@rapidmx/web-client 0.36.0 → 0.37.1

package/dist/lib/crypto/composeSecurity.js

@@ -41,9 +41,17 @@ function policyStateForTier(policy, tier) {
 }
 /** Per-recipient encryption eligibility, given this device's own encryption preference and the
  * system-wide policy. One entry per (address, lookup result) pair the caller already resolved via
- * `lookupKeys()` - this function does no discovery itself. */
-export function resolveRecipientEncryption(ownAddress, ownPrefersMutual, policy, recipientAddress, lookup) {
-    const encryptCert = lookup ? findActivePublicKey(lookup.keys, "encrypt") : undefined;
+ * `lookupKeys()` - this function does no discovery itself. `ownCanUseOpenPgp` false: the sender has no OpenPGP key to use here
+ * (an OpenPGP copy is encrypted to the sender too), so a recipient who prefers OpenPGP but has an S/MIME certificate gets S/MIME - a
+ * preference never leaves them unencrypted (restapi `specs/end-to-end_encryption.md` *Choosing the format*). */
+export function resolveRecipientEncryption(ownAddress, ownPrefersMutual, policy, recipientAddress, lookup, ownCanUseOpenPgp = true) {
+    const smimeCert = lookup ? findActivePublicKey(lookup.keys, "encrypt") : undefined;
+    const usableOpenPgpKey = lookup && policy.allowOpenPgp === true ? findActivePublicKey(lookup.keys, "encrypt", "openpgp") : undefined;
+    // S/MIME, unless the recipient has no certificate or prefers OpenPGP (restapi *Choosing the format*: the user's choice for the
+    // contact, what the address advertises, what it was last seen using) - and OpenPGP only where the server allows it.
+    const useOpenPgp = !!usableOpenPgpKey && (!smimeCert || (lookup?.preferredFormat === "openpgp" && ownCanUseOpenPgp));
+    const encryptCert = useOpenPgp ? undefined : smimeCert;
+    const openPgpKey = useOpenPgp ? usableOpenPgpKey : undefined;
     const tier = classifyRecipientTier(ownAddress, recipientAddress, !!lookup && lookup.keys.length > 0);
     const policyState = policyStateForTier(policy, tier);
     if (policyState === "prohibited") {
@@ -56,7 +64,7 @@ export function resolveRecipientEncryption(ownAddress, ownPrefersMutual, policy,
             prohibitedReason: "Your organization's encryption policy does not allow encrypting messages to this recipient.",
         };
     }
-    if (!encryptCert) {
+    if (!encryptCert && !openPgpKey) {
         return { address: recipientAddress, tier, canEncrypt: false, autoEncrypt: false };
     }
     const recipientPrefersMutual = lookup?.encryptPreference?.preferEncrypt === "mutual";
@@ -64,7 +72,7 @@ export function resolveRecipientEncryption(ownAddress, ownPrefersMutual, policy,
     return {
         address: recipientAddress,
         tier,
-        encryptCert,
+        ...(encryptCert ? { encryptCert, format: "smime" } : { openPgpKey, format: "openpgp" }),
         canEncrypt: true,
         autoEncrypt: policyState === "automatic" && mutual,
     };

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyExport.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import "reflect-metadata";
 import * as asn1js from "asn1js";
 import * as pkijs from "pkijs";
 import { fromBase64 } from "./encoding.js";
-import { findActivePublicKey, recordKeyExport } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { findActivePublicKey, isOpenPgpKey, recordKeyExport } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
 import { ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS, openMasterKeyWithPassword, SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, } from "./keySession.js";
 import { buildAad, openWithKey } from "./masterKey.js";
 /** PBKDF2 iterations for the shrouded key bags and the PKCS#12 MAC. Windows, macOS and iOS all accept this. */
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ async function openExportedKeys(input, vault, masterKey) {
     const active = findActivePublicKey(input.mailboxKeys, "encrypt");
     const encryption = [
         ...(active ? [active] : []),
-        ...input.mailboxKeys.filter((k) => k.useType === "encrypt" && k !== active).sort((a, b) => b.notBefore - a.notBefore),
+        ...input.mailboxKeys.filter((k) => k.useType === "encrypt" && !isOpenPgpKey(k) && k !== active).sort((a, b) => b.notBefore - a.notBefore),
     ];
     await take("encrypt", encryption, ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1);
     if (input.includeSigningKey) {

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyPairMatch.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/**
+ * Whether a certificate the server lists is really the one of a private key this device opened. A zero-access key's private half comes
+ * from an authenticated seal (or a member's wrap), but its certificate comes from the server as it is: what this device then encrypts
+ * to that certificate - the search index segments it builds from end-to-end mail, a protected meeting's key - must not go to a key the
+ * server swapped in. Plain WebCrypto and a few lines of DER, so the unlock path loads no certificate library.
