@rapidmx/web-client 0.3.1 → 0.5.0

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexSchema.js

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * The Tier 2 local index's SQLite schema (`specs/search.md` §13). One database per mailbox (see
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts`), holding both the FTS5 index and the metadata cache in the same store - the
+ * spec's own rationale for choosing SQLite over an in-memory JS index in the first place ("the index
+ * database also holds the decrypted metadata cache... so there is one local store rather than two").
+ *
+ * Bumping `SCHEMA_VERSION` is how a schema change invalidates every existing local index (§11
+ * "Invalidation... on schema version change") - `localIndexWorker.ts` compares it against `meta`'s
+ * stored value on open and discards+rebuilds on a mismatch, the same path a corruption/GCM-auth-failure
+ * takes.
+ */
+/** Bump whenever `CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL` changes in a way existing on-disk databases can't be reconciled
+ * with in place. A mismatch deletes and recreates the whole database file (not just its rows), so
+ * creation-time-only settings like `auto_vacuum` also apply to upgraded indexes.
+ *
+ * 2 - added `entities.entity_version` (incremental rebuild skip) and `auto_vacuum=INCREMENTAL`. */
+export const SCHEMA_VERSION = 2;
+/**
+ * `entities` is the real row store (metadata + the plaintext content fields), `entities_fts` is an FTS5
+ * *external content* table over it (`content='entities'`) - the standard SQLite pattern for keeping one
+ * copy of the text instead of duplicating it into the FTS5 shadow tables, kept in sync via the three
+ * triggers below (SQLite's own documented pattern for external-content FTS5 tables; there is no
+ * "ON CONFLICT UPDATE re-index" primitive, so update is modeled as delete-then-reinsert into the FTS
+ * index specifically, not into `entities` itself).
+ *
+ * Column order in `entities_fts` (`subject, participants, body, attachment_text`) is load-bearing: every
+ * `bm25(entities_fts, 3.0, 2.0, 1.0, 1.0)` call elsewhere in this module family assumes that exact
+ * positional order, matching `searchScoring.ts`'s `SEARCH_FIELD_WEIGHTS` (`subject: 3, participants: 2,
+ * body: 1, attachmentText: 1`) so Tier 2's local ranking agrees with the Tier 1/Tier 3 re-scoring the
+ * spec requires for one consistent ordering across tiers (§7).
+ */
+export const CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL = `
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS meta (
+    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    value TEXT
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS entities (
+    rowid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
+    entity_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+    entity_uid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    mailbox_uid TEXT NOT NULL,
+    folder_uid TEXT,
+    date_for_sort TEXT NOT NULL,
+    participants TEXT,
+    flags TEXT,
+    has_attachments INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    subject TEXT,
+    body TEXT,
+    attachment_text TEXT,
+    byte_size INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    entity_version TEXT
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_entities_date ON entities(date_for_sort);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_entities_mailbox ON entities(mailbox_uid);
+
+CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS entities_fts USING fts5(
+    subject, participants, body, attachment_text,
+    content='entities', content_rowid='rowid', tokenize='unicode61'
+);
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_ai AFTER INSERT ON entities BEGIN
+    INSERT INTO entities_fts(rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)
+    VALUES (new.rowid, new.subject, new.participants, new.body, new.attachment_text);
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_ad AFTER DELETE ON entities BEGIN
+    INSERT INTO entities_fts(entities_fts, rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)
+    VALUES ('delete', old.rowid, old.subject, old.participants, old.body, old.attachment_text);
+END;
+
+CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS entities_au AFTER UPDATE ON entities BEGIN
+    INSERT INTO entities_fts(entities_fts, rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)
+    VALUES ('delete', old.rowid, old.subject, old.participants, old.body, old.attachment_text);
+    INSERT INTO entities_fts(rowid, subject, participants, body, attachment_text)
+    VALUES (new.rowid, new.subject, new.participants, new.body, new.attachment_text);
+END;
+`;
+/** The exact `bm25()` weight arguments every ranked query against `entities_fts` MUST pass, in column
