@raidiant/notifai 8.0.0 → 9.0.0

package/dist/session-activation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * Model-visible session bootstrap. It names the installed capability and its
+ * authoritative sources without restating any notification policy that the
+ * user may have overridden.
+ */
+export const SESSION_ACTIVATION_CONTEXT = 'Notifai is active for this session, even when the user did not mention it. ' +
+    'Before beginning task work, use the Notifai skill and run `notifai guidance`; its resolved guidance governs notification decisions for Agent Events. ' +
+    'Missing skill or CLI readiness is handled through `notifai init` and its diagnosis. ' +
+    'For delegated work, the parent owns User-visible Notification Requests unless it explicitly delegates that ownership; workers report Agent Events to the parent and do not send independently.';
+/** One lifecycle meaning, encoded for each harness output contract. */
+export function sessionActivationOutput(harness, hookEventName) {
+    if (harness === 'cursor') {
+        return JSON.stringify({ additional_context: SESSION_ACTIVATION_CONTEXT });
+    }
+    if (harness === 'claude-code' || harness === 'codex') {
+        return JSON.stringify({
+            hookSpecificOutput: {
+                hookEventName,
+                additionalContext: SESSION_ACTIVATION_CONTEXT,
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Cursor currently accepts sessionStart context without reliably delivering it
+ * to the model. Its native post-Stop follow-up is the narrow fallback and is
+ * claimed once per conversation by the hook-state layer.
+ */
+export function cursorStopActivationOutput() {
+    return JSON.stringify({
+        followup_message: SESSION_ACTIVATION_CONTEXT.replace('Before beginning task work,', 'Before finalizing the Agent Event from the turn that just ended,'),
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-activation.js.map

package/dist/session-activation.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/url-policy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * The URL trust policy: which network destinations this CLI will touch on
+ * input it did not author. `docs/TRUST.md` is the written policy; this module
+ * is its enforcement, and the two must change together.
+ *
+ * The threat is not a hostile user — it is hostile *input* reaching a
+ * trusted user's CLI: a cloned repository, a compromised server response, or
+ * an agent following text it found in a working tree. Every rule here is
+ * therefore fail-closed, and every escape hatch resolves only from
+ * configuration layers the User owns — never from a repository.
+ */
+/** The one dashboard origin the shipped service uses for pairing approval. */
+export declare const CANONICAL_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN = "https://app.notifai.sh";
+/** Redirect hops a remote image fetch may follow, each re-validated. */
+export declare const MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT = 3;
+/** One address attempt must not hold an agent command indefinitely. */
+export declare const MEDIA_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+export type UrlRefusal = {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Normalize one configured origin entry to `scheme://host[:port]`, or null
+ * when the entry is not a bare http(s) origin. Paths, queries, fragments, and
+ * userinfo are rejected rather than stripped: a config entry that carries
+ * them says the author expected them to matter, and silently ignoring parts
+ * of a trust rule is how allowlists rot.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeOrigin(entry: string): string | null;
+/** Whether one IP literal is publicly routable. */
+export declare function isPublicAddress(address: string): boolean;
+export declare function isLoopbackHostname(hostname: string): boolean;
+export interface MediaUrlPolicy {
+    /**
+     * Extra origins remote media may use beyond public HTTPS — the self-host
+     * and intranet escape hatch. Entries are normalized origins from
+     * User-owned configuration (`media_origins`); a repository cannot supply
+     * them.
+     */
+    allowOrigins: readonly string[];
+    /** Test seam; production resolves with the system resolver. */
+    lookup?: (hostname: string) => Promise<string[]>;
+}
+type MediaUrlApproval = {
+    ok: true;
+    addresses: readonly string[];
+};
+/**
+ * Whether one URL is a destination remote media may be fetched from.
+ *
+ * Default policy: `https` to a host every resolved address of which is
+ * publicly routable. A User-allowed origin skips the scheme and address
+ * checks — the User said that exact origin is theirs to trust — but nothing
+ * skips the userinfo refusal, and every redirect hop is checked again.
