@reinconsole/graph 0.4.0 → 0.5.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// ../../packages/core/dist/chunk-AW74KJ6X.js
+// ../../packages/core/dist/chunk-SRKPESD5.js
 import { z } from "zod";
 var ULID_BODY = "[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}";
 function prefixedId(prefix) {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ var SessionId = prefixedId("ses");
 var GateReceiptId = prefixedId("grc");
 var ApiKeyId = prefixedId("key");
 var ApproverKeyId = prefixedId("apk");
-var ApiKeyScope = z.enum(["read", "evaluate", "approve", "report", "admin"]);
+var ApiKeyScope = z.enum(["read", "evaluate", "approve", "report", "identity", "admin"]);
 var ApiKey = z.object({
   id: ApiKeyId,
   name: z.string().min(1).max(200),
@@ -1197,6 +1197,13 @@ var AuthError = class _AuthError extends Error {
 var ApiKeyAuth = class {
   store;
   now;
+  /**
+   * Keys with an authority write (rotate, revoke, lift) in flight. A usage
+   * touch writes back a WHOLE record snapshot, so one taken while such a write
+   * is on its way to disk would land after it and undo it -- re-open a revoked
+   * key, or give a claimed sandbox its expiry back. Touches skip these keys.
+   */
+  mutating = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   constructor(options = {}) {
     this.store = options.store ?? new InMemoryApiKeyStore();
     this.now = options.now ?? Date.now;
@@ -1250,16 +1257,31 @@ var ApiKeyAuth = class {
       rotated.previousSecretHash = record.secretHash;
       rotated.previousSecretExpiresAt = new Date(this.now() + graceMs);
     }
-    await this.store.put(rotated);
+    await this.write(rotated);
     return { key: toPublicApiKey(rotated), secret };
   }
   async revoke(keyId) {
     const record = this.store.get(keyId);
     if (!record) return void 0;
     const revoked = { ...record, revokedAt: new Date(this.now()) };
-    await this.store.put(revoked);
+    await this.write(revoked);
     return toPublicApiKey(revoked);
   }
+  /**
+   * Make an expiring key permanent -- what claiming a sandbox is (Sprint 13).
+   * Revoked keys stay revoked: lifting an expiry never resurrects anything.
+   * Answers undefined for an unknown key, the record unchanged when there was
+   * no expiry to lift.
+   */
+  async clearExpiry(keyId) {
+    const record = this.store.get(keyId);
+    if (!record) return void 0;
+    if (record.expiresAt === void 0) return toPublicApiKey(record);
+    const lifted = { ...record };
+    delete lifted.expiresAt;
+    await this.write(lifted);
+    return toPublicApiKey(lifted);
+  }
   list() {
     return this.store.list().map(toPublicApiKey);
   }
@@ -1301,9 +1323,19 @@ var ApiKeyAuth = class {
     void this.touch(record);
     return toPublicApiKey(record);
   }
+  /** An authority write that usage touches must not overtake (see `mutating`). */
+  async write(record) {
+    this.mutating.add(record.id);
+    try {
+      await this.store.put(record);
+    } finally {
+      this.mutating.delete(record.id);
+    }
+  }
   /** Throttled write-through of `lastUsedAt` — never on the critical path. */
   async touch(record) {
     const at = this.now();
+    if (this.mutating.has(record.id)) return;
     if (record.lastUsedAt && at - record.lastUsedAt.getTime() < TOUCH_INTERVAL_MS) return;
     try {
       await this.store.put({ ...record, lastUsedAt: new Date(at) });

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../packages/core/src/ids.ts","../../../packages/core/src/api-key.ts","../../../packages/core/src/ulid.ts","../../../packages/core/src/chain.ts","../../../packages/core/src/money.ts","../../../packages/core/src/glob.ts","../../../packages/core/src/agent.ts","../../../packages/core/src/erc8004.ts","../../../packages/core/src/intent.ts","../../../packages/core/src/decision.ts","../../../packages/core/src/canonical.ts","../../../packages/core/src/session.ts","../../../packages/core/src/payment.ts","../../../packages/core/src/receipt.ts","../../../packages/core/src/gate-receipt.ts","../../../packages/core/src/policy.ts","../../../packages/core/src/liveness.ts","../../../packages/core/src/approval.ts","../../../packages/core/src/reputation.ts","../../../packages/core/src/events.ts","../src/evidence.ts","../src/intents.ts","../src/scoring.ts","../src/graph.ts","../src/server.ts","../../../packages/core/src/auth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/** Crockford base32 ULID body (26 chars), as produced by `ulid()`. */\nconst ULID_BODY = '[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}';\n\n/**\n * A zod schema for a Stripe-style prefixed ULID, e.g. `agt_01J7...`.\n * Centralizing this keeps id formats consistent across DB rows, API payloads,\n * and SDK types.\n */\nexport function prefixedId(prefix: string) {\n  return z\n    .string()\n    .regex(new RegExp(`^${prefix}_${ULID_BODY}$`), `expected a \"${prefix}_\" prefixed id`);\n}\n\nexport const OrgId = prefixedId('org');\nexport const AgentId = prefixedId('agt');\nexport const PolicyId = prefixedId('pol');\nexport const IntentId = prefixedId('int');\nexport const DecisionId = prefixedId('dec');\nexport const ReceiptId = prefixedId('rcp');\nexport const SessionId = prefixedId('ses');\nexport const GateReceiptId = prefixedId('grc');\nexport const ApiKeyId = prefixedId('key');\nexport const ApproverKeyId = prefixedId('apk');\n\nexport type OrgId = z.infer<typeof OrgId>;\nexport type AgentId = z.infer<typeof AgentId>;\nexport type PolicyId = z.infer<typeof PolicyId>;\nexport type IntentId = z.infer<typeof IntentId>;\nexport type DecisionId = z.infer<typeof DecisionId>;\nexport type ReceiptId = z.infer<typeof ReceiptId>;\nexport type SessionId = z.infer<typeof SessionId>;\nexport type GateReceiptId = z.infer<typeof GateReceiptId>;\nexport type ApiKeyId = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyId>;\nexport type ApproverKeyId = z.infer<typeof ApproverKeyId>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApiKeyId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\n\n/**\n * What a key is allowed to reach. `admin` satisfies every requirement (it is\n * the issuing/rotating key); the rest are least-privilege grants so an agent\n * runtime carrying an `evaluate` key cannot rewrite policy, and an approval\n * relay cannot read the spend history.\n *\n * `report` is the graph's ingestion grant, and it is deliberately NOT folded\n * into `evaluate`: evidence written to the reputation graph is about OTHER\n * subjects, so a fleet key that may spend its own budget has no business\n * moving a vendor's score. The engine's own reporting routes ride `evaluate`\n * because there the reporter IS the spender — that reasoning does not reach\n * across to a shared graph.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyScope = z.enum(['read', 'evaluate', 'approve', 'report', 'admin']);\nexport type ApiKeyScope = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyScope>;\n\n/**\n * The public view of an API key — everything except the secret. This is what\n * the API returns on list/issue; the secret itself is shown exactly once, at\n * issuance, and never persisted in recoverable form (see {@link ApiKeyRecord}).\n */\nexport const ApiKey = z.object({\n  id: ApiKeyId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  scopes: z.array(ApiKeyScope).min(1),\n  /**\n   * The org this key acts inside. ABSENT means unscoped — an operator key that\n   * reads and writes across every org, which is what a self-hosted single-org\n   * deployment and every env-seeded boot secret have always been. That is the\n   * compatibility rule the whole tenancy design rests on: adding tenancy\n   * changed no existing key's behaviour, because no existing key has this\n   * field.\n   *\n   * Present, it is a hard confinement, not a default: the key cannot read,\n   * spend, approve or govern outside the org, and a write it submits is\n   * stamped with this org rather than the one the body asked for.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Narrow an org-scoped key further, to specific agents — what an agent\n   * runtime should carry, so a stolen key spends one agent's budget rather\n   * than the org's. Only meaningful alongside {@link ApiKey.orgId}: agent\n   * narrowing without an org is refused at issuance, because the scope it\n   * would describe has no org to resolve policies and approvers in.\n   *\n   * Capped at 64: a list long enough to need more is a fleet, and a fleet is\n   * what the org scope is for.\n   */\n  agentIds: z.array(AgentId).max(64).optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Last successful authentication, for spotting keys that can be retired. */\n  lastUsedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by revoke(); a revoked key never authenticates again. */\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by rotate(); with `previousSecretExpiresAt` it dates the overlap. */\n  rotatedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Past this instant the key stops authenticating, like a revoked one.\n   * ABSENT means it never expires -- every key before the sandbox, and every\n   * key an operator mints. Only the anonymous sandbox sets it, and a key minted\n   * BY an expiring key inherits the deadline: a sandbox that could mint itself\n   * a permanent key would not be a 7-day sandbox.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKey = z.infer<typeof ApiKey>;\n\n/**\n * SERVER-SIDE ONLY. The stored form: the public record plus sha256 digests of\n * the secrets. Digests, not secrets — a stolen database yields nothing that\n * authenticates. Rotation keeps the outgoing digest alive until\n * `previousSecretExpiresAt` so a running fleet can roll over without a\n * flag-day restart; past that instant only the current secret verifies.\n *\n * This shape never leaves the engine: every route answers with {@link ApiKey}.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyRecord = ApiKey.extend({\n  secretHash: z.string(),\n  previousSecretHash: z.string().optional(),\n  previousSecretExpiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKeyRecord = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyRecord>;\n\n/** Strip the digests: the only sanctioned way to put a key on the wire. */\nexport function toPublicApiKey(record: ApiKeyRecord): ApiKey {\n  const { secretHash, previousSecretHash, previousSecretExpiresAt, ...pub } = record;\n  void secretHash;\n  void previousSecretHash;\n  void previousSecretExpiresAt;\n  return pub;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal ULID generation, dependency-free. ULIDs are lexicographically\n * sortable (time-prefixed) and url-safe, which is why Rein uses them for all\n * primary keys instead of UUIDs. Works in Node 22 and modern browsers/edge via\n * the WebCrypto `globalThis.crypto`.\n */\n\n// Crockford's base32 alphabet (excludes I, L, O, U to avoid ambiguity).\nconst ENCODING = '0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ';\nconst TIME_LEN = 10;\nconst RANDOM_LEN = 16;\n\nfunction randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction encodeTime(now: number): string {\n  let time = now;\n  let out = '';\n  for (let i = TIME_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out = ENCODING.charAt(time % 32) + out;\n    time = Math.floor(time / 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction encodeRandom(): string {\n  let out = '';\n  for (const byte of randomBytes(RANDOM_LEN)) {\n    out += ENCODING.charAt(byte % 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/** Generate a 26-character ULID. */\nexport function ulid(seedTime: number = Date.now()): string {\n  return encodeTime(seedTime) + encodeRandom();\n}\n\n/** Generate a Stripe-style prefixed id, e.g. `newId('agt')` -> `agt_01J...`. */\nexport function newId<P extends string>(prefix: P): `${P}_${string}` {\n  return `${prefix}_${ulid()}`;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Chains Rein observes/governs. x402 is multi-chain; Base and Solana ship\n * first, Polygon and BNB follow. The policy/ledger domain is rail-agnostic —\n * this enum is the only place chains are enumerated.\n */\nexport const Chain = z.enum(['base', 'solana', 'polygon', 'bnb']);\nexport type Chain = z.infer<typeof Chain>;\n\n/** Stablecoins settled over x402. */\nexport const Asset = z.enum(['USDC', 'USDT', 'EURC']);\nexport type Asset = z.infer<typeof Asset>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Monetary amounts in Rein are always non-negative **decimal strings**, never\n * floats. Float arithmetic silently loses precision on values like 0.1 + 0.2,\n * which is unacceptable for money. All comparison/aggregation goes through the\n * BigInt-backed helpers below.\n */\nexport const DecimalString = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/, 'must be a non-negative decimal string, e.g. \"5.00\"');\nexport type DecimalString = z.infer<typeof DecimalString>;\n\nconst DECIMAL_RE = /^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/;\n\nexport function isValidDecimal(value: string): boolean {\n  return DECIMAL_RE.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction assertDecimal(value: string): void {\n  if (!isValidDecimal(value)) {\n    throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal string: ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction fractionLength(value: string): number {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  return dot === -1 ? 0 : value.length - dot - 1;\n}\n\n/** Scale a decimal string into an integer BigInt at a fixed number of fraction digits. */\nfunction toScaled(value: string, scale: number): bigint {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? '' : value.slice(dot + 1);\n  const paddedFrac = (fracPart + '0'.repeat(scale)).slice(0, scale);\n  return BigInt(intPart + paddedFrac);\n}\n\n/** Render a scaled BigInt back to a normalized decimal string (no trailing zeros). */\nfunction fromScaled(scaled: bigint, scale: number): string {\n  if (scale === 0) return scaled.toString();\n  const digits = scaled.toString().padStart(scale + 1, '0');\n  const intPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - scale);\n  const fracPart = digits.slice(digits.length - scale).replace(/0+$/, '');\n  return fracPart.length > 0 ? `${intPart}.${fracPart}` : intPart;\n}\n\n/** Compare two decimal strings. Returns -1 (a<b), 0 (a==b), or 1 (a>b). */\nexport function compareDecimal(a: string, b: string): -1 | 0 | 1 {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  const av = toScaled(a, scale);\n  const bv = toScaled(b, scale);\n  return av < bv ? -1 : av > bv ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/** Sum a list of decimal strings without floating-point error. */\nexport function sumDecimal(values: readonly string[]): string {\n  if (values.length === 0) return '0';\n  let scale = 0;\n  for (const v of values) {\n    assertDecimal(v);\n    scale = Math.max(scale, fractionLength(v));\n  }\n  let total = 0n;\n  for (const v of values) total += toScaled(v, scale);\n  return fromScaled(total, scale);\n}\n\n/**\n * `a - b` for decimal strings, exact. Requires `a >= b`: the one caller is\n * \"how much more settled than was allowed\", and a negative money string is a\n * shape nothing else in the system accepts, so asking for one is a bug here\n * rather than a value to hand on.\n */\nexport function subDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  if (compareDecimal(a, b) < 0) {\n    throw new RangeError(`subDecimal: ${a} is less than ${b}`);\n  }\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  return fromScaled(toScaled(a, scale) - toScaled(b, scale), scale);\n}\n\n/** Multiply two decimal strings exactly (e.g. median * \"3\" for price-sanity). */\nexport function mulDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scaleA = fractionLength(a);\n  const scaleB = fractionLength(b);\n  const product = toScaled(a, scaleA) * toScaled(b, scaleB);\n  return fromScaled(product, scaleA + scaleB);\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a > b. */\nexport function gt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === 1;\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a < b. */\nexport function lt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === -1;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal, safe glob matcher supporting only the `*` wildcard (matches any run\n * of characters, including none). Used for vendor host allowlists\n * (e.g. \"*.trusted.io\"), agent-id targeting (e.g. \"agt_research_*\"), and\n * Gate route pricing (e.g. \"/api/reports/*\").\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a regex from user input — the pattern is escaped so a\n * malicious policy value cannot inject regex behavior (ReDoS, etc.).\n */\nexport function globMatch(pattern: string, value: string): boolean {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&'); // escape regex metachars\n  const withWildcard = escaped.replace(/\\\\\\*/g, '.*'); // re-enable only `*`\n  return new RegExp(`^${withWildcard}$`).test(value);\n}\n\n/** True if `value` matches any pattern in the list. */\nexport function globMatchAny(patterns: readonly string[], value: string): boolean {\n  return patterns.some((p) => globMatch(p, value));\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\n\n/**\n * Enforcement tier of a given agent wallet:\n * - `observed`    — Rein sees spend on-chain but has no control (no SDK either).\n * - `sdk`         — agent uses @reinconsole/sdk; advisory + observability (bypassable).\n * - `session-key` — signer-level scope; out-of-policy txs cannot be signed.\n */\nexport const EnforcementMode = z.enum(['observed', 'sdk', 'session-key']);\nexport type EnforcementMode = z.infer<typeof EnforcementMode>;\n\nexport const AgentWallet = z.object({\n  chain: Chain,\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  mode: EnforcementMode,\n});\nexport type AgentWallet = z.infer<typeof AgentWallet>;\n\nexport const AgentStatus = z.enum(['active', 'frozen']);\nexport type AgentStatus = z.infer<typeof AgentStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A semantic grouping label, e.g. \"research\" or \"prod-trading\". Lowercase\n * slugs only — policy `appliesTo.labels` matches these (with globs), and a\n * case-normalization mismatch would silently un-target a policy.\n */\nexport const AgentLabel = z\n  .string()\n  .max(40)\n  .regex(/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/, 'label must be a lowercase slug like \"research\" or \"prod-trading\"');\nexport type AgentLabel = z.infer<typeof AgentLabel>;\n\nexport const Agent = z.object({\n  id: AgentId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** On-chain ERC-8004 identity, if the agent is registered. */\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Semantic grouping labels — the targets of policy `appliesTo.labels`. */\n  labels: z\n    .array(AgentLabel)\n    .max(16)\n    .refine((ls) => new Set(ls).size === ls.length, { message: 'labels must be unique' })\n    .default([]),\n  wallets: z.array(AgentWallet).default([]),\n  status: AgentStatus.default('active'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Agent = z.infer<typeof Agent>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * The canonical string form of an ERC-8004 agent identity:\n *\n *     eip155:{chainId}:{identityRegistry}/{tokenId}\n *\n * The part before the `/` is the spec's registry reference verbatim (the\n * `agentRegistry` field of a registration file, CAIP-10 account form); the\n * tokenId is the ERC-721 id the Identity Registry minted (`agentId` in the\n * spec). This exact string is what `Agent.erc8004Id` / `Vendor.erc8004Id`\n * carry, AND the reputation-subject id a registered agent's evidence keys by.\n *\n * Casing is load-bearing: reputation subject keys for agent-kind ids are\n * case-sensitive unless they start with `0x` (see @reinconsole/graph\n * `normalizeSubject`), and an eip155 string does not. `formatErc8004Id`\n * therefore always emits the registry address in lowercase, and consumers must\n * never hand-build the string — parse then re-format to normalize.\n */\n\nexport interface Erc8004Ref {\n  /** EIP-155 chain id (e.g. 8453 Base, 84532 Base Sepolia). */\n  chainId: number;\n  /** Identity Registry contract address, lowercase 0x-hex. */\n  registry: string;\n  /** ERC-721 tokenId — the spec's `agentId`. bigint: token ids exceed 2^53. */\n  tokenId: bigint;\n}\n\nconst REGISTRY_PATTERN = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\nconst ID_PATTERN = /^eip155:(\\d+):(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})\\/(\\d+)$/;\n\n/** Build the canonical id string. Throws on a malformed ref (programmer error). */\nexport function formatErc8004Id(ref: Erc8004Ref): string {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ref.chainId) || ref.chainId < 1) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad chainId ${ref.chainId}`);\n  }\n  if (!REGISTRY_PATTERN.test(ref.registry)) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad registry address ${ref.registry}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof ref.tokenId !== 'bigint' || ref.tokenId < 0n) {\n    // The typeof guard matters for plain-JS callers: 1.5 < 0n is legal JS and\n    // false, and would mint the unparseable \"…/1.5\".\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad tokenId ${ref.tokenId}`);\n  }\n  return `eip155:${ref.chainId}:${ref.registry.toLowerCase()}/${ref.tokenId}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a canonical (or hand-written) id string. Accepts any address casing\n * and returns a lowercase ref, or undefined when malformed — so\n * `formatErc8004Id(parseErc8004Id(x)!)` is the normalization step.\n */\nexport function parseErc8004Id(value: string): Erc8004Ref | undefined {\n  const match = ID_PATTERN.exec(value);\n  if (!match) return undefined;\n  const chainId = Number(match[1]);\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(chainId) || chainId < 1) return undefined;\n  return {\n    chainId,\n    registry: match[2]!.toLowerCase(),\n    tokenId: BigInt(match[3]!),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Strict boundary schema for the id string (the fields themselves stay free-form). */\nexport const Erc8004Id = z\n  .string()\n  .refine((value) => parseErc8004Id(value) !== undefined, {\n    message: 'expected \"eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}\"',\n  });\nexport type Erc8004Id = z.infer<typeof Erc8004Id>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\nexport const Vendor = z.object({\n  host: z.string().min(1),\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vendor = z.infer<typeof Vendor>;\n\n/**\n * The observability gold: links every micro-payment back to the task and run\n * that caused it, so finance teams can answer \"what was this spend for?\".\n */\nexport const TaskContext = z.object({\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  parentRunId: z.string().optional(),\n  purpose: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\nexport type TaskContext = z.infer<typeof TaskContext>;\n\n/**\n * A request to spend, submitted to the policy engine BEFORE any signature is\n * released. The `nonce` provides replay protection on the signer path.\n */\nexport const PaymentIntent = z.object({\n  id: IntentId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  vendor: Vendor,\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  nonce: z.string().min(1),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type PaymentIntent = z.infer<typeof PaymentIntent>;\n\n/**\n * Reduce an intent's `resource` to its path for policy matching. The value is\n * vendor-declared and shape-varies: the x402 spec puts a full URL in\n * `requirement.resource`, while the guard falls back to the request pathname\n * when the vendor omits it. Policies match on the PATH so authors never need\n * to know which shape a vendor emits; host targeting stays with\n * `vendorHostIn`, which is derived from the real request URL rather than the\n * vendor's own claim. Query strings do not survive the reduction.\n */\nexport function resourcePathOf(resource: string): string {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(resource);\n    if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') return url.pathname;\n  } catch {\n    // Not a URL — already a bare path.\n  }\n  return resource;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\n\nexport const DecisionOutcome = z.enum(['allow', 'deny', 'escalate']);\nexport type DecisionOutcome = z.infer<typeof DecisionOutcome>;\n\n/**\n * The signed, hash-chained record of a single policy evaluation. Written BEFORE\n * any signature is released. `prevHash` + `hash` form a tamper-evident chain;\n * `signature` is the policy service's signing key over `hash`. The eventual\n * on-chain `txHash` is attached later by the indexer (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const Decision = z.object({\n  id: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /**\n   * sha256 of the intent's canonical content (see canonical.ts). Binds the\n   * decision to the exact transfer it judged — amount, recipient, asset,\n   * chain — so a signer can verify an {intent, decision} pair offline as a\n   * self-contained spend voucher, not just a reference by id.\n   */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** Ids of the rules that fired, for explainability. */\n  matchedRules: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  /** Human-readable explanation surfaced in the dashboard. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  policyVersion: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of the previous decision in the chain (tamper-evident log). */\n  prevHash: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of this decision's canonical content. */\n  hash: z.string(),\n  /** Service signing-key signature over `hash`. */\n  signature: z.string(),\n  latencyMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  decidedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Decision = z.infer<typeof Decision>;\n\n/**\n * A decision as `GET /v1/decisions` serves it (0.3.0): the signed record plus\n * `agentId`, the agent whose intent it judged.\n *\n * `agentId` is an ENVELOPE field -- the engine's own attribution, outside\n * `hash` and `signature`, so a verified chain vouches for nothing about it.\n * Putting it inside would have changed the hash of every future decision and\n * split the chain into two formats. It is here for a reconciler that is not\n * co-located with the agent: `reconcile()` needs an allowed intent's agent,\n * or agent B's payment against A's intent is credited to A (S74), and before\n * this field only `/v1/reconciliation` carried it -- and erases it the moment\n * a settlement lands. Absent on an unattributed (pre-tenancy) row.\n */\nexport const AttributedDecision = Decision.extend({ agentId: AgentId.optional() });\nexport type AttributedDecision = z.infer<typeof AttributedDecision>;\n","import type { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport type { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\nimport type { ApprovalVerdict } from './approval.js';\n\n/**\n * Canonical byte forms shared by the policy engine (which hashes and signs\n * them) and the signer (which verifies them offline). Field order is fixed,\n * dates are ISO strings, and absent optionals are explicit nulls, so the same\n * parsed object always canonicalizes to the same bytes — including after a\n * JSON round-trip over HTTP.\n *\n * These builders are pure (no node:crypto) so @reinconsole/core stays loadable in a\n * browser; services hash the strings with whatever sha256 they have.\n */\n\n/** Canonical form of an intent — what `Decision.intentHash` commits to. */\nexport function canonicalIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    id: intent.id,\n    agentId: intent.agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: intent.vendor.host,\n      address: intent.vendor.address,\n      erc8004Id: intent.vendor.erc8004Id ?? null,\n    },\n    resource: intent.resource,\n    amount: intent.amount,\n    asset: intent.asset,\n    chain: intent.chain,\n    taskContext: {\n      taskId: intent.taskContext.taskId ?? null,\n      parentRunId: intent.taskContext.parentRunId ?? null,\n      purpose: intent.taskContext.purpose ?? null,\n    },\n    nonce: intent.nonce,\n    createdAt: intent.createdAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The decision fields covered by `Decision.hash` (and thus its signature). */\nexport interface DecisionContent {\n  intentId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome;\n  matchedRules: string[];\n  policyId: string;\n  policyVersion: string;\n  prevHash: string;\n  decidedAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Canonical form of a decision — what `Decision.hash` is computed over. */\nexport function canonicalDecision(d: DecisionContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    intentId: d.intentId,\n    intentHash: d.intentHash,\n    outcome: d.outcome,\n    matchedRules: d.matchedRules,\n    policyId: d.policyId,\n    policyVersion: d.policyVersion,\n    prevHash: d.prevHash,\n    decidedAt: d.decidedAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The fields an approval signature commits to. */\nexport interface ApprovalContent {\n  decisionId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an approval — the exact bytes an approver signs.\n *\n * Three properties are deliberate. The leading `rein` domain tag separates\n * this signature space from the decision log's, so a decision signature can\n * never be replayed as an approval or the reverse. `decisionId` makes each\n * challenge single-use: one escalation, one decision id, one signature that\n * means anything. And `verdict` is INSIDE the signed bytes — without it, a\n * captured approval could be resubmitted as a rejection (or vice versa) by\n * anyone who saw it in flight.