@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 2.7.1 → 2.8.0

package/skills/finance/capital-allocation-advisor/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: capital-allocation-advisor
+description: Multi-jurisdiction reference framework for corporate capital allocation, investment appraisal (NPV, IRR, MIRR, payback, profitability index), cost of capital (WACC, CAPM, hurdle rates), M&A valuation methods (DCF, trading comparables, precedent transactions, accretion/dilution), capital return policy (dividends vs. buybacks vs. reinvestment with ROIC > WACC test), and sensitivity/scenario analysis. Jurisdictional and tax overlays for US, EU, UK, Japan, China, India, and Australia. Advisory only — not investment advice and not a fairness opinion.
+allowed-tools: Skill Read WebFetch Glob
+metadata:
+  author: "github: Raishin"
+  version: "0.1.0"
+  updated: "2026-06-01"
+  category: finance
+  lifecycle: experimental
+---
+
+# Capital Allocation Advisor Skill
+
+> Read-only reference framework. All conclusions are advisory. Tax rates, regulatory requirements, and market
+> benchmarks change frequently. Verify current requirements with qualified financial advisors, tax counsel,
+> and legal advisors before making any capital allocation or investment decision.
+
+---
+
+## Part 1 — Investment Appraisal Methods
+
+### 1.1 Net Present Value (NPV)
+
+**Formula:**
+
+NPV = Σ [CF_t / (1 + r)^t] − C₀
+
+where CF_t = after-tax cash flow in period t, r = discount rate (hurdle rate or WACC), C₀ = initial capital outlay, t = 1 … n.
+
+**Decision rule:** Accept if NPV > 0; reject if NPV < 0. Between mutually exclusive projects, choose the highest positive NPV.
+
+**Key inputs:**
+- Free cash flow to firm (FCFF) or free cash flow to equity (FCFE) depending on whether WACC or cost of equity is the discount rate
+- Terminal value (Gordon Growth Model or Exit Multiple): TV_n = [FCF_n × (1 + g)] / (WACC − g) or TV_n = EBITDA_n × EV/EBITDA_exit
+- Tax shield treatment: WACC method (after-tax cost of debt) vs. APV method (explicit PV of tax shields)
+
+**Common errors:**
+- Using nominal cash flows with a real discount rate (or vice versa)
+- Double-counting the tax shield in both cash flows and the discount rate
+- Ignoring changes in net working capital (NWC) as a cash flow component
+- Omitting terminal value entirely or using an unrealistic growth rate g ≥ WACC
+
+### 1.2 Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
+
+**Definition:** The discount rate r* that sets NPV = 0.
+
+NPV = Σ [CF_t / (1 + r*)^t] − C₀ = 0 → solve for r*
+
+**Decision rule:** Accept if IRR > hurdle rate (WACC or required return); reject if IRR < hurdle rate.
+
+**IRR pitfalls:**
+
+| Pitfall | Description | Remedy |
+|---|---|---|
+| Multiple IRRs | Occurs with non-conventional cash flow sign changes | Use MIRR or NPV profile |
+| Scale insensitivity | IRR ignores project size; a small project can have a higher IRR than a larger NPV project | Always compare on NPV or incremental IRR |
+| Reinvestment rate assumption | IRR implicitly assumes reinvestment at the IRR rate, which may be unrealistic | Use MIRR with explicit reinvestment rate |
+| Mutually exclusive projects | Higher IRR project may have lower NPV if cash flow timing differs | Choose by NPV for mutually exclusive decisions |
+
+### 1.3 Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR)
+
+**Formula:**
+
+MIRR = [FV(positive cash flows, reinvestment rate) / PV(negative cash flows, financing rate)]^(1/n) − 1
+
+**Decision rule:** Accept if MIRR > cost of capital.
+
+**Advantage over IRR:** Eliminates multiple IRR problem and uses explicit reinvestment rate (typically WACC) rather than the implicit reinvestment assumption in IRR.
