@rafter-security/cli 0.11.3 → 0.11.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ function claudeCodeHooks() {
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  if (settings.hooks.SessionStart.length === 0)
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  delete settings.hooks.SessionStart;
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  }
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- settings.hooks.PreToolUse.push({ matcher: "Bash", hooks: [pre] }, { matcher: "Write|Edit", hooks: [pre] });
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+ settings.hooks.PreToolUse.push({ matcher: "Bash", hooks: [pre] }, { matcher: "Write|Edit|MultiEdit", hooks: [pre] });
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  // Narrow to tools that produce scannable output (shell output + file
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  // writes); avoids firing posttool on every Read/MCP call (latency).
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  settings.hooks.PostToolUse.push({ matcher: "Bash|Write|Edit|MultiEdit", hooks: [post] });
@@ -549,8 +549,9 @@ function geminiHooks() {
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  s.hooks.AfterTool = filterOutRafter(s.hooks.AfterTool, (e) => hookEntryMatchesRafter(e, "rafter hook posttool"));
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  // Explicit Gemini built-in tool names per geminicli.com/docs/hooks/reference
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  // (rf-044o verification).
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+ // No tool is named `edit`: Gemini's edit tool is `replace`.
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  s.hooks.BeforeTool.push({
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- matcher: "run_shell_command|write_file|replace|edit",
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+ matcher: "run_shell_command|write_file|replace",
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  hooks: [{ type: "command", command: "rafter hook pretool --format gemini", timeout: 5000 }],
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  });
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  s.hooks.AfterTool.push({
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ function installClaudeCodeHooks(root, out) {
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  delete settings.hooks.SessionStart;
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  }
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  // Add Rafter hooks
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- settings.hooks.PreToolUse.push({ matcher: "Bash", hooks: [preHook] }, { matcher: "Write|Edit", hooks: [preHook] });
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+ settings.hooks.PreToolUse.push({ matcher: "Bash", hooks: [preHook] }, { matcher: "Write|Edit|MultiEdit", hooks: [preHook] });
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  // Narrow to tools that produce scannable output (shell output + file
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  // writes). Firing posttool on every tool — including Read and MCP calls —
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  // added latency to operations that never produce secrets to redact.
@@ -590,10 +590,12 @@ function installGeminiHooks(root, out) {
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  settings.hooks.AfterTool = settings.hooks.AfterTool.filter((entry) => !(entry.hooks || []).some((h) => String(h.command ?? "").includes("hook posttool")));
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  // Gemini matchers are regexes against built-in tool names per
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  // geminicli.com/docs/hooks/reference. Match the mutating tools by name
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- // explicitly: run_shell_command, write_file, replace, edit. (rf-044o
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- // verification 2026-05-03 — schema confirmed against current Gemini docs.)
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+ // explicitly: run_shell_command, write_file, replace. (rf-044o
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+ // verification 2026-05-03 — schema confirmed against current Gemini docs.
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+ // Gemini has no tool named `edit`; its edit tool is `replace` per
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+ // geminicli.com/docs/reference/tools.)
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  settings.hooks.BeforeTool.push({
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- matcher: "run_shell_command|write_file|replace|edit",
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+ matcher: "run_shell_command|write_file|replace",
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  hooks: [{ type: "command", command: absoluteHookCommand("pretool --format gemini"), timeout: 5000 }],
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  });
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  settings.hooks.AfterTool.push({
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ const WRITE_TOOLS = new Set(["Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit", "write_file", "replac
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  * Map each write tool's input onto the { file_path, content } shape that
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  * evaluateWrite reads: Continue's Write names its path `filepath`; MultiEdit
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  * and Windsurf's pre_write_code carry `edits[].new_string`; Codex's
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- * apply_patch carries the whole patch in `command`.
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+ * apply_patch carries the whole patch in `command`, with its target paths
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+ * in the patch headers (`patch_paths`).