+ */
+/** Whether `certDer` (a P-256 certificate) carries the public half of `pkcs8` (a P-256 private key). Never rejects: anything that won't
+ * parse or import is `false`. */
+export declare function certificateHoldsKey(certDer: Uint8Array, pkcs8: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean>;

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyPairMatch.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * Whether a certificate the server lists is really the one of a private key this device opened. A zero-access key's private half comes
+ * from an authenticated seal (or a member's wrap), but its certificate comes from the server as it is: what this device then encrypts
+ * to that certificate - the search index segments it builds from end-to-end mail, a protected meeting's key - must not go to a key the
+ * server swapped in. Plain WebCrypto and a few lines of DER, so the unlock path loads no certificate library.
+ */
+/** One DER element of `der` at `offset`: where its header starts, where its content starts, where it ends. */
+function element(der, offset) {
+    const tag = der[offset];
+    let length = der[offset + 1];
+    let content = offset + 2;
+    if (length & 0x80) {
+        const bytes = length & 0x7f;
+        if (bytes === 0 || bytes > 4) {
+            throw new Error("Unsupported DER length.");
+        }
+        length = 0;
+        for (let i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+            length = length * 256 + der[content + i];
+        }
+        content += bytes;
+    }
+    const end = content + length;
+    if (tag === undefined || end > der.length) {
+        throw new Error("Truncated DER.");
+    }
+    return { tag, header: offset, content, end };
+}
+/** The children of the constructed element `parent`. */
+function children(der, parent) {
+    const found = [];
+    for (let offset = parent.content; offset < parent.end; offset = found[found.length - 1].end) {
+        found.push(element(der, offset));
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+/** The SubjectPublicKeyInfo of X.509 certificate `certDer` (RFC 5280: the seventh field of `tbsCertificate`, the sixth when it has no
+ * explicit version). */
+function subjectPublicKeyInfo(certDer) {
+    const [tbs] = children(certDer, element(certDer, 0));
+    const fields = children(certDer, tbs);
+    const spki = fields[fields[0].tag === 0xa0 ? 6 : 5];
+    if (!spki || spki.tag !== 0x30) {
+        throw new Error("No subject public key.");
+    }
+    return certDer.subarray(spki.header, spki.end);
+}
+const P256_ECDH = { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" };
+/** Whether `certDer` (a P-256 certificate) carries the public half of `pkcs8` (a P-256 private key). Never rejects: anything that won't
+ * parse or import is `false`. */
+export async function certificateHoldsKey(certDer, pkcs8) {
+    try {
+        const publicKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("spki", subjectPublicKeyInfo(certDer), P256_ECDH, true, []);
+        const privateKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("pkcs8", pkcs8, P256_ECDH, true, ["deriveBits"]);
+        const [certified, held] = await Promise.all([crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", publicKey), crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", privateKey)]);
+        return !!certified.x && certified.x === held.x && certified.y === held.y;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}

package/dist/lib/crypto/keySession.d.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 import { type KeyVault, type PublicKey } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
 import type { ApiClient } from "../util/api.js";
 import { KeysLockedError } from "./masterKey.js";
+import type { OpenPgpPrivateKey } from "./openpgp.js";
 /** AAD purpose labels — MUST exactly match what `KeyEnrollmentGate.tsx` used when it originally
  * sealed each of these values, or `openWithKey()` fails (GCM authenticates the AAD, not just the
  * ciphertext). Centralized here as the one place both wrapping and unwrapping refer to. */
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ export declare const MASTER_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "master-key";
 export declare const SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "sign-private-key";
 export declare const ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "encrypt-private-key";
 export declare const ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "zero-access-private-key";
+export declare const OPENPGP_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "openpgp-private-key";
 export { KeysLockedError };
 /** How many retained (non-active) encryption keys an unlock opens at most: the most recently issued ones by
  * `notBefore`. Each costs an AEAD open and a key import at unlock, and `smime.ts`'s `decryptEnvelopedDataWithKeys()`
@@ -66,6 +68,13 @@ export interface UnlockedKeys {
      * index entries and sealed summaries to - the active one first, then retained ones newest first, at most
      * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`. Decryption only. Absent when the mailbox has none (or none opened). */
     zeroAccessKeys?: RetainedEncryptionKey[];
+    /** The mailbox's OpenPGP secret keys (restapi `specs/end-to-end_encryption.md` *OpenPGP Interoperability*) - the active one
+     * first, then retained ones newest first, at most `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`: what opens mail OpenPGP users encrypt to
+     * the mailbox, and signs what it sends them. Absent when the mailbox has none (or none opened). */
+    openPgpKeys?: {
+        fingerprint: string;
+        privateKey: OpenPgpPrivateKey;
+    }[];
     /** A shared mailbox opened through this user's member key wraps (`sharedMailboxKeys.ts`), not with its own master key: it holds
      * only `zeroAccessKeys`, and `masterKey` is a per-key secret derived from its zero-access private key (what the local search
      * index's key is derived from), never a key that opens the mailbox's vault. */
@@ -96,6 +105,14 @@ export declare function subscribeKeySession(listener: KeySessionListener): () =>
  * meanwhile; the next unlock opens the key from the vault anyway).
