@rapidmx/web-client 0.5.0 → 0.6.0

package/dist/apps/shared/plugins/pluginNav.js

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/** A same-origin absolute path: starts with `/`, but not `//` or `/\` (both of which browsers treat as
+ * protocol-relative URLs to another host). */
+export function isSafePluginHref(href) {
+    return /^\/(?![/\\])/.test(href);
+}
+/**
+ * Appends a plugin's nav items after the core ones. Skips any item that isn't well-formed, whose `href`
+ * isn't a same-origin path (see `isSafePluginHref`), or whose id is already taken - by a core item or
+ * `reservedIds` (core ids always win) or by an earlier plugin item.
+ */
+export function mergePluginNavItems(coreItems, pluginItems, toItem, reservedIds = []) {
+    if (!pluginItems?.length) {
+        return coreItems;
+    }
+    const taken = new Set([...coreItems.map((item) => item.id), ...reservedIds]);
+    const merged = [...coreItems];
+    for (const item of pluginItems) {
+        if (typeof item?.id !== "string" ||
+            typeof item.label !== "string" ||
+            typeof item.href !== "string" ||
+            !isSafePluginHref(item.href) ||
+            taken.has(item.id)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        taken.add(item.id);
+        merged.push(toItem(item));
+    }
+    return merged;
+}

package/dist/apps/shared/search/LocalIndexLifecycle.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import type { PublicKey } from "@rapidmx/react-shared/crypto/keyvaultApi.js";
+import type { Folder } from "@rapidmx/react-shared/mail/mailApi.js";
+export declare const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
+export interface LocalIndexLifecycleProps {
+    mailboxUid?: string;
+    mailboxKeys?: PublicKey[];
+    folders: Folder[];
+    /** Every mailbox the signed-in user can currently access. Once known, indexes on this device for any
+     * other mailbox (e.g. left behind by a different user who never signed out) are removed. */
+    accessibleMailboxUids?: string[];
+}
+/** Renders nothing - pure side-effect component, mounted by `MailShell.tsx`. */
+export default function LocalIndexLifecycle({ mailboxUid, folders, accessibleMailboxUids }: LocalIndexLifecycleProps): null;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexBlockCipher.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * The actual AES-256-GCM block cipher `localIndexVFS.ts`'s `EncryptingVFS` uses to encrypt/decrypt one
+ * physical storage block - deliberately split out from that file so it can be exercised with real
+ * WebCrypto in a plain unit test, with no OPFS/Worker/wa-sqlite involved at all (none of those are
+ * available under Vitest's jsdom environment, matching the same "node" test environment convention
+ * `react-shared`'s other crypto modules already use for exactly this reason).
+ *
+ * See `localIndexVFS.ts`'s own doc comment for the full design rationale (page layout, why a fresh
+ * random nonce per write, why AAD binds to filename+block index). This module is pure mechanism; that
+ * one is where the design is explained.
+ */
+/** The logical SQLite page size `EncryptingVFS` is designed for - MUST match the `PRAGMA page_size` the
+ * database was created with (`localIndexWorker.ts` sets this before the first write). */
+export declare const LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE = 4096;
+/** One physical block on disk: `nonce || ciphertext || tag`. */
+export declare const PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE: number;
+/** Thrown when a stored block fails AES-GCM authentication - a wrong/rotated key, on-disk corruption, or
+ * a block moved to the wrong position (see `localIndexVFS.ts`'s doc comment on why AAD binds position).
+ * The worker's caller treats this identically to a schema-version mismatch: discard the whole index and
+ * rebuild (spec §11 "Invalidation"). */
+export declare class PageCorruptedError extends Error {
+    /** The underlying `DOMException`/error `crypto.subtle.decrypt()` threw, or an inner-VFS read failure
+     * - kept as a plain field rather than the ES2022 `Error` constructor's `cause` option, since
+     * web-client's `tsconfig.json` targets ES2020. */
+    readonly cause: unknown;
+    constructor(filename: string, blockIndex: number, cause: unknown);
+}
+export declare function importAesGcmKey(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey>;
+/** Encrypts one logical block (`plaintext`, exactly `LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE` bytes) into its physical,
+ * on-disk representation (`PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE` bytes: a fresh random nonce followed by
+ * ciphertext+tag). */
+export declare function encryptBlock(key: CryptoKey, filename: string, blockIndex: number, plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+/** Inverse of `encryptBlock()`. Throws `PageCorruptedError` (never a raw `DOMException`) on auth
+ * failure - a wrong key, tampered ciphertext, or a block swapped into the wrong position (caught by the
+ * position-bound AAD not matching). */
+export declare function decryptBlock(key: CryptoKey, filename: string, blockIndex: number, physical: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexBuilder.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * The Tier 2 local index's background builder (`specs/search.md` §11 "Initial build... incrementally,
+ * newest-first"). Runs on the main thread - the actual storage I/O and encryption happen in
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts` (off the UI thread, per that file's own doc comment); this module's own work is
+ * orchestration (deciding what to fetch) plus already-async fetch/decrypt calls, not CPU-heavy work that
+ * would itself need to move off-thread.
