@raibitsi/tiresias 1.0.1 → 1.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +88 -0
- package/README.md +72 -33
- package/data/README.md +33 -0
- package/data/guard-ordinary-urls.txt +102 -0
- package/data/guard-starter.jsonl +424 -0
- package/dist/aimed.js +23 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js +26 -13
- package/dist/browsecli.js +17 -13
- package/dist/cdp.js +22 -1
- package/dist/cleanup.js +3 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +216 -68
- package/dist/config.js +75 -1
- package/dist/confirm.js +20 -5
- package/dist/cooldown.js +57 -32
- package/dist/dailylog.js +11 -5
- package/dist/dom.js +13 -8
- package/dist/doors.js +1 -1
- package/dist/engine.js +9 -4
- package/dist/envelope.js +10 -1
- package/dist/fetcher.js +29 -2
- package/dist/filereply.js +7 -1
- package/dist/formflow.js +21 -3
- package/dist/forms.js +337 -42
- package/dist/getactions.js +119 -0
- package/dist/guard.js +1240 -0
- package/dist/guardclient.js +245 -0
- package/dist/guardnetwork.js +22 -0
- package/dist/history.js +11 -5
- package/dist/hook.js +2 -0
- package/dist/hosts.js +34 -27
- package/dist/keys.js +420 -18
- package/dist/local.js +537 -0
- package/dist/mcp.js +56 -25
- package/dist/needs.js +9 -5
- package/dist/parentwatch.js +6 -16
- package/dist/pdf.js +4 -1
- package/dist/pdfchild.js +0 -2
- package/dist/pdfproc.js +26 -11
- package/dist/pdfwatch.js +14 -0
- package/dist/pipeline.js +117 -26
- package/dist/preformatted.js +12 -0
- package/dist/profiles.js +3 -3
- package/dist/queue.js +24 -20
- package/dist/reader.js +441 -87
- package/dist/receipts.js +7 -2
- package/dist/render.js +156 -27
- package/dist/renderactions.js +69 -0
- package/dist/resume.js +8 -6
- package/dist/rules.js +24 -5
- package/dist/safebrowsing.js +3 -3
- package/dist/safety.js +15 -7
- package/dist/sandbox.js +1 -1
- package/dist/saved.js +24 -9
- package/dist/savedlock.js +99 -5
- package/dist/settings.js +10 -3
- package/dist/shelf.js +1 -1
- package/dist/shield.js +15 -0
- package/dist/slips.js +43 -1
- package/dist/store.js +119 -25
- package/dist/tabs.js +1 -1
- package/dist/textview.js +16 -0
- package/dist/translate.js +22 -2
- package/dist/types.js +9 -2
- package/dist/watchflow.js +1 -2
- package/dist/work.js +10 -2
- package/docs/LOCAL-MODELS.md +271 -0
- package/package.json +5 -2
package/dist/safety.js
CHANGED
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
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// The connection's own `lookup` hook resolves the name, validates every
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// answer, and hands that same answer to the socket. TLS still verifies the
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// hostname because we connect by name, not by IP.
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import { guardGetAction } from "./getactions.js";
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import dns from "node:dns/promises";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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@@ -413,10 +414,12 @@ export function decoderFor(encoding) {
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// only the first bytes are kept until the decision, then nothing but the running hash (and the last 512
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// bytes, for a disk image's trailer). With no `files` option (or a status that is not a success) the body
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// is kept as a page whatever it is, as before v0.5.
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-
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// v1.2: `noBody` is a 204 or a 304. Neither has a body, so there is nothing to decompress, whatever
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// Content-Encoding the headers repeat (Wikipedia's 304 says gzip, and gunzipping nothing failed every revisit).
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async function readBody(msg, max, truncate, signal, d, files, noBody = false) {
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let chosen;
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try {
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chosen = decoderFor(msg.headers["content-encoding"]);
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chosen = noBody ? null : decoderFor(msg.headers["content-encoding"]);
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}
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catch (e) {
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msg.destroy();
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@@ -684,13 +687,15 @@ export class Wire {
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}
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}
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}
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// v0.7: one plain GET, no redirects,
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// v0.7: one plain GET, no redirects, guarded lookup, capped by its connection's bytes (Wire). For API calls to a
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// fixed endpoint (Google Web Risk), never for a site. The body is read up to `bodyMax`; past it, null.