\n */\nexport function canonicalApproval(a: ApprovalContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    rein: 'approval/v1',\n    decisionId: a.decisionId,\n    intentHash: a.intentHash,\n    verdict: a.verdict,\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * A session-key grant: the signer tier's unit of delegated authority. The\n * agent process holds only the bearer token — the wallet key never leaves the\n * signer — and the stored record keeps a hash of the token, never the token\n * itself (it is returned exactly once, at creation).\n *\n * Caps here are the signer-side backstop UNDER whatever policy says: a\n * signature is released only when the engine allowed the intent AND the\n * session has room. Amounts are decimal strings in the asset's human units.\n */\nexport const Session = z.object({\n  id: SessionId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** sha256 hex of the bearer token. */\n  tokenHash: z.string(),\n  /** Cumulative ceiling across the session's lifetime. Absent = uncapped. */\n  capAmount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Ceiling per individual signature. Absent = uncapped. */\n  maxPerPayment: DecimalString.optional(),\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type Session = z.infer<typeof Session>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * On-chain confirmation of a settled payment, reconciled by the indexer against\n * the originating intent (amount + recipient + nonce, or facilitator webhook).\n */\nexport const SettledPayment = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  txHash: z.string(),\n  chain: Chain,\n  blockNumber: z.coerce.bigint(),\n  facilitator: z.string().optional(),\n  feePaid: DecimalString.optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettledPayment = z.infer<typeof SettledPayment>;\n\n/**\n * A report that an allowed intent's payment actually landed — the settlement\n * half of reconciliation (\"allowed but never settled\", B1).\n *\n * Deliberately looser than {@link SettledPayment}: the on-chain confirmation\n * requires a tx hash and a block, while a REPORT is whatever the observer\n * could see. A vendor's `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` names a transaction but no block;\n * a facilitator webhook may name neither. Demanding the strong shape would\n * mean the weakest observers — the ones a deployment actually has — could\n * report nothing at all, and every allowance would read as a gap.\n *\n * `source` records WHO said so, because the evidence is not all equal: an\n * independent indexer watching the chain is the strong claim, while a guard\n * reporting on its own payment is the agent vouching for itself. Nothing here\n * grants authority — a settlement report can only ever CLOSE a gap in the\n * reconciliation report, never authorize a payment or alter a decision.\n */\nexport const SettlementReport = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** The settling transaction, when the observer saw one. */\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  chain: Chain.optional(),\n  /** The amount as SETTLED, when known — may differ from the amount allowed. */\n  amount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Free-form observer tag, e.g. \"indexer\", \"guard\", \"facilitator\". */\n  source: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettlementReport = z.infer<typeof SettlementReport>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReceiptId, IntentId, DecisionId, AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { TaskContext } from './intent.js';\nimport { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\n\n/**\n * What the SDK reports back after settlement: the `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` header\n * a vendor returns once payment clears. Mock facilitators fill this in v0.1;\n * the indexer reconciles it against on-chain truth later (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const ReceiptSettlement = z.object({\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  networkId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Raw header payload, kept for forensics until the indexer confirms. */\n  raw: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReceiptSettlement = z.infer<typeof ReceiptSettlement>;\n\n/**\n * The SDK-side record of one guarded payment attempt: which request triggered\n * it, what the engine decided, and (if allowed and paid) how it settled.\n * Receipts are the observability primitive — every 402 the guard touches\n * produces exactly one, whether the payment was allowed or blocked.\n */\nexport const Receipt = z.object({\n  id: ReceiptId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** The URL the agent actually fetched (the paywalled resource). */\n  url: z.string(),\n  method: z.string().default('GET'),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  /** Human-readable explanation copied from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Present only once a payment was made and the vendor confirmed it. */\n  settlement: ReceiptSettlement.optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Receipt = z.infer<typeof Receipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { GateReceiptId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * The vendor-side twin of `Receipt`: one settled x402 payment as the GATE saw\n * it — who paid, for which priced route, and the settlement transaction. The\n * agent-side Receipt records what an agent tried to spend; a GateReceipt\n * records what a vendor actually earned.\n */\nexport const GateReceipt = z.object({\n  id: GateReceiptId,\n  at: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** The route pattern that priced this request, e.g. \"/api/reports/*\". */\n  route: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The concrete resource paid for (URL path actually requested). */\n  resource: z.string().min(1),\n  method: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The paying wallet address, as asserted by the settled payment. */\n  payer: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.05\". */\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  /** The same amount in the asset's atomic units, e.g. \"50000\". */\n  amountAtomic: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  /** Token symbol or contract address, exactly as quoted in the requirement. */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  network: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Settlement transaction hash (mock ledger or on-chain). */\n  transaction: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type GateReceipt = z.infer<typeof GateReceipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/** A rolling-window spec, e.g. \"24h\", \"1h\", \"30m\", \"7d\". */\nexport const Window = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+[smhd]$/, 'window must be like \"30s\", \"15m\", \"1h\", or \"7d\"');\nexport type Window = z.infer<typeof Window>;\n\n/** A relative multiplier, e.g. \"3x\" (used for price-sanity checks). */\nexport const Multiplier = z.string().regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?x$/, 'multiplier must be like \"3x\"');\nexport type Multiplier = z.infer<typeof Multiplier>;\n\n/**\n * The set of predicates a rule can test. Multiple predicates in one condition\n * are ANDed together. Each maps to an evaluator in the policy engine.\n */\nexport const Condition = z\n  .object({\n    /** Per-transaction amount exceeds this value. */\n    amountGt: DecimalString.optional(),\n    /** Sum of spend in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    rollingSum: z.object({ window: Window, gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** Transaction count in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    txCount: z.object({ window: Window, gt: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).optional(),\n    /** Vendor host matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs). */\n    vendorHostIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Resource PATH matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g.\n     * \"/v1/reports/*\"). A full-URL resource is reduced to its pathname before\n     * matching (see `resourcePathOf`), so the same pattern works whether the\n     * vendor declares \"https://api.x.com/v1/answer\" or \"/v1/answer\". Pair\n     * with `vendorHostIn` to scope a path rule to specific vendors.\n     */\n    resourceIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /** First time Rein has seen this vendor for the agent. */\n    vendorFirstSeen: z.boolean().optional(),\n    /** Vendor reputation score is below this threshold (Phase 3 hook). */\n    vendorReputationLt: z.number().min(0).max(100).optional(),\n    /** Amount is more than `gt`-times the observed median for this resource. */\n    amountVsResourceMedian: z.object({ gt: Multiplier }).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Cumulative spend attributed to THIS intent's `taskContext.taskId`\n     * (prior spend on the task plus this payment) exceeds `gt`. Scopes a\n     * budget to one unit of work rather than to a window: a research run that\n     * is meant to cost a dollar cannot quietly cost fifty, however slowly.\n     *\n     * An intent carrying no `taskId` cannot be attributed to a task, so the\n     * predicate never triggers for one. Requiring attribution is a separate,\n     * deliberate rule (deny on `taskIdMissing`), not a side effect of setting\n     * a budget — otherwise every untagged probe payment would trip every\n     * task budget in the policy.\n     */\n    taskBudget: z.object({ gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** The intent carries no `taskContext.taskId` (or an empty one). */\n    taskIdMissing: z.boolean().optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((c) => Object.values(c).some((v) => v !== undefined), {\n    message: 'a condition must specify at least one predicate',\n  });\nexport type Condition = z.infer<typeof Condition>;\n\n/**\n * A behavioral circuit breaker: one primitive with three tripwires — a window\n * (rate), a transaction count, and a value cap — measured over the agent's\n * own recent activity.\n *\n * A breaker is not a rule. Rules ask about the intent in front of them; a\n * breaker asks whether the agent's BEHAVIOR has left the envelope it was\n * given, and once it has, every subsequent intent ESCALATES for a signed\n * approval. It never denies on its own: an agent that trips a breaker in the\n * middle of a job must be able to be waved through by a human, because a\n * silent deny at the wrong moment strands the work with no path forward and\n * no one told (the failure mode Flash's exit paths taught).\n *\n * Reset happens two ways, and they are one mechanism: the window rolling\n * forward, or a signed approval, which moves the breaker's counting floor to\n * now. Nothing \"un-trips\" a breaker by decree — the activity simply stops\n * being inside the measured span.\n *\n * Targeting is the policy's job: `appliesTo.agents` / `appliesTo.labels`\n * decide WHICH agents carry the breaker. COUNTING is always per agent — a\n * breaker pooled across every agent sharing a label needs a cross-agent\n * aggregate the per-agent spend context cannot express, and is deferred.\n */\nexport const Breaker = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    /** The trailing span the tripwires measure over. */\n    window: Window,\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window would hold MORE than this many transactions.\n     * `10` permits ten in the window and escalates the eleventh.\n     */\n    txCount: z.number().int().positive().optional(),\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window's spend would exceed this total. `\"50.00\"` permits\n     * a window totalling exactly 50.00 and escalates the payment that would\n     * carry it past. Prospective, like every other spend predicate: the\n     * payment that would breach the cap is the one that escalates, rather\n     * than the innocent one after it.\n     */\n    valueCap: DecimalString.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((b) => b.txCount !== undefined || b.valueCap !== undefined, {\n    message: 'a breaker must specify at least one of txCount / valueCap',\n  });\nexport type Breaker = z.infer<typeof Breaker>;\n\n/**\n * A single rule: an id plus exactly one action (allow / deny / escalate) whose\n * value is the condition that triggers it.\n */\nexport const Rule = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    allow: Condition.optional(),\n    deny: Condition.optional(),\n    escalate: Condition.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((r) => [r.allow, r.deny, r.escalate].filter((v) => v !== undefined).length === 1, {\n    message: 'a rule must specify exactly one of allow / deny / escalate',\n  });\nexport type Rule = z.infer<typeof Rule>;\n\nexport const PolicyDefault = z.enum(['allow', 'deny']);\nexport type PolicyDefault = z.infer<typeof PolicyDefault>;\n\nexport const AppliesTo = z.object({\n  /** Agent id patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g. \"agt_research_*\"). */\n  agents: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  /**\n   * Agent label patterns (supports `*` globs) — semantic targeting. Matches\n   * when the agent carries at least one label matching any pattern. Requires\n   * the agent DOCUMENT: an intent from an unregistered agent never matches a\n   * labels-targeted policy (and so fails closed when no other policy applies).\n   */\n  labels: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  chains: z.array(Chain).optional(),\n});\nexport type AppliesTo = z.infer<typeof AppliesTo>;\n\nexport const Escalation = z.object({\n  approvers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  timeoutAction: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  timeoutMin: z.number().int().positive().default(15),\n});\nexport type Escalation = z.infer<typeof Escalation>;\n\n/**\n * A declarative, versioned, immutable-once-active policy. Evaluation order in\n * the engine is: explicit DENY > ESCALATE > ALLOW > `default`.\n */\nexport const Policy = z.object({\n  policyId: z.string().min(1),\n  version: z.string().default('1'),\n  /**\n   * The org this policy governs. ABSENT means GLOBAL — it is considered for\n   * every agent, which is what every policy written before tenancy existed is\n   * and stays.\n   *\n   * This is separate from {@link AppliesTo} on purpose, and it has to be:\n   * `appliesTo: {}` matches every agent, so a tenant's policy carrying the\n   * default targeting would otherwise govern other tenants' agents the moment\n   * it was written. Org scoping is applied BEFORE targeting — a policy whose\n   * `orgId` is not the agent's org is not a candidate at all.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  appliesTo: AppliesTo.default({}),\n  rules: z.array(Rule).default([]),\n  /**\n   * Behavioral breakers evaluated alongside the rules. A tripped breaker\n   * escalates at the same precedence as an `escalate` rule — so an explicit\n   * DENY still wins, and an ALLOW rule cannot wave past a tripped breaker.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(Breaker).default([]),\n  default: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  /** Below this amount, fail-open is permitted during a policy-service outage. */\n  denyFloor: DecimalString.default('0.05'),\n  escalation: Escalation.optional(),\n});\nexport type Policy = z.infer<typeof Policy>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Window } from './policy.js';\n\n/**\n * Dead-man monitoring: the alarm for an agent that stopped (Phase B2).\n *\n * Every other control in Rein answers \"should this payment happen?\". This one\n * answers the question nothing else in the stack asks: an agent that has gone\n * quiet raises no intent, breaks no budget, and trips no breaker — it simply\n * disappears, and a control plane watching only for bad payments will report\n * a perfectly clean month while the work silently stopped being done. (Flash\n * lost four detectors this way, none of which announced anything.)\n *\n * Three rules hold the design honest, and each is the direct mirror of a rule\n * B1 already established:\n *\n * 1. An expectation is DECLARED, never inferred. Most agents are episodic:\n *    they run when there is work. Silence is only evidence for an agent\n *    somebody said should be periodic, so an unwatched agent has no liveness\n *    state at all — the same rule as `taskBudget`, which never fires on an\n *    intent that carries no task id.\n * 2. Silence has an AGE, not a boolean — `late` before `missing` — exactly as\n *    a missing settlement is `in-flight` before it is `unsettled`.\n * 3. The engine never alarms about silence it did not witness. An engine that\n *    was down cannot tell a dead agent from its own outage, so a silence\n *    older than this process reads `unknown` until the process has been up\n *    long enough to certify it. B1 refuses to manufacture gaps out of records\n *    it cannot join; this refuses to manufacture alarms out of downtime.\n *\n * Liveness is observability and carries no authority whatsoever: it cannot\n * deny, escalate, freeze, or alter any decision. A missing agent is news for\n * a human, not an input to policy.\n */\n\n/** How the engine came to know an agent was alive. */\nexport const LivenessSource = z.enum([\n  /** It submitted an intent — ANY outcome, including a denial. */\n  'intent',\n  /** It reported in explicitly, having nothing to buy. */\n  'heartbeat',\n]);\nexport type LivenessSource = z.infer<typeof LivenessSource>;\n\n/** Default slack past the interval before silence becomes an alarm. */\nexport const DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * \"This agent is supposed to check in at least this often.\"\n *\n * `graceMs` is what keeps a jittery-but-healthy agent out of the alert\n * channel: an agent on a 15m cadence that lands at 15m04s is not a dead agent,\n * and an alarm that cries at every wobble is one an operator learns to ignore\n * — which is the failure mode that loses the detector nobody was watching.\n */\nexport const LivenessExpectation = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** Longest silence still considered normal, e.g. '15m'. */\n  interval: Window,\n  /** Extra slack past `interval` before the silence is an alarm. */\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().default(DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS),\n  /**\n   * When watching began. An agent that has NEVER been seen is measured from\n   * here, so a watch on an agent that never starts does raise an alarm — a\n   * detector that never came up is exactly as dead as one that stopped.\n   */\n  since: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** What this agent is supposed to be doing, shown beside the alarm. */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessExpectation = z.infer<typeof LivenessExpectation>;\n\n/** The registration payload; the engine stamps `since`. */\nexport const LivenessWatchInput = LivenessExpectation.omit({ since: true }).extend({\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessWatchInput = z.input<typeof LivenessWatchInput>;\n\n/**\n * An out-of-band \"I am alive\" from an agent with nothing to buy.\n *\n * The engine sees every intent, so a spending agent needs no heartbeat at all.\n * This exists for the agent that is working and simply not paying for\n * anything — without it, a dead-man alarm is really a no-spend alarm, and it\n * would page a human every time an agent had a quiet afternoon.\n *\n * It authorizes nothing. The only thing a heartbeat can change is a row in the\n * liveness report; it cannot lift a breaker, a budget, or a freeze.\n */\nexport const Heartbeat = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** When the agent was alive. Defaults to arrival time. */\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Free-form note from the reporter, e.g. \"poll cycle 41 ok\". */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type Heartbeat = z.infer<typeof Heartbeat>;\n\n/**\n * Where an agent stands against its expectation.\n *\n * - `alive`   — seen within the interval.\n * - `late`    — past the interval, inside the grace. Not yet news.\n * - `missing` — past both, and this process watched it happen. THE alarm.\n * - `unknown` — past both, but the engine has not been up long enough to have\n *               witnessed the silence. Not an alarm: an engine that restarted\n *               five minutes ago knows nothing about the last three days.\n */\nexport const LivenessStatus = z.enum(['alive', 'late', 'missing', 'unknown']);\nexport type LivenessStatus = z.infer<typeof LivenessStatus>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApproverKeyId, DecisionId, IntentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Asset, Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * Human approval of an escalated payment.\n *\n * The load-bearing rule: an approval is a SIGNATURE over the decision, made by\n * a key registered with the engine. The delivery channel (Telegram, email,\n * whatever) is transport, never authority — anyone who compromises the channel\n * gets to show a human a message, not to release funds. There is deliberately\n * no click-to-approve path.\n */\n\nexport const ApprovalVerdict = z.enum(['approve', 'reject']);\nexport type ApprovalVerdict = z.infer<typeof ApprovalVerdict>;\n\n/**\n * `pending` is the only non-terminal state. `expired` is what a TTL lapse\n * converts to — indistinguishable from `rejected` in effect (both deny), but\n * distinguished in the record so \"nobody answered\" and \"somebody said no\" stay\n * separable in an audit.\n */\nexport const ApprovalStatus = z.enum(['pending', 'approved', 'rejected', 'expired']);\nexport type ApprovalStatus = z.infer<typeof ApprovalStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A key whose signature the engine accepts as an approval. Public half only —\n * the private half lives with the human (a hardware token, a laptop, an\n * offline signer) and must never reach the engine.\n */\nexport const ApproverKey = z.object({\n  id: ApproverKeyId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** ed25519 public key, SPKI PEM — the same encoding as the decision log's. */\n  publicKey: z.string().min(1),\n  algorithm: z.literal('ed25519').default('ed25519'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApproverKey = z.infer<typeof ApproverKey>;\n\n/**\n * A parked escalation: the payment the engine refused to allow on its own\n * authority, held open until a signature arrives or the TTL lapses. Keyed by\n * the escalating decision — one decision, at most one approval request.\n *\n * The payment facts are copied in rather than referenced so the challenge a\n * human sees is self-contained: amount, vendor and resource are exactly what\n * they are being asked to authorize.\n */\nexport const ApprovalRequest = z.object({\n  /** The `escalate` decision this request answers (primary key). */\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** Binds the approval to the exact transfer — the signed bytes commit to it. */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /**\n   * The org the escalating agent belongs to, stamped when the request is\n   * parked. ABSENT means the agent was never registered (or the request\n   * predates tenancy), and such a request is answerable only by an unscoped\n   * operator — there is no org to check an approver against, and guessing one\n   * is how a cross-tenant approval happens.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  /**\n   * Task attribution copied from the intent. Carried so an approved payment\n   * still counts against its `taskBudget` — an escalation that lost its task\n   * id on the way through would make the budget silently under-count exactly\n   * the payments a human had to look at.\n   */\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Why policy escalated, verbatim from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Breaker ids whose trip contributed to this escalation. An approval of\n   * this request resets exactly these — moving their counting floor to the\n   * approval instant — so a human waving one payment through also clears the\n   * behavior that stopped it, rather than being asked again immediately.\n   * Empty when ordinary rules did the escalating.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  status: ApprovalStatus,\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Past this instant the request denies, whatever arrives afterwards. */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  resolvedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Which registered key signed — absent when the TTL lapsed instead. */\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * The follow-up decision appended to the chain when this resolved. That\n   * decision, not this record, is the voucher a signer verifies: the original\n   * `escalate` decision is never rewritten.\n   */\n  finalDecisionId: DecisionId.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalRequest = z.infer<typeof ApprovalRequest>;\n\n/** The two byte-strings an approver may sign for a given request. */\nexport const ApprovalChallenges = z.object({\n  approve: z.string(),\n  reject: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalChallenges = z.infer<typeof ApprovalChallenges>;\n\n/**\n * A signed verdict, submitted to the engine by anyone (the signature is the\n * authority, so the carrier does not matter). `signature` is base64 ed25519\n * over `canonicalApproval({ decisionId, intentHash, verdict })`.\n */\nexport const ApprovalGrant = z.object({\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict,\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId,\n  signature: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ApprovalGrant = z.infer<typeof ApprovalGrant>;\n\n/** Terminal statuses — a request in one of these will never change again. */\nexport function isResolved(status: ApprovalStatus): boolean {\n  return status !== 'pending';\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\nexport const ReputationSubject = z.object({\n  kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']),\n  id: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ReputationSubject = z.infer<typeof ReputationSubject>;\n\nexport const ReputationComponents = z.object({\n  volume: z.number(),\n  longevity: z.number(),\n  disputeRate: z.number(),\n  counterpartyQuality: z.number(),\n  settlementReliability: z.number(),\n});\nexport type ReputationComponents = z.infer<typeof ReputationComponents>;\n\n/**\n * A reputation score for an agent or vendor (Phase 3 — Graph). `confidence` is\n * first-class: a thin-history subject returns LOW confidence rather than a\n * misleadingly high score, so policy can avoid both false trust and unfair\n * freezing.\n */\nexport const ReputationScore = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  score: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  components: ReputationComponents,\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  asOf: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Hash-anchored attestation, optionally published on-chain (ERC-8004). */\n  evidenceUri: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReputationScore = z.infer<typeof ReputationScore>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport { Decision } from './decision.js';\nimport { SettledPayment } from './payment.js';\nimport { GateReceipt } from './gate-receipt.js';\nimport { ApprovalRequest } from './approval.js';\nimport { LivenessExpectation, LivenessSource } from './liveness.js';\n\n/**\n * The canonical event envelope published on the bus (NATS in production).\n * `shadow.spend` is emitted when the indexer sees on-chain spend from a managed\n * wallet with NO corresponding ALLOW decision — the bypass signal that catches\n * SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n * `signature.released` / `signature.refused` are that tier's heartbeat: every\n * time the signer does or does not put a key to work, the bus knows why.\n * `gate.*` is the vendor side of the wire: every quote a Gate issues, every\n * payment it accepts, every payment it turns away.\n * `approval.*` is the human-in-the-loop tier: an escalated intent parked for a\n * signature, and the signed (or lapsed) verdict that closed it.\n * `liveness.*` is the dead-man tier (B2), and the only pair here emitted by\n * something NOT happening: a watched agent that went quiet past its expected\n * interval, and the sighting that ended the silence.\n */\nexport const ReinEvent = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('intent.created'), at: z.coerce.date(), intent: PaymentIntent }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('decision.made'), at: z.coerce.date(), decision: Decision }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('payment.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), payment: SettledPayment }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('shadow.spend'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    txHash: z.string(),\n    chain: Chain,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.released'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    sessionId: SessionId,\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    intentId: IntentId,\n    decisionId: DecisionId,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"decision_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/signer). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    sessionId: SessionId.optional(),\n    agentId: AgentId.optional(),\n    intentId: IntentId.optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.quoted'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    method: z.string(),\n    amount: DecimalString,\n    asset: z.string(),\n    network: z.string(),\n  }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('gate.