@real-life/trust-protocol 0.1.1 → 0.3.0

package/README.md

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ look in the code:
 | `carrier-identity` | Identity §7a | The carrier-relationship principal: one Ed25519 control key per (relationship × carrier), derived so that no computable relation to the relationship's other principals or its `rkid` exists — which is why registration must *prove* the binding instead of computing it. |
 | `carrier` | Delivery §4.4 + §5a | The carrier side of the port as one transport-agnostic state machine: the five guarantees, the proof rule, the total binding lifecycle (unbound → live → closing → released), the verdict sets in their normative evaluation orders, wind-up and binding tombstones. The clock is injected. |
 | `holder` | Delivery §5a + Identity §9.3 | The holder's half: proof construction for all four purposes, the closed verdict set, and the two-exchange recovery flow for a lost carrier entry. |
+| `visibility` | Network Visibility 0.29 on Delivery 0.79 | The trust act (`anchor-mapping@2` + `grade-declaration@1`), the blinded star (`star@1`, 5.2a chunks), the admission layer and the 5.4 reconciliation automaton, §6a continuity (probe + mapping — chains instead of duplicates), and the deniable `delivery-ack/0.1`. Namespaced: `visibility.trust`, `.continuity`, `.acks`. Graduated from `/probe` on 04.09.2026 after a 39-round conformance loop. |
+| `ceremony` | Encounter 0.29 (`encounter-scan@0.25`) on Delivery 0.79 | The ceremony's transmission: `encounter-bundle/0.1`, `encounter-credential-delivery/0.1` (counter-step in the bundle's thread), the signed `delivery-ack/0.1`; the own-challenge state model with its aging latch, the enactment record as the serialization point, the eight-step acceptance, connected and offline path with free switching; one commit discipline (prepare → verify → commit) under the §6.2 lock set; resumable issuance. Graduated from `/probe` on 05.09.2026 after a 25-round conformance loop. |
 
 Everything is re-exported from the package root; the table is a map, not an
 import instruction.
@@ -46,17 +48,20 @@ import { labeledContext, signCard, seal, sameDigest } from '@real-life/trust-pro
 ## Two entry points
 
 ```ts
-import { … } from '@real-life/trust-protocol'          // wire-normative core
-import { introduce, trust, continuity, membership }
-  from '@real-life/trust-protocol/probe'               // draft — will change
+import { …, visibility } from '@real-life/trust-protocol'   // wire-normative core
+const { trust, continuity, acks } = visibility                // Network Visibility, graduated
+import { introduce, membership }
+  from '@real-life/trust-protocol/probe'                     // draft — will change
 ```
 
 The **`/probe` subpath is deliberate.** Its modules exercise the converged
 *semantics* of their layers, but their transport shapes carry `@probe` and
-are **not wire-normative**: mediated introductions over a rendezvous drop,
-the explicit trust act with the blinded star, §6a continuity (chains
-instead of duplicates), and group membership (founding, VIC invite,
-admission, vouching). Experiment with them; do not treat their wire forms
+are **not wire-normative**: mediated introductions over a rendezvous drop
+and group membership (founding, VIC invite, admission, vouching). The
+trust act, the blinded star, §6a continuity and the deniable ack **left
+this subpath on 04.09.2026** — they are wire-normative now and live under
+`visibility` at the package root; the Encounter ceremony's transmission
+**left on 05.09.2026** and lives under `ceremony`. Experiment with the rest; do not treat its wire forms
 as an interoperability target. A subpath import is a decision someone has
 to make — nothing behind it can be reached by accident.
 
@@ -75,15 +80,17 @@ This package uses its own semver; the specification uses castings. Each
 release states, per module, whose **wire forms** it implements — and what
 it deliberately does not:
 
-| Module (0.1.x) | Casting | Implemented | Not in this package |
+| Module (0.3.x) | Casting | Implemented | Not in this package |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `identity` | Identity 0.50 | context derivation under the closed label registry (§6.1, unchanged since 0.13) with the ordered persona pipeline (§6.2, Unicode 15.0 pinned) | recovery derivation (§5.3), service identities (§7), the label register and its state |
 | `carrier-identity` | Identity 0.51 (§7a) | the carrier-relationship principal derivation, identifier validation | the register's generation state (held by the holder's store) |
-| `carrier` + `holder` | Delivery 0.69 (§4.4, §5a) + Identity 0.51 (§9.3) | the port state machine, proofs for all four purposes, verdicts, recovery | transport adapters and their policies (a carrier's budgets enter through hooks) |
-| `encounter` | Encounter 0.29 — wire `0.25` (`rltp-card/0.25`, `encounter-scan@0.25`) | challenges, both card profiles, the enactment binding, encounter credentials | the ceremony state machine, acceptance rules, ack deadlines |
+| `carrier` + `holder` | Delivery 0.79 (§4.4, §5a) + Identity 0.51 (§9.3) | the port state machine, proofs for all four purposes, verdicts, recovery | transport adapters and their policies (a carrier's budgets enter through hooks) |
+| `encounter` | Encounter 0.29 — wire `0.25` (`rltp-card/0.25`, `encounter-scan@0.25`) | challenges, both card profiles, the enactment binding, encounter credentials (the primitives) | — (the ceremony machine lives in `ceremony`) |
+| `ceremony` | Encounter 0.29 §5.3–5.8 + Delivery 0.79 (§3, §4.1–4.3, §6) | `encounter-bundle/0.1`, `encounter-credential-delivery/0.1`, signed `delivery-ack/0.1`; own-challenge state model (aging latch, whole seconds), enactment record + record-key lock set, 5.6 acceptance in order, both 5.8 paths, thread freshness incl. re-issue, resumable issuance, chain-head carry | storage, transport adapters, the host's UI correlation (duties listed in the handoff) |
 | `delivery` | Delivery 0.64 | the sealed envelope (§5) and the generic receive stages 1–4 | the type-specific stages, residual bookkeeping, transport adapters |
 | `core`, `crypto` | cross-layer | canonical form, digest equality, timestamps, validator; primitives + `eddsa-jcs-2022` proof | — |
-| `/probe` | Network Visibility · Membership Tasks + Access | introductions, trust act + blinded star, §6a continuity, group membership — semantics of the running castings, transport shapes `@probe` | any wire-form stability whatsoever |
+| `visibility` | Network Visibility 0.29 + Delivery 0.79 (§3, §4.2, §4.4) | the trust act (`anchor-mapping@2`, `grade-declaration@1`), `star@1` with 5.2a chunk assembly, the admission layer (Section 2), the 5.4 reconciliation automaton with completion via deniable acks, §6a continuity (`continuity-probe@1`, `continuity-mapping@1`, chaining), the registered task documents and `delivery-ack/0.1` with the 4.2 class rule; full §6.2 stage order on every receive path, peek→build→commit issuance on every producer | storage, transport adapters and their policies (the Encounter ceremony's flows live in `ceremony`) |
+| `/probe` | Network Visibility (introductions) · Membership Tasks + Access | mediated introductions, group membership — semantics of the running castings, transport shapes `@probe` | any wire-form stability whatsoever |
 