+ * order - see this module's own doc comment on why the order is load-bearing. Centralized here so a
+ * future column reorder can't silently desync a query building its own literal weight list. */
+export const BM25_WEIGHTS_SQL = "3.0, 2.0, 1.0, 1.0";
+/** `entity_uid` upsert - `ON CONFLICT` (SQLite's UPSERT syntax) rather than a separate delete-then-insert,
+ * so re-indexing an already-present message (a flag changed, a folder move) updates it in place and the
+ * `entities_au` trigger keeps `entities_fts` in sync automatically. */
+export const UPSERT_ENTITY_SQL = `
+INSERT INTO entities (entity_type, entity_uid, mailbox_uid, folder_uid, date_for_sort, participants, flags, has_attachments, subject, body, attachment_text, byte_size, entity_version)
+VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+ON CONFLICT(entity_uid) DO UPDATE SET
+    folder_uid = excluded.folder_uid, date_for_sort = excluded.date_for_sort, participants = excluded.participants,
+    flags = excluded.flags, has_attachments = excluded.has_attachments, subject = excluded.subject,
+    body = excluded.body, attachment_text = excluded.attachment_text, byte_size = excluded.byte_size,
+    entity_version = excluded.entity_version
+`;
+/** Bind values for `UPSERT_ENTITY_SQL`, in column order - kept alongside it so the two can never drift
+ * out of sync with each other. */
+export function entityBindValues(entity) {
+    return [
+        entity.entityType,
+        entity.entityUid,
+        entity.mailboxUid,
+        entity.folderUid ?? null,
+        entity.dateForSort,
+        entity.participants,
+        entity.flags,
+        entity.hasAttachments ? 1 : 0,
+        entity.subject ?? null,
+        entity.body ?? null,
+        entity.attachmentText ?? null,
+        entity.byteSize,
+        entity.entityVersion ?? null,
+    ];
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the SQL `WHERE` predicate (and its bind params) for every *structured* operator this local
+ * index can actually evaluate. **Known simplification**: unlike Tier 1's server-side `SearchDocument`
+ * (which splits `from`/`to`/`cc` into distinct fields - confirmed already implemented server-side), this
+ * local schema keeps only the combined `participants` field (see `CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL`'s own doc comment) -
+ * `from:`/`to:`/`cc:` are therefore evaluated here as a substring match against that combined field
+ * rather than a precise per-role match. Reasonable for a bounded, best-effort recent-window cache
+ * (Tier 1 already serves the precise version for anything it indexes), but a real gap if Tier 2 is later
+ * extended to distinguish them - flagged here rather than left silently approximate.
+ */
+export function buildSearchPredicates(parsed, mailboxUid) {
+    const clauses = ["e.mailbox_uid = ?"];
+    const params = [mailboxUid];
+    if (parsed.folderUid) {
+        clauses.push("e.folder_uid = ?");
+        params.push(parsed.folderUid);
+    }
+    if (parsed.before) {
+        clauses.push("e.date_for_sort < ?");
+        params.push(parsed.before.toISOString());
+    }
+    if (parsed.after) {
+        clauses.push("e.date_for_sort > ?");
+        params.push(parsed.after.toISOString());
+    }
+    if (parsed.hasAttachment !== undefined) {
+        clauses.push("e.has_attachments = ?");
+        params.push(parsed.hasAttachment ? 1 : 0);
+    }
+    for (const flag of parsed.flags ?? []) {
+        clauses.push("e.flags LIKE ?");
+        params.push(`%,${flag},%`);
+    }
+    for (const participant of [parsed.from, parsed.to, parsed.cc]) {
+        if (participant) {
+            clauses.push("e.participants LIKE ?");
+            params.push(`%${participant}%`);
+        }
+    }
+    return { where: clauses.join(" AND "), params };
+}
+/** Escapes a free-text fragment for safe embedding inside an FTS5 `MATCH` phrase - FTS5's own quoting
+ * rule for a `"..."` phrase is doubling an embedded `"`, mirroring SQL string-literal escaping. */
+function escapeFtsPhrase(value) {
+    return value.replace(/"/g, '""');
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the FTS5 `MATCH` expression for a parsed query's free-text and `subject:` portions, or
+ * `undefined` when there's nothing to match on text at all (a pure operator/structured-filter query -
+ * `buildSearchPredicates()`'s `WHERE` clause alone already narrows that case correctly, no `MATCH`
+ * needed). `parsed.text` is passed through close to verbatim (quoted phrases, `OR`, `-` negation - FTS5's
+ * own query syntax supports the same shape `queryGrammar.ts`'s own doc comment says every provider's
+ * free-text engine is expected to), wrapped only enough to combine it with a `subject:`-scoped clause
+ * when both are present.
