@rangojs/router 0.0.0-experimental.9c9afef3 → 0.0.0-experimental.a014d2b7

package/src/rsc/origin-guard.ts

@@ -9,11 +9,31 @@
  * navigations, bookmarks, and non-browser clients don't send Origin.
  */
 
+import type { RequestPlan } from "../router/request-classification.js";
+
 /**
  * Request phase that triggered the origin check.
  */
 export type OriginCheckPhase = "action" | "loader" | "pe-form";
 
+// Exhaustive over RequestPlan modes so a new mode must be classified here (the
+// security gate) instead of silently falling through to no origin check.
+export const ORIGIN_CHECK_PHASE_BY_MODE: Record<
+  RequestPlan["mode"],
+  OriginCheckPhase | null
+> = {
+  action: "action",
+  loader: "loader",
+  "pe-render": "pe-form",
+  "full-render": null,
+  "partial-render": null,
+  response: null,
+  redirect: null,
+  "version-mismatch": null,
+  // Terminal: handled before the origin guard (emits X-RSC-Reload, no execution).
+  "app-switch": null,
+};
+
 /**
  * Context passed to the originCheck callback.
  */
@@ -49,11 +69,8 @@ export type OriginCheckConfig<TEnv = any> =
  * Returns true to allow, false to reject.
  */
 export function defaultOriginCheck(request: Request, url: URL): boolean {
-  // 1. Read Origin header (present on all cross-origin requests and
-  //    same-origin POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE in modern browsers)
   let requestOrigin = request.headers.get("origin");
 
-  // 2. Fallback to Referer if Origin is absent (some proxies strip it)
   if (!requestOrigin) {
     const referer = request.headers.get("referer");
     if (referer) {
@@ -65,23 +82,20 @@ export function defaultOriginCheck(request: Request, url: URL): boolean {
     }
   }
 
-  // 3. No Origin or Referer — allow (can't be browser-initiated CSRF)
   if (!requestOrigin) return true;
 
-  // "null" origin comes from privacy-sensitive contexts (data: URLs,
-  // sandboxed iframes, cross-origin redirects). Reject it.
   if (requestOrigin === "null") return false;
 
-  // 4. Determine expected host from Host header or URL.
-  // X-Forwarded-Host/Proto are NOT used — they are client-controllable
-  // unless a trusted proxy strips them. On standard deployments (Cloudflare
-  // Workers, Node behind nginx/caddy) the Host header is already correct.
-  // For non-standard setups, use the custom function escape hatch.
-  const expectedHost = request.headers.get("host") || url.host;
-  const expectedProtocol = url.protocol;
+  // An Origin/Referer is present, so this is a browser request worth checking.
+  // Establish the expected origin from the Host header only -- browsers always
+  // send Host alongside Origin (runtimes synthesize it from the HTTP/2
+  // :authority), so a missing Host here is anomalous. Fail closed rather than
+  // fall back to url.host (derived from the request line) when the trusted Host
+  // cannot be established.
+  const expectedHost = request.headers.get("host");
+  if (!expectedHost) return false;
 
-  // 5. Build expected origin and compare (case-insensitive)
-  const expectedOrigin = `${expectedProtocol}//${expectedHost}`;
+  const expectedOrigin = `${url.protocol}//${expectedHost}`;
 
   return requestOrigin.toLowerCase() === expectedOrigin.toLowerCase();
 }
@@ -116,14 +130,15 @@ export async function checkRequestOrigin<TEnv = any>(
   // Disabled by explicit opt-out
   if (config === false) return null;
 
-  // Default: built-in validation (config === true or undefined)
-  if (config === true || config === undefined) {
-    const allowed = defaultOriginCheck(request, url);
-    if (allowed) return null;
-    return createForbiddenResponse(request);
-  }
+  // Default (true/undefined) becomes a callback returning boolean, so the
+  // Response|true|reject resolution below is written once.
+  const check: (
+    ctx: OriginCheckContext<TEnv>,
+  ) => boolean | Response | Promise<boolean | Response> =
+    config === true || config === undefined
+      ? () => defaultOriginCheck(request, url)
+      : config;
 
-  // Custom function — build context and call
   const ctx: OriginCheckContext<TEnv> = {
     request,
     url,
@@ -133,9 +148,8 @@ export async function checkRequestOrigin<TEnv = any>(
     defaultCheck: () => defaultOriginCheck(request, url),
   };
 