  */
 export declare function addZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, key: RetainedEncryptionKey): void;
+/**
+ * Makes an OpenPGP key this device has just enrolled (`openPgpKey.ts`'s `ensureOpenPgpKey()`) the active one of `unlocked`, so
+ * OpenPGP mail to it reads without another unlock - the same rules as `addZeroAccessKey()`.
+ */
+export declare function addOpenPgpKey(mailboxUid: string, unlocked: UnlockedKeys, key: {
+    fingerprint: string;
+    privateKey: OpenPgpPrivateKey;
+}): void;
 /**
  * Stores the keys of a shared mailbox opened through member key wraps (`sharedMailboxKeys.ts`'s `unlockSharedMailbox()`) as that mailbox's
  * session, exactly as an unlock would - tracked for `destroyUnlockedKeys()`, and notified - unless the mailbox was locked since `generation`
@@ -163,8 +180,8 @@ export declare class UnopenableEncryptionKeyError extends Error {
  * "incorrect password," not a generic error, but this module doesn't presume a specific UI's error copy.
  * Once the master key has opened, the password is known to be right: an active signing key that then
  * won't open is skipped and listed in `UnlockResult.unopenableKeys` (so is a retained encryption key); an active
- * encryption key that won't
- * open still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
+ * encryption key that won't open, or whose certificate isn't its own,
+ * still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
  * `destroyUnlockedKeys()` locked this mailbox (or all mailboxes) while the unlock was in flight.
  */
 export declare function unlockWithPassword(mailboxUid: string, mailboxKeys: PublicKey[], password: string): Promise<UnlockResult>;

package/dist/lib/crypto/keySession.js

@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@
  * follow-up, not a silent gap: a mailbox enrolled *only* with a passkey has no way to unlock through this
  * module today.
  */
-import { findActivePublicKey, getKeyVault } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
+import { findActivePublicKey, getKeyVault, isOpenPgpKey } from "./keyvaultApi.js";
 import { fromBase64 } from "./encoding.js";
+import { certificateHoldsKey } from "./keyPairMatch.js";
 import { importPrivateKeyPkcs8 } from "./keys.js";
 import { KeysLockedError, buildAad, openWithKey } from "./masterKey.js";
 import { deriveFromPassword, parseArgon2idKdfLabel } from "./passwordUnlock.js";
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ export const MASTER_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "master-key";
 export const SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "sign-private-key";
 export const ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "encrypt-private-key";
 export const ZERO_ACCESS_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "zero-access-private-key";
+export const OPENPGP_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE = "openpgp-private-key";
 export { KeysLockedError };
 /** How many retained (non-active) encryption keys an unlock opens at most: the most recently issued ones by
  * `notBefore`. Each costs an AEAD open and a key import at unlock, and `smime.ts`'s `decryptEnvelopedDataWithKeys()`
@@ -102,6 +104,16 @@ export function addZeroAccessKey(mailboxUid, unlocked, key) {
     }
     unlocked.zeroAccessKeys = [key, ...(unlocked.zeroAccessKeys ?? []).filter((k) => k.fingerprint !== key.fingerprint)];
 }
+/**
+ * Makes an OpenPGP key this device has just enrolled (`openPgpKey.ts`'s `ensureOpenPgpKey()`) the active one of `unlocked`, so
+ * OpenPGP mail to it reads without another unlock - the same rules as `addZeroAccessKey()`.
+ */
+export function addOpenPgpKey(mailboxUid, unlocked, key) {
+    if (unlocked.destroyed || sessions.get(mailboxUid) !== unlocked) {
+        return;
+    }
+    unlocked.openPgpKeys = [key, ...(unlocked.openPgpKeys ?? []).filter((k) => k.fingerprint !== key.fingerprint)];
+}
 /**
  * Stores the keys of a shared mailbox opened through member key wraps (`sharedMailboxKeys.ts`'s `unlockSharedMailbox()`) as that mailbox's
  * session, exactly as an unlock would - tracked for `destroyUnlockedKeys()`, and notified - unless the mailbox was locked since `generation`
@@ -197,6 +209,15 @@ function destroyObject(unlocked) {
         unlocked.zeroAccessKeys.length = 0;
         delete unlocked.zeroAccessKeys;
     }
+    if (unlocked.openPgpKeys) {
+        // OpenPGP.js keeps a decrypted secret key's material in its own objects: wipe it there too.