+ */
+export function buildMatchExpression(parsed) {
+    const parts = [];
+    if (parsed.subject) {
+        parts.push(`subject:"${escapeFtsPhrase(parsed.subject)}"`);
+    }
+    if (parsed.text.trim()) {
+        parts.push(parsed.subject ? `(${parsed.text})` : parsed.text);
+    }
+    if (parts.length === 0) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return parts.join(" AND ");
+}

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexSizePreference.js

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * The user-adjustable byte budget behind the Tier 2 local index's window (`localIndexBuilder.ts`'s
+ * `buildLocalIndex()`). Stored in `localStorage`, not synced to the server - a per-device preference
+ * about *this device's* own local OPFS storage, the same posture `idleTimeout.ts`
+ * (`@rapidmx/react-shared`) already takes for its own per-device setting, which this file mirrors.
+ *
+ * `specs/search.md` §10/§11 distinguish "Web" (quota-limited) from "Native desktop" (disk-limited) as
+ * different rows of the same Window Sizing table, not different storage engines - Electron's renderer is
+ * Chromium, so it runs this exact same OPFS/wa-sqlite/`EncryptingVFS` code, just with more disk headroom
+ * to spend. `isElectronRuntime()` reads `window.rapidmx` - the `contextBridge` global
+ * `electron-client/src/main/preload.ts` exposes only inside that renderer (see its own `global.d.ts`) -
+ * as a runtime duck-type signal, so this file (which `electron-client` consumes unmodified via its
+ * `link:../web-client` dependency - see `localIndexBuilder.ts`'s own doc comment on that) never needs an
+ * explicit "which platform am I" value threaded down from anywhere.
+ */
+const STORAGE_KEY = "rapidmx:local-index-byte-budget";
+const MB = 1024 * 1024;
+const GB = 1024 * MB;
+/** §11's Window Sizing table, Web row. */
+export const WEB_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES = 500 * MB;
+/** §11's Window Sizing table, Native desktop row - still a real, user-adjustable ceiling (not
+ * `UNBOUNDED`), just a roomier default given Electron's storage is disk-limited rather than
+ * browser-quota-limited. */
+export const ELECTRON_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES = 1 * GB;
+/** Selectable presets for the Settings UI. `0` means "unlimited" - `applyEviction()`
+ * (`localIndexWorker.ts`) already treats a falsy byte budget as unconfigured/unenforced. */
+export const LOCAL_INDEX_SIZE_OPTIONS = [
+    { bytes: 100 * MB, label: "100 MB" },
+    { bytes: 250 * MB, label: "250 MB" },
+    { bytes: WEB_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES, label: "500 MB" },
+    { bytes: ELECTRON_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES, label: "1 GB" },
+    { bytes: 2 * GB, label: "2 GB" },
+    { bytes: 5 * GB, label: "5 GB" },
+    { bytes: 10 * GB, label: "10 GB" },
+    { bytes: 0, label: "Unlimited (disk space only)" },
+];
+function isElectronRuntime() {
+    return typeof window !== "undefined" && "rapidmx" in window;
+}
+/** This device's default byte budget before any explicit preference is saved - `500 MB` in a browser
+ * tab, `1 GB` in the Electron shell. */
+export function getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget() {
+    return isElectronRuntime() ? ELECTRON_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES : WEB_DEFAULT_BYTE_BUDGET_BYTES;
+}
+/**
+ * Reads this device's configured local-index byte budget. Falls back to
+ * `getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget()` for a never-configured device, a corrupted/non-numeric stored
+ * value, or a `localStorage` access that throws (private-browsing/storage-blocked contexts) - never
+ * throws itself, matching `getIdleTimeoutMinutes()`'s identical fallback posture.