 Persona-name validation is **pinned to Unicode 15.0** as Identity §6.2
 requires: the repertoire ships with the package (`unicode15.ts`, ~5 kB of

package/dist/carrier-identity.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import type { KeyPair } from './crypto.js';
 export declare const CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX = "rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/";
+export declare const CONNECTION_INFO_PREFIX = "rltp/v1/carrier-connection/ed25519/v1/";
+export declare const EGRESS_INFO_PREFIX = "rltp/v1/carrier-egress/ed25519/v1/";
 export declare function validCarrierIdentifier(c: unknown): c is string;
 export interface CarrierPrincipal {
     principal: string;
@@ -8,4 +10,11 @@ export interface CarrierPrincipal {
     keyAgreement: null;
 }
 export declare function carrierPrincipal(rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array): Promise<CarrierPrincipal>;
+export interface CarrierScopedIdentity {
+    did: string;
+    key: KeyPair;
+    info: string;
+    scope: 'connection' | 'egress';
+}
+export declare function carrierScopedIdentity(rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array, scope: 'connection' | 'egress'): Promise<CarrierScopedIdentity>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=carrier-identity.d.ts.map

package/dist/carrier-identity.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"carrier-identity.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/carrier-identity.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAmBA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAK1C,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,6CAA6C,CAAA;AAS7E,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,2CAA2C,CAAA;AAC9E,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,uCAAuC,CAAA;AA4BtE,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAE,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,CAmB/D;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACZ,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAA;CACnB;AAKD,wBAAsB,gBAAgB,CACpC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,GACtD,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAY3B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAqB;IACpC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACX,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACZ,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAA;CAC/B;AAKD,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CACzC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EACvD,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,GAC7B,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAUhC"}

package/dist/carrier-identity.js

@@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ import { sha, hkdf, edFromSeed, anchorOfEd } from './crypto.js';
 import { WHITE_SPACE_15 } from './unicode15.js';
 const te = new TextEncoder();
 export const CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/';
+// Adapter-scoped identities (profile spec/adapter-vti-mediator.md,
+// Delivery §5a.10): the mediation connection DID and the sender-side
+// egress identity. Both derive from the same root as the control
+// principal but under distinct info prefixes — each is derivable from
+// the root, none from any other. That is exactly the §5a.10 sentence
+// "never a control principal or derivable from one", satisfied by
+// construction: without rootIkm no party can compute one from another.
+export const CONNECTION_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-connection/ed25519/v1/';
+export const EGRESS_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-egress/ed25519/v1/';
 // multihash(sha2-256) in base64url — the digest form Identity §7a.4 fixes
 const mh = async (bytes) => 'u' + b64uOf(cat(Uint8Array.from([0x12, 0x20]), await sha(bytes)));
 // Identity §7a.2 — the ordered validation pipeline for C, fail closed
@@ -77,9 +86,30 @@ export async function carrierPrincipal(rootIkm, carrier, nonce) {
         throw new Error('invalid carrier identifier (7a.2)');
     if (nonce.length !== 32)
         throw new Error('carrier nonce must be 32 bytes (7a.3)');
-    const info = CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(nonce);
-    const seed = await hkdf(rootIkm, info);
+    // M-3: the derivation reads its inputs at entry, once. Caller-held
+    // buffers can be mutated while the HKDF awaits; copies make the
+    // derived principal a function of the arguments as passed.
+    const ikm = rootIkm.slice();
+    const n = nonce.slice();
+    const info = CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(n);
+    const seed = await hkdf(ikm, info);
     const key = await edFromSeed(seed);
     return { principal: anchorOfEd(key.pubRaw), key, info, keyAgreement: null };
 }
+// One connection DID / one egress identity per (relationship × carrier),
+// same derivation discipline and same input rules as the principal
+// (§7a.4), distinct prefix. Retired with the principal, never reused.
+export async function carrierScopedIdentity(rootIkm, carrier, nonce, scope) {
+    if (!validCarrierIdentifier(carrier))
+        throw new Error('invalid carrier identifier (7a.2)');
+    if (nonce.length !== 32)
+        throw new Error('carrier nonce must be 32 bytes (7a.3)');
+    const ikm = rootIkm.slice();
+    const n = nonce.slice();
+    const prefix = scope === 'connection' ? CONNECTION_INFO_PREFIX : EGRESS_INFO_PREFIX;
+    const info = prefix + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(n);
+    const seed = await hkdf(ikm, info);
+    const key = await edFromSeed(seed);
+    return { did: anchorOfEd(key.pubRaw), key, info, scope };
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=carrier-identity.js.map

