@rafter-security/cli 0.9.0 → 0.10.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/agent/components.js +4 -2
- package/dist/commands/agent/init.js +5 -4
- package/dist/commands/agent/instruction-block.js +21 -9
- package/dist/commands/backend/run.js +59 -1
- package/dist/commands/mcp/server.js +123 -0
- package/dist/commands/scan/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/create.js +30 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/errors.js +78 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/get.js +30 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/index.js +27 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/list.js +39 -0
- package/dist/commands/sites/scan.js +54 -0
- package/dist/core/command-interceptor.js +28 -41
- package/dist/core/config-manager.js +9 -0
- package/dist/core/pattern-engine.js +33 -2
- package/dist/core/policy-loader.js +9 -0
- package/dist/core/risk-rules.js +408 -28
- package/dist/index.js +3 -0
- package/dist/scanners/secret-patterns.js +14 -0
- package/dist/utils/api.js +7 -0
- package/package.json +6 -2
- package/resources/rafter-security-skill.md +1 -1
- package/resources/skills/rafter/SKILL.md +18 -8
- package/resources/skills/rafter-code-review/SKILL.md +7 -1
- package/resources/skills/rafter-secure-design/SKILL.md +7 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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import { ConfigManager } from "./config-manager.js";
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import { AuditLogger } from "./audit-logger.js";
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import { assessCommandRisk, matchedCriticalPattern } from "./risk-rules.js";
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import { assessCommandRisk, matchedCriticalPattern, sanitizeCommandForMatching, } from "./risk-rules.js";
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export class CommandInterceptor {
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constructor() {
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this.config = new ConfigManager();
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@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ export class CommandInterceptor {
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requiresApproval: false
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};
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}
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// Check blocked patterns (always block)
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// Check blocked patterns (always block).
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//
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// A deny-list match denies — that is what a deny-list is for — but it must
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// NOT rewrite the command's risk. Reporting every deny-list hit as
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// "critical" made the hook tell users a `gh pr create` was an irreversible
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// system-damage command. The assessed risk is reported as assessed; the
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// genuinely unconditional hard-blocks are the CRITICAL_PATTERNS handled
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// above, and the default deny-list is exactly that set.
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for (const pattern of policy.blockedPatterns) {
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if (this.matchesPattern(command, pattern)) {
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel
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riskLevel,
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allowed: false,
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requiresApproval: false,
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reason: `Matches blocked pattern: ${pattern}`,
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@@ -63,7 +70,6 @@ export class CommandInterceptor {
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// Check approval patterns
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for (const pattern of policy.requireApproval) {
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if (this.matchesPattern(command, pattern)) {
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const riskLevel = this.assessRisk(command);
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel,
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@@ -74,47 +80,21 @@ export class CommandInterceptor {
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};
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}
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}
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// Check policy mode
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel: this.assessRisk(command),
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allowed: true,
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requiresApproval: false
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};
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}
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else if (policy.mode === "approve-dangerous") {
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// Assess risk and require approval for high/critical
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const riskLevel = this.assessRisk(command);
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if (riskLevel === "high" || riskLevel === "critical") {
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel,
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allowed: false,
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requiresApproval: true,
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reason: `High risk command requires approval`
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};
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}
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// Check policy mode. `riskLevel` is the assessment made at the top of
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// evaluate() — critical already returned, so it is high/medium/low here.
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if (policy.mode === "approve-dangerous" && riskLevel === "high") {
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel,
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allowed:
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requiresApproval:
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-
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}
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else if (policy.mode === "allow-all") {
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel: this.assessRisk(command),
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allowed: true,
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requiresApproval: false
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allowed: false,
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requiresApproval: true,
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reason: `High risk command requires approval`
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};
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}
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//
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// deny-list / allow-all / unknown mode: not blocked, not approval-gated.
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return {
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command,
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riskLevel
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riskLevel,
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allowed: true,
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requiresApproval: false
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};
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@@ -126,16 +106,23 @@ export class CommandInterceptor {
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this.audit.logCommandIntercepted(evaluation.command, evaluation.allowed, actionTaken, evaluation.reason);
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}
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/**
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* Match command against pattern
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* Match a command against a policy pattern.
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*
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* Matching runs against the SANITIZED command line, not the raw string: the
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* policy patterns describe commands, so quoted text a command merely consumes
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* as data (a commit message, a PR body) must not match them, while text a
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* shell or eval wrapper executes (`bash -c "…"`) must. See
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* `sanitizeCommandForMatching`.
