@raolin2025/claude-code-node 2.8.1 → 2.8.3

package/README.md

@@ -111,11 +111,51 @@ printf '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize"}\n' | cc-node --stdio
 | `/clear` | 清空当前对话 |
 | `/config KEY` | 查看配置（支持点号路径如 `tools.bash.timeout`） |
 | `/budget` | 查看 Token 预算使用情况 |
+| `/window [N]` | 查看/设置上下文窗口（如 `/window 128k`、`/window auto`） |
 | `/exit` `/quit` | 退出（Ctrl+C 也可以） |
 
 [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@raolin2025/claude-code-node.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@raolin2025/claude-code-node) [![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-bg1avd%2Fclaude--code--node-blue)](https://github.com/bg1avd/claude-code-node) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 ---
 
+## 🧠 上下文窗口感知（自动压缩）
+
+cc-node 会自动感知当前所用模型的**上下文窗口长度**，并在接近上限时**自动压缩**对话历史，
+确保上下文**永不超出**模型窗口。
+
+### 窗口来源优先级
+
+| 优先级 | 来源 | 说明 |
+|--------|------|------|
+| 1 | **手动指定**（`/window N`） | 持久化到 config，每次启动优先采用 |
+| 2 | **API 探测** | 从 `GET /models` 响应提取（vLLM `context_length`、Ollama `model_info` 等） |
+| 3 | **内置模型表** | 内置 40+ 常见模型上下文表（DeepSeek/OpenAI/Qwen/GLM/Kimi 等） |
+| 4 | **安全兜底** | 64K（探测不到且表里没有时） |
+
+> 探测结果**不落盘**，每次启动重新探测；只有 `/window N` 手动指定才会持久化（方案 A）。
+> 探测不精确时，用 `/window N` 手动纠正即可。
+
+### 自动压缩机制
+
+- 当已用 token 达到窗口的 **80%** 时自动触发压缩（`autoCompact`）。
+- 压缩策略：保留最近 4 轮完整对话，早期历史压缩为摘要（用户意图、用到的工具、关键结果），
+  并将过长工具结果截断，目标压到窗口的 60%。
+- **发送前硬校验**：每次发请求前估算消息量，超窗先压缩再发，作为最终兜底保险。
+
+### `/window` 命令用法
+
+```
+/window              → 查看当前窗口 + 来源 + 用量
+/window 128k         → 手动指定 128K（持久化到 config）
+/window 64k          → 手动指定 64K
+/window 1m           → 手动指定 100 万
+/window auto         → 清除手动指定，回到自动探测
+/window reset        → 清除手动指定并立即重探测
+```
+
+> 切换模型（`/model`）后会自动重新探测窗口。`/budget` 也会显示当前窗口与 80% 触发阈值。
+
+---
+
 ## 🛠️ 内置工具（10 个）
 
