@raishin/vanguard-frontier-agentic 1.2.0 → 1.3.0

package/catalog/agents.json

@@ -1,4 +1,59 @@
 [
+  {
+    "id": "argo-rollouts-progressive-delivery-review-agent",
+    "name": "Argo Rollouts Progressive Delivery Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "argocd",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Argo Rollouts canary and blue-green strategy configuration, AnalysisTemplate success and failure conditions, traffic management provider alignment, canaryService isolation, PDB deadlock risk, and automated rollback posture for progressive delivery safety.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/",
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/features/canary/",
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/features/analysis/",
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/features/traffic-management/",
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/features/bluegreen/",
+      "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-rollouts/generated/kubectl-argo-rollouts/kubectl-argo-rollouts_promote/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "AnalysisTemplates with always-true success conditions defeat automated rollback entirely. A canary that silently passes all analysis checks will promote a broken release to 100% production traffic without any automated abort.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/argocd/argo-rollouts-progressive-delivery-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "argocd-gitops-review-agent",
+    "name": "Argo CD GitOps Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "argocd",
+    "summary": "Review Argo CD Application, AppProject, ApplicationSet, sync-window, RBAC, and sync impersonation configuration for blast-radius containment, least-privilege sync identity, and safe rollout posture.",
+    "path": "agents/argocd/argocd-gitops-review-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/projects/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/applicationset/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/sync-impersonation/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "application.sync.impersonation.enabled false (default) means every sync runs as cluster-admin. AppProject clusterResourceWhitelist with ['*/*'] grants full cluster write. ApplicationSet cluster generator with empty selector auto-onboards every registered cluster.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "aws-agentcore-agent",
     "name": "AWS AgentCore",
@@ -798,6 +853,43 @@
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "aws-maestro-agent",
+    "name": "AWS Maestro",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "aws",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Per-cloud router that classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest AWS specialist or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches in parallel when the task spans multiple domains. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/framework/welcome.html",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents.html",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agentcore.html",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/what-is-bedrock.html"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable: aws-live-deployment-guarded-operator-agent, aws-live-ecs-rollout-guard-agent, aws-live-iac-change-guard-agent, aws-live-pipeline-approval-operator-agent, and aws-live-serverless-release-guard-agent must never be auto-dispatched. Always surface blast-radius assessment and rollback path and require explicit written human confirmation before routing to any live-guard agent.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent",
+    "harness_variants": {
+      "codex": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
+      "copilot": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
+      "claude-code": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
+      "cursor": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
+      "gemini": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
+      "kiro-ide": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
+      "kiro-cli": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
+    },
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "aws-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
     "name": "AWS Migration Cutover Architect",
@@ -934,6 +1026,33 @@
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "aws-private-ca-issuer-review-agent",
+    "name": "AWS Private CA Issuer Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "aws",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review AWS ACM Private Certificate Authority issuer configurations for cert-manager, covering CA hierarchy safety, certificate template ARN scope, IRSA permissions minimization, validity period alignment, CRL reachability, and cross-account PCA usage patterns.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/privateca/latest/userguide/PcaWelcome.html",
+      "https://github.com/cert-manager/aws-privateca-issuer",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/privateca/latest/userguide/UsingTemplates.html",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/privateca/latest/userguide/crl-planning.html",
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Using a Root CA ARN in AWSPCAIssuer exposes the root of trust directly to cert-manager. A SubordinateCACertificate template allows cert-manager to issue intermediate CAs, enabling an attacker with cert-manager IRSA access to create a shadow CA trusted by the entire corporate PKI. IRSA role must exclude acm-pca:DeleteCertificateAuthority and acm-pca:CreateCertificateAuthority.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/aws/aws-private-ca-issuer-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "aws-rds-aurora-performance-investigator-agent",
     "name": "AWS RDS Aurora Performance Investigator",
@@ -1562,6 +1681,32 @@
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-keyvault-certificate-issuer-review-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Key Vault Certificate Issuer Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Azure Key Vault certificate issuer configurations for cert-manager, covering certificate policy alignment, Managed Identity authorization scope, exportability posture, private endpoint connectivity, integrated CA credential scoping, and cert-manager vs Key Vault auto-rotation race conditions.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/certificates/about-certificates",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/certificates/certificate-scenarios",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles/security",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/network-security"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Key Vault Contributor role assigned to cert-manager allows deletion of the Key Vault, management policy changes, and purge of soft-deleted certs — a full management plane compromise. Use Key Vault Certificate Officer (data plane RBAC) instead. Exportable certificates allow private key extraction from Key Vault; use non-exportable certs for cluster-internal mTLS.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-keyvault-certificate-issuer-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "azure-landing-zone-architect-agent",
     "name": "Azure Landing Zone Architect",
@@ -1596,8 +1741,8 @@
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Migrate Landing Zone Cutover",
+    "id": "azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live AKS Rollout Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1608,28 +1753,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover. Stress-test Azure migration cutovers across assessment quality, landing-zone readiness, dependency sequencing, permissions, rollback, and post-cutover operating ownership.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard AKS deployment rollouts with PDB audit, maxUnavailable and surge check, and explicit pause-before-proceed or undo gate before advancing.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/concepts-overview?view=migrate",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/assessment-prerequisites?view=migrate",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/review-application-assessment?view=migrate",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/platform-landing-zone?view=migrate",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/ready-azure-landing-zone",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/whats-new?view=migrate",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/operator-best-practices-cluster-security",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-clusters-workloads",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/deployment/#rolling-update-deployment",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/run-application/configure-pdb/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not equate Azure readiness with cutover readiness. Treat stale assessments, weak dependency mapping, broad migration permissions, missing rollback checkpoints, and incomplete landing-zone connectivity or monitoring as high-risk blockers. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Never advance an AKS rollout without PDB audit and replica health check. kubectl rollout undo is safe but must be confirmed before execution to avoid double-rollback churn.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-network-topology-review-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Network Topology Review",
+    "id": "azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live App Service Slot Swap Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1640,25 +1780,22 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-network-topology-review. Review Azure hub-spoke and related network topologies for routing, DNS, shared-services boundaries, security implications, and platform-versus-workload control ownership.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard App Service slot swaps by auditing sticky settings, warmup probe readiness, and swap-with-preview evidence before final swap commit.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/networking/architecture/hub-spoke",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/networking/guide/private-link-hub-spoke-network",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-staging-slots",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-best-practices",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/configure-common"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not recommend flat or over-centralized network patterns by default. Always address routing, DNS, shared-service blast radius, and platform-versus-workload control boundaries before calling a topology safe. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-network-topology-review-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Never perform a production slot swap without sticky-settings diff audit and warmup health confirmation. A bad swap with no rollback plan can take a production app offline instantly.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-observability-investigator-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Observability Investigator",
+    "id": "azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live ARM Deployment Stack Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1669,36 +1806,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-observability-investigator. Investigate Azure Monitor, Log Analytics, Application Insights, alerting, KQL triage, telemetry gaps, and observability workflows with explicit evidence-versus-inference handling.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard ARM template and Deployment Stack changes with what-if evidence, denySettings review, and explicit approval before execute.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/best-practices-analysis",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/action-groups",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-processing-rules",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/log-analytics-workspace-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/workspace-design",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/get-started-queries",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/app/app-insights-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/service-guides/application-insights",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/visualize/workbooks-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/visualize/visualize-grafana-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/monitor",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-monitor",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/deploy-what-if",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/deployment-stacks",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/deny-assignments",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/best-practices"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not over-attribute symptoms as root cause, ignore missing telemetry, or recommend broad alerting changes without signal-quality review, routing checks, and bounded verification steps. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-observability-investigator-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Never execute an ARM or Deployment Stack change without what-if evidence, confirmed target scope, denySettings review, and explicit human approval. Repo write access does not authorize live Azure mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-platform-automation-devops-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Platform Automation DevOps",