+ *
+ * The approved addresses come back with the verdict rather than being
+ * rediscovered later: `fetchMediaUrl` connects to one of exactly these, so a
+ * resolver that would answer differently on a second lookup cannot rebind the
+ * request onto a private address between the check and the connection.
+ */
+export declare function checkMediaUrl(target: URL, policy: MediaUrlPolicy): Promise<MediaUrlApproval | UrlRefusal>;
+/**
+ * Fetch a remote image under the media URL policy, following at most
+ * `MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT` redirects and re-validating every hop — a public
+ * HTTPS URL redirecting into an intranet is the exact attack the per-hop
+ * check exists for.
+ */
+export declare function fetchMediaUrl(source: string, policy: MediaUrlPolicy, fetchImpl?: typeof fetch): Promise<{
+    ok: true;
+    response: Response;
+} | UrlRefusal>;
+/**
+ * Whether a server-supplied pairing approval URL may be shown and opened.
+ *
+ * The server chooses `approve_url`, so a compromised or misconfigured one
+ * must not be able to drive this machine's browser to an arbitrary
+ * destination. Allowed: the canonical dashboard, the exact origin the user
+ * pointed this pairing at, loopback for local development, and origins the
+ * User allowed (`approve_origins`) for a self-host whose dashboard lives on
+ * a different origin than its API.
+ */
+export declare function checkApproveUrl(raw: string, baseUrl: string, allowOrigins: readonly string[]): {
+    ok: true;
+} | UrlRefusal;
+export {};

package/dist/url-policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+import { lookup as dnsLookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
+import { request as httpRequest } from 'node:http';
+import { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';
+import { BlockList, isIP } from 'node:net';
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
+/**
+ * The URL trust policy: which network destinations this CLI will touch on
+ * input it did not author. `docs/TRUST.md` is the written policy; this module
+ * is its enforcement, and the two must change together.
+ *
+ * The threat is not a hostile user — it is hostile *input* reaching a
+ * trusted user's CLI: a cloned repository, a compromised server response, or
+ * an agent following text it found in a working tree. Every rule here is
+ * therefore fail-closed, and every escape hatch resolves only from
+ * configuration layers the User owns — never from a repository.
+ */
+/** The one dashboard origin the shipped service uses for pairing approval. */
+export const CANONICAL_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN = 'https://app.notifai.sh';
+/** Redirect hops a remote image fetch may follow, each re-validated. */
+export const MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT = 3;
+/** One address attempt must not hold an agent command indefinitely. */
+export const MEDIA_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+/**
+ * Normalize one configured origin entry to `scheme://host[:port]`, or null
+ * when the entry is not a bare http(s) origin. Paths, queries, fragments, and
+ * userinfo are rejected rather than stripped: a config entry that carries
+ * them says the author expected them to matter, and silently ignoring parts
+ * of a trust rule is how allowlists rot.
+ */
+export function normalizeOrigin(entry) {
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(entry);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && url.protocol !== 'http:')
+        return null;
+    if (url.username !== '' || url.password !== '')
+        return null;
+    if (url.pathname !== '/' || url.search !== '' || url.hash !== '')
+        return null;
+    // `https://*.example` parses, and would then match exactly one impossible
+    // host while reading like a wildcard. Refusing it is how someone finds out
+    // that origins are exact before they trust one that never matches.
+    if (!/^(?:[a-z0-9-]+(?:\.[a-z0-9-]+)*|\[[0-9a-f:.]+\])$/i.test(url.hostname))
+        return null;
+    return url.origin;
+}
+/**
+ * Addresses that are not publicly routable: loopback, RFC 1918, link-local
+ * (including cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254), CGNAT, benchmark,
+ * documentation, multicast, and reserved space; for IPv6 also unspecified,
+ * unique-local, site-local, and discard prefixes. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
+ * are classified as the IPv4 address they carry.