+ *
+ * **Known scoping simplification**: walks the mailbox's real mail folders one at a time (a fixed,
+ * reasonable priority order - Inbox and Sent first), each already newest-first via `listMessages()`'s own
+ * default sort, rather than a true interleaved k-way merge producing one single globally-newest-first
+ * stream across folders. A message in, say, Sent slightly older than the *oldest-processed-so-far*
+ * message in Inbox can therefore be indexed slightly out of true global date order relative to it. Given
+ * the byte-budget eviction below is itself date-based (oldest `date_for_sort` first, enforced by
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts`'s own `applyEviction()` after every insert - see that file), a small amount of
+ * cross-folder interleaving imprecision here does not affect *what* ultimately survives the window, only
+ * the exact order entities are inserted (and therefore briefly evicted-and-reinserted) in.
+ *
+ * Only encrypted messages (`subject === "[...]"`) are indexed - see `ENCRYPTED_SUBJECT_PLACEHOLDER`'s
+ * own precedent in `apps/www/index.tsx`'s inbox-list decrypt work. An unencrypted message is already
+ * fully searchable via Tier 1; indexing it here too would spend this index's bounded byte budget on
+ * content that didn't need it.
+ *
+ * **Verification seals.** A message this pass decrypts that has no seal for the vault's current `masterKeyGeneration` is
+ * evaluated with `evaluateMessageSecurityWithSeal()`, against the sender's pinned signing keys from the reader's
+ * contacts (`pinnedSigners.ts`, the message pane's own source, looked up once per sender per pass), so a verified
+ * message gets its seal without being opened (see `apps/shared/components/mail/verificationSeals.ts`). Pins only change
+ * the security state, never the recovered subject or body this index stores. Seal writes are best effort and bounded:
+ * at most `SEAL_WRITE_CONCURRENCY` in flight, at most `MAX_SEAL_WRITES_PER_PASS` per pass (past it, messages are
+ * evaluated without seals), failures ignored, and nothing new starts once the pass is aborted or its keys are destroyed.
+ * A seal carries only a hash, fingerprint, state and time, never plaintext. With no readable vault generation the pass
+ * seals nothing. Signed-only (unencrypted) messages aren't sealed here: this pass never fetches their raw MIME (see
+ * above), and fetching it only to seal would cost a download per message; they are sealed when opened.
+ */
+import { type Folder } from "@rapidmx/react-shared/mail/mailApi.js";
+import type { UnlockedKeys } from "@rapidmx/react-shared/crypto/keySession.js";
+/** §11's Window Sizing table's time-floor column - explicitly unvalidated starting-point default per the
+ * spec's own §16 "Measurement Task" ("cannot be supplied by design work... MUST NOT be treated as
+ * validated"). Used as-is rather than invented/adjusted here. Not user-adjustable today (unlike the byte
+ * budget - see `localIndexSizePreference.ts`) - nothing in this codebase has asked for that yet. */
+export declare const WEB_TIME_FLOOR_MONTHS = 12;
+/** Either bound as `0` means "no limit": `applyEviction()` (`localIndexWorker.ts`) already treats a
+ * falsy byte budget as unconfigured/unenforced, and `buildLocalIndex()` below mirrors that same
+ * convention for `timeFloorMonths` so a single `0` means the same thing in both dimensions. */
+export interface LocalIndexWindowConfig {
+    timeFloorMonths: number;
+    byteBudgetBytes: number;
+}
+/** How many times a pass walks a folder whose total count changed during the walk. `listMessages()` only
+ * pages by offset, so a message removed from an already-walked page shifts a later one onto it unseen;
+ * only a folder whose count held steady across a whole walk is trusted for completeness and pruning. */
+export declare const MAX_WALK_ATTEMPTS = 3;
+/** Subtracted from the pass's start time before it's recorded as the end of guaranteed coverage - a
+ * message's server-assigned `receivedDate` can be ahead of this device's clock. */
+export declare const CLOCK_SKEW_MARGIN_MS: number;
+/** How many raw-MIME fetch+decrypt calls run at once - a page of 100 encrypted messages used to fire all
+ * 100 requests simultaneously. */
+export declare const FETCH_CONCURRENCY = 6;
+/** How many verification seal writes run at once during a pass. */
+export declare const SEAL_WRITE_CONCURRENCY = 2;
+/** The most verification seals one pass writes. */
+export declare const MAX_SEAL_WRITES_PER_PASS = 200;
+/** Runs one full incremental build pass for `mailboxUid`: sets the window, walks mail folders newest-first
+ * (per this module's own doc comment on the folder-order simplification), decrypts and indexes only
+ * `"[...]"`-subject messages until each folder's own coverage passes the time floor, then clears the
+ * `building` flag. Messages already indexed at the same version are skipped, fetches run at most
+ * `FETCH_CONCURRENCY` at a time, and messages older than the eviction watermark (`WindowState.evictedBefore`)
+ * are neither fetched nor walked past. A failure partway through leaves whatever was indexed so far in place
+ * and records the pass as incomplete (spec §11's "incomplete-index UX... MUST indicate that coverage is
+ * partial" - see `Coverage.complete`). Rows the server no longer lists (deleted or moved elsewhere by any
+ * client) are pruned only within folders whose count held steady for a whole walk (see `MAX_WALK_ATTEMPTS`).
