@rebasepro/server 0.17.0 → 0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4

package/dist/{internal-tables-DpxfPaEB.js → internal-tables-DYVcFFSv.js}

@@ -73,6 +73,25 @@ var SAFE_IDENTIFIER = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/;
 *  - the table may not exist yet — `cron_logs` never appears in a project with
 *    no cron jobs — and `to_regclass` returning NULL has to be tolerated too.
 *
+* The third guard is the one that decides whether the *right* table is being
+* revoked. The names in {@link REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES} are unqualified, and the
+* boot-time sweep in `ensureAppRole` applies all of them to every schema a
+* project uses — including the schema its own collections live in. A project is
+* free to call a collection `jobs`, `branches` or `api_keys`, and when it does,
+* the sweep was revoking `rebase_user`'s DML on the project's table on every
+* single boot. That is not a subtle degradation: the collection's whole API
+* answers 500 `permission denied for table …` from then on, which is what
+* happened to a public job board whose vacancies live in `public.jobs`.
+*
+* `relrowsecurity` separates the two cleanly, and it is the same fact this
+* module already relies on. Framework-internal tables carry no RLS — that is the
+* premise stated at the top of this file, and the reason a revoke is needed at
+* all. Every collection table has it enabled, because that is how Rebase
+* enforces `securityRules`. So "RLS is off" is exactly "this is not somebody's
+* collection", and the guard also subsumes the hand-carved `users` exception:
+* the auth user table is a collection, has RLS, and would now be skipped on its
+* own merits rather than by being kept off a list.
+*
 * One command, so it is safe on handles that speak the extended query protocol
 * and reject multi-statement strings.
 */
@@ -84,7 +103,8 @@ function revokeInternalTableSql(schema, table) {
         DO $rebase_revoke$
         BEGIN
             IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${REBASE_USER_ROLE}')
-               AND to_regclass('${qualified}') IS NOT NULL THEN
+               AND to_regclass('${qualified}') IS NOT NULL
+               AND NOT (SELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE oid = to_regclass('${qualified}')) THEN
                 EXECUTE 'REVOKE ALL ON ${qualified} FROM ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}';
             END IF;
         END
@@ -94,4 +114,4 @@ function revokeInternalTableSql(schema, table) {
 //#endregion
 export { revokeInternalTableSql as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=internal-tables-DpxfPaEB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=internal-tables-DYVcFFSv.js.map

package/dist/internal-tables-DYVcFFSv.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"internal-tables-DYVcFFSv.js","names":[],"sources":["../../common/src/util/internal-tables.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The tables Rebase creates for its own bookkeeping, and the SQL that keeps the\n * end-user role away from them.\n *\n * ## Why this exists\n *\n * Authenticated requests run as {@link REBASE_USER_ROLE}, and the boot-time role\n * provisioning grants that role `SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE` on every table\n * in the schemas a project uses — including `rebase`, because a project's own\n * collections are allowed to live there (the scaffold puts `users` there). It\n * also sets `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES`, so a table created *later* by the\n * migrating role inherits the same grant.\n *\n * Every framework-internal table is created later: auth's tables come up during\n * `initializeAuth`, `api_keys` during route mounting, `cron_logs` when the first\n * job registers, `idempotency_keys` on the first request that carries a key. So\n * they all inherited full DML for the end-user role — and none of them enables\n * row-level security, because none of them is a collection with\n * `securityRules`. Measured on a freshly provisioned database, `SET ROLE\n * rebase_user` could read `rebase.refresh_tokens` (session token hashes),\n * `rebase.mfa_factors` (`secret_encrypted`), `rebase.recovery_codes`, and\n * `rebase.api_keys` (including its `admin` flag), and insert into\n * `rebase.app_config`.\n *\n * Nothing routes a user-context query at those tables today, so this was not\n * reachable over the API. That is the wrong thing to depend on: the documented\n * model is that RLS is the authorization boundary, and these tables sat outside\n * it. The boundary is now a privilege boundary instead — the role simply cannot\n * address them.\n *\n * ## Why REVOKE rather than ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY\n *\n * RLS with no policy denies every row, which is the same outcome, but it is the\n * *weaker* statement: it leaves the grant in place, so a later policy — or a\n * `FORCE` flag cleared by some future migration — reopens the table. There is no\n * row of `refresh_tokens` any end user should ever reach, so the honest encoding\n * is \"this role has no privilege here at all\". It also keeps the owner\n * connection (which auth actually runs on) completely unaffected.\n *\n * ## Keeping it true\n *\n * `packages/rls-check` scans the `rebase` schema — it used to skip it as a\n * \"platform\" schema — and its `rls-disabled` check fires on exactly the\n * condition this module removes: RLS off *and* a DML grant to a reachable role.\n * So a table added here without a revoke is caught by `pnpm rls:check`, not by\n * someone re-reading this file.\n */\n\n/**\n * The Postgres role authenticated requests run as.\n *\n * Defined here rather than in the Postgres driver because both the driver (which\n * provisions the role) and this module (which revokes on its behalf) need it,\n * and a second spelling of a role name is a silent no-op waiting to happen.\n */\nexport const REBASE_USER_ROLE = \"rebase_user\";\n\n/**\n * Framework-internal table names, unqualified.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT including `users`: the auth user table is also a collection,\n * with `securityRules`, RLS enabled and policies applied. Users read their own\n * row through it — revoking there would break sign-in. `revokeInternalTableSql`\n * now skips any table with RLS enabled, so that exception is enforced rather\n * than merely remembered — and so is the same hazard for every other name here,\n * any of which a project may legitimately use for a collection of its own.\n *\n * `atlas_schema_revisions` is Atlas's migration ledger, which lands in `rebase`\n * because `db migrate apply` passes `--revisions-schema rebase`.\n *\n * Every entry here must also be revoked by whatever creates it, and vice versa:\n * the creation-time revoke fires once, on the boot that first makes the table,\n * so it cannot help a database provisioned before that revoke existed. This\n * list is what the boot-time sweep in `ensureAppRole` iterates, and the sweep\n * is the only thing that can repair an already-granted table. A table revoked\n * at creation but missing here is therefore permanently stranded on any\n * database that predates its revoke.\n *\n * These names are unqualified, and the boot-time sweep applies them to every\n * schema a project uses — so an entry here is a claim on that name in `public`\n * as much as in `rebase`. `jobs` is Rebase's queue at `rebase.jobs` AND a\n * perfectly ordinary collection name, and revoking `public.jobs` from a project\n * that owns it leaves every read failing 42501 with correct policies applied\n * and nothing in the RLS logs to explain it. The `relrowsecurity` guard in\n * `revokeInternalTableSql` is what makes a common noun safe here — it is not a\n * licence to claim more of them.\n */\nexport const REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES: readonly string[] = [\n    // auth\n    \"user_identities\",\n    \"refresh_tokens\",\n    \"password_reset_tokens\",\n    \"magic_link_tokens\",\n    \"mfa_factors\",\n    \"mfa_challenges\",\n    \"recovery_codes\",\n    \"app_config\",\n    \"schema_meta\",\n    // platform services\n    \"api_keys\",\n    \"cron_logs\",\n    \"cron_claims\",\n    \"jobs\",\n    \"rate_limit_hits\",\n    \"idempotency_keys\",\n    \"entity_history\",\n    \"branches\",\n    \"metric_samples\",\n    // realtime channels — authorization for these lives in the channel rules the\n    // server evaluates before it reads or writes, never in a row policy\n    \"channel_messages\",\n    \"channel_cursors\",\n    \"channel_presence\",\n    // migration bookkeeping\n    \"atlas_schema_revisions\"\n];\n\n/** Postgres identifiers this module is willing to interpolate. */\nconst SAFE_IDENTIFIER = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/;\n\n/**\n * A single statement that takes every privilege on `schema.table` away from the\n * end-user role.