+ */
+const NON_PUBLIC = new BlockList();
+const PUBLIC_IPV6 = new BlockList();
+PUBLIC_IPV6.addSubnet('2000::', 3, 'ipv6');
+for (const [subnet, prefix] of [
+    ['0.0.0.0', 8],
+    ['10.0.0.0', 8],
+    ['100.64.0.0', 10],
+    ['127.0.0.0', 8],
+    ['169.254.0.0', 16],
+    ['172.16.0.0', 12],
+    ['192.0.0.0', 24],
+    ['192.0.2.0', 24],
+    ['192.88.99.0', 24],
+    ['192.168.0.0', 16],
+    ['198.18.0.0', 15],
+    ['198.51.100.0', 24],
+    ['203.0.113.0', 24],
+    ['224.0.0.0', 4],
+    ['240.0.0.0', 4],
+]) {
+    NON_PUBLIC.addSubnet(subnet, prefix, 'ipv4');
+}
+for (const [subnet, prefix] of [
+    ['::', 128],
+    ['::1', 128],
+    ['64:ff9b::', 96], // NAT64 — fail closed rather than trust the embedded address
+    ['64:ff9b:1::', 48],
+    ['100::', 64],
+    ['2001::', 32], // Teredo embeds an IPv4 destination
+    ['2001:2::', 48],
+    ['2001:10::', 28],
+    ['2001:20::', 28],
+    ['2001:db8::', 32],
+    ['2002::', 16], // 6to4 embeds an IPv4 address; fail closed
+    ['3fff::', 20],
+    ['fc00::', 7],
+    ['fe80::', 10],
+    ['fec0::', 10],
+    ['ff00::', 8],
+    // Deliberately no `::ffff:0:0/96` rule: Node checks an IPv4 address against
+    // IPv6 rules through its own IPv4-mapped form, so that entry would classify
+    // every address on the internet as private. `mappedIpv4` handles the mapped
+    // spellings instead.
+]) {
+    NON_PUBLIC.addSubnet(subnet, prefix, 'ipv6');
+}
+/**
+ * The IPv4 address an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address carries, in either spelling:
+ * `::ffff:127.0.0.1` and `::ffff:7f00:1` are the same address, and only the
+ * first would survive being classified as IPv6.
+ */
+function mappedIpv4(address) {
+    const lower = address.toLowerCase();
+    if (!lower.startsWith('::ffff:'))
+        return null;
+    const rest = lower.slice('::ffff:'.length);
+    if (isIP(rest) === 4)
+        return rest;
+    const hex = /^([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/.exec(rest);
+    if (hex === null)
+        return null;
+    const high = Number.parseInt(hex[1], 16);
+    const low = Number.parseInt(hex[2], 16);
+    return `${high >> 8}.${high & 0xff}.${low >> 8}.${low & 0xff}`;
+}
+/** Whether one IP literal is publicly routable. */
+export function isPublicAddress(address) {
+    const candidate = mappedIpv4(address) ?? address;
+    const family = isIP(candidate);
+    if (family === 0)
+        return false;
+    // Fail closed outside the currently allocated global-unicast block. This
+    // catches reserved IPv6 space without depending on an inevitably stale
+    // enumeration; explicit exclusions below then carve special-use prefixes
+    // out of global unicast itself.
+    if (family === 6 && !PUBLIC_IPV6.check(candidate, 'ipv6'))
+        return false;
+    return !NON_PUBLIC.check(candidate, family === 6 ? 'ipv6' : 'ipv4');
+}
+/** A URL hostname as an address-or-name: IPv6 hosts arrive bracketed. */
+function hostnameAddress(hostname) {
+    return hostname.startsWith('[') && hostname.endsWith(']')
+        ? hostname.slice(1, -1)
+        : hostname;
+}
+export function isLoopbackHostname(hostname) {
+    const host = hostnameAddress(hostname).toLowerCase();
+    if (host === 'localhost' || host.endsWith('.localhost'))
+        return true;
+    const family = isIP(host);
+    if (family === 4)
+        return host.startsWith('127.');
+    if (family === 6)
+        return host === '::1' || /^::ffff:127\./.test(host);
+    return false;
+}
+async function resolveAddresses(hostname, policy) {
+    if (policy.lookup !== undefined) {
+        try {
+            return await policy.lookup(hostname);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    try {
+        const results = await dnsLookup(hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });
+        return results.map((entry) => entry.address);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Whether one URL is a destination remote media may be fetched from.