 | 工具 | 说明 | 权限级别 | 安全检查 |
@@ -126,7 +166,7 @@ printf '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize"}\n' | cc-node --stdio
 | **Write** | 创建/覆盖文件 | `ask` | ✅ 写入路径安全 |
 | **Glob** | 文件模式搜索 | `always-allow` | — |
 | **Grep** | 内容搜索（rg/grep） | `always-allow` | — |
-| **WebFetch** | 抓取网页内容 | `ask` | ✅ SSRF 防护 |
+| **WebFetch** | 抓取网页内容（安全管道 + Jina 兜底） | `ask` | ✅ SSRF + 重定向 + 脱敏 |
 | **WebSearch** | 网页搜索 | `ask` | 需要 API Key |
 | **GitTool** | GitHub PR 自动化（审查/合并/评论） | `high` | ✅ 预检查 |
 | **NpmPublish** | npm 发布一键工具（版本/打包/发布） | `ask` | ✅ token 校验 |
@@ -154,9 +194,27 @@ printf '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize"}\n' | cc-node --stdio
 ✅ ::1                 — IPv6 回环
 ```
 
+### 🕸️ WebFetch 安全抓取（安全管道 + Jina 兜底）
+
+`WebFetch` 内置完整安全管道（移植自 safe-jina-fetch 设计，`src/security/fetch-guard.js`）：
+
+- **协议白名单**：仅 `http/https`，拒绝 `file://`、`ftp://`、`data:` 等
+- **连接级 SSRF**：TCP 连接建立时对全部解析地址逐一校验（防 DNS rebinding），
+  并对 IP 字面量前置校验（Node 对 IP 不走 DNS lookup，必须显式拦截）
+- **重定向逐跳校验**：默认最多 5 跳，每跳重新校验协议 + SSRF（防 302 → 内网绕过）
+- **响应大小上限**：10MB；**超时**：30s；**强制 SSL**（证书错误直接拒绝）
+- **敏感数据自动脱敏**：API Key / Bearer / AWS Key / 私钥 / OpenAI `sk-` / Slack token 等
+  命中即替换为 `[REDACTED:类型]` 并告警（`src/security/redact.js`）
+
+**Jina Reader 兜底**（`src/tools/web-fetch-providers.js`）：
+
+- 直连失败（403 / 反爬 / 网络错误 / 超时）时，自动经 `r.jina.ai` 清洗后返回 Markdown
+- 直连返回 200 但正文 < 200 字符（疑似 JS 挑战页，如豆瓣）也触发兜底
+- `extractMode` 参数：`auto`（默认，直连优先 + 兜底）/ `direct`（强制直连）/ `jina`（强制 Jina）
+- Jina 凭据三选一（可选，匿名约 20 RPM）：环境变量 `JINA_API_KEY` > 配置 `web.fetch.jinaApiKey` > 匿名
+
 ### 2️⃣ Bash 命令安全（279 行）
 阻止 LLM 执行危险 shell 命令：
-
 | 类别 | 示例 | 严重性 |
 |------|------|--------|
 | 破坏性操作 | `rm -rf /`, `dd of=/dev/sda`, `mkfs` | 🚫 CRITICAL |
@@ -259,7 +317,7 @@ cc-node --api-base http://localhost:11434/v1
 {
   "model": "deepseek-chat",
   "maxTurns": 100,
-  "maxBudgetTokens": 1000000,
+  "maxBudgetTokens": 128000,
   "permissionMode": "ask",
   "tools": {
     "bash": { "timeout": 120 },
@@ -272,6 +330,10 @@ cc-node --api-base http://localhost:11434/v1
 }
 ```
 
+> **`maxBudgetTokens`**：手动指定的上下文窗口上限（token 数）。
+> 为 `0` 或未设置时，自动探测模型真实窗口；手动指定后优先于自动探测，
+> 等价于 `/window N` 的效果，并持久化保存。
+
 [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@raolin2025/claude-code-node.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@raolin2025/claude-code-node) [![GitHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/GitHub-bg1avd%2Fclaude--code--node-blue)](https://github.com/bg1avd/claude-code-node) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
 ---
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@raolin2025/claude-code-node",
-  "version": "2.8.1",
+  "version": "2.8.3",
   "description": "Node.js AI Code Agent CLI - Zero dependencies, pure JavaScript, security hardened, multi-channel notifications, Telegram & QQ Bot remote programming, rich media upload, multi-account management",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/core/index.js",

