@rangojs/router 0.0.0-experimental.14 → 0.0.0-experimental.140

package/src/browser/app-shell.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import type { ComponentType, ReactNode } from "react";
+
+/**
+ * App-shell metadata: the per-router fields describing the "envelope" around
+ * the current app's segment tree — the rootLayout (Document), basename,
+ * version, and router identity. Set once from the initial RSC payload and read
+ * through the AppShellRef when rendering segments.
+ *
+ * This is a per-document value. A navigation that crosses a host-router app
+ * boundary is a full document load (the server returns X-RSC-Reload for it;
+ * see request-classification.ts, mode "app-switch"), so the target app's shell
+ * — along with everything else document-level (theme, warmup, prefetch-TTL) —
+ * is established fresh by the target app's own load. The shell is never swapped
+ * in place within a session.
+ */
+export interface AppShell {
+  /** Router identity. Used to namespace per-app client state (e.g. the
+   *  rango-state localStorage key) so sibling apps on the same origin
+   *  cannot observe each other's cache invalidations. */
+  routerId?: string;
+  rootLayout?: ComponentType<{ children: ReactNode }>;
+  basename?: string;
+  version?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Container for the active app shell. Read-through via `get()` so closures
+ * (e.g. the segment renderer) capture the ref and read the shell at call time
+ * rather than closing over a stale snapshot.
+ */
+export interface AppShellRef {
+  get(): AppShell;
+}
+
+export function createAppShellRef(initial: AppShell): AppShellRef {
+  return {
+    get: () => initial,
+  };
+}

package/src/browser/app-version.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * Mutable app version — updated after HMR revalidation.
+ * Read by prefetch, navigation, and context code.
+ */
+
+let currentVersion: string | undefined;
+
+export function getAppVersion(): string | undefined {
+  return currentVersion;
+}
+
+export function setAppVersion(version: string | undefined): void {
+  currentVersion = version;
+}

package/src/browser/connection-warmup.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/**
+ * Connection warmup: keep TLS alive after idle periods.
+ *
+ * After IDLE_TIMEOUT of no user interaction the connection is marked "cold".
+ * On the next pointer/touch interaction or a visibility change, a HEAD request
+ * warms the TLS connection before the user actually clicks a link.
+ *
+ * Extracted from NavigationProvider so the idle/cold/warmup state machine is
+ * unit-testable with an injected environment (document, fetch, timers).
+ *
+ * Ordering bug this guards against: the warmup listeners (mousemove/touchstart)
+ * share events with the idle-reset listeners, and the idle-reset listener is
+ * registered first, so it clears the live "cold" flag before the warmup
+ * listener reads it on the same event. A separate coldLatch — set when the
+ * connection goes cold and cleared only when warmup fires or listeners detach,
+ * never by the idle reset — lets the warmup decision see the pre-reset cold
+ * state regardless of listener ordering.
+ */
+
+const IDLE_TIMEOUT = 60_000;
+const DEBOUNCE_DELAY = 150;
+
+type TimerHandle = ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;
+
+export interface WarmupEnv {
+  doc: Pick<
+    Document,
+    "addEventListener" | "removeEventListener" | "visibilityState"
+  >;
+  fetch: typeof fetch;
+  setTimeout: (fn: () => void, ms: number) => TimerHandle;
+  clearTimeout: (handle: TimerHandle | undefined) => void;
+}
+
+function defaultEnv(): WarmupEnv {
+  return {
+    doc: document,
+    fetch: (...args) => fetch(...args),
+    setTimeout: (fn, ms) => setTimeout(fn, ms),
+    clearTimeout: (handle) => clearTimeout(handle),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start the connection-warmup state machine. Returns a cleanup function that
+ * cancels timers and removes all listeners.
+ */
+export function startConnectionWarmup(
+  env: WarmupEnv = defaultEnv(),
+): () => void {
+  const { doc, setTimeout: setT, clearTimeout: clearT } = env;
+
+  let idleTimer: TimerHandle | undefined;
+  let debounceTimer: TimerHandle | undefined;
+  // Cold latch for the warmup decision — see module header. Set in markCold;
+  // cleared only when warmup fires or listeners detach, NOT by resetIdleTimer,
+  // so triggerWarmup sees the pre-reset cold state regardless of listener
+  // ordering (the idle-reset listener runs first on a shared mousemove event).