+ */
+export function getLocalIndexByteBudget() {
+    try {
+        const stored = localStorage.getItem(STORAGE_KEY);
+        if (stored === null) {
+            return getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget();
+        }
+        const parsed = Number(stored);
+        return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed >= 0 ? parsed : getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget();
+    }
+    catch {
+        return getDefaultLocalIndexByteBudget();
+    }
+}
+/** Persists this device's local-index byte-budget preference. A `localStorage` write failure is
+ * swallowed, not thrown - the setting just doesn't survive a reload in that case, same fallback-to-default
+ * behavior `getLocalIndexByteBudget()` already has for a storage-blocked context. */
+export function setLocalIndexByteBudget(bytes) {
+    try {
+        localStorage.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, String(bytes));
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Best-effort - see this function's own doc comment.
+    }
+}

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexStorage.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * The Tier 2 local index's on-disk naming and bulk-removal helpers, shared by the Worker
+ * (`localIndexWorker.ts`) and the main thread (`localIndexRpcClient.ts`). Deliberately free of any
+ * wa-sqlite import so the main thread can use it without pulling the WASM build into its own bundle.
+ *
+ * Every mailbox's index lives in its own top-level OPFS directory named `rapidmx-localsearch-<mailboxUid>`
+ * (`AccessHandlePoolVFS` creates it from the VFS name). Enumerating that prefix is how sign-out destroys
+ * *every* index on this device - including ones for mailboxes this page load never opened, which the
+ * RPC client's own session-scoped bookkeeping can't know about - and how a sign-in prunes indexes left
+ * behind for mailboxes the current user can no longer access.
+ */
+export const LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX = "rapidmx-localsearch-";
+/** The OPFS directory name (and `EncryptingVFS` name) a mailbox's index lives under. */
+export function poolNameFor(mailboxUid) {
+    return `${LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX}${mailboxUid}`;
+}
+/** Inverse of `poolNameFor()`; `undefined` for any OPFS entry that isn't a local index directory. */
+export function mailboxUidFromPoolName(name) {
+    return name.startsWith(LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX) && name.length > LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX.length
+        ? name.slice(LOCAL_INDEX_POOL_PREFIX.length)
+        : undefined;
+}
+/** `navigator.storage.getDirectory()`, or `undefined` where OPFS isn't available at all (older browsers,
+ * jsdom/node) - there is nothing on disk to remove in that case. */
+async function getOpfsRoot() {
+    const storage = typeof navigator === "undefined" ? undefined : navigator.storage;
+    if (!storage?.getDirectory) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return storage.getDirectory();
+}
+function isNotFound(err) {
+    return err?.name === "NotFoundError";
+}
+/** Removes one mailbox's index directory. Resolves quietly when it doesn't exist; rejects for any other
+ * failure (most commonly `NoModificationAllowedError` - another tab still holds its access handles). */
+export async function removeLocalIndexDirectory(mailboxUid) {
+    const root = await getOpfsRoot();
+    if (!root) {
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        await root.removeEntry(poolNameFor(mailboxUid), { recursive: true });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (!isNotFound(err)) {
+            throw err;
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** Every mailbox uid that has a local index directory on this origin. */
+export async function listLocalIndexMailboxUids() {
+    const root = await getOpfsRoot();
+    if (!root) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const mailboxUids = [];
+    // `keys()` is part of the OPFS spec and every browser that has `getDirectory()` at all, but isn't in
+    // this TypeScript version's DOM lib yet.