package/dist/carrier-identity.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The\n// derivation shares no computable relation with the relationship's other\n// principals or with its `rkid` — that absence is the privacy property\n// the whole class exists for (§7a.5), and it is why registration must\n// PROVE the binding instead of computing it (Delivery §5a.3).\n//\n// info = \"rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/\" || Dc || Dn\n// where Dc = multihash(sha2-256, UTF-8 of the configured carrier\n// identifier C) and Dn = multihash(sha2-256, 32-byte carrier nonce N),\n// each rendered as 'u' + base64url — exactly 47 characters, so the two\n// parts are length-fixed and no concatenation ambiguity exists (§7a.4).\n//\n// NO key-agreement key is derived for this class: sealing stays at the\n// `rkid` (§7a.1), and a carrier that never holds a decryption key can\n// never be asked to use one.\nimport { b64uOf, cat } from './crypto.js'\nimport { sha, hkdf, edFromSeed, anchorOfEd } from './crypto.js'\nimport type { KeyPair } from './crypto.js'\nimport { WHITE_SPACE_15 } from './unicode15.js'\n\nconst te = new TextEncoder()\n\nexport const CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/'\n\n// multihash(sha2-256) in base64url — the digest form Identity §7a.4 fixes\nconst mh = async (bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<string> =>\n  'u' + b64uOf(cat(Uint8Array.from([0x12, 0x20]), await sha(bytes)))\n\n// Identity §7a.2 — the ordered validation pipeline for C, fail closed\n// and NO normalization (the deliberate difference to §6.2): valid\n// Unicode scalar values only (unpaired surrogates never repaired),\n// 1..1024 UTF-8 BYTES, and no Cc, Cf or White_Space code point anywhere.\n//\n// The category tables are PINNED to Unicode 15.0 (port-review-2 M-6):\n// evaluating against the platform's \\p{...} data would let the same\n// identifier derive a principal on one runtime and be rejected on\n// another the moment a Unicode revision moves a code point — the exact\n// defect the persona repertoire (unicode15.ts) already closed for §6.2.\n// Cc is the stable C0/C1 block; Cf is the 170-code-point Unicode-15.0\n// set, enumerated below; White_Space is unicode15.ts's pinned set.\nconst CC_15 = (cp: number): boolean => cp <= 0x1f || (cp >= 0x7f && cp <= 0x9f)\nconst CF_15_RANGES: Array<[number, number]> = [\n  [0x00ad, 0x00ad], [0x0600, 0x0605], [0x061c, 0x061c], [0x06dd, 0x06dd],\n  [0x070f, 0x070f], [0x0890, 0x0891], [0x08e2, 0x08e2], [0x180e, 0x180e],\n  [0x200b, 0x200f], [0x202a, 0x202e], [0x2060, 0x2064], [0x2066, 0x206f],\n  [0xfeff, 0xfeff], [0xfff9, 0xfffb], [0x110bd, 0x110bd], [0x110cd, 0x110cd],\n  [0x13430, 0x1343f], [0x1bca0, 0x1bca3], [0x1d173, 0x1d17a],\n  [0xe0001, 0xe0001], [0xe0020, 0xe007f],\n]\nconst CF_15 = (cp: number): boolean => CF_15_RANGES.some(([a, b]) => cp >= a && cp <= b)\nexport function validCarrierIdentifier (c: unknown): c is string {\n  if (typeof c !== 'string' || c.length === 0) return false\n  // scalar values: an unpaired surrogate is not a Unicode string\n  for (let i = 0; i < c.length; i++) {\n    const u = c.charCodeAt(i)\n    if (u >= 0xdc00 && u <= 0xdfff) return false                       // lone low\n    if (u >= 0xd800 && u <= 0xdbff) {\n      const nxt = c.charCodeAt(i + 1)\n      if (!(nxt >= 0xdc00 && nxt <= 0xdfff)) return false              // lone high\n      i++\n    }\n  }\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(c)\n  if (bytes.length < 1 || bytes.length > 1024) return false\n  for (const ch of c) {\n    const cp = ch.codePointAt(0)!\n    if (CC_15(cp) || CF_15(cp) || WHITE_SPACE_15.has(cp)) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nexport interface CarrierPrincipal {\n  principal: string          // did:key:z6Mk…, the control principal\n  key: KeyPair               // its Ed25519 pair (for the proofs of §5a.3)\n  info: string               // the derivation info, for auditability\n  keyAgreement: null         // declared, not omitted: Ed25519-only (§7a.1)\n}\n\n// Identity §7a.4 — derive the control principal for one relationship at\n// one carrier. `carrier` is C exactly as configured (byte-exact), `nonce`\n// is the relationship's 32-byte carrier nonce N from the register (§7a.3).\nexport async function carrierPrincipal (\n  rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CarrierPrincipal> {\n  if (!validCarrierIdentifier(carrier)) throw new Error('invalid carrier identifier (7a.2)')\n  if (nonce.length !== 32) throw new Error('carrier nonce must be 32 bytes (7a.3)')\n  const info = CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(nonce)\n  const seed = await hkdf(rootIkm, info)\n  const key = await edFromSeed(seed)\n  return { principal: anchorOfEd(key.pubRaw), key, info, keyAgreement: null }\n}\n"]}
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The\n// derivation shares no computable relation with the relationship's other\n// principals or with its `rkid` — that absence is the privacy property\n// the whole class exists for (§7a.5), and it is why registration must\n// PROVE the binding instead of computing it (Delivery §5a.3).\n//\n// info = \"rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/\" || Dc || Dn\n// where Dc = multihash(sha2-256, UTF-8 of the configured carrier\n// identifier C) and Dn = multihash(sha2-256, 32-byte carrier nonce N),\n// each rendered as 'u' + base64url — exactly 47 characters, so the two\n// parts are length-fixed and no concatenation ambiguity exists (§7a.4).\n//\n// NO key-agreement key is derived for this class: sealing stays at the\n// `rkid` (§7a.1), and a carrier that never holds a decryption key can\n// never be asked to use one.