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), receipt: GateReceipt }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.requested'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.resolved'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n    /** The follow-up allow/deny decision this resolution appended. */\n    decision: Decision,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.missing'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n    /** How long the agent has been silent when the alarm was raised. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    /** Last sighting, absent when the agent was never seen at all. */\n    lastSeenAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.recovered'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    /** How long the silence lasted, measured to this sighting. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    source: LivenessSource,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"payment_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/gate). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    /** Known only when the payment header decoded far enough to name a payer. */\n    payer: z.string().optional(),\n  }),\n]);\nexport type ReinEvent = z.infer<typeof ReinEvent>;\n","import { formatErc8004Id, parseErc8004Id, sumDecimal, type ReputationSubject } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/** A value that may be produced synchronously or awaited (durable writes). */\nexport type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>;\n\n/** One settled-money edge to a counterparty (the \"graph\" in reputation graph). */\nexport interface CounterpartyLine {\n  settled: number;\n  /** Settled decimal volume across this edge. */\n  volume: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything the graph has observed about one subject. Counters are raw and\n * append-only — scoring (scoring.ts) is a pure function over this record, so a\n * score is always re-derivable and explainable from the evidence behind it.\n */\nexport interface SubjectEvidence {\n  subject: ReputationSubject;\n  firstSeenMs: number;\n  lastSeenMs: number;\n  /** Payment attempts observed (allowed intents, presented payments). */\n  attempts: number;\n  /** Confirmed settlements (indexer-reconciled or gate-receipted). */\n  settled: number;\n  /** Settled decimal volume. */\n  volume: string;\n  /** Refusals by code (gate refusal codes, signer refusal codes). */\n  refusals: Record<string, number>;\n  /** Managed-wallet spend with no ALLOW decision behind it (bypass). */\n  shadowSpends: number;\n  /** Manual out-of-band reports (chargebacks, fraud complaints). */\n  disputes: number;\n  /** Manual out-of-band vouches. */\n  endorsements: number;\n  /** Who this subject has settled money with, keyed by subjectKey(). */\n  counterparties: Map<string, CounterpartyLine>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical subject identity. Hosts and EVM addresses are case-insensitive,\n * so they normalize to lowercase; ULID agent ids are case-sensitive and pass\n * through. ERC-8004 ids (`eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}`) normalize\n * via parse->format — @reinconsole/erc8004 always emits the canonical form, but this\n * is the graph's OWN boundary (remote producers hit POST /v1/links with\n * hand-built strings), and a checksummed registry or zero-padded tokenId\n * variant must not mint a split subject row. Note the two id spaces under\n * kind \"agent\": the engine names agents by ULID, a gate names them by paying\n * wallet — ERC-8004 linking (S17) folds both into the on-chain identity.\n */\nexport function normalizeSubject(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationSubject {\n  if (subject.id.startsWith('eip155:')) {\n    const ref = parseErc8004Id(subject.id);\n    if (ref) return { kind: subject.kind, id: formatErc8004Id(ref) };\n    // Malformed eip155-ish strings fall through to the plain rules below.\n  }\n  const id =\n    subject.kind === 'vendor' || subject.id.startsWith('0x') || subject.id.startsWith('0X')\n      ? subject.id.toLowerCase()\n      : subject.id;\n  return { kind: subject.kind, id };\n}\n\nexport function subjectKey(subject: ReputationSubject): string {\n  const normal = normalizeSubject(subject);\n  return `${normal.kind}:${normal.id}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The evidence store seam the graph depends on. Writes may be asynchronous (a\n * durable ledger persists behind them); reads are synchronous from the\n * hydrated working set so `score()` / `payerCheck()` stay sync in the gate hot\n * path. Mutations are explicit, atomic operations rather than a returned record\n * the caller mutates — that is what lets a durable implementation persist them.\n */\nexport interface EvidenceLedgerPort {\n  /** A payment attempt (allowed intent / presented payment). */\n  recordAttempt(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** A confirmed settlement between two subjects (credits both sides + the edge). */\n  recordSettlement(\n    a: ReputationSubject,\n    b: ReputationSubject,\n    amount: string,\n    atMs: number,\n  ): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** A refusal against a subject, by code. */\n  recordRefusal(subject: ReputationSubject, code: string, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** Managed-wallet spend with no ALLOW behind it. */\n  recordShadowSpend(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** An out-of-band dispute. */\n  recordDispute(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** An out-of-band endorsement. */\n  recordEndorsement(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Fold everything known about `alias` into `canonical` and forget the alias:\n   * counters sum, volumes add, first/last seen widen, and settled-money edges\n   * re-key on BOTH endpoints (peers that pointed at the alias now point at the\n   * canonical subject). No-op when the alias has no record — which makes\n   * re-asserting links at boot idempotent. This is the identity-linking\n   * primitive (ERC-8004: one on-chain identity, many addresses/ids).\n   */\n  merge(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): MaybePromise<void>;\n  get(subject: ReputationSubject): SubjectEvidence | undefined;\n  getByKey(key: string): SubjectEvidence | undefined;\n  all(): IterableIterator<SubjectEvidence>;\n  readonly size: number;\n  /**\n   * Await any pending durable writes (no-op in memory). Durable\n   * implementations surface write failures HERE — the graph fire-and-forgets\n   * its writes (a bus handler cannot await), so flush() is the error channel.\n   */\n  flush?(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** The evidence store: one record per subject, created on first sighting. */\nexport class EvidenceLedger implements EvidenceLedgerPort {\n  private readonly records = new Map<string, SubjectEvidence>();\n\n  recordAttempt(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).attempts += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordSettlement(\n    a: ReputationSubject,\n    b: ReputationSubject,\n    amount: string,\n    atMs: number,\n  ): void {\n    for (const [subject, other] of [\n      [a, b],\n      [b, a],\n    ] as const) {\n      const ev = this.touch(subject, atMs);\n      ev.settled += 1;\n      ev.volume = sumDecimal([ev.volume, amount]);\n      const key = subjectKey(other);\n      const line = ev.counterparties.get(key) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n      line.settled += 1;\n      line.volume = sumDecimal([line.volume, amount]);\n      ev.counterparties.set(key, line);\n    }\n  }\n\n  recordRefusal(subject: ReputationSubject, code: string, atMs: number): void {\n    const ev = this.touch(subject, atMs);\n    ev.refusals[code] = (ev.refusals[code] ?? 0) + 1;\n  }\n\n  recordShadowSpend(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).shadowSpends += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordDispute(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).disputes += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordEndorsement(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).endorsements += 1;\n  }\n\n  merge(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): void {\n    const aliasKey = subjectKey(alias);\n    const canonicalKey = subjectKey(canonical);\n    const from = this.records.get(aliasKey);\n    if (!from || aliasKey === canonicalKey) return;\n    // The canonical side may have no record yet — the alias's history becomes\n    // its history (same create shape as touch, seeded with the alias's window).\n    const into = this.records.get(canonicalKey) ?? this.touch(canonical, from.firstSeenMs);\n    into.firstSeenMs = Math.min(into.firstSeenMs, from.firstSeenMs);\n    into.lastSeenMs = Math.max(into.lastSeenMs, from.lastSeenMs);\n    into.attempts += from.attempts;\n    into.settled += from.settled;\n    into.volume = sumDecimal([into.volume, from.volume]);\n    for (const [code, count] of Object.entries(from.refusals)) {\n      into.refusals[code] = (into.refusals[code] ?? 0) + count;\n    }\n    into.shadowSpends += from.shadowSpends;\n    into.disputes += from.disputes;\n    into.endorsements += from.endorsements;\n    for (const [peerKey, line] of from.counterparties) {\n      if (peerKey === canonicalKey) continue; // a self-edge would score the subject by itself\n      const existing = into.counterparties.get(peerKey) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n      existing.settled += line.settled;\n      existing.volume = sumDecimal([existing.volume, line.volume]);\n      into.counterparties.set(peerKey, existing);\n      // Re-key the peer's reverse edge: alias -> canonical.\n      const peer = this.records.get(peerKey);\n      const held = peer?.counterparties.get(aliasKey);\n      if (peer && held) {\n        peer.counterparties.delete(aliasKey);\n        const reverse = peer.counterparties.get(canonicalKey) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n        reverse.settled += held.settled;\n        reverse.volume = sumDecimal([reverse.volume, held.volume]);\n        peer.counterparties.set(canonicalKey, reverse);\n      }\n    }\n    into.counterparties.delete(aliasKey);\n    this.records.delete(aliasKey);\n  }\n\n  get(subject: ReputationSubject): SubjectEvidence | undefined {\n    return this.records.get(subjectKey(subject));\n  }\n\n  getByKey(key: string): SubjectEvidence | undefined {\n    return this.records.get(key);\n  }\n\n  all(): IterableIterator<SubjectEvidence> {\n    return this.records.values();\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.records.size;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Insert a fully-formed record verbatim — the hydration primitive a durable\n   * store uses to rebuild the working set on open. Bypasses the live counters\n   * (the record already holds its accumulated state and timestamps).\n   */\n  load(record: SubjectEvidence): void {\n    this.records.set(subjectKey(record.subject), record);\n  }\n\n  /** Get-or-create the record for a subject and stamp first/last seen. */\n  private touch(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): SubjectEvidence {\n    const key = subjectKey(subject);\n    let record = this.records.get(key);\n    if (!record) {\n      record = {\n        subject: normalizeSubject(subject),\n        firstSeenMs: atMs,\n        lastSeenMs: atMs,\n        attempts: 0,\n        settled: 0,\n        volume: '0',\n        refusals: {},\n        shadowSpends: 0,\n        disputes: 0,\n        endorsements: 0,\n        counterparties: new Map(),\n      };\n      this.records.set(key, record);\n    }\n    if (atMs < record.firstSeenMs) record.firstSeenMs = atMs;\n    if (atMs > record.lastSeenMs) record.lastSeenMs = atMs;\n    return record;\n  }\n}\n","import type { MaybePromise } from './evidence.js';\n\n/**\n * What an `intent.created` event tells us, kept until the matching\n * `payment.settled` (which carries only an intentId) can be attributed.\n */\nexport interface IntentFacts {\n  agentId: string;\n  host: string;\n  amount: string;\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Bridges `intent.created` -> later `payment.settled`/`decision.made`. A\n * `payment.settled` event names only an intentId, so the graph remembers every\n * undecided intent until it settles. Bounded (oldest-evicted) so undecided\n * intents that never settle cannot leak. Writes may be async (a durable store\n * persists them so an in-flight intent survives a restart); reads are sync.\n */\nexport interface IntentCorrelationPort {\n  remember(intentId: string, facts: IntentFacts): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** Read the facts without consuming them (decision.made reads, doesn't burn). */\n  peek(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined;\n  /** Read and consume (payment.settled attributes once, then forgets). */\n  take(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined;\n  readonly size: number;\n  /**\n   * Await any pending durable writes (no-op in memory). Durable\n   * implementations surface write failures HERE — the graph fire-and-forgets\n   * its writes, so flush() is the error channel.\n   */\n  flush?(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** In-memory correlation map with FIFO eviction once `limit` is reached. */\nexport class InMemoryIntentStore implements IntentCorrelationPort {\n  private readonly intents = new Map<string, IntentFacts>();\n\n  constructor(private readonly limit: number = DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT) {}\n\n  remember(intentId: string, facts: IntentFacts): void {\n    // Re-remembering an existing id is an update, not a new entry — evicting\n    // for it would shrink the working set below the bound (and desync a\n    // durable mirror, whose upsert adds no row). Updates keep their position,\n    // matching an SQL upsert leaving seq unchanged.\n    if (!this.intents.has(intentId) && this.intents.size >= this.limit) {\n      const oldest = this.intents.keys().next().value;\n      if (oldest !== undefined) this.intents.delete(oldest);\n    }\n    this.intents.set(intentId, facts);\n  }\n\n  peek(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined {\n    return this.intents.get(intentId);\n  }\n\n  take(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined {\n    const facts = this.intents.get(intentId);\n    if (facts) this.intents.delete(intentId);\n    return facts;\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.intents.size;\n  }\n}\n","import type { ReputationComponents } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport type { SubjectEvidence } from './evidence.js';\n\n/**\n * Component weights, summing to 1. The blend is a deliberately transparent\n * heuristic: every component is 0–100 with higher = healthier, so a score is\n * readable straight off its explanation. Sophistication can replace this\n * later without touching the evidence model — scores are pure functions of\n * evidence, never stored.\n */\nexport interface ScoreWeights {\n  volume: number;\n  longevity: number;\n  disputeRate: number;\n  counterpartyQuality: number;\n  settlementReliability: number;\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_WEIGHTS: ScoreWeights = {\n  settlementReliability: 0.3,\n  disputeRate: 0.3,\n  volume: 0.15,\n  counterpartyQuality: 0.15,\n  longevity: 0.1,\n};\n\nconst DAY_MS = 86_400_000;\n\n/**\n * How much one bad observation hurts, relative to a plain refusal. Disputes\n * and shadow spends are deliberate misconduct; a replay means someone tried\n * to spend the same money twice; the rest is sloppiness.\n */\nconst BADNESS = { dispute: 4, shadowSpend: 4, replay: 3, refusal: 1, endorsementCredit: 2 };\n\nconst REPLAY_CODES = new Set(['payment_replayed', 'decision_replayed']);\n\nfunction clamp(value: number, lo: number, hi: number): number {\n  return Math.min(hi, Math.max(lo, value));\n}\n\nfunction refusalCounts(ev: SubjectEvidence): { replays: number; others: number } {\n  let replays = 0;\n  let others = 0;\n  for (const [code, count] of Object.entries(ev.refusals)) {\n    if (REPLAY_CODES.has(code)) replays += count;\n    else others += count;\n  }\n  return { replays, others };\n}\n\n/** Saturating settled-transaction volume: 0 at none, ~63 at 20, ~92 at 50. */\nexport function volumeComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  return 100 * (1 - Math.exp(-ev.settled / 20));\n}\n\n/** How long the subject has been known: linear to 100 at 30 days. */\nexport function longevityComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n  const knownDays = Math.max(0, nowMs - ev.firstSeenMs) / DAY_MS;\n  return 100 * Math.min(1, knownDays / 30);\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispute hygiene (the core field is named `disputeRate`; the component is\n * stored INVERTED — 100 = a clean record — so all five components blend in\n * the same direction). Weighted badness over total interactions; manual\n * endorsements buy back a little slack.\n */\nexport function disputeComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  const { replays, others } = refusalCounts(ev);\n  const badness = Math.max(\n    0,\n    ev.disputes * BADNESS.dispute +\n      ev.shadowSpends * BADNESS.shadowSpend +\n      replays * BADNESS.replay +\n      others * BADNESS.refusal -\n      ev.endorsements * BADNESS.endorsementCredit,\n  );\n  const interactions = Math.max(1, ev.attempts + ev.disputes + ev.endorsements);\n  return 100 * Math.max(0, 1 - badness / interactions);\n}\n\n/** Settled / attempted. No attempts yet = neutral 50, not perfect 100. */\nexport function reliabilityComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  if (ev.attempts === 0) return 50;\n  return 100 * Math.min(1, ev.settled / ev.attempts);\n}\n\n/**\n * Confidence is first-class (see core ReputationScore): a thin or brand-new\n * history yields LOW confidence rather than a misleading score, so consumers\n * (engine sync, gate screening) can refuse to act on it. Depth of evidence\n * saturates around 10 observations; age stops mattering after a week.\n *\n * The 0.1 age floor is load-bearing for fairness. Both consumers act at a 0.3\n * confidence floor (`syncVendors`, `payerCheck`), so capping a day-0 subject at\n * 0.1 makes first-day enforcement impossible BY CONSTRUCTION rather than by\n * arithmetic luck. It used to be 0.4, which left day-0 subjects enforceable\n * after only 14 observations — `depth` saturates so fast that a busy vendor\n * cleared that in seconds, and the console's own vendor sat at 0.30136 against\n * the 0.3 floor, i.e. inside the newcomer grace period by 0.0014. Enforcement\n * now needs roughly 1.6 days (high volume) to 2.3 days (moderate) of history:\n * a grace period measured in time, which is what \"newcomer\" means.\n *\n * Note the constant only ever applies to subjects younger than a week — past\n * 7 days `min(1, d/7)` saturates and age is 1.0 under any floor — so lowering\n * it leaves every mature score bit-for-bit unchanged.\n */\nexport function confidence(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n  const { replays, others } = refusalCounts(ev);\n  const observations =\n    ev.attempts + ev.disputes + ev.endorsements + ev.shadowSpends + replays + others;\n  const depth = 1 - Math.exp(-observations / 10);\n  const knownDays = Math.max(0, nowMs - ev.firstSeenMs) / DAY_MS;\n  const age = 0.1 + 0.9 * Math.min(1, knownDays / 7);\n  return clamp(depth * age, 0, 1);\n}\n\n/** Blend all five components into the headline 0–100 score. */\nexport function blend(components: ReputationComponents, weights: ScoreWeights): number {\n  const total =\n    components.volume * weights.volume +\n    components.longevity * weights.longevity +\n    components.disputeRate * weights.disputeRate +\n    components.counterpartyQuality * weights.counterpartyQuality +\n    components.settlementReliability * weights.settlementReliability;\n  return clamp(Math.round(total), 0, 100);\n}\n\n/**\n * The one-hop base score: the blend WITHOUT counterpartyQuality, with the\n * remaining weights renormalized. Counterparty quality for subject A averages\n * the base scores of A's counterparties — base, not full, so the computation\n * is a single hop and cycles (A pays B pays A) cannot recurse.\n */\nexport function blendBase(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number, weights: ScoreWeights): number {\n  const remaining =\n    weights.volume + weights.longevity + weights.disputeRate + weights.settlementReliability;\n  if (remaining <= 0) return 50;\n  const total =\n    volumeComponent(ev) * weights.volume +\n    longevityComponent(ev, nowMs) * weights.longevity +\n    disputeComponent(ev) * weights.disputeRate +\n    reliabilityComponent(ev) * weights.settlementReliability;\n  return clamp(total / remaining, 0, 100);\n}\n","import {\n  ReputationScore,\n  type Receipt,\n  type ReinEvent,\n  type ReputationComponents,\n  type ReputationSubject,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport {\n  EvidenceLedger,\n  normalizeSubject,\n  subjectKey,\n  type EvidenceLedgerPort,\n  type MaybePromise,\n  type SubjectEvidence,\n} from './evidence.js';\nimport {\n  DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT,\n  InMemoryIntentStore,\n  type IntentCorrelationPort,\n} from './intents.js';\nimport {\n  blend,\n  blendBase,\n  confidence,\n  DEFAULT_WEIGHTS,\n  disputeComponent,\n  longevityComponent,\n  reliabilityComponent,\n  volumeComponent,\n  type ScoreWeights,\n} from './scoring.js';\n\n/** Anything with a Rein event bus: engine, indexer, gate, signer. */\nexport interface EventSource {\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate refusal codes that are the vendor's throttle or the vendor's rails\n * failing — not payer misbehavior. They must never become reputation evidence\n * (see the `gate.refused` case below). Mirrors @reinconsole/gate's no-fault classes;\n * kept as strings because the event schema deliberately carries codes as\n * strings (remote gates may run other versions).\n */\nconst NO_FAULT_GATE_CODES = new Set([\n  'rate_limited',\n  'velocity_exceeded',\n  'rails_unavailable',\n  'settle_unknown',\n  'price_unavailable',\n  'price_ceiling',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Where vendor scores land. `PolicyEngine.spend` satisfies this structurally,\n * so `graph.syncVendors(engine.spend)` closes the loop — durable when the\n * engine runs on @reinconsole/store.\n */\nexport interface VendorReputationSink {\n  setVendorReputation(host: string, score: number): void | Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface ReputationGraphOptions {\n  weights?: Partial<ScoreWeights>;\n  /** Injectable clock (scores are functions of evidence AND time). */\n  now?: () => Date;\n  /**\n   * Max undecided intents remembered for settlement correlation. Ignored when\n   * a custom `intents` store is injected (that store owns its own bound).\n   */\n  correlationLimit?: number;\n  /**\n   * Durable evidence ledger. Defaults to in-memory; @reinconsole/store provides a\n   * PGlite-backed one so scores survive a restart.\n   */\n  ledger?: EvidenceLedgerPort;\n  /** Durable intent correlation store. Defaults to in-memory (bounded by `correlationLimit`). */\n  intents?: IntentCorrelationPort;\n}\n\nexport interface ManualReport {\n  subject: ReputationSubject;\n  kind: 'dispute' | 'endorsement';\n  /** When the incident happened (defaults to now). */\n  at?: Date;\n  note?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SyncedVendorScore {\n  host: string;\n  score: number;\n  confidence: number;\n}\n\nexport interface SyncOptions {\n  /**\n   * Scores below this confidence are NOT pushed — the evaluator treats an\n   * unknown reputation as indeterminate (never triggers vendorReputationLt),\n   * and a thin history must stay unknown rather than condemn a newcomer.\n   */\n  minConfidence?: number;\n}\n\n/** A score plus the raw evidence it was derived from, render-ready. */\nexport interface ReputationExplanation {\n  score: ReputationScore;\n  weights: ScoreWeights;\n  evidence: {\n    attempts: number;\n    settled: number;\n    volume: string;\n    refusals: Record<string, number>;\n    shadowSpends: number;\n    disputes: number;\n    endorsements: number;\n    firstSeen: Date;\n    lastSeen: Date;\n    counterparties: { subject: ReputationSubject; settled: number; volume: string }[];\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The Rein reputation graph (Phase 3). Subscribes to the event buses both\n * sides already publish — the engine/indexer name vendors by host and agents\n * by id; a gate names payers by wallet — and accumulates per-subject evidence:\n * settlements, refusals, shadow spends, manual disputes, and settled-money\n * edges between counterparties. Scores are computed on demand (never stored)\n * from that evidence, so every number is explainable, and they feed back into\n * enforcement on both sides of the wire:\n *\n *   graph.syncVendors(engine.spend)  -> policies with vendorReputationLt fire\n *   screen: { check: payerCheck(graph) } -> a gate turns away low-rep wallets\n *\n * Event mapping notes: engine-side evidence keys agents by ULID and vendors by\n * host; gate-side evidence keys payers by wallet and recipients by payTo\n * address — distinct subjects, so feeding one graph from BOTH buses (the\n * console world) never double-counts. `payment.settled` carries only an\n * intentId, so the graph keeps a bounded intent.created correlation map.\n * Denied decisions are deliberately NOT held against anyone: a deny means\n * policy worked, not that the agent or vendor misbehaved.\n */\nexport class ReputationGraph {\n  private readonly ledger: EvidenceLedgerPort;\n  private readonly intents: IntentCorrelationPort;\n  private readonly weights: ScoreWeights;\n  private readonly now: () => Date;\n  /** aliasKey -> canonical subject. Links are derived state (an agent registry\n   * or ERC-8004 lookup knows them) — re-assert at boot; merges are idempotent. */\n  private readonly aliases = new Map<string, ReputationSubject>();\n\n  constructor(options: ReputationGraphOptions = {}) {\n    this.weights = { ...DEFAULT_WEIGHTS, ...options.weights };\n    this.now = options.now ?? (() => new Date());\n    this.ledger = options.ledger ?? new EvidenceLedger();\n    this.intents =\n      options.intents ??\n      new InMemoryIntentStore(options.correlationLimit ?? DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT);\n  }\n\n  /** Subscribe to a bus. Returns `this` so construction chains. */\n  observe(source: EventSource): this {\n    source.onEvent((event) => this.ingest(event));\n    return this;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fire-and-forget a port write: bus handlers cannot await, and a rejecting\n   * durable write must never become an unhandled rejection (Node kills the\n   * process). Failures are the port's to surface — flush() throws them.\n   */\n  private fire(write: () => MaybePromise<void>): void {\n    // Thunk form (parity with the gate's fire, S19): a ledger that THROWS\n    // synchronously must not turn an ingest into a crash — telemetry failures\n    // are the port's to surface, and flush() throws them.\n    try {\n      void Promise.resolve(write()).catch(() => undefined);\n    } catch {\n      // swallowed by design — see above\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Declare that `alias` is the same real-world party as `canonical` (the\n   * ERC-8004 identity story: one identity, many addresses/ids — an engine\n   * agent's ULID and its paying wallet, or a vendor's host and its payTo\n   * address). Everything already known about the alias is folded into the\n   * canonical subject, and all future evidence and lookups for the alias\n   * resolve to it. Idempotent — re-asserting known links at boot is free.\n   */\n  link(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): void {\n    const target = normalizeSubject(this.resolve(canonical)); // flatten chains\n    const aliasKey = subjectKey(alias);\n    if (subjectKey(target) === aliasKey) return;\n    this.aliases.set(aliasKey, target);\n    // Repoint any alias that resolved THROUGH this alias (a->b then b->c).\n    for (const [key, resolved] of this.aliases) {\n      if (subjectKey(resolved) === aliasKey) this.aliases.set(key, target);\n    }\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.merge(target, alias));\n  }\n\n  /** The canonical subject for a possibly-aliased one. */\n  private resolve(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationSubject {\n    return this.aliases.get(subjectKey(subject)) ?? subject;\n  }\n\n  ingest(event: ReinEvent): void {\n    const atMs = event.at.getTime();\n    switch (event.type) {\n      case 'intent.created': {\n        this.fire(() =>\n          this.intents.remember(event.intent.id, {\n            agentId: event.intent.agentId,\n            host: event.intent.vendor.host,\n            amount: event.intent.amount,\n          }),\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'decision.made': {\n        if (event.decision.outcome !