+ *
+ * Only one pass runs per mailbox (a newer call cancels the older), and every Worker call carries this pass's
+ * generation, so a pass outlived by a destroy can't write anything (see `cancelLocalIndexBuild()`).
+ *
+ * `windowConfig` defaults to this device's own configured byte budget (`getLocalIndexByteBudget()` -
+ * 500 MB in a browser tab, 1 GB in Electron, or whatever the user has since set in Settings > Encryption)
+ * alongside the fixed time floor above. Evaluated fresh on every call with no explicit override, so a
+ * preference change in Settings takes effect starting with this mailbox's next build pass (its next
+ * unlock), without requiring a reload.
+ */
+export declare function buildLocalIndex(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, folders: Folder[], windowConfig?: LocalIndexWindowConfig): Promise<void>;
+/** Stops a mailbox's running build pass, if any (e.g. its keys were just destroyed), resolving once it has
+ * wound down. The Worker independently rejects the pass's later calls once the index is destroyed (see
+ * `GenerationParams`); this just stops the fetching and decrypting too. Never rejects. */
+export declare function cancelLocalIndexBuild(mailboxUid: string): Promise<void>;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexKey.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/** Derives this mailbox's local-index page-encryption key from its already-unlocked master key. Every
+ * call with the same `(masterKey, mailboxUid)` pair returns the identical key - callers never need to
+ * persist it themselves. */
+export declare function deriveLocalIndexKey(masterKey: Uint8Array, mailboxUid: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexRpcClient.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Main-thread Promise-based RPC wrapper around `localIndexWorker.ts`. One Worker per tab (spawned
+ * lazily, on first use, not at module load - a page that never touches search shouldn't pay for booting
+ * the WASM module at all), shared across every mailbox `init()`-ed this session - the Worker itself keeps
+ * a per-mailbox connection map (see that file's own doc comment).
+ *
+ * `postMessage` has no native request/response pairing, so every call generates its own numeric `id` and
+ * this module correlates the eventual matching response via a pending-request map.
+ *
+ * **Generations**: `nextLocalIndexGeneration()` hands out one monotonic counter shared by build passes and
+ * destroys, so the Worker can reject a build call issued before the index was destroyed (see
+ * `GenerationParams`).
+ *
+ * **Sign-out reaches every tab**: `destroyAllLocalIndexes()` broadcasts on a `BroadcastChannel`; any other
+ * tab running a Worker closes its connections and refuses further `init`s.
+ *
+ * **Failed deletions are retried**: a destroy that couldn't remove a directory (another tab held it, the page
+ * navigated away first) is recorded in `localStorage` and retried before this tab's first `init`.
