@real-life/trust-protocol 0.3.1 → 0.4.0

package/dist/holder.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/holder.js.map

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It derives its\n// principal (carrier-identity), asks for challenges, signs proofs whose\n// bytes are fixed by §5a.3, and reads exactly the closed verdict set —\n// including the one disclosure the protocol makes: a\n// `refused(stale-generation)` carries the generation to exceed, which is\n// what makes \"carrier entry lost, pair context held\" replaceable in two\n// exchanges instead of never.\nimport { jcs } from './core.js'\nimport type { Json } from './core.js'\nimport { base58 } from './crypto.js'\nimport { carrierPrincipal } from './carrier-identity.js'\nimport type { CarrierPrincipal } from './carrier-identity.js'\nimport { PROOF_V } from './carrier.js'\nimport type { CarrierProof, RegistrationVerdict } from './carrier.js'\n\nconst S = globalThis.crypto.subtle\nconst te = new TextEncoder()\n\nexport interface HolderContext {\n  carrier: string                 // C, byte-exact\n  identity: CarrierPrincipal      // from carrierPrincipal(rootIkm, C, N)\n  rkid: string                    // the relationship address at this carrier\n  generation: number              // the register's generation for N (§7a.3)\n}\n\n/** derive-and-wrap: one holder context per (relationship × carrier) */\nexport async function holderContext (\n  rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array, rkid: string, generation: number,\n): Promise<HolderContext> {\n  return { carrier, identity: await carrierPrincipal(rootIkm, carrier, nonce), rkid, generation }\n}\n\nasync function sign (ctx: HolderContext, fields: Record<string, Json>): Promise<CarrierProof> {\n  const p = {\n    v: PROOF_V, type: 'carrier-registration-proof',\n    carrier: ctx.carrier, principal: ctx.identity.principal, rkid: ctx.rkid,\n    ...fields,\n  }\n  const sig = new Uint8Array(await S.sign({ name: 'Ed25519' }, ctx.identity.key.priv, te.encode(jcs(p as unknown as Json))))\n  return { ...(p as unknown as CarrierProof), sig: 'z' + base58(sig) }\n}\n\n/** register/rebind proof: both succession fields present (§5a.3).\n * `openedAddressChallenge` is the value the holder decrypted from the\n * carrier's sealed challenge — possession of the rkid's private key. */\nexport function registrationProof (\n  ctx: HolderContext, purpose: 'register' | 'rebind',\n  principalChallenge: string, openedAddressChallenge: string, generation = ctx.generation,\n): Promise<CarrierProof> {\n  return sign(ctx, { purpose, generation, principalChallenge, addressChallenge: openedAddressChallenge })\n}\n\n/** collect/conclude proof: session-scoped, neither succession field —\n * their ABSENCE is part of the signed bytes (§5a.3). */\nexport function sessionProof (\n  ctx: HolderContext, purpose: 'collect' | 'conclude', principalChallenge: string,\n): Promise<CarrierProof> {\n  return sign(ctx, { purpose, principalChallenge })\n}\n\n// ── the recovery flow (Identity §9.3, executable) ───────────────────────\n// After losing the carrier entry alone (pair context held), the holder\n// knows neither the old principal nor the generation to exceed. The flow\n// is: attempt at generation 1; on the disclosing refusal, ROTATE THE\n// REGISTER to disclosed + 1 — Identity §7a.3: each rotation is a fresh\n// nonce N at generation g+1, and the principal is DERIVED from the new\n// nonce; a proof that named a higher generation over an old nonce would\n// claim a register state that does not exist (port-review B-6). Only the\n// number of carrier exchanges stays two; the rotations are local.\nexport const GENERATION_MAX = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER   // 2^53 − 1 (Identity §7a.3)\n\nexport interface RecoveryStep {\n  attempt: number\n  generation: number\n  verdict: RegistrationVerdict['verdict']\n}\nexport interface RecoveryResult {\n  outcome: 'bound' | 'waiting' | 'failed' | 'terminal'\n  finalGeneration?: number\n  steps: RecoveryStep[]\n}\n\n/** One recovery run. `rotateTo(g)` performs the LOCAL register rotations\n * up to generation g — fresh nonce, re-derived principal — and returns\n * the holder context of the new canonical entry (Identity §7a.3).