== 'allow') return;\n        const facts = this.intents.peek(event.decision.intentId);\n        if (!facts) return;\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: facts.agentId }), atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: facts.host }), atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'payment.settled': {\n        const facts = this.intents.take(event.payment.intentId);\n        if (!facts) return; // unattributable — no subject to credit\n        const agent = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: facts.agentId });\n        const vendor = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: facts.host });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(agent, vendor, facts.amount, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'shadow.spend': {\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordShadowSpend(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.agentId }), atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'signature.refused': {\n        const agentId = event.agentId; // hoisted: narrowing must survive the thunk\n        if (!agentId) return;\n        this.fire(() =>\n          this.ledger.recordRefusal(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: agentId }), event.code, atMs),\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'gate.settled': {\n        const payer = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.receipt.payer });\n        const recipient = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: event.receipt.payTo });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(payer, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(recipient, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(payer, recipient, event.receipt.amount, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'gate.refused': {\n        // No-fault refusals carry NO evidence — the gate-side parallel of\n        // \"denied decisions count against no one\". Throttle codes are the\n        // VENDOR'S cap (one gate's rate limit must not bleed into a payer's\n        // global score); rails codes are the vendor's infrastructure failing\n        // (a settle_unknown payment may even have gone through). Not even the\n        // attempt is recorded: an attempt with no settlement would silently\n        // drag settlementReliability down.\n        if (!event.payer || NO_FAULT_GATE_CODES.has(event.code)) return;\n        const payer = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.payer });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(payer, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordRefusal(payer, event.code, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      // signature.released and gate.quoted carry no evidence the engine-side\n      // events don't already: released duplicates the allow that preceded it,\n      // and a quote names no payer.\n      case 'signature.released':\n      case 'gate.quoted':\n        return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Agent-side alternative to observing the engine bus: feed the SDK guard's\n   * onReceipt straight in. Connect events OR receipts per side, not both —\n   * a receipt restates the decision/settlement the bus already carried.\n   */\n  ingestReceipt(receipt: Receipt): void {\n    if (receipt.outcome !== 'allow') return; // policy verdicts are not subject badness\n    const atMs = receipt.createdAt.getTime();\n    const agent = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: receipt.agentId });\n    const vendor = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: receipt.vendorHost });\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(agent, atMs));\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(vendor, atMs));\n    if (receipt.settlement?.txHash) {\n      this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(agent, vendor, receipt.amount, atMs));\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Record an out-of-band dispute or endorsement against a subject. */\n  report(input: ManualReport): void {\n    const atMs = (input.at ?? this.now()).getTime();\n    const subject = this.resolve(input.subject);\n    if (input.kind === 'dispute') this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordDispute(subject, atMs));\n    else this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordEndorsement(subject, atMs));\n  }\n\n  /** Await any pending durable writes (no-op for in-memory stores). */\n  async flush(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.ledger.flush?.();\n    await this.intents.flush?.();\n  }\n\n  /** The score for one subject, or undefined when nothing is known (fairness).\n   *  Aliased subjects resolve to their canonical identity — a linked wallet\n   *  answers with the merged history, on both sides of the wire. */\n  score(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationScore | undefined {\n    const ev = this.ledger.get(this.resolve(subject));\n    return ev && this.scoreOf(ev);\n  }\n\n  /** All known scores, best first. */\n  scores(kind?: ReputationSubject['kind']): ReputationScore[] {\n    const out: ReputationScore[] = [];\n    for (const ev of this.ledger.all()) {\n      if (kind && ev.subject.kind !== kind) continue;\n      out.push(this.scoreOf(ev));\n    }\n    return out.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score);\n  }\n\n  /** The score plus the raw evidence behind it. */\n  explain(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationExplanation | undefined {\n    const ev = this.ledger.get(this.resolve(subject));\n    if (!ev) return undefined;\n    return {\n      score: this.scoreOf(ev),\n      weights: this.weights,\n      evidence: {\n        attempts: ev.attempts,\n        settled: ev.settled,\n        volume: ev.volume,\n        refusals: { ...ev.refusals },\n        shadowSpends: ev.shadowSpends,\n        disputes: ev.disputes,\n        endorsements: ev.endorsements,\n        firstSeen: new Date(ev.firstSeenMs),\n        lastSeen: new Date(ev.lastSeenMs),\n        counterparties: [...ev.counterparties.entries()].map(([key, line]) => {\n          const [kind, ...id] = key.split(':');\n          return {\n            subject: { kind: kind as ReputationSubject['kind'], id: id.join(':') },\n            settled: line.settled,\n            volume: line.volume,\n          };\n        }),\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Push every vendor score that clears the confidence floor into the engine's\n   * spend store (or any sink). Returns what was pushed. Low-confidence scores\n   * are withheld so `vendorReputationLt` keeps treating thin histories as\n   * unknown — the evaluator's no-data-no-trigger rule stays intact end to end.\n   */\n  async syncVendors(\n    sink: VendorReputationSink,\n    options: SyncOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<SyncedVendorScore[]> {\n    const minConfidence = options.minConfidence ?? 0.3;\n    const pushed: SyncedVendorScore[] = [];\n    for (const ev of this.ledger.all()) {\n      if (ev.subject.kind !== 'vendor') continue;\n      const score = this.scoreOf(ev);\n      if (score.confidence < minConfidence) continue;\n      await sink.setVendorReputation(ev.subject.id, score.score);\n      pushed.push({ host: ev.subject.id, score: score.score, confidence: score.confidence });\n    }\n    return pushed;\n  }\n\n  /** Number of subjects with evidence. */\n  subjects(): number {\n    return this.ledger.size;\n  }\n\n  private scoreOf(ev: SubjectEvidence): ReputationScore {\n    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();\n    const components: ReputationComponents = {\n      volume: volumeComponent(ev),\n      longevity: longevityComponent(ev, nowMs),\n      disputeRate: disputeComponent(ev),\n      counterpartyQuality: this.counterpartyQuality(ev, nowMs),\n      settlementReliability: reliabilityComponent(ev),\n    };\n    return ReputationScore.parse({\n      subject: ev.subject,\n      score: blend(components, this.weights),\n      components,\n      confidence: confidence(ev, nowMs),\n      asOf: new Date(nowMs),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** One-hop mean of the counterparties' base scores; neutral 50 when alone. */\n  private counterpartyQuality(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n    if (ev.counterparties.size === 0) return 50;\n    let total = 0;\n    for (const key of ev.counterparties.keys()) {\n      const other = this.ledger.getByKey(key);\n      total += other ? blendBase(other, nowMs, this.weights) : 50;\n    }\n    return total / ev.counterparties.size;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PayerCheckOptions {\n  /** Refuse payers scoring below this (default 40). */\n  denyBelow?: number;\n  /** Ignore scores below this confidence (default 0.3) — newcomers pass. */\n  minConfidence?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reputation-driven gate screening: plugs into @reinconsole/gate's `screen.check`.\n * Unknown wallets and thin histories pass (same fairness rule as the engine\n * sync); a confident low score is turned away at the door, before any\n * facilitator round-trip.\n */\nexport function payerCheck(\n  graph: ReputationGraph,\n  options: PayerCheckOptions = {},\n): (payer: string) => string | undefined {\n  const denyBelow = options.denyBelow ?? 40;\n  const minConfidence = options.minConfidence ?? 0.3;\n  return (payer) => {\n    const score = graph.score({ kind: 'agent', id: payer });\n    if (!score || score.confidence < minConfidence) return undefined;\n    if (score.score >= denyBelow) return undefined;\n    return `payer reputation ${score.score} is below this gate's floor of ${denyBelow}`;\n  };\n}\n","import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nimport { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReinEvent, ReputationSubject } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { ApiKeyAuth, AuthError } from '@reinconsole/core/auth';\nimport { ReputationGraph } from './graph.js';\n\nconst ReportInput = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  kind: z.enum(['dispute', 'endorsement']),\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  note: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\n\nconst ScoresQuery = z.object({ kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']).optional() });\n\nconst LinkInput = z\n  .object({\n    canonical: ReputationSubject,\n    alias: ReputationSubject,\n  })\n  // Merging across kinds would delete a vendor row into an agent identity\n  // (silently dropping the host from syncVendors) — always a caller bug.\n  .refine((l) => l.canonical.kind === l.alias.kind, {\n    message: 'canonical and alias must be the same kind',\n  });\n\nexport interface GraphServerOptions {\n  /**\n   * API-key authentication for the WRITE routes. Omit for embedded use (the\n   * console world holds the graph object directly) or for a loopback-only\n   * process; pass an {@link ApiKeyAuth} and every write demands a `report`\n   * scope while reads stay open.\n   */\n  auth?: ApiKeyAuth;\n}\n\n/** Writes accept evidence; reads only reflect it back. */\nfunction isWrite(method: string): boolean {\n  return method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD' && method !== 'OPTIONS';\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the graph HTTP API. Remote producers POST their events here; anyone\n * can read scores with the evidence behind them. Pass a graph for tests, or\n * let it create a fresh in-memory one.\n *\n * READS ARE OPEN BY DESIGN and that is the whole point of a reputation graph:\n * a score nobody can read governs nothing. WRITES are the asymmetry — an event\n * posted here becomes evidence about a subject that did not post it — so when\n * `auth` is supplied they require the `report` scope. Without `auth` the server\n * is exactly as open as it always was, which is why the bins that expose it\n * refuse a public bind unless a key exists or the operator says otherwise.\n */\nexport function buildGraphServer(\n  graph: ReputationGraph = new ReputationGraph(),\n  options: GraphServerOptions = {},\n): FastifyInstance {\n  const app = Fastify({ logger: false });\n  const auth = options.auth;\n\n  // Turn ZodErrors into clean 400s instead of 500s.\n  app.setErrorHandler((err: unknown, _req, reply) => {\n    if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {\n      return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'validation_error', issues: err.issues });\n    }\n    if (AuthError.is(err)) {\n      return reply.status(err.status).send({ error: err.code, message: err.message });\n    }\n    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    return reply.status(500).send({ error: 'internal_error', message });\n  });\n\n  // Auth runs before routing, so an unknown write path cannot leak whether it\n  // exists. A missing credential is a 401 with a challenge, never a silent\n  // pass and never a 404 pretending the route moved.\n  if (auth) {\n    app.addHook('onRequest', async (req, reply) => {\n      if (!isWrite(req.method)) return;\n      try {\n        auth.authenticate(req.headers, 'report');\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (AuthError.is(err)) {\n          if (err.status === 401) reply.header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer realm=\"rein-graph\"');\n          return reply.status(err.status).send({ error: err.code, message: err.message });\n        }\n        throw err;\n      }\n      return;\n    });\n  }\n\n  app.get('/health', () => ({\n    status: 'ok',\n    subjects: graph.subjects(),\n    // Advertised so a producer can tell \"this graph wants a key\" apart from\n    // \"my key is wrong\" without guessing from a 401.\n    auth: auth ? 'api-key' : 'none',\n  }));\n\n  // --- Ingestion ---\n  // The HTTP path can await durability even though the in-process bus path\n  // cannot — flush the durable writes before answering so a POST that returns\n  // 200 is persisted.\n  app.post('/v1/events', async (req) => {\n    const events = z.union([ReinEvent.transform((e) => [e]), z.array(ReinEvent)]).parse(req.body);\n    for (const event of events) graph.ingest(event);\n    await graph.flush();\n    return { ingested: events.length };\n  });\n\n  app.post('/v1/reports', async (req) => {\n    const input = ReportInput.parse(req.body);\n    graph.report(input);\n    await graph.flush();\n    return graph.score(input.subject);\n  });\n\n  // --- Identity links ---\n  // Unverified by DESIGN: this endpoint's trust level equals POST /v1/events —\n  // whoever can post events can already fabricate the evidence itself. On-chain\n  // verification belongs to the CALLER (@reinconsole/erc8004 derives link facts from\n  // the Identity Registry, then asserts them here).\n  app.post('/v1/links', async (req) => {\n    const links = z.union([LinkInput.transform((l) => [l]), z.array(LinkInput)]).parse(req.body);\n    for (const link of links) graph.link(link.canonical, link.alias);\n    await graph.flush(); // durable merges land before the 200 (same contract as /v1/events)\n    return { linked: links.length };\n  });\n\n  // --- Scores ---\n  app.get('/v1/scores', (req) => {\n    const { kind } = ScoresQuery.parse(req.query);\n    return graph.scores(kind);\n  });\n\n  app.get('/v1/scores/:kind/:id', (req, reply) => {\n    const subject = ReputationSubject.parse(req.params);\n    const explanation = graph.explain(subject);\n    if (!explanation) {\n      return reply\n        .status(404)\n        .send({ error: 'not_found', message: `no evidence for ${subject.kind} ${subject.id}` });\n    }\n    return explanation;\n  });\n\n  return app;\n}\n\nconst LOOPBACK = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1', '[::1]']);\n\n/**\n * Build the graph's auth layer from the environment, or explain why there is\n * none. `REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY` seeds one or more comma-separated secrets.\n *\n * They are seeded with `report` and nothing else: the graph has no key-issuing\n * routes to bootstrap (unlike the engine, which seeds `admin` so `/v1/keys` is\n * reachable), so an `admin` secret here would grant authority no route needs.\n */\nexport async function graphAuthFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Promise<ApiKeyAuth | undefined> {\n  const raw = env['REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY']?.trim();\n  if (!raw) return undefined;\n  const auth = new ApiKeyAuth();\n  const secrets = raw\n    .split(',')\n    .map((secret) => secret.trim())\n    .filter(Boolean);\n  for (const [i, secret] of secrets.entries()) {\n    await auth.issue({ name: `env-key-${i + 1}`, scopes: ['report'], secret });\n  }\n  return auth.hasKeys() ? auth : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Where a graph process binds, given whether auth exists.\n *\n * Until D1(a) the graph had no key to trade, so the only trade available was a\n * statement: `REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1`. Now that writes can demand a `report` key,\n * the rule matches the engine's — a key buys a public bind, and asking for one\n * without a key is a startup ERROR rather than a warning. `REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1`\n * survives as the deliberate override for an open graph, because a read-only\n * showcase is a real deployment and reads were never the exposure.\n */\nexport function resolveGraphHost(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  hasAuth = false,\n): { host: string; warning?: string } {\n  const requested = env['HOST']?.trim();\n  const optedIn = env['REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC']?.trim() === '1';\n  if (hasAuth) return { host: requested || '0.0.0.0' };\n  if (optedIn) {\n    return {\n      host: requested || '0.0.0.0',\n      warning:\n        'REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1 — this reputation graph is answering unauthenticated requests. ' +\n        'Anyone who can reach it can write evidence that moves scores.',\n    };\n  }\n  if (requested && !LOOPBACK.has(requested)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `refusing to bind ${requested}: the reputation graph has no authentication.` +\n        '\\n  Set REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY=<secret> to protect its writes, or' +\n        '\\n  set REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1 to expose an open graph deliberately.',\n    );\n  }\n  return { host: requested || '127.0.0.1' };\n}\n\n// Start the server when run directly (tsx/node), not when imported.\nfunction isMainModule(): boolean {\n  if (!process.argv[1]) return false;\n  try {\n    return realpathSync(process.argv[1]) === realpathSync(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nif (isMainModule()) {\n  const port = Number(process.env.PORT ?? 8788);\n  // This block used to default to 0.0.0.0 with no auth at all — the in-memory\n  // twin of the exposure D1 closed on the durable bin, and the more reachable\n  // of the two, since it needs no data directory to run.\n  graphAuthFromEnv(process.env)\n    .then((auth) => {\n      const { host, warning } = resolveGraphHost(process.env, auth !== undefined);\n      if (warning) console.warn(`[rein] ${warning}`);\n      const app = buildGraphServer(new ReputationGraph(), { ...(auth ? { auth } : {}) });\n      return app\n        .listen({ port, host })\n        .then(() =>\n          console.log(\n            `[rein] graph listening on http://${host}:${port} (auth: ${auth ? 'api-key' : 'none'})`,\n          ),\n        );\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      console.error(err);\n      process.exit(1);\n    });\n}\n","import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { ApiKeyRecord, toPublicApiKey, type ApiKey, type ApiKeyScope } from './api-key.js';\nimport { newId } from './ulid.js';\n\n/**\n * API-key authentication for a Rein service's HTTP surface.\n *\n * Secrets are never stored: a service keeps sha256 digests, so a leaked\n * database yields nothing that authenticates. A secret is returned exactly\n * once, at issuance. Rotation mints a new secret while keeping the outgoing\n * digest valid for a grace window, so a fleet rolls over without a flag-day\n * restart.\n *\n * This lives in core, beside the {@link ApiKeyRecord} schema it reads and\n * writes, because three services need the SAME answer to \"who is calling and\n * may they do this\" — the engine, the signer's admin surface, and the graph's\n * ingestion routes. Two implementations of authentication is two things to get\n * wrong. It is reached as `@reinconsole/core/auth` rather than through the\n * package barrel ON PURPOSE: the barrel is imported by the console's BROWSER\n * bundle, and every symbol below needs `node:crypto`.\n */\n\n/** A port may answer synchronously (in memory) or not (durable). */\nexport type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>;\n\n/** The presented-secret prefix, so a leaked key is greppable in logs and repos. */\nconst SECRET_PREFIX = 'rk_';\n\n/** How often a key's `lastUsedAt` is written through. Telemetry, not authority. */\nconst TOUCH_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;\n\n/** Default rotation overlap: long enough to redeploy, short enough to matter. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS = 3_600_000; // 1h\n\nexport function mintSecret(): string {\n  return SECRET_PREFIX + randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n}\n\nexport function hashSecret(secret: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/** Digest comparison that does not leak a prefix match through timing. */\nfunction digestsEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const left = Buffer.from(a, 'hex');\n  const right = Buffer.from(b, 'hex');\n  return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time comparison of a presented secret against an expected one.\n *\n * Both sides are hashed first, so the comparison is over two fixed-length\n * digests: `timingSafeEqual` throws on a length mismatch, which would\n * otherwise turn \"wrong length\" into a distinguishable error and leak the\n * secret's size. This is what a service holding ONE static shared secret\n * needs — a key store is the {@link ApiKeyAuth} path above. It lives here so\n * the signer's admin token and the engine's keys agree on what a constant-time\n * secret check is; the signer had its own copy until S52.\n */\nexport function secretsEqual(presented: string, expected: string): boolean {\n  return digestsEqual(hashSecret(presented), hashSecret(expected));\n}\n\n/**\n * Persistence seam for keys, mirroring the engine's other ports. Auth is\n * authority state, so writes are persist-then-cache: `put` is awaited before a\n * key counts as issued, rotated, or revoked.\n */\nexport interface ApiKeyStorePort {\n  put(record: ApiKeyRecord): MaybePromise<void>;\n  get(id: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined;\n  /** Lookup by sha256 of a presented secret (current OR in-grace previous). */\n  byHash(hash: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined;\n  list(): ApiKeyRecord[];\n}\n\nexport class InMemoryApiKeyStore implements ApiKeyStorePort {\n  private readonly byId = new Map<string, ApiKeyRecord>();\n  private readonly hashes = new Map<string, string>(); // secretHash -> keyId\n\n  put(record: ApiKeyRecord): void {\n    const existing = this.byId.get(record.id);\n    if (existing) {\n      this.hashes.delete(existing.secretHash);\n      if (existing.previousSecretHash) this.hashes.delete(existing.previousSecretHash);\n    }\n    this.byId.set(record.id, record);\n    this.hashes.set(record.secretHash, record.id);\n    if (record.previousSecretHash) this.hashes.set(record.previousSecretHash, record.id);\n  }\n\n  get(id: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined {\n    return this.byId.get(id);\n  }\n\n  byHash(hash: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined {\n    const id = this.hashes.get(hash);\n    return id === undefined ? undefined : this.byId.get(id);\n  }\n\n  list(): ApiKeyRecord[] {\n    return [...this.byId.values()];\n  }\n}\n\nexport type AuthFailureCode =\n  | 'missing_credentials'\n  | 'invalid_key'\n  | 'key_revoked'\n  /** Past the key's `expiresAt` (a sandbox key nobody claimed). */\n  | 'key_expired'\n  | 'secret_expired'\n  | 'insufficient_scope'\n  | 'unknown_key_id'\n  /** The key is confined to an org, and the named agent is not in it. */\n  | 'agent_not_in_scope'\n  /**\n   * The key is confined to an org and the route has no tenant rule, so there\n   * is no way to confine the call. Fail closed: an unclassified route is\n   * reachable only by an unscoped operator key, exactly as an unclassified\n   * route already demands `admin`.\n   */\n  | 'route_not_scopable';\n\n/**\n * Every rejected request throws one of these. It carries the HTTP status so a\n * route never has to guess: 401 means \"we do not know who you are\", 403 means\n * \"we know, and this key may not do that\". Nothing fails open, nothing fails\n * silently.\n */\nexport class AuthError extends Error {\n  /**\n   * A brand, because `instanceof` is not enough here. Every service bundles\n   * `@reinconsole/core` into its own output (`noExternal`, for self-contained\n   * deploys), so an `ApiKeyAuth` built from one package and handed to a server\n   * in another throws an AuthError from a DIFFERENT copy of this class. An\n   * `instanceof` check in the catching service then misses it and a 401 turns\n   * into a 500 — which is what happened the first time the graph was handed\n   * the engine's auth object.\n   */\n  readonly reinAuthError = true;\n\n  constructor(\n    readonly status: 401 | 403 | 404,\n    readonly code: AuthFailureCode,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'AuthError';\n  }\n\n  /** Use this, never a bare `instanceof`, when catching across packages. */\n  static is(err: unknown): err is AuthError {\n    return (\n      err instanceof AuthError ||\n      (typeof err === 'object' &&\n        err !== null &&\n        (err as { reinAuthError?: unknown }).reinAuthError === true)\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface IssuedApiKey {\n  key: ApiKey;\n  /** The plaintext secret. Shown once, at issuance; never recoverable after. */\n  secret: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApiKeyAuthOptions {\n  store?: ApiKeyStorePort;\n  /** Injected clock, so grace-window behaviour is testable without waiting. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\nexport class ApiKeyAuth {\n  private readonly store: ApiKeyStorePort;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n\n  constructor(options: ApiKeyAuthOptions = {}) {\n    this.store = options.store ?? new InMemoryApiKeyStore();\n    this.now = options.now ?? Date.now;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a key. The secret in the result is the only copy that will exist.\n   *\n   * `orgId` confines the key to one tenant; omitting it mints the unscoped\n   * operator key that every deployment had before tenancy. `agentIds` narrows\n   * an org-scoped key to named agents and is refused without an org, because a\n   * scope with no org cannot say which policies or approvers the key may\n   * reach — and a half-defined scope is the kind that fails open.\n   */\n  async issue(input: {\n    name: string;\n    scopes: ApiKeyScope[];\n    /** Confine the key to one org. Omit for an unscoped operator key. */\n    orgId?: string;\n    /** Narrow an org-scoped key to named agents (max 64). */\n    agentIds?: string[];\n    /** Adopt a caller-supplied secret (env-seeded boot keys). */\n    secret?: string;\n    /** Stop authenticating at this instant (sandbox keys). Omit for never. */\n    expiresAt?: Date;\n  }): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    if (input.scopes.length === 0) throw new TypeError('an API key needs at least one scope');\n    if (input.agentIds?.length && input.orgId === undefined) {\n      throw new TypeError('agentIds narrows an org-scoped key; pass orgId as well');\n    }\n    const secret = input.secret ?? mintSecret();\n    const record = ApiKeyRecord.parse({\n      id: newId('key'),\n      name: input.name,\n      scopes: input.scopes,\n      ...(input.orgId !== undefined ? { orgId: input.orgId } : {}),\n      ...(input.agentIds?.length ? { agentIds: input.agentIds } : {}),\n      createdAt: new Date(this.now()),\n      ...(input.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: input.expiresAt } : {}),\n      secretHash: hashSecret(secret),\n    });\n    await this.store.put(record);\n    return { key: toPublicApiKey(record), secret };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a replacement secret for an existing key. The outgoing secret keeps\n   * working for `graceMs` so callers can be redeployed one at a time; pass 0\n   * to cut it off immediately (what a compromised secret needs).\n   */\n  async rotate(keyId: string, options: { graceMs?: number } = {}): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    if (!record) throw new AuthError(404, 'unknown_key_id', `no such key: ${keyId}`);\n    const graceMs = options.graceMs ?? DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS;\n    const secret = mintSecret();\n    const rotated: ApiKeyRecord = {\n      ...record,\n      secretHash: hashSecret(secret),\n      rotatedAt: new Date(this.now()),\n    };\n    delete rotated.previousSecretHash;\n    delete rotated.previousSecretExpiresAt;\n    if (graceMs > 0) {\n      rotated.previousSecretHash = record.secretHash;\n      rotated.previousSecretExpiresAt = new Date(this.now() + graceMs);\n    }\n    await this.store.put(rotated);\n    return { key: toPublicApiKey(rotated), secret };\n  }\n\n  async revoke(keyId: string): Promise<ApiKey | undefined> {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    if (!record) return undefined;\n    const revoked: ApiKeyRecord = { ...record, revokedAt: new Date(this.now()) };\n    await this.store.put(revoked);\n    return toPublicApiKey(revoked);\n  }\n\n  list(): ApiKey[] {\n    return this.store.list().map(toPublicApiKey);\n  }\n\n  /** One key's public record, for an ownership check before rotate/revoke. */\n  get(keyId: string): ApiKey | undefined {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    return record === undefined ? undefined : toPublicApiKey(record);\n  }\n\n  /** True once at least one key exists — what \"auth is configured\" means. */\n  hasKeys(): boolean {\n    return this.store.list().length > 0;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a request's credentials, or throw. `scope` is what the route\n   * needs; an `admin` key satisfies every scope, any other key must hold the\n   * exact one.\n   */\n  authenticate(headers: IncomingHeaders, scope: ApiKeyScope): ApiKey {\n    const presented = readCredential(headers);\n    if (presented === undefined) {\n      throw new AuthError(401, 'missing_credentials', 'missing API key (Authorization: Bearer ...)');\n    }\n\n    const hash = hashSecret(presented);\n    const record = this.store.byHash(hash);\n    if (!record) throw new AuthError(401, 'invalid_key', 'unknown API key');\n\n    if (!digestsEqual(record.secretHash, hash)) {\n      // Only the in-grace previous secret can reach here.