\nimport { b64uOf, cat } from './crypto.js'\nimport { sha, hkdf, edFromSeed, anchorOfEd } from './crypto.js'\nimport type { KeyPair } from './crypto.js'\nimport { WHITE_SPACE_15 } from './unicode15.js'\n\nconst te = new TextEncoder()\n\nexport const CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-relationship/ed25519/v1/'\n\n// Adapter-scoped identities (profile spec/adapter-vti-mediator.md,\n// Delivery §5a.10): the mediation connection DID and the sender-side\n// egress identity. Both derive from the same root as the control\n// principal but under distinct info prefixes — each is derivable from\n// the root, none from any other. That is exactly the §5a.10 sentence\n// \"never a control principal or derivable from one\", satisfied by\n// construction: without rootIkm no party can compute one from another.\nexport const CONNECTION_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-connection/ed25519/v1/'\nexport const EGRESS_INFO_PREFIX = 'rltp/v1/carrier-egress/ed25519/v1/'\n\n// multihash(sha2-256) in base64url — the digest form Identity §7a.4 fixes\nconst mh = async (bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<string> =>\n  'u' + b64uOf(cat(Uint8Array.from([0x12, 0x20]), await sha(bytes)))\n\n// Identity §7a.2 — the ordered validation pipeline for C, fail closed\n// and NO normalization (the deliberate difference to §6.2): valid\n// Unicode scalar values only (unpaired surrogates never repaired),\n// 1..1024 UTF-8 BYTES, and no Cc, Cf or White_Space code point anywhere.\n//\n// The category tables are PINNED to Unicode 15.0 (port-review-2 M-6):\n// evaluating against the platform's \\p{...} data would let the same\n// identifier derive a principal on one runtime and be rejected on\n// another the moment a Unicode revision moves a code point — the exact\n// defect the persona repertoire (unicode15.ts) already closed for §6.2.\n// Cc is the stable C0/C1 block; Cf is the 170-code-point Unicode-15.0\n// set, enumerated below; White_Space is unicode15.ts's pinned set.\nconst CC_15 = (cp: number): boolean => cp <= 0x1f || (cp >= 0x7f && cp <= 0x9f)\nconst CF_15_RANGES: Array<[number, number]> = [\n  [0x00ad, 0x00ad], [0x0600, 0x0605], [0x061c, 0x061c], [0x06dd, 0x06dd],\n  [0x070f, 0x070f], [0x0890, 0x0891], [0x08e2, 0x08e2], [0x180e, 0x180e],\n  [0x200b, 0x200f], [0x202a, 0x202e], [0x2060, 0x2064], [0x2066, 0x206f],\n  [0xfeff, 0xfeff], [0xfff9, 0xfffb], [0x110bd, 0x110bd], [0x110cd, 0x110cd],\n  [0x13430, 0x1343f], [0x1bca0, 0x1bca3], [0x1d173, 0x1d17a],\n  [0xe0001, 0xe0001], [0xe0020, 0xe007f],\n]\nconst CF_15 = (cp: number): boolean => CF_15_RANGES.some(([a, b]) => cp >= a && cp <= b)\nexport function validCarrierIdentifier (c: unknown): c is string {\n  if (typeof c !== 'string' || c.length === 0) return false\n  // scalar values: an unpaired surrogate is not a Unicode string\n  for (let i = 0; i < c.length; i++) {\n    const u = c.charCodeAt(i)\n    if (u >= 0xdc00 && u <= 0xdfff) return false                       // lone low\n    if (u >= 0xd800 && u <= 0xdbff) {\n      const nxt = c.charCodeAt(i + 1)\n      if (!(nxt >= 0xdc00 && nxt <= 0xdfff)) return false              // lone high\n      i++\n    }\n  }\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(c)\n  if (bytes.length < 1 || bytes.length > 1024) return false\n  for (const ch of c) {\n    const cp = ch.codePointAt(0)!\n    if (CC_15(cp) || CF_15(cp) || WHITE_SPACE_15.has(cp)) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nexport interface CarrierPrincipal {\n  principal: string          // did:key:z6Mk…, the control principal\n  key: KeyPair               // its Ed25519 pair (for the proofs of §5a.3)\n  info: string               // the derivation info, for auditability\n  keyAgreement: null         // declared, not omitted: Ed25519-only (§7a.1)\n}\n\n// Identity §7a.4 — derive the control principal for one relationship at\n// one carrier. `carrier` is C exactly as configured (byte-exact), `nonce`\n// is the relationship's 32-byte carrier nonce N from the register (§7a.3).\nexport async function carrierPrincipal (\n  rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CarrierPrincipal> {\n  if (!validCarrierIdentifier(carrier)) throw new Error('invalid carrier identifier (7a.2)')\n  if (nonce.length !== 32) throw new Error('carrier nonce must be 32 bytes (7a.3)')\n  // M-3: the derivation reads its inputs at entry, once. Caller-held\n  // buffers can be mutated while the HKDF awaits; copies make the\n  // derived principal a function of the arguments as passed.\n  const ikm = rootIkm.slice()\n  const n = nonce.slice()\n  const info = CARRIER_INFO_PREFIX + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(n)\n  const seed = await hkdf(ikm, info)\n  const key = await edFromSeed(seed)\n  return { principal: anchorOfEd(key.pubRaw), key, info, keyAgreement: null }\n}\n\nexport interface CarrierScopedIdentity {\n  did: string                // did:key:z6Mk…\n  key: KeyPair\n  info: string\n  scope: 'connection' | 'egress'\n}\n\n// One connection DID / one egress identity per (relationship × carrier),\n// same derivation discipline and same input rules as the principal\n// (§7a.4), distinct prefix. Retired with the principal, never reused.\nexport async function carrierScopedIdentity (\n  rootIkm: Uint8Array, carrier: string, nonce: Uint8Array,\n  scope: 'connection' | 'egress',\n): Promise<CarrierScopedIdentity> {\n  if (!validCarrierIdentifier(carrier)) throw new Error('invalid carrier identifier (7a.2)')\n  if (nonce.length !== 32) throw new Error('carrier nonce must be 32 bytes (7a.3)')\n  const ikm = rootIkm.slice()\n  const n = nonce.slice()\n  const prefix = scope === 'connection' ? CONNECTION_INFO_PREFIX : EGRESS_INFO_PREFIX\n  const info = prefix + await mh(te.encode(carrier)) + await mh(n)\n  const seed = await hkdf(ikm, info)\n  const key = await edFromSeed(seed)\n  return { did: anchorOfEd(key.pubRaw), key, info, scope }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/ceremony.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export type { Person } from './probe/deps.js';
+export * from './probe/encounter.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=ceremony.d.ts.map