package/src/__tests__/web-fetch-guard.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/**
+ * WebFetch 安全管道 + Jina 兜底测试
+ * 覆盖：协议白名单、SSRF、重定向逐跳校验、脱敏、大小上限、Jina provider、WebFetch 兜底
+ */
+import { test } from 'node:test'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import http from 'http'
+import {
+  parseAndValidateUrl,
+  checkAddressBlocked,
+  safeFetchWithRedirects,
+  readBodyLimited,
+} from '../security/fetch-guard.js'
+import { redactSensitiveData } from '../security/redact.js'
+import {
+  safeJinaFetch,
+  cleanJinaMarkdown,
+  extractTitleFromMarkdown,
+  resolveJinaApiKey,
+} from '../tools/web-fetch-providers.js'
+
+// ============ 协议白名单 ============
+test('协议白名单：拒绝 file/ftp/data', () => {
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('file:///etc/passwd').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('ftp://example.com/x').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('data:text/plain,hello').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('javascript:alert(1)').ok, false)
+})
+
+test('协议白名单：允许 http/https', () => {
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('https://example.com').ok, true)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://example.com').ok, true)
+})
+
+test('无效 URL 拒绝', () => {
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('not a url').ok, false)
+})
+
+// ============ SSRF 地址校验 ============
+test('SSRF：私有/保留地址全部阻止', () => {
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('127.0.0.1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('10.0.0.1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('192.168.1.1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('172.16.0.1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('100.64.0.1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('169.254.169.254').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('0.0.0.0').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('::1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('fe80::1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('fd00::1').blocked, true)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('::ffff:192.168.1.1').blocked, true)
+})
+
+test('SSRF：公网地址放行', () => {
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('8.8.8.8').blocked, false)
+  assert.equal(checkAddressBlocked('1.1.1.1').blocked, false)
+})
+
+test('SSRF：内网域名后缀阻止', () => {
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://router.local/x').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://svc.internal/x').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://localhost:8080/').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://db.home/x').ok, false)
+})
+
+test('SSRF：IP 字面量私网地址被 parseAndValidateUrl 拒绝', () => {
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://127.0.0.1:8080/').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://192.168.1.1/').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('http://10.0.0.5/').ok, false)
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl('https://8.8.8.8/').ok, true)
+})
+
+// ============ 重定向逐跳校验 ============
+test('重定向：起始 URL 为内网地址被 SSRF 阻止', async () => {
+  // 本地服务器跑在 127.0.0.1（回环，SSRF 目标），safeFetchWithRedirects 应在连接前拒绝
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    res.writeHead(200)
+    res.end('ok')
+  })
+  await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r))
+  const port = server.address().port
+  const result = await safeFetchWithRedirects(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`, { timeoutMs: 2000 })
+  server.close()
+  assert.equal(result.ok, false)
+  assert.ok(result.error && result.error.includes('SSRF'), `应报 SSRF 错误，实际: ${result.error}`)
+})
+
+test('重定向：目标跳转到内网被拦截（校验 next URL）', async () => {
+  // 用公网可访问的域名作为起始（绕过起始 SSRF），但通过 verifySafeRedirectTarget 验证目标校验。
+  // 直接验证"相对重定向 → 内网"的目标解析 + 校验逻辑：
+  //   起始 https://example.com/a → 302 Location: http://192.168.1.1/（绝对内网）
+  const v = parseAndValidateUrl('http://192.168.1.1/')