\n * `exchange` is the transport; `challenges` draws a fresh pair per\n * attempt. `maxCapacityRetries` bounds only this run: the protocol\n * promises order, never time (round-46 B-2). At the generation maximum\n * no rotation exists and the address is not re-registrable at this\n * carrier (Identity §7a.3) — the outcome is `terminal`, and the lever is\n * §7a.2's move to a different configured carrier string. */\nexport async function recoverCarrierEntry (\n  initial: HolderContext,\n  rotateTo: (generation: number) => Promise<HolderContext>,\n  exchange: (proof: CarrierProof, rawGeneration: string) => Promise<RegistrationVerdict>,\n  challenges: () => Promise<{ principalChallenge: string, openedAddressChallenge: string }>,\n  maxCapacityRetries = 3,\n): Promise<RecoveryResult> {\n  const steps: RecoveryStep[] = []\n  let ctx = initial\n  let purpose: 'register' | 'rebind' = 'register'\n  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 2 + maxCapacityRetries; attempt++) {\n    const ch = await challenges()\n    const proof = await registrationProof(ctx, purpose, ch.principalChallenge, ch.openedAddressChallenge)\n    const v = await exchange(proof, String(ctx.generation))\n    steps.push({ attempt, generation: ctx.generation, verdict: v.verdict })\n    switch (v.verdict) {\n      case 'registered':\n      case 'rebound':\n      case 'registered(idempotent)':\n        return { outcome: 'bound', finalGeneration: ctx.generation, steps }\n      case 'refused(stale-generation)': {\n        const held = (v as { heldGeneration: number }).heldGeneration\n        if (held >= GENERATION_MAX) return { outcome: 'terminal', steps }\n        ctx = await rotateTo(held + 1)                  // real rotations, fresh nonce\n        purpose = 'rebind'\n        break\n      }\n      case 'registration-refused(capacity)':\n      case 'refused(admission-resource)':\n        break\n      default:\n        return { outcome: 'failed', steps }\n    }\n  }\n  return { outcome: 'waiting', steps }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/probe/acks.d.ts

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-import * as C from './deps.js';
-import type { Person } from './deps.js';
-export declare const ACK_TYPE = "https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1";
-/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */
-export declare function ackKey(ownCtx: any, counterpartKa: string, issuerAnchor: string, recipientAnchor: string): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>>;
-/**
- * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s
- * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same
- * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked
- * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).
- */
-export declare function buildAck(p: Person, contact: any, refDigest: string, threadId: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
-    to: any;
-    kind: string;
-    env: C.Envelope;
-}>;
-/**
- * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,
- * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on
- * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }
- * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.
- */
-export declare function verifyAck(p: Person, contact: any, doc: any, cls?: 'signature' | 'dv'): Promise<{
-    ref: string;
-    threadId: string;
-} | null>;
-//# sourceMappingURL=acks.d.ts.map

package/dist/probe/acks.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/probe/acks.js

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-// acks — the delivery acknowledgement (Delivery 4.2/4.4, the
-// acknowledgement CLASS rule) for the probe world. The ack DOCUMENT is
-// the real, registered wire form (`delivery-ack/0.1`) in the form the
-// acknowledged payload's class selects: a SIGNED ack (eddsa-jcs-2022
-// under the issuer anchor) for signature-class payloads (the Encounter
-// forms), the DENIABLE MAC ack for designated-verifier payloads (the
-// Visibility forms). The MAC key regime is the normative one —
-// byte-compatible with vectors/delivery-ack.json and
-// lib/test/vectors4.test.mjs: one channel-keyed derivation for every
-// DV-type ack, never the payload's internal MAC structure.