+    for await (const name of root.keys()) {
+        const mailboxUid = mailboxUidFromPoolName(name);
+        if (mailboxUid) {
+            mailboxUids.push(mailboxUid);
+        }
+    }
+    return mailboxUids;
+}
+/** Removes every local index directory on this origin except those whose mailbox uid is in `keep`. */
+export async function removeLocalIndexDirectories(keep = new Set()) {
+    const result = { removed: [], failed: [] };
+    const mailboxUids = (await listLocalIndexMailboxUids()).filter((mailboxUid) => !keep.has(mailboxUid));
+    for (const mailboxUid of mailboxUids) {
+        try {
+            await removeLocalIndexDirectory(mailboxUid);
+            result.removed.push(mailboxUid);
+        }
+        catch {
+            result.failed.push(mailboxUid);
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}

package/dist/apps/shared/search/localIndexVFS.js

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+var __classPrivateFieldSet = (this && this.__classPrivateFieldSet) || function (receiver, state, value, kind, f) {
+    if (kind === "m") throw new TypeError("Private method is not writable");
+    if (kind === "a" && !f) throw new TypeError("Private accessor was defined without a setter");
+    if (typeof state === "function" ? receiver !== state || !f : !state.has(receiver)) throw new TypeError("Cannot write private member to an object whose class did not declare it");
+    return (kind === "a" ? f.call(receiver, value) : f ? f.value = value : state.set(receiver, value)), value;
+};
+var __classPrivateFieldGet = (this && this.__classPrivateFieldGet) || function (receiver, state, kind, f) {
+    if (kind === "a" && !f) throw new TypeError("Private accessor was defined without a getter");
+    if (typeof state === "function" ? receiver !== state || !f : !state.has(receiver)) throw new TypeError("Cannot read private member from an object whose class did not declare it");
+    return kind === "m" ? f : kind === "a" ? f.call(receiver) : f ? f.value : state.get(receiver);
+};
+var _EncryptingVFS_instances, _EncryptingVFS_inner, _EncryptingVFS_key, _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId, _EncryptingVFS_readBlock, _EncryptingVFS_writeBlock, _EncryptingVFS_jReadBlocks, _EncryptingVFS_jWriteBlocks;
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Copyright (C) 2026 Jean-Philippe Steinmetz
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+/**
+ * `EncryptingVFS` - the Tier 2 local index's at-rest encryption layer (`specs/search.md` §11
+ * "Persistence and protection", §13 "Encryption at Rest": "no official SQLCipher WASM build exists...
+ * encryption at rest requires a custom VFS that encrypts pages before they reach OPFS").
+ *
+ * Wraps (composes, does not subclass - `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s own file-table state is private `#`
+ * fields) an `AccessHandlePoolVFS` instance and delegates every `FacadeVFS` method straight through
+ * except `jRead`/`jWrite`, which it intercepts to decrypt/encrypt pages.
+ *
+ * ## Page layout
+ *
+ * SQLite is opened with a fixed 4096-byte page size (`PRAGMA page_size=4096` - set by
+ * `localIndexWorker.ts` before the first write, since SQLite fixes a database's page size on creation).
+ * Each *logical* 4096-byte page is stored *physically* as `nonce(12) || AES-256-GCM(ciphertext(4096) ||
+ * tag(16))` = 4124 bytes, at a remapped offset (`physicalOffset(page) = page * 4124`). This block size
+ * is this class's own fixed constant, independent of whatever byte range a given `jRead`/`jWrite` call
+ * actually requests - reads/writes are handled generically over whichever physical blocks the requested
+ * logical range overlaps (including a read-modify-write for a sub-block write), not by assuming SQLite
+ * only ever issues page-aligned, page-sized I/O. That assumption holds for the *main database file* once
+ * its page size is fixed, but handling the general case costs little and removes the need to rely on it.
+ *
+ * **A fresh random nonce is generated on every write, never reused or derived from a counter** - the
+ * simplest way to make an AES-GCM (key, nonce) pair never repeat across different plaintexts, which is
+ * the one hard requirement GCM has. The nonce travels with its block, so decryption never needs any
+ * external state (a lost/corrupted counter, a persisted salt) to reconstruct it.
+ *
+ * **AAD binds each block to its logical filename and page index** (not just its own ciphertext) - GCM
+ * authenticates a block's own content but not its *position*; without this, an attacker able to write
+ * directly into this origin's OPFS storage (outside this codebase's own threat model per spec §4, which
+ * excludes a compromised client, but cheap to close off anyway) could silently swap two blocks and each
+ * would still decrypt "successfully" on its own, corrupting data instead of failing loudly. Binding to
+ * position turns a swap into a caught decryption failure - see `PageCorruptedError` below - the same
+ * "invalidate and rebuild" path a schema-version mismatch already takes (spec §11 "Invalidation").
