@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 1.4.0 → 1.5.0

package/catalog/agents.json

@@ -2594,14 +2594,14 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://kyverno.io/docs/",
       "https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/validate/",
       "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/validating-admission-policy/",
       "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Changing failureAction from Enforce to Audit in production silently unblocks violations. Deleting a ClusterPolicy removes admission control for ALL namespaces simultaneously. PolicyException without expiry is permanent.",
+    "security_notes": "Changing failureAction from Enforce to Audit in production silently unblocks violations. Deleting a ClusterPolicy removes admission control for ALL namespaces simultaneously. PolicyException without expiry is permanent. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
@@ -2620,14 +2620,14 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/",
       "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/projects/",
       "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/sync-windows/",
       "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/sync-impersonation/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Deleting or disabling a sync-window removes the last gate blocking unreviewed changes to production. Expanding AppProject clusterResourceWhitelist to ['*/*'] grants full cluster write. RollingSync requires auto-sync disabled.",
+    "security_notes": "Deleting or disabling a sync-window removes the last gate blocking unreviewed changes to production. Expanding AppProject clusterResourceWhitelist to ['*/*'] grants full cluster write. RollingSync requires auto-sync disabled. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
@@ -2646,14 +2646,47 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ambient/",
       "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/authorization-policy/",
       "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/peer_authentication/",
       "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/diagnostic-tools/istioctl-analyze/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Changing PeerAuthentication from STRICT to PERMISSIVE disables mTLS for all traffic to matched workloads. Deleting the only DENY AuthorizationPolicy removes the default-deny posture. L7 AuthorizationPolicy in ambient without waypoint is silently bypassed.",
+    "security_notes": "Changing PeerAuthentication from STRICT to PERMISSIVE disables mTLS for all traffic to matched workloads. Deleting the only DENY AuthorizationPolicy removes the default-deny posture. L7 AuthorizationPolicy in ambient without waypoint is silently bypassed. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Network Architecture Mutation Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/patch/create operations on networking architecture surface (Service spec, CoreDNS Corefile, NodeLocal DNSCache install, Gateway API resources, ClusterMesh peer Secrets). HARD REFUSE one-way doors (CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod/Service CIDR resize, namespace deletion, kube-system DaemonSet writes). Pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any write.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service-traffic-policy/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/topology-aware-routing/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/nodelocaldns/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/gateway/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/httproute/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/grpcroute/",
+      "https://coredns.io/plugins/reload/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/clustermesh/clustermesh/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Cluster-side enforcement via least-privilege ServiceAccount per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md. Deliberately omitted: namespaces (any verb), pods (any verb), broad secrets, kube-system DaemonSets/Deployments writes, CRDs, any cluster-wide delete verb, any wildcard. Pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix MUST run before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes or operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. HARD REFUSE list covers one-way doors no agent in this repo will execute.",
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
@@ -2672,14 +2705,14 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/kubernetes/policy/",
       "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/egress-gateway/",
       "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/observability/hubble/",
       "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Deleting a default-deny CiliumNetworkPolicy removes all ingress/egress restrictions for matched workloads. toCIDRSet change to include 0.0.0.0/0 without excluding 169.254.169.254/32 opens the cloud metadata service. CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy changes affect all namespaces simultaneously.",
+    "security_notes": "Deleting a default-deny CiliumNetworkPolicy removes all ingress/egress restrictions for matched workloads. toCIDRSet change to include 0.0.0.0/0 without excluding 169.254.169.254/32 opens the cloud metadata service. CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy changes affect all namespaces simultaneously. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
@@ -2704,8 +2737,8 @@
       "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/",
       "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Capture current RBAC state before every mutation — no built-in rollback. Block escalate, bind, and impersonate verbs without platform-team approval. Never approve wildcard grants. Cached tokens remain valid after binding deletion until expiry.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "security_notes": "Capture current RBAC state before every mutation — no built-in rollback. Block escalate, bind, and impersonate verbs without platform-team approval. Never approve wildcard grants. Cached tokens remain valid after binding deletion until expiry. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.1.0"
@@ -2732,8 +2765,8 @@
       "https://velero.io/docs/latest/locations/",
       "https://velero.io/docs/latest/hooks/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Velero restore with existingResourcePolicy:update can overwrite live RBAC resources, Secrets, and ServiceAccounts — equivalent to a partial cluster wipe. BSL credentials with write-only access prevent listing/deleting old backups, causing runaway storage costs. Never proceed with cluster-wide restores without explicit platform-team sign-off.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "security_notes": "Velero restore with existingResourcePolicy:update can overwrite live RBAC resources, Secrets, and ServiceAccounts — equivalent to a partial cluster wipe. BSL credentials with write-only access prevent listing/deleting old backups, causing runaway storage costs. Never proceed with cluster-wide restores without explicit platform-team sign-off. Per docs/least-privilege-rbac.md the agent now runs a pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns yes (binding over-scoped) or if operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. References shipped: least-privilege-rbac.yaml (deny-by-default ClusterRole), rbac-pre-flight.md (positive + negative resourceName tests), refusal-list.md (universal one-way doors plus domain-specific HARD REFUSE list). Refuses to read or process credentials volunteered by the operator; uses only the in-pod ServiceAccount token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
     "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-velero-restore-guard-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
@@ -2767,6 +2800,39 @@
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-network-architecture-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Network Architecture Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Agent for kubernetes-network-architecture-review. Review Kubernetes cluster network architecture: CNI and dataplane (kube-proxy mode, IPAM, MTU, encapsulation, dual-stack), Service surface (EndpointSlices, internalTrafficPolicy, externalTrafficPolicy, topology-aware routing), Ingress to Gateway API migration, CoreDNS and NodeLocal DNSCache, multi-cluster topology (ClusterMesh, Submariner, MCS-API), egress topology, and connectivity observability and troubleshooting. Read-only; delegates NetworkPolicy content and live mutations to companion agents.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-network-architecture-review-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-07",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/networking/virtual-ips/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/endpoint-slices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service-traffic-policy/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/topology-aware-routing/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/dual-stack/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/nodelocaldns/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/concepts/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/kube-proxy-replacement/",
+      "https://coredns.io/plugins/kubernetes/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Pod and Service CIDR sizing are one-way architectural doors on most stacks. kube-proxy mode swap and CNI replacement are connectivity-affecting rollouts requiring an explicit cutover plan. MTU mismatch between underlay and overlay is a silent payload-stall failure mode. externalTrafficPolicy: Local black-holes traffic when no local endpoint exists. NodeLocal DNSCache OOM produces a node-wide DNS outage via stale packet-filter redirect to an unhealthy pod. Multi-cluster pod CIDR collisions break any cross-cluster scheme regardless of policy correctness. Linux Foundation CKNE program curriculum is not yet published as of last_verified; this agent is grounded in upstream Kubernetes, Gateway API, Cilium, and CoreDNS documentation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "kubernetes-pod-spec-review-agent",
     "name": "Kubernetes Pod Spec Review",