+        for (const { privateKey } of unlocked.openPgpKeys) {
+            // Present at runtime on every `PrivateKey`, missing from OpenPGP.js's type declarations.
+            privateKey.clearPrivateParams();
+        }
+        unlocked.openPgpKeys.length = 0;
+        delete unlocked.openPgpKeys;
+    }
 }
 /** Finds the wrapped private key whose fingerprint matches a given published public key. */
 function findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, fingerprint) {
@@ -217,10 +238,15 @@ export class UnopenableEncryptionKeyError extends Error {
     }
 }
 /** Opens one wrapped PKCS#8 private key under `masterKey` and imports it (non-extractable by default, like
- * `importPrivateKeyPkcs8()` itself), zeroing the transient plaintext whether or not the import succeeds. */
-async function openPrivateKey(masterKey, wrapped, aad, algorithm, usages, extractable = false) {
+ * `importPrivateKeyPkcs8()` itself), zeroing the transient plaintext whether or not the import succeeds. With `certDer` - the server's
+ * certificate for it, unauthenticated - it rejects a key that certificate isn't the one of (`certificateHoldsKey()`), so a swapped
+ * certificate never pairs with the opened key. */
+async function openPrivateKey(masterKey, wrapped, aad, algorithm, usages, extractable = false, certDer) {
     const raw = await openWithKey(masterKey, wrapped, aad);
     try {
+        if (certDer && !(await certificateHoldsKey(certDer, raw))) {
+            throw new Error("The certificate isn't the key's.");
+        }
         return await importPrivateKeyPkcs8(raw, algorithm, usages, extractable);
     }
     finally {
@@ -231,7 +257,7 @@ async function openPrivateKey(masterKey, wrapped, aad, algorithm, usages, extrac
  * Opens the retained encryption keys onto `unlocked.retainedEncryptionKeys`: every published `encrypt` key in
  * `mailboxKeys` other than the active one (`activeFingerprint`), whatever its revocation or expiry, that has a wrapped
  * private key in the vault - de-duplicated by fingerprint, newest `notBefore` first, at most
- * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS`. A key that won't open or import, or whose certificate won't decode, is skipped and
+ * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS`. A key that won't open or import, or whose certificate won't decode or isn't the key's, is skipped and
  * added to `unopenableKeys`. Retained keys are imported non-extractable. Each key is attached as it opens, so a failed
  * unlock's `destroyObject()` drops those too.
  */
@@ -239,7 +265,7 @@ async function openRetainedEncryptionKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlock
     const seen = new Set(activeFingerprint !== undefined ? [activeFingerprint] : []);
     const candidates = [];
     for (const publicKey of [...mailboxKeys].sort((a, b) => b.notBefore - a.notBefore)) {
-        const wrapped = publicKey.useType === "encrypt" && !seen.has(publicKey.fingerprint) ? findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, publicKey.fingerprint) : undefined;
+        const wrapped = publicKey.useType === "encrypt" && !isOpenPgpKey(publicKey) && !seen.has(publicKey.fingerprint) ? findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, publicKey.fingerprint) : undefined;
         if (!wrapped) {
             continue;
         }
@@ -253,7 +279,7 @@ async function openRetainedEncryptionKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlock
     for (const { publicKey, wrapped } of candidates) {
         try {
             const certDer = fromBase64(publicKey.publicKey);
-            const privateKey = await openPrivateKey(unlocked.masterKey, wrapped, aad, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false);
+            const privateKey = await openPrivateKey(unlocked.masterKey, wrapped, aad, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false, certDer);
             (unlocked.retainedEncryptionKeys ?? (unlocked.retainedEncryptionKeys = [])).push({ fingerprint: publicKey.fingerprint, certDer, privateKey });
         }
         catch {
@@ -265,7 +291,9 @@ async function openRetainedEncryptionKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlock
  * Opens the mailbox's zero-access private keys into `unlocked.zeroAccessKeys`: the vault's `zeroAccessKeys` that have a
  * wrapped private key, the unrevoked one with the latest `notBefore` first, then the rest newest first, at most
  * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`. A key that won't open is listed in `unopenableKeys` and skipped - zero-access mail
- * encrypted to it doesn't decrypt on this device, but nothing else about the unlock depends on it.