+ */
+import type { ParsedSearchQuery } from "@rapidmx/react-shared/search/queryGrammar.js";
+import type { Coverage, IndexEntitiesResult, InitParams, LocalSearchPage, WindowState } from "./localIndexWorker.js";
+import type { LocalIndexEntity } from "./localIndexSchema.js";
+/** A fresh generation - see this module's doc comment. */
+export declare function nextLocalIndexGeneration(): number;
+export declare const SIGN_OUT_CHANNEL = "rapidmx-localsearch";
+export declare const PENDING_DELETIONS_KEY = "rapidmx-localsearch-pending-deletions";
+/** Retries every deletion an earlier page load couldn't finish. Runs once per page load (memoized), before
+ * this tab's first `init` - so it never races an index this tab itself opens. Never rejects. */
+export declare function retryPendingLocalIndexDeletions(): Promise<void>;
+export declare function initLocalIndex(params: InitParams): Promise<void>;
+export declare function indexLocalEntities(mailboxUid: string, entities: LocalIndexEntity[], generation?: number): Promise<IndexEntitiesResult>;
+/** Drops one message from this session's local index (a delete). A no-op for a mailbox not indexed in
+ * this tab - a later build pass prunes it instead. Never rejects: best-effort housekeeping. */
+export declare function removeLocalEntity(mailboxUid: string, entityUid: string): Promise<void>;
+/** Re-points one indexed message at its new folder (archive, cancel-scheduled-send) so `folder:`-scoped
+ * local searches stay correct. Same no-op/never-rejects rules as `removeLocalEntity()`. */
+export declare function moveLocalEntity(mailboxUid: string, entityUid: string, folderUid: string): Promise<void>;
+export declare function getIndexedVersions(mailboxUid: string, entityUids: string[]): Promise<Record<string, string>>;
+export declare function pruneLocalEntities(mailboxUid: string, keepEntityUids: string[], since: string | undefined, options?: {
+    folderUids?: string[];
+    generation?: number;
+}): Promise<number>;
+export declare function searchLocal(mailboxUid: string, parsed: ParsedSearchQuery, limit: number, offset?: number): Promise<LocalSearchPage>;
+export declare function getLocalCoverage(mailboxUid: string): Promise<Coverage>;
+export declare function setLocalIndexWindow(mailboxUid: string, timeFloorMonths: number, byteBudgetBytes: number, generation?: number): Promise<WindowState>;
+export declare function setLocalIndexBuilding(mailboxUid: string, building: boolean, completion?: {
+    complete: boolean;
+    coveredFrom?: string;
+    coveredUntil?: string;
+    generation?: number;
+}): Promise<void>;
+/** Destroys one mailbox's local index (both the SQLite connection and its on-disk OPFS storage) - spec
+ * §11 "MUST be destroyed on the same events that destroy private keys." Never rejects (it's called from
+ * lifecycle hooks where a failure mustn't block key destruction) but resolves `false` - and logs why -
+ * when the index could not be removed, e.g. because another tab still has it open; the deletion is then
+ * retried on the next page load. */
+export declare function destroyLocalIndex(mailboxUid: string): Promise<boolean>;
+/** How long sign-out waits for local index destruction before navigating anyway. */
+export declare const DESTROY_ALL_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;
+/**
+ * Destroys **every** local index on this device - not just the mailboxes this page load opened (sign-out
+ * from Calendar, say, never opened any), by enumerating OPFS for the index directory prefix - and tells every
+ * other tab to close its own connections. Closes this tab's own open connections through the Worker first
+ * (only if one was ever spawned - there's nothing to close otherwise, and booting one just to delete files
+ * would be waste), then removes the directories. Anything left behind is retried on the next load. Resolves
+ * `true` when everything was removed within `timeoutMs`; never rejects.
+ */
+export declare function destroyAllLocalIndexes(timeoutMs?: number): Promise<boolean>;
+/** Removes local indexes for mailboxes outside `accessibleMailboxUids` - e.g. left behind by a different
+ * user who signed in on this device without signing out. Never rejects. */
+export declare function pruneInaccessibleLocalIndexes(accessibleMailboxUids: Iterable<string>): Promise<void>;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexRpcClient.js

@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ export const SIGN_OUT_CHANNEL = "rapidmx-localsearch";
 let channel;
 function getWorker() {
     if (!worker) {
-        worker = new Worker(new URL("./localIndexWorker.ts", import.meta.url), { type: "module" });
+        // Named by its compiled `.js` file, like every other relative import: tsc copies the literal into
+        // `dist` unchanged, where only the `.js` file exists, and Vite maps it back to the `.ts` source.
+        worker = new Worker(new URL("./localIndexWorker.js", import.meta.url), { type: "module" });
         worker.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
             const entry = pending.get(event.data.id);
             if (!entry) {

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexSchema.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * The Tier 2 local index's SQLite schema (`specs/search.md` §13). One database per mailbox (see
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts`), holding both the FTS5 index and the metadata cache in the same store - the
+ * spec's own rationale for choosing SQLite over an in-memory JS index in the first place ("the index
+ * database also holds the decrypted metadata cache... so there is one local store rather than two").
+ *
+ * Bumping `SCHEMA_VERSION` is how a schema change invalidates every existing local index (§11
+ * "Invalidation... on schema version change") - `localIndexWorker.ts` compares it against `meta`'s
+ * stored value on open and discards+rebuilds on a mismatch, the same path a corruption/GCM-auth-failure
+ * takes.
+ */
+/** Bump whenever `CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL` changes in a way existing on-disk databases can't be reconciled
+ * with in place. A mismatch deletes and recreates the whole database file (not just its rows), so
+ * creation-time-only settings like `auto_vacuum` also apply to upgraded indexes.
+ *
+ * 2 - added `entities.entity_version` (incremental rebuild skip) and `auto_vacuum=INCREMENTAL`. */
+export declare const SCHEMA_VERSION = 2;
+/**
+ * `entities` is the real row store (metadata + the plaintext content fields), `entities_fts` is an FTS5
+ * *external content* table over it (`content='entities'`) - the standard SQLite pattern for keeping one
+ * copy of the text instead of duplicating it into the FTS5 shadow tables, kept in sync via the three
+ * triggers below (SQLite's own documented pattern for external-content FTS5 tables; there is no
+ * "ON CONFLICT UPDATE re-index" primitive, so update is modeled as delete-then-reinsert into the FTS
+ * index specifically, not into `entities` itself).