package/catalog/install-roles.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "Role-based agent and skill selections for vfa-export-agents --role installs. Each role maps to the minimal, high-value agent and skill IDs a practitioner in that function needs across all supported cloud providers. Roles are intentionally overlapping \u2014 a single agent may serve multiple roles.",
+  "description": "Role-based agent and skill selections for vfa-export-agents --role installs. Each role maps to the minimal, high-value agent and skill IDs a practitioner in that function needs across all supported cloud providers. Roles are intentionally overlapping — a single agent may serve multiple roles.",
   "roles": {
     "cloud-security-engineer": {
       "label": "Cloud Security Engineer",
@@ -314,18 +314,22 @@
     },
     "kubernetes-network-engineer": {
       "label": "Kubernetes Network Engineer",
-      "description": "CNI, service mesh, ingress, egress: Cilium NetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy, Cilium ClusterMesh, CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy, Hubble flow observability, and Istio mesh in both sidecar and ambient modes including the L7-AuthorizationPolicy-without-waypoint trap.",
+      "description": "Cluster network architecture and policy: CNI selection and dataplane (kube-proxy mode, IPAM, Pod and Service CIDR sizing, MTU, encapsulation, dual-stack), Service surface (EndpointSlices, internalTrafficPolicy, externalTrafficPolicy, topology-aware routing), Ingress to Gateway API migration, CoreDNS and NodeLocal DNSCache, multi-cluster topology (ClusterMesh, Submariner, MCS-API), egress topology and connectivity troubleshooting, plus Cilium NetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy review, CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy, Hubble flow observability, and Istio mesh in both sidecar and ambient modes including the L7-AuthorizationPolicy-without-waypoint trap.",
       "agents": [
         "cilium-network-policy-review-agent",
         "istio-ambient-mesh-review-agent",
         "kubernetes-live-mesh-policy-guard-agent",
+        "kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard-agent",
         "kubernetes-live-network-policy-guard-agent",
-        "kubernetes-maestro-agent"
+        "kubernetes-maestro-agent",
+        "kubernetes-network-architecture-review-agent"
       ],
       "skills": [
         "cilium-network-policy-review",
         "istio-ambient-mesh-review",
-        "kubernetes-maestro"
+        "kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard",
+        "kubernetes-maestro",
+        "kubernetes-network-architecture-review"
       ]
     },
     "kubernetes-application-platform-engineer": {

package/catalog/skill-manifest.json

@@ -2824,6 +2824,53 @@
         }
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     {
       "id": "kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard",
       "path": "skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard",
@@ -2864,7 +2911,7 @@
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@@ -2878,13 +2925,65 @@
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@@ -4365,12 +4464,12 @@
     {
       "id": "velero-backup-restore-guard",
       "path": "skills/velero/velero-backup-restore-guard",
-      "aggregate_sha256": "6a3ef7e50bc1bd42db30acb712f127a654ab3ff5096d2360d553352b27f0994d",
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       "files": [
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           "path": "skills/velero/velero-backup-restore-guard/SKILL.md",
-          "sha256": "4e2776d5261e1bd766bb29df45d1f13b563f422656f7e3197c141db28bab1a81",
-          "bytes": 2595
+          "sha256": "28b3586ffbdeb3feea8a9e42171f52b8a736cd09a6bdbb5508bafc58d5394f7b",
+          "bytes": 2758
         },
         {
           "path": "skills/velero/velero-backup-restore-guard/metadata.json",
@@ -4379,13 +4478,13 @@
         },
         {
           "path": "skills/velero/velero-backup-restore-guard/references/safety-checklist.md",
-          "sha256": "ef35cda68bbcdbd06df5c023b753904cc3727e7b611767aa7c2f2fa24eedf07e",
-          "bytes": 4595
+          "sha256": "9d8724b63c6bd8c1566619f14be75cdc1564f9db70b315d6248a069f331b24d3",
+          "bytes": 4869
         },
         {
           "path": "skills/velero/velero-backup-restore-guard/references/workflow-and-output.md",
-          "sha256": "7edb0ed3d8b6f95ee47bedcbd5a526fe905c438780743b46f88dcb8452b7be21",
-          "bytes": 5968
+          "sha256": "f3f8d2080d5e35ffc6067951b8b2c850aaad1c70c0a2d8eced0a4f7554d6a9f3",
+          "bytes": 6704
         }
       ]
     }

package/catalog/skills.json

@@ -2559,6 +2559,39 @@
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Network Architecture Mutation Guard",
+    "type": "skill",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro",
+      "other"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/patch/create operations on networking architecture surface (Service spec, CoreDNS Corefile, NodeLocal DNSCache, Gateway API resources, ClusterMesh peer Secrets). HARD REFUSE one-way doors. Pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix before any write.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service-traffic-policy/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/topology-aware-routing/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/nodelocaldns/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/gateway/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/httproute/",
+      "https://coredns.io/plugins/reload/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/clustermesh/clustermesh/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix runs before any mutation against a least-privilege ServiceAccount. Refuses if binding is over-scoped or operator is cluster-admin / system:masters. HARD REFUSE: CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod / Service CIDR resize, namespace deletion, kube-system DaemonSet writes, CRD operations, broad Secret access. CoreDNS Corefile changes require backup and reload verification within 2 minutes.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
+    "path": "skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "kubernetes-maestro",
     "name": "Kubernetes Maestro",
@@ -2587,6 +2620,40 @@
     "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-network-architecture-review",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Network Architecture Review",
+    "type": "skill",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro",
+      "other"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Kubernetes cluster network architecture: CNI and dataplane selection, kube-proxy mode and replacement, IPAM and CIDR sizing, MTU and encapsulation, dual-stack and IPv6, Service surface (EndpointSlices, internalTrafficPolicy, externalTrafficPolicy, topology-aware routing), Ingress to Gateway API migration, CoreDNS and NodeLocal DNSCache, multi-cluster topology, and connectivity observability and troubleshooting. Excludes NetworkPolicy content review and live mutations — those are delegated to cilium-network-policy-review and the live-guard agents.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/networking/virtual-ips/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/endpoint-slices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service-traffic-policy/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/topology-aware-routing/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/dual-stack/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/nodelocaldns/",
+      "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/concepts/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/kube-proxy-replacement/",
+      "https://coredns.io/plugins/kubernetes/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "CNI and Pod CIDR are one-way architectural choices on most stacks — resizing requires cluster rebuild. kube-proxy mode swap can break in-flight connections. MTU mismatch between underlay and overlay is a silent payload-stall failure. externalTrafficPolicy: Local preserves source IP but black-holes traffic when no local endpoint exists. NodeLocal DNSCache OOM produces a node-wide DNS outage via stale packet-filter redirect. Multi-cluster pod CIDR collisions break any cross-cluster scheme regardless of policy correctness. ndots:5 plus search path is the dominant cluster DNS load on most installations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-07",
+    "path": "skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-network-architecture-review",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "kubernetes-pod-security-admission-review",
     "name": "Kubernetes Pod Security Admission Review",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.5.0",
   "description": "Cloud and zero-trust agentic workflow marketplace for skills, agents, rules, MCP references, and compliance-aware architecture.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "repository": {

package/skills/kubernetes/README.md

@@ -9,10 +9,12 @@ This folder contains Kubernetes-focused skills curated for this marketplace.
 
 ## Local marketplace portfolio
 
-This folder contains **2** local Kubernetes skills:
+This folder contains **4** local Kubernetes skills:
 
 - `kubernetes-rbac-review`
 - `kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard`
+- `kubernetes-network-architecture-review`
+- `kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard`
 
 ## Portfolio posture
 
@@ -27,4 +29,6 @@ These skills are intentionally conservative:
 - always assess cluster-scope vs namespace-scope necessity — prefer a Role over a ClusterRole when namespace scope is sufficient
 - use official Kubernetes documentation for RBAC behavior and policy
 
+Network architecture review covers the cluster's dataplane, Service surface, Ingress and Gateway API, DNS, and multi-cluster topology — it stays read-only and delegates NetworkPolicy content review and live mutations to dedicated agents.
+
 Run `npm run validate` after changing cataloged Kubernetes skills.