+ * encrypted to it doesn't decrypt on this device, but nothing else about the unlock depends on it. So is one whose certificate (the
+ * server's, unauthenticated) isn't the private key's: this device seals to the active key's certificate - search index segments of
+ * end-to-end mail, protected meetings' keys - so a certificate swapped by the server must never become it.
  */
 async function openZeroAccessKeys(mailboxUid, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys) {
     const ordered = [...(vault.zeroAccessKeys ?? [])].sort((a, b) => Number(!!a.revokedAt) - Number(!!b.revokedAt) || b.notBefore - a.notBefore);
@@ -277,8 +305,18 @@ async function openZeroAccessKeys(mailboxUid, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys) {
             continue;
         }
         try {
-            const privateKey = await openPrivateKey(unlocked.masterKey, wrapped, aad, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false);
-            (unlocked.zeroAccessKeys ?? (unlocked.zeroAccessKeys = [])).push({ fingerprint: publicKey.fingerprint, certDer: fromBase64(publicKey.publicKey), privateKey });
+            const certDer = fromBase64(publicKey.publicKey);
+            const raw = await openWithKey(unlocked.masterKey, wrapped, aad);
+            try {
+                if (!(await certificateHoldsKey(certDer, raw))) {
+                    throw new Error("The zero-access certificate isn't the key's.");
+                }
+                const privateKey = await importPrivateKeyPkcs8(raw, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false);
+                (unlocked.zeroAccessKeys ?? (unlocked.zeroAccessKeys = [])).push({ fingerprint: publicKey.fingerprint, certDer, privateKey });
+            }
+            finally {
+                raw.fill(0);
+            }
         }
         catch {
             unopenableKeys.push(publicKey.fingerprint);
@@ -288,6 +326,39 @@ async function openZeroAccessKeys(mailboxUid, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys) {
         }
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Opens the mailbox's OpenPGP secret keys into `unlocked.openPgpKeys`: its published OpenPGP certificates (`type: "openpgp"`) that
+ * have a wrapped secret key, the active one first (unrevoked, unexpired, latest `notBefore`), then the rest newest first, at most
+ * `MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1`. OpenPGP.js is loaded only for a mailbox that has one. A key that won't open is listed in
+ * `unopenableKeys` and skipped.
+ */
+async function openOpenPgpKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys) {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const active = (key) => !key.revokedAt && key.notAfter > now;
+    const ordered = mailboxKeys
+        .filter((key) => isOpenPgpKey(key) && findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, key.fingerprint))
+        .sort((a, b) => Number(active(b)) - Number(active(a)) || b.notBefore - a.notBefore)
+        .slice(0, MAX_RETAINED_ENCRYPTION_KEYS + 1);
+    if (ordered.length === 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+    const { readSecretKey } = await import("./openpgp.js");
+    const aad = buildAad(mailboxUid, OPENPGP_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE);
+    for (const publicKey of ordered) {
+        try {
+            const raw = await openWithKey(unlocked.masterKey, findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, publicKey.fingerprint), aad);
+            try {
+                (unlocked.openPgpKeys ?? (unlocked.openPgpKeys = [])).push({ fingerprint: publicKey.fingerprint, privateKey: await readSecretKey(raw) });
+            }
+            finally {
+                raw.fill(0);
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            unopenableKeys.push(publicKey.fingerprint);
+        }
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Unlocks a mailbox's key vault with its password unlock method: fetches the vault, derives the
  * wrapping key from `password` using the *exact* KDF parameters that wrap was created with, unwraps
@@ -300,8 +371,8 @@ async function openZeroAccessKeys(mailboxUid, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys) {
  * "incorrect password," not a generic error, but this module doesn't presume a specific UI's error copy.
  * Once the master key has opened, the password is known to be right: an active signing key that then
  * won't open is skipped and listed in `UnlockResult.unopenableKeys` (so is a retained encryption key); an active
- * encryption key that won't
- * open still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
+ * encryption key that won't open, or whose certificate isn't its own,
+ * still fails the unlock, with `UnopenableEncryptionKeyError`. Throws `KeysLockedError` when
  * `destroyUnlockedKeys()` locked this mailbox (or all mailboxes) while the unlock was in flight.
  */
 export async function unlockWithPassword(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, password) {
@@ -416,18 +487,23 @@ async function openSession(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, masterKey, generation
         const encryptionPublicKey = findActivePublicKey(mailboxKeys, "encrypt");
         const wrappedEncryptionKey = encryptionPublicKey && findWrappedPrivateKey(vault, encryptionPublicKey.fingerprint);
         if (encryptionPublicKey && wrappedEncryptionKey) {
+            let encryptionCertDer;
             try {
+                // The certificate is the server's: one that isn't this key's - what this device encrypts its own copies to, and what it
+                // hands out as its S/MIME certificate - makes the key unopenable, exactly as a wrap that won't open.