\n      const expiry = record.previousSecretExpiresAt;\n      if (\n        record.previousSecretHash === undefined ||\n        !digestsEqual(record.previousSecretHash, hash) ||\n        expiry === undefined ||\n        this.now() >= expiry.getTime()\n      ) {\n        throw new AuthError(401, 'secret_expired', 'rotated API key secret is no longer accepted');\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (record.revokedAt) throw new AuthError(401, 'key_revoked', 'API key has been revoked');\n    if (record.expiresAt && this.now() >= record.expiresAt.getTime()) {\n      throw new AuthError(401, 'key_expired', 'API key has expired');\n    }\n\n    if (!record.scopes.includes('admin') && !record.scopes.includes(scope)) {\n      throw new AuthError(403, 'insufficient_scope', `API key lacks the \"${scope}\" scope`);\n    }\n\n    void this.touch(record);\n    return toPublicApiKey(record);\n  }\n\n  /** Throttled write-through of `lastUsedAt` — never on the critical path. */\n  private async touch(record: ApiKeyRecord): Promise<void> {\n    const at = this.now();\n    if (record.lastUsedAt && at - record.lastUsedAt.getTime() < TOUCH_INTERVAL_MS) return;\n    try {\n      await this.store.put({ ...record, lastUsedAt: new Date(at) });\n    } catch {\n      // Usage telemetry must never turn a valid request into a failed one.\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** Just enough of a request's headers to read a credential from. */\nexport interface IncomingHeaders {\n  authorization?: string | string[] | undefined;\n  'x-api-key'?: string | string[] | undefined;\n}\n\nfunction first(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;\n}\n\n/**\n * `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` is the primary form; `X-Api-Key: <secret>`\n * is accepted too, because a fair share of agent runtimes only send that.\n */\nexport function readCredential(headers: IncomingHeaders): string | undefined {\n  const auth = first(headers.authorization)?.trim();\n  if (auth) {\n    const match = /^Bearer\\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth);\n    if (match?.[1]) return match[1].trim();\n  }\n  const apiKey = first(headers['x-api-key'])?.trim();\n  return apiKey === undefined || apiKey === '' ? undefined : 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The engine's own reporting routes ride `evaluate`\n * because there the reporter IS the spender — that reasoning does not reach\n * across to a shared graph.\n *\n * `identity` is the hosted console's grant (Sprint 13): it redeems claim codes\n * and turns a signed-in owner into a short-lived read key for their org. It is\n * useful only on an UNSCOPED key -- those routes have no tenant rule, so an\n * org-scoped key holding it is refused before the route runs -- and it reads\n * and spends nothing by itself.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyScope = z.enum(['read', 'evaluate', 'approve', 'report', 'identity', 'admin']);\nexport type ApiKeyScope = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyScope>;\n\n/**\n * The public view of an API key — everything except the secret. This is what\n * the API returns on list/issue; the secret itself is shown exactly once, at\n * issuance, and never persisted in recoverable form (see {@link ApiKeyRecord}).\n */\nexport const ApiKey = z.object({\n  id: ApiKeyId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  scopes: z.array(ApiKeyScope).min(1),\n  /**\n   * The org this key acts inside. ABSENT means unscoped — an operator key that\n   * reads and writes across every org, which is what a self-hosted single-org\n   * deployment and every env-seeded boot secret have always been. That is the\n   * compatibility rule the whole tenancy design rests on: adding tenancy\n   * changed no existing key's behaviour, because no existing key has this\n   * field.\n   *\n   * Present, it is a hard confinement, not a default: the key cannot read,\n   * spend, approve or govern outside the org, and a write it submits is\n   * stamped with this org rather than the one the body asked for.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Narrow an org-scoped key further, to specific agents — what an agent\n   * runtime should carry, so a stolen key spends one agent's budget rather\n   * than the org's. Only meaningful alongside {@link ApiKey.orgId}: agent\n   * narrowing without an org is refused at issuance, because the scope it\n   * would describe has no org to resolve policies and approvers in.\n   *\n   * Capped at 64: a list long enough to need more is a fleet, and a fleet is\n   * what the org scope is for.\n   */\n  agentIds: z.array(AgentId).max(64).optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Last successful authentication, for spotting keys that can be retired. */\n  lastUsedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by revoke(); a revoked key never authenticates again. */\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Set by rotate(); with `previousSecretExpiresAt` it dates the overlap. */\n  rotatedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Past this instant the key stops authenticating, like a revoked one.\n   * ABSENT means it never expires -- every key before the sandbox, and every\n   * key an operator mints. Only the anonymous sandbox sets it, and a key minted\n   * BY an expiring key inherits the deadline: a sandbox that could mint itself\n   * a permanent key would not be a 7-day sandbox.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKey = z.infer<typeof ApiKey>;\n\n/**\n * SERVER-SIDE ONLY. The stored form: the public record plus sha256 digests of\n * the secrets. Digests, not secrets — a stolen database yields nothing that\n * authenticates. Rotation keeps the outgoing digest alive until\n * `previousSecretExpiresAt` so a running fleet can roll over without a\n * flag-day restart; past that instant only the current secret verifies.\n *\n * This shape never leaves the engine: every route answers with {@link ApiKey}.\n */\nexport const ApiKeyRecord = ApiKey.extend({\n  secretHash: z.string(),\n  previousSecretHash: z.string().optional(),\n  previousSecretExpiresAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApiKeyRecord = z.infer<typeof ApiKeyRecord>;\n\n/** Strip the digests: the only sanctioned way to put a key on the wire. */\nexport function toPublicApiKey(record: ApiKeyRecord): ApiKey {\n  const { secretHash, previousSecretHash, previousSecretExpiresAt, ...pub } = record;\n  void secretHash;\n  void previousSecretHash;\n  void previousSecretExpiresAt;\n  return pub;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal ULID generation, dependency-free. ULIDs are lexicographically\n * sortable (time-prefixed) and url-safe, which is why Rein uses them for all\n * primary keys instead of UUIDs. Works in Node 22 and modern browsers/edge via\n * the WebCrypto `globalThis.crypto`.\n */\n\n// Crockford's base32 alphabet (excludes I, L, O, U to avoid ambiguity).\nconst ENCODING = '0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ';\nconst TIME_LEN = 10;\nconst RANDOM_LEN = 16;\n\nfunction randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction encodeTime(now: number): string {\n  let time = now;\n  let out = '';\n  for (let i = TIME_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    out = ENCODING.charAt(time % 32) + out;\n    time = Math.floor(time / 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction encodeRandom(): string {\n  let out = '';\n  for (const byte of randomBytes(RANDOM_LEN)) {\n    out += ENCODING.charAt(byte % 32);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/** Generate a 26-character ULID. */\nexport function ulid(seedTime: number = Date.now()): string {\n  return encodeTime(seedTime) + encodeRandom();\n}\n\n/** Generate a Stripe-style prefixed id, e.g. `newId('agt')` -> `agt_01J...`. */\nexport function newId<P extends string>(prefix: P): `${P}_${string}` {\n  return `${prefix}_${ulid()}`;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Chains Rein observes/governs. x402 is multi-chain; Base and Solana ship\n * first, Polygon and BNB follow. The policy/ledger domain is rail-agnostic —\n * this enum is the only place chains are enumerated.\n */\nexport const Chain = z.enum(['base', 'solana', 'polygon', 'bnb']);\nexport type Chain = z.infer<typeof Chain>;\n\n/** Stablecoins settled over x402. */\nexport const Asset = z.enum(['USDC', 'USDT', 'EURC']);\nexport type Asset = z.infer<typeof Asset>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Monetary amounts in Rein are always non-negative **decimal strings**, never\n * floats. Float arithmetic silently loses precision on values like 0.1 + 0.2,\n * which is unacceptable for money. All comparison/aggregation goes through the\n * BigInt-backed helpers below.\n */\nexport const DecimalString = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/, 'must be a non-negative decimal string, e.g. \"5.00\"');\nexport type DecimalString = z.infer<typeof DecimalString>;\n\nconst DECIMAL_RE = /^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?$/;\n\nexport function isValidDecimal(value: string): boolean {\n  return DECIMAL_RE.test(value);\n}\n\nfunction assertDecimal(value: string): void {\n  if (!isValidDecimal(value)) {\n    throw new TypeError(`invalid decimal string: ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction fractionLength(value: string): number {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  return dot === -1 ? 0 : value.length - dot - 1;\n}\n\n/** Scale a decimal string into an integer BigInt at a fixed number of fraction digits. */\nfunction toScaled(value: string, scale: number): bigint {\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  const intPart = dot === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, dot);\n  const fracPart = dot === -1 ? '' : value.slice(dot + 1);\n  const paddedFrac = (fracPart + '0'.repeat(scale)).slice(0, scale);\n  return BigInt(intPart + paddedFrac);\n}\n\n/** Render a scaled BigInt back to a normalized decimal string (no trailing zeros). */\nfunction fromScaled(scaled: bigint, scale: number): string {\n  if (scale === 0) return scaled.toString();\n  const digits = scaled.toString().padStart(scale + 1, '0');\n  const intPart = digits.slice(0, digits.length - scale);\n  const fracPart = digits.slice(digits.length - scale).replace(/0+$/, '');\n  return fracPart.length > 0 ? `${intPart}.${fracPart}` : intPart;\n}\n\n/** Compare two decimal strings. Returns -1 (a<b), 0 (a==b), or 1 (a>b). */\nexport function compareDecimal(a: string, b: string): -1 | 0 | 1 {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  const av = toScaled(a, scale);\n  const bv = toScaled(b, scale);\n  return av < bv ? -1 : av > bv ? 1 : 0;\n}\n\n/** Sum a list of decimal strings without floating-point error. */\nexport function sumDecimal(values: readonly string[]): string {\n  if (values.length === 0) return '0';\n  let scale = 0;\n  for (const v of values) {\n    assertDecimal(v);\n    scale = Math.max(scale, fractionLength(v));\n  }\n  let total = 0n;\n  for (const v of values) total += toScaled(v, scale);\n  return fromScaled(total, scale);\n}\n\n/**\n * `a - b` for decimal strings, exact. Requires `a >= b`: the one caller is\n * \"how much more settled than was allowed\", and a negative money string is a\n * shape nothing else in the system accepts, so asking for one is a bug here\n * rather than a value to hand on.\n */\nexport function subDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  if (compareDecimal(a, b) < 0) {\n    throw new RangeError(`subDecimal: ${a} is less than ${b}`);\n  }\n  const scale = Math.max(fractionLength(a), fractionLength(b));\n  return fromScaled(toScaled(a, scale) - toScaled(b, scale), scale);\n}\n\n/** Multiply two decimal strings exactly (e.g. median * \"3\" for price-sanity). */\nexport function mulDecimal(a: string, b: string): string {\n  assertDecimal(a);\n  assertDecimal(b);\n  const scaleA = fractionLength(a);\n  const scaleB = fractionLength(b);\n  const product = toScaled(a, scaleA) * toScaled(b, scaleB);\n  return fromScaled(product, scaleA + scaleB);\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a > b. */\nexport function gt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === 1;\n}\n\n/** Convenience: a < b. */\nexport function lt(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return compareDecimal(a, b) === -1;\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal, safe glob matcher supporting only the `*` wildcard (matches any run\n * of characters, including none). Used for vendor host allowlists\n * (e.g. \"*.trusted.io\"), agent-id targeting (e.g. \"agt_research_*\"), and\n * Gate route pricing (e.g. \"/api/reports/*\").\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a regex from user input — the pattern is escaped so a\n * malicious policy value cannot inject regex behavior (ReDoS, etc.).\n */\nexport function globMatch(pattern: string, value: string): boolean {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&'); // escape regex metachars\n  const withWildcard = escaped.replace(/\\\\\\*/g, '.*'); // re-enable only `*`\n  return new RegExp(`^${withWildcard}$`).test(value);\n}\n\n/** True if `value` matches any pattern in the list. */\nexport function globMatchAny(patterns: readonly string[], value: string): boolean {\n  return patterns.some((p) => globMatch(p, value));\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\n\n/**\n * Enforcement tier of a given agent wallet:\n * - `observed`    — Rein sees spend on-chain but has no control (no SDK either).\n * - `sdk`         — agent uses @reinconsole/sdk; advisory + observability (bypassable).\n * - `session-key` — signer-level scope; out-of-policy txs cannot be signed.\n */\nexport const EnforcementMode = z.enum(['observed', 'sdk', 'session-key']);\nexport type EnforcementMode = z.infer<typeof EnforcementMode>;\n\nexport const AgentWallet = z.object({\n  chain: Chain,\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  mode: EnforcementMode,\n});\nexport type AgentWallet = z.infer<typeof AgentWallet>;\n\nexport const AgentStatus = z.enum(['active', 'frozen']);\nexport type AgentStatus = z.infer<typeof AgentStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A semantic grouping label, e.g. \"research\" or \"prod-trading\". Lowercase\n * slugs only — policy `appliesTo.labels` matches these (with globs), and a\n * case-normalization mismatch would silently un-target a policy.\n */\nexport const AgentLabel = z\n  .string()\n  .max(40)\n  .regex(/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/, 'label must be a lowercase slug like \"research\" or \"prod-trading\"');\nexport type AgentLabel = z.infer<typeof AgentLabel>;\n\nexport const Agent = z.object({\n  id: AgentId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** On-chain ERC-8004 identity, if the agent is registered. */\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Semantic grouping labels — the targets of policy `appliesTo.labels`. */\n  labels: z\n    .array(AgentLabel)\n    .max(16)\n    .refine((ls) => new Set(ls).size === ls.length, { message: 'labels must be unique' })\n    .default([]),\n  wallets: z.array(AgentWallet).default([]),\n  status: AgentStatus.default('active'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Agent = z.infer<typeof Agent>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * The canonical string form of an ERC-8004 agent identity:\n *\n *     eip155:{chainId}:{identityRegistry}/{tokenId}\n *\n * The part before the `/` is the spec's registry reference verbatim (the\n * `agentRegistry` field of a registration file, CAIP-10 account form); the\n * tokenId is the ERC-721 id the Identity Registry minted (`agentId` in the\n * spec). This exact string is what `Agent.erc8004Id` / `Vendor.erc8004Id`\n * carry, AND the reputation-subject id a registered agent's evidence keys by.\n *\n * Casing is load-bearing: reputation subject keys for agent-kind ids are\n * case-sensitive unless they start with `0x` (see @reinconsole/graph\n * `normalizeSubject`), and an eip155 string does not. `formatErc8004Id`\n * therefore always emits the registry address in lowercase, and consumers must\n * never hand-build the string — parse then re-format to normalize.\n */\n\nexport interface Erc8004Ref {\n  /** EIP-155 chain id (e.g. 8453 Base, 84532 Base Sepolia). */\n  chainId: number;\n  /** Identity Registry contract address, lowercase 0x-hex. */\n  registry: string;\n  /** ERC-721 tokenId — the spec's `agentId`. bigint: token ids exceed 2^53. */\n  tokenId: bigint;\n}\n\nconst REGISTRY_PATTERN = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\nconst ID_PATTERN = /^eip155:(\\d+):(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})\\/(\\d+)$/;\n\n/** Build the canonical id string. Throws on a malformed ref (programmer error). */\nexport function formatErc8004Id(ref: Erc8004Ref): string {\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ref.chainId) || ref.chainId < 1) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad chainId ${ref.chainId}`);\n  }\n  if (!REGISTRY_PATTERN.test(ref.registry)) {\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad registry address ${ref.registry}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof ref.tokenId !== 'bigint' || ref.tokenId < 0n) {\n    // The typeof guard matters for plain-JS callers: 1.5 < 0n is legal JS and\n    // false, and would mint the unparseable \"…/1.5\".\n    throw new RangeError(`erc8004: bad tokenId ${ref.tokenId}`);\n  }\n  return `eip155:${ref.chainId}:${ref.registry.toLowerCase()}/${ref.tokenId}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a canonical (or hand-written) id string. Accepts any address casing\n * and returns a lowercase ref, or undefined when malformed — so\n * `formatErc8004Id(parseErc8004Id(x)!)` is the normalization step.\n */\nexport function parseErc8004Id(value: string): Erc8004Ref | undefined {\n  const match = ID_PATTERN.exec(value);\n  if (!match) return undefined;\n  const chainId = Number(match[1]);\n  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(chainId) || chainId < 1) return undefined;\n  return {\n    chainId,\n    registry: match[2]!.toLowerCase(),\n    tokenId: BigInt(match[3]!),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Strict boundary schema for the id string (the fields themselves stay free-form). */\nexport const Erc8004Id = z\n  .string()\n  .refine((value) => parseErc8004Id(value) !== undefined, {\n    message: 'expected \"eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}\"',\n  });\nexport type Erc8004Id = z.infer<typeof Erc8004Id>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\nexport const Vendor = z.object({\n  host: z.string().min(1),\n  address: z.string().min(1),\n  erc8004Id: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vendor = z.infer<typeof Vendor>;\n\n/**\n * The observability gold: links every micro-payment back to the task and run\n * that caused it, so finance teams can answer \"what was this spend for?\".\n */\nexport const TaskContext = z.object({\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  parentRunId: z.string().optional(),\n  purpose: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\nexport type TaskContext = z.infer<typeof TaskContext>;\n\n/**\n * A request to spend, submitted to the policy engine BEFORE any signature is\n * released. The `nonce` provides replay protection on the signer path.\n */\nexport const PaymentIntent = z.object({\n  id: IntentId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  vendor: Vendor,\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  nonce: z.string().min(1),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type PaymentIntent = z.infer<typeof PaymentIntent>;\n\n/**\n * Reduce an intent's `resource` to its path for policy matching. The value is\n * vendor-declared and shape-varies: the x402 spec puts a full URL in\n * `requirement.resource`, while the guard falls back to the request pathname\n * when the vendor omits it. Policies match on the PATH so authors never need\n * to know which shape a vendor emits; host targeting stays with\n * `vendorHostIn`, which is derived from the real request URL rather than the\n * vendor's own claim. Query strings do not survive the reduction.\n */\nexport function resourcePathOf(resource: string): string {\n  try {\n    const url = new URL(resource);\n    if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') return url.pathname;\n  } catch {\n    // Not a URL — already a bare path.\n  }\n  return resource;\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId } from './ids.js';\n\nexport const DecisionOutcome = z.enum(['allow', 'deny', 'escalate']);\nexport type DecisionOutcome = z.infer<typeof DecisionOutcome>;\n\n/**\n * The signed, hash-chained record of a single policy evaluation. Written BEFORE\n * any signature is released. `prevHash` + `hash` form a tamper-evident chain;\n * `signature` is the policy service's signing key over `hash`. The eventual\n * on-chain `txHash` is attached later by the indexer (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const Decision = z.object({\n  id: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /**\n   * sha256 of the intent's canonical content (see canonical.ts). Binds the\n   * decision to the exact transfer it judged — amount, recipient, asset,\n   * chain — so a signer can verify an {intent, decision} pair offline as a\n   * self-contained spend voucher, not just a reference by id.\n   */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** Ids of the rules that fired, for explainability. */\n  matchedRules: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  /** Human-readable explanation surfaced in the dashboard. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  policyId: z.string(),\n  policyVersion: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of the previous decision in the chain (tamper-evident log). */\n  prevHash: z.string(),\n  /** Hash of this decision's canonical content. */\n  hash: z.string(),\n  /** Service signing-key signature over `hash`. */\n  signature: z.string(),\n  latencyMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  decidedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Decision = z.infer<typeof Decision>;\n\n/**\n * A decision as `GET /v1/decisions` serves it (0.3.0): the signed record plus\n * `agentId`, the agent whose intent it judged.\n *\n * `agentId` is an ENVELOPE field -- the engine's own attribution, outside\n * `hash` and `signature`, so a verified chain vouches for nothing about it.\n * Putting it inside would have changed the hash of every future decision and\n * split the chain into two formats. It is here for a reconciler that is not\n * co-located with the agent: `reconcile()` needs an allowed intent's agent,\n * or agent B's payment against A's intent is credited to A (S74), and before\n * this field only `/v1/reconciliation` carried it -- and erases it the moment\n * a settlement lands. Absent on an unattributed (pre-tenancy) row.\n */\nexport const AttributedDecision = Decision.extend({ agentId: AgentId.optional() });\nexport type AttributedDecision = z.infer<typeof AttributedDecision>;\n","import type { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport type { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\nimport type { ApprovalVerdict } from './approval.js';\n\n/**\n * Canonical byte forms shared by the policy engine (which hashes and signs\n * them) and the signer (which verifies them offline). Field order is fixed,\n * dates are ISO strings, and absent optionals are explicit nulls, so the same\n * parsed object always canonicalizes to the same bytes — including after a\n * JSON round-trip over HTTP.\n *\n * These builders are pure (no node:crypto) so @reinconsole/core stays loadable in a\n * browser; services hash the strings with whatever sha256 they have.\n */\n\n/** Canonical form of an intent — what `Decision.intentHash` commits to. */\nexport function canonicalIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    id: intent.id,\n    agentId: intent.agentId,\n    vendor: {\n      host: intent.vendor.host,\n      address: intent.vendor.address,\n      erc8004Id: intent.vendor.erc8004Id ?? null,\n    },\n    resource: intent.resource,\n    amount: intent.amount,\n    asset: intent.asset,\n    chain: intent.chain,\n    taskContext: {\n      taskId: intent.taskContext.taskId ?? null,\n      parentRunId: intent.taskContext.parentRunId ?? null,\n      purpose: intent.taskContext.purpose ?? null,\n    },\n    nonce: intent.nonce,\n    createdAt: intent.createdAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The decision fields covered by `Decision.hash` (and thus its signature). */\nexport interface DecisionContent {\n  intentId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome;\n  matchedRules: string[];\n  policyId: string;\n  policyVersion: string;\n  prevHash: string;\n  decidedAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Canonical form of a decision — what `Decision.hash` is computed over. */\nexport function canonicalDecision(d: DecisionContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    intentId: d.intentId,\n    intentHash: d.intentHash,\n    outcome: d.outcome,\n    matchedRules: d.matchedRules,\n    policyId: d.policyId,\n    policyVersion: d.policyVersion,\n    prevHash: d.prevHash,\n    decidedAt: d.decidedAt.toISOString(),\n  });\n}\n\n/** The fields an approval signature commits to. */\nexport interface ApprovalContent {\n  decisionId: string;\n  intentHash: string;\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an approval — the exact bytes an approver signs.\n *\n * Three properties are deliberate. The leading `rein` domain tag separates\n * this signature space from the decision log's, so a decision signature can\n * never be replayed as an approval or the reverse. `decisionId` makes each\n * challenge single-use: one escalation, one decision id, one signature that\n * means anything. And `verdict` is INSIDE the signed bytes — without it, a\n * captured approval could be resubmitted as a rejection (or vice versa) by\n * anyone who saw it in flight.\n */\nexport function canonicalApproval(a: ApprovalContent): string {\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    rein: 'approval/v1',\n    decisionId: a.decisionId,\n    intentHash: a.intentHash,\n    verdict: a.verdict,\n  });\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * A session-key grant: the signer tier's unit of delegated authority. The\n * agent process holds only the bearer token — the wallet key never leaves the\n * signer — and the stored record keeps a hash of the token, never the token\n * itself (it is returned exactly once, at creation).\n *\n * Caps here are the signer-side backstop UNDER whatever policy says: a\n * signature is released only when the engine allowed the intent AND the\n * session has room. Amounts are decimal strings in the asset's human units.\n */\nexport const Session = z.object({\n  id: SessionId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** sha256 hex of the bearer token. */\n  tokenHash: z.string(),\n  /** Cumulative ceiling across the session's lifetime. Absent = uncapped. */\n  capAmount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Ceiling per individual signature. Absent = uncapped. */\n  maxPerPayment: DecimalString.optional(),\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type Session = z.infer<typeof Session>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { IntentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * On-chain confirmation of a settled payment, reconciled by the indexer against\n * the originating intent (amount + recipient + nonce, or facilitator webhook).\n */\nexport const SettledPayment = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  txHash: z.string(),\n  chain: Chain,\n  blockNumber: z.coerce.bigint(),\n  facilitator: z.string().optional(),\n  feePaid: DecimalString.optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettledPayment = z.infer<typeof SettledPayment>;\n\n/**\n * A report that an allowed intent's payment actually landed — the settlement\n * half of reconciliation (\"allowed but never settled\", B1).\n *\n * Deliberately looser than {@link SettledPayment}: the on-chain confirmation\n * requires a tx hash and a block, while a REPORT is whatever the observer\n * could see. A vendor's `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` names a transaction but no block;\n * a facilitator webhook may name neither. Demanding the strong shape would\n * mean the weakest observers — the ones a deployment actually has — could\n * report nothing at all, and every allowance would read as a gap.\n *\n * `source` records WHO said so, because the evidence is not all equal: an\n * independent indexer watching the chain is the strong claim, while a guard\n * reporting on its own payment is the agent vouching for itself. Nothing here\n * grants authority — a settlement report can only ever CLOSE a gap in the\n * reconciliation report, never authorize a payment or alter a decision.\n */\nexport const SettlementReport = z.object({\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** The settling transaction, when the observer saw one. */\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  chain: Chain.optional(),\n  /** The amount as SETTLED, when known — may differ from the amount allowed. */\n  amount: DecimalString.optional(),\n  /** Free-form observer tag, e.g. \"indexer\", \"guard\", \"facilitator\". */\n  source: z.string().min(1).max(64).optional(),\n  confirmedAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type SettlementReport = z.infer<typeof SettlementReport>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReceiptId, IntentId, DecisionId, AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain, Asset } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { TaskContext } from './intent.js';\nimport { DecisionOutcome } from './decision.js';\n\n/**\n * What the SDK reports back after settlement: the `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` header\n * a vendor returns once payment clears. Mock facilitators fill this in v0.1;\n * the indexer reconciles it against on-chain truth later (see SettledPayment).