-  const result = await config(ctx);
+  const result = await check(ctx);
 
   if (result instanceof Response) return result;
-  if (result === true) return null;
-  return createForbiddenResponse(request);
+  return result === true ? null : createForbiddenResponse(request);
 }

package/src/rsc/progressive-enhancement.ts

@@ -7,12 +7,14 @@
  */
 
 import {
-  requireRequestContext,
+  getRequestContext,
   setRequestContextParams,
 } from "../server/request-context.js";
 import { getSSRSetup } from "./ssr-setup.js";
 import type { MiddlewareFn } from "../router/middleware.js";
 import { executeMiddleware } from "../router/middleware.js";
+import { observePhase, PHASES } from "../router/instrument.js";
+import { gateTransitions } from "./transition-gate.js";
 import type { RscPayload, ReactFormState } from "./types.js";
 import {
   createResponseWithMergedHeaders,
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
   env: TEnv,
   url: URL,
   isAction: boolean,
-  handleStore: ReturnType<typeof requireRequestContext>["_handleStore"],
+  handleStore: ReturnType<typeof getRequestContext>["_handleStore"],
   nonce: string | undefined,
   routeMwInfo?: PeRouteMiddlewareInfo,
 ): Promise<Response | null> {
@@ -115,6 +117,13 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
   // Execute action and return HTML
   let actionResult: unknown = undefined;
   let reactFormState: ReactFormState | null = null;
+  // Status for the fall-through re-render after a boundaryless action error.
+  // When an action throws and NO error boundary matches, the PE path re-renders
+  // the page (below) the same way it would after a successful action. Without
+  // this the re-render serves HTTP 200, diverging from the JS path which serves
+  // 500 (server-action.ts sets actionStatus=500 for the same boundaryless error).
+  // 500 is carried only into the final HTML response, never the redirect branch.
+  let boundarylessErrorStatus: number | undefined;
 
   if (isUseActionState) {
     // Decode and extract action identity before execution so error
@@ -124,7 +133,11 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
       const boundAction = await ctx.decodeAction(formData);
       // React's custom .bind() preserves $$id on server references.
       useActionStateId = (boundAction as { $$id?: string }).$$id ?? undefined;
-      actionResult = await boundAction();
+      // Meter the no-JS form action as the action phase, same as the JS path.
+      actionResult = await observePhase(
+        PHASES.action(useActionStateId ?? "useActionState"),
+        () => boundAction(),
+      );
     } catch (error) {
       // Handle thrown redirect (e.g., throw redirect('/path'))
       const redirectResponse = extractRedirectResponse(error);
@@ -140,6 +153,7 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
         handleStore,
         nonce,
         useActionStateId,
+        true, // an action ran and threw
       );
       if (errorHtml) return errorHtml;
 
@@ -151,10 +165,21 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
         handledByBoundary: false,
       });
       console.error("[RSC] Progressive enhancement action error:", error);
+      // No boundary matched — the fall-through re-render must carry 500 to match
+      // the JS path's boundaryless-error status (server-action.ts).
+      boundarylessErrorStatus = 500;
     }
   } else if (isDirectAction && directActionId) {
     const temporaryReferences = ctx.createTemporaryReferenceSet();
 
+    // INTENTIONAL JS/PE divergence (do NOT "fix" to match the JS reject path).
+    // On the JS path React Flight-encodes the action args, so decodeReply
+    // succeeds or a failure means a malformed body (rejected). On the no-JS PE
+    // path the browser submits a raw <form action={fn}> POST with NO encoded
+    // args, so decodeReply throws by design and the raw FormData IS the action
+    // argument (the React form-action convention: fn(formData)). Removing this
+    // fallback breaks every unbound no-JS form action (verified: it fails the
+    // progressive-enhancement dev+prod e2e suite). See #572 (decided: keep).
     let args: unknown[] = [];
     try {
       args = await ctx.decodeReply(formData, { temporaryReferences });
@@ -164,7 +189,9 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
 
     try {
       const loadedAction = await ctx.loadServerAction(directActionId);
-      actionResult = await loadedAction.apply(null, args);
+      actionResult = await observePhase(PHASES.action(directActionId), () =>
+        loadedAction.apply(null, args),
+      );
     } catch (error) {
       // Handle thrown redirect (e.g., throw redirect('/path'))
       const redirectResponse = extractRedirectResponse(error);
@@ -180,6 +207,7 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
         handleStore,
         nonce,
         directActionId,
+        true, // an action ran and threw
       );
       if (errorHtml) return errorHtml;
 