+ *
+ * Column order in `entities_fts` (`subject, participants, body, attachment_text`) is load-bearing: every
+ * `bm25(entities_fts, 3.0, 2.0, 1.0, 1.0)` call elsewhere in this module family assumes that exact
+ * positional order, matching `searchScoring.ts`'s `SEARCH_FIELD_WEIGHTS` (`subject: 3, participants: 2,
+ * body: 1, attachmentText: 1`) so Tier 2's local ranking agrees with the Tier 1/Tier 3 re-scoring the
+ * spec requires for one consistent ordering across tiers (§7).
+ */
+export declare const CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL = "\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS meta (\n    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n    value TEXT\n);\n\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS entities (\n    rowid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,\n    entity_type TEXT NOT NULL,\n    entity_uid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,\n    mailbox_uid TEXT NOT NULL,\n    folder_uid TEXT,\n    date_for_sort TEXT NOT NULL,\n    participants TEXT,\n    flags TEXT,\n    has_attachments INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,\n    subject TEXT,\n    body TEXT,\n    attachment_text TEXT,\n    byte_size INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,\n    entity_version TEXT\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_entities_date ON entities(date_for_sort);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_entities_mailbox ON entities(mailbox_uid);\n\nCREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS entities_fts USING fts5(\n    subject, participants, body, attachment_text,\n    content='entities', content_rowid='rowid', tokenize='unicode61'\n);\n\nCREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_ai AFTER INSERT ON entities BEGIN\n    INSERT INTO entities_fts(rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)\n    VALUES (new.rowid, new.subject, new.participants, new.body, new.attachment_text);\nEND;\n\nCREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_ad AFTER DELETE ON entities BEGIN\n    INSERT INTO entities_fts(entities_fts, rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)\n    VALUES ('delete', old.rowid, old.subject, old.participants, old.body, old.attachment_text);\nEND;\n\nCREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_au AFTER UPDATE ON entities BEGIN\n    INSERT INTO entities_fts(entities_fts, rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)\n    VALUES ('delete', old.rowid, old.subject, old.participants, old.body, old.attachment_text);\n    INSERT INTO entities_fts(rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)\n    VALUES (new.rowid, new.subject, new.participants, new.body, new.attachment_text);\nEND;\n";
+/** The exact `bm25()` weight arguments every ranked query against `entities_fts` MUST pass, in column
+ * order - see this module's own doc comment on why the order is load-bearing. Centralized here so a
+ * future column reorder can't silently desync a query building its own literal weight list. */
+export declare const BM25_WEIGHTS_SQL = "3.0, 2.0, 1.0, 1.0";
+/** One message's decrypted content, ready to index - `localIndexBuilder.ts`'s own output shape, built
+ * from `Message` + the recovered `MessageSecurityResult` fields the same way `searchTier3.ts` already
+ * derives them for its own per-candidate matching. */
+export interface LocalIndexEntity {
+    entityType: "message";
+    entityUid: string;
+    mailboxUid: string;
+    folderUid?: string;
+    /** ISO 8601 - compares correctly as plain text since every value here is UTC. */
+    dateForSort: string;
+    participants: string;
+    /** Comma-delimited, leading/trailing commas included (`,read,flagged,`) - simplest possible substring
+     * match (`flags LIKE '%,read,%'`) without needing SQLite's JSON1 extension compiled in. */
+    flags: string;
+    hasAttachments: boolean;
+    subject?: string;
+    body?: string;
+    attachmentText?: string;
+    /** Rough on-disk cost of this entity's own content, in bytes - what `localIndexBuilder.ts`'s
+     * byte-budget accounting (spec §11) sums against the configured budget. */
+    byteSize: number;
+    /** Opaque change marker for the source entity (the builder uses the message's `version` plus its
+     * folder) - lets a rebuild skip re-fetching/decrypting anything already indexed unchanged. */
+    entityVersion?: string;
+}
+/** `entity_uid` upsert - `ON CONFLICT` (SQLite's UPSERT syntax) rather than a separate delete-then-insert,
+ * so re-indexing an already-present message (a flag changed, a folder move) updates it in place and the
+ * `entities_au` trigger keeps `entities_fts` in sync automatically. */
+export declare const UPSERT_ENTITY_SQL = "\nINSERT INTO entities (entity_type, entity_uid, mailbox_uid, folder_uid, date_for_sort, participants, flags, has_attachments, subject, body, attachment_text, byte_size, entity_version)\nVALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\nON CONFLICT(entity_uid) DO UPDATE SET\n    folder_uid = excluded.folder_uid, date_for_sort = excluded.date_for_sort, participants = excluded.participants,\n    flags = excluded.flags, has_attachments = excluded.has_attachments, subject = excluded.subject,\n    body = excluded.body, attachment_text = excluded.attachment_text, byte_size = excluded.byte_size,\n    entity_version = excluded.entity_version\n";