package/skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+name: kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard
+description: Guard live kubectl apply, patch, or create operations on Kubernetes networking *architecture* surface — Service spec (`internalTrafficPolicy`, `externalTrafficPolicy`, `topology-mode`, `trafficDistribution`), CoreDNS Corefile, NodeLocal DNSCache install, Gateway API resources (Gateway / HTTPRoute / GRPCRoute / TLSRoute / ReferenceGrant), and ClusterMesh peer Secrets. HARD REFUSE one-way doors (CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod / Service CIDR resize, namespace deletion). Pre-flight `kubectl auth can-i` matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any write. Use only when an intentional architecture-level networking mutation is requested against a confirmed cluster target with a documented rollback path.
+allowed-tools: Bash Read Edit Grep Glob WebFetch
+metadata:
+  author: "github: Raishin"
+  version: "0.1.0"
+  updated: "2026-05-08"
+  category: networking
+---
+
+# Kubernetes Live Network Architecture Mutation Guard
+
+## Purpose
+
+Act as the guarded live operator for low-blast-radius, reversible architecture-level networking mutations. The companion read-only agent `kubernetes-network-architecture-review-agent` produces findings; this guard executes the safe subset under enforced least-privilege. High-blast-radius operations (CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod / Service CIDR resize, kube-system DaemonSet edits) are HARD REFUSED — they are one-way doors that require human-led cutover plans, not agent execution.
+
+## When to use
+
+Use this skill when:
+
+- A `Service` needs an `internalTrafficPolicy` / `externalTrafficPolicy` / `service.kubernetes.io/topology-mode` / `spec.trafficDistribution` patch.
+- A `ConfigMap/coredns` Corefile change is required (e.g. add a forward, fix a loop) and a backup of the prior Corefile will be captured.
+- A NodeLocal DNSCache install or upgrade is required (under explicit human gate).
+- Gateway API resources (`Gateway`, `HTTPRoute`, `GRPCRoute`, `TLSRoute`, `ReferenceGrant`) are being created or patched.
+- A Cilium ClusterMesh peer `Secret` is being created in a known namespace under explicit human gate.
+
+Do NOT use this skill when:
+
+- The change replaces or uninstalls a CNI.
+- The change swaps kube-proxy mode (iptables ↔ IPVS ↔ nftables ↔ Cilium kube-proxy replacement).
+- The change adjusts node MTU.
+- The change resizes Pod CIDR or Service CIDR.
+- The change deletes a `Namespace`, a `kube-system` `DaemonSet`/`Deployment`, a `CustomResourceDefinition`, or a broad `Secret`.
+
+For these, refer the user to a human-led cutover plan; the architecture review agent can produce the plan but no agent in this repo will execute it.
+
+## Pre-flight RBAC self-check (mandatory)
+
+Before any mutation, run the matrix from `references/rbac-pre-flight.md`. The matrix is grounded against `kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices`. Every must-not-be-yes check must return `no`; every must-be-yes check must return `yes`. Any deviation: refuse to act and tell the user the binding is over-scoped.
+
+If the operator's principal returns `yes` to `kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces` (i.e. it is `cluster-admin` or in `system:masters`), refuse. Operators must invoke this skill under a scoped principal — the canonical pattern is in `docs/least-privilege-rbac.md`.
+
+## Lean operating rules
+
+- Prefer live cluster evidence from `kubectl` when available; fall back to upstream documentation (kubernetes.io, gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io, docs.cilium.io, coredns.io) and sanitized YAML provided by the user.
+- **HARD REFUSE** the one-way doors listed in `references/refusal-list.md`. Do not negotiate.
+- Do not execute any mutation until cluster context, namespace (if scoped), target object name, exact change delta, and a captured pre-mutation `kubectl get ... -o yaml` baseline are all explicit.
+- Capture the current state of the target object as `/tmp/<resource>.before.yaml` (or equivalent path) as the rollback baseline before any write. If the baseline cannot be captured, refuse.
+- Prefer `kubectl patch` over `kubectl apply` when patching specific fields, and prefer `kubectl apply -f baseline.yaml` over `kubectl delete` for rollback.
+- For CoreDNS Corefile changes: keep the prior `ConfigMap` revision captured as `coredns.before.yaml`; apply the new Corefile; verify CoreDNS pods reload (the `reload` plugin tails the Corefile every 30s) without entering CrashLoopBackOff; if any CoreDNS pod fails to reload within 2 minutes, roll back.
+- For Gateway API changes: confirm the `GatewayClass.spec.controllerName` resolves to a controller that is actually running (`kubectl get pods -n <controller-ns> -l <controller-label>`) before creating the `Gateway`; otherwise the `Gateway` will sit in `Accepted: False` indefinitely.
+- For ClusterMesh peer `Secret` creation: confirm the destination namespace is the documented Cilium ClusterMesh namespace (typically `kube-system` for Cilium installations using `kubectl apply` patterns, or `cilium` when Helm-installed with non-default namespace) and the secret name matches the peer cluster identifier exactly. Refuse on any name mismatch.
+- If the proposed change touches a security boundary (e.g. setting `spec.allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All` on a Gateway, or `ReferenceGrant` to a sensitive namespace), require explicit platform-team sign-off in the response shape.
+- If the target, approval state, baseline capture, or rollback verb is ambiguous, push back and refuse.
+- Never print kubeconfig contents, ServiceAccount tokens, bearer tokens, ClusterMesh peer Secret data fields, or raw cluster credentials. Summarize sanitized evidence only.
+- **Refuse to read or process credentials offered by the operator.** If the user volunteers a kubeconfig file path, pastes a token, or offers a peer Secret payload, refuse to read it. The agent always uses the in-pod ServiceAccount token mounted at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` and rejects any other credential source. This refusal applies even when the user insists "just this once."
+- Load references only when needed.
+
+## References
+
+Load these only when needed:
+
+- [Permitted mutations](references/permitted-mutations.md) — the explicit allowlist of mutations this guard will execute and the verb-by-verb safety contract for each.
+- [Refusal list](references/refusal-list.md) — the explicit HARD REFUSE list of one-way-door operations and the rationale for each. Includes the cluster-side blast-radius if the refusal is bypassed.
+- [RBAC pre-flight](references/rbac-pre-flight.md) — the `kubectl auth can-i` matrix that runs before any mutation, with grounding to `kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices` and pointer to `docs/least-privilege-rbac.md`.
+- [Rollback patterns](references/rollback-patterns.md) — per-mutation-type rollback verb, baseline capture path, and post-rollback verification.
+- [Official sources](references/official-sources.md) — authoritative upstream documentation links.
+
+## Response minimum
+
+Return, at minimum:
+
+- confirmed cluster context (cluster name, namespace where applicable, principal acting),
+- pre-flight RBAC self-check result (matrix output, must-not rows confirmed `no`, must-be rows confirmed `yes`),
+- pre-mutation baseline path (`/tmp/<resource>.before.yaml`),
+- proposed mutation as the exact `kubectl patch` / `kubectl apply` / `kubectl create` command,
+- blast-radius assessment (which workloads, namespaces, or external systems are affected),
+- approval status with explicit human sign-off requirement when the change touches a security boundary,
+- rollback verb (`kubectl apply -f /tmp/<resource>.before.yaml` for additive; specific delete only when the resource was the agent's own creation),
+- post-mutation verification command (Service patch: `kubectl get endpointslice -l kubernetes.io/service-name=<svc>`; Corefile change: `kubectl -n kube-system logs -l k8s-app=kube-dns --tail=50` looking for reload success; Gateway: `kubectl get gateway <name> -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions}'`),
+- explicit `REFUSED` response with the matching rule from `references/refusal-list.md` if the requested mutation is on the hard-refuse list.

package/skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard/metadata.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "id": "kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard",
+  "name": "Kubernetes Live Network Architecture Mutation Guard",
+  "type": "skill",
+  "provider": "kubernetes",
+  "harnesses": [
+    "codex",
+    "claude-code",
+    "cursor",
+    "gemini",
+    "kiro",
+    "other"
+  ],
+  "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/patch/create operations on networking architecture surface — Service spec (internalTrafficPolicy, externalTrafficPolicy, topology-mode, trafficDistribution), CoreDNS Corefile, NodeLocal DNSCache install, Gateway API resources, and ClusterMesh peer Secrets. HARD REFUSE one-way doors (CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod / Service CIDR resize, namespace deletion). Pre-flight kubectl auth can-i matrix against a least-privilege ServiceAccount before any write.",
+  "source_type": "original",
+  "official_docs": [
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/",
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/",
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service-traffic-policy/",
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/topology-aware-routing/",
+    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/nodelocaldns/",
+    "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/gateway/",
+    "https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/api-types/httproute/",
+    "https://coredns.io/plugins/reload/",
+    "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/clustermesh/clustermesh/"
+  ],
+  "security_notes": "This skill is bound to a ServiceAccount with deliberately omitted verbs: no `delete` cluster-wide, no operations on `namespaces` / `customresourcedefinitions` / `kube-system` DaemonSets and Deployments / broad `secrets`. Pre-flight `kubectl auth can-i` matrix MUST run before any mutation; refuses if any must-not check returns `yes` (binding over-scoped) or if operator is in `system:masters` (RBAC bypass). HARD REFUSE list covers one-way doors that are out-of-scope for any agent: CNI replacement, kube-proxy mode swap, MTU change, Pod / Service CIDR resize. CoreDNS Corefile changes require backup capture and post-mutation reload verification within 2 minutes. Gateway resources require GatewayClass controller liveness check before creation. ClusterMesh peer Secret data fields must never be printed or logged.",
+  "last_verified": "2026-05-08",
+  "path": "skills/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-architecture-mutation-guard",
+  "author": "github: Raishin",
+  "version": "0.1.0"
+}