@rafter-security/cli 0.8.5 → 0.8.6
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
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import { getRafterDir, getAuditLogPath, getBinDir } from "../../core/config-defaults.js";
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import { AuditLogger } from "../../core/audit-logger.js";
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import { ConfigManager } from "../../core/config-manager.js";
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import { resolveHookControl } from "../../core/hook-control.js";
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import { BinaryManager } from "../../utils/binary-manager.js";
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import { SkillManager } from "../../utils/skill-manager.js";
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export function createStatusCommand() {
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@@ -38,6 +39,22 @@ export function createStatusCommand() {
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else {
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console.log(`\nConfig: not found — run: rafter agent init`);
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}
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// --- Hook off-switch (trusted-source only: env / global config) ---
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{
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const c = resolveHookControl();
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const describe = (on, src) => on ? "active" : `DISABLED (via ${src === "env" ? "RAFTER_DISABLE_* env" : "global config"})`;
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if (!c.hookEnabled) {
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console.log(`Hooks: ${describe(false, c.source.hook)}`);
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}
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else if (!c.secretScanEnabled || !c.commandPolicyEnabled) {
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console.log(`Hooks: active (partial)`);
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console.log(` secret scan: ${describe(c.secretScanEnabled, c.source.secretScan)}`);
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console.log(` command policy: ${describe(c.commandPolicyEnabled, c.source.commandPolicy)}`);
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}
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else {
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console.log(`Hooks: active`);
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}
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}
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// --- Betterleaks ---
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const exeExt = process.platform === "win32" ? ".exe" : "";
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const localBetterleaks = path.join(getBinDir(), `betterleaks${exeExt}`);
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@@ -208,6 +225,19 @@ function buildStatusJson(home, configPath, auditPath) {
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betterleaks_available: isBetterleaksAvailable(),
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config_path: formatHomePath(configPath, home),
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audit_log_path: formatHomePath(auditPath, home),
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hook_control: (() => {
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const c = resolveHookControl();
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return {
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hook_enabled: c.hookEnabled,
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secret_scan_enabled: c.secretScanEnabled,
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command_policy_enabled: c.commandPolicyEnabled,
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source: {
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hook: c.source.hook,
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secret_scan: c.source.secretScan,
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command_policy: c.source.commandPolicy,
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},
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};
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})(),
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};
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}
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function detectAgents(home) {
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { RegexScanner } from "../../scanners/regex-scanner.js";
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import { AuditLogger } from "../../core/audit-logger.js";
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import { ConfigManager } from "../../core/config-manager.js";
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import { applySuppressions } from "../../core/custom-patterns.js";
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import { resolveHookControl } from "../../core/hook-control.js";
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import { collectSuppressions, applyExcludePaths } from "../agent/scan.js";
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import { execSync } from "child_process";
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import fs from "fs";
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@@ -140,37 +141,51 @@ function normalizeInput(raw, format) {
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}
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function evaluateToolCall(payload) {
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const { tool_name, tool_input } = payload;
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// Honor the (trusted-source-only) hook off-switch before doing any work.
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// Master switch off → allow everything; otherwise the two concerns are gated
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// independently inside evaluateBash (command policy + git-commit secret scan).
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const control = resolveHookControl();
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if (!control.hookEnabled)
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return { decision: "allow" };
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if (tool_name === "Bash") {
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-
return evaluateBash(tool_input?.command || "");
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return evaluateBash(tool_input?.command || "", control);
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}
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if (tool_name === "Write" || tool_name === "Edit") {
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if (!control.secretScanEnabled)
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return { decision: "allow" };
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return evaluateWrite(tool_input || {});
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}
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return { decision: "allow" };
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}
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-
function evaluateBash(command) {
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-
const interceptor = new CommandInterceptor();
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function evaluateBash(command, control) {
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const audit = new AuditLogger();
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-
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//
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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// Command-risk interception — gated by commandPolicy. When disabled, skip the
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// block/approval logic but still fall through to the staged-secret scan below
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// (a user may keep secret scanning while silencing command prompts).