+                encryptionCertDer = fromBase64(encryptionPublicKey.publicKey);
                 const aad = buildAad(mailboxUid, ENCRYPTION_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE);
-                unlocked.encryptionPrivateKey = await openPrivateKey(masterKey, wrappedEncryptionKey, aad, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"]);
+                unlocked.encryptionPrivateKey = await openPrivateKey(masterKey, wrappedEncryptionKey, aad, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" }, ["deriveBits"], false, encryptionCertDer);
             }
             catch (err) {
                 throw new UnopenableEncryptionKeyError(encryptionPublicKey.fingerprint, err);
             }
-            unlocked.encryptionCertDer = fromBase64(encryptionPublicKey.publicKey);
+            unlocked.encryptionCertDer = encryptionCertDer;
             unlocked.encryptionFingerprint = encryptionPublicKey.fingerprint;
         }
         await openRetainedEncryptionKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlocked, encryptionPublicKey?.fingerprint, unopenableKeys);
         await openZeroAccessKeys(mailboxUid, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys);
+        await openOpenPgpKeys(mailboxUid, mailboxKeys, vault, unlocked, unopenableKeys);
         if (lockGeneration(mailboxUid) !== generation) {
             // Locked (e.g. logout) while this unlock was awaiting - never restore keys after that.
             throw new KeysLockedError();

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyvaultApi.d.ts

@@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ import { ApiClient, ApiRequestError } from "../util/api.js";
 /** A cryptographic public key used to sign or encrypt messages — safe to expose publicly. Mirrors
  * `@rapidmx/restapi`'s `PublicKey` type exactly. */
 export interface PublicKey {
-    /** Base64-encoded DER X.509 certificate. */
+    /** Base64-encoded DER X.509 certificate - or, for `type: "openpgp"`, the binary OpenPGP transferable public key. */
     publicKey: string;
-    /** The key's type/format (e.g. `x509`). */
+    /** The key's type/format: `x509` (S/MIME), or `openpgp` - an OpenPGP certificate, which both encrypts and signs and is listed
+     * once, with `useType: "encrypt"` (restapi `specs/end-to-end_encryption.md` *OpenPGP Interoperability*). */
     type: string;
     useType: "sign" | "encrypt";
     /** SHA-256 fingerprint of the certificate, hex encoded. */
@@ -42,7 +43,20 @@ export interface WrappedPrivateKey {
     algorithm: string;
     fingerprint: string;
     useType: KeyUseType;
+    /** `"openpgp"` for an OpenPGP secret key (sealed with `OPENPGP_PRIVATE_KEY_AAD_PURPOSE`); absent for a PKCS#8 key. */
+    type?: string;
 }
+/** `PublicKey.type` of an OpenPGP certificate. */
+export declare const OPENPGP_KEY_TYPE = "openpgp";
+/** Whether `key` is an OpenPGP certificate (or an OpenPGP secret key's wrap). */
+export declare function isOpenPgpKey(key: {
+    type?: string;
+} | undefined): boolean;
+/** A key's format: `"openpgp"`, or `"x509"` for every other key (S/MIME). */
+export type KeyFormat = "x509" | "openpgp";
+export declare function keyFormat(key: {
+    type?: string;
+}): KeyFormat;
 /** What a mailbox's own key is used for. `sign`/`encrypt` keys are published (`Mailbox.keys`); `zero-access` keys never are.
  * Mirrors `@rapidmx/restapi`'s `KeyUseType`. */
 export type KeyUseType = "sign" | "encrypt" | "zero-access";
@@ -73,7 +87,12 @@ export interface MasterKeyWrap {
 export interface EncryptionPreference {
     lastSeen?: number;
     preferEncrypt: "mutual" | "nopreference";
+    /** Which end-to-end format the address would rather receive when a sender can use either (restapi
+     * `specs/end-to-end_encryption.md` *Choosing the format*). Absent: no preference. */
+    preferFormat?: EndToEndFormat;
 }
+/** The two end-to-end encryption formats. */
+export type EndToEndFormat = "smime" | "openpgp";
 /** A newly observed key that differs from a contact's pinned key of the same `useType` - restapi records it instead of
  * silently replacing the pin (the spec's Key Conflict Handling) until the user resolves it with `resolveKeyConflict()`.