-//
-//   k = HKDF-SHA-256(ikm = X25519(pairX_issuer, pairX_recipient),
-//                    salt = empty, info = "rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/"
-//                    || issuerPairAnchor || "/" || recipientPairAnchor,
-//                    32 bytes; all-zero shared secret rejected)
-//   proof = { mac: HMAC-SHA-256 over JCS(document without proof) }
-//
-// Deniable by construction: either relationship party can compute the
-// MAC — for DV payloads the ack is evidence to the sender alone, never
-// an attestation toward anyone else (4.2).
-import { jcs, makeValidator } from '../core.js';
-import { SCHEMAS } from '../schemas.js';
-import * as C from './deps.js';
-const te = new TextEncoder();
-const S = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
-export const ACK_TYPE = 'https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1';
-const V = makeValidator(SCHEMAS);
-const schemaOk = (file, data) => V.validate(data, SCHEMAS[file], SCHEMAS[file]).length === 0;
-const hmacU = async (key, msg) => {
-    const k = await S.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']);
-    return 'u' + C.b64uOf(new Uint8Array(await S.sign('HMAC', k, te.encode(msg))));
-};
-const contactKeyOf = (p, contact) => {
-    for (const [k, c] of p.contacts)
-        if (c === contact)
-            return k;
-    return undefined;
-};
-/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */
-export async function ackKey(ownCtx, counterpartKa, issuerAnchor, recipientAnchor) {
-    const shared = await C.ecdh(ownCtx.x.priv, C.xRawOfMk(counterpartKa));
-    if (shared.every((b) => b === 0))
-        throw new Error('all-zero X25519 output');
-    return C.hkdf(shared, 'rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/' + issuerAnchor + '/' + recipientAnchor);
-}
-/**
- * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s
- * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same
- * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked
- * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).
- */
-export async function buildAck(p, contact, refDigest, threadId, when, ent = {}) {
-    const own = contact.channel.own;
-    const doc = {
-        id: ent.ackId ?? globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),
-        type: ACK_TYPE,
-        issuer: own.anchor, // = the acked document's recipient (4.2)
-        // the recipient is the counterparty anchor; `ent.recipient` names it
-        // when the tuple is not yet inserted (a record-creating effect builds
-        // its ack BEFORE the one synchronous commit, Delivery 4.1)
-        recipient: ent.recipient ?? contactKeyOf(p, contact),
-        threadId,
-        issuedAt: C.iso(when),
-        payload: { ref: refDigest, meaning: 'received' },
-    };
-    // the acknowledgement CLASS rule (4.2/4.4): a payload whose authenticity
-    // is a TRANSFERABLE SIGNATURE (the Encounter forms: card + credential
-    // under DataIntegrityProof) is acknowledged with eddsa-jcs-2022 under
-    // the ack's issuer anchor — an attestation; a DESIGNATED-VERIFIER
-    // payload with the deniable channel-keyed MAC. `ent.cls` selects.
-    if (ent.cls === 'signature') {
-        const document = await C.diSign(own, doc, doc.issuedAt);
-        return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (signiert, eddsa-jcs-2022 unter dem Issuer-Anker)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) };
-    }
-    const k = await ackKey(own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient);
-    const document = { ...doc, proof: { mac: await hmacU(k, jcs(doc)) } };
-    return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (deniabel, MAC unter dem Kanal-Ack-Key)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) };
-}
-/**
- * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,
- * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on
- * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }
- * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.