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export function boundedGet(url, headers, bodyMax, wire, signal) {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const u =
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const u = parseSafeUrl(url);
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assertLiteral(u);
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assertPort(u);
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const mod = u.protocol === "https:" ? https : http;
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const req = mod.request({ hostname: u.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, ""), port: u.port || undefined, path: u.pathname + u.search, method: "GET", headers, agent: false, signal }, (res) => {
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const req = mod.request({ hostname: u.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, ""), port: u.port || undefined, path: u.pathname + u.search, method: "GET", headers, lookup: guardedLookup, agent: false, signal }, (res) => {
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if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
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res.destroy();
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return resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, body: null });
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@@ -840,6 +845,9 @@ export async function safeFetch(rawUrl, opts = {}) {
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if (sent)
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(sent.requests++, signed && sent.signed++);
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};
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if (!opts.submit && (hop > 0 || method === "GET"))
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guardGetAction(u);
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opts.beforeSend?.(u);
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let msg;
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try {
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msg = await abortable(requestOnce(u, headers, ctl.signal, onSent, hop === 0 ? method : "GET", hop === 0 ? body : undefined, wire));
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@@ -915,7 +923,7 @@ export async function safeFetch(rawUrl, opts = {}) {
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}
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let read;
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try {
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read = await readBody(msg, max, !!opts.truncate, ctl.signal, declared, files);
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read = await readBody(msg, max, !!opts.truncate, ctl.signal, declared, files, status === 204 || status === 304);
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}
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catch (e) {
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if (e instanceof FetchError && e.code === "too_large" && mimeOf(ct) === "application/pdf") {
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@@ -927,7 +935,7 @@ export async function safeFetch(rawUrl, opts = {}) {
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if ("file" in read) {
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if (Number.isFinite(cl))
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read.file.declared_size = String(cl);
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return { status, headers: toHeaders(msg.headers), body: "", url: u.href, redirected, truncated:
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return { status, headers: toHeaders(msg.headers), body: "", url: u.href, redirected, truncated: read.file.stopped !== undefined, file: read.file };
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}
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const { page: buf, truncated, verdict } = read;
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const common = { status, headers: toHeaders(msg.headers), url: u.href, redirected, truncated, size: wire.total, ...("read" in verdict ? { read: verdict.read } : {}), fileFlags: verdict.flags };
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package/dist/sandbox.js
CHANGED
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ export async function runUntrusted(job, size) {
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// decoder buffers are not counted by a worker's heap limit.
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if (job.op === "pdf")
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return (await import("./pdfproc.js")).runPdfChild(job);
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-
if (size <= INLINE_MAX)
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if (size <= INLINE_MAX && !(job.op === "parse" && job.kind === "plain" && job.mode === "calendar"))
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return unwrap(handle(job));
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const sig = currentSignal();
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let release;
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package/dist/saved.js
CHANGED
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { randomBytes, sign as edSign, verify as edVerify } from "node:crypto";
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-
import { ensureSlipKey, readSlipKey } from "./keys.js";
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import { ensureSlipKey, readSlipKey, retiredSlipKeys } from "./keys.js";
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import { releaseLock, stillOwned, takeLock } from "./savedlock.js";
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import { bound as boundReceipt } from "./receipts.js";
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import { DEFAULT_LIMITS, loadLimits, loadSavingMode } from "./config.js";
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@@ -485,18 +485,32 @@ export async function verify(idOrPrefix) {
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return { id, ok: false, manifest: "damaged", message: "The manifest is damaged or not one of Tiresias's: this snapshot cannot be trusted." };
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const idMatches = m.id === id && snapshotId(m) === id;
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let signature = "bad";
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let retiredAt;
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const sig = Buffer.from(m.sig, "base64url");
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const sigOk = sig.length === 64 && sig.toString("base64url") === m.sig;
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try {
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const keys = readSlipKey();
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if (!keys)
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signature = "no_key";
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-
else
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-
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signature = sig.length === 64 && sig.toString("base64url") === m.sig && edVerify(null, signedBytes(m), keys.pub, sig) ? "ok" : "bad";
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-
}
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else
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signature = sigOk && edVerify(null, signedBytes(m), keys.pub, sig) ? "ok" : "bad";
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}
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catch {
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signature = "no_key";
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}
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// v1.1: a snapshot signed before `keys rotate --slips` is checked against the retired public halves.
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if (signature !== "ok" && sigOk) {
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try {
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const hit = retiredSlipKeys().find((k) => edVerify(null, signedBytes(m), k.pub, sig));
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if (hit) {
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signature = "retired_key";
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retiredAt = hit.retired_at;
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}
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}
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catch {
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// the retired list cannot be read: the result stays as it was
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}
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}
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const parts = new Map();
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const files = m.files.map((f) => {
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const b = readFileChecked(path.join(dir, f.name), MAX_PART);
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@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ export async function verify(idOrPrefix) {
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// (Codex v0.8 round 1: a planted manifest must not choose work for the reader).