package/dist/ceremony.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"ceremony.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ceremony.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA4BA,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAC7C,cAAc,sBAAsB,CAAA"}

package/dist/ceremony.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// @real-life/trust-protocol — ceremony: the GRADUATED transmission of the
+// Encounter ceremony on the normative forms.
+//
+// Graduated 05.09.2026 after a 25-round adversarial conformance loop
+// (design/encounter-nachzug-konvergenz-2026-09.md): this module implements
+// the one registered ceremony `encounter-scan@0.25` (Encounter 0.29, wire
+// 0.25) carried by the Delivery Contract 0.79 —
+//
+//   encounter-bundle/0.1                 the scanner's sent card + step
+//                                        credential (Delivery 4.1)
+//   encounter-credential-delivery/0.1    the counter-step in the bundle's
+//                                        thread (Delivery 4.3)
+//   delivery-ack/0.1 (signed class)      arrival, never acceptance (4.2)
+//
+// The machine: the own-challenge state model with its lock-free aging
+// latch (5.3), the enactment record as the one serialization point (5.5),
+// the eight-step acceptance (5.6), connected and offline path of 5.8 with
+// free switching, and ONE commit discipline for every effect —
+// prepare (async, no mutation) → verify (sync, under the 6.2 lock set) →
+// commit (sync). `delivered` is the sender's status only on a valid ack.
+//
+// The module operates on the probe WORLD (a `Person`); the host owns
+// storage and transport and carries the duties listed in the handoff
+// (atomic writes, resume before flush, UI correlation).
+//
+//   show · scan · counter · captureSentCard · receiveEncounter ·
+//   resumeEncounter · flushEncounter · resolve · constants
+export * from './probe/encounter.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=ceremony.js.map

package/dist/ceremony.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"ceremony.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ceremony.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,0EAA0E;AAC1E,6CAA6C;AAC7C,EAAE;AACF,qEAAqE;AACrE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,gDAAgD;AAChD,EAAE;AACF,wEAAwE;AACxE,mEAAmE;AACnE,0EAA0E;AAC1E,+DAA+D;AAC/D,yEAAyE;AACzE,EAAE;AACF,sEAAsE;AACtE,0EAA0E;AAC1E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,+DAA+D;AAC/D,yEAAyE;AACzE,yEAAyE;AACzE,EAAE;AACF,qEAAqE;AACrE,qEAAqE;AACrE,wDAAwD;AACxD,EAAE;AACF,iEAAiE;AACjE,2DAA2D;AAG3D,cAAc,sBAAsB,CAAA","sourcesContent":["// @real-life/trust-protocol — ceremony: the GRADUATED transmission of the\n// Encounter ceremony on the normative forms.\n//\n// Graduated 05.09.2026 after a 25-round adversarial conformance loop\n// (design/encounter-nachzug-konvergenz-2026-09.md): this module implements\n// the one registered ceremony `encounter-scan@0.25` (Encounter 0.29, wire\n// 0.25) carried by the Delivery Contract 0.79 —\n//\n//   encounter-bundle/0.1                 the scanner's sent card + step\n//                                        credential (Delivery 4.1)\n//   encounter-credential-delivery/0.1    the counter-step in the bundle's\n//                                        thread (Delivery 4.3)\n//   delivery-ack/0.1 (signed class)      arrival, never acceptance (4.2)\n//\n// The machine: the own-challenge state model with its lock-free aging\n// latch (5.3), the enactment record as the one serialization point (5.5),\n// the eight-step acceptance (5.6), connected and offline path of 5.8 with\n// free switching, and ONE commit discipline for every effect —\n// prepare (async, no mutation) → verify (sync, under the 6.2 lock set) →\n// commit (sync). `delivered` is the sender's status only on a valid ack.\n//\n// The module operates on the probe WORLD (a `Person`); the host owns\n// storage and transport and carries the duties listed in the handoff\n// (atomic writes, resume before flush, UI correlation).\n//\n//   show · scan · counter · captureSentCard · receiveEncounter ·\n//   resumeEncounter · flushEncounter · resolve · constants\n\nexport type { Person } from './probe/deps.js'\nexport * from './probe/encounter.js'\n"]}