+
+### 1.4 Payback Period
+
+**Formula:**
+
+Payback = Year before full recovery + (Remaining cost / Cash flow in recovery year)
+
+**Decision rule:** Accept if payback ≤ maximum acceptable payback period (management-defined).
+
+**Limitations:**
+- Ignores time value of money
+- Ignores cash flows after payback period
+- Useful as a liquidity screen; should not be the primary capital budgeting criterion
+
+### 1.5 Discounted Payback Period
+
+**Formula:** Same as payback, but uses PV of each cash flow (discounted at the hurdle rate).
+
+**Advantage:** Accounts for time value of money. Still ignores cash flows after payback period.
+
+### 1.6 Profitability Index (PI)
+
+**Formula:**
+
+PI = PV of future cash flows / Initial investment = (NPV + C₀) / C₀ = 1 + NPV/C₀
+
+**Decision rule:** Accept if PI > 1 (equivalent to NPV > 0). Useful for capital rationing — rank projects by PI when budget is constrained.
+
+### 1.7 Decision Matrix
+
+| Metric | Primary Use Case | Handles Mutually Exclusive? | Handles Capital Rationing? |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| NPV | Primary criterion — maximizes firm value | Yes (pick highest positive NPV) | No (use PI for rationing) |
+| IRR | Intuitive hurdle rate comparison | No (can conflict with NPV) | No |
+| MIRR | Corrects IRR reinvestment assumption | Better than IRR; still may conflict | No |
+| Payback | Liquidity screen; secondary check | No | No |
+| Discounted Payback | Time-value-adjusted liquidity screen | No | No |
+| PI | Capital rationing when budget is binding | No | Yes |
+
+---
+
+## Part 2 — Cost of Capital and WACC
+
+### 2.1 WACC Formula
+
+WACC = (E/V) × r_e + (D/V) × r_d × (1 − t_c)
+
+where:
+- E = market value of equity
+- D = market value of debt
+- V = E + D (enterprise value, excluding cash for levered firms; use total capital)
+- r_e = cost of equity
+- r_d = pre-tax cost of debt (yield to maturity on outstanding debt)
+- t_c = marginal corporate tax rate
+
+**Key assumption: Use market value weights, not book value weights.** Book values reflect historical accounting; market values reflect current economic claims.
+
+### 2.2 Cost of Equity — CAPM
+
+r_e = r_f + β × ERP
+
+where:
+- r_f = risk-free rate (typically yield on 10-year government bond in the currency of analysis)
+- β = equity beta (levered; from market regression or comparable company analysis)
+- ERP = equity risk premium (historical or implied; country-specific for emerging markets)
+
+**Additional adjustments for emerging markets:**
+
+r_e = r_f + β × ERP_US + CRP
+
+where CRP = country risk premium (e.g., Damodaran's sovereign default spread × relative equity market volatility ratio).
+
+**Beta estimation:**
+- Regress equity returns against market index (typically 60-month monthly returns)
+- Unlever comparable company betas: β_u = β_L / [1 + (1 − t_c) × (D/E)]
+- Relever at target capital structure: β_L = β_u × [1 + (1 − t_c) × (D/E)_target]
+
+**Reference sources (public):**
+- Damodaran betas by industry: [pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/betas.html](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/betas.html)
+- Damodaran country risk premium: [pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html)
+
+### 2.3 Cost of Debt
+
+r_d = yield to maturity on long-term debt (for investment-grade companies)
+    = risk-free rate + default spread (for synthetic rating approach)
+
+**After-tax cost of debt:** r_d × (1 − t_c)
+
+**Note on hybrid instruments:** Preferred stock is typically excluded from D and treated as a third capital component: WACC = (E/V) × r_e + (P/V) × r_p + (D/V) × r_d × (1 − t_c).