+  assert.equal(v.ok, false)
+  assert.ok(v.reason.includes('192.168.1.1'))
+
+  // 相对重定向目标解析：https://example.com/x + Location: //192.168.1.1 也是内网
+  const parsed = new URL('//192.168.1.1/', 'https://example.com')
+  assert.equal(parsed.hostname, '192.168.1.1')
+  const v2 = parseAndValidateUrl(parsed.href)
+  assert.equal(v2.ok, false)
+})
+
+test('重定向：相对路径解析到公网放行', () => {
+  const parsed = new URL('/final', 'https://example.com/start')
+  assert.equal(parsed.href, 'https://example.com/final')
+  assert.equal(parseAndValidateUrl(parsed.href).ok, true)
+})
+
+// ============ 响应大小上限 ============
+test('响应大小上限：超限截断', async () => {
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' })
+    res.end('x'.repeat(1000))
+  })
+  await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r))
+  const port = server.address().port
+  // 无法用 127.0.0.1（SSRF 阻止），改用测试 readBodyLimited 直接逻辑
+  server.close()
+
+  // 直接测试 readBodyLimited
+  const chunks = { async *[Symbol.asyncIterator]() { yield Buffer.from('x'.repeat(100)); yield Buffer.from('y'.repeat(100)) } }
+  const fakeRes = { [Symbol.asyncIterator]: chunks[Symbol.asyncIterator].bind(chunks) }
+  const { body, truncated } = await readBodyLimited(fakeRes, 150)
+  assert.equal(truncated, true)
+  assert.equal(body.length, 150)
+})
+
+// ============ 敏感数据脱敏 ============
+test('脱敏：OpenAI key 替换', () => {
+  const { text, redacted } = redactSensitiveData('key is sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890')
+  assert.equal(text.includes('sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'), false)
+  assert.ok(text.includes('[REDACTED:OpenAI-Key]'))
+  assert.ok(redacted.includes('OpenAI-Key'))
+})
+
+test('脱敏：AWS key 替换', () => {
+  const { text, redacted } = redactSensitiveData('AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE')
+  assert.ok(text.includes('[REDACTED:AWS-Key]'))
+  assert.ok(redacted.includes('AWS-Key'))
+})
+
+test('脱敏：私钥整体替换', () => {
+  const { text } = redactSensitiveData('-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nabc123\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----')
+  assert.ok(!text.includes('abc123'))
+  assert.ok(text.includes('[REDACTED:Private-Key]'))
+})
+
+test('脱敏：Bearer token 替换', () => {
+  const { text } = redactSensitiveData('Authorization: Bearer 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef')
+  assert.ok(text.includes('[REDACTED:Bearer]'))
+})
+
+test('脱敏：无敏感内容不动', () => {
+  const { text, redacted } = redactSensitiveData('hello world, nothing sensitive here')
+  assert.equal(text, 'hello world, nothing sensitive here')
+  assert.equal(redacted.length, 0)
+})
+
+// ============ Jina provider ============
+test('Jina markdown 清洗', () => {
+  const md = 'Title: Test Page\nURL Source: https://example.com\nMarkdown Content:\n\nHello **world**'
+  const cleaned = cleanJinaMarkdown(md)
+  assert.equal(cleaned, 'Hello **world**')
+})
+
+test('Jina 标题提取', () => {
+  assert.equal(extractTitleFromMarkdown('Title: My Page\ncontent'), 'My Page')
+  assert.equal(extractTitleFromMarkdown('no title'), '')
+})
+
+test('Jina key 解析优先级：环境变量 > 配置', () => {
+  process.env.JINA_API_KEY = 'env-key'
+  const fromEnv = resolveJinaApiKey({ get: () => 'config-key' })
+  assert.equal(fromEnv, 'env-key')
+  delete process.env.JINA_API_KEY
+  const fromCfg = resolveJinaApiKey({ get: () => 'config-key' })
+  assert.equal(fromCfg, 'config-key')
+  const anonymous = resolveJinaApiKey(null)
+  assert.equal(anonymous, '')
+})
+
+test('safeJinaFetch：拒绝 file 协议', async () => {
+  const r = await safeJinaFetch('file:///etc/passwd')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.ok(r.error.includes('协议'))
+})
+
+test('safeJinaFetch：本地 mock 服务器（重定向到 Jina 不可行，验证网络错误处理）', async () => {
+  // 指向一个不存在的端口，验证错误路径
+  const r = await safeJinaFetch('http://127.0.0.1:1/', { timeoutMs: 500 })
+  // Jina 服务本身会 4xx（因为 r.jina.ai/127.0.0.1... 无法访问），或返回错误
+  assert.equal(typeof r.ok, 'boolean')
+})