+/** Bind values for `UPSERT_ENTITY_SQL`, in column order - kept alongside it so the two can never drift
+ * out of sync with each other. */
+export declare function entityBindValues(entity: LocalIndexEntity): (string | number)[];
+/** A parsed query's structured (non-free-text) fields - the subset of `ParsedSearchQuery`
+ * (`react-shared`'s `queryGrammar.ts`) this module's predicate builder reads. Typed locally rather than
+ * importing `ParsedSearchQuery` itself so this Worker-bundled module has no dependency on `@rapidmx/
+ * react-shared` beyond what it actually uses - `localIndexBuilder.ts`/`searchTier2.ts` (main-thread side)
+ * pass the real `ParsedSearchQuery` in, which structurally satisfies this. */
+export interface LocalSearchPredicateFields {
+    from?: string;
+    to?: string;
+    cc?: string;
+    subject?: string;
+    hasAttachment?: boolean;
+    before?: Date;
+    after?: Date;
+    folderUid?: string;
+    flags?: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the SQL `WHERE` predicate (and its bind params) for every *structured* operator this local
+ * index can actually evaluate. **Known simplification**: unlike Tier 1's server-side `SearchDocument`
+ * (which splits `from`/`to`/`cc` into distinct fields - confirmed already implemented server-side), this
+ * local schema keeps only the combined `participants` field (see `CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL`'s own doc comment) -
+ * `from:`/`to:`/`cc:` are therefore evaluated here as a substring match against that combined field
+ * rather than a precise per-role match. Reasonable for a bounded, best-effort recent-window cache
+ * (Tier 1 already serves the precise version for anything it indexes), but a real gap if Tier 2 is later
+ * extended to distinguish them - flagged here rather than left silently approximate.
+ */
+export declare function buildSearchPredicates(parsed: LocalSearchPredicateFields, mailboxUid: string): {
+    where: string;
+    params: (string | number)[];
+};
+/**
+ * Builds the FTS5 `MATCH` expression for a parsed query's free-text and `subject:` portions, or
+ * `undefined` when there's nothing to match on text at all (a pure operator/structured-filter query -
+ * `buildSearchPredicates()`'s `WHERE` clause alone already narrows that case correctly, no `MATCH`
+ * needed). `parsed.text` is passed through close to verbatim (quoted phrases, `OR`, `-` negation - FTS5's
+ * own query syntax supports the same shape `queryGrammar.ts`'s own doc comment says every provider's
+ * free-text engine is expected to), wrapped only enough to combine it with a `subject:`-scoped clause
+ * when both are present.
+ */
+export declare function buildMatchExpression(parsed: {
+    text: string;
+    subject?: string;
+}): string | undefined;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexSizePreference.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/** §11's Window Sizing table, Web row. */
+export declare const WEB_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES: number;
+/** §11's Window Sizing table, Native desktop row - still a real, user-adjustable ceiling (not
+ * `UNBOUNDED`), just a roomier default given Electron's storage is disk-limited rather than
+ * browser-quota-limited. */
+export declare const ELECTRON_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES: number;
+export interface LocalIndexSizeOption {
+    bytes: number;
+    label: string;
+}
+/** Selectable presets for the Settings UI. `0` means "unlimited" - `applyEviction()`
+ * (`localIndexWorker.ts`) already treats a falsy byte budget as unconfigured/unenforced. */
+export declare const LOCAL_INDEX_SIZE_OPTIONS: LocalIndexSizeOption[];
+/** This device's default byte budget before any explicit preference is saved - `500 MB` in a browser
+ * tab, `1 GB` in the Electron shell. */
+export declare function getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget(): number;
+/**
+ * Reads this device's configured local-index byte budget. Falls back to
+ * `getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget()` for a never-configured device, a corrupted/non-numeric stored
+ * value, or a `localStorage` access that throws (private-browsing/storage-blocked contexts) - never
+ * throws itself, matching `getIdleTimeoutMinutes()`'s identical fallback posture.
+ */
+export declare function getLocalIndexByteBudget(): number;
+/** Persists this device's local-index byte-budget preference. A `localStorage` write failure is
+ * swallowed, not thrown - the setting just doesn't survive a reload in that case, same fallback-to-default
+ * behavior `getLocalIndexByteBudget()` already has for a storage-blocked context. */
+export declare function setLocalIndexByteBudget(bytes: number): void;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexStorage.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * The Tier 2 local index's on-disk naming and bulk-removal helpers, shared by the Worker
+ * (`localIndexWorker.ts`) and the main thread (`localIndexRpcClient.ts`). Deliberately free of any
+ * wa-sqlite import so the main thread can use it without pulling the WASM build into its own bundle.