+    "id": "azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live Cost Budget Action Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1709,31 +1833,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-platform-automation-devops. Design and review Azure platform automation delivery across landing-zone IaC choices, bootstrap-versus-run separation, infra-versus-app pipelines, secret handling, validation gates, and safe rollout patterns.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Gate subscription and management-group budget action changes and GPU or HPC SKU scale-up against approved spend thresholds before any cost-impacting mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/implementation-options",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/landing-zones/bicep/landing-zone-bicep",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/terraform-landing-zone",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-best-practices",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-staging-slots?view=azure-devops-2020",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-deploy",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/bicep-mcp-server",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/costs/tutorial-acm-create-budgets",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/azure-subscription-service-limits",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/quotas/quickstart-increase-quota-portal",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/finops/overview-finops"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Keep bootstrap and steady-state delivery separate, do not mix platform and application pipelines without control boundaries, never store secrets in repo or pipeline definitions, and require preview, validation, approval, and rollback paths before production-impacting Azure changes. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-platform-automation-devops-agent",
+    "security_notes": "GPU/HPC SKUs (NDv5, H100, A100) can generate $50K+ daily costs. Never approve quota increases or budget threshold raises without explicit spend-approval sign-off from a financial authority.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Private Endpoint Adoption Planner",
+    "id": "azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live Entra Role Assignment Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1744,28 +1860,24 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner. Plan Azure Private Link and private endpoint adoption with explicit hub-versus-spoke placement, private DNS zone linkage, route implications, and centralized-versus-local trade-offs.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard live permanent Microsoft Entra ID and Azure RBAC role assignments with scope audit, principal-type risk classification, dangerous-role detection, and explicit approval gates before write.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/guide/networking/private-link-hub-spoke-network",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/private-endpoint-dns-integration",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/private-endpoint-dns",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/dns/private-dns-privatednszone",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/private-link-design",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/best-practices",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/role-assignments-alert",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not recommend private endpoint placement without naming consumer networks, DNS-zone ownership, VNet links, route implications, and rollback checks. Challenge both over-centralized hub designs and uncontrolled per-spoke duplication. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Never create Owner, Contributor, or UAA assignments at subscription or management-group scope without CISO-level justification. Always prefer PIM eligible assignment. Block Guest principal assignments without Director-level sign-off.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-entra-role-assignment-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-rbac-review-agent",
-    "name": "Azure RBAC Review",
+    "id": "azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1776,24 +1888,120 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-rbac-review. Review Azure role assignments, custom roles, and scope choices for least privilege and operational safety.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard Key Vault key and secret rotation, soft-delete enforcement, and purge-protection changes, with explicit irreversibility warning before any purge-protection enable.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/best-practices",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/about-keys-details",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/best-practices"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Purge-protection enable is irreversible. Soft-deleted keys can be recovered within the retention window. HSM-backed hard-purged keys cannot be recovered. Never grant purge rights to routine rotation operators.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Live PIM JIT Activation Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Gate PIM eligible role activations with justification, ticket binding, MFA verification, and time-bound scope before approval submission.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-deployment-plan",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-resource-roles-configure-role-settings",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-activate-role",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure-azure-ad-roles"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Never activate a PIM role without justification, ticket reference, and MFA confirmation. An agent cannot activate another user's PIM role on their behalf — only the eligible principal may submit. Requires Entra ID P2 or equivalent license.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-maestro-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Maestro",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Per-cloud router agent for Azure. Classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest Azure specialist or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches in parallel when the task spans multiple domains. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not recommend Owner or User Access Administrator unless justified. Prefer narrow scopes and built-in roles before custom broad grants. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "security_notes": "Live-guard agents (azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent, azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent, azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent, azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent, azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent, azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent) must NEVER be auto-dispatched. All six require explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and a confirmed rollback path before dispatch. Do not ask for secrets, credentials, tenant IDs, subscription IDs, or any customer-specific identifiers.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent",
+    "harness_variants": {
+      "codex": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
+      "copilot": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
+      "claude-code": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
+      "cursor": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
+      "gemini": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
+      "kiro-ide": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
+      "kiro-cli": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
+    },
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Migrate Landing Zone Cutover",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover. Stress-test Azure migration cutovers across assessment quality, landing-zone readiness, dependency sequencing, permissions, rollback, and post-cutover operating ownership.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/concepts-overview?view=migrate",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/assessment-prerequisites?view=migrate",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/review-application-assessment?view=migrate",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/platform-landing-zone?view=migrate",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/ready-azure-landing-zone",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/migrate/whats-new?view=migrate",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not equate Azure readiness with cutover readiness. Treat stale assessments, weak dependency mapping, broad migration permissions, missing rollback checkpoints, and incomplete landing-zone connectivity or monitoring as high-risk blockers. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-rbac-review-agent",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-migrate-landing-zone-cutover-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Resilience BCDR Review",
+    "id": "azure-network-topology-review-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Network Topology Review",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1804,29 +2012,65 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-resilience-bcdr-review. Review Azure resilience and disaster-recovery posture for RTO/RPO realism, failover and failback assumptions, shared-responsibility gaps, and recovery runbook or drill quality.",
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-network-topology-review. Review Azure hub-spoke and related network topologies for routing, DNS, shared-services boundaries, security implications, and platform-versus-workload control ownership.",
     "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/reliability/principles",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/reliability/disaster-recovery",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/networking/architecture/hub-spoke",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/networking/guide/private-link-hub-spoke-network",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not recommend flat or over-centralized network patterns by default. Always address routing, DNS, shared-service blast radius, and platform-versus-workload control boundaries before calling a topology safe. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-network-topology-review-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-observability-investigator-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Observability Investigator",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-observability-investigator. Investigate Azure Monitor, Log Analytics, Application Insights, alerting, KQL triage, telemetry gaps, and observability workflows with explicit evidence-versus-inference handling.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/best-practices-analysis",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/resource-health-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/action-groups",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-processing-rules",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/log-analytics-workspace-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/workspace-design",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/get-started-queries",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/app/app-insights-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/service-guides/application-insights",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/visualize/workbooks-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/visualize/visualize-grafana-overview",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/monitor",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-monitor",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not accept zero-downtime or zero-data-loss claims without explicit architecture and test evidence. Separate Azure platform resilience from workload recovery obligations, and treat untested runbooks, undocumented failback, and single-region dependencies as material risks. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "security_notes": "Do not over-attribute symptoms as root cause, ignore missing telemetry, or recommend broad alerting changes without signal-quality review, routing checks, and bounded verification steps. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-observability-investigator-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-resource-health-incident-triage-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Resource Health Incident Triage",
+    "id": "azure-platform-automation-devops-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Platform Automation DevOps",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1837,30 +2081,31 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-resource-health-incident-triage. Triage Azure Resource Health, Service Health, activity-log alerts, and first-pass cloud-health incidents with explicit separation between provider incidents, tenant-side changes, and unresolved evidence.",
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-platform-automation-devops. Design and review Azure platform automation delivery across landing-zone IaC choices, bootstrap-versus-run separation, infra-versus-app pipelines, secret handling, validation gates, and safe rollout patterns.",