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let texts = null;
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let why;
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-
if (m.receipts.length && (!idMatches || signature
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if (m.receipts.length && (!idMatches || !(signature === "ok" || signature === "retired_key") || !filesOk))
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why = "not_authentic";
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else if (m.receipts.length && m.files.length) {
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try {
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@@ -540,7 +554,8 @@ export async function verify(idOrPrefix) {
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quote: (texts ? (texts.some((t) => r.quote.length <= t.length && t.includes(r.quote)) ? "found" : "not_found") : "not_checked"),
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}));
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const quotesOk = receipts.every((r) => r.snapshot_matches && r.quote === "found");
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-
const
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const signed = signature === "ok" || signature === "retired_key";
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const ok = idMatches && signed && filesOk && !unreadable && extra === 0 && quotesOk;
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const reader = m.parser === PARSER_VERSION ? "same" : "different";
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const problems = [
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!idMatches && "the id does not match the manifest",
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@@ -554,9 +569,9 @@ export async function verify(idOrPrefix) {
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569
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receipts.some((r) => r.quote === "not_checked") && "some quotes could not be checked",
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555
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].filter((x) => !!x);
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return {
|
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557
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-
id, ok, manifest: "ok", id_matches: idMatches, signature, files, ...(extra ? { extra_files: extra } : {}), ...(unreadable ? { folder: "unreadable" } : {}), receipts, reader, ...(why ? { quotes_unchecked_reason: why } : {}),
|
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572
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+
id, ok, manifest: "ok", id_matches: idMatches, signature, ...(retiredAt ? { retired_key_at: retiredAt } : {}), files, ...(extra ? { extra_files: extra } : {}), ...(unreadable ? { folder: "unreadable" } : {}), receipts, reader, ...(why ? { quotes_unchecked_reason: why } : {}),
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558
573
|
message: ok
|
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559
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-
? `Verified: the signature, the id and every saved file match, and all ${receipts.length} quotes are in the saved bytes.`
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574
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+
? `Verified: the signature, the id and every saved file match, and all ${receipts.length} quotes are in the saved bytes.${retiredAt ? ` The signature is by this profile's earlier slip key, retired on ${retiredAt} (tiresias keys rotate --slips); if that key had leaked, someone holding it could also have made this snapshot.` : ""}`
|
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560
575
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: `Not verified: ${problems.join("; ")}.`,
|
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};
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}
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package/dist/savedlock.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,26 +1,101 @@
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1
1
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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2
2
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// Saves run in killable MCP servers. Publish a nonempty lock directory atomically, so even a kill during
|
|
3
|
-
// acquisition leaves a named owner.
|
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3
|
+
// acquisition leaves a named owner. Recovery needs proof the owner is gone: ESRCH, or (v1.1, Codex K.9) the pid now
|
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4
|
+
// belongs to a different process than the one whose start stamp the lock recorded. A live owner is never timed out.
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4
5
|
// Recovery removes the dead owner's unique entry, then rmdir: a delayed recoverer cannot remove a new,
|
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5
6
|
// nonempty lock. Config commands keep ownedlock.ts's deliberately manual recovery policy.
|
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7
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+
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
|
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6
8
|
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
|
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7
9
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import fs from "node:fs";
|
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10
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+
import os from "node:os";
|
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8
11
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import path from "node:path";
|
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9
12
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import { NOFOLLOW, NONBLOCK } from "./store.js";
|
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10
13
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const TRY_MS = 1_000;
|
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11
14
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const OWNER_RE = /^[1-9][0-9]*-[0-9a-f]{24}$/;
|
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12
15
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const sleepSync = (ms) => Atomics.wait(new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)), 0, 0, ms);
|
|
13
|
-
|
|
16
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+
// A process's start stamp, as the kernel recorded it, or null. Format: "<scope>|<value>".
|
|
17
|
+
// - Linux: scope = boot id + pid namespace + time namespace (ours), value = start time in clock ticks since boot
|
|
18
|
+
// (/proc/<pid>/stat field 22).
|
|
19
|
+
// - Elsewhere: scope = "ps" + host name, value = ps's lstart, printed with TZ=UTC and LC_ALL=C so every reader
|
|
20
|
+
// prints it the same way (Codex r4: time zone and locale change the text).
|
|
21
|
+
// The value stays the same for the life of a process whatever the wall clock does, and differs for a later
|
|
22
|
+
// process given the same pid.
|
|
23
|
+
function scope() {
|
|
24
|
+
try {
|
|
25
|
+
if (process.platform === "linux") {
|
|
26
|
+
// Codex r5: stat's start time includes the READER's time-namespace offset, so the time namespace is part of
|
|
27
|
+
// the scope too. Kernels without time namespaces have no such link: one shared clock.
|
|
28
|
+
let timeNs = "no-time-ns";
|
|
29
|
+
try {
|
|
30
|
+
timeNs = fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self/ns/time");
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
catch {
|
|
33
|
+
// kept as one shared clock
|
|
34
|
+
}
|
|
35
|
+
return `linux:${fs.readFileSync("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id", "utf8").trim()}:${fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self/ns/pid")}:${timeNs}`;
|
|
36
|
+
}
|
|
37
|
+
return `ps:${os.hostname()}`;
|
|
38
|
+
}
|
|
39
|
+
catch {
|
|
40
|
+
return null;
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
function startStamp(pid) {
|
|
44
|
+
const sc = scope();
|
|
45
|
+
if (!sc)
|
|
46
|
+
return null;
|
|
47
|
+
try {
|
|
48
|
+
if (process.platform === "linux") {
|
|
49
|
+
// Only meaningful when this /proc numbers pids the way we do (Codex r6: a procfs mounted for another pid
|
|
50
|
+
// namespace can map our number to someone else) and that pid lives in OUR pid namespace.
|
|
51
|
+
if (fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self") !== String(process.pid))
|
|
52
|
+
return null;
|
|
53
|
+
if (fs.readlinkSync(`/proc/${pid}/ns/pid`) !== fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self/ns/pid"))
|
|
54
|
+
return null;
|
|
55
|
+
const stat = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf8");
|
|
56
|
+
const ticks = stat.slice(stat.lastIndexOf(")") + 2).split(" ")[19];
|
|
57
|
+
return ticks && /^\d+$/.test(ticks) ? `${sc}|${ticks}` : null;
|
|
58
|
+
}
|
|
59
|
+
const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "/usr/bin:/bin", TZ: "UTC", LC_ALL: "C" };
|
|
60
|
+
const t = execFileSync("ps", ["-o", "lstart=", "-p", String(pid)], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 2_000, env, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();
|
|
61
|
+
return t ? `${sc}|${t}` : null;
|
|
62
|
+
}
|
|
63
|
+
catch {
|
|
64
|
+
return null;
|
|
65
|
+
}
|
|
66
|
+
}
|
|
67
|
+
let ownStamp;
|
|
68
|
+
const myStamp = () => (ownStamp === undefined ? (ownStamp = startStamp(process.pid)) : ownStamp);
|
|
69
|
+
// The owner is gone if its pid no longer exists (ESRCH). Codex K.9: a pid can be reused, so when the pid is alive
|
|
70
|
+
// and the lock recorded its owner's start stamp, a different stamp on that pid now means a different process,
|
|
71
|
+
// but only when the lock was taken in the same scope (same machine and boot, same pid namespace) as ours; a lock
|
|
72
|
+
// from another container or host is never judged this way. The wall clock is never used (Codex r3). Anything
|
|
73
|
+
// unclear, including an old lock with no stamp or a stamp that cannot be read, counts as alive.
|
|
74
|
+
export function dead(pid, recordedStamp) {
|
|
14
75
|
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(pid) || pid <= 0)
|
|
15
76
|
return false;
|
|
16
77
|
try {
|
|
17
78
|
process.kill(pid, 0);
|
|
18
|
-
return false;
|
|
19
79
|
}
|
|
20
80
|
catch (e) {
|
|
21
81
|
return e.code === "ESRCH";
|
|
22
82
|
}
|
|
83
|
+
if (!recordedStamp)
|
|
84
|
+
return false;
|
|
85
|
+
const sep = recordedStamp.lastIndexOf("|");
|
|
86
|
+
if (sep < 0)
|
|
87
|
+
return false;
|
|
88
|
+
const now = startStamp(pid);
|
|
89
|
+
if (now === null)
|
|
90
|
+
return false;
|
|
91
|
+
const nowSep = now.lastIndexOf("|");
|
|
92
|
+
// Both stamps must come from the same scope, checked on the stamp just read (Codex r6: a host name change
|
|
93
|
+
// between two samples must not turn a scope change into a "different process").
|
|
94
|
+
if (now.slice(0, nowSep) !== recordedStamp.slice(0, sep))
|
|
95
|
+
return false;
|
|
96
|
+
return now.slice(nowSep + 1) !== recordedStamp.slice(sep + 1);
|
|
23
97
|
}
|
|
98
|
+
export const _startStamp = startStamp; // tests
|
|
24
99
|
function recover(file) {
|
|
25
100
|
const l = file + ".lock";
|
|
26
101
|
try {
|
|
@@ -36,7 +111,18 @@ function recover(file) {
|
|
|
36
111
|
finally {
|
|
37
112
|
d.closeSync();
|
|
38
113
|
}
|
|
39
|
-
if (!owner
|
|
114
|
+
if (!owner)
|
|
115
|
+
return;
|
|
116
|
+
let stamp;
|
|
117
|
+
try {
|
|
118
|
+
const st = fs.lstatSync(path.join(l, owner));
|
|
119
|
+
if (st.size > 0 && st.size <= 256)
|
|
120
|
+
stamp = fs.readFileSync(path.join(l, owner), "utf8").trim() || undefined;
|
|
121
|
+
}
|
|
122
|
+
catch {
|
|
123
|
+
return;
|
|
124
|
+
}
|
|
125
|
+
if (!dead(Number(owner.split("-")[0]), stamp))
|
|
40
126
|
return;
|
|
41
127
|
releaseLock(file, owner);
|
|
42
128
|
}
|
|
@@ -66,7 +152,15 @@ export function takeLock(file, tryMs = TRY_MS) {
|
|
|
66
152
|
const until = Date.now() + tryMs;
|
|
67
153
|
try {
|
|
68
154
|
fs.mkdirSync(tmp, { mode: 0o700 });
|
|
69
|
-
fs.
|
|
155
|
+
const ofd = fs.openSync(path.join(tmp, token), fs.constants.O_WRONLY | fs.constants.O_CREAT | fs.constants.O_EXCL | NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
|
|
156
|
+
try {
|
|
157
|
+
const stamp = myStamp(); // K.9: who holds this pid, so a later process given the same pid is told apart
|
|
158
|
+
if (stamp)
|
|
159
|
+
fs.writeSync(ofd, stamp + "\n");
|
|
160
|
+
}
|
|
161
|
+
finally {
|
|
162
|
+
fs.closeSync(ofd);
|
|
163
|
+
}
|
|
70
164
|
for (;;) {
|
|
71
165
|
try {
|
|
72
166
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, l); // replaces an empty recovered directory, never a live nonempty one
|
package/dist/settings.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
|
|
10
10
|
// Risk key is shown only as set or not set.
|
|
11
11
|
import os from "node:os";
|
|
12
12
|
import path from "node:path";
|
|
13
|
-
import { ConfigError, DEFAULT_ANCHORING, DEFAULT_CALENDARS, DEFAULT_DOORS, DEFAULT_LIMITS, DEFAULT_SAVING, parseAnchoring, parseCalendars, KNOWN_KEYS, parseAgentStyle, parseDoors, parseKeyFile, parseSafeBrowsing, parseSaving, parseScanner, parseSignatureAgent, parseTranslator, readConfigObject, } from "./config.js";
|
|
13
|
+
import { parseChoice, ConfigError, DEFAULT_ANCHORING, DEFAULT_CALENDARS, DEFAULT_DOORS, DEFAULT_LIMITS, DEFAULT_SAVING, parseAnchoring, parseCalendars, KNOWN_KEYS, parseAgentStyle, parseDoors, parseGuard, parseKeyFile, parseSafeBrowsing, parseSaving, parseScanner, parseSignatureAgent, parseTranslator, readConfigObject, } from "./config.js";
|
|
14
14
|
import { defaultKeyFile } from "./safebrowsing.js";
|
|
15
15
|
import { DEFAULT_RENDER, parseRender } from "./render.js";
|
|
16
16
|
import { MAX_SPACING_S, MIN_SPACING_S, candidates, loadSites, normalizeSite, parsePortList, parseSiteRule, parseSites } from "./sites.js";
|
|
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ const onOff = (name) => (s) => {
|
|
|
35
35
|
throw new ConfigError(`"${name}" takes on or off.`);
|
|
36
36
|
};
|
|
37
37
|
export const DEFS = [
|
|
38
|
+
{ name: "get_form_actions", default: "read", description: 'Reading a URL matching a GET form action seen on its source page: "read" reads it normally; "slip" requires a submit_form slip. Rendered scripts may never request the GET form actions on that page.', check: (v) => parseChoice("get_form_actions", v), fromText: (v) => parseChoice("get_form_actions", v) },
|
|
39
|
+
{ name: "private_spacing", default: "shared", description: 'Private calls and form previews: "shared" writes origin and times only to share spacing across processes; "none" writes nothing and separate processes do not space these calls against each other.', check: (v) => parseChoice("private_spacing", v), fromText: (v) => parseChoice("private_spacing", v) },
|
|
40
|
+
{ name: "hook_secrets", default: "hidden", description: 'Scanner and translator environment: "hidden" removes Tiresias secret variables; "inherit" passes the full owner environment, including those secrets.', check: (v) => parseChoice("hook_secrets", v), fromText: (v) => parseChoice("hook_secrets", v) },
|
|
41
|
+
{ name: "text_views", default: "marked", description: 'Text views: "marked" keeps them readable with a marker before web content; "wrapped" wraps the text inside untrusted_content, like JSON. Agents should use JSON output.', check: (v) => parseChoice("text_views", v), fromText: (v) => parseChoice("text_views", v) },
|
|
38
42
|
{ name: "doors", default: DEFAULT_DOORS, description: 'How a first read of a site treats its door checks (llms.txt, MCP, API): "background" returns the page at once and checks them afterwards; "wait" checks them first (slower).', check: parseDoors, fromText: parseDoors },
|
|
39
43
|
{ name: "rendering", default: DEFAULT_RENDER, description: 'Running a page\'s JavaScript (W-10), in the installed Google Chrome, sandboxed and throwaway, with every request it makes going through Tiresias\'s rules: "off" never; "ask" when a read asks for it; "auto" also when a plain read is an empty JavaScript shell. TIRESIAS_RENDERING overrides it.', check: parseRender, fromText: parseRender },
|
|
40
44
|
{ name: "saving", default: DEFAULT_SAVING, description: 'Keeping a signed snapshot of a page a read asks to save (W-28): "off" never; "ask" when a read asks for it (read --save, or save on the MCP read). Snapshots are kept in this profile\'s saved/ folder; see tiresias saved.', check: parseSaving, fromText: parseSaving },
|
|
@@ -52,6 +56,8 @@ export const DEFS = [
|
|
|
52
56
|
{ name: "safe_browsing", default: true, description: "Check every URL against the Phishing.Database list (and Google Web Risk, with a key) before requesting it.", check: parseSafeBrowsing, fromText: onOff("safe_browsing") },
|
|
53
57
|
{ name: "web_risk_key_file", default: null, description: "The file holding WEB_RISK_API_KEY= (a full path). Default for the default profile: ~/.config/tiresias/secrets.env.", check: parseKeyFile, fromText: parseKeyFile },
|
|
54
58
|
{ name: "scanner", default: null, description: "Your own virus checker, run on every high-risk file warning (none is included).", check: parseScanner, howToSet: "Set it with: tiresias scanner set [--timeout 10] [--send-file] -- /full/path/to/program [args...]" },
|
|
59
|
+
{ name: "guard", default: null, description: "The meaning check for local model mode (W-38): your own embedding model, reached at an OpenAI-compatible address, compares each passage with a library of known planted instructions (none is included and nothing is sent anywhere until you set it up).", check: (v) => parseGuard(v), howToSet: "Set it with: tiresias guard setup --url http://localhost:1234/v1 --model <embedding model id> (see tiresias guard --help); remove it with: tiresias guard off" },
|
|
60
|
+
{ name: "written_by", default: "on", description: 'Local model mode\'s label for who wrote each passage (W-39): "on" gives every passage of a page that carries visitor text (comments, reviews, forum posts, as the page\'s own markup marks them) a written_by saying whether the site or a visitor wrote it; "off" leaves it out. It is a fact about the page, not a warning, and nothing is withheld because of it.', check: (v) => parseChoice("written_by", v), fromText: (v) => parseChoice("written_by", v) },
|
|
55
61
|
{ name: "translator", default: null, description: "Your own translation program, run only when an agent asks a read for a translation; it gets the page's text on standard input and the source and target languages as its last two arguments (none is included).", check: parseTranslator, howToSet: "Set it with: tiresias translator set [--timeout 20] -- /full/path/to/program [args...]" },
|
|
56
62
|
];
|
|
57
63
|
const DEF = new Map(DEFS.map((d) => [d.name, d]));
|
|
@@ -84,7 +90,7 @@ const SITE_DEF = new Map(SITE_DEFS.map((d) => [d.name, d]));
|
|
|
84
90
|
const ENV = [
|
|
85
91
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_HOME", default: "~/.tiresias", description: "The store folder (shared by every agent pointed at it)." },
|
|
86
92
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_PROFILE", default: "default", description: "The profile to use when --profile is not given." },
|
|
87
|
-
{ name: "TIRESIAS_PRIVATE", default: "off", description: "1 makes the whole session private:
|
|
93
|
+
{ name: "TIRESIAS_PRIVATE", default: "off", description: "1 makes the whole session private: no page records are saved; minimal politeness state still applies." },
|
|
88
94
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_SAFE_BROWSING", default: "on", description: "0 turns the Safe Browsing check off for the session." },
|
|
89
95
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_ALLOW_PORTS", default: "none", description: 'More ports to allow on every site, like "8080,9000-9100".' },
|
|
90
96
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_MAX_BYTES", default: String(5 * 1024 * 1024), description: "The most bytes of a page that are read." },
|
|
@@ -96,6 +102,7 @@ const ENV = [
|
|
|
96
102
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_RENDERING", default: "not set", description: 'off, ask or auto: overrides the "rendering" setting for the session.' },
|
|
97
103
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_CHROME", default: "not set", description: "The full path of the Chrome program used to render pages, when it is not in the usual place. Tiresias never downloads a browser." },
|
|
98
104
|
{ name: "TIRESIAS_WEB_RISK_KEY", default: "not set", description: "A Google Web Risk key (shown here only as set or not set).", secret: true },
|
|
105
|
+