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -6,4 +6,6 @@ export * from './delivery.js';
 export * from './carrier-identity.js';
 export * from './carrier.js';
 export * from './holder.js';
+export * as visibility from './visibility.js';
+export * as ceremony from './ceremony.js';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA2BA,cAAc,WAAW,CAAA;AACzB,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,gBAAgB,CAAA;AAC9B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,uBAAuB,CAAA;AACrC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAA;AAC5B,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAoCA,cAAc,WAAW,CAAA;AACzB,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,gBAAgB,CAAA;AAC9B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,uBAAuB,CAAA;AACrC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAA;AAC5B,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAC7C,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,CAAA"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@
 //   carrier-identity  the carrier-relationship principal (Identity §7a)
 //   carrier           the carrier side of the port (Delivery §4.4 + §5a)
 //   holder            the holder side: proofs, verdicts, recovery (§5a, §9.3)
+//   visibility        Network Visibility 0.29 on Delivery 0.79 — the trust
+//                     act, the blinded star, §6a continuity, the deniable
+//                     ack (namespaced: `visibility.trust`, `.continuity`,
+//                     `.acks`; graduated from /probe on 04.09.2026)
+//   ceremony          Encounter 0.29's registered ceremony on Delivery
+//                     0.79 — encounter-bundle, encounter-credential-
+//                     delivery, the signed ack; own-challenge state
+//                     model, enactment record, 5.6 acceptance, both
+//                     paths of 5.8 (graduated from /probe on 05.09.2026)
 //
 // Specification, schemas and vectors: https://rltp.real-life.org
 export * from './core.js';
@@ -32,4 +41,6 @@ export * from './delivery.js';
 export * from './carrier-identity.js';
 export * from './carrier.js';
 export * from './holder.js';
+export * as visibility from './visibility.js';
+export * as ceremony from './ceremony.js';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,8DAA8D;AAC9D,EAAE;AACF,uEAAuE;AACvE,mEAAmE;AACnE,uEAAuE;AACvE,uEAAuE;AACvE,6BAA6B;AAC7B,EAAE;AACF,oEAAoE;AACpE,kEAAkE;AAClE,sEAAsE;AACtE,sEAAsE;AACtE,uEAAuE;AACvE,qEAAqE;AACrE,uBAAuB;AACvB,EAAE;AACF,oDAAoD;AACpD,mEAAmE;AACnE,+EAA+E;AAC/E,gFAAgF;AAChF,6EAA6E;AAC7E,wEAAwE;AACxE,yEAAyE;AACzE,8EAA8E;AAC9E,EAAE;AACF,iEAAiE;AAEjE,cAAc,WAAW,CAAA;AACzB,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,gBAAgB,CAAA;AAC9B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,uBAAuB,CAAA;AACrC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAA;AAC5B,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA","sourcesContent":["// @real-life/trust-protocol — the cryptographic core of RLTP.\n//\n// What this entry point IS: the wire-level primitives of the converged\n// layers, reproducing the shipped test vectors byte for byte — the\n// canonical form, the derivation of identity contexts under the closed\n// label registry, the encounter wire builders, the sealed envelope and\n// the generic receive chain.\n//\n// What it is NOT (yet): the layers' full state machines. Identity's\n// recovery derivation, Encounter's ceremony record and acceptance\n// machinery, Delivery's type-specific stages and residual bookkeeping\n// live in the specification and its conformance fixtures, not here. A\n// conformant implementation builds ON this module; importing it is not\n// yet conformance. The README states per module which casting's wire\n// forms it implements.\n//\n//   core              the form every artifact obeys\n//   crypto            the primitives, and the Data Integrity proof\n//   identity          context derivation under the closed registry (§6.1/§6.2)\n//   encounter         the ceremony's wire forms: challenges, cards, credentials\n//   delivery          the sealed envelope and the generic receive stages 1–4\n//   carrier-identity  the carrier-relationship principal (Identity §7a)\n//   carrier           the carrier side of the port (Delivery §4.4 + §5a)\n//   holder            the holder side: proofs, verdicts, recovery (§5a, §9.3)\n//\n// Specification, schemas and vectors: https://rltp.real-life.org\n\nexport * from './core.js'\nexport * from './crypto.js'\nexport * from './identity.js'\nexport * from './encounter.js'\nexport * from './delivery.js'\nexport * from './carrier-identity.js'\nexport * from './carrier.js'\nexport * from './holder.js'\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,8DAA8D;AAC9D,EAAE;AACF,uEAAuE;AACvE,mEAAmE;AACnE,uEAAuE;AACvE,uEAAuE;AACvE,6BAA6B;AAC7B,EAAE;AACF,oEAAoE;AACpE,kEAAkE;AAClE,sEAAsE;AACtE,sEAAsE;AACtE,uEAAuE;AACvE,qEAAqE;AACrE,uBAAuB;AACvB,EAAE;AACF,oDAAoD;AACpD,mEAAmE;AACnE,+EAA+E;AAC/E,gFAAgF;AAChF,6EAA6E;AAC7E,wEAAwE;AACxE,yEAAyE;AACzE,8EAA8E;AAC9E,2EAA2E;AAC3E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,oEAAoE;AACpE,uEAAuE;AACvE,qEAAqE;AACrE,oEAAoE;AACpE,oEAAoE;AACpE,yEAAyE;AACzE,EAAE;AACF,iEAAiE;AAEjE,cAAc,WAAW,CAAA;AACzB,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,gBAAgB,CAAA;AAC9B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAC7B,cAAc,uBAAuB,CAAA;AACrC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAA;AAC5B,cAAc,aAAa,CAAA;AAC3B,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAC7C,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,CAAA","sourcesContent":["// @real-life/trust-protocol — the cryptographic core of RLTP.\n//\n// What this entry point IS: the wire-level primitives of the converged\n// layers, reproducing the shipped test vectors byte for byte — the\n// canonical form, the derivation of identity contexts under the closed\n// label registry, the encounter wire builders, the sealed envelope and\n// the generic receive chain.\n//\n// What it is NOT (yet): the layers' full state machines. Identity's\n// recovery derivation, Encounter's ceremony record and acceptance\n// machinery, Delivery's type-specific stages and residual bookkeeping\n// live in the specification and its conformance fixtures, not here. A\n// conformant implementation builds ON this module; importing it is not\n// yet conformance. The README states per module which casting's wire\n// forms it implements.\n//\n//   core              the form every artifact obeys\n//   crypto            the primitives, and the Data Integrity proof\n//   identity          context derivation under the closed registry (§6.1/§6.2)\n//   encounter         the ceremony's wire forms: challenges, cards, credentials\n//   delivery          the sealed envelope and the generic receive stages 1–4\n//   carrier-identity  the carrier-relationship principal (Identity §7a)\n//   carrier           the carrier side of the port (Delivery §4.4 + §5a)\n//   holder            the holder side: proofs, verdicts, recovery (§5a, §9.3)\n//   visibility        Network Visibility 0.29 on Delivery 0.79 — the trust\n//                     act, the blinded star, §6a continuity, the deniable\n//                     ack (namespaced: `visibility.trust`, `.continuity`,\n//                     `.acks`; graduated from /probe on 04.09.2026)\n//   ceremony          Encounter 0.29's registered ceremony on Delivery\n//                     0.79 — encounter-bundle, encounter-credential-\n//                     delivery, the signed ack; own-challenge state\n//                     model, enactment record, 5.6 acceptance, both\n//                     paths of 5.8 (graduated from /probe on 05.09.2026)\n//\n// Specification, schemas and vectors: https://rltp.real-life.org\n\nexport * from './core.js'\nexport * from './crypto.js'\nexport * from './identity.js'\nexport * from './encounter.js'\nexport * from './delivery.js'\nexport * from './carrier-identity.js'\nexport * from './carrier.js'\nexport * from './holder.js'\nexport * as visibility from './visibility.js'\nexport * as ceremony from './ceremony.js'\n"]}

