@rebasepro/server-postgres 0.23.0 → 0.24.1-canary.g56af4a4

package/dist/{rls-enforcement-C6Xk0lA6.js → rls-enforcement-DvzqlaL1.js}

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { r as __exportAll } from "./__vite-browser-external-BnuHet1e.js";
 import { logger } from "@rebasepro/server";
 import { sql } from "drizzle-orm";
 import { ANONYMOUS_USER_ID, REBASE_SCHEMA, usesLegacyRlsFunctions } from "@rebasepro/types";
-import { REBASE_USER_ROLE as REBASE_USER_ROLE$1, findAnonymousGrants, revokeInternalTableAccess, securityRuleToConditions } from "@rebasepro/common";
+import { REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES, REBASE_USER_ROLE as REBASE_USER_ROLE$1, findAnonymousGrants, revokeInternalTableAccess, securityRuleToConditions } from "@rebasepro/common";
 //#region src/security/rls-enforcement.ts
 var rls_enforcement_exports = /* @__PURE__ */ __exportAll({
 	REBASE_USER_ROLE: () => REBASE_USER_ROLE$1,
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ var rls_enforcement_exports = /* @__PURE__ */ __exportAll({
 	applyAuthContext: () => applyAuthContext,
 	detectConnectionPosture: () => detectConnectionPosture,
 	ensureAppRole: () => ensureAppRole,
+	ensureAppRoleGrants: () => ensureAppRoleGrants,
+	internalTablesGrantedToUserRole: () => internalTablesGrantedToUserRole,
+	revokeUserRoleSql: () => revokeUserRoleSql,
 	validatePolicyPgRoles: () => validatePolicyPgRoles,
 	warnOnAnonymousGrants: () => warnOnAnonymousGrants,
 	warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions: () => warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions,
@@ -21,6 +24,13 @@ var quoteIdent = (name) => `"${name.replace(/"/g, "\"\"")}"`;
 /** DML the user role holds on managed tables (RLS still filters per row). */
 var USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES = "SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE";
 /**
+* Take every privilege the user role holds on one table back — what a table
+* gets when RLS cannot be switched on for it, so it is unreachable rather than
+* unprotected. Quoted exactly: a mixed-case adopted table (`"User"`) folded to
+* lower case names a table that does not exist.
+*/
+var revokeUserRoleSql = (schema, table) => `REVOKE ALL PRIVILEGES ON ${quoteIdent(schema)}.${quoteIdent(table)} FROM ${quoteIdent(REBASE_USER_ROLE$1)}`;
+/**
 * Warn when the connection role shares its name with an existing schema.
 *
 * Postgres resolves unqualified names through `search_path`, which defaults to
@@ -165,27 +175,137 @@ async function ensureAppRole(run, schemas) {
 	} catch (err) {
 		throw new Error(`The connection role is not a member of "${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}" and cannot grant itself membership: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\n\n` + appRoleSetupInstructions(String(memberRows[0]?.role ?? "current connection role"), uniqueSchemas));
 	}
-	const nspRows = await run("SELECT nspname FROM pg_namespace");
-	const existing = new Set(nspRows.map((r) => String(r.nspname)));
+	await ensureAppRoleGrants(run, uniqueSchemas);
+	logger.debug(`🔐 [rls] User role "${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}" provisioned (schemas: ${uniqueSchemas.join(", ")})`);
+}
+/** A string literal for a catalogue read. Names come from config and constants, never from a request. */
+var sqlLiteral = (value) => `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`;
+var textArray = (values) => values.length === 0 ? "ARRAY[]::text[]" : `ARRAY[${values.map(sqlLiteral).join(", ")}]::text[]`;
+/**
+* The grant tier's state for every existing schema in `schemas`, in one read.
+*
+* A grant counts as present only as the statement this tier runs would record
+* it — grantor the object's owner, which is what a GRANT by the owner, a member
+* of the owning role or a superuser records — so skipping it leaves the ACL
+* exactly as running it would. Anything else reads as missing, and the
+* statement runs as it always did.
+*/
+async function readSchemaGrants(run, schemas) {
+	const internal = textArray(REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES);
+	const target = `(SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = ${sqlLiteral(REBASE_USER_ROLE$1)})`;
+	/** Distinct privileges `acl` gives the user role (from `grantor`, when given) out of `privileges`. */
+	const held = (acl, privileges, grantor) => `(SELECT count(DISTINCT a.privilege_type) FROM aclexplode(${acl}) a WHERE a.grantee = ${target}${grantor ? ` AND a.grantor = ${grantor}` : ""} AND a.privilege_type IN (${privileges.map(sqlLiteral).join(", ")}))`;
+	const DML = [
+		"SELECT",
+		"INSERT",
+		"UPDATE",
+		"DELETE"
+	];
+	const SEQ = ["USAGE", "SELECT"];
+	const rows = await run(`
+        SELECT n.nspname AS schema,
+               ${held("n.nspacl", ["USAGE"], "n.nspowner")} = 1 AS usage,
+               NOT EXISTS (
+                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c
+                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relkind IN ('r', 'v', 'm', 'f', 'p')
+                     AND NOT (c.relname = ANY(${internal}) AND NOT c.relrowsecurity)
+                     AND ${held("c.relacl", DML, "c.relowner")} < ${DML.length}
+               ) AS tables,
+               NOT EXISTS (
+                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c
+                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relkind = 'S'
+                     AND ${held("c.relacl", SEQ, "c.relowner")} < ${SEQ.length}
+               ) AS sequences,
+               EXISTS (
+                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_default_acl d
+                   WHERE d.defaclrole = (SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user)
+                     AND d.defaclnamespace = n.oid AND d.defaclobjtype = 'r'
+                     AND ${held("d.defaclacl", DML)} = ${DML.length}
+               ) AS default_tables,
+               EXISTS (
+                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_default_acl d
+                   WHERE d.defaclrole = (SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user)
+                     AND d.defaclnamespace = n.oid AND d.defaclobjtype = 'S'
+                     AND ${held("d.defaclacl", SEQ)} = ${SEQ.length}
+               ) AS default_sequences,
+               ARRAY(
+                   SELECT c.relname::text FROM pg_class c
+                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relname = ANY(${internal}) AND NOT c.relrowsecurity
+                     AND (c.relacl IS NULL OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM aclexplode(c.relacl) a WHERE a.grantee = ${target}))
+                   ORDER BY 1
+               ) AS internal_granted
+        FROM pg_namespace n
+        WHERE n.nspname = ANY(${textArray(schemas)})
+    `);
+	const grants = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	for (const row of rows) {
+		const internalGranted = row.internal_granted;
+		grants.set(String(row.schema), {
+			usage: row.usage === true,
+			tables: row.tables === true,
+			sequences: row.sequences === true,
+			defaultTables: row.default_tables === true,
+			defaultSequences: row.default_sequences === true,
+			internalGranted: Array.isArray(internalGranted) ? internalGranted.map(String) : String(internalGranted ?? "").replace(/^\{|\}$/g, "").split(",").filter(Boolean)
+		});
+	}
+	return grants;
+}
+/**
+* The grant tier of {@link ensureAppRole} on its own: `USAGE` on each existing
+* schema in `schemas`, DML on its tables and `USAGE, SELECT` on its
+* sequences, the default privileges that cover what this role creates later,
+* and Rebase's own tables taken back — for a role and membership already
+* provisioned.
+*
+* Every statement is issued only when the catalogue says it would change
+* something. They used to run unconditionally, twice per boot (at connect, and
+* again in the final posture check): a `GRANT … ON ALL TABLES` rewrites every
+* table's `pg_class` row whether or not the ACL changes, which invalidates
+* every table's cached plans on every connection, and the internal-table sweep
+* ran 23 `REVOKE`s per schema. A boot against a database whose grants already
+* hold now reads one catalogue query and writes nothing; one that is missing
+* any of them runs exactly the statements it always ran.
+*
+* Table owners (the expected non-superuser posture) can always grant on their
+* own objects, so this needs no extra privilege.
+*/
+async function ensureAppRoleGrants(run, schemas) {
+	const uniqueSchemas = Array.from(new Set(schemas.filter(Boolean)));
+	const grants = await readSchemaGrants(run, uniqueSchemas);
 	for (const schema of uniqueSchemas) {
-		if (!existing.has(schema)) continue;
+		const state = grants.get(schema);
+		if (!state) continue;
 		const s = quoteIdent(schema);
-		await run(`GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
-		await run(`GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
-		await run(`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
-		await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON TABLES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
-		await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		if (!state.usage) await run(`GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		if (!state.tables) await run(`GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		if (!state.sequences) await run(`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		if (!state.defaultTables) await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON TABLES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		if (!state.defaultSequences) await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}`);
+		const tables = state.tables ? state.internalGranted : void 0;
+		if (tables && tables.length === 0) continue;
 		await revokeInternalTableAccess(async (text) => {
 			await run(text);
-		}, schema, { onError: (table, error) => logger.warn(`🔐 [rls] Could not revoke "${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}" access to "${schema}"."${table}" — it stays reachable by authenticated requests: ` + (error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error))) });
+		}, schema, {
+			tables,
+			onError: (table, error) => logger.warn(`🔐 [rls] Could not revoke "${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}" access to "${schema}"."${table}" — it stays reachable by authenticated requests: ` + (error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)))
+		});
 	}
-	logger.debug(`🔐 [rls] User role "${REBASE_USER_ROLE$1}" provisioned (schemas: ${uniqueSchemas.join(", ")})`);
+}
+/**
+* Rebase's own RLS-off tables in `schema` that a `revokeInternalTableAccess`
+* sweep would change — the user role holds a privilege on them, or their ACL
+* has never been written. One read; the sweep it narrows is one `DO` per
+* table name.
+*/
+async function internalTablesGrantedToUserRole(run, schema) {
+	return (await readSchemaGrants(run, [schema])).get(schema)?.internalGranted ?? [];
 }
 /**
 * Apply the authenticated context to a transaction: the `app.*` GUCs that RLS
 * policies read via `rebase.uid()` / `rebase.roles()` / `rebase.jwt()`, and — when
-* `userRole` is set — `SET LOCAL ROLE` so RLS binds every statement in this
-* transaction (reads *and* writes).
+* `userRole` is set — the `LOCAL` role switch, in the same statement, so RLS
+* binds every statement in this transaction (reads *and* writes).
 *
 * GUCs are set with `is_local = true` and the role switch is `LOCAL`: both
 * reset at commit/rollback, so pooled connections are never polluted.
@@ -218,9 +338,9 @@ async function applyAuthContext(tx, auth, userRole) {
 		sub: uid,
 		roles: auth.roles,
 		is_anonymous: auth.isAnonymous === true
-	})}, true)
+	})}, true)${userRole ? sql`,
+            set_config('role', ${userRole}, true)` : sql``}
     `);
-	if (userRole) await tx.execute(sql.raw(`SET LOCAL ROLE ${quoteIdent(userRole)}`));
 }
 /** Role names from other BaaS platforms that people reach for out of habit. */
 var FOREIGN_CONVENTION_ROLES = {
@@ -338,6 +458,6 @@ async function validatePolicyPgRoles(run, collections, requestRole = REBASE_USER
 	if (problems.length > 0) throw new Error(`Security rules target PostgreSQL roles this server cannot use. Requests run as "${requestRole}", so these policies would never apply and every row would be filtered out — the collections would look empty rather than error.\n\n` + problems.join("\n\n") + "\n");
 }
 //#endregion
-export { rls_enforcement_exports as a, warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions as c, ensureAppRole as i, warnOnRoleSchemaCollision as l, applyAuthContext as n, validatePolicyPgRoles as o, detectConnectionPosture as r, warnOnAnonymousGrants as s, REBASE_USER_ROLE$1 as t };
+export { ensureAppRoleGrants as a, rls_enforcement_exports as c, warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions as d, warnOnRoleSchemaCollision as f, ensureAppRole as i, validatePolicyPgRoles as l, applyAuthContext as n, internalTablesGrantedToUserRole as o, detectConnectionPosture as r, revokeUserRoleSql as s, REBASE_USER_ROLE$1 as t, warnOnAnonymousGrants as u };
 
-//# sourceMappingURL=rls-enforcement-C6Xk0lA6.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=rls-enforcement-DvzqlaL1.js.map

package/dist/rls-enforcement-DvzqlaL1.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"rls-enforcement-DvzqlaL1.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/security/rls-enforcement.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { sql as drizzleSql, SQL } from \"drizzle-orm\";\nimport { ANONYMOUS_USER_ID, PolicyExpression, SecurityRule } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport {\n    AnonymousGrantRisk,\n    findAnonymousGrants,\n    REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES,\n    REBASE_USER_ROLE,\n    revokeInternalTableAccess,\n    securityRuleToConditions\n} from \"@rebasepro/common\";\nimport { REBASE_SCHEMA, usesLegacyRlsFunctions } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\nimport { logger } from \"@rebasepro/server\";\n\n/**\n * Unified RLS enforcement — the \"user context vs server context\" model.\n *\n * Every operation runs in one of two contexts:\n *\n *  - **User context** — a request authenticated (or anonymous) via\n *    `driver.withAuth(user)`. Runs as the restricted `rebase_user` role: a\n *    non-owner, NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS role, so Postgres RLS binds *every*\n *    statement (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE). The collection's\n *    `securityRules` are the whole authorization model; app-layer callbacks\n *    are validation/side-effects, not a security boundary.\n *\n *  - **Server context** — the base (owner) connection: auth flows, migrations,\n *    and raw `rebase.sql`. As table owner it bypasses RLS. This is the trusted\n *    plane, equivalent to Supabase's `service_role`.\n *\n *    `rebase.dataAsAdmin` is **not** in it, despite the name. `init.ts` scopes\n *    that driver with `withAuth(SERVICE_IDENTITY)`, so it arrives as user\n *    context above — `rebase_user`, `app.uid = 'service'`, policies evaluated —\n *    and clears the default policies through their admin arm rather than the\n *    `rebase.uid() IS NULL` one.\n *\n * This module provides the three pieces:\n *\n *  1. {@link detectConnectionPosture} — is the connection subject to RLS at\n *     all? (superuser / BYPASSRLS / table owner ⇒ no)\n *  2. {@link ensureAppRole} — idempotently provision `rebase_user` with\n *     SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE grants (+ default privileges so future\n *     tables stay covered).\n *  3. {@link applyAuthContext} — per-transaction: set the `app.*` GUCs the\n *     policies read (`rebase.uid()` etc.) and the transaction-local role\n *     `rebase_user` so RLS binds, in one statement. Transaction-scoped, so it\n *     composes with poolers.\n *\n * Provisioning runs from the framework's own bootstrap/migrate (which already\n * self-creates the `auth` schema and functions) — enforcement is default-on,\n * not an operator opt-in.\n */\n\n/**\n * The restricted role every authenticated (user-context) request runs as.\n *\n * Re-exported, not re-declared: the same name is needed by\n * `@rebasepro/common`'s internal-table revokes, and two spellings of a role name\n * fail as a silent no-op rather than an error.\n */\nexport { REBASE_USER_ROLE };\n\n/** Minimal SQL runner so callers can adapt drizzle or pg.Client. */\nexport type RawSqlRunner = (sqlText: string) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]>;\n\n/** Minimal transaction surface needed by {@link applyAuthContext}. */\nexport interface SqlTx {\n    execute(query: SQL): Promise<unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface ConnectionPosture {\n    /** The connection's `current_user`. */\n    role: string;\n    superuser: boolean;\n    bypassRLS: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Owns at least one user table — owners bypass non-FORCE RLS.\n     *\n     * \"Owns\" in Postgres's sense, not by name: a role that INHERITs the owner is\n     * the owner for every ownership test the planner makes, including the one\n     * that decides whether a policy applies at all.\n     */\n    ownsTables: boolean;\n    /**\n     * May create tables somewhere the server writes — and would then own them.\n     *\n     * The reason this is part of the posture rather than a separate question:\n     * the posture is decided ONCE, at boot, and on a fresh database the\n     * catalogue has nothing to report yet. The process that asks then goes on to\n     * create every table in the schema and owns all of them for the rest of its\n     * life. Asking only what is already there answers about the wrong instant.\n     */\n    canCreateTables: boolean;\n    /** True when RLS would NOT constrain this connection. */\n    privileged: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface AuthContext {\n    uid: string;\n    /** Raw roles as carried on the user (strings or `{ id }` objects). */\n    roles: unknown[];\n    /**\n     * Whether this session came from anonymous sign-in rather than an account.\n     *\n     * Anonymous sign-in mints a real user row and a real uid, so a guest was\n     * indistinguishable from a registered account inside a policy: same\n     * `rebase.uid()`, same default role. Every rule meaning \"a signed-in\n     * person\" was therefore also a rule about anybody who had called\n     * `POST /auth/anonymous`, which asks for no email, no password and no\n     * agreement to anything.\n     *\n     * Optional, and absent reads as `false`: a caller that predates this — a\n     * realtime subscription, a custom validator — keeps the behaviour it had\n     * rather than having every one of its users reclassified as guests.\n     */\n    isAnonymous?: boolean;\n    /**\n     * The **custom** claims on the caller's token, as `rebase.jwt()` reports\n     * them.\n     *\n     * This is how a policy reaches a fact about the session that is neither the\n     * uid nor the roles — which, before this, it could not: `app.jwt` was built\n     * from three fields the driver already had, so `rebase.jwt()`, documented\n     * as \"full JWT claims as JSONB\", returned a three-key object that never had\n     * a claim in it.\n     *\n     * Multi-tenancy's `claim` form is the first caller — `policy.authClaim(…)`\n     * compiles to `rebase.jwt() ->> '<name>'`. Identity claims are stripped out\n     * before they reach here (`AccessTokenPayload.claims`) and the identity\n     * fields are written *over* them below, so nothing a hook put on a token\n     * can assert a uid, roles or guest status.\n     */\n    claims?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nconst quoteIdent = (name: string): string => `\"${name.replace(/\"/g, \"\\\"\\\"\")}\"`;\n\n/** DML the user role holds on managed tables (RLS still filters per row). */\nconst USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES = \"SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE\";\n\n/**\n * Take every privilege the user role holds on one table back — what a table\n * gets when RLS cannot be switched on for it, so it is unreachable rather than\n * unprotected. Quoted exactly: a mixed-case adopted table (`\"User\"`) folded to\n * lower case names a table that does not exist.\n */\nexport const revokeUserRoleSql = (schema: string, table: string): string =>\n    `REVOKE ALL PRIVILEGES ON ${quoteIdent(schema)}.${quoteIdent(table)} FROM ${quoteIdent(REBASE_USER_ROLE)}`;\n\n/**\n * Warn when the connection role shares its name with an existing schema.\n *\n * Postgres resolves unqualified names through `search_path`, which defaults to\n * `\"$user\", public` — and `$user` is the connection ROLE. When a schema of that\n * name exists it sits ahead of `public`, so every unqualified statement\n * silently operates on it instead:\n *\n *     CREATE TABLE posts (...);   -- you meant public.posts; you got <role>.posts\n *\n * Nothing errors. You get a second table of the same name in the wrong schema,\n * and reads that pin `public` cannot see it — which reads as \"missing table\" and\n * sends people to re-run a push that creates a *third* copy. The bootstrapper\n * has a whole branch dedicated to recognising the symptom after the fact.\n *\n * Rebase shipped straight into this: it creates a schema named `rebase` while\n * every template named the database role `rebase` too. The scaffold uses\n * `rebase_app` now, and every pool Rebase opens pins `search_path=public`\n * (`pinSearchPath`), which covers the paths the framework controls. This covers\n * the ones it does not — `psql`, `pg_dump`, drizzle-kit, a colleague's script,\n * a hand-written migration — because the hazard is a property of the two NAMES,\n * not of any one connection.\n *\n * A warning rather than a boot failure: the database works, the framework's own\n * traffic is pinned, and refusing to start over a naming choice a user may have\n * inherited would be worse than the risk.\n */\nexport async function warnOnRoleSchemaCollision(run: RawSqlRunner): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n        const rows = await run(`\n            SELECT current_user AS role,\n                   EXISTS (\n                       SELECT 1 FROM pg_namespace n WHERE n.nspname = current_user\n                   ) AS collides\n        `);\n        if (rows[0]?.collides !== true) return;\n        const role = String(rows[0]?.role ?? \"the connection role\");\n        logger.warn(\n            `⚠️  The database role \"${role}\" has the same name as a schema. Postgres resolves unqualified ` +\n            `names through \\`search_path\\`, which defaults to \\`\"$user\", public\\` — so \"${role}\" is searched ` +\n            `BEFORE public, and any unqualified \\`CREATE TABLE\\`/\\`SELECT\\` from a tool that does not pin the ` +\n            `path (psql, pg_dump, drizzle-kit, a hand-written migration) silently lands in \"${role}\" instead. ` +\n            `Rebase's own connections pin \\`search_path=public\\`, so the server is unaffected. To remove the ` +\n            `hazard entirely, connect as a role whose name is not also a schema — the scaffold uses ` +\n            `\"rebase_app\".`\n        );\n    } catch {\n        // A diagnostic must never be the reason a boot fails.\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Would RLS actually constrain this connection?\n *\n * Four ways the answer is no, and only two of them are obvious. Superuser and\n * BYPASSRLS announce themselves in `pg_roles`. The other two are about\n * ownership, and both used to read as \"no bypass here\":\n *\n * - **Ownership through membership.** The old query compared\n *   `pg_tables.tableowner` to `current_user` as a string. Postgres does not: a\n *   role that INHERITs the owner passes every ownership test the planner makes,\n *   including the one that decides whether a policy applies. So a perfectly\n *   ordinary \"app role that is a member of the owner role\" setup reported\n *   unprivileged and bypassed every policy — permanently, since no restart\n *   changes a string comparison's answer.\n *\n * - **Ownership that has not happened yet.** The posture is decided once, at\n *   boot, and on a fresh database there is nothing in the catalogue to find. The\n *   same process then creates every table and owns all of them. The first boot\n *   of a new deployment therefore served every request unconstrained, the log\n *   said RLS was fine, and the SECOND boot silently fixed it — which is the\n *   worst possible shape for a security check, because the state that reproduces\n *   it is gone by the time anyone looks. Asking \"may this role create tables\n *   where the server provisions?\" answers about the process's whole life rather\n *   than about one instant of it.\n *\n * `schemas` narrows the CREATE question to where the server actually writes.\n * Omitted, it asks about every schema the role can see, which is the safe\n * direction: over-reporting costs a role switch that was not strictly needed,\n * under-reporting costs the entire authorization model.\n */\nexport async function detectConnectionPosture(\n    run: RawSqlRunner,\n    schemas?: string[]\n): Promise<ConnectionPosture> {\n    // Identifiers, and they reach SQL as literals in a catalogue comparison —\n    // but they arrive from collection configs, so they are quoted as string\n    // literals rather than interpolated as names, and a quote inside one is\n    // escaped rather than trusted.\n    const schemaFilter = schemas?.length\n        ? `AND n.nspname IN (${Array.from(new Set(schemas))\n            .map((s) => `'${s.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`)\n            .join(\", \")})`\n        : \"\";\n\n    const rows = await run(`\n        SELECT current_user            AS role,\n               r.rolsuper              AS superuser,\n               r.rolbypassrls          AS bypassrls,\n               EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_tables t\n                   WHERE pg_has_role(current_user, t.tableowner, 'USAGE')\n                     AND t.schemaname NOT IN ('pg_catalog', 'information_schema')\n               )                       AS owns_tables,\n               EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_namespace n\n                   WHERE n.nspname NOT IN ('pg_catalog', 'information_schema')\n                     AND n.nspname NOT LIKE 'pg\\\\_toast%'\n                     AND n.nspname NOT LIKE 'pg\\\\_temp%'\n                     ${schemaFilter}\n                     AND has_schema_privilege(current_user, n.oid, 'CREATE')\n               )                       AS can_create\n        FROM pg_roles r\n        WHERE r.rolname = current_user\n    `);\n    const row = rows[0] ?? {};\n    const superuser = row.superuser === true;\n    const bypassRLS = row.bypassrls === true;\n    const ownsTables = row.owns_tables === true;\n    const canCreateTables = row.can_create === true;\n    return {\n        role: String(row.role ?? \"unknown\"),\n        superuser,\n        bypassRLS,\n        ownsTables,\n        canCreateTables,\n        privileged: superuser || bypassRLS || ownsTables || canCreateTables\n    };\n}\n\n/**\n * Human-actionable instructions for when the connection cannot provision the\n * user role itself (no CREATEROLE and role not pre-created by the platform).\n */\nexport function appRoleSetupInstructions(connectionRole: string, schemas: string[]): string {\n    const grants = schemas.map((s) =>\n        `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${quoteIdent(s)} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE};\\n` +\n        `GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${quoteIdent(s)} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE};\\n` +\n        `GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${quoteIdent(s)} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE};`\n    ).join(\"\\n\");\n    return (\n        `Rebase enforces row-level security by running authenticated requests as ` +\n        `the restricted role \"${REBASE_USER_ROLE}\", but the connection role ` +\n        `\"${connectionRole}\" bypasses RLS and cannot create that role itself.\\n` +\n        `Run the following as a database administrator, then restart:\\n\\n` +\n        `CREATE ROLE ${REBASE_USER_ROLE} NOLOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS NOINHERIT;\\n` +\n        `GRANT ${REBASE_USER_ROLE} TO ${quoteIdent(connectionRole)};\\n` +\n        grants\n    );\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotently provision the `rebase_user` role, membership for the current\n * connection role, and DML grants (+ default privileges for future tables)\n * on every existing schema in `schemas`.\n *\n * Split into privilege tiers so it works both when the connection is a\n * superuser (creates everything) and when the platform pre-created the role\n * and membership (e.g. CNPG `postInitApplicationSQL`) and the connection is\n * merely the table owner — owners can always run the grant tier themselves.\n *\n * RLS still filters every row: these grants only make the tables *reachable*\n * by the role; the policies decide which rows/commands actually pass.\n *\n * Throws with precise setup instructions when the role is missing and the\n * connection cannot create it.\n */\nexport async function ensureAppRole(run: RawSqlRunner, schemas: string[]): Promise<void> {\n    const uniqueSchemas = Array.from(new Set(schemas.filter(Boolean)));\n\n    // Tier 1 — role existence.\n    const roleRows = await run(`SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${REBASE_USER_ROLE}'`);\n    if (roleRows.length === 0) {\n        try {\n            await run(`CREATE ROLE ${REBASE_USER_ROLE} NOLOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS NOINHERIT`);\n        } catch (err) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `Failed to create the \"${REBASE_USER_ROLE}\" role: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\\n\\n` +\n                appRoleSetupInstructions(\"current connection role\", uniqueSchemas)\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    // Tier 2 — membership, so a non-superuser connection may SET ROLE to it.\n    const memberRows = await run(`\n        SELECT (pg_has_role(current_user, '${REBASE_USER_ROLE}', 'MEMBER')\n                OR (SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user)) AS can_set,\n               current_user AS role\n    `);\n    if (memberRows[0]?.can_set !== true) {\n        try {\n            await run(`GRANT ${REBASE_USER_ROLE} TO CURRENT_USER`);\n        } catch (err) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `The connection role is not a member of \"${REBASE_USER_ROLE}\" and cannot grant itself membership: ` +\n                `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\\n\\n` +\n                appRoleSetupInstructions(String(memberRows[0]?.role ?? \"current connection role\"), uniqueSchemas)\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    // Tier 3 — grants.\n    await ensureAppRoleGrants(run, uniqueSchemas);\n\n    logger.debug(`🔐 [rls] User role \"${REBASE_USER_ROLE}\" provisioned (schemas: ${uniqueSchemas.join(\", \")})`);\n}\n\n/** A string literal for a catalogue read. Names come from config and constants, never from a request. */\nconst sqlLiteral = (value: string): string => `'${value.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`;\nconst textArray = (values: readonly string[]): string =>\n    values.length === 0 ? \"ARRAY[]::text[]\" : `ARRAY[${values.map(sqlLiteral).join(\", \")}]::text[]`;\n\n/** What the grant tier would find already in place in one schema. */\ninterface SchemaGrants {\n    /** `USAGE` on the schema, granted by its owner. */\n    usage: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Every relation `GRANT … ON ALL TABLES` reaches already has all four DML\n     * privileges from its owner — Rebase's own RLS-off tables aside, which the\n     * sweep takes back right after and so never keep them.\n     */\n    tables: boolean;\n    /** Every sequence already has `USAGE, SELECT` from its owner. */\n    sequences: boolean;\n    /** This role's default privileges in the schema already grant the table DML. */\n    defaultTables: boolean;\n    /** …and the sequence `USAGE, SELECT`. */\n    defaultSequences: boolean;\n    /**\n     * Rebase's own RLS-off tables a `REVOKE` would still change: the user role\n     * holds a privilege on them, or the table has never had an ACL written —\n     * `NULL`, which a `REVOKE` (like the grant-and-revoke it replaces) turns\n     * into the owner's explicit default. Same access either way; the same\n     * catalogue only this way.\n     */\n    internalGranted: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * The grant tier's state for every existing schema in `schemas`, in one read.\n *\n * A grant counts as present only as the statement this tier runs would record\n * it — grantor the object's owner, which is what a GRANT by the owner, a member\n * of the owning role or a superuser records — so skipping it leaves the ACL\n * exactly as running it would. Anything else reads as missing, and the\n * statement runs as it always did.\n */\nasync function readSchemaGrants(run: RawSqlRunner, schemas: string[]): Promise<Map<string, SchemaGrants>> {\n    const internal = textArray(REBASE_INTERNAL_TABLES);\n    const target = `(SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = ${sqlLiteral(REBASE_USER_ROLE)})`;\n    /** Distinct privileges `acl` gives the user role (from `grantor`, when given) out of `privileges`. */\n    const held = (acl: string, privileges: string[], grantor?: string): string =>\n        `(SELECT count(DISTINCT a.privilege_type) FROM aclexplode(${acl}) a WHERE a.grantee = ${target}` +\n        `${grantor ? ` AND a.grantor = ${grantor}` : \"\"} AND a.privilege_type IN (${privileges.map(sqlLiteral).join(\", \")}))`;\n    const DML = [\"SELECT\", \"INSERT\", \"UPDATE\", \"DELETE\"];\n    const SEQ = [\"USAGE\", \"SELECT\"];\n    const rows = await run(`\n        SELECT n.nspname AS schema,\n               ${held(\"n.nspacl\", [\"USAGE\"], \"n.nspowner\")} = 1 AS usage,\n               NOT EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c\n                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relkind IN ('r', 'v', 'm', 'f', 'p')\n                     AND NOT (c.relname = ANY(${internal}) AND NOT c.relrowsecurity)\n                     AND ${held(\"c.relacl\", DML, \"c.relowner\")} < ${DML.length}\n               ) AS tables,\n               NOT EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c\n                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relkind = 'S'\n                     AND ${held(\"c.relacl\", SEQ, \"c.relowner\")} < ${SEQ.length}\n               ) AS sequences,\n               EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_default_acl d\n                   WHERE d.defaclrole = (SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user)\n                     AND d.defaclnamespace = n.oid AND d.defaclobjtype = 'r'\n                     AND ${held(\"d.defaclacl\", DML)} = ${DML.length}\n               ) AS default_tables,\n               EXISTS (\n                   SELECT 1 FROM pg_default_acl d\n                   WHERE d.defaclrole = (SELECT oid FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user)\n                     AND d.defaclnamespace = n.oid AND d.defaclobjtype = 'S'\n                     AND ${held(\"d.defaclacl\", SEQ)} = ${SEQ.length}\n               ) AS default_sequences,\n               ARRAY(\n                   SELECT c.relname::text FROM pg_class c\n                   WHERE c.relnamespace = n.oid AND c.relname = ANY(${internal}) AND NOT c.relrowsecurity\n                     AND (c.relacl IS NULL OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM aclexplode(c.relacl) a WHERE a.grantee = ${target}))\n                   ORDER BY 1\n               ) AS internal_granted\n        FROM pg_namespace n\n        WHERE n.nspname = ANY(${textArray(schemas)})\n    `);\n    const grants = new Map<string, SchemaGrants>();\n    for (const row of rows) {\n        const internalGranted = row.internal_granted;\n        grants.set(String(row.schema), {\n            usage: row.usage === true,\n            tables: row.tables === true,\n            sequences: row.sequences === true,\n            defaultTables: row.default_tables === true,\n            defaultSequences: row.default_sequences === true,\n            internalGranted: Array.isArray(internalGranted)\n                ? internalGranted.map(String)\n                // A driver that hands arrays back as text: `{a,b}`.\n                : String(internalGranted ?? \"\").replace(/^\\{|\\}$/g, \"\").split(\",\").filter(Boolean)\n        });\n    }\n    return grants;\n}\n\n/**\n * The grant tier of {@link ensureAppRole} on its own: `USAGE` on each existing\n * schema in `schemas`, DML on its tables and `USAGE, SELECT` on its\n * sequences, the default privileges that cover what this role creates later,\n * and Rebase's own tables taken back — for a role and membership already\n * provisioned.\n *\n * Every statement is issued only when the catalogue says it would change\n * something. They used to run unconditionally, twice per boot (at connect, and\n * again in the final posture check): a `GRANT … ON ALL TABLES` rewrites every\n * table's `pg_class` row whether or not the ACL changes, which invalidates\n * every table's cached plans on every connection, and the internal-table sweep\n * ran 23 `REVOKE`s per schema. A boot against a database whose grants already\n * hold now reads one catalogue query and writes nothing; one that is missing\n * any of them runs exactly the statements it always ran.\n *\n * Table owners (the expected non-superuser posture) can always grant on their\n * own objects, so this needs no extra privilege.\n */\nexport async function ensureAppRoleGrants(run: RawSqlRunner, schemas: string[]): Promise<void> {\n    const uniqueSchemas = Array.from(new Set(schemas.filter(Boolean)));\n    const grants = await readSchemaGrants(run, uniqueSchemas);\n    for (const schema of uniqueSchemas) {\n        const state = grants.get(schema);\n        // Not there (yet): a later call, once provisioning has created it, grants it.\n        if (!state) continue;\n        const s = quoteIdent(schema);\n        if (!state.usage) await run(`GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}`);\n        if (!state.tables) await run(`GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}`);\n        if (!state.sequences) await run(`GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA ${s} TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}`);\n        // Cover objects created later by the CURRENT role (the role that runs\n        // migrations), so a migrate can never strand the user role.\n        if (!state.defaultTables) {\n            await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT ${USER_TABLE_PRIVILEGES} ON TABLES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}`);\n        }\n        if (!state.defaultSequences) {\n            await run(`ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA ${s} GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO ${REBASE_USER_ROLE}`);\n        }\n\n        // The grants above are deliberately schema-wide — a project's own\n        // collections may live in `rebase`, and future tables must be reachable\n        // or a migration strands the role. Rebase's OWN tables are the exception:\n        // refresh tokens, MFA secrets, API keys and the rest carry no RLS and no\n        // row an end user should ever address. Taking the privilege back here\n        // covers every table that already exists; each creator revokes on the\n        // table it just made, for the boot that creates them for the first time.\n        //\n        // All of them right after the schema-wide grant, which has just handed\n        // them out; otherwise only the ones the catalogue says still hold one.\n        const tables = state.tables ? state.internalGranted : undefined;\n        if (tables && tables.length === 0) continue;\n        await revokeInternalTableAccess(async (text) => { await run(text); }, schema, {\n            tables,\n            onError: (table, error) => logger.warn(\n                `🔐 [rls] Could not revoke \"${REBASE_USER_ROLE}\" access to \"${schema}\".\"${table}\" — ` +\n                \"it stays reachable by authenticated requests: \" +\n                (error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error))\n            )\n        });\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebase's own RLS-off tables in `schema` that a `revokeInternalTableAccess`\n * sweep would change — the user role holds a privilege on them, or their ACL\n * has never been written. One read; the sweep it narrows is one `DO` per\n * table name.\n */\nexport async function internalTablesGrantedToUserRole(run: RawSqlRunner, schema: string): Promise<string[]> {\n    return (await readSchemaGrants(run, [schema])).get(schema)?.internalGranted ?? [];\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply the authenticated context to a transaction: the `app.*` GUCs that RLS\n * policies read via `rebase.uid()` / `rebase.roles()` / `rebase.jwt()`, and — when\n * `userRole` is set — the `LOCAL` role switch, in the same statement, so RLS\n * binds every statement in this transaction (reads *and* writes).\n *\n * GUCs are set with `is_local = true` and the role switch is `LOCAL`: both\n * reset at commit/rollback, so pooled connections are never polluted.\n *\n * Fails closed by construction: if the role switch errors, the transaction\n * aborts instead of proceeding privileged.\n *\n * SECURITY: this function is only ever called on the **user** path (the server\n * context uses the base/owner driver and never calls it). The default policies\n * treat `rebase.uid() IS NULL` as the trusted server context, and `rebase.uid()`\n * is `NULLIF(current_setting('app.uid'), '')` — so an EMPTY user id would\n * be read as NULL and silently escalate a user request to server privileges.\n * Coerce empty/blank ids to `ANONYMOUS_USER_ID` here, at the single chokepoint,\n * rather than trusting every caller (e.g. realtime subscription auth) to do it.\n * That sentinel is exported from `@rebasepro/types` because it leaks into rule\n * semantics: it is why `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL` is true for anonymous requests.\n */\nexport async function applyAuthContext(tx: SqlTx, auth: AuthContext, userRole?: string): Promise<void> {\n    const uid = typeof auth.uid === \"string\" && auth.uid.trim() !== \"\" ? auth.uid : ANONYMOUS_USER_ID;\n    const normalizedRoles = auth.roles.map((r: unknown) =>\n        typeof r === \"string\" ? r : (r as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? String(r)\n    );\n    // `app.user_id` is the pre-rename spelling, still written because policies\n    // are data: a database provisioned before the rename holds rules compiled\n    // to `current_setting('app.user_id')`, and those predicates would evaluate\n    // to NULL — failing open or locking out — if we stopped setting it. Drop\n    // the alias only once no live database carries a legacy policy.\n    // A guest is a signed-in caller with no account behind them, and until this\n    // the database could not tell the difference — see `rebase.is_anonymous()`.\n    // Written as a string because that is what `set_config` takes.\n    const isAnonymous = auth.isAnonymous === true ? \"true\" : \"false\";\n\n    await tx.execute(drizzleSql`\n        SELECT\n            set_config('app.uid', ${uid}, true),\n            set_config('app.user_id', ${uid}, true),\n            set_config('app.user_roles', ${normalizedRoles.join(\",\")}, true),\n            set_config('app.is_anonymous', ${isAnonymous}, true),\n            set_config('app.jwt', ${JSON.stringify({\n        // The caller's custom claims, FIRST, so the identity keys below\n        // overwrite them rather than the other way round. Same ordering, and\n        // the same reason, as `generateAccessToken`: a claims hook is a place\n        // to add facts about a session, not the place its subject is decided.\n        // `verifyAccessToken` already strips the identity claims out of this\n        // object; the ordering is the second lock on the same door.\n        ...(auth.claims ?? {}),\n        sub: uid,\n        roles: auth.roles,\n        // In the claims too, so a policy reading `rebase.jwt()` — which is\n        // how a rule reaches anything that is not uid or roles — sees the\n        // same fact as `rebase.is_anonymous()`. Two sources that could\n        // disagree would be worse than one.\n        is_anonymous: auth.isAnonymous === true\n    })}, true)${userRole\n        // The role switch, in the same statement rather than a `SET LOCAL ROLE`\n        // round trip of its own on every transaction. Postgres implements\n        // `SET ROLE` as the `role` setting: `set_config('role', name, true)`\n        // runs the same membership check, fails with the same SQLSTATE and\n        // message (42501 \"permission denied to set role\", 22023 for an unknown\n        // role — `isRoleSwitchingPermissionError` still reads it), takes the\n        // name verbatim as the quoted identifier did, and resets at COMMIT and\n        // ROLLBACK like `LOCAL`. Last in the list, after the GUCs; a refusal\n        // fails the whole statement, so the transaction aborts rather than\n        // running on as the connection owner. auth-context-one-statement.test.ts.\n        ? drizzleSql`,\n            set_config('role', ${userRole}, true)`\n        : drizzleSql``}\n    `);\n}\n\n/** Role names from other BaaS platforms that people reach for out of habit. */\nconst FOREIGN_CONVENTION_ROLES: Record<string, string> = {\n    authenticated: \"Supabase\",\n    anon: \"Supabase\",\n    service_role: \"Supabase\"\n};\n\n/**\n * Warn about rules that read as \"signed-in users only\" but admit anonymous\n * callers — `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL`, or a comparison against another\n * platform's magic user id such as `'anon'`.\n *\n * The sibling of {@link validatePolicyPgRoles}, for the more dangerous spelling\n * of the same habit. A foreign `pgRoles` value makes a policy unreachable and\n * the table reads empty — loud, and that guard throws. These do the opposite:\n * the rule compiles to a grant, and nothing looks wrong until the data is\n * already public.\n *\n * Warns rather than throws. Unlike an unreachable `pgRoles`, these rules are\n * serving traffic today: refusing to boot would take an app offline to report a\n * problem it already has, and on the read path it would take it offline\n * *because* its data was exposed. Rewriting the author's SQL is not an option\n * either — this is the escape hatch whose whole promise is that it means what it\n * says. So: say so, loudly, and leave the rule alone.\n */\nexport function warnOnAnonymousGrants(\n    collections: { slug?: string; securityRules?: readonly SecurityRule[] }[]\n): void {\n    // Grouped by the mistake, not by the rule: one habit typically repeats\n    // across every collection an author wrote, and a per-rule list would repeat\n    // the same paragraph dozens of times and get skimmed.\n    const byRisk = new Map<string, { risk: AnonymousGrantRisk; sites: string[] }>();\n\n    for (const collection of collections) {\n        for (const rule of collection.securityRules ?? []) {\n            const { usingExpr, withCheckExpr } = securityRuleToConditions(rule);\n            const risks = [usingExpr, withCheckExpr]\n                .filter((e): e is PolicyExpression => e !== null)\n                .flatMap(findAnonymousGrants);\n\n            for (const risk of risks) {\n                const key = `${risk.pattern}:${risk.detail}`;\n                const site = `${collection.slug ?? \"(unnamed)\"} → \"${rule.name ?? \"(unnamed rule)\"}\"`;\n                const entry = byRisk.get(key) ?? { risk, sites: [] };\n                if (!entry.sites.includes(site)) entry.sites.push(site);\n                byRisk.set(key, entry);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (byRisk.size === 0) return;\n\n    const problems = [...byRisk.values()].map(({ risk, sites }) =>\n        `  • ${risk.explanation}\\n    ${sites.length} rule(s): ${sites.join(\", \")}`\n    );\n\n    logger.warn(\n        `Security rules that read as a lockdown but grant access to anonymous requests. Every caller from a ` +\n        `client carries a user id ('${ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}' when nobody is signed in), so these clauses are ` +\n        `true for everyone:\\n\\n` +\n        problems.join(\"\\n\\n\") + \"\\n\"\n    );\n}\n\n/**\n * Name the collections whose raw policy SQL still calls the pre-1.0 helpers.\n *\n * The compiler rewrites `auth.uid()` to `rebase.uid()` on the way into the\n * database, so nothing is broken and no policy is wrong — which is exactly why\n * this has to be said out loud. A silent rewrite that works forever is not a\n * migration, it is a second supported spelling nobody wrote down, and the next\n * person to read those rules will copy the old one.\n *\n * Only `raw` expressions can carry it. Structured rules (`policy.authUid()`,\n * `policy.rolesOverlap(...)`) compile from the model and were never affected.\n */\nexport function warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions(\n    collections: { slug?: string; securityRules?: readonly SecurityRule[] }[]\n): void {\n    const sites: string[] = [];\n\n    for (const collection of collections) {\n        for (const rule of collection.securityRules ?? []) {\n            const { usingExpr, withCheckExpr } = securityRuleToConditions(rule);\n            const carriesLegacy = [usingExpr, withCheckExpr]\n                .filter((e): e is PolicyExpression => e !== null)\n                .some(containsLegacyRlsCall);\n            if (!carriesLegacy) continue;\n\n            const site = `${collection.slug ?? \"(unnamed)\"} → \"${rule.name ?? \"(unnamed rule)\"}\"`;\n            if (!sites.includes(site)) sites.push(site);\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (sites.length === 0) return;\n\n    logger.warn(\n        `These security rules call the pre-1.0 RLS helpers (\\`auth.uid()\\`, \\`auth.roles()\\`, \\`auth.jwt()\\`). ` +\n        `They still work — the compiler rewrites them — but the functions now live in the \\`rebase\\` schema, ` +\n        `and the \\`auth\\` one is Supabase's. Update the raw SQL in these rules to \\`${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid()\\` ` +\n        `and friends, or switch them to the structured helpers (\\`policy.authUid()\\`, \\`policy.rolesOverlap()\\`), ` +\n        `which never had to be spelled by hand:\\n\\n` +\n        sites.map(s => `  • ${s}`).join(\"\\n\") + \"\\n\"\n    );\n}\n\n/** Whether any `raw` expression in the tree calls a pre-1.0 helper. */\nfunction containsLegacyRlsCall(expr: PolicyExpression): boolean {\n    switch (expr.kind) {\n        case \"raw\":\n            return usesLegacyRlsFunctions(expr.sql);\n        case \"and\":\n        case \"or\":\n            return expr.operands.some(containsLegacyRlsCall);\n        case \"not\":\n            return containsLegacyRlsCall(expr.operand);\n        case \"existsIn\":\n            return containsLegacyRlsCall(expr.where);\n        default:\n            return false;\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject `pgRoles` that this server can never satisfy.\n *\n * `pgRoles` sets the `TO` clause of a generated policy, so a policy naming a\n * role the request never runs as simply never applies — and RLS then filters\n * every row. The table reads as empty, which is indistinguishable from having\n * no data, so the mistake survives review and ships.\n *\n * Requests run as `rebase_user`, so a policy is only reachable if it targets\n * `public` or a role `rebase_user` holds. Anything else is a configuration\n * error worth failing the boot for.\n */\nexport async function validatePolicyPgRoles(\n    run: RawSqlRunner,\n    collections: { slug?: string; securityRules?: readonly { name?: string; pgRoles?: readonly string[] }[] }[],\n    /** The role requests actually run as: `rebase_user` when the connection is\n     *  privileged enough to switch, otherwise the connection role itself. */\n    requestRole: string = REBASE_USER_ROLE\n): Promise<void> {\n    const wanted = new Map<string, string[]>();\n    for (const collection of collections) {\n        for (const rule of collection.securityRules ?? []) {\n            for (const role of rule.pgRoles ?? []) {\n                if (role === \"public\") continue;\n                wanted.set(role, [...(wanted.get(role) ?? []), collection.slug ?? \"(unnamed)\"]);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (wanted.size === 0) return;\n\n    const names = [...wanted.keys()].map((r) => `'${r.replace(/'/g, \"''\")}'`).join(\",\");\n    const escapedRequestRole = requestRole.replace(/'/g, \"''\");\n    const rows = await run(`\n        SELECT r.rolname AS role,\n               COALESCE(pg_has_role(to_regrole('${escapedRequestRole}'), r.oid, 'MEMBER'), false) AS reachable\n        FROM pg_roles r\n        WHERE r.rolname IN (${names})\n    `);\n\n    const reachable = new Map(rows.map((row) => [String(row.role), row.reachable === true]));\n    const problems: string[] = [];\n\n    for (const [role, slugs] of wanted) {\n        if (reachable.get(role) === true) continue;\n\n        const why = reachable.has(role)\n            ? `\"${requestRole}\" is not a member of it`\n            : \"no such role exists in this database\";\n        const platform = FOREIGN_CONVENTION_ROLES[role];\n        const hint = platform\n            ? `\"${role}\" is a ${platform} convention, not a PostgreSQL role. Application roles belong in \\`roles: [\"${role === \"service_role\" ? \"admin\" : role}\"]\\`, which is checked inside the policy via rebase.roles().`\n            : `Either grant it (GRANT ${role} TO ${requestRole}) or drop \\`pgRoles\\` so the policy targets \\`public\\`.`;\n\n        problems.push(\n            `  • pgRoles: [\"${role}\"] on ${slugs.join(\", \")} — ${why}.\\n    ${hint}`\n        );\n    }\n\n    if (problems.length > 0) {\n        throw new Error(\n            `Security rules target PostgreSQL roles this server cannot use. Requests run as ` +\n            `\"${requestRole}\", so these policies would never apply and every row would be ` +\n            `filtered out — the collections would look empty rather than error.\\n\\n` +\n            problems.join(\"\\n\\n\") + \"\\n\"\n        );\n    }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsIA,IAAM,cAAc,SAAyB,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE;;AAG5E,IAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;;;AAQ9B,IAAa,qBAAqB,QAAgB,UAC9C,4BAA4B,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,WAAW,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW,kBAAgB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA6B3G,eAAsB,0BAA0B,KAAkC;CAC9E,IAAI;EACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;;;;;SAKtB;EACD,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM;EAChC,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,qBAAqB;EAC1D,OAAO,KACH,0BAA0B,KAAK,4IAC+C,KAAK,gMAED,KAAK,gNAI3F;CACJ,QAAQ,CAER;AACJ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgCA,eAAsB,wBAClB,KACA,SAC0B;CA+B1B,MAAM,OAAM,MApBO,IAAI;;;;;;;;;;;;;;uBANF,SAAS,SACxB,qBAAqB,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAC9C,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CACxC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,KACd,GAgB0B;;;;;KAK/B,EAAA,CACgB,MAAM,CAAC;CACxB,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,cAAc;CACpC,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,cAAc;CACpC,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB;CACvC,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,eAAe;CAC3C,OAAO;EACH,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;EAClC;EACA;EACA;EACA;EACA,YAAY,aAAa,aAAa,cAAc;CACxD;AACJ;;;;;AAMA,SAAgB,yBAAyB,gBAAwB,SAA2B;CACxF,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,MACxB,yBAAyB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAiB,WACrD,sBAAsB,2BAA2B,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAiB,oDAC7C,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAiB,EAC3F,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI;CACX,OACI,gGACwB,mBAAiB,8BACrC,eAAe,kIAEJ,mBAAiB,qDACvB,mBAAiB,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc,EAAE,OAC3D;AAER;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBA,eAAsB,cAAc,KAAmB,SAAkC;CACrF,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CAIjE,KAAI,MADmB,IAAI,2CAA2C,mBAAiB,EAAE,EAAA,CAC5E,WAAW,GACpB,IAAI;EACA,MAAM,IAAI,eAAe,mBAAiB,2CAA2C;CACzF,SAAS,KAAK;EACV,MAAM,IAAI,MACN,yBAAyB,mBAAiB,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QACrG,yBAAyB,2BAA2B,aAAa,CACrE;CACJ;CAIJ,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI;6CACY,mBAAiB;;;KAGzD;CACD,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,MAC3B,IAAI;EACA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,mBAAiB,iBAAiB;CACzD,SAAS,KAAK;EACV,MAAM,IAAI,MACN,2CAA2C,mBAAiB,wCACzD,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QACpD,yBAAyB,OAAO,WAAW,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,yBAAyB,GAAG,aAAa,CACpG;CACJ;CAIJ,MAAM,oBAAoB,KAAK,aAAa;CAE5C,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,mBAAiB,0BAA0B,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;AAC9G;;AAGA,IAAM,cAAc,UAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE;AAC5E,IAAM,aAAa,WACf,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;;;;;;;;;;AAqCzF,eAAe,iBAAiB,KAAmB,SAAuD;CACtG,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,sBAAsB;CACjD,MAAM,SAAS,6CAA6C,WAAW,kBAAgB,EAAE;;CAEzF,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAa,YAAsB,YAC7C,4DAA4D,IAAI,wBAAwB,SACrF,UAAU,oBAAoB,YAAY,GAAG,4BAA4B,WAAW,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;CACtH,MAAM,MAAM;EAAC;EAAU;EAAU;EAAU;CAAQ;CACnD,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ;CAC9B,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;;iBAEV,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,YAAY,EAAE;;;;gDAIX,SAAS;2BAC9B,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO;;;;;2BAKpD,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO;;;;;;2BAMpD,KAAK,eAAe,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO;;;;;;2BAMzC,KAAK,eAAe,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO;;;;sEAIE,SAAS;+GACgC,OAAO;;;;gCAItF,UAAU,OAAO,EAAE;KAC9C;CACD,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,IAA0B;CAC7C,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;EACpB,MAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI;EAC5B,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;GAC3B,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU;GACrB,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW;GACvB,WAAW,IAAI,cAAc;GAC7B,eAAe,IAAI,mBAAmB;GACtC,kBAAkB,IAAI,sBAAsB;GAC5C,iBAAiB,MAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,IACxC,gBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,IAE1B,OAAO,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,OAAO;EACzF,CAAC;CACL;CACA,OAAO;AACX;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqBA,eAAsB,oBAAoB,KAAmB,SAAkC;CAC3F,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CACjE,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,aAAa;CACxD,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe;EAChC,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM;EAE/B,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;EACZ,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM;EAC3B,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAkB;EAC/E,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,sBAAsB,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAkB;EACjH,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,IAAI,kDAAkD,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAkB;EAG5G,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,eACP,MAAM,IAAI,sCAAsC,EAAE,SAAS,sBAAsB,gBAAgB,oBAAkB;EAEvH,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,kBACP,MAAM,IAAI,sCAAsC,EAAE,uCAAuC,oBAAkB;EAa/G,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAA;EACtD,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG;EACnC,MAAM,0BAA0B,OAAO,SAAS;GAAE,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI;EAAG,GAAG,QAAQ;GAC1E;GACA,UAAU,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,KAC9B,8BAA8B,mBAAiB,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,uDAE/E,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK,EAC1D;EACJ,CAAC;CACL;AACJ;;;;;;;AAQA,eAAsB,gCAAgC,KAAmB,QAAmC;CACxG,QAAQ,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAA,CAAG,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACpF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBA,eAAsB,iBAAiB,IAAW,MAAmB,UAAkC;CACnG,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;CAChF,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,MACpC,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,IAAK,GAA+B,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,CAC9E;CASA,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,gBAAgB,OAAO,SAAS;CAEzD,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAU;;oCAEK,IAAI;wCACA,IAAI;2CACD,gBAAgB,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE;6CACxB,YAAY;oCACrB,KAAK,UAAU;EAO3C,GAAI,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;EACpB,KAAK;EACL,OAAO,KAAK;EAKZ,cAAc,KAAK,gBAAgB;CACvC,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,WAWN,GAAU;iCACa,SAAS,WAChC,GAAU,GAAG;KAClB;AACL;;AAGA,IAAM,2BAAmD;CACrD,eAAe;CACf,MAAM;CACN,cAAc;AAClB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoBA,SAAgB,sBACZ,aACI;CAIJ,MAAM,yBAAS,IAAI,IAA2D;CAE9E,KAAK,MAAM,cAAc,aACrB,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG;EAC/C,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,kBAAkB,yBAAyB,IAAI;EAClE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,aAAa,CAAC,CACnC,QAAQ,MAA6B,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,CAChD,QAAQ,mBAAmB;EAEhC,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;GACtB,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG,KA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package/dist/schema/auth-schema.d.ts

@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ export declare function createAuthSchema(usersSchemaName?: string): {
                 identity: undefined;
                 generated: undefined;
             }, {}, {
+                size: undefined;
                 baseBuilder: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumnBuilder<{
                     name: "roles";
                     dataType: "string";
@@ -212,7 +213,6 @@ export declare function createAuthSchema(usersSchemaName?: string): {
                     enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
                     driverParam: string;
                 }, {}, {}, import("drizzle-orm").ColumnBuilderExtraConfig>;
-                size: undefined;
             }>;
             metadata: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
                 name: "metadata";
@@ -250,6 +250,74 @@ export declare function createAuthSchema(usersSchemaName?: string): {
                 identity: undefined;
                 generated: undefined;
             }, {}, {}>;
+            disabledAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+                name: "disabled_at";
+                tableName: "users";
+                dataType: "date";
+                columnType: "PgTimestamp";
+                data: Date;
+                driverParam: string;
+                notNull: false;
+                hasDefault: false;
+                isPrimaryKey: false;
+                isAutoincrement: false;
+                hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+                enumValues: undefined;
+                baseColumn: never;
+                identity: undefined;
+                generated: undefined;
+            }, {}, {}>;
+            pendingEmail: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+                name: "pending_email";
+                tableName: "users";
+                dataType: "string";
+                columnType: "PgText";
+                data: string;
+                driverParam: string;
+                notNull: false;
+                hasDefault: false;
+                isPrimaryKey: false;
+                isAutoincrement: false;
+                hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+                enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+                baseColumn: never;
+                identity: undefined;
+                generated: undefined;
+            }, {}, {}>;
+            emailChangeToken: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+                name: "email_change_token";
+                tableName: "users";
+                dataType: "string";
+                columnType: "PgText";
+                data: string;
+                driverParam: string;
+                notNull: false;
+                hasDefault: false;
+                isPrimaryKey: false;
+                isAutoincrement: false;
+                hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+                enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+                baseColumn: never;
+                identity: undefined;
+                generated: undefined;
+            }, {}, {}>;
+            emailChangeSentAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+                name: "email_change_sent_at";
+                tableName: "users";
+                dataType: "date";
+                columnType: "PgTimestamp";
+                data: Date;
+                driverParam: string;
+                notNull: false;
+                hasDefault: false;
+                isPrimaryKey: false;
+                isAutoincrement: false;
+                hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+                enumValues: undefined;
+                baseColumn: never;
+                identity: undefined;
+                generated: undefined;
+            }, {}, {}>;
             createdAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
                 name: "created_at";
                 tableName: "users";
@@ -444,6 +512,23 @@ export declare function createAuthSchema(usersSchemaName?: string): {
                 identity: undefined;
                 generated: undefined;
             }, {}, {}>;
+            method: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+                name: "method";
+                tableName: "refresh_tokens";
+                dataType: "string";
+                columnType: "PgText";
+                data: string;
+                driverParam: string;
+                notNull: false;
+                hasDefault: false;
+                isPrimaryKey: false;
+                isAutoincrement: false;
+                hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+                enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+                baseColumn: never;
+                identity: undefined;
+                generated: undefined;
+            }, {}, {}>;
             userAgent: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
                 name: "user_agent";
                 tableName: "refresh_tokens";
@@ -1470,6 +1555,7 @@ export declare const users: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgTableWithColumns<{
             identity: undefined;
             generated: undefined;
         }, {}, {
+            size: undefined;
             baseBuilder: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumnBuilder<{
                 name: "roles";
                 dataType: "string";
@@ -1478,7 +1564,6 @@ export declare const users: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgTableWithColumns<{
                 enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
                 driverParam: string;
             }, {}, {}, import("drizzle-orm").ColumnBuilderExtraConfig>;
-            size: undefined;
         }>;
         metadata: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
             name: "metadata";
@@ -1516,6 +1601,74 @@ export declare const users: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgTableWithColumns<{
             identity: undefined;
             generated: undefined;
         }, {}, {}>;
+        disabledAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+            name: "disabled_at";
+            tableName: "users";
+            dataType: "date";
+            columnType: "PgTimestamp";
+            data: Date;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: undefined;
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {}>;
+        pendingEmail: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+            name: "pending_email";
+            tableName: "users";
+            dataType: "string";
+            columnType: "PgText";
+            data: string;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {}>;
+        emailChangeToken: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+            name: "email_change_token";
+            tableName: "users";
+            dataType: "string";
+            columnType: "PgText";
+            data: string;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {}>;
+        emailChangeSentAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+            name: "email_change_sent_at";
+            tableName: "users";
+            dataType: "date";
+            columnType: "PgTimestamp";
+            data: Date;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: undefined;
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {}>;
         createdAt: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
             name: "created_at";
             tableName: "users";
@@ -1710,6 +1863,23 @@ export declare const refreshTokens: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgTableWithCol
             identity: undefined;
             generated: undefined;
         }, {}, {}>;
+        method: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
+            name: "method";
+            tableName: "refresh_tokens";
+            dataType: "string";
+            columnType: "PgText";
+            data: string;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {}>;
         userAgent: import("drizzle-orm/pg-core").PgColumn<{
             name: "user_agent";
             tableName: "refresh_tokens";

package/dist/schema/boot-ddl.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/** `lock_timeout` for each attempt at a boot DDL statement or batch. See the module comment. */
+export declare const BOOT_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS = 1000;
+/** Attempts per table, including the first, before a contended table is given up on. */
+export declare const BOOT_LOCK_ATTEMPTS = 3;
+/**
+ * The most lock waiting one boot step spends on *retries*, in total.
+ *
+ * Without a cap, a holder that covers the whole database — a `pg_dump` takes
+ * `ACCESS SHARE` on every table it dumps, for as long as it runs — costs
+ * tables × attempts × timeout: four minutes at 240 tables. Retrying is for the
+ * holder that is about to finish (a report, a transaction), and ten seconds is
+ * plenty to wait that out; past it, waiting longer only delays the boot.
+ */
+export declare const BOOT_LOCK_RETRY_BUDGET_MS = 10000;
+export interface BootLockOptions {
+    /** Per-attempt `lock_timeout`, ms. Default {@link BOOT_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS}. */
+    lockTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Attempts per table, including the first. Default {@link BOOT_LOCK_ATTEMPTS}. */
+    attempts?: number;
+    /** Total retry waiting per step, ms. Default {@link BOOT_LOCK_RETRY_BUDGET_MS}. */
+    retryBudgetMs?: number;
+    /** Pause before retry round `round` (1-based), ms. Default: jittered, growing. */
+    backoffMs?: (round: number) => number;
+}
+export interface ResolvedBootLockOptions {
+    lockTimeoutMs: number;
+    attempts: number;
+    retryBudgetMs: number;
+    backoffMs: (round: number) => number;
+}
+export declare const resolveBootLockOptions: (options?: BootLockOptions) => ResolvedBootLockOptions;
+/** `55P03 lock_not_available` — what `lock_timeout` raises. */
+export declare const isLockTimeout: (err: unknown) => boolean;
+/**
+ * `42601` "cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement": the
+ * handle runs every query over the extended protocol, which carries exactly one
+ * statement. Raised before anything runs, so nothing needs undoing.
+ */
+export declare const isMultiStatementRefusal: (err: unknown) => boolean;
+/**
+ * `SET LOCAL lock_timeout`, then the statements: one string, one implicit
+ * transaction. See the module comment for why this and not `BEGIN … COMMIT`.
+ */
+export declare const atomicBatch: (statements: readonly string[], lockTimeoutMs: number) => string;
+/** Statements as one multi-statement string — one implicit transaction — each `;`-terminated. */
+export declare const joinStatements: (statements: readonly string[]) => string;
+export declare const sleep: (ms: number) => Promise<void>;

package/dist/schema/classify-change.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,23 @@
  * `diverges` is the whole point of this module: an editor that reports them as
  * safe is worse than one that refuses them.
  *
+ * ## Read from the plan, not from the properties
+ *
+ * Whether an edit changes the database is decided by comparing what
+ * `planSchema` — the one reading of a `Property` every emitter renders — makes
+ * of the collections before and after it: each table's columns, their types,
+ * nullability, defaults, uniqueness and foreign keys, the junction tables,
+ * indexes and triggers. It used to be decided by a hand-picked list of property
+ * fields, which knew nothing of `validation.integer`, of a string becoming an
+ * enum, of an array's element type or of anything about a relation beyond its
+ * name — and every one of those was reported "safe, no change", committed, and
+ * never applied. A difference in the plan cannot be missed that way: a new kind
+ * of edit either changes the plan, and is classified here from the difference,
+ * or it does not change the database.
+ *
+ * The property-level reading is still here, for the parts only it can name: a
+ * property added or removed, a required flag, an enum's values, a key renamed.
+ *
  * ## Why refusing is the right default for the rest
  *
  * Dropping a column, narrowing a type, changing a primary key: each is
@@ -37,7 +54,7 @@
  * somebody wrote and read. `needs-migration` says exactly that, and naming the
  * change is more useful than attempting it.
  */
-import type { CollectionConfig, SchemaChange, SchemaChangeKind, SchemaChangeVerdict, ClassifiedSchemaChanges } from "@rebasepro/types";
+import { type CollectionConfig, type SchemaChange, type SchemaChangeKind, type SchemaChangeVerdict, type ClassifiedSchemaChanges } from "@rebasepro/types";
 /**
  * The vocabulary lives in `@rebasepro/types` so that `@rebasepro/server`, which
  * cannot import this package, can still describe a change. Re-exported here
@@ -66,6 +83,10 @@ export interface SchemaFacts {
     notNullColumns?: Set<string>;
     /** `schema.typename` → the values that type currently holds. */
     enumValues?: Map<string, string[]>;
+    /** `schema.table.column` → the type Postgres reports for it (`udt_name`). */
+    columnTypes?: Map<string, string>;
+    /** `schema.table.column` of every column that has a DEFAULT. */
+    columnDefaults?: Set<string>;
 }
 /**
  * Classify the difference between two collection sets.
@@ -78,5 +99,12 @@ export interface SchemaFacts {
  * get the conservative reading.
  */
 export declare function classifyCollectionChanges(before: CollectionConfig[], after: CollectionConfig[], facts?: SchemaFacts): ClassifiedChanges;
+/**
+ * The statements a default change needs that the additive ensure does not
+ * plan: it sets a DEFAULT only on a column that has none, and never changes or
+ * drops one. Both are metadata-only — a DEFAULT binds future writes and touches
+ * no row — so a reviewed change may make them.
+ */
+export declare function defaultChangeStatements(before: CollectionConfig[], after: CollectionConfig[], existingTables: Map<string, Set<string>>): string[];
 /** A one-line summary, for a log or a refusal message. */
 export declare function summarizeChanges(classified: ClassifiedChanges): string;