- */
-export async function verifyAck(p, contact, doc, cls = 'dv') {
-    try {
-        if (doc?.type !== ACK_TYPE)
-            return null;
-        // STUFENORDNUNG (Review 33, B-2): erst das DOKUMENTPROFIL + der
-        // recipient (Stufe 5), dann das Payload-Schema (Stufe 7), dann die
-        // Typ-Konsistenzregeln (Stufe 8), der MAC zuletzt
-        // — Stufe 5: Dokument-Schema, geschlossene Form, Proof-Form,
-        //   Kalender, recipient = eigener Anker
-        if (!schemaOk('rltp-delivery-document.schema.json', doc))
-            return null;
-        if (!C.shaped(doc, { id: 'string', issuer: 'string', recipient: 'string', threadId: 'string', issuedAt: 'string', payload: 'object', proof: 'object' }))
-            return null;
-        // geschlossene Form + das OPTIONALE ceremony-Feld (Review 19, B-2:
-        // „ceremony — OPTIONAL, and entirely unconstrained"); der MAC läuft
-        // über JCS(Dokument ohne proof) und deckt es mit ab
-        if (Object.keys(doc).some((k) => !['id', 'type', 'issuer', 'recipient', 'threadId', 'issuedAt', 'payload', 'proof', 'ceremony'].includes(k)))
-            return null;
-        // — Stufe 7 VOR Stufe 8: das Payload-Schema zuerst
-        if (!schemaOk('payload-delivery-ack.schema.json', doc.payload))
-            return null;
-        // class rule (4.2/4.4, Stufe 8): EXACTLY the form the acknowledged
-        // payload's class selects — signature-class payload → SIGNED ack,
-        // designated-verifier payload → MAC ack. Every other combination
-        // (MAC on a signature-class payload, signature on a DV payload, a
-        // hybrid proof) is invalid
-        if (cls === 'signature') {
-            if (doc.proof.mac !== undefined || doc.proof.type !== 'DataIntegrityProof' || doc.proof.cryptosuite !== 'eddsa-jcs-2022')
-                return null;
-            if (!C.calOK(doc.proof.created))
-                return null;
-        }
-        else {
-            if (Object.keys(doc.proof).length !== 1)
-                return null;
-            if (typeof doc.proof.mac !== 'string' || doc.proof.proofValue !== undefined)
-                return null;
-        }
-        if (!C.calOK(doc.issuedAt))
-            return null; // Kalender-Validität (Review 12, B-3)
-        if (doc.recipient !== contact.channel.own.anchor)
-            return null;
-        // — Stufe 8: enactment-Profilregel (Review 20, B-2: ein Ack
-        //   umschließt kein Bindungsmaterial), issuer-Bindung, meaning
-        if (doc.ceremony?.enactment !== undefined)
-            return null;
-        if (doc.issuer !== contactKeyOf(p, contact))
-            return null;
-        if (!C.shaped(doc.payload, { ref: 'string', meaning: 'string' }) || doc.payload.meaning !== 'received')
-            return null;
-        if (cls === 'signature') {
-            // the attestation: verifies under the ack's issuer anchor (= the
-            // acked document's recipient, our counterpart on the tuple)
-            if (!(await C.diVerify(doc, doc.issuer)))
-                return null;
-            return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId };
-        }
-        const { proof, ...rest } = doc;
-        const k = await ackKey(contact.channel.own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient);
-        if ((await hmacU(k, jcs(rest))) !== proof.mac)
-            return null;
-        return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId };
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=acks.js.map

package/dist/probe/acks.js.map

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acks — the delivery acknowledgement (Delivery 4.2/4.4, the\n// acknowledgement CLASS rule) for the probe world. The ack DOCUMENT is\n// the real, registered wire form (`delivery-ack/0.1`) in the form the\n// acknowledged payload's class selects: a SIGNED ack (eddsa-jcs-2022\n// under the issuer anchor) for signature-class payloads (the Encounter\n// forms), the DENIABLE MAC ack for designated-verifier payloads (the\n// Visibility forms). The MAC key regime is the normative one —\n// byte-compatible with vectors/delivery-ack.json and\n// lib/test/vectors4.test.mjs: one channel-keyed derivation for every\n// DV-type ack, never the payload's internal MAC structure.