package/dist/probe/acks.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import * as C from './deps.js';
+import type { Person } from './deps.js';
+export declare const ACK_TYPE = "https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1";
+/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */
+export declare function ackKey(ownCtx: any, counterpartKa: string, issuerAnchor: string, recipientAnchor: string): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>>;
+/**
+ * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s
+ * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same
+ * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked
+ * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).
+ */
+export declare function buildAck(p: Person, contact: any, refDigest: string, threadId: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
+    to: any;
+    kind: string;
+    env: C.Envelope;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,
+ * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on
+ * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }
+ * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.
+ */
+export declare function verifyAck(p: Person, contact: any, doc: any, cls?: 'signature' | 'dv'): Promise<{
+    ref: string;
+    threadId: string;
+} | null>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=acks.d.ts.map

package/dist/probe/acks.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/probe/acks.js

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+// acks — the delivery acknowledgement (Delivery 4.2/4.4, the
+// acknowledgement CLASS rule) for the probe world. The ack DOCUMENT is
+// the real, registered wire form (`delivery-ack/0.1`) in the form the
+// acknowledged payload's class selects: a SIGNED ack (eddsa-jcs-2022
+// under the issuer anchor) for signature-class payloads (the Encounter
+// forms), the DENIABLE MAC ack for designated-verifier payloads (the
+// Visibility forms). The MAC key regime is the normative one —
+// byte-compatible with vectors/delivery-ack.json and
+// lib/test/vectors4.test.mjs: one channel-keyed derivation for every
+// DV-type ack, never the payload's internal MAC structure.
+//
+//   k = HKDF-SHA-256(ikm = X25519(pairX_issuer, pairX_recipient),
+//                    salt = empty, info = "rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/"
+//                    || issuerPairAnchor || "/" || recipientPairAnchor,
+//                    32 bytes; all-zero shared secret rejected)
+//   proof = { mac: HMAC-SHA-256 over JCS(document without proof) }
+//
+// Deniable by construction: either relationship party can compute the
+// MAC — for DV payloads the ack is evidence to the sender alone, never
+// an attestation toward anyone else (4.2).
+import { jcs, makeValidator } from '../core.js';
+import { SCHEMAS } from '../schemas.js';
+import * as C from './deps.js';
+const te = new TextEncoder();
+const S = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
+export const ACK_TYPE = 'https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1';
+const V = makeValidator(SCHEMAS);
+const schemaOk = (file, data) => V.validate(data, SCHEMAS[file], SCHEMAS[file]).length === 0;
+const hmacU = async (key, msg) => {
+    const k = await S.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign']);
+    return 'u' + C.b64uOf(new Uint8Array(await S.sign('HMAC', k, te.encode(msg))));
+};
+const contactKeyOf = (p, contact) => {
+    for (const [k, c] of p.contacts)
+        if (c === contact)
+            return k;
+    return undefined;
+};
+/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */
+export async function ackKey(ownCtx, counterpartKa, issuerAnchor, recipientAnchor) {
+    const shared = await C.ecdh(ownCtx.x.priv, C.xRawOfMk(counterpartKa));
+    if (shared.every((b) => b === 0))
+        throw new Error('all-zero X25519 output');
+    return C.hkdf(shared, 'rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/' + issuerAnchor + '/' + recipientAnchor);
+}
+/**
+ * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s
+ * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same
+ * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked
+ * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).
+ */
+export async function buildAck(p, contact, refDigest, threadId, when, ent = {}) {
+    const own = contact.channel.own;
+    const doc = {
+        id: ent.ackId ?? globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),
+        type: ACK_TYPE,
+        issuer: own.anchor, // = the acked document's recipient (4.2)
+        // the recipient is the counterparty anchor; `ent.recipient` names it
+        // when the tuple is not yet inserted (a record-creating effect builds
+        // its ack BEFORE the one synchronous commit, Delivery 4.1)
+        recipient: ent.recipient ?? contactKeyOf(p, contact),
+        threadId,
+        issuedAt: C.iso(when),
+        payload: { ref: refDigest, meaning: 'received' },
+    };
+    // the acknowledgement CLASS rule (4.2/4.4): a payload whose authenticity
+    // is a TRANSFERABLE SIGNATURE (the Encounter forms: card + credential
+    // under DataIntegrityProof) is acknowledged with eddsa-jcs-2022 under
+    // the ack's issuer anchor — an attestation; a DESIGNATED-VERIFIER
+    // payload with the deniable channel-keyed MAC. `ent.cls` selects.
+    if (ent.cls === 'signature') {
+        const document = await C.diSign(own, doc, doc.issuedAt);
+        return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (signiert, eddsa-jcs-2022 unter dem Issuer-Anker)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) };
+    }
+    const k = await ackKey(own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient);
+    const document = { ...doc, proof: { mac: await hmacU(k, jcs(doc)) } };
+    return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (deniabel, MAC unter dem Kanal-Ack-Key)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) };
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,
+ * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on
+ * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }
+ * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.
+ */
+export async function verifyAck(p, contact, doc, cls = 'dv') {
+    try {
+        if (doc?.type !== ACK_TYPE)
+            return null;
+        // STUFENORDNUNG (Review 33, B-2): erst das DOKUMENTPROFIL + der
+        // recipient (Stufe 5), dann das Payload-Schema (Stufe 7), dann die
+        // Typ-Konsistenzregeln (Stufe 8), der MAC zuletzt
+        // — Stufe 5: Dokument-Schema, geschlossene Form, Proof-Form,
+        //   Kalender, recipient = eigener Anker
+        if (!schemaOk('rltp-delivery-document.schema.json', doc))
+            return null;
+        if (!C.shaped(doc, { id: 'string', issuer: 'string', recipient: 'string', threadId: 'string', issuedAt: 'string', payload: 'object', proof: 'object' }))
+            return null;
+        // geschlossene Form + das OPTIONALE ceremony-Feld (Review 19, B-2:
+        // „ceremony — OPTIONAL, and entirely unconstrained"); der MAC läuft
+        // über JCS(Dokument ohne proof) und deckt es mit ab
+        if (Object.keys(doc).some((k) => !['id', 'type', 'issuer', 'recipient', 'threadId', 'issuedAt', 'payload', 'proof', 'ceremony'].includes(k)))
+            return null;
+        // — Stufe 7 VOR Stufe 8: das Payload-Schema zuerst
+        if (!schemaOk('payload-delivery-ack.schema.json', doc.payload))
+            return null;
+        // class rule (4.2/4.4, Stufe 8): EXACTLY the form the acknowledged
+        // payload's class selects — signature-class payload → SIGNED ack,
+        // designated-verifier payload → MAC ack. Every other combination
+        // (MAC on a signature-class payload, signature on a DV payload, a
+        // hybrid proof) is invalid
+        if (cls === 'signature') {
+            if (doc.proof.mac !== undefined || doc.proof.type !== 'DataIntegrityProof' || doc.proof.cryptosuite !== 'eddsa-jcs-2022')
+                return null;
+            if (!C.calOK(doc.proof.created))
+                return null;
+        }
+        else {
+            if (Object.keys(doc.proof).length !== 1)
+                return null;
+            if (typeof doc.proof.mac !== 'string' || doc.proof.proofValue !== undefined)
+                return null;
+        }
+        if (!C.calOK(doc.issuedAt))
+            return null; // Kalender-Validität (Review 12, B-3)
+        if (doc.recipient !== contact.channel.own.anchor)
+            return null;
+        // — Stufe 8: enactment-Profilregel (Review 20, B-2: ein Ack
+        //   umschließt kein Bindungsmaterial), issuer-Bindung, meaning
+        if (doc.ceremony?.enactment !== undefined)
+            return null;
+        if (doc.issuer !== contactKeyOf(p, contact))
+            return null;
+        if (!C.shaped(doc.payload, { ref: 'string', meaning: 'string' }) || doc.payload.meaning !== 'received')
+            return null;
+        if (cls === 'signature') {
+            // the attestation: verifies under the ack's issuer anchor (= the
+            // acked document's recipient, our counterpart on the tuple)
+            if (!(await C.diVerify(doc, doc.issuer)))
+                return null;
+            return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId };
+        }
+        const { proof, ...rest } = doc;
+        const k = await ackKey(contact.channel.own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient);
+        if ((await hmacU(k, jcs(rest))) !== proof.mac)
+            return null;
+        return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=acks.js.map