  * A contact holds at most one per `useType`. Mirrors `@rapidmx/restapi`'s `KeyConflict`. */
@@ -133,7 +152,7 @@ export declare function getKeyVault(mailboxUid: string, client?: ApiClient): Pro
  * `revocationReason` - a superseded key may still verify old mail (`isTrustedForVerification()`) but is never used for
  * new mail. Shared by `crypto/keySession.ts` (the
  * mailbox's own keys) and `crypto/composeSecurity.ts` (a recipient's discovered keys). */
-export declare function findActivePublicKey(keys: PublicKey[], useType: "sign" | "encrypt"): PublicKey | undefined;
+export declare function findActivePublicKey(keys: PublicKey[], useType: "sign" | "encrypt", format?: KeyFormat): PublicKey | undefined;
 /**
  * Whether `key` may still be trusted to *verify* existing signatures - never whether to sign or encrypt with it (that is
  * `findActivePublicKey()`, which skips every revoked key). Expired keys are trusted: mail signed while a key was valid
@@ -165,7 +184,11 @@ export interface EnrollKeyInput extends ExpectedMasterKeyGeneration {
     csr?: string;
     /** An already-issued PEM certificate — required (and only meaningful) for `useType: "sign"`. */
     certificate?: string;
-    wrappedKey: Omit<WrappedPrivateKey, "fingerprint" | "useType">;
+    /** `"openpgp"` to enroll the mailbox's OpenPGP key (with `useType: "encrypt"`): self-certified, no CA. */
+    type?: string;
+    /** The OpenPGP public key (armored or base64 binary) - required, and only meaningful, with `type: "openpgp"`. */
+    publicKey?: string;
+    wrappedKey: Omit<WrappedPrivateKey, "fingerprint" | "useType" | "type">;
     /** Only meaningful the very first time a mailbox enrolls a key at all (bootstraps its master key). */
     masterKeyWraps?: MasterKeyWrap[];
 }
@@ -401,6 +424,11 @@ export interface KeyLookupResult {
     keyConflicts?: KeyConflict[];
     /** Keys that were pinned before, newest first - see `PreviousKey`. */
     previousKeys?: PreviousKey[];
+    /** The format to use for a recipient reachable in both (restapi *Choosing the format*): the user's choice for the contact, else what
+     * the address advertises, else what it was last seen using. Absent when nothing says - S/MIME then. */
+    preferredFormat?: EndToEndFormat;
+    /** Where `preferredFormat` came from. */
+    preferredFormatSource?: "contact" | "advertised" | "observed";
 }
 /** Server-side Discovery: the server itself performs the `_rapidmx` DNS lookup and remote key-endpoint
  * fetch (browsers can't do DNS TXT lookups, and a direct cross-origin fetch would hit CORS), persisting
@@ -410,8 +438,11 @@ export declare function lookupKeys(mailboxUid: string, addr: string, client?: Ap
 /** What `trustSigner()` pins: the sender's address and the certificate that signed their message. */
 export interface TrustSignerInput {
     address: string;
-    /** Base64 DER of the signer certificate - `MessageSecurityResult.signerCertificate`. */
+    /** Base64 DER of the signer certificate - `MessageSecurityResult.signerCertificate` - or, with `type: "openpgp"`, an OpenPGP
+     * public key (armored or base64 binary): a signer's, a key attached to a message, or one the user pasted. */
     certificate: string;
+    /** `"openpgp"` to pin an OpenPGP key (it encrypts and signs); omitted for an X.509 signing certificate. */
+    type?: string;
 }
 /**
  * Thrown by `trustSigner()` when restapi answers `409`: a different signing key is already pinned for that address, so
@@ -444,6 +475,8 @@ export interface ResolveKeyConflictInput {
     /** For `"accept"`: base64 DER of the certificate to pin (e.g. `MessageSecurityResult.signerCertificate` of a
      * `signer_key_changed` result). Omitted, restapi pins the recorded conflict's `observedKey`. */
     certificate?: string;
+    /** `"openpgp"` for the contact's OpenPGP key (always `useType: "encrypt"`); omitted for its S/MIME certificate. */
+    type?: string;
 }
 /** The contact's resulting key state after `resolveKeyConflict()`. */
 export type ResolveKeyConflictResult = KeyLookupResult;
@@ -471,6 +504,9 @@ export interface EncryptionPolicy {
      * supports zero-access encryption (its stored value or the server default); absent from one that doesn't, which a
      * caller treats as not allowed. */
     allowZeroAccess?: boolean;
+    /** "Allow OpenPGP": whether mailboxes may enroll and publish OpenPGP keys, for mail with OpenPGP users. Absent from a server
+     * that predates it, which a caller treats as not allowed. */
+    allowOpenPgp?: boolean;
 }
 /** The system-wide encryption policy (readable by any authenticated user, used to decide what encryption
  * controls a compose UI should offer). */

package/dist/lib/crypto/keyvaultApi.js

@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@
  * and `crypto/keys.ts` for the client-side cryptography that produces the values passed here.