+ *
+ * **No WAL, no rollback journal.** `localIndexWorker.ts` opens the database with `journal_mode=OFF`. A
+ * page cipher for the main database file is one encryption surface; WAL frames (their own header +
+ * checksum format) and rollback-journal records (their own, different record format) would each be a
+ * *second* one. This index has no durability requirement to justify that cost - spec §11 already
+ * requires discarding and rebuilding it on corruption, schema change, key rotation, or platform storage
+ * eviction, and eviction "MUST NOT block search" - so an interrupted write in the worst case is just
+ * caught by the same GCM-auth-failure -> rebuild path as any other corruption, never partial/torn state
+ * silently trusted.
+ *
+ * Every `jRead`/`jWrite` here is `async` (declared `async` specifically so `FacadeVFS.hasAsyncMethod()`
+ * detects it via `instanceof AsyncFunction` and awaits it) because `crypto.subtle.encrypt`/`decrypt` has
+ * no synchronous form in a browser - this is *why* `localIndexWorker.ts` boots the Asyncify SQLite build
+ * (`dist/wa-sqlite-async.mjs`), not the plain synchronous one `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s own doc comment
+ * says it's designed for: that claim is about `AccessHandlePoolVFS`'s *own* methods (real synchronous
+ * OPFS access-handle calls), which stay synchronous and work fine wrapped underneath an async outer VFS
+ * on an Asyncify build - the build choice is driven by this class's needs, not the inner VFS's.
+ */
+import { FacadeVFS } from "@journeyapps/wa-sqlite/src/FacadeVFS.js";
+import { AccessHandlePoolVFS } from "@journeyapps/wa-sqlite/src/examples/AccessHandlePoolVFS.js";
+import * as VFS from "@journeyapps/wa-sqlite/src/VFS.js";
+import { LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE, PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE, PageCorruptedError, decryptBlock, encryptBlock, importAesGcmKey, } from "./localIndexBlockCipher.js";
+export { PageCorruptedError } from "./localIndexBlockCipher.js";
+export class EncryptingVFS extends FacadeVFS {
+    constructor(name, module, inner) {
+        super(name, module);
+        _EncryptingVFS_instances.add(this);
+        _EncryptingVFS_inner.set(this, void 0);
+        _EncryptingVFS_key.set(this, void 0);
+        /** `jOpen`'s `filename` is stable across the life of a fileId; `fileId` itself is only valid for one
+         * open handle, never persisted - this map lets `jRead`/`jWrite` recover the stable filename an AAD
+         * needs to bind to, from the ephemeral fileId SQLite actually passes them. */
+        _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId.set(this, new Map());
+        /** Set once any block has failed to decrypt/authenticate (or the inner VFS failed a read/write outright)
+         * - `localIndexWorker.ts` checks this after a failed SQLite call to tell real corruption (discard and
+         * rebuild, spec §11 "Invalidation") apart from an ordinary error such as a malformed FTS5 query. */
+        this.corruptionDetected = false;
+        __classPrivateFieldSet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, inner, "f");
+    }
+    /** `rawKey` MUST be exactly 32 bytes (AES-256) - see `localIndexKey.ts`'s `deriveLocalIndexKey()`,
+     * the only intended source of this value. */
+    static async create(name, module, rawKey) {
+        const inner = await AccessHandlePoolVFS.create(name, module);
+        const vfs = new EncryptingVFS(name, module, inner);
+        __classPrivateFieldSet(vfs, _EncryptingVFS_key, await importAesGcmKey(rawKey), "f");
+        return vfs;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Releases every pooled OPFS sync access handle `AccessHandlePoolVFS` opened and holds open for its
+     * entire lifetime (not per SQLite-file-open/close - `jOpen`/`jClose` above only associate/disassociate
+     * a SQLite fileId with an already-open handle, they never open or close the handles themselves). MUST
+     * be called before creating another VFS instance against the same OPFS pool `name` - confirmed by
+     * direct reproduction: skipping this and calling `create()` again with the same `name` throws
+     * "Access Handles cannot be created if there is another open Access Handle," since the previous
+     * instance's handles are still live. `localIndexWorker.ts` calls this alongside `sqlite3.close(db)`
+     * (which closes the SQLite *connection*, a separate, shorter-lived thing from the VFS itself) whenever
+     * it tears down a mailbox's connection - on `destroy()` and in `selfTest()`'s own close/reopen check.
+     */
+    close() {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").close();
+    }
+    // Every method below except jRead/jWrite is a pure passthrough to the inner (real storage) VFS -
+    // this class's only job is to sit in the read/write path.