+  let coldLatch = false;
+  let warmupListenersAttached = false;
+
+  function sendWarmup() {
+    coldLatch = false;
+    env.fetch("/?_rsc_warmup", { method: "HEAD" }).catch(() => {});
+  }
+
+  function triggerWarmup() {
+    if (!coldLatch) return;
+    clearT(debounceTimer);
+    debounceTimer = setT(() => {
+      sendWarmup();
+      detachWarmupListeners();
+      resetIdleTimer();
+    }, DEBOUNCE_DELAY);
+  }
+
+  function onVisibilityChange() {
+    if (doc.visibilityState === "visible" && coldLatch) {
+      triggerWarmup();
+    }
+  }
+
+  function attachWarmupListeners() {
+    if (warmupListenersAttached) return;
+    warmupListenersAttached = true;
+    doc.addEventListener("visibilitychange", onVisibilityChange);
+    doc.addEventListener("mousemove", triggerWarmup, { once: true });
+    doc.addEventListener("touchstart", triggerWarmup, { once: true });
+  }
+
+  function detachWarmupListeners() {
+    warmupListenersAttached = false;
+    coldLatch = false;
+    doc.removeEventListener("visibilitychange", onVisibilityChange);
+    doc.removeEventListener("mousemove", triggerWarmup);
+    doc.removeEventListener("touchstart", triggerWarmup);
+  }
+
+  function markCold() {
+    coldLatch = true;
+    attachWarmupListeners();
+  }
+
+  function resetIdleTimer() {
+    clearT(idleTimer);
+    idleTimer = setT(markCold, IDLE_TIMEOUT);
+  }
+
+  // Activity events that reset the idle timer. mousemove/touchstart overlap
+  // with the warmup listeners; this listener is registered first, which is the
+  // ordering the coldLatch defends against.
+  const activityEvents = [
+    "mousemove",
+    "keydown",
+    "touchstart",
+    "scroll",
+  ] as const;
+  const activityOptions: AddEventListenerOptions = { passive: true };
+
+  for (const event of activityEvents) {
+    doc.addEventListener(event, resetIdleTimer, activityOptions);
+  }
+
+  resetIdleTimer();
+
+  return () => {
+    clearT(idleTimer);
+    clearT(debounceTimer);
+    detachWarmupListeners();
+    for (const event of activityEvents) {
+      doc.removeEventListener(event, resetIdleTimer);
+    }
+  };
+}

package/src/browser/cookie-name.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * Rango state cookie: value codec and attribute serialization.
+ *
+ * Shared by the client (the document.cookie writer in rango-state.ts) and the
+ * server (the Set-Cookie writer in invalidateClientCache). Environment-agnostic:
+ * no window/document access and no name composition.
+ *
+ * Name RESOLUTION deliberately lives elsewhere (router init, see
+ * router/state-cookie-name.ts). Keeping composition out of this shared module
+ * is what lets the client read the server-resolved name verbatim and compose
+ * nothing.
+ */
+
+/** Default prefix when `stateCookiePrefix` is unset or empty after sanitization. */
+export const DEFAULT_STATE_COOKIE_PREFIX = "rango-state";
+
+/** Internal response header carrying the keepClientCache() directive. */
+export const KEEP_CACHE_HEADER = "x-rango-keep-cache";
+
+// Per-client signal headers (lower-case) that a SHARED response cache must never
+// store or replay (Finding #3): a `Set-Cookie` (rango state rotation, or any
+// cookie a loader set) and the keepClientCache() directive. Strip-all-Set-Cookie
+// is deliberate — a shared store can't know the resolved cookie name, and any
+// per-client cookie in a cacheable document is the hazard. Single source for the
+// predicate, presence check, and strip below.