  */
 import { ApiRequestError, withClient } from "../util/api.js";
+/** `PublicKey.type` of an OpenPGP certificate. */
+export const OPENPGP_KEY_TYPE = "openpgp";
+/** Whether `key` is an OpenPGP certificate (or an OpenPGP secret key's wrap). */
+export function isOpenPgpKey(key) {
+    return key?.type === OPENPGP_KEY_TYPE;
+}
+export function keyFormat(key) {
+    return isOpenPgpKey(key) ? "openpgp" : "x509";
+}
 /** `client`, given by every function below that calls the network, is an explicit `ApiClient` from `createApiClient()`
  * (e.g. one account of a multi-account app) to call instead of the default global `apiFetch()` - see `withClient()`'s
  * own doc comment in `util/api.ts`. Omitted (the default), every function here behaves exactly as before. */
@@ -24,10 +33,10 @@ export function getKeyVault(mailboxUid, client) {
  * `revocationReason` - a superseded key may still verify old mail (`isTrustedForVerification()`) but is never used for
  * new mail. Shared by `crypto/keySession.ts` (the
  * mailbox's own keys) and `crypto/composeSecurity.ts` (a recipient's discovered keys). */
-export function findActivePublicKey(keys, useType) {
+export function findActivePublicKey(keys, useType, format = "x509") {
     const now = Date.now();
     return keys
-        .filter((k) => k.useType === useType && !k.revokedAt && k.notAfter > now)
+        .filter((k) => k.useType === useType && keyFormat(k) === format && !k.revokedAt && k.notAfter > now)
         .sort((a, b) => b.notBefore - a.notBefore)[0];
 }
 /**
@@ -320,7 +329,7 @@ export async function trustSigner(mailboxUid, input, client) {
     try {
         return await withClient(client, `/mail/mailboxes/${encodeURIComponent(mailboxUid)}/keys/trust`, {
             method: "POST",
-            body: JSON.stringify({ address: input.address, certificate: input.certificate }),
+            body: JSON.stringify({ address: input.address, certificate: input.certificate, ...(input.type ? { type: input.type } : {}) }),
         });
     }
     catch (err) {
@@ -354,6 +363,7 @@ export async function resolveKeyConflict(mailboxUid, input, client) {
         action: input.action,
         expectedPinnedFingerprint: input.expectedPinnedFingerprint,
         ...(input.certificate !== undefined ? { certificate: input.certificate } : {}),
+        ...(input.type ? { type: input.type } : {}),
     };
     try {
         return await withClient(client, `/mail/mailboxes/${encodeURIComponent(mailboxUid)}/keys/resolve`, {

package/dist/lib/crypto/meetingKeys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import type { DecryptionKey } from "./smime.js";
+/** The `#` parameter of a link that carries a meeting key. */
+export declare const MEETING_KEY_FRAGMENT_PARAM = "k";
+/** A meeting key as its creator holds it. */
+export interface GeneratedMeetingKey {
+    /** PKCS#8 DER of the private key - what a link carries and a wrap seals. */
+    pkcs8: Uint8Array;
+    /** The self-signed certificate's DER - what the server stores and data is sealed to. */
+    certificateDer: Uint8Array;
+    /** SHA-256 of `certificateDer`, lowercase hex. */
+    fingerprint: string;
+}
+/** A new meeting key valid until `expiresAt` (its certificate's `notAfter`). */
+export declare function generateMeetingKey(expiresAt: Date): Promise<GeneratedMeetingKey>;
+/** The `#` part a guest's link carries for `pkcs8`: `k=<base64url>`. */
+export declare function meetingKeyFragment(pkcs8: Uint8Array): string;
+/** The meeting key in `hash` (a `location.hash`, with or without its `#`), or `undefined` when it carries none or it is malformed. */
+export declare function readMeetingKeyFragment(hash: string): Uint8Array | undefined;
+/** The meeting key `pkcs8` as the CMS code opens with it, and its live key for meeting `meetingUid`. Rejects a key that isn't P-256. */
+export declare function importMeetingKey(pkcs8: Uint8Array, certificateDer: Uint8Array, meetingUid: string): Promise<{
+    decryptionKey: DecryptionKey;
+    liveKey: CryptoKey;
+}>;
+/** The AES-256-GCM live key of meeting `meetingUid` from `ikm`, the meeting key's private scalar. Non-extractable. */
+export declare function deriveLiveKey(ikm: Uint8Array, meetingUid: string): Promise<CryptoKey>;