\n */\nexport const ReceiptSettlement = z.object({\n  txHash: z.string().optional(),\n  networkId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Raw header payload, kept for forensics until the indexer confirms. */\n  raw: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReceiptSettlement = z.infer<typeof ReceiptSettlement>;\n\n/**\n * The SDK-side record of one guarded payment attempt: which request triggered\n * it, what the engine decided, and (if allowed and paid) how it settled.\n * Receipts are the observability primitive — every 402 the guard touches\n * produces exactly one, whether the payment was allowed or blocked.\n */\nexport const Receipt = z.object({\n  id: ReceiptId,\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  outcome: DecisionOutcome,\n  /** The URL the agent actually fetched (the paywalled resource). */\n  url: z.string(),\n  method: z.string().default('GET'),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  taskContext: TaskContext.default({}),\n  /** Human-readable explanation copied from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Present only once a payment was made and the vendor confirmed it. */\n  settlement: ReceiptSettlement.optional(),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n});\nexport type Receipt = z.infer<typeof Receipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { GateReceiptId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * The vendor-side twin of `Receipt`: one settled x402 payment as the GATE saw\n * it — who paid, for which priced route, and the settlement transaction. The\n * agent-side Receipt records what an agent tried to spend; a GateReceipt\n * records what a vendor actually earned.\n */\nexport const GateReceipt = z.object({\n  id: GateReceiptId,\n  at: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** The route pattern that priced this request, e.g. \"/api/reports/*\". */\n  route: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The concrete resource paid for (URL path actually requested). */\n  resource: z.string().min(1),\n  method: z.string().min(1),\n  /** The paying wallet address, as asserted by the settled payment. */\n  payer: z.string().min(1),\n  payTo: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Human-unit decimal amount, e.g. \"0.05\". */\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  /** The same amount in the asset's atomic units, e.g. \"50000\". */\n  amountAtomic: z.string().regex(/^\\d+$/, 'atomic amount must be an integer string'),\n  /** Token symbol or contract address, exactly as quoted in the requirement. */\n  asset: z.string().min(1),\n  network: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Settlement transaction hash (mock ledger or on-chain). */\n  transaction: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type GateReceipt = z.infer<typeof GateReceipt>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/** A rolling-window spec, e.g. \"24h\", \"1h\", \"30m\", \"7d\". */\nexport const Window = z\n  .string()\n  .regex(/^\\d+[smhd]$/, 'window must be like \"30s\", \"15m\", \"1h\", or \"7d\"');\nexport type Window = z.infer<typeof Window>;\n\n/** A relative multiplier, e.g. \"3x\" (used for price-sanity checks). */\nexport const Multiplier = z.string().regex(/^\\d+(\\.\\d+)?x$/, 'multiplier must be like \"3x\"');\nexport type Multiplier = z.infer<typeof Multiplier>;\n\n/**\n * The set of predicates a rule can test. Multiple predicates in one condition\n * are ANDed together. Each maps to an evaluator in the policy engine.\n */\nexport const Condition = z\n  .object({\n    /** Per-transaction amount exceeds this value. */\n    amountGt: DecimalString.optional(),\n    /** Sum of spend in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    rollingSum: z.object({ window: Window, gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** Transaction count in a rolling window exceeds `gt`. */\n    txCount: z.object({ window: Window, gt: z.number().int().nonnegative() }).optional(),\n    /** Vendor host matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs). */\n    vendorHostIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Resource PATH matches one of these patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g.\n     * \"/v1/reports/*\"). A full-URL resource is reduced to its pathname before\n     * matching (see `resourcePathOf`), so the same pattern works whether the\n     * vendor declares \"https://api.x.com/v1/answer\" or \"/v1/answer\". Pair\n     * with `vendorHostIn` to scope a path rule to specific vendors.\n     */\n    resourceIn: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n    /** First time Rein has seen this vendor for the agent. */\n    vendorFirstSeen: z.boolean().optional(),\n    /** Vendor reputation score is below this threshold (Phase 3 hook). */\n    vendorReputationLt: z.number().min(0).max(100).optional(),\n    /** Amount is more than `gt`-times the observed median for this resource. */\n    amountVsResourceMedian: z.object({ gt: Multiplier }).optional(),\n    /**\n     * Cumulative spend attributed to THIS intent's `taskContext.taskId`\n     * (prior spend on the task plus this payment) exceeds `gt`. Scopes a\n     * budget to one unit of work rather than to a window: a research run that\n     * is meant to cost a dollar cannot quietly cost fifty, however slowly.\n     *\n     * An intent carrying no `taskId` cannot be attributed to a task, so the\n     * predicate never triggers for one. Requiring attribution is a separate,\n     * deliberate rule (deny on `taskIdMissing`), not a side effect of setting\n     * a budget — otherwise every untagged probe payment would trip every\n     * task budget in the policy.\n     */\n    taskBudget: z.object({ gt: DecimalString }).optional(),\n    /** The intent carries no `taskContext.taskId` (or an empty one). */\n    taskIdMissing: z.boolean().optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((c) => Object.values(c).some((v) => v !== undefined), {\n    message: 'a condition must specify at least one predicate',\n  });\nexport type Condition = z.infer<typeof Condition>;\n\n/**\n * A behavioral circuit breaker: one primitive with three tripwires — a window\n * (rate), a transaction count, and a value cap — measured over the agent's\n * own recent activity.\n *\n * A breaker is not a rule. Rules ask about the intent in front of them; a\n * breaker asks whether the agent's BEHAVIOR has left the envelope it was\n * given, and once it has, every subsequent intent ESCALATES for a signed\n * approval. It never denies on its own: an agent that trips a breaker in the\n * middle of a job must be able to be waved through by a human, because a\n * silent deny at the wrong moment strands the work with no path forward and\n * no one told (the failure mode Flash's exit paths taught).\n *\n * Reset happens two ways, and they are one mechanism: the window rolling\n * forward, or a signed approval, which moves the breaker's counting floor to\n * now. Nothing \"un-trips\" a breaker by decree — the activity simply stops\n * being inside the measured span.\n *\n * Targeting is the policy's job: `appliesTo.agents` / `appliesTo.labels`\n * decide WHICH agents carry the breaker. COUNTING is always per agent — a\n * breaker pooled across every agent sharing a label needs a cross-agent\n * aggregate the per-agent spend context cannot express, and is deferred.\n */\nexport const Breaker = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    /** The trailing span the tripwires measure over. */\n    window: Window,\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window would hold MORE than this many transactions.\n     * `10` permits ten in the window and escalates the eleventh.\n     */\n    txCount: z.number().int().positive().optional(),\n    /**\n     * Trip when the window's spend would exceed this total. `\"50.00\"` permits\n     * a window totalling exactly 50.00 and escalates the payment that would\n     * carry it past. Prospective, like every other spend predicate: the\n     * payment that would breach the cap is the one that escalates, rather\n     * than the innocent one after it.\n     */\n    valueCap: DecimalString.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((b) => b.txCount !== undefined || b.valueCap !== undefined, {\n    message: 'a breaker must specify at least one of txCount / valueCap',\n  });\nexport type Breaker = z.infer<typeof Breaker>;\n\n/**\n * A single rule: an id plus exactly one action (allow / deny / escalate) whose\n * value is the condition that triggers it.\n */\nexport const Rule = z\n  .object({\n    id: z.string().min(1),\n    allow: Condition.optional(),\n    deny: Condition.optional(),\n    escalate: Condition.optional(),\n  })\n  .refine((r) => [r.allow, r.deny, r.escalate].filter((v) => v !== undefined).length === 1, {\n    message: 'a rule must specify exactly one of allow / deny / escalate',\n  });\nexport type Rule = z.infer<typeof Rule>;\n\nexport const PolicyDefault = z.enum(['allow', 'deny']);\nexport type PolicyDefault = z.infer<typeof PolicyDefault>;\n\nexport const AppliesTo = z.object({\n  /** Agent id patterns (supports `*` globs, e.g. \"agt_research_*\"). */\n  agents: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  /**\n   * Agent label patterns (supports `*` globs) — semantic targeting. Matches\n   * when the agent carries at least one label matching any pattern. Requires\n   * the agent DOCUMENT: an intent from an unregistered agent never matches a\n   * labels-targeted policy (and so fails closed when no other policy applies).\n   */\n  labels: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  chains: z.array(Chain).optional(),\n});\nexport type AppliesTo = z.infer<typeof AppliesTo>;\n\nexport const Escalation = z.object({\n  approvers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  timeoutAction: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  timeoutMin: z.number().int().positive().default(15),\n});\nexport type Escalation = z.infer<typeof Escalation>;\n\n/**\n * A declarative, versioned, immutable-once-active policy. Evaluation order in\n * the engine is: explicit DENY > ESCALATE > ALLOW > `default`.\n */\nexport const Policy = z.object({\n  policyId: z.string().min(1),\n  version: z.string().default('1'),\n  /**\n   * The org this policy governs. ABSENT means GLOBAL — it is considered for\n   * every agent, which is what every policy written before tenancy existed is\n   * and stays.\n   *\n   * This is separate from {@link AppliesTo} on purpose, and it has to be:\n   * `appliesTo: {}` matches every agent, so a tenant's policy carrying the\n   * default targeting would otherwise govern other tenants' agents the moment\n   * it was written. Org scoping is applied BEFORE targeting — a policy whose\n   * `orgId` is not the agent's org is not a candidate at all.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  appliesTo: AppliesTo.default({}),\n  rules: z.array(Rule).default([]),\n  /**\n   * Behavioral breakers evaluated alongside the rules. A tripped breaker\n   * escalates at the same precedence as an `escalate` rule — so an explicit\n   * DENY still wins, and an ALLOW rule cannot wave past a tripped breaker.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(Breaker).default([]),\n  default: PolicyDefault.default('deny'),\n  /** Below this amount, fail-open is permitted during a policy-service outage. */\n  denyFloor: DecimalString.default('0.05'),\n  escalation: Escalation.optional(),\n});\nexport type Policy = z.infer<typeof Policy>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Window } from './policy.js';\n\n/**\n * Dead-man monitoring: the alarm for an agent that stopped (Phase B2).\n *\n * Every other control in Rein answers \"should this payment happen?\". This one\n * answers the question nothing else in the stack asks: an agent that has gone\n * quiet raises no intent, breaks no budget, and trips no breaker — it simply\n * disappears, and a control plane watching only for bad payments will report\n * a perfectly clean month while the work silently stopped being done. (Flash\n * lost four detectors this way, none of which announced anything.)\n *\n * Three rules hold the design honest, and each is the direct mirror of a rule\n * B1 already established:\n *\n * 1. An expectation is DECLARED, never inferred. Most agents are episodic:\n *    they run when there is work. Silence is only evidence for an agent\n *    somebody said should be periodic, so an unwatched agent has no liveness\n *    state at all — the same rule as `taskBudget`, which never fires on an\n *    intent that carries no task id.\n * 2. Silence has an AGE, not a boolean — `late` before `missing` — exactly as\n *    a missing settlement is `in-flight` before it is `unsettled`.\n * 3. The engine never alarms about silence it did not witness. An engine that\n *    was down cannot tell a dead agent from its own outage, so a silence\n *    older than this process reads `unknown` until the process has been up\n *    long enough to certify it. B1 refuses to manufacture gaps out of records\n *    it cannot join; this refuses to manufacture alarms out of downtime.\n *\n * Liveness is observability and carries no authority whatsoever: it cannot\n * deny, escalate, freeze, or alter any decision. A missing agent is news for\n * a human, not an input to policy.\n */\n\n/** How the engine came to know an agent was alive. */\nexport const LivenessSource = z.enum([\n  /** It submitted an intent — ANY outcome, including a denial. */\n  'intent',\n  /** It reported in explicitly, having nothing to buy. */\n  'heartbeat',\n]);\nexport type LivenessSource = z.infer<typeof LivenessSource>;\n\n/** Default slack past the interval before silence becomes an alarm. */\nexport const DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * \"This agent is supposed to check in at least this often.\"\n *\n * `graceMs` is what keeps a jittery-but-healthy agent out of the alert\n * channel: an agent on a 15m cadence that lands at 15m04s is not a dead agent,\n * and an alarm that cries at every wobble is one an operator learns to ignore\n * — which is the failure mode that loses the detector nobody was watching.\n */\nexport const LivenessExpectation = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** Longest silence still considered normal, e.g. '15m'. */\n  interval: Window,\n  /** Extra slack past `interval` before the silence is an alarm. */\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().default(DEFAULT_LIVENESS_GRACE_MS),\n  /**\n   * When watching began. An agent that has NEVER been seen is measured from\n   * here, so a watch on an agent that never starts does raise an alarm — a\n   * detector that never came up is exactly as dead as one that stopped.\n   */\n  since: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** What this agent is supposed to be doing, shown beside the alarm. */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessExpectation = z.infer<typeof LivenessExpectation>;\n\n/** The registration payload; the engine stamps `since`. */\nexport const LivenessWatchInput = LivenessExpectation.omit({ since: true }).extend({\n  graceMs: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n});\nexport type LivenessWatchInput = z.input<typeof LivenessWatchInput>;\n\n/**\n * An out-of-band \"I am alive\" from an agent with nothing to buy.\n *\n * The engine sees every intent, so a spending agent needs no heartbeat at all.\n * This exists for the agent that is working and simply not paying for\n * anything — without it, a dead-man alarm is really a no-spend alarm, and it\n * would page a human every time an agent had a quiet afternoon.\n *\n * It authorizes nothing. The only thing a heartbeat can change is a row in the\n * liveness report; it cannot lift a breaker, a budget, or a freeze.\n */\nexport const Heartbeat = z.object({\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /** When the agent was alive. Defaults to arrival time. */\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Free-form note from the reporter, e.g. \"poll cycle 41 ok\". */\n  note: z.string().max(200).optional(),\n});\nexport type Heartbeat = z.infer<typeof Heartbeat>;\n\n/**\n * Where an agent stands against its expectation.\n *\n * - `alive`   — seen within the interval.\n * - `late`    — past the interval, inside the grace. Not yet news.\n * - `missing` — past both, and this process watched it happen. THE alarm.\n * - `unknown` — past both, but the engine has not been up long enough to have\n *               witnessed the silence. Not an alarm: an engine that restarted\n *               five minutes ago knows nothing about the last three days.\n */\nexport const LivenessStatus = z.enum(['alive', 'late', 'missing', 'unknown']);\nexport type LivenessStatus = z.infer<typeof LivenessStatus>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, ApproverKeyId, DecisionId, IntentId, OrgId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Asset, Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\n\n/**\n * Human approval of an escalated payment.\n *\n * The load-bearing rule: an approval is a SIGNATURE over the decision, made by\n * a key registered with the engine. The delivery channel (Telegram, email,\n * whatever) is transport, never authority — anyone who compromises the channel\n * gets to show a human a message, not to release funds. There is deliberately\n * no click-to-approve path.\n */\n\nexport const ApprovalVerdict = z.enum(['approve', 'reject']);\nexport type ApprovalVerdict = z.infer<typeof ApprovalVerdict>;\n\n/**\n * `pending` is the only non-terminal state. `expired` is what a TTL lapse\n * converts to — indistinguishable from `rejected` in effect (both deny), but\n * distinguished in the record so \"nobody answered\" and \"somebody said no\" stay\n * separable in an audit.\n */\nexport const ApprovalStatus = z.enum(['pending', 'approved', 'rejected', 'expired']);\nexport type ApprovalStatus = z.infer<typeof ApprovalStatus>;\n\n/**\n * A key whose signature the engine accepts as an approval. Public half only —\n * the private half lives with the human (a hardware token, a laptop, an\n * offline signer) and must never reach the engine.\n */\nexport const ApproverKey = z.object({\n  id: ApproverKeyId,\n  orgId: OrgId,\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  /** ed25519 public key, SPKI PEM — the same encoding as the decision log's. */\n  publicKey: z.string().min(1),\n  algorithm: z.literal('ed25519').default('ed25519'),\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  revokedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n});\nexport type ApproverKey = z.infer<typeof ApproverKey>;\n\n/**\n * A parked escalation: the payment the engine refused to allow on its own\n * authority, held open until a signature arrives or the TTL lapses. Keyed by\n * the escalating decision — one decision, at most one approval request.\n *\n * The payment facts are copied in rather than referenced so the challenge a\n * human sees is self-contained: amount, vendor and resource are exactly what\n * they are being asked to authorize.\n */\nexport const ApprovalRequest = z.object({\n  /** The `escalate` decision this request answers (primary key). */\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentId: IntentId,\n  /** Binds the approval to the exact transfer — the signed bytes commit to it. */\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  agentId: AgentId,\n  /**\n   * The org the escalating agent belongs to, stamped when the request is\n   * parked. ABSENT means the agent was never registered (or the request\n   * predates tenancy), and such a request is answerable only by an unscoped\n   * operator — there is no org to check an approver against, and guessing one\n   * is how a cross-tenant approval happens.\n   */\n  orgId: OrgId.optional(),\n  vendorHost: z.string(),\n  resource: z.string(),\n  amount: DecimalString,\n  asset: Asset,\n  chain: Chain,\n  /**\n   * Task attribution copied from the intent. Carried so an approved payment\n   * still counts against its `taskBudget` — an escalation that lost its task\n   * id on the way through would make the budget silently under-count exactly\n   * the payments a human had to look at.\n   */\n  taskId: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Why policy escalated, verbatim from the decision. */\n  reason: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Breaker ids whose trip contributed to this escalation. An approval of\n   * this request resets exactly these — moving their counting floor to the\n   * approval instant — so a human waving one payment through also clears the\n   * behavior that stopped it, rather than being asked again immediately.\n   * Empty when ordinary rules did the escalating.\n   */\n  breakers: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  status: ApprovalStatus,\n  createdAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Past this instant the request denies, whatever arrives afterwards. */\n  expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),\n  resolvedAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  /** Which registered key signed — absent when the TTL lapsed instead. */\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId.optional(),\n  /**\n   * The follow-up decision appended to the chain when this resolved. That\n   * decision, not this record, is the voucher a signer verifies: the original\n   * `escalate` decision is never rewritten.\n   */\n  finalDecisionId: DecisionId.optional(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalRequest = z.infer<typeof ApprovalRequest>;\n\n/** The two byte-strings an approver may sign for a given request. */\nexport const ApprovalChallenges = z.object({\n  approve: z.string(),\n  reject: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ApprovalChallenges = z.infer<typeof ApprovalChallenges>;\n\n/**\n * A signed verdict, submitted to the engine by anyone (the signature is the\n * authority, so the carrier does not matter). `signature` is base64 ed25519\n * over `canonicalApproval({ decisionId, intentHash, verdict })`.\n */\nexport const ApprovalGrant = z.object({\n  decisionId: DecisionId,\n  intentHash: z.string(),\n  verdict: ApprovalVerdict,\n  approverKeyId: ApproverKeyId,\n  signature: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ApprovalGrant = z.infer<typeof ApprovalGrant>;\n\n/** Terminal statuses — a request in one of these will never change again. */\nexport function isResolved(status: ApprovalStatus): boolean {\n  return status !== 'pending';\n}\n","import { z } from 'zod';\n\nexport const ReputationSubject = z.object({\n  kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']),\n  id: z.string(),\n});\nexport type ReputationSubject = z.infer<typeof ReputationSubject>;\n\nexport const ReputationComponents = z.object({\n  volume: z.number(),\n  longevity: z.number(),\n  disputeRate: z.number(),\n  counterpartyQuality: z.number(),\n  settlementReliability: z.number(),\n});\nexport type ReputationComponents = z.infer<typeof ReputationComponents>;\n\n/**\n * A reputation score for an agent or vendor (Phase 3 — Graph). `confidence` is\n * first-class: a thin-history subject returns LOW confidence rather than a\n * misleadingly high score, so policy can avoid both false trust and unfair\n * freezing.\n */\nexport const ReputationScore = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  score: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  components: ReputationComponents,\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  asOf: z.coerce.date(),\n  /** Hash-anchored attestation, optionally published on-chain (ERC-8004). */\n  evidenceUri: z.string().optional(),\n});\nexport type ReputationScore = z.infer<typeof ReputationScore>;\n","import { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AgentId, DecisionId, IntentId, SessionId } from './ids.js';\nimport { Chain } from './chain.js';\nimport { DecimalString } from './money.js';\nimport { PaymentIntent } from './intent.js';\nimport { Decision } from './decision.js';\nimport { SettledPayment } from './payment.js';\nimport { GateReceipt } from './gate-receipt.js';\nimport { ApprovalRequest } from './approval.js';\nimport { LivenessExpectation, LivenessSource } from './liveness.js';\n\n/**\n * The canonical event envelope published on the bus (NATS in production).\n * `shadow.spend` is emitted when the indexer sees on-chain spend from a managed\n * wallet with NO corresponding ALLOW decision — the bypass signal that catches\n * SDK-mode evasion and drives the upgrade to the signer tier.\n * `signature.released` / `signature.refused` are that tier's heartbeat: every\n * time the signer does or does not put a key to work, the bus knows why.\n * `gate.*` is the vendor side of the wire: every quote a Gate issues, every\n * payment it accepts, every payment it turns away.\n * `approval.*` is the human-in-the-loop tier: an escalated intent parked for a\n * signature, and the signed (or lapsed) verdict that closed it.\n * `liveness.*` is the dead-man tier (B2), and the only pair here emitted by\n * something NOT happening: a watched agent that went quiet past its expected\n * interval, and the sighting that ended the silence.\n */\nexport const ReinEvent = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('intent.created'), at: z.coerce.date(), intent: PaymentIntent }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('decision.made'), at: z.coerce.date(), decision: Decision }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('payment.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), payment: SettledPayment }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('shadow.spend'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    txHash: z.string(),\n    chain: Chain,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.released'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    sessionId: SessionId,\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    intentId: IntentId,\n    decisionId: DecisionId,\n    amount: DecimalString,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('signature.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"decision_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/signer). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    sessionId: SessionId.optional(),\n    agentId: AgentId.optional(),\n    intentId: IntentId.optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.quoted'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    method: z.string(),\n    amount: DecimalString,\n    asset: z.string(),\n    network: z.string(),\n  }),\n  z.object({ type: z.literal('gate.settled'), at: z.coerce.date(), receipt: GateReceipt }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.requested'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('approval.resolved'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    request: ApprovalRequest,\n    /** The follow-up allow/deny decision this resolution appended. */\n    decision: Decision,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.missing'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    expectation: LivenessExpectation,\n    /** How long the agent has been silent when the alarm was raised. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    /** Last sighting, absent when the agent was never seen at all. */\n    lastSeenAt: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('liveness.recovered'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    agentId: AgentId,\n    /** How long the silence lasted, measured to this sighting. */\n    silentMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    source: LivenessSource,\n  }),\n  z.object({\n    type: z.literal('gate.refused'),\n    at: z.coerce.date(),\n    /** Refusal code, e.g. \"payment_replayed\" (see @reinconsole/gate). */\n    code: z.string(),\n    reason: z.string(),\n    resource: z.string(),\n    /** Known only when the payment header decoded far enough to name a payer. */\n    payer: z.string().optional(),\n  }),\n]);\nexport type ReinEvent = z.infer<typeof ReinEvent>;\n","import { formatErc8004Id, parseErc8004Id, sumDecimal, type ReputationSubject } from '@reinconsole/core';\n\n/** A value that may be produced synchronously or awaited (durable writes). */\nexport type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>;\n\n/** One settled-money edge to a counterparty (the \"graph\" in reputation graph). */\nexport interface CounterpartyLine {\n  settled: number;\n  /** Settled decimal volume across this edge. */\n  volume: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Everything the graph has observed about one subject. Counters are raw and\n * append-only — scoring (scoring.ts) is a pure function over this record, so a\n * score is always re-derivable and explainable from the evidence behind it.\n */\nexport interface SubjectEvidence {\n  subject: ReputationSubject;\n  firstSeenMs: number;\n  lastSeenMs: number;\n  /** Payment attempts observed (allowed intents, presented payments). */\n  attempts: number;\n  /** Confirmed settlements (indexer-reconciled or gate-receipted). */\n  settled: number;\n  /** Settled decimal volume. */\n  volume: string;\n  /** Refusals by code (gate refusal codes, signer refusal codes). */\n  refusals: Record<string, number>;\n  /** Managed-wallet spend with no ALLOW decision behind it (bypass). */\n  shadowSpends: number;\n  /** Manual out-of-band reports (chargebacks, fraud complaints). */\n  disputes: number;\n  /** Manual out-of-band vouches. */\n  endorsements: number;\n  /** Who this subject has settled money with, keyed by subjectKey(). */\n  counterparties: Map<string, CounterpartyLine>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical subject identity. Hosts and EVM addresses are case-insensitive,\n * so they normalize to lowercase; ULID agent ids are case-sensitive and pass\n * through. ERC-8004 ids (`eip155:{chainId}:{registry}/{tokenId}`) normalize\n * via parse->format — @reinconsole/erc8004 always emits the canonical form, but this\n * is the graph's OWN boundary (remote producers hit POST /v1/links with\n * hand-built strings), and a checksummed registry or zero-padded tokenId\n * variant must not mint a split subject row. Note the two id spaces under\n * kind \"agent\": the engine names agents by ULID, a gate names them by paying\n * wallet — ERC-8004 linking (S17) folds both into the on-chain identity.