+    jOpen(filename, pFile, flags, pOutFlags) {
+        const result = __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jOpen(filename, pFile, flags, pOutFlags);
+        __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId, "f").set(pFile, filename ?? `(anon:${pFile})`);
+        return result;
+    }
+    jClose(pFile) {
+        __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId, "f").delete(pFile);
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jClose(pFile);
+    }
+    jDelete(filename, syncDir) {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jDelete(filename, syncDir);
+    }
+    jAccess(filename, flags, pResOut) {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jAccess(filename, flags, pResOut);
+    }
+    jFullPathname(filename, zOut) {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jFullPathname(filename, zOut);
+    }
+    jSync(pFile, flags) {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jSync(pFile, flags);
+    }
+    jSectorSize(pFile) {
+        return LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE;
+    }
+    jDeviceCharacteristics(pFile) {
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jDeviceCharacteristics(pFile);
+    }
+    /** Logical file size = physical size scaled back down to the logical block size - the inner VFS's
+     * own `jFileSize` reports the *physical* (post-remap) byte count, which is always an exact multiple
+     * of `PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE` since every write here always fills whole physical blocks. */
+    async jFileSize(pFile, pSize64) {
+        const buf = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(8));
+        const rc = await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jFileSize(pFile, buf);
+        if (rc !== VFS.SQLITE_OK)
+            return rc;
+        const physicalSize = Number(buf.getBigInt64(0, true));
+        const logicalSize = Math.floor(physicalSize / PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE) * LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        pSize64.setBigInt64(0, BigInt(logicalSize), true);
+        return VFS.SQLITE_OK;
+    }
+    /** `iSize` is a logical byte size - truncates to the smallest whole number of *physical* blocks that
+     * still covers it, so a partially-truncated trailing block is never left half-written. */
+    async jTruncate(pFile, iSize) {
+        const blocks = Math.ceil(iSize / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jTruncate(pFile, blocks * PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    }
+    /**
+     * `jRead`/`jWrite` MUST NOT throw: with the Asyncify build, an exception escaping an async VFS method
+     * never reaches the awaiting `sqlite3.*` call - it surfaces only as an unhandled rejection and the
+     * SQLite call hangs forever (confirmed by direct reproduction in node against the real wa-sqlite build).
+     * A thrown `PageCorruptedError` therefore used to wedge the whole connection instead of triggering a
+     * rebuild. Errors are converted to an I/O error return code here, which SQLite does propagate as a
+     * normal `SQLiteError`, and recorded on `corruptionDetected`.
+     */
+    async jRead(pFile, pData, iOffset) {
+        try {
+            return await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_instances, "m", _EncryptingVFS_jReadBlocks).call(this, pFile, pData, iOffset);
+        }
+        catch {
+            this.corruptionDetected = true;
+            return VFS.SQLITE_IOERR_READ;
+        }
+    }
+    async jWrite(pFile, pData, iOffset) {
+        try {
+            return await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_instances, "m", _EncryptingVFS_jWriteBlocks).call(this, pFile, pData, iOffset);
+        }
+        catch {
+            this.corruptionDetected = true;
+            return VFS.SQLITE_IOERR_WRITE;
+        }
+    }
+}
+_EncryptingVFS_inner = new WeakMap(), _EncryptingVFS_key = new WeakMap(), _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId = new WeakMap(), _EncryptingVFS_instances = new WeakSet(), _EncryptingVFS_readBlock = 
+/**
+ * Reads one physical block and decrypts it. `absent: true` means nothing has ever been written at
+ * this block (the inner VFS's own read came back short) - `plaintext` is a zero-filled logical block
+ * in that case, matching what SQLite expects for a region it has never written, and it is
+ * deliberately never handed to `crypto.subtle.decrypt()` at all (there aren't enough physical bytes
+ * present to contain a real nonce+tag).
+ *
+ * `absent` is determined *only* from the inner VFS's own return code, never inferred from whether the
+ * decrypted plaintext happens to be all-zero - a real, fully-written SQLite page is routinely
+ * all-zero (an unused/freelist page, or a page beyond a freshly created database's real content), so
+ * that content shape means nothing about whether the block is actually present.