\n *\n * Wrapped in a `DO` block guarded on `pg_roles` for two reasons, both of which\n * happen in practice:\n *\n *  - the role does not exist when the connection is unprivileged (Rebase then\n *    relies on native RLS rather than a role switch), and a bare `REVOKE` on a\n *    missing role is an error, not a no-op;\n *  - the table may not exist yet — `cron_logs` never appears in a project with\n *    no cron jobs — and `to_regclass` returning NULL has to be tolerated too.\n *\n * The third guard is the one that decides whether the *right* table is being\n * revoked. The names in {@link REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES} are unqualified, and the\n * boot-time sweep in `ensureAppRole` applies all of them to every schema a\n * project uses — including the schema its own collections live in. A project is\n * free to call a collection `jobs`, `branches` or `api_keys`, and when it does,\n * the sweep was revoking `rebase_user`'s DML on the project's table on every\n * single boot. That is not a subtle degradation: the collection's whole API\n * answers 500 `permission denied for table …` from then on, which is what\n * happened to a public job board whose vacancies live in `public.jobs`.\n *\n * `relrowsecurity` separates the two cleanly, and it is the same fact this\n * module already relies on. Framework-internal tables carry no RLS — that is the\n * premise stated at the top of this file, and the reason a revoke is needed at\n * all. Every collection table has it enabled, because that is how Rebase\n * enforces `securityRules`. So \"RLS is off\" is exactly \"this is not somebody's\n * collection\", and the guard also subsumes the hand-carved `users` exception:\n * the auth user table is a collection, has RLS, and would now be skipped on its\n * own merits rather than by being kept off a list.\n *\n * One command, so it is safe on handles that speak the extended query protocol\n * and reject multi-statement strings.\n */\nexport function revokeInternalTableSql(schema: string, table: string): string {\n    if (!SAFE_IDENTIFIER.test(schema)) {\n        throw new Error(`Refusing to build SQL with an unsafe schema name: ${JSON.stringify(schema)}`);\n    }\n    if (!SAFE_IDENTIFIER.test(table)) {\n        throw new Error(`Refusing to build SQL with an unsafe table name: ${JSON.stringify(table)}`);\n    }\n    const qualified = `\"${schema}\".\"${table}\"`;\n    return `\n        DO $rebase_revoke$\n        BEGIN\n            IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${REBASE_USER_ROLE}')\n               AND to_regclass('${qualified}') IS NOT NULL\n               AND NOT (SELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class WHERE oid = to_regclass('${qualified}')) THEN\n                EXECUTE 'REVOKE ALL ON ${qualified} FROM ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}';\n            END IF;\n        END\n        $rebase_revoke$;\n    `.trim();\n}\n\n/**\n * Revoke on every internal table in `schema`, one statement at a time.\n *\n * Best-effort per table: a connection that does not own one of them (a\n * pre-provisioned database, a platform-managed ledger) cannot revoke on it, and\n * that must not take down a boot. The caller decides how loud to be — `onError`\n * exists so the driver can warn without this module importing a logger.\n */\nexport async function revokeInternalTableAccess(\n    execute: (sql: string) => Promise<unknown>,\n    schema: string,\n    options?: { tables?: readonly string[]; onError?: (table: string, error: unknown) => void }\n): Promise<void> {\n    for (const table of options?.tables ?? REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES) {\n        try {\n            await execute(revokeInternalTableSql(schema, table));\n        } catch (error) {\n            options?.onError?.(table, error);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuDA,IAAa,mBAAmB;;AA+DhC,IAAM,kBAAkB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCxB,SAAgB,uBAAuB,QAAgB,OAAuB;CAC1E,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,GAC5B,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qDAAqD,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;CAEjG,IAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,KAAK,KAAK,GAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oDAAoD,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG;CAE/F,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;CACxC,OAAO;;;iEAGsD,iBAAiB;kCAChD,UAAU;uFAC2C,UAAU;yCACxD,UAAU,QAAQ,iBAAiB;;;;MAItE,KAAK;AACX"}

package/dist/{jobs-B2ELModo.js → jobs-BKG0mDlS.js}

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { n as __exportAll } from "./rolldown-runtime-dW7B1o5h.js";
 import "./src-B-CmIFMr.js";
 import "./src-Cdsw7DqV.js";
 import { n as createDdlBootstrapper, o as isSQLAdmin, r as hasInCauseChain } from "./ddl-bootstrap-5YZCZ8qk.js";
-import { t as revokeInternalTableSql } from "./internal-tables-DpxfPaEB.js";
+import { t as revokeInternalTableSql } from "./internal-tables-DYVcFFSv.js";
 import { t as logger } from "./logger-DS03e908.js";
 import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
 //#region src/jobs/job-store.ts
@@ -325,4 +325,4 @@ var jobs_exports = /* @__PURE__ */ __exportAll({
 //#endregion
 export { createJobStore as i, createJobQueue as n, defaultBackoff as r, jobs_exports as t };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=jobs-B2ELModo.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=jobs-BKG0mDlS.js.map

package/dist/{jobs-B2ELModo.js.map → jobs-BKG0mDlS.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"jobs-B2ELModo.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/jobs/job-store.ts","../src/jobs/job-queue.ts","../src/jobs/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { DataDriver } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport { isSQLAdmin } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport { revokeInternalTableSql } from \"@rebasepro/common\";\nimport { logger } from \"../utils/logger.js\";\nimport { createDdlBootstrapper, hasInCauseChain, type SqlExec } from \"../boot/ddl-bootstrap.js\";\nimport type { JobRecord } from \"./types.js\";\n\n/**\n * The queue's storage, as SQL against `rebase.jobs`.\n *\n * Split from the worker for the same reason `cron-store` is split from\n * `cron-scheduler`: the interesting parts here are three statements that have\n * to be exactly right under concurrency, and they are much easier to reason\n * about — and to test — away from a polling loop.\n */\n\nconst TABLE = \"rebase.jobs\";\n\n/** How long finished jobs are kept before the boot sweep removes them. */\nconst SUCCEEDED_RETENTION_DAYS = 3;\n/**\n * Failures outlive successes by a lot. A dead-lettered job is evidence, and the\n * person who needs it is usually looking on Monday for something that happened\n * on Friday night.\n */\nconst FAILED_RETENTION_DAYS = 30;\n\n/** A row as Postgres returns it. */\ninterface JobRow {\n    id: string;\n    task: string;\n    payload: unknown;\n    status: string;\n    run_at: string;\n    attempts: number;\n    max_attempts: number;\n    last_error: string | null;\n    created_at: string;\n    updated_at: string;\n}\n\nfunction toRecord(row: JobRow): JobRecord {\n    return {\n        id: row.id,\n        task: row.task,\n        payload: row.payload,\n        status: row.status as JobRecord[\"status\"],\n        runAt: new Date(row.run_at).toISOString(),\n        attempts: Number(row.attempts),\n        maxAttempts: Number(row.max_attempts),\n        lastError: row.last_error,\n        createdAt: new Date(row.created_at).toISOString(),\n        updatedAt: new Date(row.updated_at).toISOString()\n    };\n}\n\n/** Same rule as `cron-store`: match the SQLSTATE, never the message. */\nfunction isUniqueViolation(err: unknown): boolean {\n    return hasInCauseChain(err, (e) => e.code === \"23505\");\n}\n\nexport interface JobStore {\n    ensureTable(): Promise<void>;\n    /** Returns the new job's id, or `null` if an idempotency key matched unfinished work. */\n    insert(job: {\n        task: string;\n        payload: unknown;\n        runAt: Date;\n        maxAttempts: number;\n        idempotencyKey?: string;\n    }): Promise<string | null>;\n    /** Atomically take up to `limit` runnable jobs for this worker. */\n    claim(limit: number, workerId: string): Promise<JobRecord[]>;\n    complete(id: string): Promise<void>;\n    /** Back to `pending` with a later `runAt`, or `failed` when out of attempts. */\n    fail(id: string, error: string, retryAt: Date | null): Promise<void>;\n    /** Return jobs stranded by a worker that died holding them. Resolves with how many. */\n    reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs: number): Promise<number>;\n    fetch(id: string): Promise<JobRecord | null>;\n}\n\nexport function createJobStore(driver: DataDriver): JobStore | undefined {\n    const admin = driver.admin;\n    if (!isSQLAdmin(admin)) {\n        logger.warn(\n            \"⚠️ [jobs] DataDriver does not support SQL admin — the durable job queue is unavailable. \" +\n            \"Work that would have been queued runs inline instead.\"\n        );\n        return undefined;\n    }\n\n    // Two shapes of the same call: the bootstrapper's `SqlExec` takes an\n    // options object, while everything below reads better with a positional\n    // parameter array.\n    const execRaw: SqlExec = (sqlText, options) =>\n        admin.executeSql(sqlText, options?.params ? { params: options.params } : undefined);\n    const exec = (sqlText: string, params?: unknown[]) =>\n        execRaw(sqlText, params ? { params } : undefined);\n\n    const ddl = createDdlBootstrapper(execRaw, \"jobs\");\n\n    return {\n        async ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating schema rebase\", \"CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS rebase\");\n\n            await ddl.ensureObject(`Creating ${TABLE}`, `\n                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ${TABLE} (\n                    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid()::text,\n                    task TEXT NOT NULL,\n                    payload JSONB,\n                    status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending',\n                    run_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n                    attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,\n                    max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 3,\n                    locked_at TIMESTAMPTZ,\n                    locked_by TEXT,\n                    idempotency_key TEXT,\n                    last_error TEXT,\n                    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n                    updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()\n                )\n            `);\n\n            // The claim query's index. Partial, because the rows it has to find\n            // fast are a shrinking minority of a table that also holds every\n            // success and every dead letter.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_runnable\", `\n                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_runnable\n                ON ${TABLE}(run_at, created_at)\n                WHERE status = 'pending'\n            `);\n\n            // Finds jobs stranded by a dead worker.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_running\", `\n                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_running\n                ON ${TABLE}(locked_at)\n                WHERE status = 'running'\n            `);\n\n            // What makes `idempotencyKey` a guarantee rather than a\n            // check-then-act race: two instances reacting to one event both\n            // reach the INSERT, and the index decides. Partial on unfinished\n            // work — see `EnqueueOptions.idempotencyKey` for why a key must be\n            // reusable once its job is done.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_idempotency\", `\n                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_idempotency\n                ON ${TABLE}(idempotency_key)\n                WHERE idempotency_key IS NOT NULL AND status IN ('pending', 'running')\n            `);\n\n            const ready = await ddl.isReadable(TABLE);\n\n            if (ready) {\n                await ddl.step(\"Job retention sweep\", async () => {\n                    await exec(\n                        `DELETE FROM ${TABLE}\n                         WHERE (status = 'succeeded' AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(days => $1))\n                            OR (status = 'failed'    AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(days => $2))`,\n                        [SUCCEEDED_RETENTION_DAYS, FAILED_RETENTION_DAYS]\n                    );\n                });\n\n                // Payloads are arbitrary application data — a webhook body, a\n                // user id, whatever was passed — and a writable queue lets any\n                // signed-in user schedule work of their choosing under the\n                // server's own authority. Same reasoning, and the same\n                // unconditional re-application, as `cron_claims`.\n                await ddl.step(\"Revoking end-user access to jobs\", () =>\n                    exec(revokeInternalTableSql(\"rebase\", \"jobs\")));\n\n                logger.info(\"✅ Job queue table ready\");\n            } else {\n                logger.error(\n                    `❌ [jobs] ${TABLE} is unavailable — nothing can be queued and nothing queued earlier ` +\n                    \"will run. Callers fall back to running the work inline.\"\n                );\n            }\n        },\n\n        async insert(job): Promise<string | null> {\n            try {\n                const rows = await exec(\n                    `INSERT INTO ${TABLE} (task, payload, run_at, max_attempts, idempotency_key)\n                     VALUES ($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4, $5)\n                     RETURNING id`,\n                    [\n                        job.task,\n                        JSON.stringify(job.payload ?? null),\n                        job.runAt.toISOString(),\n                        job.maxAttempts,\n                        job.idempotencyKey ?? null\n                    ]\n                );\n                return (rows?.[0]?.id as string) ?? null;\n            } catch (error) {\n                // The losing side of an idempotency race. Not an error: the\n                // work the caller wanted is already queued, which is the\n                // outcome they asked for.\n                if (isUniqueViolation(error)) return null;\n                throw error;\n            }\n        },\n\n        async claim(limit: number, workerId: string): Promise<JobRecord[]> {\n            // `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` is the whole design. The inner select\n            // takes row locks on the jobs it picks and *skips* any a concurrent\n            // worker already holds, so N workers polling the same table divide\n            // the work instead of contending for the head of it — and no job is\n            // ever handed to two of them.\n            //\n            // `attempts` is incremented here, on claim, rather than on failure.\n            // A worker that is killed mid-job never reports anything, so\n            // counting on failure would let a job that crashes the process be\n            // retried forever, once per restart, taking the process down each\n            // time.\n            const rows = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET\n                    status = 'running',\n                    attempts = attempts + 1,\n                    locked_at = now(),\n                    locked_by = $2,\n                    updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id IN (\n                     SELECT id FROM ${TABLE}\n                     WHERE status = 'pending' AND run_at <= now()\n                     ORDER BY run_at, created_at\n                     LIMIT $1\n                     FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED\n                 )\n                 RETURNING *`,\n                [limit, workerId]\n            );\n            return (rows as unknown as JobRow[]).map(toRecord);\n        },\n\n        async complete(id: string): Promise<void> {\n            await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'succeeded', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = NULL, updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id = $1`,\n                [id]\n            );\n        },\n\n        async fail(id: string, error: string, retryAt: Date | null): Promise<void> {\n            if (retryAt) {\n                await exec(\n                    `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'pending', run_at = $2, locked_at = NULL,\n                            locked_by = NULL, last_error = $3, updated_at = now()\n                     WHERE id = $1`,\n                    [id, retryAt.toISOString(), error]\n                );\n                return;\n            }\n            await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'failed', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = $2, updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id = $1`,\n                [id, error]\n            );\n        },\n\n        async reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs: number): Promise<number> {\n            // A worker killed while holding a job cannot release it, so nothing\n            // but a timeout will ever free the row. Jobs that still have\n            // attempts left go back to `pending`; the rest are dead-lettered\n            // with an error that says what happened, because \"attempts: 3,\n            // lastError: null\" is otherwise a genuinely baffling row to find.\n            const seconds = Math.max(1, Math.round(visibilityTimeoutMs / 1000));\n\n            const revived = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'pending', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = 'Worker stopped responding; the job was reclaimed', updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE status = 'running'\n                   AND locked_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)\n                   AND attempts < max_attempts\n                 RETURNING id`,\n                [seconds]\n            );\n\n            const buried = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'failed', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = 'Worker stopped responding on the final attempt', updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE status = 'running'\n                   AND locked_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)\n                   AND attempts >= max_attempts\n                 RETURNING id`,\n                [seconds]\n            );\n\n            const count = (revived?.length ?? 0) + (buried?.length ?? 0);\n            if (count > 0) {\n                logger.warn(\n                    `[jobs] Reclaimed ${count} job(s) from a worker that stopped responding ` +\n                    `(${revived?.length ?? 0} retryable, ${buried?.length ?? 0} dead-lettered)`\n                );\n            }\n            return count;\n        },\n\n        async fetch(id: string): Promise<JobRecord | null> {\n            const rows = await exec(`SELECT * FROM ${TABLE} WHERE id = $1`, [id]);\n            const row = (rows as unknown as JobRow[])[0];\n            return row ? toRecord(row) : null;\n        }\n    };\n}\n","import { randomUUID } from \"crypto\";\nimport { logger } from \"../utils/logger.js\";\nimport type { JobStore } from \"./job-store.js\";\nimport type { EnqueueOptions, JobHandler, JobQueueClient, JobQueueOptions, JobRecord } from \"./types.js\";\n\n/**\n * The worker: claim, run, record, repeat.\n *\n * Everything difficult about running jobs concurrently is in `job-store.ts`,\n * where one `UPDATE … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` does the arbitration. What is\n * left here is a loop and the decisions around a handler that throws.\n */\n\nconst DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY = 5;\nconst DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;\nconst DEFAULT_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_000;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;\n\n/** 1s, 5s, 25s, 125s … capped at an hour. */\nexport function defaultBackoff(attempt: number): number {\n    return Math.min(1_000 * Math.pow(5, Math.max(0, attempt - 1)), 60 * 60_000);\n}\n\n/**\n * How often the reaper runs, relative to the visibility timeout.\n *\n * A quarter of it, so a stranded job waits at most 1.25× the timeout rather\n * than 2× — and so the sweep is not itself a per-poll query against a table\n * whose interesting rows are, almost always, none.\n */\nconst REAP_INTERVAL_FACTOR = 0.25;\n\nexport interface JobQueue extends JobQueueClient {\n    start(): void;\n    stop(): Promise<void>;\n    /** Run one poll's worth of work and return how many jobs ran. For tests and for `/jobs/drain`. */\n    runOnce(): Promise<number>;\n    /** Registered after construction — how `tasks` from config and internal producers meet. */\n    register<P = unknown>(task: string, handler: JobHandler<P>): void;\n    isRunning(): boolean;\n}\n\nexport function createJobQueue(store: JobStore, options: JobQueueOptions = {}): JobQueue {\n    const concurrency = options.concurrency ?? DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY;\n    const pollIntervalMs = options.pollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS;\n    const visibilityTimeoutMs = options.visibilityTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    const defaultMaxAttempts = options.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS;\n    const backoff = options.backoff ?? defaultBackoff;\n\n    const handlers = new Map<string, JobHandler<never>>();\n    for (const [task, handler] of Object.entries(options.tasks ?? {})) {\n        handlers.set(task, handler);\n    }\n\n    // Identifies this process in `locked_by`. Purely diagnostic — the claim is\n    // enforced by the row lock, not by this — but \"which pod had it when it\n    // stopped\" is the first question anyone asks of a stuck job.\n    const workerId = `${process.pid}-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;\n\n    let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;\n    let running = false;\n    let draining = false;\n    /** Resolves when the in-flight poll finishes, so `stop()` can wait for it. */\n    let inFlight: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();\n    let lastReapAt = 0;\n\n    async function runJob(job: JobRecord): Promise<void> {\n        const handler = handlers.get(job.task);\n\n        if (!handler) {\n            // Not a failure. A rolling deploy runs old and new code at once, and\n            // an instance that has not been updated yet must not burn the\n            // attempts of a job belonging to one that has. Give the row back\n            // and let a peer — or this process after its next deploy — take it.\n            //\n            // The attempt increment from the claim is deliberately not undone:\n            // a task nobody in the fleet implements would otherwise cycle\n            // forever, and this way it dead-letters after `maxAttempts` with an\n            // error naming the task.\n            logger.warn(`[jobs] No handler registered for task \"${job.task}\" — returning the job to the queue`);\n            await store.fail(\n                job.id,\n                `No handler registered for task \"${job.task}\"`,\n                job.attempts < job.maxAttempts ? new Date(Date.now() + backoff(job.attempts)) : null\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n            await handler({\n                id: job.id,\n                task: job.task,\n                payload: job.payload as never,\n                attempt: job.attempts,\n                maxAttempts: job.maxAttempts\n            } as never);\n            await store.complete(job.id);\n        } catch (error) {\n            const message = error instanceof Error ? (error.stack ?? error.message) : String(error);\n            const willRetry = job.attempts < job.maxAttempts;\n\n            // Truncated, because `last_error` holds a stack and a queue that\n            // accumulates megabytes of them is its own outage.\n            await store.fail(job.id, message.slice(0, 4_000), willRetry ? new Date(Date.now() + backoff(job.attempts)) : null);\n\n            if (willRetry) {\n                logger.warn(`[jobs] \"${job.task}\" failed on attempt ${job.attempts}/${job.maxAttempts}; retrying`, { jobId: job.id });\n            } else {\n                // The last attempt is an error, not a warning: nothing else will\n                // touch this job, and if nobody looks at the table it is simply\n                // lost work.\n                logger.error(`[jobs] \"${job.task}\" failed permanently after ${job.attempts} attempts`, { jobId: job.id, error: message });\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    async function poll(): Promise<number> {\n        // The reaper, on its own cadence.\n        const now = Date.now();\n        if (now - lastReapAt > visibilityTimeoutMs * REAP_INTERVAL_FACTOR) {\n            lastReapAt = now;\n            try {\n                await store.reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs);\n            } catch (error) {\n                logger.error(\"[jobs] Failed to reclaim expired jobs\", { error });\n            }\n        }\n\n        const jobs = await store.claim(concurrency, workerId);\n        if (jobs.length === 0) return 0;\n\n        // Settled, not `all`: `runJob` handles its own errors, but a store\n        // write failing inside it must not abandon this batch's siblings.\n        await Promise.allSettled(jobs.map(runJob));\n        return jobs.length;\n    }\n\n    function schedule(delayMs: number): void {\n        if (!running) return;\n        timer = setTimeout(() => {\n            void tick();\n        }, delayMs);\n        // Never hold the process open. A queue with nothing to do should not be\n        // the reason `rebase dev` will not exit.\n        timer.unref?.();\n    }\n\n    async function tick(): Promise<void> {\n        if (!running) return;\n        const work = (async () => {\n            try {\n                return await poll();\n            } catch (error) {\n                logger.error(\"[jobs] Poll failed\", { error });\n                return 0;\n            }\n        })();\n        inFlight = work;\n        const count = await work;\n\n        // A full batch means there is probably more waiting, so go straight\n        // back rather than sleeping through a backlog.\n        schedule(count >= concurrency ? 0 : pollIntervalMs);\n    }\n\n    return {\n        start(): void {\n            if (running) return;\n            running = true;\n            logger.info(`[jobs] Worker started (concurrency ${concurrency}, poll ${pollIntervalMs}ms)`);\n            schedule(0);\n        },\n\n        async stop(): Promise<void> {\n            running = false;\n            if (timer) {\n                clearTimeout(timer);\n                timer = null;\n            }\n            if (draining) return;\n            draining = true;\n            // Jobs in flight keep their claim until they finish or the\n            // visibility timeout expires, so waiting here is what turns a\n            // graceful shutdown into \"no job runs twice\".\n            await inFlight.catch(() => undefined);\n            draining = false;\n        },\n\n        runOnce(): Promise<number> {\n            return poll();\n        },\n\n        register<P = unknown>(task: string, handler: JobHandler<P>): void {\n            if (handlers.has(task)) {\n                logger.warn(`[jobs] Task \"${task}\" was already registered; the later handler wins`);\n            }\n            handlers.set(task, handler as JobHandler<never>);\n        },\n\n        isRunning(): boolean {\n            return running;\n        },\n\n        async enqueue<P = unknown>(task: string, payload?: P, enqueueOptions: EnqueueOptions = {}): Promise<string | null> {\n            return store.insert({\n                task,\n                payload: payload ?? null,\n                runAt: new Date(Date.now() + (enqueueOptions.delayMs ?? 0)),\n                maxAttempts: enqueueOptions.maxAttempts ?? defaultMaxAttempts,\n                idempotencyKey: enqueueOptions.idempotencyKey\n            });\n        }\n    };\n}\n","export { createJobStore } from \"./job-store\";\nexport type { JobStore } from \"./job-store\";\nexport { createJobQueue, defaultBackoff } from \"./job-queue\";\nexport type { JobQueue } from \"./job-queue\";\nexport type {\n    EnqueueOptions,\n    JobContext,\n    JobHandler,\n    JobQueueClient,\n    JobQueueOptions,\n    JobRecord,\n    JobStatus\n} from 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+{"version":3,"file":"jobs-BKG0mDlS.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/jobs/job-store.ts","../src/jobs/job-queue.ts","../src/jobs/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { DataDriver } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport { isSQLAdmin } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport { revokeInternalTableSql } from \"@rebasepro/common\";\nimport { logger } from \"../utils/logger.js\";\nimport { createDdlBootstrapper, hasInCauseChain, type SqlExec } from \"../boot/ddl-bootstrap.js\";\nimport type { JobRecord } from \"./types.js\";\n\n/**\n * The queue's storage, as SQL against `rebase.jobs`.\n *\n * Split from the worker for the same reason `cron-store` is split from\n * `cron-scheduler`: the interesting parts here are three statements that have\n * to be exactly right under concurrency, and they are much easier to reason\n * about — and to test — away from a polling loop.\n */\n\nconst TABLE = \"rebase.jobs\";\n\n/** How long finished jobs are kept before the boot sweep removes them. */\nconst SUCCEEDED_RETENTION_DAYS = 3;\n/**\n * Failures outlive successes by a lot. A dead-lettered job is evidence, and the\n * person who needs it is usually looking on Monday for something that happened\n * on Friday night.\n */\nconst FAILED_RETENTION_DAYS = 30;\n\n/** A row as Postgres returns it. */\ninterface JobRow {\n    id: string;\n    task: string;\n    payload: unknown;\n    status: string;\n    run_at: string;\n    attempts: number;\n    max_attempts: number;\n    last_error: string | null;\n    created_at: string;\n    updated_at: string;\n}\n\nfunction toRecord(row: JobRow): JobRecord {\n    return {\n        id: row.id,\n        task: row.task,\n        payload: row.payload,\n        status: row.status as JobRecord[\"status\"],\n        runAt: new Date(row.run_at).toISOString(),\n        attempts: Number(row.attempts),\n        maxAttempts: Number(row.max_attempts),\n        lastError: row.last_error,\n        createdAt: new Date(row.created_at).toISOString(),\n        updatedAt: new Date(row.updated_at).toISOString()\n    };\n}\n\n/** Same rule as `cron-store`: match the SQLSTATE, never the message. */\nfunction isUniqueViolation(err: unknown): boolean {\n    return hasInCauseChain(err, (e) => e.code === \"23505\");\n}\n\nexport interface JobStore {\n    ensureTable(): Promise<void>;\n    /** Returns the new job's id, or `null` if an idempotency key matched unfinished work. */\n    insert(job: {\n        task: string;\n        payload: unknown;\n        runAt: Date;\n        maxAttempts: number;\n        idempotencyKey?: string;\n    }): Promise<string | null>;\n    /** Atomically take up to `limit` runnable jobs for this worker. */\n    claim(limit: number, workerId: string): Promise<JobRecord[]>;\n    complete(id: string): Promise<void>;\n    /** Back to `pending` with a later `runAt`, or `failed` when out of attempts. */\n    fail(id: string, error: string, retryAt: Date | null): Promise<void>;\n    /** Return jobs stranded by a worker that died holding them. Resolves with how many. */\n    reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs: number): Promise<number>;\n    fetch(id: string): Promise<JobRecord | null>;\n}\n\nexport function createJobStore(driver: DataDriver): JobStore | undefined {\n    const admin = driver.admin;\n    if (!isSQLAdmin(admin)) {\n        logger.warn(\n            \"⚠️ [jobs] DataDriver does not support SQL admin — the durable job queue is unavailable. \" +\n            \"Work that would have been queued runs inline instead.\"\n        );\n        return undefined;\n    }\n\n    // Two shapes of the same call: the bootstrapper's `SqlExec` takes an\n    // options object, while everything below reads better with a positional\n    // parameter array.\n    const execRaw: SqlExec = (sqlText, options) =>\n        admin.executeSql(sqlText, options?.params ? { params: options.params } : undefined);\n    const exec = (sqlText: string, params?: unknown[]) =>\n        execRaw(sqlText, params ? { params } : undefined);\n\n    const ddl = createDdlBootstrapper(execRaw, \"jobs\");\n\n    return {\n        async ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating schema rebase\", \"CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS rebase\");\n\n            await ddl.ensureObject(`Creating ${TABLE}`, `\n                CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ${TABLE} (\n                    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid()::text,\n                    task TEXT NOT NULL,\n                    payload JSONB,\n                    status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending',\n                    run_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n                    attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,\n                    max_attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 3,\n                    locked_at TIMESTAMPTZ,\n                    locked_by TEXT,\n                    idempotency_key TEXT,\n                    last_error TEXT,\n                    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),\n                    updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()\n                )\n            `);\n\n            // The claim query's index. Partial, because the rows it has to find\n            // fast are a shrinking minority of a table that also holds every\n            // success and every dead letter.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_runnable\", `\n                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_runnable\n                ON ${TABLE}(run_at, created_at)\n                WHERE status = 'pending'\n            `);\n\n            // Finds jobs stranded by a dead worker.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_running\", `\n                CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_running\n                ON ${TABLE}(locked_at)\n                WHERE status = 'running'\n            `);\n\n            // What makes `idempotencyKey` a guarantee rather than a\n            // check-then-act race: two instances reacting to one event both\n            // reach the INSERT, and the index decides. Partial on unfinished\n            // work — see `EnqueueOptions.idempotencyKey` for why a key must be\n            // reusable once its job is done.\n            await ddl.ensureObject(\"Creating idx_jobs_idempotency\", `\n                CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_jobs_idempotency\n                ON ${TABLE}(idempotency_key)\n                WHERE idempotency_key IS NOT NULL AND status IN ('pending', 'running')\n            `);\n\n            const ready = await ddl.isReadable(TABLE);\n\n            if (ready) {\n                await ddl.step(\"Job retention sweep\", async () => {\n                    await exec(\n                        `DELETE FROM ${TABLE}\n                         WHERE (status = 'succeeded' AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(days => $1))\n                            OR (status = 'failed'    AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(days => $2))`,\n                        [SUCCEEDED_RETENTION_DAYS, FAILED_RETENTION_DAYS]\n                    );\n                });\n\n                // Payloads are arbitrary application data — a webhook body, a\n                // user id, whatever was passed — and a writable queue lets any\n                // signed-in user schedule work of their choosing under the\n                // server's own authority. Same reasoning, and the same\n                // unconditional re-application, as `cron_claims`.\n                await ddl.step(\"Revoking end-user access to jobs\", () =>\n                    exec(revokeInternalTableSql(\"rebase\", \"jobs\")));\n\n                logger.info(\"✅ Job queue table ready\");\n            } else {\n                logger.error(\n                    `❌ [jobs] ${TABLE} is unavailable — nothing can be queued and nothing queued earlier ` +\n                    \"will run. Callers fall back to running the work inline.\"\n                );\n            }\n        },\n\n        async insert(job): Promise<string | null> {\n            try {\n                const rows = await exec(\n                    `INSERT INTO ${TABLE} (task, payload, run_at, max_attempts, idempotency_key)\n                     VALUES ($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4, $5)\n                     RETURNING id`,\n                    [\n                        job.task,\n                        JSON.stringify(job.payload ?? null),\n                        job.runAt.toISOString(),\n                        job.maxAttempts,\n                        job.idempotencyKey ?? null\n                    ]\n                );\n                return (rows?.[0]?.id as string) ?? null;\n            } catch (error) {\n                // The losing side of an idempotency race. Not an error: the\n                // work the caller wanted is already queued, which is the\n                // outcome they asked for.\n                if (isUniqueViolation(error)) return null;\n                throw error;\n            }\n        },\n\n        async claim(limit: number, workerId: string): Promise<JobRecord[]> {\n            // `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` is the whole design. The inner select\n            // takes row locks on the jobs it picks and *skips* any a concurrent\n            // worker already holds, so N workers polling the same table divide\n            // the work instead of contending for the head of it — and no job is\n            // ever handed to two of them.\n            //\n            // `attempts` is incremented here, on claim, rather than on failure.\n            // A worker that is killed mid-job never reports anything, so\n            // counting on failure would let a job that crashes the process be\n            // retried forever, once per restart, taking the process down each\n            // time.\n            const rows = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET\n                    status = 'running',\n                    attempts = attempts + 1,\n                    locked_at = now(),\n                    locked_by = $2,\n                    updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id IN (\n                     SELECT id FROM ${TABLE}\n                     WHERE status = 'pending' AND run_at <= now()\n                     ORDER BY run_at, created_at\n                     LIMIT $1\n                     FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED\n                 )\n                 RETURNING *`,\n                [limit, workerId]\n            );\n            return (rows as unknown as JobRow[]).map(toRecord);\n        },\n\n        async complete(id: string): Promise<void> {\n            await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'succeeded', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = NULL, updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id = $1`,\n                [id]\n            );\n        },\n\n        async fail(id: string, error: string, retryAt: Date | null): Promise<void> {\n            if (retryAt) {\n                await exec(\n                    `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'pending', run_at = $2, locked_at = NULL,\n                            locked_by = NULL, last_error = $3, updated_at = now()\n                     WHERE id = $1`,\n                    [id, retryAt.toISOString(), error]\n                );\n                return;\n            }\n            await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'failed', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = $2, updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE id = $1`,\n                [id, error]\n            );\n        },\n\n        async reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs: number): Promise<number> {\n            // A worker killed while holding a job cannot release it, so nothing\n            // but a timeout will ever free the row. Jobs that still have\n            // attempts left go back to `pending`; the rest are dead-lettered\n            // with an error that says what happened, because \"attempts: 3,\n            // lastError: null\" is otherwise a genuinely baffling row to find.\n            const seconds = Math.max(1, Math.round(visibilityTimeoutMs / 1000));\n\n            const revived = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'pending', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = 'Worker stopped responding; the job was reclaimed', updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE status = 'running'\n                   AND locked_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)\n                   AND attempts < max_attempts\n                 RETURNING id`,\n                [seconds]\n            );\n\n            const buried = await exec(\n                `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET status = 'failed', locked_at = NULL, locked_by = NULL,\n                        last_error = 'Worker stopped responding on the final attempt', updated_at = now()\n                 WHERE status = 'running'\n                   AND locked_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)\n                   AND attempts >= max_attempts\n                 RETURNING id`,\n                [seconds]\n            );\n\n            const count = (revived?.length ?? 0) + (buried?.length ?? 0);\n            if (count > 0) {\n                logger.warn(\n                    `[jobs] Reclaimed ${count} job(s) from a worker that stopped responding ` +\n                    `(${revived?.length ?? 0} retryable, ${buried?.length ?? 0} dead-lettered)`\n                );\n            }\n            return count;\n        },\n\n        async fetch(id: string): Promise<JobRecord | null> {\n            const rows = await exec(`SELECT * FROM ${TABLE} WHERE id = $1`, [id]);\n            const row = (rows as unknown as JobRow[])[0];\n            return row ? toRecord(row) : null;\n        }\n    };\n}\n","import { randomUUID } from \"crypto\";\nimport { logger } from \"../utils/logger.js\";\nimport type { JobStore } from \"./job-store.js\";\nimport type { EnqueueOptions, JobHandler, JobQueueClient, JobQueueOptions, JobRecord } from \"./types.js\";\n\n/**\n * The worker: claim, run, record, repeat.\n *\n * Everything difficult about running jobs concurrently is in `job-store.ts`,\n * where one `UPDATE … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` does the arbitration. What is\n * left here is a loop and the decisions around a handler that throws.\n */\n\nconst DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY = 5;\nconst DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000;\nconst DEFAULT_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_000;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;\n\n/** 1s, 5s, 25s, 125s … capped at an hour. */\nexport function defaultBackoff(attempt: number): number {\n    return Math.min(1_000 * Math.pow(5, Math.max(0, attempt - 1)), 60 * 60_000);\n}\n\n/**\n * How often the reaper runs, relative to the visibility timeout.\n *\n * A quarter of it, so a stranded job waits at most 1.25× the timeout rather\n * than 2× — and so the sweep is not itself a per-poll query against a table\n * whose interesting rows are, almost always, none.\n */\nconst REAP_INTERVAL_FACTOR = 0.25;\n\nexport interface JobQueue extends JobQueueClient {\n    start(): void;\n    stop(): Promise<void>;\n    /** Run one poll's worth of work and return how many jobs ran. For tests and for `/jobs/drain`. */\n    runOnce(): Promise<number>;\n    /** Registered after construction — how `tasks` from config and internal producers meet. */\n    register<P = unknown>(task: string, handler: JobHandler<P>): void;\n    isRunning(): boolean;\n}\n\nexport function createJobQueue(store: JobStore, options: JobQueueOptions = {}): JobQueue {\n    const concurrency = options.concurrency ?? DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY;\n    const pollIntervalMs = options.pollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS;\n    const visibilityTimeoutMs = options.visibilityTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_VISIBILITY_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    const defaultMaxAttempts = options.maxAttempts ?? DEFAULT_MAX_ATTEMPTS;\n    const backoff = options.backoff ?? defaultBackoff;\n\n    const handlers = new Map<string, JobHandler<never>>();\n    for (const [task, handler] of Object.entries(options.tasks ?? {})) {\n        handlers.set(task, handler);\n    }\n\n    // Identifies this process in `locked_by`. Purely diagnostic — the claim is\n    // enforced by the row lock, not by this — but \"which pod had it when it\n    // stopped\" is the first question anyone asks of a stuck job.\n    const workerId = `${process.pid}-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;\n\n    let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;\n    let running = false;\n    let draining = false;\n    /** Resolves when the in-flight poll finishes, so `stop()` can wait for it. */\n    let inFlight: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();\n    let lastReapAt = 0;\n\n    async function runJob(job: JobRecord): Promise<void> {\n        const handler = handlers.get(job.task);\n\n        if (!handler) {\n            // Not a failure. A rolling deploy runs old and new code at once, and\n            // an instance that has not been updated yet must not burn the\n            // attempts of a job belonging to one that has. Give the row back\n            // and let a peer — or this process after its next deploy — take it.\n            //\n            // The attempt increment from the claim is deliberately not undone:\n            // a task nobody in the fleet implements would otherwise cycle\n            // forever, and this way it dead-letters after `maxAttempts` with an\n            // error naming the task.\n            logger.warn(`[jobs] No handler registered for task \"${job.task}\" — returning the job to the queue`);\n            await store.fail(\n                job.id,\n                `No handler registered for task \"${job.task}\"`,\n                job.attempts < job.maxAttempts ? new Date(Date.now() + backoff(job.attempts)) : null\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n\n        try {\n            await handler({\n                id: job.id,\n                task: job.task,\n                payload: job.payload as never,\n                attempt: job.attempts,\n                maxAttempts: job.maxAttempts\n            } as never);\n            await store.complete(job.id);\n        } catch (error) {\n            const message = error instanceof Error ? (error.stack ?? error.message) : String(error);\n            const willRetry = job.attempts < job.maxAttempts;\n\n            // Truncated, because `last_error` holds a stack and a queue that\n            // accumulates megabytes of them is its own outage.\n            await store.fail(job.id, message.slice(0, 4_000), willRetry ? new Date(Date.now() + backoff(job.attempts)) : null);\n\n            if (willRetry) {\n                logger.warn(`[jobs] \"${job.task}\" failed on attempt ${job.attempts}/${job.maxAttempts}; retrying`, { jobId: job.id });\n            } else {\n                // The last attempt is an error, not a warning: nothing else will\n                // touch this job, and if nobody looks at the table it is simply\n                // lost work.\n                logger.error(`[jobs] \"${job.task}\" failed permanently after ${job.attempts} attempts`, { jobId: job.id, error: message });\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    async function poll(): Promise<number> {\n        // The reaper, on its own cadence.\n        const now = Date.now();\n        if (now - lastReapAt > visibilityTimeoutMs * REAP_INTERVAL_FACTOR) {\n            lastReapAt = now;\n            try {\n                await store.reapExpired(visibilityTimeoutMs);\n            } catch (error) {\n                logger.error(\"[jobs] Failed to reclaim expired jobs\", { error });\n            }\n        }\n\n        const jobs = await store.claim(concurrency, workerId);\n        if (jobs.length === 0) return 0;\n\n        // Settled, not `all`: `runJob` handles its own errors, but a store\n        // write failing inside it must not abandon this batch's siblings.\n        await Promise.allSettled(jobs.map(runJob));\n        return jobs.length;\n    }\n\n    function schedule(delayMs: number): void {\n        if (!running) return;\n        timer = setTimeout(() => {\n            void tick();\n        }, delayMs);\n        // Never hold the process open. A queue with nothing to do should not be\n        // the reason `rebase dev` will not exit.\n        timer.unref?.();\n    }\n\n    async function tick(): Promise<void> {\n        if (!running) return;\n        const work = (async () => {\n            try {\n                return await poll();\n            } catch (error) {\n                logger.error(\"[jobs] Poll failed\", { error });\n                return 0;\n            }\n        })();\n        inFlight = work;\n        const count = await work;\n\n        // A full batch means there is probably more waiting, so go straight\n        // back rather than sleeping through a backlog.\n        schedule(count >= concurrency ? 0 : pollIntervalMs);\n    }\n\n    return {\n        start(): void {\n            if (running) return;\n            running = true;\n            logger.info(`[jobs] Worker started (concurrency ${concurrency}, poll ${pollIntervalMs}ms)`);\n            schedule(0);\n        },\n\n        async stop(): Promise<void> {\n            running = false;\n            if (timer) {\n                clearTimeout(timer);\n                timer = null;\n            }\n            if (draining) return;\n            draining = true;\n            // Jobs in flight keep their claim until they finish or the\n            // visibility timeout expires, so waiting here is what turns a\n            // graceful shutdown into \"no job runs twice\".\n            await inFlight.catch(() => undefined);\n            draining = false;\n        },\n\n        runOnce(): Promise<number> {\n            return poll();\n        },\n\n        register<P = unknown>(task: string, handler: JobHandler<P>): void {\n            if (handlers.has(task)) {\n                logger.warn(`[jobs] Task \"${task}\" was already registered; the later handler wins`);\n            }\n            handlers.set(task, handler as JobHandler<never>);\n        },\n\n        isRunning(): boolean {\n            return running;\n        },\n\n        async enqueue<P = unknown>(task: string, payload?: P, enqueueOptions: EnqueueOptions = {}): Promise<string | null> {\n            return store.insert({\n                task,\n                payload: payload ?? null,\n                runAt: new Date(Date.now() + (enqueueOptions.delayMs ?? 0)),\n                maxAttempts: enqueueOptions.maxAttempts ?? defaultMaxAttempts,\n                idempotencyKey: enqueueOptions.idempotencyKey\n            });\n        }\n    };\n}\n","export { createJobStore } from \"./job-store\";\nexport type { JobStore } from \"./job-store\";\nexport { createJobQueue, defaultBackoff } from \"./job-queue\";\nexport type { JobQueue } from \"./job-queue\";\nexport type {\n    EnqueueOptions,\n    JobContext,\n    JobHandler,\n    JobQueueClient,\n    JobQueueOptions,\n    JobRecord,\n    JobStatus\n} from 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package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@rebasepro/server",
   "type": "module",
-  "version": "0.17.0",
+  "version": "0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4",
   "description": "Database-Agnostic Backend Core for Rebase",
   "funding": {
     "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/rebaseco"
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@
     "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3",
     "ws": "^8.21.1",
     "zod": "^4.4.3",
-    "@rebasepro/client": "0.17.0",
-    "@rebasepro/common": "0.17.0",
-    "@rebasepro/types": "0.17.0",
-    "@rebasepro/utils": "0.17.0"
+    "@rebasepro/client": "0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4",
+    "@rebasepro/common": "0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4",
+    "@rebasepro/types": "0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4",
+    "@rebasepro/utils": "0.17.1-canary.gdc3e9e4"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@jest/globals": "^30.4.1",

package/dist/internal-tables-DpxfPaEB.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"internal-tables-DpxfPaEB.js","names":[],"sources":["../../common/src/util/internal-tables.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The tables Rebase creates for its own bookkeeping, and the SQL that keeps the\n * end-user role away from them.\n *\n * ## Why this exists\n *\n * Authenticated requests run as {@link REBASE_USER_ROLE}, and the boot-time role\n * provisioning grants that role `SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE` on every table\n * in the schemas a project uses — including `rebase`, because a project's own\n * collections are allowed to live there (the scaffold puts `users` there). It\n * also sets `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES`, so a table created *later* by the\n * migrating role inherits the same grant.\n *\n * Every framework-internal table is created later: auth's tables come up during\n * `initializeAuth`, `api_keys` during route mounting, `cron_logs` when the first\n * job registers, `idempotency_keys` on the first request that carries a key. So\n * they all inherited full DML for the end-user role — and none of them enables\n * row-level security, because none of them is a collection with\n * `securityRules`. Measured on a freshly provisioned database, `SET ROLE\n * rebase_user` could read `rebase.refresh_tokens` (session token hashes),\n * `rebase.mfa_factors` (`secret_encrypted`), `rebase.recovery_codes`, and\n * `rebase.api_keys` (including its `admin` flag), and insert into\n * `rebase.app_config`.\n *\n * Nothing routes a user-context query at those tables today, so this was not\n * reachable over the API. That is the wrong thing to depend on: the documented\n * model is that RLS is the authorization boundary, and these tables sat outside\n * it. The boundary is now a privilege boundary instead — the role simply cannot\n * address them.\n *\n * ## Why REVOKE rather than ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY\n *\n * RLS with no policy denies every row, which is the same outcome, but it is the\n * *weaker* statement: it leaves the grant in place, so a later policy — or a\n * `FORCE` flag cleared by some future migration — reopens the table. There is no\n * row of `refresh_tokens` any end user should ever reach, so the honest encoding\n * is \"this role has no privilege here at all\". It also keeps the owner\n * connection (which auth actually runs on) completely unaffected.\n *\n * ## Keeping it true\n *\n * `packages/rls-check` scans the `rebase` schema — it used to skip it as a\n * \"platform\" schema — and its `rls-disabled` check fires on exactly the\n * condition this module removes: RLS off *and* a DML grant to a reachable role.\n * So a table added here without a revoke is caught by `pnpm rls:check`, not by\n * someone re-reading this file.\n */\n\n/**\n * The Postgres role authenticated requests run as.\n *\n * Defined here rather than in the Postgres driver because both the driver (which\n * provisions the role) and this module (which revokes on its behalf) need it,\n * and a second spelling of a role name is a silent no-op waiting to happen.\n */\nexport const REBASE_USER_ROLE = \"rebase_user\";\n\n/**\n * Framework-internal table names, unqualified.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT including `users`: the auth user table is also a collection,\n * with `securityRules`, RLS enabled and policies applied. Users read their own\n * row through it — revoking there would break sign-in.\n *\n * `atlas_schema_revisions` is Atlas's migration ledger, which lands in `rebase`\n * because `db migrate apply` passes `--revisions-schema rebase`.\n *\n * Every entry here must also be revoked by whatever creates it, and vice versa:\n * the creation-time revoke fires once, on the boot that first makes the table,\n * so it cannot help a database provisioned before that revoke existed. This\n * list is what the boot-time sweep in `ensureAppRole` iterates, and the sweep\n * is the only thing that can repair an already-granted table. A table revoked\n * at creation but missing here is therefore permanently stranded on any\n * database that predates its revoke — which is exactly what happened to\n * `jobs`, added here after a scan of a pre-0.14 database found it.\n */\nexport const REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES: readonly string[] = [\n    // auth\n    \"user_identities\",\n    \"refresh_tokens\",\n    \"password_reset_tokens\",\n    \"magic_link_tokens\",\n    \"mfa_factors\",\n    \"mfa_challenges\",\n    \"recovery_codes\",\n    \"app_config\",\n    \"schema_meta\",\n    // platform services\n    \"api_keys\",\n    \"cron_logs\",\n    \"cron_claims\",\n    \"jobs\",\n    \"rate_limit_hits\",\n    \"idempotency_keys\",\n    \"entity_history\",\n    \"branches\",\n    \"metric_samples\",\n    // realtime channels — authorization for these lives in the channel rules the\n    // server evaluates before it reads or writes, never in a row policy\n    \"channel_messages\",\n    \"channel_cursors\",\n    \"channel_presence\",\n    // migration bookkeeping\n    \"atlas_schema_revisions\"\n];\n\n/** Postgres identifiers this module is willing to interpolate. */\nconst SAFE_IDENTIFIER = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_$]*$/;\n\n/**\n * A single statement that takes every privilege on `schema.table` away from the\n * end-user role.\n *\n * Wrapped in a `DO` block guarded on `pg_roles` for two reasons, both of which\n * happen in practice:\n *\n *  - the role does not exist when the connection is unprivileged (Rebase then\n *    relies on native RLS rather than a role switch), and a bare `REVOKE` on a\n *    missing role is an error, not a no-op;\n *  - the table may not exist yet — `cron_logs` never appears in a project with\n *    no cron jobs — and `to_regclass` returning NULL has to be tolerated too.\n *\n * One command, so it is safe on handles that speak the extended query protocol\n * and reject multi-statement strings.\n */\nexport function revokeInternalTableSql(schema: string, table: string): string {\n    if (!SAFE_IDENTIFIER.test(schema)) {\n        throw new Error(`Refusing to build SQL with an unsafe schema name: ${JSON.stringify(schema)}`);\n    }\n    if (!SAFE_IDENTIFIER.test(table)) {\n        throw new Error(`Refusing to build SQL with an unsafe table name: ${JSON.stringify(table)}`);\n    }\n    const qualified = `\"${schema}\".\"${table}\"`;\n    return `\n        DO $rebase_revoke$\n        BEGIN\n            IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${REBASE_USER_ROLE}')\n               AND to_regclass('${qualified}') IS NOT NULL THEN\n                EXECUTE 'REVOKE ALL ON ${qualified} FROM ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}';\n            END IF;\n        END\n        $rebase_revoke$;\n    `.trim();\n}\n\n/**\n * Revoke on every internal table in `schema`, one statement at a time.\n *\n * Best-effort per table: a connection that does not own one of them (a\n * pre-provisioned database, a platform-managed ledger) cannot revoke on it, and\n * that must not take down a boot. 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