+ *
+ * Every mailbox's index lives in its own top-level OPFS directory named `rapidmx-localsearch-<mailboxUid>`
+ * (`AccessHandlePoolVFS` creates it from the VFS name). Enumerating that prefix is how sign-out destroys
+ * *every* index on this device - including ones for mailboxes this page load never opened, which the
+ * RPC client's own session-scoped bookkeeping can't know about - and how a sign-in prunes indexes left
+ * behind for mailboxes the current user can no longer access.
+ */
+export declare const LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX = "rapidmx-localsearch-";
+/** The OPFS directory name (and `EncryptingVFS` name) a mailbox's index lives under. */
+export declare function poolNameFor(mailboxUid: string): string;
+/** Inverse of `poolNameFor()`; `undefined` for any OPFS entry that isn't a local index directory. */
+export declare function mailboxUidFromPoolName(name: string): string | undefined;
+/** Removes one mailbox's index directory. Resolves quietly when it doesn't exist; rejects for any other
+ * failure (most commonly `NoModificationAllowedError` - another tab still holds its access handles). */
+export declare function removeLocalIndexDirectory(mailboxUid: string): Promise<void>;
+export interface LocalIndexRemovalResult {
+    removed: string[];
+    /** Mailbox uids whose directory could not be removed (e.g. still open in another tab). */
+    failed: string[];
+}
+/** Every mailbox uid that has a local index directory on this origin. */
+export declare function listLocalIndexMailboxUids(): Promise<string[]>;
+/** Removes every local index directory on this origin except those whose mailbox uid is in `keep`. */
+export declare function removeLocalIndexDirectories(keep?: ReadonlySet<string>): Promise<LocalIndexRemovalResult>;

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexVFS.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * `EncryptingVFS` - the Tier 2 local index's at-rest encryption layer (`specs/search.md` §11
+ * "Persistence and protection", §13 "Encryption at Rest": "no official SQLCipher WASM build exists...
+ * encryption at rest requires a custom VFS that encrypts pages before they reach OPFS").
+ *
+ * Wraps (composes, does not subclass - `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s own file-table state is private `#`
+ * fields) an `AccessHandlePoolVFS` instance and delegates every `FacadeVFS` method straight through
+ * except `jRead`/`jWrite`, which it intercepts to decrypt/encrypt pages.
+ *
+ * ## Page layout
+ *
+ * SQLite is opened with a fixed 4096-byte page size (`PRAGMA page_size=4096` - set by
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts` before the first write, since SQLite fixes a database's page size on creation).
+ * Each *logical* 4096-byte page is stored *physically* as `nonce(12) || AES-256-GCM(ciphertext(4096) ||
+ * tag(16))` = 4124 bytes, at a remapped offset (`physicalOffset(page) = page * 4124`). This block size
+ * is this class's own fixed constant, independent of whatever byte range a given `jRead`/`jWrite` call
+ * actually requests - reads/writes are handled generically over whichever physical blocks the requested
+ * logical range overlaps (including a read-modify-write for a sub-block write), not by assuming SQLite
+ * only ever issues page-aligned, page-sized I/O. That assumption holds for the *main database file* once
+ * its page size is fixed, but handling the general case costs little and removes the need to rely on it.
+ *
+ * **A fresh random nonce is generated on every write, never reused or derived from a counter** - the
+ * simplest way to make an AES-GCM (key, nonce) pair never repeat across different plaintexts, which is
+ * the one hard requirement GCM has. The nonce travels with its block, so decryption never needs any
+ * external state (a lost/corrupted counter, a persisted salt) to reconstruct it.
+ *
+ * **AAD binds each block to its logical filename and page index** (not just its own ciphertext) - GCM
+ * authenticates a block's own content but not its *position*; without this, an attacker able to write
+ * directly into this origin's OPFS storage (outside this codebase's own threat model per spec §4, which
+ * excludes a compromised client, but cheap to close off anyway) could silently swap two blocks and each
+ * would still decrypt "successfully" on its own, corrupting data instead of failing loudly. Binding to
+ * position turns a swap into a caught decryption failure - see `PageCorruptedError` below - the same
+ * "invalidate and rebuild" path a schema-version mismatch already takes (spec §11 "Invalidation").
+ *
+ * **No WAL, no rollback journal.** `localIndexWorker.ts` opens the database with `journal_mode=OFF`. A
+ * page cipher for the main database file is one encryption surface; WAL frames (their own header +
+ * checksum format) and rollback-journal records (their own, different record format) would each be a
+ * *second* one. This index has no durability requirement to justify that cost - spec §11 already
+ * requires discarding and rebuilding it on corruption, schema change, key rotation, or platform storage
+ * eviction, and eviction "MUST NOT block search" - so an interrupted write in the worst case is just
+ * caught by the same GCM-auth-failure -> rebuild path as any other corruption, never partial/torn state
+ * silently trusted.