+
+### 2.4 Hurdle Rates
+
+A hurdle rate is the minimum acceptable return for a specific project, division, or asset class. It equals WACC when the project risk matches the firm's overall risk. Adjustments:
+
+| Project Type | Adjustment to WACC |
+|---|---|
+| Business-as-usual expansion (same risk as firm) | Use firm WACC |
+| Higher-risk project (new market, technology) | WACC + risk premium (2–5% typical) |
+| Lower-risk project (regulated utility, cost reduction) | WACC − risk premium |
+| Emerging market project | Add CRP to base WACC |
+| Leveraged buyout (LBO) | IRR threshold typically 15–25%; sponsor WACC at acquisition leverage |
+
+### 2.5 Adjusted Present Value (APV)
+
+APV = Base NPV (all-equity) + PV(Tax Shields) + PV(Financing Side Effects)
+
+**When to use APV vs. WACC:**
+- WACC: constant D/E ratio target (target leverage); simpler
+- APV: changing capital structure (LBO, project finance, debt paydown); explicit tax shield modeling preferred
+
+---
+
+## Part 3 — M&A Valuation Methods
+
+### 3.1 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
+
+DCF valuation for M&A targets follows the same structure as project NPV but applied to the standalone enterprise:
+
+EV = Σ [FCFF_t / (1 + WACC)^t] + [TV / (1 + WACC)^n]
+
+FCFF_t = EBIT × (1 − t_c) + D&A − ΔCapEx − ΔNWC
+
+**Terminal value methods:**
+
+| Method | Formula | When to Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| Gordon Growth Model (GGM) | TV = FCFF_n+1 / (WACC − g) | Stable, mature businesses with predictable growth |
+| Exit Multiple | TV = EBITDA_n × EV/EBITDA_exit | Cyclical or high-growth businesses; anchors to market |
+
+**DCF sensitivity factors:** discount rate (±50–100 bps) and terminal growth rate (±50 bps) drive most of the value range.
+
+### 3.2 Trading Comparables (Public Market Multiples)
+
+Select publicly traded peers → compute multiples → apply to target.
+
+**Common multiples:**
+
+| Multiple | Formula | Best Used For |
+|---|---|---|
+| EV/EBITDA | Enterprise Value / EBITDA | Cross-sector; capital structure-neutral |
+| EV/EBIT | Enterprise Value / EBIT | Businesses with significant D&A differences |
+| EV/Revenue | Enterprise Value / Revenue | High-growth or negative-EBITDA companies |
+| P/E | Price / Earnings per Share | Equity value (not enterprise value) |
+| P/B | Price / Book Value | Banks and financial institutions |
+| EV/FCF | Enterprise Value / Free Cash Flow | Asset-light; capital allocation focus |
+
+**Adjustment:** Apply a control premium (typically 20–40% in M&A) to public market multiples when valuing a private target or acquiring a public company.
+
+### 3.3 Precedent Transactions
+
+Select prior M&A transactions in the same sector → analyze transaction multiples paid (EV/EBITDA, EV/Revenue, P/E) → apply to target.
+
+**Typically higher than trading comparables** because:
+- Control premium already embedded
+- Synergy value partially priced into the transaction multiple
+- Strategic vs. financial buyer dynamics
+
+**Data sources:** Public M&A disclosures (SEC filings, press releases, deal databases such as Bloomberg, Refinitiv — note these require subscriptions; for public educational analysis, SEC EDGAR filings are publicly available at [sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcurrent)).
+
+### 3.4 Accretion / Dilution Analysis
+
+Accretion/dilution measures whether the acquisition is EPS-accretive (increases acquirer EPS) or EPS-dilutive (decreases acquirer EPS) in Year 1 (and over time).
+
+**Pro forma EPS post-acquisition:**
+
+New EPS = (Acquirer net income + Target net income + Synergies − Amortization of intangibles − After-tax financing cost) / Pro forma diluted shares
+
+**Key drivers:**
+
+| Driver | Accretive Effect | Dilutive Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| Synergies | Higher combined earnings | — |
+| Intangible amortization | — | Increases D&A, reduces earnings |
+| Deal financing (cash vs. stock) | Cash: no share dilution | Stock: EPS dilution if target P/E > acquirer P/E |
+| Interest cost on acquisition debt | — | Reduces pre-tax earnings |
+| Tax synergies (NOL utilization) | Reduces effective tax rate | — |
+
+**Important:** EPS accretion in Year 1 does not prove value creation. A company can be EPS-accretive and NPV-negative if it overpays. The ROIC > WACC test (Part 4) is the correct value-creation check.
+
+### 3.5 Synergy Analysis
+
+| Synergy Type | Source | Realization Timeline |
+|---|---|---|
+| Revenue synergies | Cross-sell, geographic expansion, pricing power | 2–4 years; higher execution risk |
+| Cost synergies | Overhead reduction, procurement, facilities | 1–3 years; higher certainty |
+| Financial synergies | Tax benefits, debt capacity, lower cost of capital | Near-term; depends on structure |
+
+**Advisory note:** Synergy estimates are illustrative. Synergy realization is uncertain; actual results depend on integration execution, cultural fit, and competitive dynamics. Label all synergy estimates as illustrative.
+
+---
+
+## Part 4 — Capital Return Policy
+
+### 4.1 ROIC vs. WACC — The Value Creation Test
+
+**Return on Invested Capital:**
+
+ROIC = NOPAT / Invested Capital = EBIT × (1 − t_c) / (Equity + Net Debt)
+
+**Economic Value Added (EVA):**
+
+EVA = (ROIC − WACC) × Invested Capital
+
+| Condition | Implication for Capital Allocation |
+|---|---|
+| ROIC > WACC | Value is created by reinvesting; grow invested capital |
+| ROIC = WACC | Value-neutral; reinvestment neither creates nor destroys value |
+| ROIC < WACC | Value is destroyed by reinvestment; return capital to shareholders |
+
+### 4.2 Dividends
+
+**Characteristics:**
+- Creates a sticky expectation; dividend cuts signal financial distress
+- Taxed as ordinary income (in most jurisdictions) or qualified dividend rate (US)
+- Signals management confidence in earnings sustainability
+- Reduces financial flexibility
+
+**Dividend yield:** DPS / Share Price
+
+**Dividend payout ratio:** DPS / EPS
+
+**Modigliani-Miller dividend irrelevance:** In a world without taxes, transaction costs, or information asymmetry, dividend policy is irrelevant to firm value. In practice, tax treatment, signaling, and clientele effects make the choice relevant.
+
+### 4.3 Share Buybacks (Repurchases)
+
+**Characteristics:**
+- Flexible; management can vary timing and amount without signaling commitment
+- Typically tax-advantaged vs. dividends in most jurisdictions (capital gains vs. ordinary income)
+- Signals management belief that shares are undervalued
+- Returns capital to shareholders who choose to sell (others retain proportional ownership)
+
+**US Excise Tax on Buybacks (IRA 2022):** 1% excise tax on corporate stock repurchases effective January 1, 2023 (IRC §4501). Proposed increase to 4% in FY2025 budget; status subject to legislative change — verify current law.
+
+**EPS effect of buyback:**
+
+Post-buyback EPS = Net Income / (Shares Outstanding − Shares Repurchased)
+
+### 4.4 Dividends vs. Buybacks: Decision Framework
+
+| Factor | Favors Dividends | Favors Buybacks |
+|---|---|---|
+| Cash flow predictability | High recurring free cash flow | Variable or cyclical free cash flow |
+| Shareholder tax profile | Low-tax / tax-exempt holders (pension funds) | High-tax holders (individuals prefer capital gain deferral) |
+| Management outlook | Confident in sustaining the payout | Uncertain about future earnings; wants flexibility |
+| Valuation signal | Stable or growing business | Shares perceived as undervalued |
+| Leverage headroom | Levered; preserve financial flexibility | Unlevered; share count reduction improves EPS optically |
+
+### 4.5 Reinvestment vs. Return of Capital
+
+When ROIC > WACC: reinvest in organic growth or M&A.
+When ROIC < WACC: return capital to shareholders (dividends or buybacks) rather than pursuing value-destructive projects.
+
+**Hierarchy of capital allocation:**
+1. Maintain core operations and capex necessary for competitive position
+2. Fund organic growth investments with ROIC > WACC
+3. Fund M&A with rigorous valuation and post-merger integration plan
+4. Return excess capital: buybacks if shares undervalued, special dividends, or regular dividend increase
+
+---
+
+## Part 5 — Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
+
+### 5.1 Sensitivity Analysis (One-Way / Two-Way)
+
+Test how NPV or IRR changes when one input varies (all others held constant).
+
+**Typical one-way sensitivities for NPV:**
+
+| Variable | Typical Range Tested |
+|---|---|
+| Discount rate (WACC) | ±100–200 bps |
+| Terminal growth rate | ±50–100 bps |
+| EBITDA margin | ±100–200 bps |
+| Revenue growth rate | ±2–5 percentage points |
+| Capital expenditure | ±10–20% of base case |
+| Tax rate | ±5 percentage points |
+
+**Tornado chart:** Rank inputs by magnitude of NPV impact (widest bar = highest sensitivity); identifies the key value driver.
+
+**Two-way sensitivity table:** Matrix of NPV outcomes across two variables (e.g., WACC × terminal growth rate).
+
+### 5.2 Scenario Analysis
+
+Assign full sets of assumptions to discrete scenarios:
+
+| Scenario | Description | Typical Purpose |
+|---|---|---|
+| Base case | Most likely operating outcome | Primary valuation anchor |
+| Bull case | Optimistic growth, margins, synergies | Upside; defines acquisition premium ceiling |
+| Bear case | Conservative growth; recession; integration failure | Downside; stress test; tests floor value |
+| Downside / Stress | Severe recession or specific risk event | Impairment testing; lender / rating agency use |
+
+**Probability-weighted NPV:** E[NPV] = p_bull × NPV_bull + p_base × NPV_base + p_bear × NPV_bear
+
+### 5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
+
+Assign probability distributions to key inputs → simulate thousands of outcomes → derive NPV distribution, mean, standard deviation, and probability of negative NPV.
+
+**Useful when:** Many correlated inputs; need to quantify full distribution of outcomes rather than just a few scenarios.
+
+**Caution:** Output quality depends entirely on input distributions assumed; garbage-in-garbage-out risk is high. Document and disclose all distributional assumptions.
+
+### 5.4 Real Options
+
+Some investments embed optionality — the right but not the obligation to expand, abandon, defer, or switch operations. Standard DCF undervalues investments with significant embedded optionality.
+
+| Option Type | Example | Valuation Method |
+|---|---|---|
+| Option to expand | Phase 2 capacity addition if Phase 1 succeeds | Black-Scholes or binomial tree |
+| Option to abandon | Sell asset if market deteriorates | Put option analogy |
+| Option to defer | Delay project start to resolve uncertainty | Call option on project |
+| Option to switch | Switch production between products | Portfolio of options |
+
+**Advisory note:** Real option valuation requires explicit modeling of uncertainty (volatility of project value) and is inherently subjective. Use as a qualitative sanity check for highly uncertain projects rather than as a hard valuation output.
+
+---
+
+## Part 6 — Jurisdictional and Tax Overlays
+
+### 6.1 Corporate Tax Rates (Current — Verify Before Use)
+
+| Jurisdiction | Corporate Tax Rate | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| **United States** | 21% (federal) | State taxes add 0–12%; effective combined rate ~25–27% for most corporations. TCJA 2017. |
+| **Eurozone (Germany)** | ~30% | ~15% corporate income tax + ~15% trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) + solidarity surcharge (5.5% of corporate tax) |
+| **Eurozone (France)** | 25% | Standard rate since 2022 (down from 33.3% in prior years) |
+| **United Kingdom** | 25% | Increased from 19% effective April 1, 2023; small profits rate 19% for profits < £50,000 |
+| **Japan** | ~30–34% effective | National corporate tax ~23.2% + local enterprise tax + local corporate tax |
+| **China** | 25% | Standard rate; high-tech enterprise preferential rate 15% |
+| **India** | 22% (domestic; existing companies, base) + surcharge + cess = ~25.17% effective | New manufacturing companies: 15% + surcharge + cess. Minimum alternate tax (MAT) 15% applies to book income |
+| **Australia** | 30% | Small business: 25% (aggregated turnover < AUD 50M) |
+
+**Source:** OECD Tax Policy Analysis — [oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/](https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/) (public)
+
+### 6.2 Withholding Tax on Dividends and Buybacks
+
+| Country | Dividend WHT (domestic) | Treaty-Reduced (example) | Notes on Buybacks |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **United States** | 30% (non-resident; non-treaty) | 5–15% (most tax treaties for ≥ 10% corporate shareholder) | Share buybacks: 1% excise tax on corporation; capital gain to seller at treaty capital gains rate |
+| **Germany** | 25% + solidarity surcharge = 26.375% | 5% (EU P-S Directive for EU parent; 5–15% for non-EU treaty) | Buybacks treated as capital gain to shareholder |
+| **United Kingdom** | 0% (no dividend WHT under UK domestic law) | N/A | Buybacks: capital gain to seller |
+| **Japan** | 20.42% | 5% (US-Japan treaty; ≥ 10% direct shareholding) | Buybacks: treated as dividend to the extent of retained earnings in some cases |
+| **China** | 10% | 5% (where treaty specifies ≥ 25% direct shareholding, e.g., China-HK tax arrangement) | Buybacks treated as deemed dividend for WHT purposes |
+| **India** | Distribution tax abolished (Finance Act 2020); taxed in shareholder's hands at applicable rate | Treaty rates apply to non-resident shareholders | Buybacks subject to buyback tax (Section 115QA: 20% on distributed income) |
+| **Australia** | 30% (unfranked); 0% (fully franked — imputation credit offsets) | 5–15% per treaty | Buybacks: complex franking / capital gain treatment |
+
+### 6.3 Thin Capitalization Rules
+
+| Jurisdiction | Rule | Limit |
+|---|---|---|
+| **United States** | IRC §163(j) (TCJA 2017) — Business Interest Expense Limitation | Interest deduction limited to 30% of Adjusted Taxable Income (ATI); unused capacity carries forward |
+| **Germany** | Zinsschranke (Interest Barrier) | Interest deduction limited to 30% of EBITDA (tax-adjusted); de minimis €3M; escape if standalone or equity ratio test met |
+| **United Kingdom** | Corporate Interest Restriction (Finance Act 2017) | Interest deduction limited to 30% of UK EBITDA; group ratio rule available; de minimis £2M |
+| **Japan** | Earnings stripping rules | 20% of EBITDA for related-party net interest expenses exceeding JPY 20M |
+| **China** | Related-party debt-to-equity ratio: 5:1 (financial institutions); 2:1 (others) | Interest on excess related-party debt non-deductible |
+| **India** | GAAR (Finance Act 2013) and arm's-length interest rate cap | Transfer pricing rules apply to IC interest; thin-cap rules primarily via TP |
+| **Australia** | Div. 820 ITAA 1997 | Arm's-length debt test or safe-harbor (varies by entity type) |
+
+**OECD BEPS Action 4:** Recommends 10–30% EBITDA interest limitation rule as best practice. Most G20 countries have implemented variations of this approach.