+const PER_CLIENT_SIGNAL_HEADERS: readonly string[] = [
+  "set-cookie",
+  KEEP_CACHE_HEADER,
+];
+
+/** True for a per-client signal header. */
+export function isPerClientSignalHeader(name: string): boolean {
+  return PER_CLIENT_SIGNAL_HEADERS.includes(name.toLowerCase());
+}
+
+/** True if `headers` carries any per-client signal. */
+export function hasPerClientSignal(headers: Headers): boolean {
+  return PER_CLIENT_SIGNAL_HEADERS.some((name) => headers.has(name));
+}
+
+/** Remove every per-client signal header from `headers` in place. */
+export function stripPerClientSignals(headers: Headers): void {
+  for (const name of PER_CLIENT_SIGNAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the raw, UNDECODED value of a single cookie from a cookie string (a
+ * `document.cookie` jar or a request `Cookie` header). Shared by both seats so
+ * the client mirror and the server monotonic-guard read the SAME jar entry —
+ * their agreement is the guard's contract. First match wins (the entry the
+ * client's mirror holds); exact name boundary via the `=`; an empty value
+ * (`name=`) returns null (treated as absent, not a usable prior value).
+ */
+export function getRawCookieValue(
+  cookieString: string | null,
+  name: string,
+): string | null {
+  if (!cookieString) return null;
+  const target = name + "=";
+  for (const part of cookieString.split(";")) {
+    const trimmed = part.trim();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith(target)) {
+      const value = trimmed.slice(target.length);
+      return value === "" ? null : value;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encode a state value for the wire: `encodeURIComponent(version):timestamp`.
+ * Only the build-derived version is encoded (it is arbitrary); the `:`
+ * separator and numeric timestamp stay raw, so the `{version}:{timestamp}`
+ * shape survives and `:` is a legal cookie-value octet.
+ */
+export function encodeStateValue(version: string, timestamp: number): string {
+  return `${encodeURIComponent(version)}:${timestamp}`;
+}
+
+/** Parsed state value. `version` is decoded; `timestamp` is the raw integer. */
+export interface StateValue {
+  version: string;
+  timestamp: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode a wire value back into `{version, timestamp}`. Returns null for a
+ * malformed value (no `:`, empty version, or non-numeric timestamp) so callers
+ * mint fresh instead of trusting garbage.
+ */
+export function decodeStateValue(raw: string): StateValue | null {
+  const colon = raw.indexOf(":");
+  if (colon <= 0) return null;
+  const timestamp = Number(raw.slice(colon + 1));
+  if (!Number.isFinite(timestamp)) return null;
+  let version: string;
+  try {
+    version = decodeURIComponent(raw.slice(0, colon));
+  } catch {
+    // A malformed percent-escape (e.g. "%:1") must mint fresh, not throw —
+    // a thrown URIError here would 500 the server seat or fail client boot.
+    return null;
+  }
+  return { version, timestamp };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mint a fresh state value whose timestamp is strictly greater than the previous
+ * one, so a re-mint inside the same millisecond (or a backward clock step) still
+ * differs from the current value. `prevRaw` is the current wire value (the
+ * client's in-memory mirror, or the server's inbound header/cookie) or null; its
+ * timestamp is the floor. Shared by both seats so the monotonic guard lives once.
+ */
+export function mintStateValue(
+  version: string,
+  prevRaw: string | null,
+): string {
+  const prevTs = prevRaw ? (decodeStateValue(prevRaw)?.timestamp ?? 0) : 0;
+  const ts = Math.max(Date.now(), prevTs + 1);
+  return encodeStateValue(version, ts);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Attribute string for the state cookie. Session cookie (no Max-Age/Expires),
+ * Path=/ (whole app), SameSite=Lax (sent on top-level navigations), and Secure
+ * only on https so the document.cookie write does not silently fail on plain
+ * http dev. Never HttpOnly (the client reads and writes it).
+ */
+export function stateCookieAttributes(secure: boolean): string {
+  return `; Path=/; SameSite=Lax${secure ? "; Secure" : ""}`;
+}
+
+/** Serialize a full `name=value` cookie string with the state attributes. */
+export function serializeStateCookie(
+  name: string,
+  value: string,
+  secure: boolean,
+): string {
+  return `${name}=${value}${stateCookieAttributes(secure)}`;
+}