package/src/core/cli.js

@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ import { TokenBudget } from './token-budget.js'
 import { ChannelManager } from '../channel/index.js'
 import { CostTracker } from './cost-tracker.js'
 import { autoCompact } from './compact.js'
+import {
+  detectContextWindow,
+  parseWindowArg,
+  formatTokens,
+  windowSourceLabel,
+  WINDOW_SOURCE,
+} from './context-window.js'
 import { isLocalLlmServer } from '../utils/index.js'
 import { SOCK_DIR, SOCK_PATH, CC_NODE_PID } from './paths.js'
 import { renderHeadpiece } from './headpiece.js'
@@ -254,6 +261,7 @@ Commands:
   /stop          — Stop current AI work (when stuck/long)
   /config KEY    — Show config value
   /budget        — Show token budget
+  /window [N]    — Show/set context window (e.g. /window 128k, /window auto)
   /channel CMD   — Manage notification channels (list|send|test)
   /cost          — Show API cost report
   /compact       — Manually compact conversation context
@@ -292,6 +300,8 @@ const DETAILED_HELP = {
 
   budget:  "/budget\n  Show token budget usage for the current session.\n  Displays how many tokens have been used vs the limit.",
 
+  window:  "/window [N|auto|reset]\n  Show or set the LLM context window (max tokens allowed in conversation).\n  This is the hard ceiling for auto-compression — context will never exceed it.\n\n  Subcommands:\n    (no arg)   — Show current window + its source (manual/probe/table/fallback) + usage\n    /window 128k — Manually set window (persisted to config). Accepts K/M suffix:\n                  64k, 128k, 200k, 1m, or a raw number like 131072.\n    /window auto  — Clear manual override, return to auto-detection (next message re-detects).\n    /window reset — Clear manual override AND re-detect now.\n\n  Manual setting takes priority over auto-detection and survives restart.\n  Auto-detection itself is NOT persisted (re-runs at each startup).\n\n  Examples:\n    /window\n    /window 128k\n    /window 64k\n    /window auto\n    /window reset",
+
   channel: "/channel <list|send|test>\n  Manage notification channels.\n\n  Subcommands:\n    list       — List all configured notification channels\n    send <msg> — Send a message via all channels\n    test       — Send a test message to verify channels\n\n  Requires channel environment variables to be set at startup.",
 
   cost:    "/cost\n  Show API cost report.\n  Displays total tokens used and estimated cost in USD.\n  Supports pricing for: DeepSeek, OpenAI, Qwen, GLM, Kimi.",
@@ -481,7 +491,31 @@ const systemPrompt = cliArgs.systemPrompt || DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT
   }
 
   // M1 fix: tokenBudget 必须在 engineConfig 之前定义，否则 TDZ ReferenceError
-  const tokenBudget = new TokenBudget({ maxTokens: config.get('maxBudgetTokens') || 200_000 })
+  // 上下文窗口来源：手动指定 > API 探测 > 内置表 > 安全兜底
+  //   - 手动指定（config.maxBudgetTokens > 0）优先，且持久化
+  //   - 自动探测结果不落盘，每次启动重新探测（方案 A）
+  let windowSource = WINDOW_SOURCE.FALLBACK
+  const tokenBudget = new TokenBudget({
+    maxTokens: config.get('maxBudgetTokens') || 0,
+  })
+
+  /** 重新探测并应用上下文窗口（供启动 & /window reset & /model 切换后调用） */
+  async function reapplyWindow() {
+    const manual = config.get('maxBudgetTokens') || 0
+    const { window: win, source } = await detectContextWindow({
+      model,
+      apiBase,
+      apiKey,
+      manualWindow: manual,
+    })
+    tokenBudget.setWindow(win, source)
+    windowSource = source
+    return { window: win, source }
+  }
+
+  // 启动即探测一次（若已手动指定，则直接应用手动值）
+  await reapplyWindow()
+
   const costTracker = new CostTracker({ model })
 
   const engineConfig = new QueryEngineConfig({
@@ -490,6 +524,7 @@ const systemPrompt = cliArgs.systemPrompt || DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT
     noStream: cliArgs.noStream,
     costTracker,
     tokenBudget,
+    configStore: config,
   })
   const engine = new QueryEngine(engineConfig)
 