\n//\n//   k = HKDF-SHA-256(ikm = X25519(pairX_issuer, pairX_recipient),\n//                    salt = empty, info = \"rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/\"\n//                    || issuerPairAnchor || \"/\" || recipientPairAnchor,\n//                    32 bytes; all-zero shared secret rejected)\n//   proof = { mac: HMAC-SHA-256 over JCS(document without proof) }\n//\n// Deniable by construction: either relationship party can compute the\n// MAC — for DV payloads the ack is evidence to the sender alone, never\n// an attestation toward anyone else (4.2).\nimport { jcs, makeValidator } from '../core.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS } from '../schemas.js'\nimport * as C from './deps.js'\nimport type { Person } from './deps.js'\n\nconst te = new TextEncoder()\nconst S = globalThis.crypto.subtle\nexport const ACK_TYPE = 'https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1'\n\nconst V = makeValidator(SCHEMAS)\nconst schemaOk = (file: string, data: any) => V.validate(data, SCHEMAS[file], SCHEMAS[file]).length === 0\nconst hmacU = async (key: Uint8Array, msg: string) => {\n  const k = await S.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n  return 'u' + C.b64uOf(new Uint8Array(await S.sign('HMAC', k, te.encode(msg))))\n}\nconst contactKeyOf = (p: Person, contact: any) => {\n  for (const [k, c] of p.contacts) if (c === contact) return k\n  return undefined\n}\n\n/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */\nexport async function ackKey (ownCtx: any, counterpartKa: string, issuerAnchor: string, recipientAnchor: string) {\n  const shared = await C.ecdh(ownCtx.x.priv, C.xRawOfMk(counterpartKa)!)\n  if (shared.every((b: number) => b === 0)) throw new Error('all-zero X25519 output')\n  return C.hkdf(shared, 'rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/' + issuerAnchor + '/' + recipientAnchor)\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s\n * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same\n * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked\n * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).\n */\nexport async function buildAck (p: Person, contact: any, refDigest: string, threadId: string, when: number, ent: any = {}) {\n  const own = contact.channel.own\n  const doc = {\n    id: ent.ackId ?? globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n    type: ACK_TYPE,\n    issuer: own.anchor,                       // = the acked document's recipient (4.2)\n    // the recipient is the counterparty anchor; `ent.recipient` names it\n    // when the tuple is not yet inserted (a record-creating effect builds\n    // its ack BEFORE the one synchronous commit, Delivery 4.1)\n    recipient: ent.recipient ?? contactKeyOf(p, contact),\n    threadId,\n    issuedAt: C.iso(when),\n    payload: { ref: refDigest, meaning: 'received' },\n  }\n  // the acknowledgement CLASS rule (4.2/4.4): a payload whose authenticity\n  // is a TRANSFERABLE SIGNATURE (the Encounter forms: card + credential\n  // under DataIntegrityProof) is acknowledged with eddsa-jcs-2022 under\n  // the ack's issuer anchor — an attestation; a DESIGNATED-VERIFIER\n  // payload with the deniable channel-keyed MAC. `ent.cls` selects.\n  if (ent.cls === 'signature') {\n    const document = await C.diSign(own, doc, doc.issuedAt)\n    return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (signiert, eddsa-jcs-2022 unter dem Issuer-Anker)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) }\n  }\n  const k = await ackKey(own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient!)\n  const document = { ...doc, proof: { mac: await hmacU(k, jcs(doc)) } }\n  return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (deniabel, MAC unter dem Kanal-Ack-Key)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,\n * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on\n * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }\n * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.\n */\nexport async function verifyAck (p: Person, contact: any, doc: any, cls: 'signature' | 'dv' = 'dv'): Promise<{ ref: string, threadId: string } | null> {\n  try {\n    if (doc?.type !