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if (control.commandPolicyEnabled) {
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const interceptor = new CommandInterceptor();
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const evaluation = interceptor.evaluate(command);
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// Blocked — hard deny
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if (!evaluation.allowed && !evaluation.requiresApproval) {
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audit.logCommandIntercepted(command, false, "blocked", evaluation.reason);
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return {
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decision: "deny",
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reason: formatBlockedMessage(command, evaluation),
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};
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}
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// Requires approval — deny (agent can't provide interactive approval)
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if (evaluation.requiresApproval) {
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audit.logCommandIntercepted(command, false, "blocked", evaluation.reason);
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return {
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decision: "deny",
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reason: formatApprovalMessage(command, evaluation),
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};
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}
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}
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-
// Git commit/push — scan staged files for secrets
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// Git commit/push — scan staged files for secrets. Gated by secretScan so the
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// git-commit secret check survives `commandPolicy` being disabled on its own.
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const trimmed = command.trim();
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-
if (trimmed.startsWith("git commit") || trimmed.startsWith("git push")) {
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if (control.secretScanEnabled && (trimmed.startsWith("git commit") || trimmed.startsWith("git push"))) {
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const scanResult = scanStagedFiles();
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if (scanResult.secretsFound) {
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// Audit per file so the log records WHICH file + pattern, not a bare count.
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
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import { ConfigManager } from "./config-manager.js";
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/**
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* Parse a tri-state from an env var. Returns true (disable), false (force-enable),
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* or undefined (unset / unrecognized → defer to config). Deliberately strict:
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* only explicit, well-known tokens count, so a stray value fails safe to "defer"
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* rather than silently disabling a security control (secure-design D2).
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*/
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function envTriState(raw) {
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if (raw == null)
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return undefined;
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const v = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
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if (v === "1" || v === "true" || v === "yes" || v === "on")
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return true; // disable
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if (v === "0" || v === "false" || v === "no" || v === "off")
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return false; // force-enable
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return undefined;
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}
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/**
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* Resolve whether the hook (and its sub-parts) should act.
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*
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* SECURITY (secure-design D1): the disable signal is honored ONLY from trusted,
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* machine-owner-owned sources — the global `~/.rafter/config.json` and the
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* `RAFTER_DISABLE_*` env vars. It is NEVER read from project-local `.rafter.yml`,
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* so cloning a hostile repo cannot silently disable a victim's secret scanning or
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* command interception. That is enforced structurally: this function calls
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* `ConfigManager.load()` (global config only), NOT `loadWithPolicy()` (which
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* merges `.rafter.yml`), and `hooks` is absent from the PolicyFile schema.
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*
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* Precedence (D5): env var overrides global config. Default (D2): enabled; an
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* unreadable config or unrecognized value fails safe to enabled.
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*/
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export function resolveHookControl(opts) {
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const env = opts?.env ?? process.env;
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let cfg = opts?.config;
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if (!cfg) {
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try {
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cfg = new ConfigManager().load();
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}
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catch {
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// Unreadable/corrupt global config must not disable the hook — fail safe.
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cfg = undefined;
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}
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}
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const h = cfg?.agent?.hooks;
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// Resolve one axis: env wins over global; absent → default `true` (enabled).
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// `globalDisabled` is the config saying `<key>: false` (disabled) or
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// `hooks.<sub>: true` meaning "disable this sub-part".
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const resolve = (envVal, globalDisabled) => {
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if (envVal !== undefined)
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return { enabled: !envVal, source: "env" };
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if (globalDisabled === true)
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return { enabled: false, source: "global-config" };
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return { enabled: true, source: "default" };
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};
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// Master switch. Global form: `agent.hooks.enabled === false` disables.
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const hook = resolve(envTriState(env.RAFTER_DISABLE_HOOKS), h?.enabled === false ? true : undefined);
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// Sub-parts. Global form: `agent.hooks.secretScan === false` disables that part.
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// A disabled master switch forces every sub-part off regardless of its own setting.
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const secretScan = hook.enabled
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? resolve(envTriState(env.RAFTER_DISABLE_SECRET_SCAN), h?.secretScan === false ? true : undefined)
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: { enabled: false, source: hook.source };
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const commandPolicy = hook.enabled
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? resolve(envTriState(env.RAFTER_DISABLE_COMMAND_POLICY), h?.commandPolicy === false ? true : undefined)
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: { enabled: false, source: hook.source };
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return {
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hookEnabled: hook.enabled,
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secretScanEnabled: secretScan.enabled,
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commandPolicyEnabled: commandPolicy.enabled,
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source: {
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hook: hook.source,
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secretScan: secretScan.source,
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commandPolicy: commandPolicy.source,
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},
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};
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}
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@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
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import { execFile } from "child_process";
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import { promisify } from "util";
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import { randomBytes } from "crypto";
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import { BinaryManager } from "../utils/binary-manager.js";
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import fs from "fs";
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import os from "os";
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@@ -48,7 +47,11 @@ export class BetterleaksScanner {
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if (!blPath) {
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throw new Error("Betterleaks not available");
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}
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-
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// mkdtempSync atomically creates a private 0700 dir, so the report path
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// can't be pre-created/symlinked by another user on the shared tmpdir —
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// avoids the TOCTOU race a predictable Date.now() filename allowed (CWE-367).
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "betterleaks-"));
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const tmpReport = path.join(tmpDir, "report.json");
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try {
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// `--` ensures a target path beginning with `-` isn't parsed as a flag by betterleaks.
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await execFileAsync(blPath, ["dir", "-f", "json", "--report-path", tmpReport, "--", filePath], { timeout: 60000 });
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@@ -56,7 +59,6 @@ export class BetterleaksScanner {
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return { file: filePath, matches: [] };
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}
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const results = this.parseResults(tmpReport);
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fs.unlinkSync(tmpReport);
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return {
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file: filePath,
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matches: results.map(r => this.convertToPatternMatch(r))
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@@ -66,17 +68,23 @@ export class BetterleaksScanner {
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// Betterleaks exits with --exit-code (default 1) when leaks found — read report before cleanup
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if (e.code === 1 && fs.existsSync(tmpReport)) {
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const results = this.parseResults(tmpReport);
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fs.unlinkSync(tmpReport);
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return {
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file: filePath,
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matches: results.map(r => this.convertToPatternMatch(r))
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};
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}
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if (fs.existsSync(tmpReport)) {
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fs.unlinkSync(tmpReport);
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}
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throw new Error(`Betterleaks scan failed: ${e.message}`);
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}
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finally {
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// Best-effort cleanup — a cleanup failure must never mask the scan's
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// real result or its original error.
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try {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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catch {
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// ignore
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}
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}
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}
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async scanFiles(filePaths) {
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const results = [];
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@@ -102,7 +110,9 @@ export class BetterleaksScanner {
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if (!blPath) {
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throw new Error("Betterleaks not available");
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}
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-
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// Private 0700 dir, atomically created — see scanFile for the TOCTOU rationale (CWE-367).
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "betterleaks-"));
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const tmpReport = path.join(tmpDir, "report.json");
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const subcommand = opts?.useGit ? "git" : "dir";
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try {
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// `--` ensures a target path beginning with `-` isn't parsed as a flag by betterleaks.
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@@ -111,19 +121,27 @@ export class BetterleaksScanner {
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return [];
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}
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const results = this.parseResults(tmpReport);
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fs.unlinkSync(tmpReport);
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return this.groupByFile(results);
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}
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catch (e) {
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if (fs.existsSync(tmpReport)) {
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const results = this.parseResults(tmpReport);
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fs.unlinkSync(tmpReport);
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if (e.code === 1) {
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return this.groupByFile(results);
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}
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}
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throw new Error(`Betterleaks scan failed: ${e.message}`);
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}
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finally {
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// Best-effort cleanup — a cleanup failure must never mask the scan's
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// real result or its original error.
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try {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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catch {
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// ignore
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}
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}
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}
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parseResults(reportPath) {
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try {
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
---
|
|
2
2
|
name: rafter-security
|
|
3
3
|
description: Security toolkit for AI workflows. Use when scanning code or repos for vulnerabilities, auditing third-party skills/MCPs/agent configs before installing, evaluating shell commands before running them, or generating secure design questions for new features. Provides `rafter run` (remote SAST + SCA, needs RAFTER_API_KEY), `rafter secrets` (offline secrets-only), `rafter agent exec --dry-run` (command-risk classification), and `rafter skill review`.
|
|
4
|
-
version: 0.8.
|
|
4
|
+
version: 0.8.6
|
|
5
5
|
homepage: https://rafter.so
|
|
6
6
|
metadata:
|
|
7
7
|
openclaw:
|