@@ -684,10 +719,48 @@ const systemPrompt = cliArgs.systemPrompt || DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT
             } else {
               engine.config.model = rest.join(' ')
             }
+            model = engine.config.model
             console.log(`Model → ${engine.config.model}`)
+            // 切换模型后重新探测上下文窗口（仅当非手动指定时自动更新）
+            if ((config.get('maxBudgetTokens') || 0) <= 0) {
+              const { window: win, source } = await reapplyWindow()
+              console.log(`  ↳ Context window → ${formatTokens(win)} (${windowSourceLabel(source)})`)
+            }
           }
           else console.log(`Model: ${engine.config.model}`)
           break
+        case 'window': {
+          const arg = rest[0] ? rest.join(' ').trim() : ''
+          if (!arg) {
+            // 无参数：显示当前窗口
+            console.log(`Context window: ${formatTokens(tokenBudget.maxTokens)} (${windowSourceLabel(windowSource)})`)
+            console.log(`  Input used: ${tokenBudget.inputTokens.toLocaleString()} / ${tokenBudget.maxTokens.toLocaleString()} (${tokenBudget.usagePercent}%)`)
+            const manual = config.get('maxBudgetTokens') || 0
+            if (manual > 0) console.log(`  Manual override: ${formatTokens(manual)} (persisted in config)`)
+            break
+          }
+          const lower = arg.toLowerCase()
+          if (lower === 'auto' || lower === 'reset') {
+            // 清除手动指定并重新探测
+            config.set('maxBudgetTokens', 0)
+            try { await config.saveToUser() } catch {}
+            const { window: win, source } = await reapplyWindow()
+            console.log(`Cleared manual override. Context window → ${formatTokens(win)} (${windowSourceLabel(source)})`)
+            break
+          }
+          const win = parseWindowArg(arg)
+          if (!win) {
+            console.log(`❌ Invalid window: "${arg}". Use a number or K/M suffix, e.g. /window 128k, /window 64k, /window 1m`)
+            break
+          }
+          // 手动指定：立即生效 + 持久化
+          tokenBudget.setWindow(win, WINDOW_SOURCE.MANUAL)
+          windowSource = WINDOW_SOURCE.MANUAL
+          config.set('maxBudgetTokens', win)
+          try { await config.saveToUser() } catch (e) { console.log(`⚠️  Failed to persist to config: ${e.message}`) }
+          console.log(`Context window → ${formatTokens(win)} (${windowSourceLabel(WINDOW_SOURCE.MANUAL)}, persisted)`)
+          break
+        }
         case 'models': {
           const apiBase = engine.config.apiBase
           const apiKey = engine.config.apiKey
@@ -818,7 +891,11 @@ const systemPrompt = cliArgs.systemPrompt || DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT
             console.log(JSON.stringify(config.toJSON(), null, 2))
           }
           break
-        case 'budget': console.log(tokenBudget.format()); break
+        case 'budget': {
+          console.log(tokenBudget.format())
+          console.log(`Context window: ${formatTokens(tokenBudget.maxTokens)} (${windowSourceLabel(windowSource)}) | trigger: ${Math.round((tokenBudget.maxTokens * 0.8)).toLocaleString()} (80%)`)
+          break
+        }
         case 'channel': {
           const subCmd = rest.join(' ')
           if (subCmd === 'list' || subCmd === '') {

package/src/core/config.js

@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ const DEFAULTS = {
     fileRead: { maxLines: 2000, maxSizeKB: 256 },
     webFetch: { timeout: 30, maxChars: 100000 },
   },
+  web: {
+    fetch: {
+      maxChars: 100000,
+      maxBytes: 10485760,  // 10MB
+      timeoutMs: 30000,
+      maxRedirects: 5,
+      fallbackProvider: 'safe-jina',  // 直连失败时的兜底 provider
+      jinaApiKey: '',                  // 可选（匿名约 20 RPM）
+    },
+  },
   channels: {},
   defaultChannel: null,
   qqbot: {