@@ -191,6 +219,9 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
         handledByBoundary: false,
       });
       console.error("[RSC] Progressive enhancement action error:", error);
+      // No boundary matched — the fall-through re-render must carry 500 to match
+      // the JS path's boundaryless-error status (server-action.ts).
+      boundarylessErrorStatus = 500;
     }
   }
 
@@ -226,11 +257,29 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
   // cookies set by route middleware are available during re-render — matching
   // the behavior of JS-enabled requests.
   const renderPage = async (): Promise<Response> => {
+    // Preserve the original POST request's headers (Authorization, Cookie,
+    // custom headers) so loaders that read request headers/cookies behave
+    // identically under PE and the JS action path. Drop body-framing headers
+    // from the bodyless GET and force the HTML accept.
+    const headers = new Headers(request.headers);
+    headers.delete("content-type");
+    headers.delete("content-length");
+    headers.delete("content-encoding");
+    headers.delete("transfer-encoding");
+    headers.set("accept", "text/html");
     const renderRequest = new Request(url.toString(), {
       method: "GET",
-      headers: new Headers({ accept: "text/html" }),
+      headers,
     });
 
+    // JS/PE parity: this is an action's revalidation render, so mark it BEFORE
+    // matching — a stale `foregroundOnAction` cache entry must re-execute in the
+    // foreground during the re-render, exactly as the JS path's
+    // revalidateAfterAction does. The transition({ when }) gate fields below are
+    // set post-match (the gate reads them after rendering); foregroundOnAction
+    // reads _inActionRevalidation during the match, so it must be set here.
+    getRequestContext()._inActionRevalidation = true;
+
     const match = await ctx.router.match(renderRequest, { env });
 
     if (match.redirect) {
@@ -240,26 +289,46 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
       });
     }
 
+    // Expose the no-JS action to the transition({ when }) gate. currentUrl/Params
+    // are absent on this full-render path (no navigation snapshot); useActionState
+    // ids are block-scoped, so only a direct action id is available here.
+    // actionUrl is the page the action was submitted from (this request's url).
+    const peReqCtx = getRequestContext();
+    peReqCtx._gateActionId = directActionId ?? undefined;
+    peReqCtx._gateActionUrl = new URL(url);
+    peReqCtx._gateActionResult = actionResult;
+    peReqCtx._gateFormData = formData;
+
     const payload: RscPayload = {
       metadata: {
         pathname: url.pathname,
-        segments: match.segments,
+        routerId: ctx.router.id,
+        basename: ctx.router.basename,
+        segments: gateTransitions(
+          match.segments,
+          getRequestContext(),
+          ctx.router.onError,
+        ),
         matched: match.matched,
         diff: match.diff,
+        resolvedIds: match.resolvedIds,
+        params: match.params,
         isPartial: false,
         rootLayout: ctx.router.rootLayout,
         handles: handleStore.stream(),
         version: ctx.version,
+        stateCookieName: ctx.router.resolvedStateCookieName,
         themeConfig: ctx.router.themeConfig,
         warmupEnabled: ctx.router.warmupEnabled,
-        initialTheme: requireRequestContext().theme,
+        strictMode: ctx.router.strictMode,
+        initialTheme: getRequestContext().theme,
       },
-      formState: actionResult,
     };
 
-    const debugChannel = requireRequestContext()._debugChannel;
     const rscStream = ctx.renderToReadableStream<RscPayload>(payload, {
-      ...(debugChannel && { debugChannel }),
+      onError: (error: unknown) => {
+        ctx.callOnError(error, "rendering", { request, url, env });
+      },
     });
     // metricsStore=undefined is safe: the handler already stashed the early
     // SSR setup promise on request variables, so getSSRSetup returns it
@@ -271,6 +340,8 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
       url,
       undefined,
     );
+    // reactFormState carries the useActionState payload via the SSR-option path
+    // (renderToReadableStream({ formState })); it does NOT travel on RscPayload.
     const htmlStream = await ssrModule.renderHTML(rscStream, {
       formState: reactFormState,
       nonce,
@@ -278,6 +349,13 @@ export async function handleProgressiveEnhancement<TEnv>(
     });
 
     return createResponseWithMergedHeaders(htmlStream, {
+      // boundarylessErrorStatus is set only when the action threw and no error
+      // boundary matched; it makes the re-render carry 500 like the JS path.
+      // The redirect branch above returns before this, so a redirect re-render
+      // keeps its 308 and is never overridden.
+      ...(boundarylessErrorStatus !== undefined
+        ? { status: boundarylessErrorStatus }
+        : {}),
       headers: { "content-type": "text/html;charset=utf-8" },
     });
   };
@@ -312,10 +390,25 @@ async function renderPeErrorBoundary<TEnv>(
   env: TEnv,
   url: URL,
   error: unknown,
-  handleStore: ReturnType<typeof requireRequestContext>["_handleStore"],
+  handleStore: ReturnType<typeof getRequestContext>["_handleStore"],
   nonce: string | undefined,
   actionId?: string | null,
+  // True when an action actually ran and threw (vs a malformed form body, where
+  // no action executed). Drives _inActionRevalidation for JS/PE parity — it must
+  // NOT be inferred from actionId, since a useActionState bound action can run
+  // and throw with no $$id (actionId === undefined) yet still be an action error.
+  actionRan = false,
 ): Promise<Response | null> {
+  // JS/PE parity for an action-triggered error re-render: a stale
+  // `foregroundOnAction` cache entry inside the error boundary must foreground
+  // too, exactly as the JS path (revalidateAfterAction sets this unconditionally
+  // before rendering the error boundary). Set BEFORE matchError (the cached fn
+  // runs during it). Gated on actionRan, NOT actionId — a malformed form body
+  // (actionRan=false) ran no action and must keep SWR.
+  if (actionRan) {
+    getRequestContext()._inActionRevalidation = true;
+  }
+
   let errorResult;
   try {
     errorResult = await ctx.router.matchError(request, { env }, error, "route");
@@ -342,24 +435,48 @@ async function renderPeErrorBoundary<TEnv>(
 
   setRequestContextParams(errorResult.params, errorResult.routeName);
 
+  // Only the failing action id + URL are in scope here (no formData/actionResult
+  // thread into this helper). Expose the URL only when the action id is known:
+  // this helper also handles malformed form bodies before action detection, and
+  // those should not look like action-triggered renders to transition({ when }).
+  if (actionId != null) {
+    const peErrCtx = getRequestContext();
+    peErrCtx._gateActionId = actionId;
+    peErrCtx._gateActionUrl = new URL(url);
+  }
+
   const payload: RscPayload = {
     metadata: {
       pathname: url.pathname,
-      segments: errorResult.segments,
+      routerId: ctx.router.id,
+      basename: ctx.router.basename,
+      segments: gateTransitions(
+        errorResult.segments,
+        getRequestContext(),
+        ctx.router.onError,
+      ),
       matched: errorResult.matched,
       diff: errorResult.diff,
+      resolvedIds: errorResult.resolvedIds,
+      params: errorResult.params,
       isPartial: false,
       isError: true,
       rootLayout: ctx.router.rootLayout,
       handles: handleStore.stream(),
       version: ctx.version,
+      stateCookieName: ctx.router.resolvedStateCookieName,
       themeConfig: ctx.router.themeConfig,
       warmupEnabled: ctx.router.warmupEnabled,
-      initialTheme: requireRequestContext().theme,
+      strictMode: ctx.router.strictMode,
+      initialTheme: getRequestContext().theme,
     },
   };
 
-  const rscStream = ctx.renderToReadableStream<RscPayload>(payload);
+  const rscStream = ctx.renderToReadableStream<RscPayload>(payload, {
+    onError: (error: unknown) => {
+      ctx.callOnError(error, "rendering", { request, url, env });
+    },
+  });
   // metricsStore=undefined is safe: the handler already stashed the early
   // SSR setup promise on request variables, so getSSRSetup returns it
   // without falling back to a fresh startSSRSetup.

package/src/rsc/redirect-guard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/**
+ * Server-side open-redirect guard.
+ *
+ * Applied to the FINAL handler response (the single top-level return in
+ * `handler.ts`) so every browser-followed redirect honors the same same-origin
+ * rule the client enforces (`browser/validate-redirect-origin.ts`), via the one
+ * shared resolver in `redirect-origin.ts`. This is the server half of the
+ * client's existing guard: the client can only validate redirects its own JS
+ * navigates to (the SPA/fetch channel), so document-native redirects -- a no-JS
+ * PE form POST, a full-page GET `match.redirect`, a middleware `redirect()`
+ * short-circuit, a response-route 3xx -- reach the browser with no client in the
+ * loop. They all funnel through one handler return, so guarding there covers
+ * every one and any future redirect exit.
+ *
+ * Soft (SPA/Flight) redirects are 200/204 responses (`X-RSC-Redirect` header or
+ * `metadata.redirect` payload) and are NOT redirect Responses, so they never
+ * reach this guard -- they stay validated client-side.
+ *
+ * Behavior on a `Location` header:
+ * - same-origin / relative  -> passes through unchanged
+ * - `redirect(url, { external: true })` (out-of-band brand present) and an
+ *   http(s) target -> allowed (explicit, auditable, unforgeable opt-in)
+ * - branded but a non-http(s) target (e.g. `javascript:`) -> neutralized: the
+ *   opt-in waives the same-origin rule, NOT scheme safety
+ * - cross-origin without the brand -> Location rewritten to the basename root
+ *   (a safe same-origin landing, the document analog of the client's "stay put");
+ *   dev logs the blocked target and points to `{ external: true }`.
+ *
+ * The opt-in is an out-of-band brand on the Response object (isExternalRedirect),
+ * never a wire header: a header is forgeable by an attacker-controlled upstream
+ * response a proxy-style response route copies through, which would defeat the
+ * guard without app code ever opting in. The reserved header name is stripped
+ * defensively so a forged value can never reach the browser.
+ */
+
+import { isRedirectResponse } from "../response-utils.js";
+import {
+  resolveSameOriginRedirect,
+  resolveExternalRedirect,
+  isExternalRedirect,
+  EXTERNAL_REDIRECT_MARKER,
+} from "../redirect-origin.js";
+import { carryOverRedirectHeaders } from "./helpers.js";
+
+export function guardOutgoingRedirect(
+  response: Response,
+  requestOrigin: string,
+  basename: string | undefined,
+): Response {
+  // Only 3xx + Location responses (document-native redirects) are guarded.
+  if (!isRedirectResponse(response)) {
+    return response;
+  }
+
+  // The reserved marker is never a trust signal. Strip any value -- forged by a
+  // proxied upstream or otherwise -- so it can never reach the browser. Trust
+  // comes solely from the out-of-band brand below.
+  try {
+    response.headers.delete(EXTERNAL_REDIRECT_MARKER);
+  } catch {
+    // Some platform responses carry immutable headers; the header is inert on
+    // the browser, so a failed strip is harmless.
+  }
+
+  // isRedirectResponse guarantees a truthy Location.
+  const location = response.headers.get("Location")!;
+
+  // Explicit opt-in via redirect(url, { external: true }): allow an off-host
+  // target, but only an http(s) one. external waives the same-origin rule, not
+  // scheme safety -- a branded javascript:/data: target falls through to be
+  // neutralized so it can never become a scriptable navigation downstream.
+  if (isExternalRedirect(response)) {
+    if (resolveExternalRedirect(location, requestOrigin) !== null) {
+      return response;
+    }
+  } else if (resolveSameOriginRedirect(location, requestOrigin) !== null) {
+    return response;
+  }
+
+  // Cross-origin (or unsafe-scheme external): neutralize to a safe same-origin
+  // landing.
+  const safeTarget = basename && basename !== "/" ? basename : "/";
+  if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") {
+    console.error(
+      `[rango] Blocked cross-origin redirect to "${location}"; sent to ` +
+        `"${safeTarget}" instead. To redirect off-host on purpose, use ` +
+        `redirect(url, { external: true }).`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const blocked = new Response(null, {
+    status: response.status,
+    headers: { Location: safeTarget },
+  });
+  // Preserve cookies and any other headers (Set-Cookie, Server-Timing, ...);
+  // carryOverRedirectHeaders intentionally skips Location.
+  carryOverRedirectHeaders(response, blocked);
+  return blocked;
+}