== ACK_TYPE) return null\n    // STUFENORDNUNG (Review 33, B-2): erst das DOKUMENTPROFIL + der\n    // recipient (Stufe 5), dann das Payload-Schema (Stufe 7), dann die\n    // Typ-Konsistenzregeln (Stufe 8), der MAC zuletzt\n    // — Stufe 5: Dokument-Schema, geschlossene Form, Proof-Form,\n    //   Kalender, recipient = eigener Anker\n    if (!schemaOk('rltp-delivery-document.schema.json', doc)) return null\n    if (!C.shaped(doc, { id: 'string', issuer: 'string', recipient: 'string', threadId: 'string', issuedAt: 'string', payload: 'object', proof: 'object' })) return null\n    // geschlossene Form + das OPTIONALE ceremony-Feld (Review 19, B-2:\n    // „ceremony — OPTIONAL, and entirely unconstrained\"); der MAC läuft\n    // über JCS(Dokument ohne proof) und deckt es mit ab\n    if (Object.keys(doc).some((k) => !['id', 'type', 'issuer', 'recipient', 'threadId', 'issuedAt', 'payload', 'proof', 'ceremony'].includes(k))) return null\n    // — Stufe 7 VOR Stufe 8: das Payload-Schema zuerst\n    if (!schemaOk('payload-delivery-ack.schema.json', doc.payload)) return null\n    // class rule (4.2/4.4, Stufe 8): EXACTLY the form the acknowledged\n    // payload's class selects — signature-class payload → SIGNED ack,\n    // designated-verifier payload → MAC ack. Every other combination\n    // (MAC on a signature-class payload, signature on a DV payload, a\n    // hybrid proof) is invalid\n    if (cls === 'signature') {\n      if (doc.proof.mac !== undefined || doc.proof.type !== 'DataIntegrityProof' || doc.proof.cryptosuite !== 'eddsa-jcs-2022') return null\n      if (!C.calOK(doc.proof.created)) return null\n    } else {\n      if (Object.keys(doc.proof).length !== 1) return null\n      if (typeof doc.proof.mac !== 'string' || doc.proof.proofValue !== undefined) return null\n    }\n    if (!C.calOK(doc.issuedAt)) return null   // Kalender-Validität (Review 12, B-3)\n    if (doc.recipient !== contact.channel.own.anchor) return null\n    // — Stufe 8: enactment-Profilregel (Review 20, B-2: ein Ack\n    //   umschließt kein Bindungsmaterial), issuer-Bindung, meaning\n    if (doc.ceremony?.enactment !== undefined) return null\n    if (doc.issuer !== contactKeyOf(p, contact)) return null\n    if (!C.shaped(doc.payload, { ref: 'string', meaning: 'string' }) || doc.payload.meaning !== 'received') return null\n    if (cls === 'signature') {\n      // the attestation: verifies under the ack's issuer anchor (= the\n      // acked document's recipient, our counterpart on the tuple)\n      if (!(await C.diVerify(doc, doc.issuer))) return null\n      return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId }\n    }\n    const { proof, ...rest } = doc\n    const k = await ackKey(contact.channel.own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient)\n    if ((await hmacU(k, jcs(rest))) !== proof.mac) return null\n    return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId }\n  } catch { return null }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/probe/continuity.d.ts

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-import * as C from './deps.js';
-import type { Person } from './deps.js';
-export declare const snapshotPriors: (p: Person) => {
-    own: any[];
-    counterpart: string[];
-};
-export declare function buildProbe(p: Person, newKey: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
-    to: any;
-    kind: string;
-    env: C.Envelope;
-}[] | null>;
-export declare function receiveContinuity(p: Person, env: any, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<any>;
-/**
- * The host's producing call for a mapping the receiver still owes
- * (review 6, B-3): a transient seal failure during probe/mapping
- * handling persists the obligation in contMappingDue; this call — not a
- * redelivery, which the freshness rule forbids — builds and returns it.
- */
-export declare function flushContinuity(p: Person, newKey: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<any>;
-//# sourceMappingURL=continuity.d.ts.map

package/dist/probe/continuity.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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