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  */
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  function normalizeWriteInput(toolName, input) {
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  const out = { ...input };
@@ -225,8 +226,28 @@ function normalizeWriteInput(toolName, input) {
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  out.content = input.command;
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  }
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  }
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+ if (toolName === "apply_patch" && typeof input.command === "string") {
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+ out.patch_paths = applyPatchPaths(input.command);
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+ }
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  return out;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * Every path an apply_patch names. The patch format carries its targets only
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+ * in hunk headers, which Codex matches on the trimmed line:
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+ * `*** Add File: <path>`, `*** Update File: <path>`, `*** Delete File: <path>`
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+ * and `*** Move to: <path>` (codex-rs/apply-patch, apply_patch.lark).
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+ */
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+ const APPLY_PATCH_HEADERS = ["*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "];
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+ function applyPatchPaths(patch) {
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+ const paths = [];
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+ for (const raw of patch.split("\n")) {
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+ const line = raw.trim();
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+ const header = APPLY_PATCH_HEADERS.find((h) => line.startsWith(h));
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+ if (header)
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+ paths.push(line.slice(header.length).trim());
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+ }
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+ return paths;
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+ }
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  function evaluateBash(command, control) {
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  const audit = new AuditLogger();
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  // Command-risk interception — gated by commandPolicy. When disabled, skip the
@@ -308,8 +329,9 @@ function writesRafterSecurityConfig(filePath) {
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  function evaluateWrite(toolInput) {
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  // rf-vnxs: checked FIRST, and before the no-content early return, because a
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  // truncating write with empty content disables the hook just as well as one
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- // carrying JSON.
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- if (writesRafterSecurityConfig(toolInput.file_path ?? "")) {
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+ // carrying JSON. apply_patch names its targets only in the patch headers.
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+ const targets = [toolInput.file_path ?? "", ...(toolInput.patch_paths ?? [])];
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+ if (targets.some(writesRafterSecurityConfig)) {
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  return {
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  decision: "deny",
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  reason: "\u2717 Rafter blocked: write to rafter's own configuration\n" +
@@ -29,24 +29,30 @@ function severityEmoji(level) {
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  return emojis[sev] || "🟡";
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  }
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  export function buildFromBackendVulnerability(vuln) {
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- const sev = severityLabel(vuln.level);
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- const emoji = severityEmoji(vuln.level);
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- const fp = fingerprint(vuln.file, vuln.ruleId);
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- const title = `${emoji} [${sev.toUpperCase()}] ${vuln.ruleId}: ${truncate(vuln.message, 80)}`;
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+ const ruleId = vuln.rule_id ?? vuln.ruleId ?? "unknown-rule";
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+ const level = vuln.severity ?? vuln.level ?? "note";
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+ const summary = vuln.title ?? vuln.message ?? "Security finding";
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+ const details = vuln.description ?? vuln.message ?? summary;
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+ const file = vuln.file_path ?? vuln.file ?? "unknown file";
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+ const line = vuln.line_start ?? vuln.line;
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+ const sev = severityLabel(level);
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+ const emoji = severityEmoji(level);
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+ const fp = fingerprint(file, ruleId);
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+ const title = `${emoji} [${sev.toUpperCase()}] ${ruleId}: ${truncate(summary, 80)}`;
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  let body = `## Security Finding\n\n`;
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- body += `**Rule:** \`${vuln.ruleId}\`\n`;
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+ body += `**Rule:** \`${ruleId}\`\n`;
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  body += `**Severity:** ${sev}\n`;
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- body += `**File:** \`${vuln.file}\``;
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- if (vuln.line)
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- body += ` (line ${vuln.line})`;
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+ body += `**File:** \`${file}\``;
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+ if (line)
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+ body += ` (line ${line})`;
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  body += `\n\n`;
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- body += `### Description\n\n${vuln.message}\n\n`;
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- body += `### Remediation\n\nReview and fix the finding in \`${vuln.file}\`.\n`;
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+ body += `### Description\n\n${details}\n\n`;
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+ body += `### Remediation\n\nReview and fix the finding in \`${file}\`.\n`;
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  body += `\n---\n*Created by [Rafter CLI](https://rafter.so) — security for AI builders*\n`;
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  const labels = [
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  "security",
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  `severity:${sev}`,
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- `rule:${vuln.ruleId}`,
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+ `rule:${ruleId}`,
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  ];
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  return {
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  title,
@@ -3,6 +3,62 @@ import { resolveKey, EXIT_GENERAL_ERROR, EXIT_SCAN_NOT_FOUND, apiClient, apiUrl
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  import { validateWebhookUrl } from "../core/audit-logger.js";
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  import { ConfigManager } from "../core/config-manager.js";
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  import { fmt } from "../utils/formatter.js";
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+ // Map a raw severity/level to a display tier, using the same rules as the
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+ // GitHub Action (github-action/action.yml) and `rafter get`, so notify agrees
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+ // with both. A value outside the known set is kept verbatim so a finding is
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+ // never silently dropped.