+
+**Official source:** [oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action4/](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action4/) (public)
+
+### 6.4 Glossary of After-Tax Return Concepts
+
+| Term | Definition |
+|---|---|
+| **Pre-tax IRR** | IRR computed on pre-tax cash flows; does not reflect actual after-tax economics |
+| **After-tax IRR** | IRR on after-tax cash flows (net of corporate tax, WHT, and financing costs); the correct metric for capital allocation decisions |
+| **After-tax WACC** | WACC using after-tax cost of debt: r_d × (1 − t_c); standard approach |
+| **Effective tax rate (ETR)** | Income tax expense / Pre-tax accounting income; may differ materially from statutory rate due to deferred taxes, credits, COGS, and jurisdictional mix |
+| **Marginal tax rate** | The tax rate applicable to the next dollar of income in the relevant jurisdiction; use for WACC and capital budgeting (not ETR) |
+
+---
+
+## Part 7 — Official Documentation URLs
+
+| Standard / Resource | URL | Access |
+|---|---|---|
+| **SEC EDGAR — M&A filings (S-4, DEFM14A)** | [sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcurrent) | Fully public |
+| **Investor.gov — NPV primer** | [investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/net-present-value](https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/net-present-value) | Fully public |
+| **Damodaran — WACC data** | [pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.html](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.html) | Fully public |
+| **Damodaran — Betas by sector** | [pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/betas.html](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/betas.html) | Fully public |
+| **Damodaran — Country Risk Premium** | [pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html](https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html) | Fully public |
+| **IAS 36 — Impairment of Assets** | [ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-36-impairment-of-assets/](https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-36-impairment-of-assets/) | Free with registration |
+| **ASC 350 — Intangibles and Goodwill (impairment)** | [asc.fasb.org/350](https://asc.fasb.org/350) | Free with registration |
+| **OECD Tax Policy Analysis** | [oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/](https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/) | Fully public |
+| **OECD BEPS Action 4 (Interest Limitations)** | [oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action4/](https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action4/) | Fully public |
+| **US IRC §163(j) — Interest Limitation** | [irs.gov/businesses/corporations/interest-expense-limitation-under-section-163j](https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/interest-expense-limitation-under-section-163j) | Fully public |
+
+---
+
+## Mandatory Advisory Note
+
+This analysis is advisory and based solely on the facts described. It does not constitute investment advice, a fairness opinion, a formal valuation conclusion, or a securities recommendation of any kind. Tax rates, regulatory requirements, market benchmarks, and corporate tax rules change frequently and vary by entity type, jurisdiction, and individual circumstances. Verify current requirements with qualified financial advisors, tax counsel, and legal advisors before making any capital allocation or investment decision. This skill does not form a financial-adviser or investment-adviser relationship.

package/skills/finance/capital-allocation-advisor/metadata.json

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+  "id": "capital-allocation-advisor",
+  "name": "Capital Allocation Advisor",
+  "type": "skill",
+  "provider": "finance",
+  "category": "finance",
+  "summary": "Multi-jurisdiction reference framework for corporate capital allocation, investment appraisal (NPV, IRR, MIRR, payback, profitability index), cost of capital (WACC, CAPM, hurdle rates), M&A valuation methods (DCF, trading comparables, precedent transactions, accretion/dilution analysis), capital return policy (dividends vs. buybacks vs. reinvestment with ROIC > WACC test), and sensitivity/scenario analysis. Jurisdictional and tax overlays for US, EU, UK, Japan, China, India, and Australia.",
+  "source_type": "original",
+  "path": "skills/finance/capital-allocation-advisor",
+  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "last_verified": "2026-06-01",
+  "lifecycle": "experimental",
+  "execution_tier": "read-only-runtime",
+  "provider_coverage": ["corp-fin", "valuation", "capm", "wacc", "ma", "dcf", "ifrs", "gaap", "tax"],
+  "official_docs": [
+    "https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.html",
+    "https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/betas.html",
+    "https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html",
+    "https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/net-present-value",
+    "https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-36-impairment-of-assets/",
+    "https://asc.fasb.org/350",
+    "https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/",
+    "https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action4/",
+    "https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/interest-expense-limitation-under-section-163j",
+    "https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcurrent"
+  ],
+  "security_notes": "Advisory educational framework only — never executes, simulates, or proposes financial transactions, capital allocations, or investment decisions on behalf of users. Never accepts MNPI (material non-public information), counterparty identities under confidentiality, specific confidential deal terms, live market or FX rates for transactions, bank account numbers, or payment instructions. Does not constitute investment advice, a fairness opinion, or a formal valuation conclusion for any regulatory or transactional purpose. Tax rates and regulatory requirements change frequently — always recommend verification with qualified financial advisors, tax counsel, and legal advisors."
+}

package/skills/finance/debt-capital-structure-advisor/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Debt & Capital Structure Advisor Skill
+
+Multi-jurisdiction reference framework for debt and capital structure advisory, covering optimal capital structure theory through ESG-linked financing instruments.
+
+## Coverage
+
+- **Capital structure theory:** Modigliani–Miller Propositions I & II (with/without taxes), trade-off theory (tax shield vs. distress costs), pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984), market timing theory, dynamic trade-off with mean reversion
+- **Credit metrics:** Leverage (gross/net), interest coverage (EBITDA/EBIT), DSCR, fixed charge coverage, FFO/Debt — with IG vs. HY vs. LBO thresholds; IFRS 16 / ASC 842 lease capitalization impact on metrics
+- **Debt instruments:** Revolving credit facilities, Term Loan A/B, senior secured notes, high yield bonds, convertible notes, mezzanine/PIK, unitranche, second lien — pricing, seniority, bank vs. bond market comparison; SOFR/EURIBOR benchmark rate transition
+- **Covenant analysis:** Maintenance vs. incurrence covenants; maximum leverage, minimum coverage, DSCR, restricted payments basket; headroom analysis
+- **Rating agency methodologies:** S&P (FFO/Debt grid, business risk + financial risk profile), Moody's (scorecard, loss given default notching), Fitch (IDR criteria, ESG relevance scores) — all three rating scales; ESG integration frameworks
+- **Refinancing and maturity wall management:** Tender offers, exchange offers, open market repurchases, consent solicitations; break-even analysis; distressed exchange criteria
+- **WACC optimization:** CAPM parameters (r_f, β, ERP), debt tax shield vs. distress costs, industry leverage benchmarks, optimal capital structure trade-offs
+- **Basel III/IV:** CET1/AT1/Tier 2 capital criteria, minimum ratios, G-SIB surcharges, CoCo bonds, MREL/TLAC requirements; Basel IV output floor and FRTB
+- **ESG-linked financing:** Green bonds (ICMA GBP four components, EU Green Bond Standard Reg. 2023/2631), sustainability-linked bonds (ICMA SLBP — KPIs, SPTs, step-up mechanism), sustainability-linked loans (LMA/LSTA principles, margin adjustment), social bonds, transition bonds
+
+## Companion Agent
+
+`finance-debt-capital-structure-advisor-agent`
+
+## Standards Cited
+
+M&M (1958, 1963), Myers & Majluf (1984), BCBS Basel III (June 2011), Basel IV (December 2017 — d424), IFRS 9, IFRS 16, ASC 842, ICMA Green Bond Principles (2021), ICMA SLB Principles (2020), LMA/APLMA/LSTA SLL Principles (2021), EU Green Bond Standard Regulation 2023/2631, FSB TLAC Term Sheet (November 2015), BRRD (2014/59/EU), S&P Corporate Rating Methodology, Moody's Corporate Rating Methodology, Fitch Corporate Rating Criteria (2023)