, 'payment is required');\n\n    let settled;\n    try {\n      settled = options.facilitator.settle(payment, requirementFor(url));\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof FacilitatorError) return paymentRequired(url, err.message);\n      throw err;\n    }\n    return new Response(JSON.stringify(options.body ?? { ok: true }), {\n      status: 200,\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        // Both dialect names carry the same base64 settlement object; the\n        // strict v2 vendor sets ONLY the v2 name.\n        ...(advertise !== 'v2' ? { 'X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE': settled.header } : {}),\n        'PAYMENT-RESPONSE': settled.header,\n      },\n    });\n  };\n\n  return { fetch, calls, requirementFor 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@reinconsole/mock-rails",
-  "version": "0.4.0",
+  "version": "0.5.1",
   "description": "Simulated payment rails for Rein v0.1 — mock x402 facilitator, on-chain ledger, and indexer with shadow-spend detection.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/bugiiiii11/rein#readme",
@@ -39,15 +39,15 @@
   ],
   "dependencies": {
     "zod": "^3.24.1",
-    "@reinconsole/sdk": "^0.4.0",
-    "@reinconsole/core": "^0.4.0"
+    "@reinconsole/core": "^0.5.1",
+    "@reinconsole/sdk": "^0.5.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^22.10.0",
     "tsup": "^8.3.5",
     "typescript": "^5.7.2",
     "vitest": "^2.1.8",
-    "@reinconsole/policy-engine": "0.4.0"
+    "@reinconsole/policy-engine": "0.5.1"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsup",