@rebasepro/server-postgres 0.12.1-canary.gf5f1d39 → 0.13.1-canary.g18cfeb7

package/dist/policy-CPkCqVTz.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+import { createRequire as __createRequire } from "module";
+import "process";
+__createRequire(import.meta.url);
+//#region ../types/src/types/policy.ts
+/**
+* The id a request without a logged-in user reports as `rebase.uid()`.
+*
+* A user-context request always sets `app.uid`: blank would read back as
+* `NULL`, and `NULL` is how the trusted server context is recognised, so an
+* anonymous visitor would be promoted to server privileges. The driver
+* therefore substitutes this sentinel at the single chokepoint where the GUC
+* is set.
+*
+* The consequence for policy authors is that **`rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL` is a
+* tautology on the user path** — it is true for anonymous visitors too. Use
+* {@link policy.authenticated} to mean "signed in", and
+* {@link policy.serverContext} to mean "the trusted server context". Do not
+* hand-write the comparison: see {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS} for why one
+* literal is not enough.
+*
+* @group Models
+*/
+var ANONYMOUS_USER_ID = "anonymous";
+/**
+* Every uid that has ever meant "nobody is signed in" — newest first.
+*
+* There are two because there were two. The types, the policy compiler, the
+* JavaScript evaluator and the linter were all built on
+* {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}, while the request path scoped unauthenticated
+* callers as `'anon'` — so `policy.authenticated()`, which compiled to
+* `rebase.uid() <> 'anonymous'`, was *true* for an anonymous visitor. The
+* sanctioned way to write "signed in" granted to everyone, and the linter
+* flagged the spelling that actually worked as a foreign convention.
+*
+* The request path now reports {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}. `'anon'` stays here
+* because policies outlive the server that generated them: a database still
+* holding policies from before the fix, or a project whose server has not been
+* upgraded yet, must not become a grant in either direction. Compile against
+* this list, not against a single literal.
+*
+* No real user id is ever one of these, so a match is always "not signed in".
+*
+* @group Models
+*/
+var ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS = [ANONYMOUS_USER_ID, "anon"];
+/** @group Models */
+var policy = {
+	true: () => ({ kind: "true" }),
+	false: () => ({ kind: "false" }),
+	and: (...operands) => ({
+		kind: "and",
+		operands
+	}),
+	or: (...operands) => ({
+		kind: "or",
+		operands
+	}),
+	not: (operand) => ({
+		kind: "not",
+		operand
+	}),
+	compare: (left, op, right) => ({
+		kind: "compare",
+		op,
+		left,
+		right
+	}),
+	rolesOverlap: (roles) => ({
+		kind: "rolesOverlap",
+		roles
+	}),
+	rolesContain: (roles) => ({
+		kind: "rolesContain",
+		roles
+	}),
+	authenticated: () => ({ kind: "authenticated" }),
+	serverContext: () => ({ kind: "serverContext" }),
+	existsIn: (args) => ({
+		kind: "existsIn",
+		collection: args.collection,
+		where: args.where
+	}),
+	raw: (sql) => ({
+		kind: "raw",
+		sql
+	}),
+	field: (name) => ({
+		kind: "field",
+		name
+	}),
+	outerField: (name) => ({
+		kind: "outerField",
+		name
+	}),
+	literal: (value) => ({
+		kind: "literal",
+		value
+	}),
+	authUid: () => ({ kind: "authUid" }),
+	authRoles: () => ({ kind: "authRoles" })
+};
+//#endregion
+export { ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS as n, policy as r, ANONYMOUS_USER_ID as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy-CPkCqVTz.js.map

package/dist/policy-CPkCqVTz.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"policy-CPkCqVTz.js","names":[],"sources":["../../types/src/types/policy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Structured, engine-agnostic policy expressions.\n *\n * A {@link PolicyExpression} is the single source of truth for a row-level\n * security condition. It is compiled to Postgres `USING`/`WITH CHECK` SQL\n * (authoritative enforcement) and independently evaluated in JavaScript (to\n * drive the admin UI, and — in future — to enforce on engines without native\n * RLS such as MongoDB). Because both the SQL and the JS decision derive from\n * the *same* expression, the UI matches database enforcement by construction —\n * no drift between two hand-written implementations.\n *\n * The only escape hatch that cannot be evaluated client-side is the\n * {@link RawPolicyExpression} node (`{ kind: \"raw\" }`): it preserves full\n * PostgreSQL power but, being arbitrary SQL, is treated as *unknown* by the\n * JavaScript evaluator (never silently allowed) and reflected exactly in the UI\n * via server-computed capability flags.\n *\n * @group Models\n */\nexport type PolicyExpression =\n    | TruePolicyExpression\n    | FalsePolicyExpression\n    | AndPolicyExpression\n    | OrPolicyExpression\n    | NotPolicyExpression\n    | ComparePolicyExpression\n    | RolesOverlapPolicyExpression\n    | RolesContainPolicyExpression\n    | AuthenticatedPolicyExpression\n    | ServerContextPolicyExpression\n    | ExistsInPolicyExpression\n    | RawPolicyExpression;\n\n/**\n * The id a request without a logged-in user reports as `rebase.uid()`.\n *\n * A user-context request always sets `app.uid`: blank would read back as\n * `NULL`, and `NULL` is how the trusted server context is recognised, so an\n * anonymous visitor would be promoted to server privileges. The driver\n * therefore substitutes this sentinel at the single chokepoint where the GUC\n * is set.\n *\n * The consequence for policy authors is that **`rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL` is a\n * tautology on the user path** — it is true for anonymous visitors too. Use\n * {@link policy.authenticated} to mean \"signed in\", and\n * {@link policy.serverContext} to mean \"the trusted server context\". Do not\n * hand-write the comparison: see {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS} for why one\n * literal is not enough.\n *\n * @group Models\n */\nexport const ANONYMOUS_USER_ID = \"anonymous\";\n\n/**\n * Every uid that has ever meant \"nobody is signed in\" — newest first.\n *\n * There are two because there were two. The types, the policy compiler, the\n * JavaScript evaluator and the linter were all built on\n * {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}, while the request path scoped unauthenticated\n * callers as `'anon'` — so `policy.authenticated()`, which compiled to\n * `rebase.uid() <> 'anonymous'`, was *true* for an anonymous visitor. The\n * sanctioned way to write \"signed in\" granted to everyone, and the linter\n * flagged the spelling that actually worked as a foreign convention.\n *\n * The request path now reports {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}. `'anon'` stays here\n * because policies outlive the server that generated them: a database still\n * holding policies from before the fix, or a project whose server has not been\n * upgraded yet, must not become a grant in either direction. Compile against\n * this list, not against a single literal.\n *\n * No real user id is ever one of these, so a match is always \"not signed in\".\n *\n * @group Models\n */\nexport const ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS: readonly string[] = [ANONYMOUS_USER_ID, \"anon\"];\n\n/**\n * Whether a uid stands for \"no one is signed in\", in any spelling rebase has\n * used. `null`/`undefined` is the trusted server context, not an anonymous\n * caller, and is therefore **not** anonymous — see {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}.\n *\n * @group Models\n */\nexport function isAnonymousUid(uid: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n    return typeof uid === \"string\" && ANONYMOUS_USER_IDS.includes(uid);\n}\n\n/** Always allows. Compiles to `true`. @group Models */\nexport interface TruePolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"true\";\n}\n\n/** Always denies. Compiles to `false`. @group Models */\nexport interface FalsePolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"false\";\n}\n\n/** Logical AND — every operand must pass. @group Models */\nexport interface AndPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"and\";\n    operands: readonly PolicyExpression[];\n}\n\n/** Logical OR — at least one operand must pass. @group Models */\nexport interface OrPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"or\";\n    operands: readonly PolicyExpression[];\n}\n\n/** Logical negation. @group Models */\nexport interface NotPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"not\";\n    operand: PolicyExpression;\n}\n\n/** Comparison operators available to {@link ComparePolicyExpression}. @group Models */\nexport type PolicyCompareOperator = \"eq\" | \"neq\" | \"lt\" | \"lte\" | \"gt\" | \"gte\";\n\n/**\n * Compares two operands, e.g. `owner_id = rebase.uid()`.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface ComparePolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"compare\";\n    op: PolicyCompareOperator;\n    left: PolicyOperand;\n    right: PolicyOperand;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the user holds *at least one* of the given application roles.\n * Compiles to `string_to_array(rebase.roles(), ',') && ARRAY[...]`.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface RolesOverlapPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"rolesOverlap\";\n    roles: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the user holds *all* of the given application roles.\n * Compiles to `string_to_array(rebase.roles(), ',') @> ARRAY[...]`.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface RolesContainPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"rolesContain\";\n    roles: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a signed-in user is making the request. Compiles to\n * `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL AND rebase.uid() <> 'anonymous'`.\n *\n * Both halves are load-bearing. `IS NOT NULL` excludes the server context;\n * the {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID} comparison excludes anonymous visitors, who\n * *do* carry a non-null `rebase.uid()`. Checking only `IS NOT NULL` grants to\n * everyone — see {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID}.\n *\n * `policy.not(policy.authenticated())` therefore means \"anonymous visitor or\n * the server context\". To single out the server context, use\n * {@link ServerContextPolicyExpression}.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface AuthenticatedPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"authenticated\";\n}\n\n/**\n * True only in the trusted **server context** — the built-in flows that run\n * without a user (signup, migrations, `dataAsAdmin`) set no user GUC, so\n * `rebase.uid()` is `NULL` for them and only for them. Compiles to\n * `rebase.uid() IS NULL`.\n *\n * This is what lets the owner connection satisfy a policy even under FORCE RLS.\n * It is deliberately a primitive rather than `not(authenticated())`: the two\n * meant the same thing while `authenticated` ignored {@link ANONYMOUS_USER_ID},\n * and conflating them is what turns a server-only grant into an anonymous one.\n *\n * The JavaScript evaluator always returns `false` for this node — a client is\n * never the server context.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface ServerContextPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"serverContext\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Membership / relational access: true when at least one row exists in another\n * collection (a join/membership table) matching `where`. This is what lets you\n * scope reads to \"rows whose team the caller belongs to\" without an N+1\n * per-row lookup — it compiles to a single correlated `EXISTS` subquery.