\n */\nexport function normalizeSubject(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationSubject {\n  if (subject.id.startsWith('eip155:')) {\n    const ref = parseErc8004Id(subject.id);\n    if (ref) return { kind: subject.kind, id: formatErc8004Id(ref) };\n    // Malformed eip155-ish strings fall through to the plain rules below.\n  }\n  const id =\n    subject.kind === 'vendor' || subject.id.startsWith('0x') || subject.id.startsWith('0X')\n      ? subject.id.toLowerCase()\n      : subject.id;\n  return { kind: subject.kind, id };\n}\n\nexport function subjectKey(subject: ReputationSubject): string {\n  const normal = normalizeSubject(subject);\n  return `${normal.kind}:${normal.id}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The evidence store seam the graph depends on. Writes may be asynchronous (a\n * durable ledger persists behind them); reads are synchronous from the\n * hydrated working set so `score()` / `payerCheck()` stay sync in the gate hot\n * path. Mutations are explicit, atomic operations rather than a returned record\n * the caller mutates — that is what lets a durable implementation persist them.\n */\nexport interface EvidenceLedgerPort {\n  /** A payment attempt (allowed intent / presented payment). */\n  recordAttempt(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** A confirmed settlement between two subjects (credits both sides + the edge). */\n  recordSettlement(\n    a: ReputationSubject,\n    b: ReputationSubject,\n    amount: string,\n    atMs: number,\n  ): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** A refusal against a subject, by code. */\n  recordRefusal(subject: ReputationSubject, code: string, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** Managed-wallet spend with no ALLOW behind it. */\n  recordShadowSpend(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** An out-of-band dispute. */\n  recordDispute(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** An out-of-band endorsement. */\n  recordEndorsement(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Fold everything known about `alias` into `canonical` and forget the alias:\n   * counters sum, volumes add, first/last seen widen, and settled-money edges\n   * re-key on BOTH endpoints (peers that pointed at the alias now point at the\n   * canonical subject). No-op when the alias has no record — which makes\n   * re-asserting links at boot idempotent. This is the identity-linking\n   * primitive (ERC-8004: one on-chain identity, many addresses/ids).\n   */\n  merge(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): MaybePromise<void>;\n  get(subject: ReputationSubject): SubjectEvidence | undefined;\n  getByKey(key: string): SubjectEvidence | undefined;\n  all(): IterableIterator<SubjectEvidence>;\n  readonly size: number;\n  /**\n   * Await any pending durable writes (no-op in memory). Durable\n   * implementations surface write failures HERE — the graph fire-and-forgets\n   * its writes (a bus handler cannot await), so flush() is the error channel.\n   */\n  flush?(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** The evidence store: one record per subject, created on first sighting. */\nexport class EvidenceLedger implements EvidenceLedgerPort {\n  private readonly records = new Map<string, SubjectEvidence>();\n\n  recordAttempt(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).attempts += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordSettlement(\n    a: ReputationSubject,\n    b: ReputationSubject,\n    amount: string,\n    atMs: number,\n  ): void {\n    for (const [subject, other] of [\n      [a, b],\n      [b, a],\n    ] as const) {\n      const ev = this.touch(subject, atMs);\n      ev.settled += 1;\n      ev.volume = sumDecimal([ev.volume, amount]);\n      const key = subjectKey(other);\n      const line = ev.counterparties.get(key) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n      line.settled += 1;\n      line.volume = sumDecimal([line.volume, amount]);\n      ev.counterparties.set(key, line);\n    }\n  }\n\n  recordRefusal(subject: ReputationSubject, code: string, atMs: number): void {\n    const ev = this.touch(subject, atMs);\n    ev.refusals[code] = (ev.refusals[code] ?? 0) + 1;\n  }\n\n  recordShadowSpend(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).shadowSpends += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordDispute(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).disputes += 1;\n  }\n\n  recordEndorsement(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): void {\n    this.touch(subject, atMs).endorsements += 1;\n  }\n\n  merge(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): void {\n    const aliasKey = subjectKey(alias);\n    const canonicalKey = subjectKey(canonical);\n    const from = this.records.get(aliasKey);\n    if (!from || aliasKey === canonicalKey) return;\n    // The canonical side may have no record yet — the alias's history becomes\n    // its history (same create shape as touch, seeded with the alias's window).\n    const into = this.records.get(canonicalKey) ?? this.touch(canonical, from.firstSeenMs);\n    into.firstSeenMs = Math.min(into.firstSeenMs, from.firstSeenMs);\n    into.lastSeenMs = Math.max(into.lastSeenMs, from.lastSeenMs);\n    into.attempts += from.attempts;\n    into.settled += from.settled;\n    into.volume = sumDecimal([into.volume, from.volume]);\n    for (const [code, count] of Object.entries(from.refusals)) {\n      into.refusals[code] = (into.refusals[code] ?? 0) + count;\n    }\n    into.shadowSpends += from.shadowSpends;\n    into.disputes += from.disputes;\n    into.endorsements += from.endorsements;\n    for (const [peerKey, line] of from.counterparties) {\n      if (peerKey === canonicalKey) continue; // a self-edge would score the subject by itself\n      const existing = into.counterparties.get(peerKey) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n      existing.settled += line.settled;\n      existing.volume = sumDecimal([existing.volume, line.volume]);\n      into.counterparties.set(peerKey, existing);\n      // Re-key the peer's reverse edge: alias -> canonical.\n      const peer = this.records.get(peerKey);\n      const held = peer?.counterparties.get(aliasKey);\n      if (peer && held) {\n        peer.counterparties.delete(aliasKey);\n        const reverse = peer.counterparties.get(canonicalKey) ?? { settled: 0, volume: '0' };\n        reverse.settled += held.settled;\n        reverse.volume = sumDecimal([reverse.volume, held.volume]);\n        peer.counterparties.set(canonicalKey, reverse);\n      }\n    }\n    into.counterparties.delete(aliasKey);\n    this.records.delete(aliasKey);\n  }\n\n  get(subject: ReputationSubject): SubjectEvidence | undefined {\n    return this.records.get(subjectKey(subject));\n  }\n\n  getByKey(key: string): SubjectEvidence | undefined {\n    return this.records.get(key);\n  }\n\n  all(): IterableIterator<SubjectEvidence> {\n    return this.records.values();\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.records.size;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Insert a fully-formed record verbatim — the hydration primitive a durable\n   * store uses to rebuild the working set on open. Bypasses the live counters\n   * (the record already holds its accumulated state and timestamps).\n   */\n  load(record: SubjectEvidence): void {\n    this.records.set(subjectKey(record.subject), record);\n  }\n\n  /** Get-or-create the record for a subject and stamp first/last seen. */\n  private touch(subject: ReputationSubject, atMs: number): SubjectEvidence {\n    const key = subjectKey(subject);\n    let record = this.records.get(key);\n    if (!record) {\n      record = {\n        subject: normalizeSubject(subject),\n        firstSeenMs: atMs,\n        lastSeenMs: atMs,\n        attempts: 0,\n        settled: 0,\n        volume: '0',\n        refusals: {},\n        shadowSpends: 0,\n        disputes: 0,\n        endorsements: 0,\n        counterparties: new Map(),\n      };\n      this.records.set(key, record);\n    }\n    if (atMs < record.firstSeenMs) record.firstSeenMs = atMs;\n    if (atMs > record.lastSeenMs) record.lastSeenMs = atMs;\n    return record;\n  }\n}\n","import type { MaybePromise } from './evidence.js';\n\n/**\n * What an `intent.created` event tells us, kept until the matching\n * `payment.settled` (which carries only an intentId) can be attributed.\n */\nexport interface IntentFacts {\n  agentId: string;\n  host: string;\n  amount: string;\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Bridges `intent.created` -> later `payment.settled`/`decision.made`. A\n * `payment.settled` event names only an intentId, so the graph remembers every\n * undecided intent until it settles. Bounded (oldest-evicted) so undecided\n * intents that never settle cannot leak. Writes may be async (a durable store\n * persists them so an in-flight intent survives a restart); reads are sync.\n */\nexport interface IntentCorrelationPort {\n  remember(intentId: string, facts: IntentFacts): MaybePromise<void>;\n  /** Read the facts without consuming them (decision.made reads, doesn't burn). */\n  peek(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined;\n  /** Read and consume (payment.settled attributes once, then forgets). */\n  take(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined;\n  readonly size: number;\n  /**\n   * Await any pending durable writes (no-op in memory). Durable\n   * implementations surface write failures HERE — the graph fire-and-forgets\n   * its writes, so flush() is the error channel.\n   */\n  flush?(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** In-memory correlation map with FIFO eviction once `limit` is reached. */\nexport class InMemoryIntentStore implements IntentCorrelationPort {\n  private readonly intents = new Map<string, IntentFacts>();\n\n  constructor(private readonly limit: number = DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT) {}\n\n  remember(intentId: string, facts: IntentFacts): void {\n    // Re-remembering an existing id is an update, not a new entry — evicting\n    // for it would shrink the working set below the bound (and desync a\n    // durable mirror, whose upsert adds no row). Updates keep their position,\n    // matching an SQL upsert leaving seq unchanged.\n    if (!this.intents.has(intentId) && this.intents.size >= this.limit) {\n      const oldest = this.intents.keys().next().value;\n      if (oldest !== undefined) this.intents.delete(oldest);\n    }\n    this.intents.set(intentId, facts);\n  }\n\n  peek(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined {\n    return this.intents.get(intentId);\n  }\n\n  take(intentId: string): IntentFacts | undefined {\n    const facts = this.intents.get(intentId);\n    if (facts) this.intents.delete(intentId);\n    return facts;\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.intents.size;\n  }\n}\n","import type { ReputationComponents } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport type { SubjectEvidence } from './evidence.js';\n\n/**\n * Component weights, summing to 1. The blend is a deliberately transparent\n * heuristic: every component is 0–100 with higher = healthier, so a score is\n * readable straight off its explanation. Sophistication can replace this\n * later without touching the evidence model — scores are pure functions of\n * evidence, never stored.\n */\nexport interface ScoreWeights {\n  volume: number;\n  longevity: number;\n  disputeRate: number;\n  counterpartyQuality: number;\n  settlementReliability: number;\n}\n\nexport const DEFAULT_WEIGHTS: ScoreWeights = {\n  settlementReliability: 0.3,\n  disputeRate: 0.3,\n  volume: 0.15,\n  counterpartyQuality: 0.15,\n  longevity: 0.1,\n};\n\nconst DAY_MS = 86_400_000;\n\n/**\n * How much one bad observation hurts, relative to a plain refusal. Disputes\n * and shadow spends are deliberate misconduct; a replay means someone tried\n * to spend the same money twice; the rest is sloppiness.\n */\nconst BADNESS = { dispute: 4, shadowSpend: 4, replay: 3, refusal: 1, endorsementCredit: 2 };\n\nconst REPLAY_CODES = new Set(['payment_replayed', 'decision_replayed']);\n\nfunction clamp(value: number, lo: number, hi: number): number {\n  return Math.min(hi, Math.max(lo, value));\n}\n\nfunction refusalCounts(ev: SubjectEvidence): { replays: number; others: number } {\n  let replays = 0;\n  let others = 0;\n  for (const [code, count] of Object.entries(ev.refusals)) {\n    if (REPLAY_CODES.has(code)) replays += count;\n    else others += count;\n  }\n  return { replays, others };\n}\n\n/** Saturating settled-transaction volume: 0 at none, ~63 at 20, ~92 at 50. */\nexport function volumeComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  return 100 * (1 - Math.exp(-ev.settled / 20));\n}\n\n/** How long the subject has been known: linear to 100 at 30 days. */\nexport function longevityComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n  const knownDays = Math.max(0, nowMs - ev.firstSeenMs) / DAY_MS;\n  return 100 * Math.min(1, knownDays / 30);\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispute hygiene (the core field is named `disputeRate`; the component is\n * stored INVERTED — 100 = a clean record — so all five components blend in\n * the same direction). Weighted badness over total interactions; manual\n * endorsements buy back a little slack.\n */\nexport function disputeComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  const { replays, others } = refusalCounts(ev);\n  const badness = Math.max(\n    0,\n    ev.disputes * BADNESS.dispute +\n      ev.shadowSpends * BADNESS.shadowSpend +\n      replays * BADNESS.replay +\n      others * BADNESS.refusal -\n      ev.endorsements * BADNESS.endorsementCredit,\n  );\n  const interactions = Math.max(1, ev.attempts + ev.disputes + ev.endorsements);\n  return 100 * Math.max(0, 1 - badness / interactions);\n}\n\n/** Settled / attempted. No attempts yet = neutral 50, not perfect 100. */\nexport function reliabilityComponent(ev: SubjectEvidence): number {\n  if (ev.attempts === 0) return 50;\n  return 100 * Math.min(1, ev.settled / ev.attempts);\n}\n\n/**\n * Confidence is first-class (see core ReputationScore): a thin or brand-new\n * history yields LOW confidence rather than a misleading score, so consumers\n * (engine sync, gate screening) can refuse to act on it. Depth of evidence\n * saturates around 10 observations; age stops mattering after a week.\n *\n * The 0.1 age floor is load-bearing for fairness. Both consumers act at a 0.3\n * confidence floor (`syncVendors`, `payerCheck`), so capping a day-0 subject at\n * 0.1 makes first-day enforcement impossible BY CONSTRUCTION rather than by\n * arithmetic luck. It used to be 0.4, which left day-0 subjects enforceable\n * after only 14 observations — `depth` saturates so fast that a busy vendor\n * cleared that in seconds, and the console's own vendor sat at 0.30136 against\n * the 0.3 floor, i.e. inside the newcomer grace period by 0.0014. Enforcement\n * now needs roughly 1.6 days (high volume) to 2.3 days (moderate) of history:\n * a grace period measured in time, which is what \"newcomer\" means.\n *\n * Note the constant only ever applies to subjects younger than a week — past\n * 7 days `min(1, d/7)` saturates and age is 1.0 under any floor — so lowering\n * it leaves every mature score bit-for-bit unchanged.\n */\nexport function confidence(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n  const { replays, others } = refusalCounts(ev);\n  const observations =\n    ev.attempts + ev.disputes + ev.endorsements + ev.shadowSpends + replays + others;\n  const depth = 1 - Math.exp(-observations / 10);\n  const knownDays = Math.max(0, nowMs - ev.firstSeenMs) / DAY_MS;\n  const age = 0.1 + 0.9 * Math.min(1, knownDays / 7);\n  return clamp(depth * age, 0, 1);\n}\n\n/** Blend all five components into the headline 0–100 score. */\nexport function blend(components: ReputationComponents, weights: ScoreWeights): number {\n  const total =\n    components.volume * weights.volume +\n    components.longevity * weights.longevity +\n    components.disputeRate * weights.disputeRate +\n    components.counterpartyQuality * weights.counterpartyQuality +\n    components.settlementReliability * weights.settlementReliability;\n  return clamp(Math.round(total), 0, 100);\n}\n\n/**\n * The one-hop base score: the blend WITHOUT counterpartyQuality, with the\n * remaining weights renormalized. Counterparty quality for subject A averages\n * the base scores of A's counterparties — base, not full, so the computation\n * is a single hop and cycles (A pays B pays A) cannot recurse.\n */\nexport function blendBase(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number, weights: ScoreWeights): number {\n  const remaining =\n    weights.volume + weights.longevity + weights.disputeRate + weights.settlementReliability;\n  if (remaining <= 0) return 50;\n  const total =\n    volumeComponent(ev) * weights.volume +\n    longevityComponent(ev, nowMs) * weights.longevity +\n    disputeComponent(ev) * weights.disputeRate +\n    reliabilityComponent(ev) * weights.settlementReliability;\n  return clamp(total / remaining, 0, 100);\n}\n","import {\n  ReputationScore,\n  type Receipt,\n  type ReinEvent,\n  type ReputationComponents,\n  type ReputationSubject,\n} from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport {\n  EvidenceLedger,\n  normalizeSubject,\n  subjectKey,\n  type EvidenceLedgerPort,\n  type MaybePromise,\n  type SubjectEvidence,\n} from './evidence.js';\nimport {\n  DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT,\n  InMemoryIntentStore,\n  type IntentCorrelationPort,\n} from './intents.js';\nimport {\n  blend,\n  blendBase,\n  confidence,\n  DEFAULT_WEIGHTS,\n  disputeComponent,\n  longevityComponent,\n  reliabilityComponent,\n  volumeComponent,\n  type ScoreWeights,\n} from './scoring.js';\n\n/** Anything with a Rein event bus: engine, indexer, gate, signer. */\nexport interface EventSource {\n  onEvent(handler: (event: ReinEvent) => void): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Gate refusal codes that are the vendor's throttle or the vendor's rails\n * failing — not payer misbehavior. They must never become reputation evidence\n * (see the `gate.refused` case below). Mirrors @reinconsole/gate's no-fault classes;\n * kept as strings because the event schema deliberately carries codes as\n * strings (remote gates may run other versions).\n */\nconst NO_FAULT_GATE_CODES = new Set([\n  'rate_limited',\n  'velocity_exceeded',\n  'rails_unavailable',\n  'settle_unknown',\n  'price_unavailable',\n  'price_ceiling',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Where vendor scores land. `PolicyEngine.spend` satisfies this structurally,\n * so `graph.syncVendors(engine.spend)` closes the loop — durable when the\n * engine runs on @reinconsole/store.\n */\nexport interface VendorReputationSink {\n  setVendorReputation(host: string, score: number): void | Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface ReputationGraphOptions {\n  weights?: Partial<ScoreWeights>;\n  /** Injectable clock (scores are functions of evidence AND time). */\n  now?: () => Date;\n  /**\n   * Max undecided intents remembered for settlement correlation. Ignored when\n   * a custom `intents` store is injected (that store owns its own bound).\n   */\n  correlationLimit?: number;\n  /**\n   * Durable evidence ledger. Defaults to in-memory; @reinconsole/store provides a\n   * PGlite-backed one so scores survive a restart.\n   */\n  ledger?: EvidenceLedgerPort;\n  /** Durable intent correlation store. Defaults to in-memory (bounded by `correlationLimit`). */\n  intents?: IntentCorrelationPort;\n}\n\nexport interface ManualReport {\n  subject: ReputationSubject;\n  kind: 'dispute' | 'endorsement';\n  /** When the incident happened (defaults to now). */\n  at?: Date;\n  note?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SyncedVendorScore {\n  host: string;\n  score: number;\n  confidence: number;\n}\n\nexport interface SyncOptions {\n  /**\n   * Scores below this confidence are NOT pushed — the evaluator treats an\n   * unknown reputation as indeterminate (never triggers vendorReputationLt),\n   * and a thin history must stay unknown rather than condemn a newcomer.\n   */\n  minConfidence?: number;\n}\n\n/** A score plus the raw evidence it was derived from, render-ready. */\nexport interface ReputationExplanation {\n  score: ReputationScore;\n  weights: ScoreWeights;\n  evidence: {\n    attempts: number;\n    settled: number;\n    volume: string;\n    refusals: Record<string, number>;\n    shadowSpends: number;\n    disputes: number;\n    endorsements: number;\n    firstSeen: Date;\n    lastSeen: Date;\n    counterparties: { subject: ReputationSubject; settled: number; volume: string }[];\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The Rein reputation graph (Phase 3). Subscribes to the event buses both\n * sides already publish — the engine/indexer name vendors by host and agents\n * by id; a gate names payers by wallet — and accumulates per-subject evidence:\n * settlements, refusals, shadow spends, manual disputes, and settled-money\n * edges between counterparties. Scores are computed on demand (never stored)\n * from that evidence, so every number is explainable, and they feed back into\n * enforcement on both sides of the wire:\n *\n *   graph.syncVendors(engine.spend)  -> policies with vendorReputationLt fire\n *   screen: { check: payerCheck(graph) } -> a gate turns away low-rep wallets\n *\n * Event mapping notes: engine-side evidence keys agents by ULID and vendors by\n * host; gate-side evidence keys payers by wallet and recipients by payTo\n * address — distinct subjects, so feeding one graph from BOTH buses (the\n * console world) never double-counts. `payment.settled` carries only an\n * intentId, so the graph keeps a bounded intent.created correlation map.\n * Denied decisions are deliberately NOT held against anyone: a deny means\n * policy worked, not that the agent or vendor misbehaved.\n */\nexport class ReputationGraph {\n  private readonly ledger: EvidenceLedgerPort;\n  private readonly intents: IntentCorrelationPort;\n  private readonly weights: ScoreWeights;\n  private readonly now: () => Date;\n  /** aliasKey -> canonical subject. Links are derived state (an agent registry\n   * or ERC-8004 lookup knows them) — re-assert at boot; merges are idempotent. */\n  private readonly aliases = new Map<string, ReputationSubject>();\n\n  constructor(options: ReputationGraphOptions = {}) {\n    this.weights = { ...DEFAULT_WEIGHTS, ...options.weights };\n    this.now = options.now ?? (() => new Date());\n    this.ledger = options.ledger ?? new EvidenceLedger();\n    this.intents =\n      options.intents ??\n      new InMemoryIntentStore(options.correlationLimit ?? DEFAULT_CORRELATION_LIMIT);\n  }\n\n  /** Subscribe to a bus. Returns `this` so construction chains. */\n  observe(source: EventSource): this {\n    source.onEvent((event) => this.ingest(event));\n    return this;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fire-and-forget a port write: bus handlers cannot await, and a rejecting\n   * durable write must never become an unhandled rejection (Node kills the\n   * process). Failures are the port's to surface — flush() throws them.\n   */\n  private fire(write: () => MaybePromise<void>): void {\n    // Thunk form (parity with the gate's fire, S19): a ledger that THROWS\n    // synchronously must not turn an ingest into a crash — telemetry failures\n    // are the port's to surface, and flush() throws them.\n    try {\n      void Promise.resolve(write()).catch(() => undefined);\n    } catch {\n      // swallowed by design — see above\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Declare that `alias` is the same real-world party as `canonical` (the\n   * ERC-8004 identity story: one identity, many addresses/ids — an engine\n   * agent's ULID and its paying wallet, or a vendor's host and its payTo\n   * address). Everything already known about the alias is folded into the\n   * canonical subject, and all future evidence and lookups for the alias\n   * resolve to it. Idempotent — re-asserting known links at boot is free.\n   */\n  link(canonical: ReputationSubject, alias: ReputationSubject): void {\n    const target = normalizeSubject(this.resolve(canonical)); // flatten chains\n    const aliasKey = subjectKey(alias);\n    if (subjectKey(target) === aliasKey) return;\n    this.aliases.set(aliasKey, target);\n    // Repoint any alias that resolved THROUGH this alias (a->b then b->c).\n    for (const [key, resolved] of this.aliases) {\n      if (subjectKey(resolved) === aliasKey) this.aliases.set(key, target);\n    }\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.merge(target, alias));\n  }\n\n  /** The canonical subject for a possibly-aliased one. */\n  private resolve(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationSubject {\n    return this.aliases.get(subjectKey(subject)) ?? subject;\n  }\n\n  ingest(event: ReinEvent): void {\n    const atMs = event.at.getTime();\n    switch (event.type) {\n      case 'intent.created': {\n        this.fire(() =>\n          this.intents.remember(event.intent.id, {\n            agentId: event.intent.agentId,\n            host: event.intent.vendor.host,\n            amount: event.intent.amount,\n          }),\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'decision.made': {\n        if (event.decision.outcome !== 'allow') return;\n        const facts = this.intents.peek(event.decision.intentId);\n        if (!facts) return;\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: facts.agentId }), atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: facts.host }), atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'payment.settled': {\n        const facts = this.intents.take(event.payment.intentId);\n        if (!facts) return; // unattributable — no subject to credit\n        const agent = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: facts.agentId });\n        const vendor = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: facts.host });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(agent, vendor, facts.amount, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'shadow.spend': {\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordShadowSpend(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.agentId }), atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'signature.refused': {\n        const agentId = event.agentId; // hoisted: narrowing must survive the thunk\n        if (!agentId) return;\n        this.fire(() =>\n          this.ledger.recordRefusal(this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: agentId }), event.code, atMs),\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'gate.settled': {\n        const payer = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.receipt.payer });\n        const recipient = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: event.receipt.payTo });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(payer, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(recipient, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(payer, recipient, event.receipt.amount, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      case 'gate.refused': {\n        // No-fault refusals carry NO evidence — the gate-side parallel of\n        // \"denied decisions count against no one\". Throttle codes are the\n        // VENDOR'S cap (one gate's rate limit must not bleed into a payer's\n        // global score); rails codes are the vendor's infrastructure failing\n        // (a settle_unknown payment may even have gone through). Not even the\n        // attempt is recorded: an attempt with no settlement would silently\n        // drag settlementReliability down.\n        if (!event.payer || NO_FAULT_GATE_CODES.has(event.code)) return;\n        const payer = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: event.payer });\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(payer, atMs));\n        this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordRefusal(payer, event.code, atMs));\n        return;\n      }\n      // signature.released and gate.quoted carry no evidence the engine-side\n      // events don't already: released duplicates the allow that preceded it,\n      // and a quote names no payer.\n      case 'signature.released':\n      case 'gate.quoted':\n        return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Agent-side alternative to observing the engine bus: feed the SDK guard's\n   * onReceipt straight in. Connect events OR receipts per side, not both —\n   * a receipt restates the decision/settlement the bus already carried.\n   */\n  ingestReceipt(receipt: Receipt): void {\n    if (receipt.outcome !== 'allow') return; // policy verdicts are not subject badness\n    const atMs = receipt.createdAt.getTime();\n    const agent = this.resolve({ kind: 'agent', id: receipt.agentId });\n    const vendor = this.resolve({ kind: 'vendor', id: receipt.vendorHost });\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(agent, atMs));\n    this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordAttempt(vendor, atMs));\n    if (receipt.settlement?.txHash) {\n      this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordSettlement(agent, vendor, receipt.amount, atMs));\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Record an out-of-band dispute or endorsement against a subject. */\n  report(input: ManualReport): void {\n    const atMs = (input.at ?? this.now()).getTime();\n    const subject = this.resolve(input.subject);\n    if (input.kind === 'dispute') this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordDispute(subject, atMs));\n    else this.fire(() => this.ledger.recordEndorsement(subject, atMs));\n  }\n\n  /** Await any pending durable writes (no-op for in-memory stores). */\n  async flush(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.ledger.flush?.();\n    await this.intents.flush?.();\n  }\n\n  /** The score for one subject, or undefined when nothing is known (fairness).\n   *  Aliased subjects resolve to their canonical identity — a linked wallet\n   *  answers with the merged history, on both sides of the wire. */\n  score(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationScore | undefined {\n    const ev = this.ledger.get(this.resolve(subject));\n    return ev && this.scoreOf(ev);\n  }\n\n  /** All known scores, best first. */\n  scores(kind?: ReputationSubject['kind']): ReputationScore[] {\n    const out: ReputationScore[] = [];\n    for (const ev of this.ledger.all()) {\n      if (kind && ev.subject.kind !== kind) continue;\n      out.push(this.scoreOf(ev));\n    }\n    return out.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score);\n  }\n\n  /** The score plus the raw evidence behind it. */\n  explain(subject: ReputationSubject): ReputationExplanation | undefined {\n    const ev = this.ledger.get(this.resolve(subject));\n    if (!ev) return undefined;\n    return {\n      score: this.scoreOf(ev),\n      weights: this.weights,\n      evidence: {\n        attempts: ev.attempts,\n        settled: ev.settled,\n        volume: ev.volume,\n        refusals: { ...ev.refusals },\n        shadowSpends: ev.shadowSpends,\n        disputes: ev.disputes,\n        endorsements: ev.endorsements,\n        firstSeen: new Date(ev.firstSeenMs),\n        lastSeen: new Date(ev.lastSeenMs),\n        counterparties: [...ev.counterparties.entries()].map(([key, line]) => {\n          const [kind, ...id] = key.split(':');\n          return {\n            subject: { kind: kind as ReputationSubject['kind'], id: id.join(':') },\n            settled: line.settled,\n            volume: line.volume,\n          };\n        }),\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Push every vendor score that clears the confidence floor into the engine's\n   * spend store (or any sink). Returns what was pushed. Low-confidence scores\n   * are withheld so `vendorReputationLt` keeps treating thin histories as\n   * unknown — the evaluator's no-data-no-trigger rule stays intact end to end.\n   */\n  async syncVendors(\n    sink: VendorReputationSink,\n    options: SyncOptions = {},\n  ): Promise<SyncedVendorScore[]> {\n    const minConfidence = options.minConfidence ?? 0.3;\n    const pushed: SyncedVendorScore[] = [];\n    for (const ev of this.ledger.all()) {\n      if (ev.subject.kind !== 'vendor') continue;\n      const score = this.scoreOf(ev);\n      if (score.confidence < minConfidence) continue;\n      await sink.setVendorReputation(ev.subject.id, score.score);\n      pushed.push({ host: ev.subject.id, score: score.score, confidence: score.confidence });\n    }\n    return pushed;\n  }\n\n  /** Number of subjects with evidence. */\n  subjects(): number {\n    return this.ledger.size;\n  }\n\n  private scoreOf(ev: SubjectEvidence): ReputationScore {\n    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();\n    const components: ReputationComponents = {\n      volume: volumeComponent(ev),\n      longevity: longevityComponent(ev, nowMs),\n      disputeRate: disputeComponent(ev),\n      counterpartyQuality: this.counterpartyQuality(ev, nowMs),\n      settlementReliability: reliabilityComponent(ev),\n    };\n    return ReputationScore.parse({\n      subject: ev.subject,\n      score: blend(components, this.weights),\n      components,\n      confidence: confidence(ev, nowMs),\n      asOf: new Date(nowMs),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** One-hop mean of the counterparties' base scores; neutral 50 when alone. */\n  private counterpartyQuality(ev: SubjectEvidence, nowMs: number): number {\n    if (ev.counterparties.size === 0) return 50;\n    let total = 0;\n    for (const key of ev.counterparties.keys()) {\n      const other = this.ledger.getByKey(key);\n      total += other ? blendBase(other, nowMs, this.weights) : 50;\n    }\n    return total / ev.counterparties.size;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PayerCheckOptions {\n  /** Refuse payers scoring below this (default 40). */\n  denyBelow?: number;\n  /** Ignore scores below this confidence (default 0.3) — newcomers pass. */\n  minConfidence?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reputation-driven gate screening: plugs into @reinconsole/gate's `screen.check`.\n * Unknown wallets and thin histories pass (same fairness rule as the engine\n * sync); a confident low score is turned away at the door, before any\n * facilitator round-trip.\n */\nexport function payerCheck(\n  graph: ReputationGraph,\n  options: PayerCheckOptions = {},\n): (payer: string) => string | undefined {\n  const denyBelow = options.denyBelow ?? 40;\n  const minConfidence = options.minConfidence ?? 0.3;\n  return (payer) => {\n    const score = graph.score({ kind: 'agent', id: payer });\n    if (!score || score.confidence < minConfidence) return undefined;\n    if (score.score >= denyBelow) return undefined;\n    return `payer reputation ${score.score} is below this gate's floor of ${denyBelow}`;\n  };\n}\n","import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nimport { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport Fastify, { type FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { ReinEvent, ReputationSubject } from '@reinconsole/core';\nimport { ApiKeyAuth, AuthError } from '@reinconsole/core/auth';\nimport { ReputationGraph } from './graph.js';\n\nconst ReportInput = z.object({\n  subject: ReputationSubject,\n  kind: z.enum(['dispute', 'endorsement']),\n  at: z.coerce.date().optional(),\n  note: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\n\nconst ScoresQuery = z.object({ kind: z.enum(['agent', 'vendor']).optional() });\n\nconst LinkInput = z\n  .object({\n    canonical: ReputationSubject,\n    alias: ReputationSubject,\n  })\n  // Merging across kinds would delete a vendor row into an agent identity\n  // (silently dropping the host from syncVendors) — always a caller bug.\n  .refine((l) => l.canonical.kind === l.alias.kind, {\n    message: 'canonical and alias must be the same kind',\n  });\n\nexport interface GraphServerOptions {\n  /**\n   * API-key authentication for the WRITE routes. Omit for embedded use (the\n   * console world holds the graph object directly) or for a loopback-only\n   * process; pass an {@link ApiKeyAuth} and every write demands a `report`\n   * scope while reads stay open.\n   */\n  auth?: ApiKeyAuth;\n}\n\n/** Writes accept evidence; reads only reflect it back. */\nfunction isWrite(method: string): boolean {\n  return method !== 'GET' && method !== 'HEAD' && method !== 'OPTIONS';\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the graph HTTP API. Remote producers POST their events here; anyone\n * can read scores with the evidence behind them. Pass a graph for tests, or\n * let it create a fresh in-memory one.\n *\n * READS ARE OPEN BY DESIGN and that is the whole point of a reputation graph:\n * a score nobody can read governs nothing. WRITES are the asymmetry — an event\n * posted here becomes evidence about a subject that did not post it — so when\n * `auth` is supplied they require the `report` scope. Without `auth` the server\n * is exactly as open as it always was, which is why the bins that expose it\n * refuse a public bind unless a key exists or the operator says otherwise.\n */\nexport function buildGraphServer(\n  graph: ReputationGraph = new ReputationGraph(),\n  options: GraphServerOptions = {},\n): FastifyInstance {\n  const app = Fastify({ logger: false });\n  const auth = options.auth;\n\n  // Turn ZodErrors into clean 400s instead of 500s.\n  app.setErrorHandler((err: unknown, _req, reply) => {\n    if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {\n      return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'validation_error', issues: err.issues });\n    }\n    if (AuthError.is(err)) {\n      return reply.status(err.status).send({ error: err.code, message: err.message });\n    }\n    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n    return reply.status(500).send({ error: 'internal_error', message });\n  });\n\n  // Auth runs before routing, so an unknown write path cannot leak whether it\n  // exists. A missing credential is a 401 with a challenge, never a silent\n  // pass and never a 404 pretending the route moved.\n  if (auth) {\n    app.addHook('onRequest', async (req, reply) => {\n      if (!isWrite(req.method)) return;\n      try {\n        auth.authenticate(req.headers, 'report');\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (AuthError.is(err)) {\n          if (err.status === 401) reply.header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer realm=\"rein-graph\"');\n          return reply.status(err.status).send({ error: err.code, message: err.message });\n        }\n        throw err;\n      }\n      return;\n    });\n  }\n\n  app.get('/health', () => ({\n    status: 'ok',\n    subjects: graph.subjects(),\n    // Advertised so a producer can tell \"this graph wants a key\" apart from\n    // \"my key is wrong\" without guessing from a 401.\n    auth: auth ? 'api-key' : 'none',\n  }));\n\n  // --- Ingestion ---\n  // The HTTP path can await durability even though the in-process bus path\n  // cannot — flush the durable writes before answering so a POST that returns\n  // 200 is persisted.\n  app.post('/v1/events', async (req) => {\n    const events = z.union([ReinEvent.transform((e) => [e]), z.array(ReinEvent)]).parse(req.body);\n    for (const event of events) graph.ingest(event);\n    await graph.flush();\n    return { ingested: events.length };\n  });\n\n  app.post('/v1/reports', async (req) => {\n    const input = ReportInput.parse(req.body);\n    graph.report(input);\n    await graph.flush();\n    return graph.score(input.subject);\n  });\n\n  // --- Identity links ---\n  // Unverified by DESIGN: this endpoint's trust level equals POST /v1/events —\n  // whoever can post events can already fabricate the evidence itself. On-chain\n  // verification belongs to the CALLER (@reinconsole/erc8004 derives link facts from\n  // the Identity Registry, then asserts them here).\n  app.post('/v1/links', async (req) => {\n    const links = z.union([LinkInput.transform((l) => [l]), z.array(LinkInput)]).parse(req.body);\n    for (const link of links) graph.link(link.canonical, link.alias);\n    await graph.flush(); // durable merges land before the 200 (same contract as /v1/events)\n    return { linked: links.length };\n  });\n\n  // --- Scores ---\n  app.get('/v1/scores', (req) => {\n    const { kind } = ScoresQuery.parse(req.query);\n    return graph.scores(kind);\n  });\n\n  app.get('/v1/scores/:kind/:id', (req, reply) => {\n    const subject = ReputationSubject.parse(req.params);\n    const explanation = graph.explain(subject);\n    if (!explanation) {\n      return reply\n        .status(404)\n        .send({ error: 'not_found', message: `no evidence for ${subject.kind} ${subject.id}` });\n    }\n    return explanation;\n  });\n\n  return app;\n}\n\nconst LOOPBACK = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1', '[::1]']);\n\n/**\n * Build the graph's auth layer from the environment, or explain why there is\n * none. `REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY` seeds one or more comma-separated secrets.\n *\n * They are seeded with `report` and nothing else: the graph has no key-issuing\n * routes to bootstrap (unlike the engine, which seeds `admin` so `/v1/keys` is\n * reachable), so an `admin` secret here would grant authority no route needs.\n */\nexport async function graphAuthFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Promise<ApiKeyAuth | undefined> {\n  const raw = env['REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY']?.trim();\n  if (!raw) return undefined;\n  const auth = new ApiKeyAuth();\n  const secrets = raw\n    .split(',')\n    .map((secret) => secret.trim())\n    .filter(Boolean);\n  for (const [i, secret] of secrets.entries()) {\n    await auth.issue({ name: `env-key-${i + 1}`, scopes: ['report'], secret });\n  }\n  return auth.hasKeys() ? auth : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Where a graph process binds, given whether auth exists.\n *\n * Until D1(a) the graph had no key to trade, so the only trade available was a\n * statement: `REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1`. Now that writes can demand a `report` key,\n * the rule matches the engine's — a key buys a public bind, and asking for one\n * without a key is a startup ERROR rather than a warning. `REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1`\n * survives as the deliberate override for an open graph, because a read-only\n * showcase is a real deployment and reads were never the exposure.\n */\nexport function resolveGraphHost(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,\n  hasAuth = false,\n): { host: string; warning?: string } {\n  const requested = env['HOST']?.trim();\n  const optedIn = env['REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC']?.trim() === '1';\n  if (hasAuth) return { host: requested || '0.0.0.0' };\n  if (optedIn) {\n    return {\n      host: requested || '0.0.0.0',\n      warning:\n        'REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1 — this reputation graph is answering unauthenticated requests. ' +\n        'Anyone who can reach it can write evidence that moves scores.',\n    };\n  }\n  if (requested && !LOOPBACK.has(requested)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `refusing to bind ${requested}: the reputation graph has no authentication.` +\n        '\\n  Set REIN_GRAPH_API_KEY=<secret> to protect its writes, or' +\n        '\\n  set REIN_GRAPH_PUBLIC=1 to expose an open graph deliberately.',\n    );\n  }\n  return { host: requested || '127.0.0.1' };\n}\n\n// Start the server when run directly (tsx/node), not when imported.\nfunction isMainModule(): boolean {\n  if (!process.argv[1]) return false;\n  try {\n    return realpathSync(process.argv[1]) === realpathSync(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nif (isMainModule()) {\n  const port = Number(process.env.PORT ?? 8788);\n  // This block used to default to 0.0.0.0 with no auth at all — the in-memory\n  // twin of the exposure D1 closed on the durable bin, and the more reachable\n  // of the two, since it needs no data directory to run.\n  graphAuthFromEnv(process.env)\n    .then((auth) => {\n      const { host, warning } = resolveGraphHost(process.env, auth !== undefined);\n      if (warning) console.warn(`[rein] ${warning}`);\n      const app = buildGraphServer(new ReputationGraph(), { ...(auth ? { auth } : {}) });\n      return app\n        .listen({ port, host })\n        .then(() =>\n          console.log(\n            `[rein] graph listening on http://${host}:${port} (auth: ${auth ? 'api-key' : 'none'})`,\n          ),\n        );\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      console.error(err);\n      process.exit(1);\n    });\n}\n","import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { ApiKeyRecord, toPublicApiKey, type ApiKey, type ApiKeyScope } from './api-key.js';\nimport { newId } from './ulid.js';\n\n/**\n * API-key authentication for a Rein service's HTTP surface.\n *\n * Secrets are never stored: a service keeps sha256 digests, so a leaked\n * database yields nothing that authenticates. A secret is returned exactly\n * once, at issuance. Rotation mints a new secret while keeping the outgoing\n * digest valid for a grace window, so a fleet rolls over without a flag-day\n * restart.\n *\n * This lives in core, beside the {@link ApiKeyRecord} schema it reads and\n * writes, because three services need the SAME answer to \"who is calling and\n * may they do this\" — the engine, the signer's admin surface, and the graph's\n * ingestion routes. Two implementations of authentication is two things to get\n * wrong. It is reached as `@reinconsole/core/auth` rather than through the\n * package barrel ON PURPOSE: the barrel is imported by the console's BROWSER\n * bundle, and every symbol below needs `node:crypto`.\n */\n\n/** A port may answer synchronously (in memory) or not (durable). */\nexport type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>;\n\n/** The presented-secret prefix, so a leaked key is greppable in logs and repos. */\nconst SECRET_PREFIX = 'rk_';\n\n/** How often a key's `lastUsedAt` is written through. Telemetry, not authority. */\nconst TOUCH_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;\n\n/** Default rotation overlap: long enough to redeploy, short enough to matter. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS = 3_600_000; // 1h\n\nexport function mintSecret(): string {\n  return SECRET_PREFIX + randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n}\n\nexport function hashSecret(secret: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/** Digest comparison that does not leak a prefix match through timing. */\nfunction digestsEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const left = Buffer.from(a, 'hex');\n  const right = Buffer.from(b, 'hex');\n  return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time comparison of a presented secret against an expected one.\n *\n * Both sides are hashed first, so the comparison is over two fixed-length\n * digests: `timingSafeEqual` throws on a length mismatch, which would\n * otherwise turn \"wrong length\" into a distinguishable error and leak the\n * secret's size. This is what a service holding ONE static shared secret\n * needs — a key store is the {@link ApiKeyAuth} path above. It lives here so\n * the signer's admin token and the engine's keys agree on what a constant-time\n * secret check is; the signer had its own copy until S52.\n */\nexport function secretsEqual(presented: string, expected: string): boolean {\n  return digestsEqual(hashSecret(presented), hashSecret(expected));\n}\n\n/**\n * Persistence seam for keys, mirroring the engine's other ports. Auth is\n * authority state, so writes are persist-then-cache: `put` is awaited before a\n * key counts as issued, rotated, or revoked.\n */\nexport interface ApiKeyStorePort {\n  put(record: ApiKeyRecord): MaybePromise<void>;\n  get(id: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined;\n  /** Lookup by sha256 of a presented secret (current OR in-grace previous). */\n  byHash(hash: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined;\n  list(): ApiKeyRecord[];\n}\n\nexport class InMemoryApiKeyStore implements ApiKeyStorePort {\n  private readonly byId = new Map<string, ApiKeyRecord>();\n  private readonly hashes = new Map<string, string>(); // secretHash -> keyId\n\n  put(record: ApiKeyRecord): void {\n    const existing = this.byId.get(record.id);\n    if (existing) {\n      this.hashes.delete(existing.secretHash);\n      if (existing.previousSecretHash) this.hashes.delete(existing.previousSecretHash);\n    }\n    this.byId.set(record.id, record);\n    this.hashes.set(record.secretHash, record.id);\n    if (record.previousSecretHash) this.hashes.set(record.previousSecretHash, record.id);\n  }\n\n  get(id: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined {\n    return this.byId.get(id);\n  }\n\n  byHash(hash: string): ApiKeyRecord | undefined {\n    const id = this.hashes.get(hash);\n    return id === undefined ? undefined : this.byId.get(id);\n  }\n\n  list(): ApiKeyRecord[] {\n    return [...this.byId.values()];\n  }\n}\n\nexport type AuthFailureCode =\n  | 'missing_credentials'\n  | 'invalid_key'\n  | 'key_revoked'\n  /** Past the key's `expiresAt` (a sandbox key nobody claimed). */\n  | 'key_expired'\n  | 'secret_expired'\n  | 'insufficient_scope'\n  | 'unknown_key_id'\n  /** The key is confined to an org, and the named agent is not in it. */\n  | 'agent_not_in_scope'\n  /**\n   * The key is confined to an org and the route has no tenant rule, so there\n   * is no way to confine the call. Fail closed: an unclassified route is\n   * reachable only by an unscoped operator key, exactly as an unclassified\n   * route already demands `admin`.\n   */\n  | 'route_not_scopable';\n\n/**\n * Every rejected request throws one of these. It carries the HTTP status so a\n * route never has to guess: 401 means \"we do not know who you are\", 403 means\n * \"we know, and this key may not do that\". Nothing fails open, nothing fails\n * silently.\n */\nexport class AuthError extends Error {\n  /**\n   * A brand, because `instanceof` is not enough here. Every service bundles\n   * `@reinconsole/core` into its own output (`noExternal`, for self-contained\n   * deploys), so an `ApiKeyAuth` built from one package and handed to a server\n   * in another throws an AuthError from a DIFFERENT copy of this class. An\n   * `instanceof` check in the catching service then misses it and a 401 turns\n   * into a 500 — which is what happened the first time the graph was handed\n   * the engine's auth object.\n   */\n  readonly reinAuthError = true;\n\n  constructor(\n    readonly status: 401 | 403 | 404,\n    readonly code: AuthFailureCode,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'AuthError';\n  }\n\n  /** Use this, never a bare `instanceof`, when catching across packages. */\n  static is(err: unknown): err is AuthError {\n    return (\n      err instanceof AuthError ||\n      (typeof err === 'object' &&\n        err !== null &&\n        (err as { reinAuthError?: unknown }).reinAuthError === true)\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface IssuedApiKey {\n  key: ApiKey;\n  /** The plaintext secret. Shown once, at issuance; never recoverable after. */\n  secret: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApiKeyAuthOptions {\n  store?: ApiKeyStorePort;\n  /** Injected clock, so grace-window behaviour is testable without waiting. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\nexport class ApiKeyAuth {\n  private readonly store: ApiKeyStorePort;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n  /**\n   * Keys with an authority write (rotate, revoke, lift) in flight. A usage\n   * touch writes back a WHOLE record snapshot, so one taken while such a write\n   * is on its way to disk would land after it and undo it -- re-open a revoked\n   * key, or give a claimed sandbox its expiry back. Touches skip these keys.\n   */\n  private readonly mutating = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(options: ApiKeyAuthOptions = {}) {\n    this.store = options.store ?? new InMemoryApiKeyStore();\n    this.now = options.now ?? Date.now;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a key. The secret in the result is the only copy that will exist.\n   *\n   * `orgId` confines the key to one tenant; omitting it mints the unscoped\n   * operator key that every deployment had before tenancy. `agentIds` narrows\n   * an org-scoped key to named agents and is refused without an org, because a\n   * scope with no org cannot say which policies or approvers the key may\n   * reach — and a half-defined scope is the kind that fails open.\n   */\n  async issue(input: {\n    name: string;\n    scopes: ApiKeyScope[];\n    /** Confine the key to one org. Omit for an unscoped operator key. */\n    orgId?: string;\n    /** Narrow an org-scoped key to named agents (max 64). */\n    agentIds?: string[];\n    /** Adopt a caller-supplied secret (env-seeded boot keys). */\n    secret?: string;\n    /** Stop authenticating at this instant (sandbox keys). Omit for never. */\n    expiresAt?: Date;\n  }): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    if (input.scopes.length === 0) throw new TypeError('an API key needs at least one scope');\n    if (input.agentIds?.length && input.orgId === undefined) {\n      throw new TypeError('agentIds narrows an org-scoped key; pass orgId as well');\n    }\n    const secret = input.secret ?? mintSecret();\n    const record = ApiKeyRecord.parse({\n      id: newId('key'),\n      name: input.name,\n      scopes: input.scopes,\n      ...(input.orgId !== undefined ? { orgId: input.orgId } : {}),\n      ...(input.agentIds?.length ? { agentIds: input.agentIds } : {}),\n      createdAt: new Date(this.now()),\n      ...(input.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: input.expiresAt } : {}),\n      secretHash: hashSecret(secret),\n    });\n    await this.store.put(record);\n    return { key: toPublicApiKey(record), secret };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Mint a replacement secret for an existing key. The outgoing secret keeps\n   * working for `graceMs` so callers can be redeployed one at a time; pass 0\n   * to cut it off immediately (what a compromised secret needs).\n   */\n  async rotate(keyId: string, options: { graceMs?: number } = {}): Promise<IssuedApiKey> {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    if (!record) throw new AuthError(404, 'unknown_key_id', `no such key: ${keyId}`);\n    const graceMs = options.graceMs ?? DEFAULT_ROTATION_GRACE_MS;\n    const secret = mintSecret();\n    const rotated: ApiKeyRecord = {\n      ...record,\n      secretHash: hashSecret(secret),\n      rotatedAt: new Date(this.now()),\n    };\n    delete rotated.previousSecretHash;\n    delete rotated.previousSecretExpiresAt;\n    if (graceMs > 0) {\n      rotated.previousSecretHash = record.secretHash;\n      rotated.previousSecretExpiresAt = new Date(this.now() + graceMs);\n    }\n    await this.write(rotated);\n    return { key: toPublicApiKey(rotated), secret };\n  }\n\n  async revoke(keyId: string): Promise<ApiKey | undefined> {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    if (!record) return undefined;\n    const revoked: ApiKeyRecord = { ...record, revokedAt: new Date(this.now()) };\n    await this.write(revoked);\n    return toPublicApiKey(revoked);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Make an expiring key permanent -- what claiming a sandbox is (Sprint 13).\n   * Revoked keys stay revoked: lifting an expiry never resurrects anything.\n   * Answers undefined for an unknown key, the record unchanged when there was\n   * no expiry to lift.\n   */\n  async clearExpiry(keyId: string): Promise<ApiKey | undefined> {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    if (!record) return undefined;\n    if (record.expiresAt === undefined) return toPublicApiKey(record);\n    const lifted: ApiKeyRecord = { ...record };\n    delete lifted.expiresAt;\n    await this.write(lifted);\n    return toPublicApiKey(lifted);\n  }\n\n  list(): ApiKey[] {\n    return this.store.list().map(toPublicApiKey);\n  }\n\n  /** One key's public record, for an ownership check before rotate/revoke. */\n  get(keyId: string): ApiKey | undefined {\n    const record = this.store.get(keyId);\n    return record === undefined ? undefined : toPublicApiKey(record);\n  }\n\n  /** True once at least one key exists — what \"auth is configured\" means. */\n  hasKeys(): boolean {\n    return this.store.list().length > 0;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a request's credentials, or throw. `scope` is what the route\n   * needs; an `admin` key satisfies every scope, any other key must hold the\n   * exact one.\n   */\n  authenticate(headers: IncomingHeaders, scope: ApiKeyScope): ApiKey {\n    const presented = readCredential(headers);\n    if (presented === undefined) {\n      throw new AuthError(401, 'missing_credentials', 'missing API key (Authorization: Bearer ...)');\n    }\n\n    const hash = hashSecret(presented);\n    const record = this.store.byHash(hash);\n    if (!record) throw new AuthError(401, 'invalid_key', 'unknown API key');\n\n    if (!digestsEqual(record.secretHash, hash)) {\n      // Only the in-grace previous secret can reach here.\n      const expiry = record.previousSecretExpiresAt;\n      if (\n        record.previousSecretHash === undefined ||\n        !digestsEqual(record.previousSecretHash, hash) ||\n        expiry === undefined ||\n        this.now() >= expiry.getTime()\n      ) {\n        throw new AuthError(401, 'secret_expired', 'rotated API key secret is no longer accepted');\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (record.revokedAt) throw new AuthError(401, 'key_revoked', 'API key has been revoked');\n    if (record.expiresAt && this.now() >= record.expiresAt.getTime()) {\n      throw new AuthError(401, 'key_expired', 'API key has expired');\n    }\n\n    if (!record.scopes.includes('admin') && !record.scopes.includes(scope)) {\n      throw new AuthError(403, 'insufficient_scope', `API key lacks the \"${scope}\" scope`);\n    }\n\n    void this.touch(record);\n    return toPublicApiKey(record);\n  }\n\n  /** An authority write that usage touches must not overtake (see `mutating`). */\n  private async write(record: ApiKeyRecord): Promise<void> {\n    this.mutating.add(record.id);\n    try {\n      await this.store.put(record);\n    } finally {\n      this.mutating.delete(record.id);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Throttled write-through of `lastUsedAt` — never on the critical path. */\n  private 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@reinconsole/graph",
-  "version": "0.4.0",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "description": "Rein's reputation graph (Phase 3) — turns guard receipts and gate receipts into explainable reputation scores, and feeds them back into policy (vendorReputationLt) and gate screening.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/bugiiiii11/rein#readme",
@@ -41,15 +41,15 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "fastify": "^5.12.1",
     "zod": "^3.24.1",
-    "@reinconsole/core": "^0.4.0"
+    "@reinconsole/core": "^0.5.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^22.10.0",
     "tsup": "^8.3.5",
     "typescript": "^5.7.2",
     "vitest": "^2.1.8",
-    "@reinconsole/gate": "0.4.0",
-    "@reinconsole/policy-engine": "0.4.0"
+    "@reinconsole/gate": "0.5.0",
+    "@reinconsole/policy-engine": "0.5.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsup",