@qwen-code/qwen-code 0.21.13 → 0.21.14-preview.0

package/chunks/{chunk-QNQAPSN2.js → chunk-UC67T4SF.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 "use strict";
 import {
   SkillError
-} from "./chunk-25EYDK42.js";
+} from "./chunk-WPVUOVYX.js";
 import {
   init_esbuild_shims
 } from "./chunk-5O2XNYP6.js";
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ var SERVE_CONTROL_EXT_METHODS = {
   sessionGoalGet: "qwen/control/session/goal/get",
   sessionMcpRuntimeAdd: "qwen/control/session/mcp/runtime-add",
   sessionMcpRuntimeRemove: "qwen/control/session/mcp/runtime-remove",
+  /** Read a bounded settled `turn_result` from the active transcript. */
+  sessionTurnStatus: "qwen/control/session/turn_status",
   workspaceMcpRuntimeAdd: "qwen/control/workspace/mcp/runtime-add",
   workspaceMcpRuntimeRemove: "qwen/control/workspace/mcp/runtime-remove",
   workspaceReload: "qwen/control/workspace/reload",

package/chunks/{chunk-O565M6A4.js → chunk-UYDGFWIJ.js}

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-NYWWQ437.js";
 import {
   CLIENT_MCP_OVER_WS_CONFIG_FLAG
-} from "./chunk-S5DWMTHO.js";
+} from "./chunk-WP4WIUOJ.js";
 import {
   MAX_WORKSPACE_PATH_LENGTH,
   translateAndCheckAbsoluteWorkspacePath
@@ -923,9 +923,107 @@ function isDeepHealthQuery(raw) {
 }
 __name(isDeepHealthQuery, "isDeepHealthQuery");
 
-// packages/cli/src/serve/auth.ts
+// packages/cli/src/serve/local-control/credentials.ts
 init_esbuild_shims();
 import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+var CredentialStore = class {
+  static {
+    __name(this, "CredentialStore");
+  }
+  #runtime;
+  /** Pairing id → sha256 of the pairing secret. */
+  #pairing = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  constructor(runtimeToken) {
+    this.#runtime = hashToken(runtimeToken);
+  }
+  addPairingToken(id, token) {
+    this.#pairing.set(id, createHash("sha256").update(token, "utf8").digest());
+  }
+  revokePairingToken(id) {
+    return this.#pairing.delete(id);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Is the gate open — i.e. may an unauthenticated request through?
+   *
+   * Only ever true on the primary listener of a no-token loopback daemon,
+   * preserving today's developer default. The LAN listener is never open: it
+   * exists only while a pairing token does, and it must not inherit the
+   * "operator chose the surface area" reasoning that governs `--hostname`.
+   */
+  isOpen(listener) {
+    if (listener.kind === "local-control") return false;
+    return this.#runtime === void 0;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Constant-time check of a presented credential against those valid for
+   * `listener`. Every candidate in scope is compared even after a match so the
+   * work is independent of which credential matched — with a handful of
+   * pairing tokens the cost is negligible and the timing signal is not worth
+   * reasoning about separately.
+   */
+  verify(credentials, listener) {
+    const candidate = createHash("sha256").update(credentials, "utf8").digest();
+    let matched = false;
+    if (listener.kind === "local-control") {
+      for (const expected of this.#pairing.values()) {
+        if (equalDigest(candidate, expected)) matched = true;
+      }
+      return matched;
+    }
+    return this.#runtime !== void 0 && equalDigest(candidate, this.#runtime);
+  }
+};
+function singleTokenCredentials(token) {
+  const expected = hashToken(token);
+  return {
+    isOpen: /* @__PURE__ */ __name((listener) => expected === void 0 && listener.kind !== "local-control", "isOpen"),
+    verify: /* @__PURE__ */ __name((candidate, listener) => {
+      if (expected === void 0 || listener.kind === "local-control") {
+        return false;
+      }
+      return equalDigest(
+        createHash("sha256").update(candidate, "utf8").digest(),
+        expected
+      );
+    }, "verify")
+  };
+}
+__name(singleTokenCredentials, "singleTokenCredentials");
+function hashToken(token) {
+  return token === void 0 || token === "" ? void 0 : createHash("sha256").update(token, "utf8").digest();
+}
+__name(hashToken, "hashToken");
+function equalDigest(a, b) {
+  return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+}
+__name(equalDigest, "equalDigest");
+
+// packages/cli/src/serve/local-control/listener-identity.ts
+init_esbuild_shims();
+var LISTENER_TAG = Symbol.for("qwen.serve.listenerIdentity");
+function tagListener(server, identity) {
+  server[LISTENER_TAG] = identity;
+}
+__name(tagListener, "tagListener");
+var PRIMARY = { kind: "primary" };
+function fromServer(server) {
+  if (!server || typeof server !== "object") return void 0;
+  return server[LISTENER_TAG];
+}
+__name(fromServer, "fromServer");
+function listenerIdentityOf(req) {
+  const socket = req.socket;
+  return fromServer(socket?.server) ?? PRIMARY;
+}
+__name(listenerIdentityOf, "listenerIdentityOf");
+function listenerIdentityOfSocket(socket) {
+  const withServer = socket;
+  return fromServer(withServer?.server) ?? PRIMARY;
+}
+__name(listenerIdentityOfSocket, "listenerIdentityOfSocket");
+
+// packages/cli/src/serve/auth.ts
+init_esbuild_shims();
 var denyBrowserOriginCors = /* @__PURE__ */ __name((req, res, next) => {
   if (req.headers.origin) {
     res.setHeader("Vary", "Origin");
@@ -973,7 +1071,42 @@ function parseAllowOriginPatterns(raw) {
   return { allowAny, origins };
 }
 __name(parseAllowOriginPatterns, "parseAllowOriginPatterns");
+var MutableOriginAllowlist = class {
+  static {
+    __name(this, "MutableOriginAllowlist");
+  }
+  #allowAny;
+  #static;
+  #dynamic = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  constructor(base) {
+    this.#allowAny = base.allowAny;
+    this.#static = new Set(base.origins);
+  }
+  allows(origin) {
+    if (this.#allowAny) return true;
+    const normalized = origin.toLowerCase();
+    if (this.#static.has(normalized)) return true;
+    for (const value of this.#dynamic.values()) {
+      if (value === normalized) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+  /** Add a runtime origin under `key`; re-adding the same key replaces it. */
+  add(key, origin) {
+    this.#dynamic.set(key, origin.toLowerCase());
+  }
+  remove(key) {
+    this.#dynamic.delete(key);
+  }
+};
+function toMatcher(patterns) {
+  return "allows" in patterns ? patterns : {
+    allows: /* @__PURE__ */ __name((origin) => patterns.allowAny || patterns.origins.has(origin.toLowerCase()), "allows")
+  };
+}
+__name(toMatcher, "toMatcher");
 function allowOriginCors(patterns) {
+  const matcher = toMatcher(patterns);
   const allowedMethods = "GET, POST, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS";
   const allowedHeaders = "Authorization, Content-Type, X-Qwen-Client-Id, Last-Event-ID, X-Qwen-Event-Epoch";
   const maxAgeSeconds = "86400";
@@ -989,7 +1122,7 @@ function allowOriginCors(patterns) {
       res.status(403).json({ error: "Request denied by CORS policy" });
       return;
     }
-    const matched = patterns.allowAny || patterns.origins.has(origin.toLowerCase());
+    const matched = matcher.allows(origin);
     if (matched) {
       res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin);
       res.setHeader("Vary", "Origin");
@@ -1010,6 +1143,24 @@ function allowOriginCors(patterns) {
 }
 __name(allowOriginCors, "allowOriginCors");
 function hostAllowlist(bind, getPort) {
+  const primaryGate = buildPrimaryHostGate(bind, getPort);
+  return (req, res, next) => {
+    const listener = listenerIdentityOf(req);
+    if (listener.kind !== "local-control") {
+      primaryGate(req, res, next);
+      return;
+    }
+    const host = (req.headers.host || "").toLowerCase();
+    const browserHost = listener.origin === void 0 ? void 0 : new URL(listener.origin).host.toLowerCase();
+    if (listener.authority === void 0 || host !== listener.authority && host !== browserHost) {
+      res.status(403).json({ error: "Invalid Host header" });
+      return;
+    }
+    next();
+  };
+}
+__name(hostAllowlist, "hostAllowlist");
+function buildPrimaryHostGate(bind, getPort) {
   if (!isLoopbackBind(bind)) {
     return (_req, _res, next) => next();
   }
@@ -1042,13 +1193,15 @@ function hostAllowlist(bind, getPort) {
     next();
   };
 }
-__name(hostAllowlist, "hostAllowlist");
-function bearerAuth(token) {
-  if (!token) {
-    return (_req, _res, next) => next();
-  }
-  const expected = createHash("sha256").update(token, "utf8").digest();
+__name(buildPrimaryHostGate, "buildPrimaryHostGate");
+function bearerAuth(source) {
+  const credentials = typeof source === "object" && source !== null ? source : singleTokenCredentials(source);
   return (req, res, next) => {
+    const listener = listenerIdentityOf(req);
+    if (credentials.isOpen(listener)) {
+      next();
+      return;
+    }
     const header = req.headers.authorization;
     if (!header) {
       res.status(401).json({ error: "Unauthorized" });
@@ -1068,26 +1221,35 @@ function bearerAuth(token) {
     while (credStart < header.length && (header.charCodeAt(credStart) === 32 || header.charCodeAt(credStart) === 9)) {
       credStart++;
     }
-    const credentials = header.slice(credStart);
-    if (credentials.length === 0) {
+    const presented = header.slice(credStart);
+    if (presented.length === 0) {
       res.status(401).json({ error: "Unauthorized" });
       return;
     }
-    const candidate = createHash("sha256").update(credentials, "utf8").digest();
-    if (!timingSafeEqual(candidate, expected)) {
+    if (!credentials.verify(presented, listener)) {
       res.status(401).json({ error: "Unauthorized" });
       return;
     }
+    req[AUTHENTICATED_REQUEST] = true;
     next();
   };
 }
 __name(bearerAuth, "bearerAuth");
+var AUTHENTICATED_REQUEST = Symbol("qwen.serve.authenticatedRequest");
+function requestWasAuthenticated(req) {
+  return req[AUTHENTICATED_REQUEST] === true;
+}
+__name(requestWasAuthenticated, "requestWasAuthenticated");
 function createMutationGate(deps) {
   const passthrough = /* @__PURE__ */ __name((_req, _res, next) => next(), "passthrough");
   if (deps.requireAuth || deps.tokenConfigured) {
     return () => passthrough;
   }
-  const strictDenier = /* @__PURE__ */ __name((_req, res) => {
+  const strictDenier = /* @__PURE__ */ __name((req, res, next) => {
+    if (requestWasAuthenticated(req)) {
+      next();
+      return;
+    }
     res.status(401).json({
       error: "This route requires the daemon to be configured with a bearer token. Set QWEN_SERVER_TOKEN or pass --token to enable bearer auth.",
       code: "token_required"
@@ -1270,6 +1432,11 @@ var SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY = {
   session_source_metadata: { since: "v1" },
   session_side_task: { since: "v1" },
   session_prompt: { since: "v1" },
+  session_turn_status: { since: "v1" },
+  // Prompts and mid-turn messages support session-scoped media uploaded once
+  // and referenced by `mediaId`. The bridge resolves bytes only when ACP input
+  // is dispatched, keeping base64 out of JSON and SSE payloads.
+  session_media: { since: "v1" },
   session_mid_turn_message_mutation: { since: "v1" },
   // Daemon-owned reconciliation surface for mid-turn messages:
   // `GET /session/:id/mid-turn-messages` returns the messages still waiting
@@ -1603,6 +1770,17 @@ var SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY = {
   // This remains independent from active export so older daemons cannot ignore
   // archive intent and return an active transcript with the same session id.
   workspace_archived_session_export: { since: "v1" },
+  // Workspace-qualified, memory-only session live-state snapshot plus the
+  // in-memory catalog version token
+  // (`GET /workspaces/:workspace/sessions/live-state`). Independent from
+  // `workspace_qualified_rest_core`: released daemons can advertise that tag
+  // without implementing this route, so clients must pre-flight it directly.
+  // The route stays subject to the per-workspace trust check even when the
+  // tag is advertised.
+  workspace_session_live_state: { since: "v1" },
+  // Workspace-qualified metadata updates for active, inactive, and archived
+  // persisted sessions.
+  workspace_session_metadata: { since: "v1" },
   // Workspace-qualified ACP transport (issue #6378 Phase 4):
   // `/workspaces/:workspace/acp` mounts a per-runtime ACP dispatcher (HTTP +
   // WebSocket) for each registered workspace, with per-runtime device-flow and
@@ -3882,11 +4060,18 @@ export {
   createBridgeFileSystemAdapter,
   PathMutexRegistry,
   isDeepHealthQuery,
+  CredentialStore,
+  singleTokenCredentials,
+  tagListener,
+  listenerIdentityOf,
+  listenerIdentityOfSocket,
   denyBrowserOriginCors,
   parseAllowOriginPatterns,
+  MutableOriginAllowlist,
   allowOriginCors,
   hostAllowlist,
   bearerAuth,
+  requestWasAuthenticated,
   createMutationGate,
   ClientMcpSenderRegistry,
   createClientMcpServerProvider,