@rebasepro/server 0.9.1-canary.a57c262 → 0.9.1-canary.ad25bc0

package/dist/auth/index.d.ts

@@ -28,10 +28,7 @@ export type { AuthModuleConfig, CookieAuthConfig } from "./routes";
 export { mountMagicLinkRoutes } from "./magic-link-routes";
 export { createResetPasswordRoute } from "./reset-password-admin";
 export type { ResetPasswordRouteConfig } from "./reset-password-admin";
-export { createRateLimiter, defaultAuthLimiter, strictAuthLimiter, createApiKeyRateLimiter, createDataRateLimiter, apiKeyKeyGenerator } from "./rate-limiter";
-export type { DataRateLimitConfig } from "./rate-limiter";
-export { MemoryRateLimitStore } from "./rate-limit-store";
-export type { RateLimitStore, RateLimitDecision } from "./rate-limit-store";
+export { createRateLimiter, defaultAuthLimiter, strictAuthLimiter, createApiKeyRateLimiter, apiKeyKeyGenerator } from "./rate-limiter";
 export { createApiKeyStore, createApiKeyRoutes, isApiKeyToken, validateApiKey, httpMethodToOperation, isOperationAllowed } from "./api-keys";
 export type { ApiKey, ApiKeyMasked, ApiKeyPermission, ApiKeyWithSecret, CreateApiKeyRequest, UpdateApiKeyRequest, ApiKeyStore, ApiKeyOperation } from "./api-keys";
 export { createBuiltinAuthAdapter } from "./builtin-auth-adapter";

package/dist/auth/jwt.d.ts

@@ -38,18 +38,7 @@ export declare function getAccessTokenExpiryMs(): number;
  */
 export declare function getAccessTokenExpiry(): number;
 /**
- * Verify and decode an access token.
- *
- * Every token this server issues is signed with the same secret, so what a
- * token *is* comes from its claims, not from its signature. A download token
- * ({@link generateDownloadToken}) is therefore a validly-signed string that
- * must never authenticate anybody: it is scoped to one file path and handed out
- * in URLs, which is a far weaker thing to hold than a session.
- *
- * Today it is rejected below for want of an id — but only by luck, since
- * nothing stops a future download token from carrying one. So the purpose is
- * checked explicitly: a token minted for reading a file is not a token for
- * being a user.
+ * Verify and decode an access token
  */
 export declare function verifyAccessToken(token: string): AccessTokenPayload | null;
 /**

package/dist/auth/middleware.d.ts

@@ -150,27 +150,6 @@ export declare const queryTokenAuth: MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>;
  * untouched, so they still require a valid token.
  */
 export declare const publicObjectAuth: MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>;
-/**
- * Helper to match paths for scoped file tokens.
- * Matches exact paths or prefixes (exact folder prefixes or ending with /).
- *
- * The traversal check is defence in depth, not the load-bearing defence.
- *
- * A prefix comparison is a lie for any path containing `..`: `user1/../user2/x`
- * starts with `user1/`, so a token scoped to `user1/` would authorize reading
- * user2's file — and the storage controller would not object, because its own
- * guard stops a path escaping the *bucket*, and that one resolves to `user2/x`,
- * comfortably inside it. The grant is what would be escaped, and this is the
- * only layer that knows what was granted.
- *
- * Nothing arrives here in that shape today: the URL parser resolves `..` (and
- * `%2e%2e`, which the WHATWG spec treats as a dot for normalization) before
- * Hono routes the request, so this comparison already runs on a resolved path.
- * But that is a guarantee of the runtime rather than of this code, and it is
- * one line to not depend on it. The same rule already guards the public-object
- * path — see `isPublicStoragePath`.
- */
-export declare function isPathMatch(requested: string, allowed: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Middleware that authenticates file-serving routes using scoped download tokens.
  * It enforces that only scoped "file-read" tokens can access "/file/*" and "?token=" query params.