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+ function severityTier(raw) {
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+ switch ((raw ?? "").toLowerCase()) {
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+ case "critical":
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+ return "critical";
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+ case "error":
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+ case "high":
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+ return "high";
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+ case "warning":
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+ case "medium":
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+ return "medium";
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+ case "note":
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+ case "low":
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+ return "low";
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+ default:
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+ return (raw ?? "unknown").toLowerCase();
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+ }
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+ }
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+ // Read findings from the real scan shape (`vulnerabilities[]`), falling back to
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+ // the legacy `findings[]` for old cached payloads. Counts are derived from each
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+ // finding's own severity — never from `summary` — so a finding cannot be lost
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+ // to a summary field this code does not read. "Clean" is therefore reported
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+ // only when there are genuinely zero findings.
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+ function normalizeScan(scan) {
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+ const raw = Array.isArray(scan.vulnerabilities)
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+ ? scan.vulnerabilities
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+ : Array.isArray(scan.findings)
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+ ? scan.findings
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+ : [];
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+ let critical = 0;
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+ let high = 0;
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+ let medium = 0;
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+ let low = 0;
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+ const findings = raw.map((v) => {
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+ const tier = severityTier(v.severity ?? v.level);
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+ if (tier === "critical")
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+ critical++;
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+ else if (tier === "high")
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+ high++;
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+ else if (tier === "medium")
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+ medium++;
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+ else if (tier === "low")
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+ low++;
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+ const title = v.title ?? v.rule_id ?? v.ruleId ?? v.message ?? "Unknown";
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+ const file = v.file_path ?? v.file;
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+ const line = v.line_start ?? v.line;
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+ let location = v.location ?? file ?? "";
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+ if (!v.location && file && line != null)
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+ location = `${file}:${line}`;
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+ return { severity: tier, title, location };
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+ });
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+ return { findings, critical, high, medium, low, total: findings.length };
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+ }
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  function resolveWebhook(cliOpt) {
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  if (cliOpt)
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  return cliOpt;
@@ -29,17 +85,11 @@ function detectPlatform(url) {
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  return "discord";
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  return "generic";
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  }
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- function formatSlackPayload(scan) {
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+ export function formatSlackPayload(scan) {
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  const status = scan.status ?? "unknown";
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  const repo = scan.repository_name ?? "unknown";
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  const scanId = scan.scan_id ?? "";
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- const findings = scan.findings ?? [];
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- const summary = scan.summary ?? {};
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- const critical = summary.critical ?? 0;
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- const high = summary.high ?? 0;
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- const medium = summary.medium ?? 0;
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- const low = summary.low ?? 0;
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- const total = critical + high + medium + low;
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+ const { findings, critical, high, medium, low, total } = normalizeScan(scan);
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  let statusIcon;
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  let statusText;
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  if (status === "completed" && total === 0) {
@@ -88,12 +138,9 @@ function formatSlackPayload(scan) {
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  }
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  if (findings.length > 0) {
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  const lines = findings.slice(0, 5).map((f) => {
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- const sev = (f.severity ?? "unknown").toUpperCase();
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- const title = f.title ?? f.rule_id ?? "Unknown";
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- const loc = f.location ?? f.file ?? "";
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- let line = `• \`[${sev}]\` ${title}`;
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- if (loc)
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- line += ` — ${loc}`;
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+ let line = `• \`[${f.severity.toUpperCase()}]\` ${f.title}`;
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+ if (f.location)
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+ line += ` — ${f.location}`;
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  return line;