\n *\n * Inside `where`, {@link FieldPolicyOperand} (`policy.field`) references a column\n * of the joined collection, while {@link OuterFieldPolicyOperand}\n * (`policy.outerField`) references a column of the row being checked (the outer\n * table under RLS). Combine with {@link AuthUidPolicyOperand} to correlate to\n * the caller.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // documents visible only to members of the document's team:\n * policy.existsIn({\n *   collection: \"team_members\",\n *   where: policy.and(\n *     policy.compare(policy.field(\"team_id\"), \"eq\", policy.outerField(\"team_id\")),\n *     policy.compare(policy.field(\"user_id\"), \"eq\", policy.authUid()),\n *   ),\n * })\n * // → EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM team_members _ex0\n * //           WHERE _ex0.team_id = documents.team_id AND _ex0.user_id = rebase.uid())\n * ```\n *\n * Postgres-authoritative: like {@link RawPolicyExpression}, the JavaScript\n * evaluator treats it as *unknown* (it cannot run a subquery client-side), so\n * enforcement is always the database's.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface ExistsInPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"existsIn\";\n    /** Slug of the collection to search (the join / membership table). */\n    collection: string;\n    /** Condition evaluated against the joined collection's rows. */\n    where: PolicyExpression;\n}\n\n/**\n * A raw PostgreSQL boolean expression — the full-power escape hatch.\n *\n * Columns can be referenced as `{column_name}`. This is Postgres-only and\n * **server-authoritative**: the JavaScript evaluator cannot evaluate arbitrary\n * SQL, so it treats this node as *unknown* rather than guessing.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface RawPolicyExpression {\n    kind: \"raw\";\n    sql: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * An operand referenced by a {@link ComparePolicyExpression}.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport type PolicyOperand =\n    | FieldPolicyOperand\n    | OuterFieldPolicyOperand\n    | LiteralPolicyOperand\n    | AuthUidPolicyOperand\n    | AuthRolesPolicyOperand;\n\n/** A column value on the row being evaluated. @group Models */\nexport interface FieldPolicyOperand {\n    kind: \"field\";\n    /** The property/column name (resolved to its DB column when compiled). */\n    name: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A column value on the *outer* row when used inside {@link ExistsInPolicyExpression}\n * — i.e. the row the RLS policy is being evaluated for, referenced from within the\n * subquery. Outside an `existsIn` it is equivalent to {@link FieldPolicyOperand}.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface OuterFieldPolicyOperand {\n    kind: \"outerField\";\n    /** The property/column name on the outer collection. */\n    name: string;\n}\n\n/** A constant value. @group Models */\nexport interface LiteralPolicyOperand {\n    kind: \"literal\";\n    value: string | number | boolean | null;\n}\n\n/** The current user's id — compiles to `rebase.uid()`. @group Models */\nexport interface AuthUidPolicyOperand {\n    kind: \"authUid\";\n}\n\n/**\n * The current user's roles as an array — compiles to\n * `string_to_array(rebase.roles(), ',')`.\n * @group Models\n */\nexport interface AuthRolesPolicyOperand {\n    kind: \"authRoles\";\n}\n\n// ── Constructor helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Small, dependency-free builders so callers (and the desugaring in\n// `@rebasepro/common`) can assemble expressions without object-literal noise.\n\n/** @group Models */\nexport const policy = {\n    true: (): TruePolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"true\" }),\n    false: (): FalsePolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"false\" }),\n    and: (...operands: readonly PolicyExpression[]): AndPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"and\",\noperands: operands as PolicyExpression[] }),\n    or: (...operands: readonly PolicyExpression[]): OrPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"or\",\noperands: operands as PolicyExpression[] }),\n    not: (operand: PolicyExpression): NotPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"not\",\noperand }),\n    compare: (left: PolicyOperand, op: PolicyCompareOperator, right: PolicyOperand): ComparePolicyExpression =>\n        ({ kind: \"compare\",\nop,\nleft,\nright }),\n    rolesOverlap: (roles: readonly string[]): RolesOverlapPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"rolesOverlap\",\nroles: roles as string[] }),\n    rolesContain: (roles: readonly string[]): RolesContainPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"rolesContain\",\nroles: roles as string[] }),\n    authenticated: (): AuthenticatedPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"authenticated\" }),\n    serverContext: (): ServerContextPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"serverContext\" }),\n    existsIn: (args: { collection: string; where: PolicyExpression }): ExistsInPolicyExpression =>\n        ({ kind: \"existsIn\",\ncollection: args.collection,\nwhere: args.where }),\n    raw: (sql: string): RawPolicyExpression => ({ kind: \"raw\",\nsql }),\n    field: (name: string): FieldPolicyOperand => ({ kind: \"field\",\nname }),\n    outerField: (name: string): OuterFieldPolicyOperand => ({ kind: \"outerField\",\nname }),\n    literal: (value: string | number | boolean | null): LiteralPolicyOperand => ({ kind: \"literal\",\nvalue }),\n    authUid: (): AuthUidPolicyOperand => ({ kind: \"authUid\" }),\n    authRoles: (): AuthRolesPolicyOperand => ({ kind: \"authRoles\" })\n};\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDA,IAAa,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuBjC,IAAa,qBAAwC,CAAC,mBAAmB,MAAM;;AA2N/E,IAAa,SAAS;CAClB,aAAmC,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO;CAClD,cAAqC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ;CACrD,MAAM,GAAG,cAAgE;EAAE,MAAM;EAC3E;CAA+B;CACrC,KAAK,GAAG,cAA+D;EAAE,MAAM;EACzE;CAA+B;CACrC,MAAM,aAAoD;EAAE,MAAM;EACtE;CAAQ;CACJ,UAAU,MAAqB,IAA2B,WACrD;EAAE,MAAM;EACjB;EACA;EACA;CAAM;CACF,eAAe,WAA4D;EAAE,MAAM;EAChF;CAAkB;CACrB,eAAe,WAA4D;EAAE,MAAM;EAChF;CAAkB;CACrB,sBAAqD,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB;CAC7E,sBAAqD,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB;CAC7E,WAAW,UACN;EAAE,MAAM;EACjB,YAAY,KAAK;EACjB,OAAO,KAAK;CAAM;CACd,MAAM,SAAsC;EAAE,MAAM;EACxD;CAAI;CACA,QAAQ,UAAsC;EAAE,MAAM;EAC1D;CAAK;CACD,aAAa,UAA2C;EAAE,MAAM;EACpE;CAAK;CACD,UAAU,WAAmE;EAAE,MAAM;EACzF;CAAM;CACF,gBAAsC,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU;CACxD,kBAA0C,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY;AAClE"}

package/dist/rls-bootstrap-sql-Bpv3nUZo.js

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+import { createRequire as __createRequire } from "module";
+import "process";
+__createRequire(import.meta.url);
+import { c as __exportAll } from "./connection-BuZ97wsr.js";
+import { n as REBASE_SCHEMA, t as LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA } from "./src-C_wvdMnl.js";
+//#region src/schema/rls-bootstrap-sql.ts
+var rls_bootstrap_sql_exports = /* @__PURE__ */ __exportAll({
+	DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL: () => DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL,
+	LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL: () => LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL,
+	LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL: () => LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL,
+	RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS: () => RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS,
+	dropLegacyAuthSchema: () => dropLegacyAuthSchema
+});
+/**
+* Canonical SQL bootstrap for the RLS helper functions.
+*
+* Generated RLS policies reference `rebase.uid()` / `rebase.roles()` /
+* `rebase.jwt()`, so any SQL stream that can contain policies must be
+* self-contained: it has to (re)create these helpers first. This matters for
+* the migration directory in particular — Atlas replays migrations against a
+* clean dev database where no out-of-band bootstrap has ever run, so a
+* migration carrying policies without this preamble fails with
+* "function rebase.uid() does not exist".
+*
+* Idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` / `OR REPLACE`) so it can be prepended to every
+* policies block and re-applied freely. The runtime boot path
+* (`auth/ensure-tables.ts`) creates the same functions under an advisory lock
+* for HMR-safety; keep the definitions in sync.
+*
+* ## Creating the `rebase` schema here is now safe, and required
+*
+* It deliberately did not, once. These functions lived in a schema called
+* `auth`, and the note here read: creating `rebase` would leak it into Atlas's
+* replayed migration state, and — absent from the desired `schema.sql` — Atlas
+* would then plan `DROP SCHEMA "rebase" CASCADE`, taking the auth tables with
+* it. That reasoning still holds; what changed is the second half of it. The
+* DDL generator now emits `CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS "rebase"`
+* unconditionally, so the schema is always in the desired state and the diff is
+* empty. (It used to appear only when some collection happened to declare
+* `schema: "rebase"` — true for the scaffold's users collection, and not a
+* property anything guaranteed.) `db push` additionally excludes the whole
+* schema from the declarative apply.
+*
+* See `@rebasepro/types`' `rls-functions` for why the functions moved out of
+* `auth` at all: the short version is that the name was Supabase's, and
+* `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth.uid() RETURNS text` cannot be applied over
+* Supabase's `RETURNS uuid` — Postgres refuses, and the refusal used to be
+* swallowed.
+*/
+/**
+* The bootstrap as individual statements.
+*
+* Kept as an array because the two consumers need different shapes and only one
+* of them can take a multi-command string: the migration preamble is written to
+* a file and replayed by Atlas, but the boot path runs through drizzle, whose
+* node-postgres handle speaks the extended query protocol and rejects more than
+* one command per call. Splitting a joined string back apart on `$$;` would be
+* a parser for a problem that does not need one.
+*/
+var RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS = [
+	`CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS ${REBASE_SCHEMA}`,
+	`CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid() RETURNS text AS $$
+    SELECT COALESCE(
+        NULLIF(current_setting('app.uid', true), ''),
+        NULLIF(current_setting('app.user_id', true), '')
+    );
+$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`,
+	`CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.jwt() RETURNS jsonb AS $$
+    SELECT COALESCE(
+        NULLIF(current_setting('app.jwt', true), ''),
+        '{}'
+    )::jsonb;
+$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`,
+	`CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.roles() RETURNS text AS $$
+    SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(current_setting('app.user_roles', true), ''), '');
+$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`
+];
+"" + RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS.map((s) => `${s};`).join("\n\n");
+/**
+* Removes the pre-1.0 `auth` schema, but only when Rebase is what put it there.
+*
+* ## Why this is safe against a Supabase database
+*
+* Two independent guards, and both have to pass:
+*
+*  1. **Each function is identified before it is dropped.** Ours returns `text`
+*     and reads the `app.uid` GUC; Supabase's returns `uuid` and reads
+*     `request.jwt.claims`. Nothing is dropped on a signature we did not write,
+*     so a Supabase database — where our `CREATE OR REPLACE` could never have
+*     succeeded in the first place, Postgres refusing to change a return type —
+*     matches nothing and this is a no-op.
+*  2. **`DROP SCHEMA … RESTRICT`**, never CASCADE. If anything else at all still
+*     lives in `auth` (Supabase's `users` table, its other helpers), the drop
+*     fails and the schema stays. CASCADE here would be unrecoverable.
+*
+* ## Why it cannot run too early
+*
+* Postgres records a dependency from every RLS policy to the functions its body
+* calls, so `DROP FUNCTION auth.uid()` fails for as long as a single policy
+* still references it. That is the interlock, and it is load-bearing: the drop
+* can only succeed once every policy has been recompiled to \`rebase.uid()\`.
+* Callers therefore run this *after* applying policies, and treat a failure as
+* "not yet — try again next boot" rather than as an error.
+*/
+var DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL = `
+DO $rebase_drop_legacy$
+DECLARE
+    dropped_any boolean := false;
+BEGIN
+    -- Each function is matched on its own result type and body, so a schema
+    -- that merely shares the name keeps everything it has.
+    IF EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
+        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'uid'
+          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'text'
+          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.uid%'
+    ) THEN
+        DROP FUNCTION auth.uid();
+        dropped_any := true;
+    END IF;
+
+    IF EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
+        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'jwt'
+          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'jsonb'
+          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.jwt%'
+    ) THEN
+        DROP FUNCTION auth.jwt();
+        dropped_any := true;
+    END IF;
+
+    IF EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
+        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'roles'
+          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'text'
+          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.user_roles%'
+    ) THEN
+        DROP FUNCTION auth.roles();
+        dropped_any := true;
+    END IF;
+
+    -- RESTRICT: only an empty schema goes. Anything else in there — including a
+    -- Supabase installation left untouched above — keeps it.
+    IF dropped_any THEN
+        BEGIN
+            EXECUTE 'DROP SCHEMA auth RESTRICT';
+        EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
+            NULL;
+        END;
+    END IF;
+END
+$rebase_drop_legacy$;
+`;
+/**
+* Policies whose body still calls `auth.uid()` / `auth.roles()` / `auth.jwt()`.
+*
+* Postgres will not drop a function a policy depends on, so this is exactly the
+* set standing between a database and losing the legacy schema. Rebase's own
+* policies leave the list on the next push or boot, when they are recompiled —
+* anything still here afterwards is hand-written, will never be recompiled by
+* anybody, and is the reason the drop keeps being skipped. Silence there would
+* leave an operator staring at a schema the release notes said would go.
+*/
+var LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL = `
+    SELECT n.nspname AS schema, c.relname AS "table", p.polname AS policy
+    FROM pg_policy p
+    JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = p.polrelid
+    JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
+    WHERE pg_get_expr(p.polqual, p.polrelid) ~* '\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\s*\\('
+       OR pg_get_expr(p.polwithcheck, p.polrelid) ~* '\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\s*\\('
+    ORDER BY 1, 2, 3
+`;
+/**
+* Functions whose body calls `auth.uid()` / `auth.roles()` / `auth.jwt()`.
+*
+* This is the half `DROP FUNCTION ... RESTRICT` cannot see, and the reason it
+* needs its own query. Postgres records a dependency for a *policy* that calls a
+* function, which is why the drop is safe against the policies above — but a
+* `LANGUAGE sql` function whose body is a **string literal** is not parsed when
+* it is created, so nothing is recorded and `RESTRICT` has nothing to refuse on.
+* The drop succeeds and the caller is left pointing at a function that no longer
+* exists, which fails at *query* time rather than at boot.
+*
+* A downstream project building on these helpers is not hypothetical: the Rebase
+* control plane defines `auth.is_org_member(uuid)` and `auth.is_org_admin(uuid)`
+* in this very schema, each calling `auth.uid()` in a string body, and eleven of
+* its row-level-security policies go through them. Every one of those would have
+* started failing the first time a recompile left no policy referencing
+* `auth.uid()` directly — the drop's own precondition.
+*
+* Matching on the body text is the only option available, and it is deliberately
+* broad: a false positive costs a schema that stays one release longer and says
+* why, while a false negative costs somebody their policies.
+*/
+var LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL = `
+    SELECT n.nspname AS schema, p.proname AS function
+    FROM pg_proc p
+    JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    WHERE n.nspname NOT IN ('pg_catalog', 'information_schema')
+      AND NOT (n.nspname = '${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}' AND p.proname IN ('uid', 'jwt', 'roles'))
+      AND p.prosrc ~* '\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\s*\\('
+    ORDER BY 1, 2
+`;
+/**
+* Retire the pre-1.0 `auth` schema, reporting what is holding it back.
+*
+* The shared implementation behind the CLI's post-push step and the runtime's
+* post-policy step. Both used to just fire {@link DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL}
+* and swallow whatever came back, which is right for the ordinary case — a
+* table not recompiled *yet* — and wrong for the one that never resolves: a
+* hand-written policy nothing will ever rewrite. Then the schema stays forever
+* and nothing ever says why.
+*/
+async function dropLegacyAuthSchema(run, report) {
+	let blockers;
+	try {
+		blockers = await run(LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL);
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+	if (blockers.length > 0) {
+		report.warn(`The pre-1.0 \`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\` schema cannot be removed yet: ${blockers.length} ${blockers.length === 1 ? "policy still calls" : "policies still call"} \`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}.uid()\` and friends, and Postgres will not drop a function a policy depends on. Rebase's own policies are rewritten automatically — anything listed here is hand-written SQL that has to be updated to \`${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid()\` by hand, after which the schema goes on its own:\n` + blockers.map((b) => `  • ${b.schema}.${b.table} → "${b.policy}"`).join("\n"));
+		return;
+	}
+	let borrowers;
+	try {
+		borrowers = await run(LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL);
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+	if (borrowers.length > 0) {
+		report.warn(`The pre-1.0 \`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\` schema cannot be removed yet: ${borrowers.length} ${borrowers.length === 1 ? "function calls" : "functions call"} \`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}.uid()\` and friends from its own body. Postgres records no dependency for that — a SQL body written as a string literal is never parsed — so dropping the helpers would leave these pointing at nothing, and they would fail when a query reached them rather than now. Repoint them at \`${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid()\`, after which the schema goes on its own:\n` + borrowers.map((b) => `  • ${b.schema}.${b.function}()`).join("\n"));
+		return;
+	}
+	try {
+		await run(DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL);
+	} catch (err) {
+		report.info(`Left the \`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\` schema in place: ` + (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)));
+	}
+}
+//#endregion
+export { rls_bootstrap_sql_exports as n, RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=rls-bootstrap-sql-Bpv3nUZo.js.map

package/dist/rls-bootstrap-sql-Bpv3nUZo.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"rls-bootstrap-sql-Bpv3nUZo.js","names":[],"sources":["../src/schema/rls-bootstrap-sql.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA, REBASE_SCHEMA } from \"@rebasepro/types\";\n\n/**\n * Canonical SQL bootstrap for the RLS helper functions.\n *\n * Generated RLS policies reference `rebase.uid()` / `rebase.roles()` /\n * `rebase.jwt()`, so any SQL stream that can contain policies must be\n * self-contained: it has to (re)create these helpers first. This matters for\n * the migration directory in particular — Atlas replays migrations against a\n * clean dev database where no out-of-band bootstrap has ever run, so a\n * migration carrying policies without this preamble fails with\n * \"function rebase.uid() does not exist\".\n *\n * Idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` / `OR REPLACE`) so it can be prepended to every\n * policies block and re-applied freely. The runtime boot path\n * (`auth/ensure-tables.ts`) creates the same functions under an advisory lock\n * for HMR-safety; keep the definitions in sync.\n *\n * ## Creating the `rebase` schema here is now safe, and required\n *\n * It deliberately did not, once. These functions lived in a schema called\n * `auth`, and the note here read: creating `rebase` would leak it into Atlas's\n * replayed migration state, and — absent from the desired `schema.sql` — Atlas\n * would then plan `DROP SCHEMA \"rebase\" CASCADE`, taking the auth tables with\n * it. That reasoning still holds; what changed is the second half of it. The\n * DDL generator now emits `CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS \"rebase\"`\n * unconditionally, so the schema is always in the desired state and the diff is\n * empty. (It used to appear only when some collection happened to declare\n * `schema: \"rebase\"` — true for the scaffold's users collection, and not a\n * property anything guaranteed.) `db push` additionally excludes the whole\n * schema from the declarative apply.\n *\n * See `@rebasepro/types`' `rls-functions` for why the functions moved out of\n * `auth` at all: the short version is that the name was Supabase's, and\n * `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth.uid() RETURNS text` cannot be applied over\n * Supabase's `RETURNS uuid` — Postgres refuses, and the refusal used to be\n * swallowed.\n */\n/**\n * The bootstrap as individual statements.\n *\n * Kept as an array because the two consumers need different shapes and only one\n * of them can take a multi-command string: the migration preamble is written to\n * a file and replayed by Atlas, but the boot path runs through drizzle, whose\n * node-postgres handle speaks the extended query protocol and rejects more than\n * one command per call. Splitting a joined string back apart on `$$;` would be\n * a parser for a problem that does not need one.\n */\nexport const RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS: readonly string[] = [\n    `CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS ${REBASE_SCHEMA}`,\n\n    // Falls back to the pre-rename `app.user_id` so a database that has taken\n    // the new schema but is still served by an older backend keeps resolving\n    // the principal. Drop the COALESCE once no such deployment remains.\n    `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid() RETURNS text AS $$\n    SELECT COALESCE(\n        NULLIF(current_setting('app.uid', true), ''),\n        NULLIF(current_setting('app.user_id', true), '')\n    );\n$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`,\n\n    `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.jwt() RETURNS jsonb AS $$\n    SELECT COALESCE(\n        NULLIF(current_setting('app.jwt', true), ''),\n        '{}'\n    )::jsonb;\n$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`,\n\n    `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${REBASE_SCHEMA}.roles() RETURNS text AS $$\n    SELECT COALESCE(NULLIF(current_setting('app.user_roles', true), ''), '');\n$$ LANGUAGE sql STABLE`\n];\n\n/** The same statements as one script, for migration files and raw clients. */\nexport const RLS_BOOTSTRAP_SQL =\n    \"-- Rebase schema + RLS helper functions (required by the policies below)\\n\" +\n    RLS_BOOTSTRAP_STATEMENTS.map(s => `${s};`).join(\"\\n\\n\") + \"\\n\";\n\n/**\n * Removes the pre-1.0 `auth` schema, but only when Rebase is what put it there.\n *\n * ## Why this is safe against a Supabase database\n *\n * Two independent guards, and both have to pass:\n *\n *  1. **Each function is identified before it is dropped.** Ours returns `text`\n *     and reads the `app.uid` GUC; Supabase's returns `uuid` and reads\n *     `request.jwt.claims`. Nothing is dropped on a signature we did not write,\n *     so a Supabase database — where our `CREATE OR REPLACE` could never have\n *     succeeded in the first place, Postgres refusing to change a return type —\n *     matches nothing and this is a no-op.\n *  2. **`DROP SCHEMA … RESTRICT`**, never CASCADE. If anything else at all still\n *     lives in `auth` (Supabase's `users` table, its other helpers), the drop\n *     fails and the schema stays. CASCADE here would be unrecoverable.\n *\n * ## Why it cannot run too early\n *\n * Postgres records a dependency from every RLS policy to the functions its body\n * calls, so `DROP FUNCTION auth.uid()` fails for as long as a single policy\n * still references it. That is the interlock, and it is load-bearing: the drop\n * can only succeed once every policy has been recompiled to \\`rebase.uid()\\`.\n * Callers therefore run this *after* applying policies, and treat a failure as\n * \"not yet — try again next boot\" rather than as an error.\n */\nexport const DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL = `\nDO $rebase_drop_legacy$\nDECLARE\n    dropped_any boolean := false;\nBEGIN\n    -- Each function is matched on its own result type and body, so a schema\n    -- that merely shares the name keeps everything it has.\n    IF EXISTS (\n        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace\n        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'uid'\n          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'text'\n          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.uid%'\n    ) THEN\n        DROP FUNCTION auth.uid();\n        dropped_any := true;\n    END IF;\n\n    IF EXISTS (\n        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace\n        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'jwt'\n          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'jsonb'\n          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.jwt%'\n    ) THEN\n        DROP FUNCTION auth.jwt();\n        dropped_any := true;\n    END IF;\n\n    IF EXISTS (\n        SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace\n        WHERE n.nspname = 'auth' AND p.proname = 'roles'\n          AND pg_get_function_result(p.oid) = 'text'\n          AND p.prosrc LIKE '%app.user_roles%'\n    ) THEN\n        DROP FUNCTION auth.roles();\n        dropped_any := true;\n    END IF;\n\n    -- RESTRICT: only an empty schema goes. Anything else in there — including a\n    -- Supabase installation left untouched above — keeps it.\n    IF dropped_any THEN\n        BEGIN\n            EXECUTE 'DROP SCHEMA auth RESTRICT';\n        EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN\n            NULL;\n        END;\n    END IF;\nEND\n$rebase_drop_legacy$;\n`;\n\n/** Somebody's policy that still calls a pre-1.0 helper. */\nexport interface LegacyRlsDependent {\n    schema: string;\n    table: string;\n    policy: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Policies whose body still calls `auth.uid()` / `auth.roles()` / `auth.jwt()`.\n *\n * Postgres will not drop a function a policy depends on, so this is exactly the\n * set standing between a database and losing the legacy schema. Rebase's own\n * policies leave the list on the next push or boot, when they are recompiled —\n * anything still here afterwards is hand-written, will never be recompiled by\n * anybody, and is the reason the drop keeps being skipped. Silence there would\n * leave an operator staring at a schema the release notes said would go.\n */\nexport const LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL = `\n    SELECT n.nspname AS schema, c.relname AS \"table\", p.polname AS policy\n    FROM pg_policy p\n    JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = p.polrelid\n    JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace\n    WHERE pg_get_expr(p.polqual, p.polrelid) ~* '\\\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\\\s*\\\\('\n       OR pg_get_expr(p.polwithcheck, p.polrelid) ~* '\\\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\\\s*\\\\('\n    ORDER BY 1, 2, 3\n`;\n\n/** Somebody's *function* that still calls a pre-1.0 helper from its own body. */\nexport interface LegacyRlsFunctionDependent {\n    schema: string;\n    function: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Functions whose body calls `auth.uid()` / `auth.roles()` / `auth.jwt()`.\n *\n * This is the half `DROP FUNCTION ... RESTRICT` cannot see, and the reason it\n * needs its own query. Postgres records a dependency for a *policy* that calls a\n * function, which is why the drop is safe against the policies above — but a\n * `LANGUAGE sql` function whose body is a **string literal** is not parsed when\n * it is created, so nothing is recorded and `RESTRICT` has nothing to refuse on.\n * The drop succeeds and the caller is left pointing at a function that no longer\n * exists, which fails at *query* time rather than at boot.\n *\n * A downstream project building on these helpers is not hypothetical: the Rebase\n * control plane defines `auth.is_org_member(uuid)` and `auth.is_org_admin(uuid)`\n * in this very schema, each calling `auth.uid()` in a string body, and eleven of\n * its row-level-security policies go through them. Every one of those would have\n * started failing the first time a recompile left no policy referencing\n * `auth.uid()` directly — the drop's own precondition.\n *\n * Matching on the body text is the only option available, and it is deliberately\n * broad: a false positive costs a schema that stays one release longer and says\n * why, while a false negative costs somebody their policies.\n */\nexport const LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL = `\n    SELECT n.nspname AS schema, p.proname AS function\n    FROM pg_proc p\n    JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace\n    WHERE n.nspname NOT IN ('pg_catalog', 'information_schema')\n      AND NOT (n.nspname = '${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}' AND p.proname IN ('uid', 'jwt', 'roles'))\n      AND p.prosrc ~* '\\\\m${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\\\.(uid|jwt|roles)\\\\s*\\\\('\n    ORDER BY 1, 2\n`;\n\n/**\n * Retire the pre-1.0 `auth` schema, reporting what is holding it back.\n *\n * The shared implementation behind the CLI's post-push step and the runtime's\n * post-policy step. Both used to just fire {@link DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL}\n * and swallow whatever came back, which is right for the ordinary case — a\n * table not recompiled *yet* — and wrong for the one that never resolves: a\n * hand-written policy nothing will ever rewrite. Then the schema stays forever\n * and nothing ever says why.\n */\nexport async function dropLegacyAuthSchema(\n    run: (sql: string) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]>,\n    report: { info: (m: string) => void; warn: (m: string) => void }\n): Promise<void> {\n    let blockers: LegacyRlsDependent[];\n    try {\n        blockers = (await run(LEGACY_RLS_DEPENDENTS_SQL)) as unknown as LegacyRlsDependent[];\n    } catch {\n        return; // No catalogue access; nothing here is worth failing a boot for.\n    }\n\n    if (blockers.length > 0) {\n        report.warn(\n            `The pre-1.0 \\`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\` schema cannot be removed yet: ${blockers.length} ` +\n            `${blockers.length === 1 ? \"policy still calls\" : \"policies still call\"} ` +\n            `\\`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}.uid()\\` and friends, and Postgres will not drop a function a policy ` +\n            `depends on. Rebase's own policies are ` +\n            `rewritten automatically — anything listed here is hand-written SQL that has to be updated to ` +\n            `\\`${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid()\\` by hand, after which the schema goes on its own:\\n` +\n            blockers.map(b => `  • ${b.schema}.${b.table} → \"${b.policy}\"`).join(\"\\n\")\n        );\n        return;\n    }\n\n    // The half Postgres will not refuse on. See LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL:\n    // a string-literal SQL body records no dependency, so `DROP FUNCTION` drops\n    // out from under a caller that is still using it and nothing complains until\n    // a query runs.\n    let borrowers: LegacyRlsFunctionDependent[];\n    try {\n        borrowers = (await run(LEGACY_RLS_FUNCTION_DEPENDENTS_SQL)) as unknown as LegacyRlsFunctionDependent[];\n    } catch {\n        return;\n    }\n\n    if (borrowers.length > 0) {\n        report.warn(\n            `The pre-1.0 \\`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\` schema cannot be removed yet: ${borrowers.length} ` +\n            `${borrowers.length === 1 ? \"function calls\" : \"functions call\"} ` +\n            `\\`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}.uid()\\` and friends from its own body. Postgres records no dependency ` +\n            `for that — a SQL body written as a string literal is never parsed — so dropping the helpers ` +\n            `would leave these pointing at nothing, and they would fail when a query reached them rather ` +\n            `than now. Repoint them at \\`${REBASE_SCHEMA}.uid()\\`, after which the schema goes on its own:\\n` +\n            borrowers.map(b => `  • ${b.schema}.${b.function}()`).join(\"\\n\")\n        );\n        return;\n    }\n\n    try {\n        await run(DROP_LEGACY_AUTH_SCHEMA_SQL);\n    } catch (err) {\n        // Something else depends on it, or the connection does not own it.\n        // Not fatal: the schema is inert either way now that no policy calls it.\n        report.info(\n            `Left the \\`${LEGACY_RLS_SCHEMA}\\` schema in place: ` +\n            (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))\n        );\n    }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgDA,IAAa,2BAA8C;CACvD,+BAA+B;CAK/B,8BAA8B,cAAc;;;;;;CAO5C,8BAA8B,cAAc;;;;;;CAO5C,8BAA8B,cAAc;;;AAGhD;AAII,KACA,yBAAyB,KAAI,MAAK,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4B1D,IAAa,8BAA8B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmE3C,IAAa,4BAA4B;;;;;sDAKa,kBAAkB;2DACb,kBAAkB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgC7E,IAAa,qCAAqC;;;;;8BAKpB,kBAAkB;4BACpB,kBAAkB;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAc9C,eAAsB,qBAClB,KACA,QACa;CACb,IAAI;CACJ,IAAI;EACA,WAAY,MAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;CACnD,QAAQ;EACJ;CACJ;CAEA,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;EACrB,OAAO,KACH,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,mCAAmC,SAAS,OAAO,GACnF,SAAS,WAAW,IAAI,uBAAuB,sBAAsB,KACnE,kBAAkB,4MAGlB,cAAc,+DACnB,SAAS,KAAI,MAAK,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAC7E;EACA;CACJ;CAMA,IAAI;CACJ,IAAI;EACA,YAAa,MAAM,IAAI,kCAAkC;CAC7D,QAAQ;EACJ;CACJ;CAEA,IAAI,UAAU,SAAS,GAAG;EACtB,OAAO,KACH,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,mCAAmC,UAAU,OAAO,GACpF,UAAU,WAAW,IAAI,mBAAmB,iBAAiB,KAC3D,kBAAkB,6RAGQ,cAAc,uDAC7C,UAAU,KAAI,MAAK,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CACnE;EACA;CACJ;CAEA,IAAI;EACA,MAAM,IAAI,2BAA2B;CACzC,SAAS,KAAK;EAGV,OAAO,KACH,cAAc,kBAAkB,yBAC/B,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG,EACpD;CACJ;AACJ"}