+ *
+ * Every `jRead`/`jWrite` here is `async` (declared `async` specifically so `FacadeVFS.hasAsyncMethod()`
+ * detects it via `instanceof AsyncFunction` and awaits it) because `crypto.subtle.encrypt`/`decrypt` has
+ * no synchronous form in a browser - this is *why* `localIndexWorker.ts` boots the Asyncify SQLite build
+ * (`dist/wa-sqlite-async.mjs`), not the plain synchronous one `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s own doc comment
+ * says it's designed for: that claim is about `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s *own* methods (real synchronous
+ * OPFS access-handle calls), which stay synchronous and work fine wrapped underneath an async outer VFS
+ * on an Asyncify build - the build choice is driven by this class's needs, not the inner VFS's.
+ */
+import { FacadeVFS } from "@journeyapps/wa-sqlite/src/FacadeVFS.js";
+export { PageCorruptedError } from "./localIndexBlockCipher.js";
+export declare class EncryptingVFS extends FacadeVFS {
+    #private;
+    private constructor();
+    /** `rawKey` MUST be exactly 32 bytes (AES-256) - see `localIndexKey.ts`'s `deriveLocalIndexKey()`,
+     * the only intended source of this value. */
+    static create(name: string, module: unknown, rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<EncryptingVFS>;
+    /**
+     * Releases every pooled OPFS sync access handle `AccessHandlePoolVFS` opened and holds open for its
+     * entire lifetime (not per SQLite-file-open/close - `jOpen`/`jClose` above only associate/disassociate
+     * a SQLite fileId with an already-open handle, they never open or close the handles themselves). MUST
+     * be called before creating another VFS instance against the same OPFS pool `name` - confirmed by
+     * direct reproduction: skipping this and calling `create()` again with the same `name` throws
+     * "Access Handles cannot be created if there is another open Access Handle," since the previous
+     * instance's handles are still live. `localIndexWorker.ts` calls this alongside `sqlite3.close(db)`
+     * (which closes the SQLite *connection*, a separate, shorter-lived thing from the VFS itself) whenever
+     * it tears down a mailbox's connection - on `destroy()` and in `selfTest()`'s own close/reopen check.
+     */
+    close(): void | Promise<void>;
+    jOpen(filename: string | null, pFile: number, flags: number, pOutFlags: DataView): number | Promise<number>;
+    jClose(pFile: number): number | Promise<number>;
+    jDelete(filename: string, syncDir: number): number | Promise<number>;
+    jAccess(filename: string, flags: number, pResOut: DataView): number | Promise<number>;
+    jFullPathname(filename: string, zOut: Uint8Array): number | Promise<number>;
+    jSync(pFile: number, flags: number): number | Promise<number>;
+    jSectorSize(pFile: number): number;
+    jDeviceCharacteristics(pFile: number): number;
+    /** Logical file size = physical size scaled back down to the logical block size - the inner VFS's
+     * own `jFileSize` reports the *physical* (post-remap) byte count, which is always an exact multiple
+     * of `PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE` since every write here always fills whole physical blocks. */
+    jFileSize(pFile: number, pSize64: DataView): Promise<number>;
+    /** `iSize` is a logical byte size - truncates to the smallest whole number of *physical* blocks that
+     * still covers it, so a partially-truncated trailing block is never left half-written. */
+    jTruncate(pFile: number, iSize: number): Promise<number>;
+    /** Set once any block has failed to decrypt/authenticate (or the inner VFS failed a read/write outright)
+     * - `localIndexWorker.ts` checks this after a failed SQLite call to tell real corruption (discard and
+     * rebuild, spec §11 "Invalidation") apart from an ordinary error such as a malformed FTS5 query. */
+    corruptionDetected: boolean;
+    /**
+     * `jRead`/`jWrite` MUST NOT throw: with the Asyncify build, an exception escaping an async VFS method
+     * never reaches the awaiting `sqlite3.*` call - it surfaces only as an unhandled rejection and the
+     * SQLite call hangs forever (confirmed by direct reproduction in node against the real wa-sqlite build).
+     * A thrown `PageCorruptedError` therefore used to wedge the whole connection instead of triggering a
+     * rebuild. Errors are converted to an I/O error return code here, which SQLite does propagate as a
+     * normal `SQLiteError`, and recorded on `corruptionDetected`.
+     */
+    jRead(pFile: number, pData: Uint8Array, iOffset: number): Promise<number>;
+    jWrite(pFile: number, pData: Uint8Array, iOffset: number): Promise<number>;
+}