+ */
+async function _EncryptingVFS_readBlock(pFile, filename, blockIndex) {
+    const physical = new Uint8Array(PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    const rc = await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jRead(pFile, physical, blockIndex * PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    if (rc === VFS.SQLITE_IOERR_SHORT_READ) {
+        // #writeBlock() never writes fewer than PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE bytes at a time, so a short read
+        // here only ever means "this block was never written," not "partially written."
+        return { plaintext: new Uint8Array(LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE), absent: true };
+    }
+    if (rc !== VFS.SQLITE_OK) {
+        throw new PageCorruptedError(filename, blockIndex, new Error(`inner VFS read failed: rc=${rc}`));
+    }
+    const plaintext = await decryptBlock(__classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_key, "f"), filename, blockIndex, physical);
+    return { plaintext, absent: false };
+}, _EncryptingVFS_writeBlock = async function _EncryptingVFS_writeBlock(pFile, filename, blockIndex, plaintext) {
+    const physical = await encryptBlock(__classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_key, "f"), filename, blockIndex, plaintext);
+    return __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_inner, "f").jWrite(pFile, physical, blockIndex * PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}, _EncryptingVFS_jReadBlocks = async function _EncryptingVFS_jReadBlocks(pFile, pData, iOffset) {
+    const filename = __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId, "f").get(pFile) ?? `(unknown:${pFile})`;
+    const startBlock = Math.floor(iOffset / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    const endBlock = Math.floor((iOffset + pData.length - 1) / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    let anyAbsent = false;
+    for (let block = startBlock; block <= endBlock; block++) {
+        const { plaintext, absent } = await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_instances, "m", _EncryptingVFS_readBlock).call(this, pFile, filename, block);
+        const blockStart = block * LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        const copyStart = Math.max(iOffset, blockStart);
+        const copyEnd = Math.min(iOffset + pData.length, blockStart + LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        pData.set(plaintext.subarray(copyStart - blockStart, copyEnd - blockStart), copyStart - iOffset);
+        // SQLITE_IOERR_SHORT_READ is how SQLite distinguishes "nothing here yet" from "here is real
+        // (possibly zero-filled) data," e.g. when probing whether a file exists at all - see
+        // #readBlock's own doc comment on why this is tracked explicitly, not inferred from content.
+        if (absent) {
+            anyAbsent = true;
+        }
+    }
+    return anyAbsent ? VFS.SQLITE_IOERR_SHORT_READ : VFS.SQLITE_OK;
+}, _EncryptingVFS_jWriteBlocks = async function _EncryptingVFS_jWriteBlocks(pFile, pData, iOffset) {
+    const filename = __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_filenamesByFileId, "f").get(pFile) ?? `(unknown:${pFile})`;
+    const startBlock = Math.floor(iOffset / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    const endBlock = Math.floor((iOffset + pData.length - 1) / LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    for (let block = startBlock; block <= endBlock; block++) {
+        const blockStart = block * LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE;
+        const writeStart = Math.max(iOffset, blockStart);
+        const writeEnd = Math.min(iOffset + pData.length, blockStart + LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        // Whole-block write (the common case once SQLite's page size is fixed): no need to read the
+        // old block first. Anything narrower (a sub-page write, or this block only partially
+        // overlaps the requested range) needs the existing content as a base - a real
+        // read-modify-write - since the physical block is re-encrypted as a single AEAD unit.
+        const plaintext = writeStart === blockStart && writeEnd === blockStart + LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE
+            ? pData.subarray(writeStart - iOffset, writeEnd - iOffset)
+            : await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_instances, "m", _EncryptingVFS_readBlock).call(this, pFile, filename, block).then(({ plaintext: existing }) => {
+                const merged = existing.slice();
+                merged.set(pData.subarray(writeStart - iOffset, writeEnd - iOffset), writeStart - blockStart);
+                return merged;
+            });
+        const rc = await __classPrivateFieldGet(this, _EncryptingVFS_instances, "m", _EncryptingVFS_writeBlock).call(this, pFile, filename, block, plaintext);
+        if (rc !== VFS.SQLITE_OK)
+            return rc;
+    }
+    return VFS.SQLITE_OK;
+};