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*/
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matchesPattern(command, pattern) {
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const target = sanitizeCommandForMatching(command);
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try {
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const regex = new RegExp(pattern, "i");
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return regex.test(
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return regex.test(target);
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}
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catch {
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// If pattern is not valid regex, try case-insensitive substring match
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return
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return target.toLowerCase().includes(pattern.toLowerCase());
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}
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}
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/**
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@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ function validateConfig(raw) {
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console.error('Warning: config "agent.scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks" must be a boolean — using default.');
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delete scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks;
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}
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if (scan.plusRequiresApproval !== undefined && typeof scan.plusRequiresApproval !== "boolean") {
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console.error('Warning: config "agent.scan.plusRequiresApproval" must be a boolean — using default.');
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delete scan.plusRequiresApproval;
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}
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}
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}
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return raw;
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@@ -299,6 +303,11 @@ export class ConfigManager {
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if (policy.scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks !== undefined) {
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config.agent.scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks = policy.scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks;
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}
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// sable-9ddf — OR merge: a project policy may turn the Plus-approval gate
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// ON, but must never turn OFF a gate the machine owner set globally.
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if (policy.scan.plusRequiresApproval === true) {
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config.agent.scan.plusRequiresApproval = true;
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}
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}
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// Ignore rules — top-level policy key, applied per finding at scan time
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if (policy.ignore && config.agent) {
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@@ -2,6 +2,22 @@ const GENERIC_PATTERN_NAMES = new Set(["Generic API Key", "Generic Secret"]);
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const VARIABLE_NAME_RE = /^[A-Z][A-Z0-9]*(?:_[A-Z0-9]+)+$/;
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const LOWERCASE_IDENT_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:_[a-z0-9]+)+$/;
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const QUOTED_VALUE_RE = /['"]([^'"]+)['"]/;
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/**
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* Matches an environment-assignment prefix in a command line: an identifier
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* followed immediately by `=` and a run of non-whitespace (the value). Used to
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* find `NAME=VALUE` tokens like `RAFTER_API_KEY=<secret> rafter ...` so their
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* value can be redacted before the command is written to the audit log.
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*/
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const ENV_ASSIGN_RE = /(^|\s)([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=(\S+)/g;
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/**
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* A `NAME` in a `NAME=VALUE` assignment is treated as secret-bearing when it
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* ends in a credential-suggesting word (e.g. RAFTER_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN,
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* DB_PASSWORD, AUTH). Values behind such names are redacted even when they
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* don't match any known secret pattern (that's the whole point — the value of
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* a bespoke API key won't match a built-in pattern, but it's still a secret).
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* Plain names like FOO or NODE_ENV do not match, so `FOO=bar` is left intact.
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*/
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const SECRET_ENV_NAME_RE = /(?:^|_)(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|SECRETS|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PWD|API[_-]?KEY|ACCESS[_-]?KEY|CREDENTIALS?|AUTH)$/i;
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export class PatternEngine {
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constructor(patterns) {
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this.patterns = patterns;
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return matches;
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}
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/**
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* Redact text by replacing sensitive patterns
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* Redact text by replacing sensitive patterns.
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*
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* Two layers, both additive:
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* 1. Env-assignment redaction: any `NAME=VALUE` whose NAME looks
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* secret-bearing has its VALUE masked, even if the VALUE matches no
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* known pattern. This catches leaks like `RAFTER_API_KEY=<key> rafter …`
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* in a logged command line, where the key's shape is unknown.
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* 2. Pattern-based redaction: values that match a built-in secret pattern
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* are masked wherever they appear.
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*/
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redactText(text) {
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let redacted = text;
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let redacted = this.redactEnvAssignments(text);
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for (const pattern of this.patterns) {
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const regex = this.createRegex(pattern.regex);
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redacted = redacted.replace(regex, (match) => this.isFalsePositive(pattern, match) ? match : this.redact(match));
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}
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return redacted;
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}
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/**
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* Mask the VALUE of every `NAME=VALUE` token whose NAME looks
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* secret-bearing. Non-secret names (FOO, NODE_ENV, …) are left untouched.
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*/
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redactEnvAssignments(text) {
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return text.replace(ENV_ASSIGN_RE, (full, prefix, name, value) => SECRET_ENV_NAME_RE.test(name) ? `${prefix}${name}=${this.redact(value)}` : full);
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}
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/**
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* Check if text contains any sensitive patterns
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*/
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if (typeof raw.scan.auto_update_betterleaks === "boolean") {
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policy.scan.autoUpdateBetterleaks = raw.scan.auto_update_betterleaks;
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}
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if (typeof raw.scan.plus_requires_approval === "boolean") {
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policy.scan.plusRequiresApproval = raw.scan.plus_requires_approval;
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}
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}
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// sable-c1c — backend flat-shape compat. rafter-backend reads
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// exclude_paths / custom_patterns at the top level (no `scan:` nesting),
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typeof raw.scan.auto_update_betterleaks !== "boolean") {
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console.error(`Warning: "scan.auto_update_betterleaks" must be a boolean — ignoring.`);
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}
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// sable-9ddf — only a boolean reaches policy.scan (mapping guards the type).
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if (raw.scan && typeof raw.scan === "object" &&
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raw.scan.plus_requires_approval !== undefined &&
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typeof raw.scan.plus_requires_approval !== "boolean") {
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console.error(`Warning: "scan.plus_requires_approval" must be a boolean — ignoring.`);
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}
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}
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if (policy.ignore !== undefined) {
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if (!Array.isArray(policy.ignore)) {
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