{ name: "TIRESIAS_GUARD_KEY", default: "not set", description: "A key for the meaning check's embedding endpoint, sent as a Bearer token, read when a call is made and never stored (shown here only as set or not set).", secret: true },
|
|
99
106
|
];
|
|
100
107
|
export const configFile = () => path.join(homeDir(), "config.json");
|
|
101
108
|
const tilde = (p) => (p.startsWith(os.homedir() + path.sep) ? "~" + p.slice(os.homedir().length) : p);
|
|
@@ -353,7 +360,7 @@ export function confirmNow(name, rest, priv, confirm) {
|
|
|
353
360
|
if (priv)
|
|
354
361
|
throw new ConfigError(PRIVATE);
|
|
355
362
|
if (!name || !isRisky(name))
|
|
356
|
-
throw new ConfigError("Usage: tiresias settings confirm <risky setting> [<site>] --confirm \"...\". Risky settings: saving, rendering, translator, scanner, anchoring, anchor_calendars, safe_browsing, and the site settings ports, spacing_seconds, never_visit, hand_off.");
|
|
363
|
+
throw new ConfigError("Usage: tiresias settings confirm <risky setting> [<site>] --confirm \"...\". Risky settings: private_spacing, hook_secrets, saving, rendering, translator, scanner, anchoring, anchor_calendars, safe_browsing, guard, and the site settings ports, spacing_seconds, never_visit, hand_off.");
|
|
357
364
|
const site = SITE_DEF.has(name) ? siteArgs(name, rest, false).site : undefined;
|
|
358
365
|
if (!site && rest.length)
|
|
359
366
|
throw new ConfigError(`Usage: tiresias settings confirm ${name} --confirm "..."`);
|
package/dist/shelf.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ export function clean(x) {
|
|
|
130
130
|
url: c(o.url, MAX_URL_LOG), final_url: c(o.final_url, MAX_URL_LOG),
|
|
131
131
|
...str("declared_type", 200), ...str("declared_name", 255),
|
|
132
132
|
agent: typeof o.agent === "string" ? c(o.agent, 200) : "unknown",
|
|
133
|
-
...(o.source === "provided_by_person" ? { source:
|
|
133
|
+
...(o.source === "provided_by_person" || o.source === "provided_by_agent" ? { source: o.source } : {}),
|
|
134
134
|
};
|
|
135
135
|
if (cut)
|
|
136
136
|
r.cut = true;
|
package/dist/shield.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
|
|
2
|
+
// N-02: injection shield.
|
|
3
|
+
// Web pages can carry text meant for the AI that reads them, not for people:
|
|
4
|
+
// white-on-white text, display:none blocks, comments, "ignore previous
|
|
5
|
+
// instructions". We do three things: keep page content inside
|
|
6
|
+
// untrusted_content, leave hidden text OUT of the readable text, and report
|
|
7
|
+
// what we found in `flags` so the agent and its human can see the attempt.
|
|
8
|
+
import { AIMED } from "./aimed.js";
|
|
1
9
|
import { EN, otherMatches } from "./shieldphrases.js";
|
|
2
10
|
import { hiddenText } from "./inspect.js";
|
|
3
11
|
// v0.7 (W-26): the English list moved to shieldphrases.ts with the twelve other languages.
|
|
@@ -54,6 +62,13 @@ export class Shield {
|
|
|
54
62
|
// text contains (shieldphrases.ts).
|
|
55
63
|
for (const o of otherMatches(norm))
|
|
56
64
|
this.add({ type: "ai_directed_instruction", snippet: snippet(o.text, o.index), detail: `${where}; phrase in ${o.lang}` });
|
|
65
|
+
// v1.2: local mode's wider check, on the same bounded normalized text. add() keeps the cap and
|
|
66
|
+
// drops duplicate snippets when a phrase and a pattern point to the same passage.
|
|
67
|
+
for (const [name, { re }] of Object.entries(AIMED)) {
|
|
68
|
+
const m = re.exec(norm);
|
|
69
|
+
if (m)
|
|
70
|
+
this.add({ type: "ai_directed_instruction", snippet: snippet(norm, m.index), detail: `${where}; pattern ${name}` });
|
|
71
|
+
}
|
|
57
72
|
}
|
|
58
73
|
hidden(reason, text) {
|
|
59
74
|
this.add({ type: "hidden_text", snippet: snippet(text), detail: reason });
|
package/dist/slips.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import { SlipError } from "./errors.js";
|
|
|
36
36
|
import { PATH_RE, pathAllowed } from "./forms.js";
|
|
37
37
|
import { readItem, writeItem } from "./itemfiles.js";
|
|
38
38
|
import * as history from "./history.js";
|
|
39
|
-
import { ensureSlipKey, readSlipKey } from "./keys.js";
|
|
39
|
+
import { SLIP_KEY_FILE, ensureSlipKey, readSlipKey, replaceSlipKey } from "./keys.js";
|
|
40
40
|
import { NOFOLLOW, NONBLOCK, cliSafeId, isPrivate, ownFile, profileName, rmRegular, subDir } from "./store.js";
|
|
41
41
|
export { SlipError };
|
|
42
42
|
// The fixed allow-list of actions. v0.4 has exactly one.
|
|
@@ -491,6 +491,35 @@ export function revokeAll(priv = false) {
|
|
|
491
491
|
removeLooseUse(d, f);
|
|
492
492
|
return n;
|
|
493
493
|
}
|
|
494
|
+
// ---- v1.1 workstream 4: rotating the slip key ----
|
|
495
|
+
// A new slip key makes every existing slip fail its signature check, so the rotation revokes them all, cleanly and
|
|
496
|
+
// on the record (revoked.jsonl), before the key is replaced, and once more after it (a slip granted meanwhile was
|
|
497
|
+
// signed by the old key). Saved pages are not touched: the old key's public half is kept for `saved verify`.
|
|
498
|
+
// Receipts never reference the slip key (a receipt names a snapshot by its SHA-256 id). An irreversible action, so
|
|
499
|
+
// it always needs its phrase, even with confirmations for risky settings turned off; the CLI also asks a person at
|
|
500
|
+
// a terminal to type "rotate slip key", like `slip revoke --all`. Written to history (tool "keys").
|
|
501
|
+
export const ROTATE_SLIP_PHRASE = "YES, ROTATE THE SLIP KEY";
|
|
502
|
+
export function checkRotatePhrase(confirm) {
|
|
503
|
+
if (confirm !== ROTATE_SLIP_PHRASE)
|
|
504
|
+
throw new SlipError(`Rotating the slip key revokes every permission slip of this profile, and saved pages signed before it are then checked against the old key's public half. It needs the exact confirmation ${JSON.stringify(ROTATE_SLIP_PHRASE)}. Run it again with: tiresias keys rotate --slips --confirm '${ROTATE_SLIP_PHRASE}' (type it exactly, in capitals; it is recorded in history). Nothing was changed.`);
|
|
505
|
+
}
|
|
506
|
+
export function rotateSlipKey(confirm, priv = false, now = Date.now()) {
|
|
507
|
+
if (priv || isPrivate())
|
|
508
|
+
throw new SlipError("Private mode: nothing is written, so the slip key is not rotated.");
|
|
509
|
+
checkRotatePhrase(confirm);
|
|
510
|
+
const d = subDir("keys", false);
|
|
511
|
+
if (!d || !fs.lstatSync(path.join(d, SLIP_KEY_FILE), { throwIfNoEntry: false }))
|
|
512
|
+
throw new SlipError("There is no slip key yet, so there is nothing to rotate. One is made by the first slip grant or saved page.");
|
|
513
|
+
// The slips are revoked inside replaceSlipKey, after every refusal (synced folder, another rotation, a full retired
|
|
514
|
+
// list), so a refused rotation never destroys them (Codex K.4).
|
|
515
|
+
let revoked = 0;
|
|
516
|
+
const r = replaceSlipKey(now, () => {
|
|
517
|
+
revoked = revokeAll(priv);
|
|
518
|
+
});
|
|
519
|
+
revoked += revokeAll(priv);
|
|
520
|
+
history.record({ time: new Date(now).toISOString(), tool: "keys", url: "", agent: "cli", status: "ok", door: "none", event: "slip_key_rotated", revoked, by: process.stdin.isTTY === true ? "terminal" : "not_terminal" });
|
|
521
|
+
return { revoked, retired: r.retired };
|
|
522
|
+
}
|
|
494
523
|
// A use file is deleted on its own only when its slip file is confirmed gone at that moment. A slip
|
|
495
524
|
// granted (and claimed) after any listing was made still has its <id>.json, so its uses are never
|
|
496
525
|
// touched (Codex round 49: a final sweep deleted a new slip's use and gave the use back). Uses only
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|
@@ -687,3 +716,16 @@ export function claimSlip(action, url, label, opts = {}) {
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687
716
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}
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688
717
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return no("no_slip");
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689
718
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}
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719
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+
// A claimed use stays spent, but may leave the queue only while its slip still permits this target.
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720
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+
export function claimedStillValid(claim, action, url) {
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721
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+
const t = target(url);
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722
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+
const d = subDir("slips", false);
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723
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+
if (!d || !t || !pathAllowed(url) || !PATH_RE.test(t.pathname))
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724
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+
return false;
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725
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+
const keys = readSlipKey();
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726
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+
const profile = profileName();
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727
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+
const s = readOne(d, claim.slip_id, keys, profile);
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728
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+
return !!s && s !== "damaged" && s.action === action && s.site === t.origin && pathCovers(s.path, t.pathname)
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729
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+
&& Date.parse(s.expires_at) > Date.now() && claim.use >= 1 && claim.use <= s.uses
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730
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&& useVerifies(d, s.id, claim.use, keys, profile);
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731
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+
}
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