package/dist/probe/acks.js.map

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acks — the delivery acknowledgement (Delivery 4.2/4.4, the\n// acknowledgement CLASS rule) for the probe world. The ack DOCUMENT is\n// the real, registered wire form (`delivery-ack/0.1`) in the form the\n// acknowledged payload's class selects: a SIGNED ack (eddsa-jcs-2022\n// under the issuer anchor) for signature-class payloads (the Encounter\n// forms), the DENIABLE MAC ack for designated-verifier payloads (the\n// Visibility forms). The MAC key regime is the normative one —\n// byte-compatible with vectors/delivery-ack.json and\n// lib/test/vectors4.test.mjs: one channel-keyed derivation for every\n// DV-type ack, never the payload's internal MAC structure.\n//\n//   k = HKDF-SHA-256(ikm = X25519(pairX_issuer, pairX_recipient),\n//                    salt = empty, info = \"rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/\"\n//                    || issuerPairAnchor || \"/\" || recipientPairAnchor,\n//                    32 bytes; all-zero shared secret rejected)\n//   proof = { mac: HMAC-SHA-256 over JCS(document without proof) }\n//\n// Deniable by construction: either relationship party can compute the\n// MAC — for DV payloads the ack is evidence to the sender alone, never\n// an attestation toward anyone else (4.2).\nimport { jcs, makeValidator } from '../core.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS } from '../schemas.js'\nimport * as C from './deps.js'\nimport type { Person } from './deps.js'\n\nconst te = new TextEncoder()\nconst S = globalThis.crypto.subtle\nexport const ACK_TYPE = 'https://real-life.org/trust-tasks/delivery-ack/0.1'\n\nconst V = makeValidator(SCHEMAS)\nconst schemaOk = (file: string, data: any) => V.validate(data, SCHEMAS[file], SCHEMAS[file]).length === 0\nconst hmacU = async (key: Uint8Array, msg: string) => {\n  const k = await S.importKey('raw', key, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n  return 'u' + C.b64uOf(new Uint8Array(await S.sign('HMAC', k, te.encode(msg))))\n}\nconst contactKeyOf = (p: Person, contact: any) => {\n  for (const [k, c] of p.contacts) if (c === contact) return k\n  return undefined\n}\n\n/** the channel ack key — Section 5's derivation discipline, 4.2's info */\nexport async function ackKey (ownCtx: any, counterpartKa: string, issuerAnchor: string, recipientAnchor: string) {\n  const shared = await C.ecdh(ownCtx.x.priv, C.xRawOfMk(counterpartKa)!)\n  if (shared.every((b: number) => b === 0)) throw new Error('all-zero X25519 output')\n  return C.hkdf(shared, 'rltp/v1/delivery/mac/ack/' + issuerAnchor + '/' + recipientAnchor)\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the sealed deniable ack for a document received on `contact`'s\n * channel. `refDigest` is the acknowledged document's digest (the same\n * digest the completed-effect cache keys on); `threadId` is the acked\n * document's thread — the ack continues it (4.2).\n */\nexport async function buildAck (p: Person, contact: any, refDigest: string, threadId: string, when: number, ent: any = {}) {\n  const own = contact.channel.own\n  const doc = {\n    id: ent.ackId ?? globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n    type: ACK_TYPE,\n    issuer: own.anchor,                       // = the acked document's recipient (4.2)\n    // the recipient is the counterparty anchor; `ent.recipient` names it\n    // when the tuple is not yet inserted (a record-creating effect builds\n    // its ack BEFORE the one synchronous commit, Delivery 4.1)\n    recipient: ent.recipient ?? contactKeyOf(p, contact),\n    threadId,\n    issuedAt: C.iso(when),\n    payload: { ref: refDigest, meaning: 'received' },\n  }\n  // the acknowledgement CLASS rule (4.2/4.4): a payload whose authenticity\n  // is a TRANSFERABLE SIGNATURE (the Encounter forms: card + credential\n  // under DataIntegrityProof) is acknowledged with eddsa-jcs-2022 under\n  // the ack's issuer anchor — an attestation; a DESIGNATED-VERIFIER\n  // payload with the deniable channel-keyed MAC. `ent.cls` selects.\n  if (ent.cls === 'signature') {\n    const document = await C.diSign(own, doc, doc.issuedAt)\n    return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (signiert, eddsa-jcs-2022 unter dem Issuer-Anker)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) }\n  }\n  const k = await ackKey(own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient!)\n  const document = { ...doc, proof: { mac: await hmacU(k, jcs(doc)) } }\n  return { to: contact, kind: 'delivery-ack/0.1 (deniabel, MAC unter dem Kanal-Ack-Key)', env: await C.seal(document, contact.channel.counterpartKa, ent) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a received deniable ack (4.2 consistency): MAC-form proof only,\n * MAC under the arrival tuple's ack key, issuer = our counterpart on\n * that tuple, recipient = our own pair anchor. Returns { ref, threadId }\n * or null — the caller matches ref against what it actually sent.\n */\nexport async function verifyAck (p: Person, contact: any, doc: any, cls: 'signature' | 'dv' = 'dv'): Promise<{ ref: string, threadId: string } | null> {\n  try {\n    if (doc?.type !== ACK_TYPE) return null\n    // STUFENORDNUNG (Review 33, B-2): erst das DOKUMENTPROFIL + der\n    // recipient (Stufe 5), dann das Payload-Schema (Stufe 7), dann die\n    // Typ-Konsistenzregeln (Stufe 8), der MAC zuletzt\n    // — Stufe 5: Dokument-Schema, geschlossene Form, Proof-Form,\n    //   Kalender, recipient = eigener Anker\n    if (!schemaOk('rltp-delivery-document.schema.json', doc)) return null\n    if (!C.shaped(doc, { id: 'string', issuer: 'string', recipient: 'string', threadId: 'string', issuedAt: 'string', payload: 'object', proof: 'object' })) return null\n    // geschlossene Form + das OPTIONALE ceremony-Feld (Review 19, B-2:\n    // „ceremony — OPTIONAL, and entirely unconstrained\"); der MAC läuft\n    // über JCS(Dokument ohne proof) und deckt es mit ab\n    if (Object.keys(doc).some((k) => !['id', 'type', 'issuer', 'recipient', 'threadId', 'issuedAt', 'payload', 'proof', 'ceremony'].includes(k))) return null\n    // — Stufe 7 VOR Stufe 8: das Payload-Schema zuerst\n    if (!schemaOk('payload-delivery-ack.schema.json', doc.payload)) return null\n    // class rule (4.2/4.4, Stufe 8): EXACTLY the form the acknowledged\n    // payload's class selects — signature-class payload → SIGNED ack,\n    // designated-verifier payload → MAC ack. Every other combination\n    // (MAC on a signature-class payload, signature on a DV payload, a\n    // hybrid proof) is invalid\n    if (cls === 'signature') {\n      if (doc.proof.mac !== undefined || doc.proof.type !== 'DataIntegrityProof' || doc.proof.cryptosuite !== 'eddsa-jcs-2022') return null\n      if (!C.calOK(doc.proof.created)) return null\n    } else {\n      if (Object.keys(doc.proof).length !== 1) return null\n      if (typeof doc.proof.mac !== 'string' || doc.proof.proofValue !== undefined) return null\n    }\n    if (!C.calOK(doc.issuedAt)) return null   // Kalender-Validität (Review 12, B-3)\n    if (doc.recipient !== contact.channel.own.anchor) return null\n    // — Stufe 8: enactment-Profilregel (Review 20, B-2: ein Ack\n    //   umschließt kein Bindungsmaterial), issuer-Bindung, meaning\n    if (doc.ceremony?.enactment !== undefined) return null\n    if (doc.issuer !== contactKeyOf(p, contact)) return null\n    if (!C.shaped(doc.payload, { ref: 'string', meaning: 'string' }) || doc.payload.meaning !== 'received') return null\n    if (cls === 'signature') {\n      // the attestation: verifies under the ack's issuer anchor (= the\n      // acked document's recipient, our counterpart on the tuple)\n      if (!(await C.diVerify(doc, doc.issuer))) return null\n      return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId }\n    }\n    const { proof, ...rest } = doc\n    const k = await ackKey(contact.channel.own, contact.channel.counterpartKa, doc.issuer, doc.recipient)\n    if ((await hmacU(k, jcs(rest))) !== proof.mac) return null\n    return { ref: doc.payload.ref, threadId: doc.threadId }\n  } catch { return null }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/probe/continuity.d.ts

@@ -4,96 +4,17 @@ export declare const snapshotPriors: (p: Person) => {
     own: any[];
     counterpart: string[];
 };
-export declare function buildProbe(p: Person, newKey: string, ent?: any): Promise<{
+export declare function buildProbe(p: Person, newKey: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
     to: any;
     kind: string;
     env: C.Envelope;
 }[] | null>;
-export declare function receiveContinuity(p: Person, env: any, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
-    handled: boolean;
-    partial: boolean;
-    error?: undefined;
-    matches?: undefined;
-    chained?: undefined;
-    name?: undefined;
-    outbound?: undefined;
-    outboundError?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    matches: number;
-    error?: undefined;
-    partial?: undefined;
-    chained?: undefined;
-    name?: undefined;
-    outbound?: undefined;
-    outboundError?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    matches: number;
-    chained: boolean;
-    name: any;
-    outbound: {
-        to: any;
-        kind: string;
-        env: C.Envelope;
-    }[];
-    outboundError: string | undefined;
-    error?: undefined;
-    partial?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    error: string;
-    chained?: undefined;
-    name?: undefined;
-    outbound?: undefined;
-    outboundError?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    chained: boolean;
-    name: any;
-    outbound: {
-        to: any;
-        kind: string;
-        env: C.Envelope;
-    }[];
-    outboundError: string;
-    error?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    chained: boolean;
-    name: any;
-    outbound: {
-        to: any;
-        kind: string;
-        env: C.Envelope;
-    }[];
-    error?: undefined;
-    outboundError?: undefined;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    doc: any;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    duplicate: boolean;
-} | {
-    handled: boolean;
-    duplicate?: undefined;
-}>;
+export declare function receiveContinuity(p: Person, env: any, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<any>;
 /**
  * The host's producing call for a mapping the receiver still owes
  * (review 6, B-3): a transient seal failure during probe/mapping
  * handling persists the obligation in contMappingDue; this call — not a
  * redelivery, which the freshness rule forbids — builds and returns it.
  */
-export declare function flushContinuity(p: Person, newKey: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<{
-    outbound: never[];
-    pending: boolean;
-} | {
-    outbound: {
-        to: any;
-        kind: string;
-        env: C.Envelope;
-    }[];
-    pending?: undefined;
-}>;
+export declare function flushContinuity(p: Person, newKey: string, when: number, ent?: any): Promise<any>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=continuity.d.ts.map

package/dist/probe/continuity.d.ts.map

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