package/dist/auth/rate-limiter.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
 import { MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
 import { HonoEnv } from "../api/types";
-import { RateLimitStore } from "./rate-limit-store";
-/**
- * Sliding-window rate limiting for Hono.
- *
- * The counting lives in a {@link RateLimitStore} — in this process's memory by
- * default, which is a per-replica limit and says so. See `rate-limit-store.ts`.
- */
 interface RateLimiterOptions {
     /** Time window in milliseconds (default: 15 minutes) */
     windowMs?: number;
@@ -16,22 +9,13 @@ interface RateLimiterOptions {
     keyGenerator?: (c: Parameters<MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>>[0]) => string;
     /** Custom message for rate limit responses */
     message?: string;
-    /**
-     * Where to keep the counts. Defaults to a private in-memory store — pass a
-     * shared one to have several limiters (or several processes) agree.
-     */
-    store?: RateLimitStore;
-    /**
-     * Per-request limit override, for buckets whose allowance is data rather
-     * than config (an API key's own `rate_limit`). Returning `undefined` uses
-     * `limit`; returning `null` skips the limiter for this request.
-     */
-    resolveLimit?: (c: Parameters<MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>>[0]) => number | null | undefined;
 }
 /**
  * Create a rate-limiting middleware.
  *
- * Uses a sliding window: only hits within the last `windowMs` are counted.
+ * Uses a sliding window algorithm: only timestamps within the last
+ * `windowMs` milliseconds are counted. Old entries are garbage-collected
+ * every `windowMs` to prevent unbounded memory growth.
  */
 export declare function createRateLimiter(options?: RateLimiterOptions): MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>;
 /**
@@ -52,44 +36,12 @@ export declare const strictAuthLimiter: MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>;
  * via an API key.
  */
 export declare function apiKeyKeyGenerator(c: Parameters<MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>>[0]): string;
-/** How the data API's limits are apportioned. All fields optional. */
-export interface DataRateLimitConfig {
-    /** Turn the whole thing off — for a deployment whose proxy already does it. */
-    enabled?: boolean;
-    windowMs?: number;
-    /** Fallback for an API key with no `rate_limit` of its own. Default 1000. */
-    apiKey?: number;
-    /** Per signed-in user. Default 1000. */
-    user?: number;
-    /** Per IP, for requests with no principal at all. Default 300. */
-    anonymous?: number;
-    /** Share counts across replicas. Defaults to this process's memory. */
-    store?: RateLimitStore;
-}
-/**
- * Rate limiting for the data API.
- *
- * Every request is in exactly one bucket, resolved most-specific first: an API
- * key by its id, a signed-in user by their uid, anyone else by IP. Previously
- * only the first of those was limited at all — the middleware returned early
- * for any request without an API key — so JWT and anonymous traffic to
- * `/api/data/*` was unbounded, which is most of the traffic a BaaS gets.
- *
- * Per bucket, not per route: the point is to bound what one caller costs, and
- * they can spend it wherever they like.
- *
- * The defaults are deliberately loose. This is a floor against a runaway client
- * or a naive scraper, not a quota — a deployment that wants real quotas should
- * set them, and one that already has a proxy doing this should pass
- * `enabled: false` rather than pay for it twice.
- */
-export declare function createDataRateLimiter(config?: DataRateLimitConfig): MiddlewareHandler<HonoEnv>;
 /**
  * Create a rate limiter specifically for API key requests.
  *
- * @deprecated Use {@link createDataRateLimiter}, which limits signed-in users
- * and anonymous callers too. This one skips every request that is not
- * API-key-authenticated, which was most of them.
+ * When a request is authenticated via an API key that has a `rate_limit`
+ * configured, this limiter enforces per-key limits using the key's ID
+ * as the rate limit bucket.
  *
  * @param defaultLimit - Fallback limit when the key has no `rate_limit` set.
  * @param windowMs     - Time window in milliseconds (default: 15 minutes).