+ *
+ * Default policy: `https` to a host every resolved address of which is
+ * publicly routable. A User-allowed origin skips the scheme and address
+ * checks — the User said that exact origin is theirs to trust — but nothing
+ * skips the userinfo refusal, and every redirect hop is checked again.
+ *
+ * The approved addresses come back with the verdict rather than being
+ * rediscovered later: `fetchMediaUrl` connects to one of exactly these, so a
+ * resolver that would answer differently on a second lookup cannot rebind the
+ * request onto a private address between the check and the connection.
+ */
+export async function checkMediaUrl(target, policy) {
+    if (target.username !== '' || target.password !== '') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'Image URLs with embedded credentials are never fetched.' };
+    }
+    if (target.protocol !== 'https:' && target.protocol !== 'http:') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `Only http(s) image URLs are supported, not ${target.protocol.replace(/:$/, '')}.` };
+    }
+    const userAllowed = policy.allowOrigins.includes(target.origin);
+    const escapeHatch = 'Remote images use public HTTPS; for a self-hosted or intranet image server, allow its exact origin with `notifai config set media_origins <origin>`.';
+    if (!userAllowed && target.protocol !== 'https:') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `${target.origin} is http. ${escapeHatch}` };
+    }
+    const literal = hostnameAddress(target.hostname);
+    if (isIP(literal) !== 0) {
+        return userAllowed || isPublicAddress(literal)
+            ? { ok: true, addresses: [literal] }
+            : { ok: false, reason: `${target.hostname} is not a public address. ${escapeHatch}` };
+    }
+    const addresses = await resolveAddresses(target.hostname, policy);
+    if (addresses === null || addresses.length === 0) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `Could not resolve ${target.hostname}.` };
+    }
+    if (addresses.some((address) => isIP(address) === 0)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `${target.hostname} resolved to an invalid address.` };
+    }
+    if (!userAllowed && !addresses.every((address) => isPublicAddress(address))) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `${target.hostname} resolves to a non-public address. ${escapeHatch}` };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, addresses };
+}
+const REDIRECT_STATUSES = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);
+function responseHeaders(response) {
+    const headers = new Headers();
+    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(response.headers)) {
+        if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+            for (const entry of value)
+                headers.append(name, entry);
+        }
+        else if (value !== undefined) {
+            headers.set(name, value);
+        }
+    }
+    return headers;
+}
+/**
+ * Fetch through one already-vetted address while retaining the URL hostname
+ * for Host and TLS verification. This closes the DNS-rebinding gap between
+ * policy resolution and the connection: the request cannot resolve the name
+ * a second time to a private address.
+ */
+async function fetchPinned(target, addresses) {
+    let lastError = new Error(`No address was available for ${target.hostname}.`);
+    for (const address of addresses) {
+        try {
+            return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+                const family = isIP(address);
+                const request = (target.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest)(target, {
+                    method: 'GET',
+                    headers: { 'accept-encoding': 'identity' },
+                    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(MEDIA_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+                    // Node asks for every address at once when it is racing address
+                    // families, and for a single one otherwise. Answering in the wrong
+                    // shape throws inside the connect path rather than failing the
+                    // request, so both forms are answered explicitly.
+                    lookup: (_hostname, options, callback) => {
+                        if (options.all === true) {
+                            callback(null, [{ address, family }]);
+                            return;
+                        }
+                        callback(null, address, family);
+                    },
+                }, (incoming) => {
+                    const status = incoming.statusCode ?? 500;
+                    const hasBody = ![101, 204, 205, 304].includes(status);
+                    const body = hasBody
+                        ? Readable.toWeb(incoming)
+                        : null;
+                    resolve(new Response(body, {
+                        status,
+                        ...(incoming.statusMessage === undefined
+                            ? {}
+                            : { statusText: incoming.statusMessage }),
+                        headers: responseHeaders(incoming),
+                    }));
+                });
+                request.once('error', reject);
+                request.end();
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            lastError = error;
+        }
+    }
+    throw lastError;
+}
+/**
+ * Fetch a remote image under the media URL policy, following at most
+ * `MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT` redirects and re-validating every hop — a public
+ * HTTPS URL redirecting into an intranet is the exact attack the per-hop
+ * check exists for.
+ */
+export async function fetchMediaUrl(source, policy, fetchImpl) {
+    let target;
+    try {
+        target = new URL(source);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `"${source}" is not a valid URL.` };
+    }
+    for (let hop = 0;; hop += 1) {
+        const allowed = await checkMediaUrl(target, policy);
+        if (!allowed.ok)
+            return allowed;
+        const response = fetchImpl === undefined
+            ? await fetchPinned(target, allowed.addresses)
+            : await fetchImpl(target, { redirect: 'manual' });
+        if (!REDIRECT_STATUSES.has(response.status))
+            return { ok: true, response };
+        const location = response.headers.get('location');
+        await response.body?.cancel();
+        if (location === null) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: `${target.origin} redirected without a destination.` };
+        }
+        if (hop >= MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: `${source} redirected more than ${MEDIA_REDIRECT_LIMIT} times.` };
+        }
+        try {
+            target = new URL(location, target);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { ok: false, reason: `${target.origin} redirected to an invalid URL.` };
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Whether a server-supplied pairing approval URL may be shown and opened.
+ *
+ * The server chooses `approve_url`, so a compromised or misconfigured one
+ * must not be able to drive this machine's browser to an arbitrary
+ * destination. Allowed: the canonical dashboard, the exact origin the user
+ * pointed this pairing at, loopback for local development, and origins the
+ * User allowed (`approve_origins`) for a self-host whose dashboard lives on
+ * a different origin than its API.
+ */
+export function checkApproveUrl(raw, baseUrl, allowOrigins) {
+    let target;
+    try {
+        target = new URL(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, reason: `the server sent an invalid approval URL.` };
+    }
+    if (target.protocol !== 'https:' && target.protocol !== 'http:') {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: `the server sent a ${target.protocol.replace(/:$/, '')} approval URL; only http(s) is ever opened.`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (target.username !== '' || target.password !== '') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'the server sent an approval URL with embedded credentials.' };
+    }
+    if (target.origin === CANONICAL_DASHBOARD_ORIGIN)
+        return { ok: true };
+    if (isLoopbackHostname(target.hostname))
+        return { ok: true };
+    let pairingOrigin = null;
+    try {
+        pairingOrigin = new URL(baseUrl).origin;
+    }
+    catch {
+        pairingOrigin = null;
+    }
+    if (allowOrigins.includes(target.origin))
+        return { ok: true };
+    if (pairingOrigin !== null &&
+        target.origin === pairingOrigin &&
+        target.protocol === 'https:') {
+        return { ok: true };
+    }
+    return {
+        ok: false,
+        reason: `the server sent an approval URL on ${target.origin}, which is not the Notifai dashboard, ` +
+            'the origin being paired with, loopback, or an origin in `approve_origins`.',
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=url-policy.js.map

package/dist/url-policy.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@raidiant/notifai",
-  "version": "8.0.0",
+  "version": "9.0.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Send native device notifications from agents and local programs",
   "bin": {
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
     "CHANGELOG.md"
   ],
   "scripts": {
-    "build": "node ../../scripts/clean-dist.mjs && tsc -p tsconfig.json",
+    "build": "node ../../scripts/clean-dist.mjs && tsc -p tsconfig.json && node ../../scripts/chmod-cli-bin.mjs",
     "pretest": "pnpm run build",
     "typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit",
     "test": "node ../../scripts/run-cli-tests.mjs",
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@clack/prompts": "^1.7.0",
-    "@raidiant/notifai-protocol": "4.1.0",
+    "@raidiant/notifai-protocol": "5.0.0",
     "commander": "^14.0.0",
     "picocolors": "^1.1.1",
     "smol-toml": "^1.4.0"

package/src/atomic-file.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ export interface AtomicWriteOptions {
   preserveMode?: boolean
   /** Reject a target owned by another user instead of replacing it. */
   requireCurrentUserOwner?: boolean
+  /**
+   * POSIX directory mode applied to the parent. Defaults to 0o700 when
+   * `requireCurrentUserOwner` is set so credential and config dirs match the
+   * hook-adapter and log directories.
+   */
+  directoryMode?: number
 }
 
 /**
@@ -34,8 +40,12 @@ export function atomicWriteFileSync(
   options: AtomicWriteOptions = {},
 ): void {
   const directory = path.dirname(file)
-  mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true })
-  const parent = safeDirectory(directory, options.requireCurrentUserOwner ?? false)
+  const requireCurrentUserOwner = options.requireCurrentUserOwner ?? false
+  const directoryMode = options.directoryMode ?? (requireCurrentUserOwner ? 0o700 : undefined)
+  const parent = ensureDirectory(directory, {
+    requireCurrentUserOwner,
+    ...(directoryMode === undefined ? {} : { mode: directoryMode }),
+  })
   const target = targetMetadata(
     file,
     options.mode ?? 0o600,
@@ -69,6 +79,30 @@ export function atomicWriteFileSync(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Create (or tighten) a directory that must not be world-readable.
+ *
+ * `mkdir` mode applies only to a newly created leaf, so an existing 0755
+ * credential directory would otherwise stay world-listable. POSIX chmod of
+ * the leaf is the matching repair; Windows has no equivalent mode bits.
+ */
+export function ensurePrivateDirectory(directory: string): void {
+  ensureDirectory(directory, { mode: 0o700, requireCurrentUserOwner: false })
+}
+
+function ensureDirectory(
+  directory: string,
+  options: { mode?: number; requireCurrentUserOwner: boolean },
+): { dev: number; ino: number } {
+  if (options.mode === undefined) mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true })
+  else mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true, mode: options.mode })
+  const parent = safeDirectory(directory, options.requireCurrentUserOwner)
+  if (options.mode !== undefined && process.platform !== 'win32') {
+    chmodSync(directory, options.mode)
+  }
+  return parent
+}
+
 /** Persist the published directory entry where the host supports directory fsync. */
 function syncDirectory(directory: string): void {
   if (process.platform === 'win32') return

package/src/cli-bin.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import os from 'node:os'
+import path from 'node:path'
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { cliBinReadiness, isExecutablePath, pathNotifaiEntries } from './cli-bin.js'
+
+describe('PATH notifai diagnosis', () => {
+  it('reports a non-executable PATH binary as a gap', () => {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') return
+    const directory = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'notifai-bin-gap-'))
+    const file = path.join(directory, 'notifai')
+    writeFileSync(file, '#!/usr/bin/env node\n')
+    chmodSync(file, 0o644)
+    expect(isExecutablePath(file, 'darwin')).toBe(false)
+    const state = cliBinReadiness({ PATH: directory }, 'darwin')
+    expect(state.status).toBe('gap')
+    expect(state.detail).toContain(file)
+    expect(state.remedy?.command).toBe('npm install -g @raidiant/notifai')
+  })
+
+  it('treats an executable PATH binary as ready', () => {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') return
+    const directory = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'notifai-bin-ok-'))
+    const file = path.join(directory, 'notifai')
+    writeFileSync(file, '#!/usr/bin/env node\n')
+    chmodSync(file, 0o755)
+    expect(pathNotifaiEntries({ PATH: directory }, 'darwin')).toEqual([file])
+    expect(cliBinReadiness({ PATH: directory }, 'darwin').status).toBe('ready')
+  })
+
+  it('is ready when PATH has no notifai entry', () => {
+    const directory = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'notifai-bin-empty-'))
+    mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true })
+    const state = cliBinReadiness({ PATH: directory }, process.platform)
+    expect(state.status).toBe('ready')
+    expect(state.detail).toContain('no notifai binary was on PATH')
+  })
+})