     "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/resource-health-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/activity-log",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-create-activity-log-alert-rule",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/service-health-alert-overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/alerts-activity-log-service-notifications-portal",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/implementation-options",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/landing-zones/bicep/landing-zone-bicep",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/terraform-landing-zone",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-best-practices",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-staging-slots?view=azure-devops-2020",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-resource-health",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-monitor",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-deploy",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/bicep-mcp-server",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not over-attribute platform health signals as root cause, ignore recent tenant-side changes, invent unsupported MCP tools, or recommend broad remediation before blast radius and evidence are clear. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "security_notes": "Keep bootstrap and steady-state delivery separate, do not mix platform and application pipelines without control boundaries, never store secrets in repo or pipeline definitions, and require preview, validation, approval, and rollback paths before production-impacting Azure changes. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-resource-health-incident-triage-agent",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-platform-automation-devops-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-role-selector-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Role Selector",
+    "id": "azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Private Endpoint Adoption Planner",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "azure",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -1871,28 +2116,746 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-role-selector. Select the narrowest Azure built-in role, custom-role fallback, and assignment scope for a requested access pattern while separating control-plane and data-plane permissions.",
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner. Plan Azure Private Link and private endpoint adoption with explicit hub-versus-spoke placement, private DNS zone linkage, route implications, and centralized-versus-local trade-offs.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/guide/networking/private-link-hub-spoke-network",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/private-endpoint-dns-integration",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/private-link/private-endpoint-dns",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/dns/private-dns-privatednszone",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/logs/private-link-design",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not recommend private endpoint placement without naming consumer networks, DNS-zone ownership, VNet links, route implications, and rollback checks. Challenge both over-centralized hub designs and uncontrolled per-spoke duplication. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-private-endpoint-adoption-planner-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-rbac-review-agent",
+    "name": "Azure RBAC Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-rbac-review. Review Azure role assignments, custom roles, and scope choices for least privilege and operational safety.",
     "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/overview",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/best-practices",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/role-definitions",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
       "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Prefer built-in roles before custom roles, minimize assignment scope, and keep control-plane and data-plane permissions separate. Do not default to Owner or Contributor for routine access requests. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-role-selector-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Do not recommend Owner or User Access Administrator unless justified. Prefer narrow scopes and built-in roles before custom broad grants. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-rbac-review-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Resilience BCDR Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-resilience-bcdr-review. Review Azure resilience and disaster-recovery posture for RTO/RPO realism, failover and failback assumptions, shared-responsibility gaps, and recovery runbook or drill quality.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/reliability/principles",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/reliability/disaster-recovery",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/resource-health-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not accept zero-downtime or zero-data-loss claims without explicit architecture and test evidence. Separate Azure platform resilience from workload recovery obligations, and treat untested runbooks, undocumented failback, and single-region dependencies as material risks. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-resilience-bcdr-review-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-resource-health-incident-triage-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Resource Health Incident Triage",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-resource-health-incident-triage. Triage Azure Resource Health, Service Health, activity-log alerts, and first-pass cloud-health incidents with explicit separation between provider incidents, tenant-side changes, and unresolved evidence.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/resource-health-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/activity-log",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/alerts/alerts-create-activity-log-alert-rule",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/service-health-alert-overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/service-health/alerts-activity-log-service-notifications-portal",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-resource-health",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/azure-monitor",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not over-attribute platform health signals as root cause, ignore recent tenant-side changes, invent unsupported MCP tools, or recommend broad remediation before blast radius and evidence are clear. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-resource-health-incident-triage-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-role-selector-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Role Selector",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-role-selector. Select the narrowest Azure built-in role, custom-role fallback, and assignment scope for a requested access pattern while separating control-plane and data-plane permissions.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/best-practices",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/role-definitions",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Prefer built-in roles before custom roles, minimize assignment scope, and keep control-plane and data-plane permissions separate. Do not default to Owner or Contributor for routine access requests. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-role-selector-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-security-posture-hardening-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Security Posture Hardening",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-security-posture-hardening. Review Azure security posture with least privilege, managed identities, Key Vault hardening, private access decisions, policy guardrails, and audit-ready logging expectations.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/security",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/best-practices-and-patterns",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/managed-identities-azure-resources/managed-identity-best-practice-recommendations",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/best-practices",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/rbac-guide",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/how-to-azure-key-vault-network-security",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/howto-logging",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/monitor-key-vault",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/services/azure-mcp-server-for-key-vault",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not recommend broad admin roles, stored secrets, or public exposure by default. Prefer managed identities, scoped RBAC, policy-enforced controls, private access where justified, and verified logging coverage. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-security-posture-hardening-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "azure-subscription-resource-organization-agent",
+    "name": "Azure Subscription Resource Organization",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "azure",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for azure-subscription-resource-organization. Design and review Azure management-group, subscription, and resource-group boundaries with explicit governance, ownership, and landing-zone operating-model consequences.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/resource-org",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/resource-org-management-groups",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/governance",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/subscription",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/resource-group",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Do not recommend flat hierarchies, fake isolation via resource groups, or subscription moves without proving governance, ownership, policy inheritance, and operational blast-radius implications. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
+    "path": "agents/azure/azure-subscription-resource-organization-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.2.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "backstage-scaffolder-template-review-agent",
+    "name": "Backstage Scaffolder Template Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "backstage",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for backstage-scaffolder-template-review. Review Backstage Scaffolder software templates for action blast-radius, input parameter injection, RBAC gate coverage, secret scope, catalog entity poisoning, and output exposure.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://backstage.io/docs/features/software-templates/",
+      "https://backstage.io/docs/features/software-templates/writing-templates",
+      "https://backstage.io/docs/features/software-templates/builtin-actions",
+      "https://backstage.io/docs/permissions/overview",
+      "https://backstage.io/docs/integrations/github/github-apps"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Backstage Scaffolder templates without RBAC gate and without input validation allow any developer to trigger infrastructure provisioning actions. Templates that provision cloud resources via Terraform or Crossplane CRDs effectively grant cloud-write to all Backstage users.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/backstage/backstage-scaffolder-template-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "cert-manager-issuer-trust-review-agent",
+    "name": "cert-manager Issuer Trust Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "cert-manager",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review cert-manager Issuer and ClusterIssuer scope, CertificateRequestPolicy coverage, certificate SAN and duration risks, trust-manager bundle distribution blast radius, and cloud CA integration authentication for Kubernetes PKI posture.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/",
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/concepts/certificate/",
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/concepts/issuer/",
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/projects/approver-policy/",
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/projects/trust-manager/",
+      "https://cert-manager.io/docs/configuration/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "A ClusterIssuer backed by a corporate Private CA with no CertificateRequestPolicy means any namespace can issue certs for any DNS name trusted by the corporate CA, enabling a compromised workload to perform mTLS MITM against internal services.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/cert-manager/cert-manager-issuer-trust-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "cilium-network-policy-review-agent",
+    "name": "Cilium Network Policy Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "cilium",
+    "summary": "Review Cilium CiliumNetworkPolicy, CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy, standard NetworkPolicy, ClusterMesh cross-cluster policy semantics, and egress gateway configuration for default-deny posture, L7 enforcement requirements, and exfiltration risk.",
+    "path": "agents/cilium/cilium-network-policy-review-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/kubernetes/policy/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/clustermesh/policy/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/egress-gateway/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/observability/hubble/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "policy-default-local-cluster flag change affects cross-cluster semantics of EVERY existing CiliumNetworkPolicy globally. toCIDRSet 0.0.0.0/0 without excluding the cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) is the Capital One breach path.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "external-secrets-operator-review-agent",
+    "name": "External Secrets Operator Review Agent",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review ESO SecretStore, ClusterSecretStore, ExternalSecret, and PushSecret for scope creep, auth anti-patterns, refresh interval risks, and dataFrom blast radius.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/introduction/overview/",
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/api/secretstore/",
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/api/externalsecret/",
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/api/clustersecretstore/",
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/provider/aws-secrets-manager/",
+      "https://external-secrets.io/latest/provider/azure-key-vault/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "ClusterSecretStore with no namespace selector grants every namespace access to every external secret reachable by the store credentials. Static credentials in SecretStore auth create a credential-to-access-credentials chain where compromise of the K8s Secret gives full access to the external store.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/external-secrets-operator-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "falco-runtime-threat-rules-review-agent",
+    "name": "Falco Runtime Threat Rules Review Agent",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "falco",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Falco rules for macro correctness, exception blast radius, sensitive-path coverage, K8s audit gaps, and alert output routing.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://falco.org/docs/rules/",
+      "https://falco.org/docs/reference/rules/supported-syscalls/",
+      "https://falco.org/docs/install-operate/third-party/falco-sidekick/",
+      "https://falco.org/docs/reference/rules/exceptions/",
+      "https://falco.org/docs/install-operate/deployment/",
+      "https://github.com/falcosecurity/rules/tree/main/rules"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Falco with overly broad rule exceptions creates detection blind spots. A rule exception matching an entire process family (java, python, node) or a specific container name completely disables detection for that workload — attackers can exploit known exception patterns.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/falco/falco-runtime-threat-rules-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "finops-cloud-price-advisor-agent",
+    "name": "FinOps Cloud Price Advisor",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "multi-cloud",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Fetch live public prices from AWS, Azure, and OCI pricing APIs and produce cost estimates for live environments or planned prototypes. Currency defaults to USD; other currencies on request. No cloud credentials required.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsaccountbilling/latest/aboutv2/price-changes.html",
+      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/cost-management/retail-prices/azure-retail-prices",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Billing/Concepts/costanalysisoverview.htm",
+      "https://aws.amazon.com/pricing/",
+      "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator/",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/price-list.html"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "All three pricing APIs are public and unauthenticated. Never request or accept cloud credentials, billing account IDs, cost export access, or tenant-specific data. Inventory enumeration for live-environment mode requires only read-only cloud permissions.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/finops/finops-cloud-price-advisor-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "fluxcd-kustomization-helmrelease-review-agent",
+    "name": "FluxCD Kustomization and HelmRelease Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "fluxcd",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for fluxcd-kustomization-helmrelease-review. Review FluxCD Kustomization, HelmRelease, and source resources for SOPS encryption, source trust, ServiceAccount scoping, prune safety, and HelmRelease upgrade remediation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/components/kustomize/kustomizations/",
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/components/helm/helmreleases/",
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/components/source/gitrepositories/",
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/guides/repository-structure/",
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/security/secrets-management/",
+      "https://fluxcd.io/flux/installation/configuration/multitenancy/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Plaintext Kubernetes Secret manifests committed to a FluxCD Git source are exposed to anyone with repo read access — including CI systems, PR participants, and auditors. GitRepository sources without commit signature verification allow any commit (including injected ones) to deploy to production.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/fluxcd/fluxcd-kustomization-helmrelease-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "istio-ambient-mesh-review-agent",
+    "name": "Istio Ambient Mesh Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "istio",
+    "summary": "Review Istio ambient mesh configuration — ztunnel L4 vs waypoint L7 enforcement, AuthorizationPolicy scope, PeerAuthentication mTLS mode, RequestAuthentication JWKs, and gateway configuration for service mesh security posture.",
+    "path": "agents/istio/istio-ambient-mesh-review-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ambient/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/authorization-policy/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/peer_authentication/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/diagnostic-tools/istioctl-analyze/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/tasks/security/authorization/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "L7 AuthorizationPolicy in ambient mode without a waypoint is silently bypassed — ztunnel only enforces L4. PERMISSIVE PeerAuthentication in a production namespace is a critical finding.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubecost-chargeback-allocation-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubecost Chargeback and Allocation Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for kubecost-chargeback-allocation-review. Review Kubecost and OpenCost deployments for cost allocation accuracy, label taxonomy completeness, shared cost model, idle attribution, budget alerts, API authentication, and savings recommendation hygiene.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://www.kubecost.com/kubernetes-cost-optimization/",
+      "https://docs.kubecost.com/using-kubecost/navigating-the-kubecost-ui/cost-allocation",
+      "https://www.opencost.io/docs/",
+      "https://docs.kubecost.com/install-and-configure/advanced-configuration/cost-model",
+      "https://docs.kubecost.com/using-kubecost/navigating-the-kubecost-ui/savings",
+      "https://docs.kubecost.com/apis/apis-overview"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Kubecost cost allocation API without authentication exposes team-level spend data to any pod in the cluster. Multi-cluster Kubecost aggregation requires cross-cluster network access — review whether the aggregation network path is private or exposed.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubecost-chargeback-allocation-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-admission-policy-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Admission Policy Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/delete operations on Kyverno ClusterPolicy, Policy, PolicyException, and native ValidatingAdmissionPolicy/MutatingAdmissionPolicy resources. Requires current-state capture, failureAction impact assessment, and explicit approval before any write.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-admission-policy-guard-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/validate/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/validating-admission-policy/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Changing failureAction from Enforce to Audit in production silently unblocks violations. Deleting a ClusterPolicy removes admission control for ALL namespaces simultaneously. PolicyException without expiry is permanent.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-argocd-sync-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Argo CD Sync Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Guard live argocd CLI or kubectl operations on Argo CD Application, AppProject, and ApplicationSet resources, and sync-window modifications. Requires AppProject blast-radius assessment, sync identity review, and explicit approval before any production sync, AppProject mutation, or sync-window deletion.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-argocd-sync-guard-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user-guide/projects/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/sync-windows/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/sync-impersonation/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Deleting or disabling a sync-window removes the last gate blocking unreviewed changes to production. Expanding AppProject clusterResourceWhitelist to ['*/*'] grants full cluster write. RollingSync requires auto-sync disabled.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-mesh-policy-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Mesh Policy Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/delete operations on Istio AuthorizationPolicy, PeerAuthentication, RequestAuthentication, Gateway, and VirtualService resources. Requires current mTLS posture assessment, waypoint enrollment check for L7 rules, and explicit approval before any write.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-mesh-policy-guard-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ambient/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/authorization-policy/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/reference/config/security/peer_authentication/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/diagnostic-tools/istioctl-analyze/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Changing PeerAuthentication from STRICT to PERMISSIVE disables mTLS for all traffic to matched workloads. Deleting the only DENY AuthorizationPolicy removes the default-deny posture. L7 AuthorizationPolicy in ambient without waypoint is silently bypassed.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-network-policy-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Network Policy Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/delete operations on CiliumNetworkPolicy, CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy, NetworkPolicy, and CiliumEgressGatewayPolicy resources. Requires default-deny posture assessment, egress blast-radius evaluation, and explicit approval before any write.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-network-policy-guard-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/kubernetes/policy/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/network/egress-gateway/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/observability/hubble/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Deleting a default-deny CiliumNetworkPolicy removes all ingress/egress restrictions for matched workloads. toCIDRSet change to include 0.0.0.0/0 without excluding 169.254.169.254/32 opens the cloud metadata service. CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy changes affect all namespaces simultaneously.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live RBAC Mutation Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Guard live kubectl apply/create/delete operations on Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, and ClusterRoleBindings with privilege-escalation verb detection, scope assessment, current-state diff, and explicit approval before write.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Capture current RBAC state before every mutation — no built-in rollback. Block escalate, bind, and impersonate verbs without platform-team approval. Never approve wildcard grants. Cached tokens remain valid after binding deletion until expiry.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard-agent",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-live-velero-restore-guard-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Live Velero Restore Guard",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Live-guard agent for Velero backup/restore operations on Kubernetes clusters — enforcing cluster context confirmation, restore scope review, dry-run gating, current-state capture, and explicit platform-team sign-off before any mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://velero.io/docs/latest/",
+      "https://velero.io/docs/latest/restore-reference/",
+      "https://velero.io/docs/latest/backup-reference/",
+      "https://velero.io/docs/latest/locations/",
+      "https://velero.io/docs/latest/hooks/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Velero restore with existingResourcePolicy:update can overwrite live RBAC resources, Secrets, and ServiceAccounts — equivalent to a partial cluster wipe. BSL credentials with write-only access prevent listing/deleting old backups, causing runaway storage costs. Never proceed with cluster-wide restores without explicit platform-team sign-off.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-live-velero-restore-guard-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-maestro-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Maestro",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Per-platform router for Kubernetes. Classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest specialist or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches in parallel when the task spans multiple domains. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-maestro-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/",
+      "https://istio.io/latest/docs/ambient/",
+      "https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/",
+      "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/",
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/kubernetes/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/pods/service-accounts/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable: kubernetes-live-rbac-mutation-guard-agent, kubernetes-live-admission-policy-guard-agent, kubernetes-live-mesh-policy-guard-agent, kubernetes-live-argocd-sync-guard-agent, and kubernetes-live-network-policy-guard-agent must never be auto-dispatched.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-pod-spec-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Pod Spec Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Kubernetes Pod, Deployment, and StatefulSet specs for probe correctness, resource QoS, securityContext posture, image pull policy, secret consumption patterns, topology spread, and termination grace period against CKAD-aligned production-readiness standards.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/pods/pod-lifecycle/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-liveness-readiness-startup-probes/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-resources-containers/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/topology-spread-constraints/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/deployment/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Secrets mounted as environment variables appear in kubectl describe pod output and in /proc/self/environ, accessible to any process in the container. Root containers can write to host paths if hostPath volumes are present. Missing runAsNonRoot allows container breakout to node if combined with hostPath or privileged mode.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-pod-spec-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-psa-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Pod Security Admission Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Review Kubernetes Pod Security Admission namespace labels — enforce/audit/warn modes, privileged/baseline/restricted profiles, version pinning, cluster AdmissionConfiguration defaults, and migration from deprecated PodSecurityPolicy.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-psa-review-agent",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/enforce-standards-namespace-labels/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/enforce-standards-admission-controller/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/migrate-from-psp/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "A production namespace with no PSA label inherits cluster default which is privileged unless overridden — treat as critical finding. enforce-version latest changes profile semantics on every Kubernetes minor upgrade.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "kubernetes-rbac-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes RBAC Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Agent for kubernetes-rbac-review. Review Kubernetes Roles, ClusterRoles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoleBindings, and ServiceAccounts for least-privilege, namespace-scope minimization, and workload identity safety.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Prefer read-only inspection. Do not recommend cluster-admin bindings, wildcard grants, or shared ServiceAccounts without explicit justification. Always prefer namespace-scoped Roles before ClusterRoles for workloads that do not need cluster-wide access.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-rbac-review-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-security-posture-hardening-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Security Posture Hardening",
+    "id": "kubernetes-workload-identity-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kubernetes Workload Identity Review",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "kubernetes",
+    "summary": "Review Kubernetes workload identity configuration — IRSA, Azure Workload Identity, GKE Workload Identity, and generic OIDC projected token bindings — for trust policy scope, static credential fallback risk, token audience validation, and cross-account reuse.",
+    "path": "agents/kubernetes/kubernetes-workload-identity-review-agent",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -1901,34 +2864,25 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-security-posture-hardening. Review Azure security posture with least privilege, managed identities, Key Vault hardening, private access decisions, policy guardrails, and audit-ready logging expectations.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/security",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/best-practices-and-patterns",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/managed-identities-azure-resources/managed-identity-best-practice-recommendations",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/best-practices",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/rbac-guide",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/how-to-azure-key-vault-network-security",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/howto-logging",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/monitor-key-vault",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/services/azure-mcp-server-for-key-vault",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html",
+      "https://azure.github.io/azure-workload-identity/docs/",
+      "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/workload-identity",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/pods/service-accounts/",
+      "https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not recommend broad admin roles, stored secrets, or public exposure by default. Prefer managed identities, scoped RBAC, policy-enforced controls, private access where justified, and verified logging coverage. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-security-posture-hardening-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "security_notes": "OIDC trust policy with wildcard sub allows any pod in the cluster to assume the role. Static credentials in environment variables defeat workload identity migration — cloud SDKs search the credential chain in order and a leftover env var always wins.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-subscription-resource-organization-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Subscription Resource Organization",
+    "id": "kyverno-policy-review-agent",
+    "name": "Kyverno Policy Review",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "kyverno",
+    "summary": "Review Kyverno ClusterPolicy and Policy resources for failureAction, background scanning, PolicyException audit, mutate/generate rules, and Kyverno-vs-native ValidatingAdmissionPolicy decision.",
+    "path": "agents/kyverno/kyverno-policy-review-agent",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -1937,25 +2891,17 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for azure-subscription-resource-organization. Design and review Azure management-group, subscription, and resource-group boundaries with explicit governance, ownership, and landing-zone operating-model consequences.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-areas",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/resource-org",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/resource-org-management-groups",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/ready/landing-zone/design-area/governance",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/subscription",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/resource-group",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/policy-reports/",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/policy-exceptions/",
+      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/validating-admission-policy/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Do not recommend flat hierarchies, fake isolation via resource groups, or subscription moves without proving governance, ownership, policy inheritance, and operational blast-radius implications. Prefer read-only discovery first and explicit approval before mutations or secret-bearing operations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-28",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-subscription-resource-organization-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "security_notes": "failureAction: Audit in production is a critical finding — violations are logged but workloads are not blocked. PolicyException without expiry is an infinite escape hatch.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
     "id": "oci-autonomous-database-architect-agent",
@@ -1982,6 +2928,32 @@
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
+  {
+    "id": "oci-certificates-issuer-review-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Certificates Issuer Review",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "oci",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "copilot",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review OCI Certificates Service issuer configurations for cert-manager on OKE, covering CA hierarchy safety, issuance rule enforcement, OKE Workload Identity vs Instance Principal authentication, IAM policy scope minimization, OCSP reachability, and certificate version lifecycle management.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/certificates/home.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/certificates/managing-certificate-authority.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ContEng/Tasks/contengusingworkloadidentity.htm",
+      "https://github.com/oracle/oci-native-ingress-controller"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Instance Principal auth for cert-manager on OKE means ANY pod on the node can call the OCI Certificates API using the instance metadata endpoint — not just cert-manager. Use OKE Workload Identity to scope cert-issuance permissions to the cert-manager ServiceAccount only. IAM policy with 'manage certificate-authorities' grants delete and update CA permissions, which is excessive for cert-manager.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-certificates-issuer-review-agent",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
   {
     "id": "oci-cloud-guard-responder-agent",
     "name": "OCI Cloud Guard Responder",
@@ -2308,133 +3280,8 @@
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Load Balancer Traffic Engineer",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "copilot",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer. Design, review, and troubleshoot OCI Load Balancer and Network Load Balancer traffic paths, listeners, backend sets, certificates, health checks, logging, and failover.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "oci-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Migration Cutover Architect",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "copilot",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-migration-cutover-architect. Plan OCI migrations and cutovers with Cloud Migrations, dependency discovery, waves, rollback, DNS, data sync, validation, and support readiness.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "oci-multi-cloud-architect-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Multi Cloud Architect",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "copilot",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-multi-cloud-architect. Design and review OCI multi-cloud architectures connecting Oracle Cloud Infrastructure with AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, on-premises, or SaaS through VPN, FastConnect, Direct Connect, ExpressRoute, Cloud Interconnect, identity federation, DNS, routing, security,",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-multi-cloud-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Mysql Heatwave Ai Specialist",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "copilot",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist. OCI Operate and review MySQL HeatWave, MySQL AI, vector/RAG workflows, connection configs, object storage ingestion, and SQL safety.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "oci-network-architect-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Network Architect",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "copilot",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-network-architect. Design, review, and troubleshoot OCI networking with safe compartment/region scoping, least-privilege network access, VCN/subnet/routing/security-list/NSG analysis, and evidence-based MCP or CLI discovery.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-network-architect-agent",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "oci-observability-incident-responder-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Observability Incident Responder",
+    "id": "oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live Autonomous DB Lifecycle Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2445,21 +3292,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-observability-incident-responder. Operate as a ruthless OCI observability and incident responder for Monitoring alarms, Logging, Events, Notifications, service health, metrics, runbooks, and IAM-scoped incident response.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard Autonomous Database scale, start, stop, clone, and terminate operations with protection-tag check, wallet backup, and connection-string audit before any lifecycle mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbscaling.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbstopstart.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbcloning.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbbackingup.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-observability-incident-responder-agent",
+    "security_notes": "ADB termination is permanent — the database and all backups are deleted. Always verify protection tags before any terminate operation. ADB storage scale-up cannot be reversed. Termination blocked by defined-tag protection requires explicit tag removal approval.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-recovery-service-operator-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Recovery Service Operator",
+    "id": "oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live Cost Budget Runaway Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2470,21 +3319,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-recovery-service-operator. Operate OCI Recovery Service protected databases, protection policies, recovery service subnets, backup health, redo status, and recovery metrics.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Gate OCI budget rule mutations, cost-tracking tag changes, and GPU or HPC shape provisioning against compartment spend limits before any cost-impacting mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Billing/Tasks/managingbudgets.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Compute/Tasks/managinginstances.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Tagging/Tasks/managingtagsandtagnamespaces.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/General/Concepts/resourcequotas.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-recovery-service-operator-agent",
+    "security_notes": "GPU/HPC shapes (BM.GPU4.8, A100, BM.HPC2.36) can generate six-figure monthly costs when left running. Never approve quota increases or budget threshold raises without explicit financial-authority approval. Emergency stop requires Compute operator rights — escalate if not held.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Registry Artifact Governor",
+    "id": "oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live IAM Policy Compartment Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2495,21 +3346,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-registry-artifact-governor. Govern OCI Registry repositories, container images, artifact access, retention, promotion, and deployment safety.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard OCI IAM policy changes and dynamic group mutations using verb-hierarchy audit and tag-condition review before write.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policygetstarted.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/managingdynamicgroups.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policysyntax.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Reference/iampolicyreference.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Any-user and any-group policies in tenancy root are the most common OCI security misconfiguration. Never approve manage-verb policies at tenancy scope without compartment scoping. Policy deletes take effect immediately with no grace period.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Resource Search Inventory Analyst",
+    "id": "oci-live-network-security-rule-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live Network Security Rule Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2520,21 +3373,24 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst. Build OCI resource inventories and dependency maps using Resource Search, compartments, tags, and cross-service discovery.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard live OCI Security List and NSG rule changes with current-state capture, open-internet and sensitive-port detection, stateful/stateless assessment, and explicit approval before ingress or egress mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Network/Concepts/securitylists.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Network/Concepts/networksecuritygroups.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Network/Concepts/manage-nsg-security-rules.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Network/Concepts/update-securitylist.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Network/Concepts/path_analyzer.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst-agent",
+    "security_notes": "oci network security-list update is a full replace — always capture current rules before writing. Never approve 0.0.0.0/0 ingress on database subnets. Enable VCN Flow Logs before any rule change.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-network-security-rule-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Security Compliance Reviewer",
+    "id": "oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live OKE Rollout Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2545,21 +3401,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-security-compliance-reviewer. Review Oracle Cloud Infrastructure security, IAM, network, logging, encryption, and compliance posture.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard OKE deployment rollouts through DevOps Service pipeline approval stages with blue-green and canary evidence, and kubectl rollout pause or undo gate.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/deploy_oke.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/bgoke_deploy.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/canaryoke_deploy.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ContEng/Concepts/contengoverview.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
+    "security_notes": "Never advance an OKE rollout past an approval stage without rollout status and PDB health evidence. kubectl rollout undo is irreversible in the sense that the prior version may not be identical to the deployed artifact — confirm target revision before undo.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-solution-architect-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Solution Architect",
+    "id": "oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live Resource Manager Stack Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2570,21 +3428,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-solution-architect. Design, review, and stress-test Oracle Cloud Infrastructure solution architectures across identity, compartments, networking, compute, database, storage, observability, security, reliability, cost, and operations.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard OCI Resource Manager plan, apply, and destroy jobs with drift detection evidence, state-version audit, and stack-lock awareness before any mutation.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Concepts/resourcemanager.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Tasks/detect-drift.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Tasks/create-job-lock-file.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/home.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-solution-architect-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI Resource Manager auto-locks a stack state during job execution. Never approve an apply or destroy job without a plan-job output review and drift detection evidence. Repo write access does not authorize live OCI infrastructure mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-storage-backup-steward-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Storage Backup Steward",
+    "id": "oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Live Vault Key Destruction Guard",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2595,21 +3455,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-storage-backup-steward. Operate as a ruthless OCI storage and backup steward for Object Storage, Block Volume, File Storage, backup policies, retention, replication, lifecycle rules, restore readiness, and IAM-scoped storage operations.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Guard OCI Vault master encryption key scheduled-deletion and HSM key rotation, refusing deletion without reviewing data associations and confirming the destruction window.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/deletingkeys.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/rotatingkeys.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Concepts/keyoverview.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/managingkeys.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-storage-backup-steward-agent",
+    "security_notes": "After the scheduled deletion window expires, HSM-backed keys are cryptographically wiped. All data encrypted exclusively by that key version is permanently unrecoverable. Recovery SLA from OCI Support: NONE. Always use a 30-day window and audit data associations before scheduling.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.2.0"
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Support Incident Coordinator",
+    "id": "oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Load Balancer Traffic Engineer",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2620,7 +3482,7 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Agent for oci-support-incident-coordinator. Coordinate OCI support incidents with evidence quality, severity discipline, resource scope, timelines, and escalation readiness.",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer. Design, review, and troubleshoot OCI Load Balancer and Network Load Balancer traffic paths, listeners, backend sets, certificates, health checks, logging, and failover.",
     "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
       "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
@@ -2628,40 +3490,15 @@
     ],
     "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-load-balancer-traffic-engineer-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "terraform-reviewer",
-    "name": "Terraform Reviewer",
-    "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "terraform",
-    "harnesses": [
-      "codex",
-      "claude-code",
-      "cursor",
-      "gemini",
-      "kiro",
-      "other"
-    ],
-    "summary": "Review Terraform modules, plans, state assumptions, and provider usage for safety, drift, and least privilege.",
-    "source_type": "original",
-    "official_docs": [
-      "https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/docs",
-      "https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cli/commands/plan"
-    ],
-    "security_notes": "Default to review and plan mode. Do not apply Terraform changes unless the user explicitly requests apply and the workspace is confirmed.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
-    "path": "agents/terraform/terraform-reviewer",
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
-  },
-  {
-    "id": "azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live ARM Deployment Stack Guard",
+    "id": "oci-maestro-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Maestro",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2670,25 +3507,35 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard ARM template and Deployment Stack changes with what-if evidence, denySettings review, and explicit approval before execute.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Per-cloud router agent for OCI. Classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest OCI specialist agent or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches them — single specialist for focused tasks, parallel team (max 4) for multi-domain tasks. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/deploy-what-if",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/bicep/deployment-stacks",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/deny-assignments",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/templates/best-practices"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policygetstarted.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Concepts/keyoverview.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Security/Concepts/security_guide.htm",
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/GSG/Concepts/baremetalintro.htm"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Never execute an ARM or Deployment Stack change without what-if evidence, confirmed target scope, denySettings review, and explicit human approval. Repo write access does not authorize live Azure mutations.",
+    "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable. The 6 live-guard agents (oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent, oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent, oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent, oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent, oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent, oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent) must never be auto-dispatched. OCI IAM policy deletion at the tenancy root has tenancy-wide blast radius and cannot be undone by the agent. Vault key destruction is irreversible — all data encrypted with the destroyed key becomes permanently unrecoverable. Both require explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and a documented rollback path before dispatch.",
     "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent",
+    "harness_variants": {
+      "codex": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
+      "copilot": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
+      "claude-code": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
+      "cursor": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
+      "gemini": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
+      "kiro-ide": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
+      "kiro-cli": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
+    },
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live PIM JIT Activation Guard",
+    "id": "oci-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Migration Cutover Architect",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2697,25 +3544,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Gate PIM eligible role activations with justification, ticket binding, MFA verification, and time-bound scope before approval submission.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-migration-cutover-architect. Plan OCI migrations and cutovers with Cloud Migrations, dependency discovery, waves, rollback, DNS, data sync, validation, and support readiness.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-deployment-plan",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-resource-roles-configure-role-settings",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-activate-role",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure-azure-ad-roles"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Never activate a PIM role without justification, ticket reference, and MFA confirmation. An agent cannot activate another user's PIM role on their behalf \u2014 only the eligible principal may submit. Requires Entra ID P2 or equivalent license.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-migration-cutover-architect-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live AKS Rollout Guard",
+    "id": "oci-multi-cloud-architect-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Multi Cloud Architect",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2724,25 +3569,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard AKS deployment rollouts with PDB audit, maxUnavailable and surge check, and explicit pause-before-proceed or undo gate before advancing.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-multi-cloud-architect. Design and review OCI multi-cloud architectures connecting Oracle Cloud Infrastructure with AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, on-premises, or SaaS through VPN, FastConnect, Direct Connect, ExpressRoute, Cloud Interconnect, identity federation, DNS, routing, security,",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/operator-best-practices-cluster-security",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/concepts-clusters-workloads",
-      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/deployment/#rolling-update-deployment",
-      "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/run-application/configure-pdb/"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Never advance an AKS rollout without PDB audit and replica health check. kubectl rollout undo is safe but must be confirmed before execution to avoid double-rollback churn.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-multi-cloud-architect-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live App Service Slot Swap Guard",
+    "id": "oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Mysql Heatwave Ai Specialist",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2751,24 +3594,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard App Service slot swaps by auditing sticky settings, warmup probe readiness, and swap-with-preview evidence before final swap commit.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist. OCI Operate and review MySQL HeatWave, MySQL AI, vector/RAG workflows, connection configs, object storage ingestion, and SQL safety.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-staging-slots",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/deploy-best-practices",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/configure-common"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Never perform a production slot swap without sticky-settings diff audit and warmup health confirmation. A bad swap with no rollback plan can take a production app offline instantly.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-mysql-heatwave-ai-specialist-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live Key Vault Rotation Purge Guard",
+    "id": "oci-network-architect-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Network Architect",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2777,25 +3619,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard Key Vault key and secret rotation, soft-delete enforcement, and purge-protection changes, with explicit irreversibility warning before any purge-protection enable.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-network-architect. Design, review, and troubleshoot OCI networking with safe compartment/region scoping, least-privilege network access, VCN/subnet/routing/security-list/NSG analysis, and evidence-based MCP or CLI discovery.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/about-keys-details",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/keys/how-to-configure-key-rotation",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/best-practices"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Purge-protection enable is irreversible. Soft-deleted keys can be recovered within the retention window. HSM-backed hard-purged keys cannot be recovered. Never grant purge rights to routine rotation operators.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-network-architect-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Live Cost Budget Action Guard",
+    "id": "oci-observability-incident-responder-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Observability Incident Responder",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2804,23 +3644,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Gate subscription and management-group budget action changes and GPU or HPC SKU scale-up against approved spend thresholds before any cost-impacting mutation.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-observability-incident-responder. Operate as a ruthless OCI observability and incident responder for Monitoring alarms, Logging, Events, Notifications, service health, metrics, runbooks, and IAM-scoped incident response.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/costs/tutorial-acm-create-budgets",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/azure-subscription-service-limits",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/quotas/quickstart-increase-quota-portal",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cost-management-billing/finops/overview-finops"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "GPU/HPC SKUs (NDv5, H100, A100) can generate $50K+ daily costs. Never approve quota increases or budget threshold raises without explicit spend-approval sign-off from a financial authority.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-observability-incident-responder-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live Resource Manager Stack Guard",
+    "id": "oci-recovery-service-operator-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Recovery Service Operator",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2831,23 +3669,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard OCI Resource Manager plan, apply, and destroy jobs with drift detection evidence, state-version audit, and stack-lock awareness before any mutation.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-recovery-service-operator. Operate OCI Recovery Service protected databases, protection policies, recovery service subnets, backup health, redo status, and recovery metrics.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Concepts/resourcemanager.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Tasks/detect-drift.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/Tasks/create-job-lock-file.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ResourceManager/home.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "OCI Resource Manager auto-locks a stack state during job execution. Never approve an apply or destroy job without a plan-job output review and drift detection evidence. Repo write access does not authorize live OCI infrastructure mutations.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-recovery-service-operator-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live IAM Policy Compartment Guard",
+    "id": "oci-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Registry Artifact Governor",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2858,23 +3694,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard OCI IAM policy changes and dynamic group mutations using verb-hierarchy audit and tag-condition review before write.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-registry-artifact-governor. Govern OCI Registry repositories, container images, artifact access, retention, promotion, and deployment safety.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policygetstarted.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Tasks/managingdynamicgroups.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policysyntax.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Reference/iampolicyreference.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Any-user and any-group policies in tenancy root are the most common OCI security misconfiguration. Never approve manage-verb policies at tenancy scope without compartment scoping. Policy deletes take effect immediately with no grace period.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-registry-artifact-governor-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live OKE Rollout Guard",
+    "id": "oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Resource Search Inventory Analyst",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2885,23 +3719,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard OKE deployment rollouts through DevOps Service pipeline approval stages with blue-green and canary evidence, and kubectl rollout pause or undo gate.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst. Build OCI resource inventories and dependency maps using Resource Search, compartments, tags, and cross-service discovery.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/deploy_oke.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/bgoke_deploy.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/devops/using/canaryoke_deploy.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/ContEng/Concepts/contengoverview.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Never advance an OKE rollout past an approval stage without rollout status and PDB health evidence. kubectl rollout undo is irreversible in the sense that the prior version may not be identical to the deployed artifact \u2014 confirm target revision before undo.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-resource-search-inventory-analyst-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live Autonomous DB Lifecycle Guard",
+    "id": "oci-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Security Compliance Reviewer",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2912,23 +3744,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard Autonomous Database scale, start, stop, clone, and terminate operations with protection-tag check, wallet backup, and connection-string audit before any lifecycle mutation.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-security-compliance-reviewer. Review Oracle Cloud Infrastructure security, IAM, network, logging, encryption, and compliance posture.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbscaling.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbstopstart.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbcloning.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Database/Tasks/adbbackingup.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "ADB termination is permanent \u2014 the database and all backups are deleted. Always verify protection tags before any terminate operation. ADB storage scale-up cannot be reversed. Termination blocked by defined-tag protection requires explicit tag removal approval.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-security-compliance-reviewer-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live Vault Key Destruction Guard",
+    "id": "oci-solution-architect-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Solution Architect",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2939,23 +3769,21 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Guard OCI Vault master encryption key scheduled-deletion and HSM key rotation, refusing deletion without reviewing data associations and confirming the destruction window.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-solution-architect. Design, review, and stress-test Oracle Cloud Infrastructure solution architectures across identity, compartments, networking, compute, database, storage, observability, security, reliability, cost, and operations.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/deletingkeys.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/rotatingkeys.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Concepts/keyoverview.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Tasks/managingkeys.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "After the scheduled deletion window expires, HSM-backed keys are cryptographically wiped. All data encrypted exclusively by that key version is permanently unrecoverable. Recovery SLA from OCI Support: NONE. Always use a 30-day window and audit data associations before scheduling.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-solution-architect-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Live Cost Budget Runaway Guard",
+    "id": "oci-storage-backup-steward-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Storage Backup Steward",
     "type": "agent",
     "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
@@ -2966,25 +3794,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Gate OCI budget rule mutations, cost-tracking tag changes, and GPU or HPC shape provisioning against compartment spend limits before any cost-impacting mutation.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-storage-backup-steward. Operate as a ruthless OCI storage and backup steward for Object Storage, Block Volume, File Storage, backup policies, retention, replication, lifecycle rules, restore readiness, and IAM-scoped storage operations.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Billing/Tasks/managingbudgets.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Compute/Tasks/managinginstances.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Tagging/Tasks/managingtagsandtagnamespaces.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/General/Concepts/resourcequotas.htm"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "GPU/HPC shapes (BM.GPU4.8, A100, BM.HPC2.36) can generate six-figure monthly costs when left running. Never approve quota increases or budget threshold raises without explicit financial-authority approval. Emergency stop requires Compute operator rights \u2014 escalate if not held.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-storage-backup-steward-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "finops-cloud-price-advisor-agent",
-    "name": "FinOps Cloud Price Advisor",
+    "id": "oci-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
+    "name": "OCI Support Incident Coordinator",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "multi-cloud",
+    "provider": "oci",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -2993,27 +3819,25 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Fetch live public prices from AWS, Azure, and OCI pricing APIs and produce cost estimates for live environments or planned prototypes. Currency defaults to USD; other currencies on request. No cloud credentials required.",
-    "source_type": "original",
+    "summary": "Agent for oci-support-incident-coordinator. Coordinate OCI support incidents with evidence quality, severity discipline, resource scope, timelines, and escalation readiness.",
+    "source_type": "adapted",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awsaccountbilling/latest/aboutv2/price-changes.html",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/cost-management/retail-prices/azure-retail-prices",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Billing/Concepts/costanalysisoverview.htm",
-      "https://aws.amazon.com/pricing/",
-      "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/calculator/",
-      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/price-list.html"
+      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
+      "https://www.oracle.com/cloud/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "All three pricing APIs are public and unauthenticated. Never request or accept cloud credentials, billing account IDs, cost export access, or tenant-specific data. Inventory enumeration for live-environment mode requires only read-only cloud permissions.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/finops/finops-cloud-price-advisor-agent",
+    "security_notes": "OCI agents can inspect or guide changes to cloud resources. Use least-privilege access, read-only discovery first, and explicit approval for mutations.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/oci/oci-support-incident-coordinator-agent",
     "author": "github: Raishin",
-    "version": "0.1.0"
+    "version": "0.2.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "aws-maestro-agent",
-    "name": "AWS Maestro",
+    "id": "opentelemetry-collector-config-review-agent",
+    "name": "OpenTelemetry Collector Config Review",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "aws",
+    "provider": "opentelemetry",
+    "summary": "Review OpenTelemetry Collector pipeline configuration — receiver/processor/exporter ordering, memory_limiter placement, batch processor tuning, exporter backend validation, Operator CRDs, and pipeline health metrics.",
+    "path": "agents/opentelemetry/opentelemetry-collector-config-review-agent",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -3022,35 +3846,23 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Per-cloud router that classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest AWS specialist or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches in parallel when the task spans multiple domains. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-01",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/",
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/framework/welcome.html",
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents.html",
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agentcore.html",
-      "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/what-is-bedrock.html"
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/",
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/configuration/",
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/deployment/",
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/kubernetes/operator/",
+      "https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/internal-telemetry/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable: aws-live-deployment-guarded-operator-agent, aws-live-ecs-rollout-guard-agent, aws-live-iac-change-guard-agent, aws-live-pipeline-approval-operator-agent, and aws-live-serverless-release-guard-agent must never be auto-dispatched. Always surface blast-radius assessment and rollback path and require explicit written human confirmation before routing to any live-guard agent.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent",
-    "harness_variants": {
-      "codex": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
-      "copilot": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
-      "claude-code": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
-      "cursor": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
-      "gemini": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
-      "kiro-ide": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
-      "kiro-cli": "agents/aws/aws-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
-    },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "security_notes": "Pipeline with a receiver and processor but no exporter silently drops all telemetry. memory_limiter must be the first processor — placing it after batch processor means the collector OOMs under burst load.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "azure-maestro-agent",
-    "name": "Azure Maestro",
+    "id": "prometheus-alerting-cardinality-review-agent",
+    "name": "Prometheus Alerting and Cardinality Review Agent",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "azure",
+    "provider": "prometheus",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -3059,36 +3871,26 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Per-cloud router agent for Azure. Classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest Azure specialist or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches in parallel when the task spans multiple domains. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Review Prometheus and AlertManager configuration for cardinality risks, alert correctness, scrape security, routing safety, and retention adequacy.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-adoption-framework/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/well-architected/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/overview",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/tools/",
-      "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/azure-mcp-server/concepts"
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/prometheus/latest/querying/basics/",
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/practices/naming/",
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/practices/alerting/",
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/alerting/latest/alertmanager/",
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/prometheus/latest/storage/",
+      "https://prometheus.io/docs/practices/remote_write/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Live-guard agents (azure-live-aks-rollout-guard-agent, azure-live-app-service-slot-swap-guard-agent, azure-live-arm-deployment-stack-guard-agent, azure-live-cost-budget-action-guard-agent, azure-live-keyvault-rotation-purge-guard-agent, azure-live-pim-jit-activation-guard-agent) must NEVER be auto-dispatched. All six require explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and a confirmed rollback path before dispatch. Do not ask for secrets, credentials, tenant IDs, subscription IDs, or any customer-specific identifiers.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent",
-    "harness_variants": {
-      "codex": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
-      "copilot": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
-      "claude-code": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
-      "cursor": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
-      "gemini": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
-      "kiro-ide": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
-      "kiro-cli": "agents/azure/azure-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
-    },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "security_notes": "honor_labels: true on untrusted scrape targets allows the scraped workload to override job/instance labels, enabling metric spoofing. Scrape configs pointing to external HTTP endpoints are SSRF candidates.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/prometheus/prometheus-alerting-cardinality-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
-    "id": "oci-maestro-agent",
-    "name": "OCI Maestro",
+    "id": "sigstore-cosign-supply-chain-review-agent",
+    "name": "Sigstore Cosign Supply Chain Review",
     "type": "agent",
-    "provider": "oci",
+    "provider": "sigstore",
     "harnesses": [
       "codex",
       "copilot",
@@ -3097,28 +3899,19 @@
       "gemini",
       "kiro"
     ],
-    "summary": "Per-cloud router agent for OCI. Classifies the user's task, selects the narrowest OCI specialist agent or the right team of specialists from the catalog, and dispatches them \u2014 single specialist for focused tasks, parallel team (max 4) for multi-domain tasks. Never auto-dispatches live-guard agents.",
-    "source_type": "adapted",
+    "summary": "Review Cosign image signing, Kyverno imageVerify policy identity constraints, SBOM and SLSA provenance attestations, Rekor transparency log posture, and keyless vs key-based signing configuration for Kubernetes workload supply chain integrity.",
+    "source_type": "original",
     "official_docs": [
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/home.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/Concepts/policygetstarted.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/KeyManagement/Concepts/keyoverview.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Security/Concepts/security_guide.htm",
-      "https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/GSG/Concepts/baremetalintro.htm"
+      "https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/",
+      "https://docs.sigstore.dev/policy-controller/overview/",
+      "https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/requirements",
+      "https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/verify-images/",
+      "https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/using-artifact-attestations",
+      "https://rekor.sigstore.dev/"
     ],
-    "security_notes": "Live-guard gate is non-negotiable. The 6 live-guard agents (oci-live-autonomous-db-lifecycle-guard-agent, oci-live-cost-budget-runaway-guard-agent, oci-live-iam-policy-compartment-guard-agent, oci-live-oke-rollout-guard-agent, oci-live-resource-manager-stack-guard-agent, oci-live-vault-key-destruction-guard-agent) must never be auto-dispatched. OCI IAM policy deletion at the tenancy root has tenancy-wide blast radius and cannot be undone by the agent. Vault key destruction is irreversible \u2014 all data encrypted with the destroyed key becomes permanently unrecoverable. Both require explicit human confirmation, blast-radius assessment, and a documented rollback path before dispatch.",
-    "last_verified": "2026-04-30",
-    "path": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent",
-    "harness_variants": {
-      "codex": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/codex.toml",
-      "copilot": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/copilot.agent.md",
-      "claude-code": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/claude-code.agent.md",
-      "cursor": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/cursor.agent.md",
-      "gemini": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/gemini.agent.md",
-      "kiro-ide": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-ide.agent.md",
-      "kiro-cli": "agents/oci/oci-maestro-agent/harnesses/kiro-cli.agent.json"
-    },
-    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "security_notes": "Kyverno imageVerify policy without subject/issuer constraints accepts any Sigstore-signed image regardless of signer identity. Long-lived Cosign keys in CI secrets allow retroactive signing of malicious images if the secret is compromised.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-05-02",
+    "path": "agents/sigstore/sigstore-cosign-supply-chain-review-agent",
     "version": "0.1.0"
   },
   {
@@ -3158,5 +3951,30 @@
     },
     "author": "github: Raishin",
     "version": "0.1.0"
+  },
+  {
+    "id": "terraform-reviewer",
+    "name": "Terraform Reviewer",
+    "type": "agent",
+    "provider": "terraform",
+    "harnesses": [
+      "codex",
+      "claude-code",
+      "cursor",
+      "gemini",
+      "kiro",
+      "other"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Review Terraform modules, plans, state assumptions, and provider usage for safety, drift, and least privilege.",
+    "source_type": "original",
+    "official_docs": [
+      "https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/docs",
+      "https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/cli/commands/plan"
+    ],
+    "security_notes": "Default to review and plan mode. Do not apply Terraform changes unless the user explicitly requests apply and the workspace is confirmed.",
+    "last_verified": "2026-04-27",
+    "path": "agents/terraform/terraform-reviewer",
+    "author": "github: Raishin",
+    "version": "0.1.0"
   }
 ]