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  });
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  if (findings.length > 5)
@@ -107,17 +154,11 @@ function formatSlackPayload(scan) {
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  });
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  return { text: `[rafter] ${repo}: ${statusText}`, blocks };
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  }
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- function formatDiscordPayload(scan) {
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+ export function formatDiscordPayload(scan) {
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  const status = scan.status ?? "unknown";
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  const repo = scan.repository_name ?? "unknown";
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  const scanId = scan.scan_id ?? "";
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- const findings = scan.findings ?? [];
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- const summary = scan.summary ?? {};
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- const critical = summary.critical ?? 0;
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- const high = summary.high ?? 0;
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- const medium = summary.medium ?? 0;
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- const low = summary.low ?? 0;
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- const total = critical + high + medium + low;
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+ const { findings, critical, high, medium, low, total } = normalizeScan(scan);
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  let color;
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  let statusText;
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  if (status === "completed" && total === 0) {
@@ -162,12 +203,9 @@ function formatDiscordPayload(scan) {
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  }
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  if (findings.length > 0) {
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  const lines = findings.slice(0, 5).map((f) => {
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- const sev = (f.severity ?? "unknown").toUpperCase();
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- const title = f.title ?? f.rule_id ?? "Unknown";
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- const loc = f.location ?? f.file ?? "";
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- let line = `• \`[${sev}]\` ${title}`;
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- if (loc)
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- line += ` — ${loc}`;
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+ let line = `• \`[${f.severity.toUpperCase()}]\` ${f.title}`;
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+ if (f.location)
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+ line += ` — ${f.location}`;
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  return line;
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  });
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  if (findings.length > 5)
@@ -179,11 +217,10 @@ function formatDiscordPayload(scan) {
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  embeds: [{ title: "\u{1f6e1}\ufe0f Rafter Security Scan", color, fields, footer: { text: "rafter-bot | rafter.so" } }],
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  };
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  }
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- function formatGenericPayload(scan) {
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+ export function formatGenericPayload(scan) {
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  const status = scan.status ?? "unknown";
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  const repo = scan.repository_name ?? "unknown";
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- const summary = scan.summary ?? {};
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- const total = (summary.critical ?? 0) + (summary.high ?? 0) + (summary.medium ?? 0) + (summary.low ?? 0);
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+ const { total } = normalizeScan(scan);
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  let statusText;
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  if (status === "completed" && total === 0)
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  statusText = "Clean — no issues found";
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ function generateClaudeConfig() {
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  hooks: [{ type: "command", command: "rafter hook pretool" }],
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  },
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  {
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- matcher: "Write|Edit",
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+ matcher: "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
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  hooks: [{ type: "command", command: "rafter hook pretool" }],
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  },
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  ],
@@ -969,9 +969,226 @@ function statementDisarmsRafter(words) {
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  export function modifiesRafterSecurityConfig(command) {
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  if (disarmsRafter(command, 0))
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  return true;
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+ if (writesRafterDir(command))
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+ return true;
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  const sanitized = sanitizeCommandForMatching(command);
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  return sanitized !== command && disarmsRafter(sanitized, 0);
974
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * sable-36oe: the SHELL route to rafter's own directory (`~/.rafter`), which
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+ * the Write/Edit route already refuses (rf-vnxs, `writesRafterSecurityConfig`
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+ * in hook/pretool). `rm ~/.rafter/config.json` disarms the gate exactly as
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+ * `rafter agent config set agent.hooks.enabled false` does.
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+ *
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+ * Deny-by-default scoped to the path, NOT a blocklist of write verbs: the
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+ * verbs are unbounded (`>`, sed -i, cp, tee, dd, install, rsync, perl -i,
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+ * python -c …). A command is protected when a statement that NAMES the
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+ * rafter dir is not a known read-only command without an output redirect.
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+ * Statements that do not name it are not constrained, so
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+ * `cat ~/.rafter/x && npm test` stays allowed; a cd INTO the dir is itself
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+ * not read-only, which keeps `cd ~/.rafter && echo x > config.json` blocked.
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+ *
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+ * Checked on the raw text (a reference inside quotes counts — python -c
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+ * code, heredoc bodies) and on the normalized view, which expands brace
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+ * lists and ANSI-C quotes (`~/.{rafter,x}`, `$'\x2erafter'`).
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+ */
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+ function writesRafterDir(command) {
996
+ if (rafterDirScan(command))
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+ return true;
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+ const normalized = normalizeForMatching(command);
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+ return normalized !== command && rafterDirScan(normalized);
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+ }
1001
+ const RAFTER_DIR_NAME = ".rafter";
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+ /** Characters that continue a file name: `.rafter.yml` and `.rafterignore` are not `.rafter`. */
1003
+ function isNameChar(c) {
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+ return /[a-z0-9_.-]/i.test(c);
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+ }
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+ /**
1007
+ * True if `text` names the rafter dir: `.rafter` as a whole path component
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+ * (so `~/.rafter`, `$HOME/.rafter`, `${HOME}/.rafter`, `/home/u/.rafter`,
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+ * `./.rafter/x`, `'.rafter'` inside code), case-insensitively because macOS
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+ * file systems are. An unquoted glob component that could expand to it
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+ * (`~/.raf*`, `.r?fter`, `.*`) counts too. Linear: one indexOf walk plus one
1012
+ * pass over components.
1013
+ */
1014
+ function namesRafterDir(text, globs) {
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+ const t = text.toLowerCase();
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+ for (let i = t.indexOf(RAFTER_DIR_NAME); i !== -1; i = t.indexOf(RAFTER_DIR_NAME, i + 1)) {
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+ const before = i === 0 ? "" : t[i - 1];
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+ const after = t[i + RAFTER_DIR_NAME.length] ?? "";
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+ if ((before === "" || !isNameChar(before)) && (after === "" || !isNameChar(after)))
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+ return true;
1021
+ }
1022
+ if (!globs)
1023
+ return false;
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+ // Bash never lets a wildcard match a leading dot, so only a component that
1025
+ // starts with a literal "." can glob to ".rafter". Over-approximate the
1026
+ // match: the literal characters outside brackets must appear in order in
1027
+ // "rafter"; `*`, `?` and a whole `[...]` are free.
1028
+ for (const comp of t.split("/")) {
1029
+ if (comp[0] !== "." || !/[*?[]/.test(comp))
1030
+ continue;
1031
+ const want = "rafter";
1032
+ let k = 0;
1033
+ let inBracket = false;
1034
+ let ok = true;
1035
+ for (let j = 1; j < comp.length; j++) {
1036
+ const c = comp[j];
1037
+ if (inBracket) {
1038
+ if (c === "]")
1039
+ inBracket = false;
1040
+ continue;
1041
+ }
1042
+ if (c === "[") {
1043
+ inBracket = true;
1044
+ continue;
1045
+ }
1046
+ if (c === "*" || c === "?")
1047
+ continue;
1048
+ while (k < want.length && want[k] !== c)
1049
+ k++;
1050
+ if (k === want.length) {
1051
+ ok = false;
1052
+ break;
1053
+ }
1054
+ k++;
1055
+ }
1056
+ if (ok)
1057
+ return true;
1058
+ }
1059
+ return false;
1060
+ }
1061
+ /**
1062
+ * Read-only commands: they can neither write a file nor run another program
1063
+ * when given no output redirect. Deliberately narrow. NOT here: sed (its `w`
1064
+ * and `e` commands write and execute without -i), less (`-o` writes a log),
1065
+ * tee/cp/mv/rm/ln/chmod/touch/truncate/dd, and anything that runs a program.
1066
+ */
1067
+ const READ_ONLY_EXECS = new Set([
1068
+ "cat", "more", "head", "tail", "ls", "stat", "file", "wc",
1069
+ "grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rg", "jq", "diff", "cmp",
1070
+ "md5sum", "sha1sum", "sha224sum", "sha256sum", "sha384sum", "sha512sum",
1071
+ "shasum", "b2sum", "cksum",
1072
+ "find", "test", "[", "realpath", "readlink", "du",
1073
+ "cd", "pushd", "popd",
1074
+ ]);
1075
+ /** find actions that delete, run a program, or write a file. */
1076
+ const FIND_WRITE_ACTIONS = new Set([
1077
+ "-delete", "-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir", "-fprint", "-fprint0", "-fprintf", "-fls",
1078
+ ]);
1079
+ /** Only a bare name or a system bin dir: `./cat` is whatever the agent wrote there. */
1080
+ const SYSTEM_BIN = /^(?:\/usr(?:\/local)?|\/opt\/homebrew)?\/s?bin\/[^/]+$/;
1081
+ const WRITE_REDIRECTS = new Set([">", ">>"]);
1082
+ /** True if some statement names the rafter dir and is not read-only. */
1083
+ function rafterDirScan(command) {
1084
+ const acc = { protected: false };
1085
+ scanRafterDirStatements(command, 0, acc);
1086
+ return acc.protected;
1087
+ }
1088
+ function scanRafterDirStatements(command, depth, acc) {
1089
+ // Past the recursion cap, or on a desynchronized parse, the structure is
1090
+ // unknown: FAIL CLOSED — a reference anywhere in the text protects it.
1091
+ if (depth > MAX_SANITIZE_DEPTH) {
1092
+ if (namesRafterDir(command, false))
1093
+ acc.protected = true;
1094
+ return;
1095
+ }
1096
+ const { pieces, unterminated } = tokenize(command);
1097
+ if (unterminated && namesRafterDir(command, false))
1098
+ acc.protected = true;
1099
+ let stmt = [];
1100
+ const flush = () => { scanRafterDirStatement(stmt, acc); stmt = []; };
1101
+ for (let i = 0; i < pieces.length; i++) {
1102
+ const p = pieces[i];
1103
+ for (const sub of p.substs)
1104
+ scanRafterDirStatements(sub, depth + 1, acc);
1105
+ if (p.op !== null && CHAIN_OPS.has(p.op)) {
1106
+ // `>|`, `>&`, `&>`, `&>>` are redirects spelled with a chain character;
1107
+ // splitting on them would orphan the target from its `>`.
1108
+ const prev = pieces[i - 1];
1109
+ const next = pieces[i + 1];
1110
+ const afterRedirect = p.op !== "&&" && p.op !== "||" && !!prev && prev.end === p.start && WRITE_REDIRECTS.has(prev.op ?? "");
1111
+ const beforeRedirect = p.op === "&" && !!next && next.start === p.end && WRITE_REDIRECTS.has(next.op ?? "");
1112
+ if (!afterRedirect && !beforeRedirect) {
1113
+ flush();
1114
+ continue;
1115
+ }
1116
+ }
1117
+ stmt.push(p);
1118
+ }
1119
+ flush();
1120
+ }
1121
+ function scanRafterDirStatement(stmt, acc) {
1122
+ let argv0 = -1;
1123
+ let redirect = false;
1124
+ let names = false;
1125
+ for (let i = 0; i < stmt.length; i++) {
1126
+ const p = stmt[i];
1127
+ if (p.op !== null) {
1128
+ if (WRITE_REDIRECTS.has(p.op) && !discardsOutput(stmt, i))
1129
+ redirect = true;
1130
+ continue;
1131
+ }
1132
+ const prevOp = i > 0 ? stmt[i - 1].op : null;
1133
+ const isRedirectTarget = prevOp !== null && REDIRECT_OPS.has(prevOp);
1134
+ // Executing a binary that lives in the dir (`~/.rafter/bin/betterleaks
1135
+ // version`) is not a reference; its arguments still are. Only an UNQUOTED
1136
+ // argv0 is a path the shell runs: a quoted one is a heredoc body line or
1137
+ // other code (`open('/home/u/.rafter/config.json','w')`), never a binary.
1138
+ if (argv0 === -1 && !isRedirectTarget) {
1139
+ argv0 = i;
1140
+ if (!p.quoted && !ENV_ASSIGNMENT.test(p.text))
1141
+ continue;
1142
+ }
1143
+ if (namesRafterDir(p.text, !p.quoted))
1144
+ names = true;
1145
+ }
1146
+ if (names && (redirect || !statementReadOnly(stmt, argv0)))
1147
+ acc.protected = true;
1148
+ }
1149
+ /** `2>/dev/null`, `2>&1`, `>&-`: an output redirect that writes no file. */
1150
+ function discardsOutput(stmt, i) {
1151
+ let j = i + 1;
1152
+ let dup = false;
1153
+ if (stmt[j]?.op === "&" && stmt[j].start === stmt[i].end) {
1154
+ dup = true;
1155
+ j++;
1156
+ }
1157
+ const target = stmt[j];
1158
+ if (!target || target.op !== null || target.substs.length > 0)
1159
+ return false;
1160
+ return dup ? /^(?:\d+|-)$/.test(target.text) : target.text === "/dev/null";
1161
+ }
1162
+ function statementReadOnly(stmt, argv0) {
1163
+ if (argv0 === -1)
1164
+ return true; // empty, or only an input redirect
1165
+ const head = stmt[argv0];
1166
+ if (!head.quoted && ENV_ASSIGNMENT.test(head.text))
1167
+ return false;
1168
+ if (head.text.includes("/") && !SYSTEM_BIN.test(head.text))
1169
+ return false;
1170
+ const exec = head.text.slice(head.text.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
1171
+ if (!READ_ONLY_EXECS.has(exec))
1172
+ return false;
1173
+ const args = stmt.slice(argv0 + 1).filter((p) => p.op === null);
1174
+ switch (exec) {
1175
+ case "find":
1176
+ return !args.some((a) => FIND_WRITE_ACTIONS.has(a.text));
1177
+ case "rg": // --pre runs a program on every file searched
1178
+ return !args.some((a) => a.text.startsWith("--pre"));
1179
+ case "file": // -C compiles a magic file, writing it
1180
+ return !args.some((a) => a.text === "--compile" || /^-[A-Za-z]*C/.test(a.text));
1181
+ case "cd":
1182
+ case "pushd":
1183
+ case "popd":
1184
+ // Claude Code's Bash tool keeps its cwd between calls, so a cd INTO the
1185
+ // dir would make the next call's bare `config.json` a write there with
1186
+ // no reference left to catch. cd elsewhere stays read-only.
1187
+ return !args.some((a) => a.substs.length > 0 || namesRafterDir(a.text, !a.quoted));
1188
+ default:
1189
+ return true;
1190
+ }
1191
+ }
975
1192
  /** True if any statement (or any command substitution) disarms rafter. */
976
1193
  function disarmsRafter(command, depth = 0) {
977
1194
  if (depth > MAX_SANITIZE_DEPTH)
package/dist/utils/api.js CHANGED
@@ -106,7 +106,11 @@ export function handle403(e) {
106
106
  if (typeof body === "object" && body?.scan_mode) {
107
107
  const mode = body.scan_mode;
108
108
  const limit = body.limit ?? "?";
109
- const used = body.used ?? limit;
109
+ // The API sends `remaining`, not `used`; `used` is kept for older servers.
110
+ const used = body.used ??
111
+ (typeof body.limit === "number" && typeof body.remaining === "number"
112
+ ? body.limit - body.remaining
113
+ : limit);
110
114
  console.error(`Error: ${mode.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + mode.slice(1)} scan limit reached (${used}/${limit} used this billing period).\nUpgrade your plan or wait for your quota to reset.`);
111
115
  return EXIT_QUOTA_EXHAUSTED;
112
116
  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@rafter-security/cli",
3
- "version": "0.11.3",
3
+ "version": "0.11.4",
4
4
  "type": "module",
5
5
  "repository": {
6
6
  "type": "git",
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
1
1
  ---
2
2
  name: rafter-security
3
3
  description: Security toolkit for AI workflows. Use when scanning code or repos for vulnerabilities, auditing third-party skills/MCPs/agent configs before installing, evaluating shell commands before running them, or generating secure design questions for new features. Provides `rafter run` (remote SAST + SCA, needs RAFTER_API_KEY), `rafter secrets` (offline secrets-only), `rafter agent exec --dry-run` (command-risk classification), and `rafter skill review`.
4
- version: 0.11.3
4
+ version: 0.11.4
5
5
  homepage: https://rafter.so
6
6
  metadata:
7
7
  openclaw: