@qwen-code/qwen-code 0.19.9-nightly.20260714.9dd8389eb → 0.19.10

package/bundled/qc-helper/docs/configuration/settings.md

@@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ If you are experiencing performance issues with file searching (e.g., with `@` c
 
 See [Memory](../features/memory) for details on how auto-memory works and how to use the `/memory`, `/remember`, and `/dream` commands.
 
+#### agents
+
+| Setting                       | Type   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Default   |
+| ----------------------------- | ------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
+| `agents.builtin.exploreModel` | string | Model selector for the built-in Explore subagent. Use `inherit` for the main session model, `fast` for `fastModel`, a model ID, or an `authType:model-id` selector. A custom same-name Explore agent keeps its own model configuration. Requires restart. | `inherit` |
+
 #### permissions
 
 The permissions system provides fine-grained control over which tools can run, which require confirmation, and which are blocked.

package/bundled/qc-helper/docs/features/sub-agents.md

@@ -194,6 +194,27 @@ When the selector resolves to another auth type, Qwen Code creates a dedicated
 runtime provider for that subagent request and sends the provider only the bare
 model ID.
 
+The built-in Explore agent inherits the main session model by default. To
+select a different model for only that built-in agent, configure
+`agents.builtin.exploreModel` in `settings.json` and restart Qwen Code:
+
+Earlier versions used `fastModel` for Explore by default. To preserve that
+behavior, set `agents.builtin.exploreModel` to `fast`.
+
+```json
+{
+  "agents": {
+    "builtin": {
+      "exploreModel": "fast"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+This setting accepts the same selectors described above. It is applied only
+when Qwen Code resolves the built-in Explore definition; a session, project,
+user, or extension agent named Explore keeps its own `model` setting.
+
 #### Permission Mode
 
 Use the optional `approvalMode` frontmatter field to control how a subagent's tool calls are approved. Valid values:

package/bundled/qc-helper/docs/qwen-serve.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Run Qwen Code as a local HTTP daemon so multiple clients (IDE plugins, web UIs,
 - **First-responder permissions** — when the agent asks for permission to run a tool, every connected client sees the request; whichever client answers first wins.
 - **One daemon, one or more workspaces** — repeat `--workspace` to register isolated workspace runtimes under one listener. The first workspace is primary and remains the default for requests that omit `cwd`.
 - **Experimental daemon-managed channels** — start with `qwen serve --channel <name>`, or start without a channel and select one later with `qwen channel set`. Workers are separate processes owned by the daemon lifecycle. Their selection can be queried, replaced, reloaded, and stopped without restarting the daemon.
-- **Remote runtime control** ([#4175](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code/issues/4175) PR 17) — change a session's approval mode (`POST /session/:id/approval-mode`), toggle a tool per workspace (`POST /workspace/tools/:name/enable`), scaffold an empty `QWEN.md` (`POST /workspace/init`, mechanical only — does NOT call the model; for AI-fill, follow up with `POST /session/:id/prompt`), restart a single MCP server with a budget pre-check (`POST /workspace/mcp/:server/restart`), or add/remove MCP servers at runtime without a daemon restart (`POST /workspace/mcp/servers`, `DELETE /workspace/mcp/servers/:name`). All strict-gated — configure `--token` first.
+- **Remote runtime control** — change a session's approval mode (`POST /session/:id/approval-mode`), toggle a tool (`POST /workspace/tools/:name/enable`) or loaded skill (`POST /workspace/skills/:name/enable`) per workspace, scaffold an empty `QWEN.md` (`POST /workspace/init`, mechanical only — does NOT call the model; for AI-fill, follow up with `POST /session/:id/prompt`), restart a single MCP server with a budget pre-check (`POST /workspace/mcp/:server/restart`), or add/remove MCP servers at runtime without a daemon restart (`POST /workspace/mcp/servers`, `DELETE /workspace/mcp/servers/:name`). All strict-gated — configure `--token` first.
 - **Session recap** ([#4175](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code/issues/4175) follow-up) — fetch a one-sentence "where did I leave off" summary of an active session (`POST /session/:id/recap`). Wraps core's `generateSessionRecap` as a side-query against the fast model; pollutes neither the main chat history nor the SSE stream. Non-strict gate (same posture as `/prompt`); SDK helper `client.recapSession(sessionId)`.
   - **Known limit — token-cost amplification:** the route is a pure-cost endpoint (each call is an LLM side-query, no state benefit) and the daemon has no per-route rate limit in v1. On a no-token loopback default a buggy or malicious local client can spam it to burn tokens. Configure `--token` (and optionally `--require-auth`) on shared dev hosts before exposing the daemon.
   - **Concurrent recap safety:** two simultaneous `/recap` calls on the same session run two independent side-queries. `generateSessionRecap` reads a snapshot of the chat history via `GeminiClient.getChat().getHistory()` and feeds it to a separate `BaseLlmClient.generateText` call (via `runSideQuery`); it never appends to or mutates the session's `GeminiChat`. Safe to call from multiple clients without coordination.
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ idle daemon returns `initialized: false` with an empty snapshot. Once a
 session is alive they switch to `initialized: true` and surface the real
 state.
 
+To mirror the CLI `/skills` panel remotely, call `POST /workspace/skills/:name/enable` with `{ "enabled": true | false }` after checking the `workspace_skill_toggle` capability. The route writes only workspace `skills.disabled`, rejects unknown, hidden, inactive-extension, higher-scope-locked, and untrusted targets, and immediately refreshes active ACP sessions. A `deferred` response means the setting was saved while no ACP child was running; it will apply when the child starts. `skills.disabled` disables both manual and model use, unlike `disable-model-invocation: true`, which keeps direct `/skill-name` invocation available.
+
 `GET /workspace/env` and `GET /workspace/preflight` always answer with
 `initialized: true` regardless of ACP state. `env` never consults ACP
 (daemon-process info only); `preflight` answers daemon-level cells from
@@ -433,7 +435,7 @@ Both flags accept a positive integer in milliseconds; `0`, `NaN`, non-integer, o
 
 Pass `--workspace` more than once to register several non-overlapping workspaces in one `qwen serve` process. The first path is primary. Each registered workspace owns an isolated runtime boundary, while the daemon-wide listener, authentication policy, and total-session limit are shared. Trusted workspaces start their own `qwen --acp` child on demand. Requests may select a registered workspace by canonical `cwd`; requests that omit `cwd` use the primary workspace. Use one daemon per user or security principal; workspace trust is an execution gate, not an ACL.
 
-An untrusted secondary workspace is visible in Web Shell as `untrusted` and `read-only`. It can be expanded to inspect the persisted session catalog, but it cannot yet be selected or opened in Web Shell, resumed, or used to create sessions. The REST API exposes its persisted session-group catalog and, when `workspace_persisted_transcript` is advertised, its active persisted transcript through the workspace-qualified pager. These reads do not include live runtime state or start an ACP child. Trust the workspace and restart the daemon before using execution or mutation features. An untrusted primary remains disabled in Web Shell.
+An untrusted secondary workspace is visible in Web Shell as `untrusted` and `read-only`. It can be expanded to inspect the persisted session catalog, but it cannot yet be selected or opened in Web Shell, resumed, used to create sessions, or fully exported. The REST API exposes its persisted session-group catalog and, when `workspace_persisted_transcript` is advertised, its active persisted transcript through the bounded workspace-qualified pager. These reads do not include live runtime state or start an ACP child. Full workspace-qualified export requires a trusted workspace and the separate `workspace_session_export` capability. Trust the workspace and restart the daemon before using execution, mutation, or export features. An untrusted primary remains disabled in Web Shell.
 
 Use separate daemon processes when you need a smaller fault or security boundary, independent bearer tokens, quotas, audit boundaries, operating-system isolation, or independent resource supervision. Multi-workspace mode is intended for one operator hosting several repos; it is not a multi-tenant isolation boundary. A single daemon token authorizes every route the daemon exposes, including the allowed read-only catalog for all registered workspaces.
 
@@ -451,6 +453,7 @@ The daemon exposes ACP's `session/load` and resume flow over HTTP, plus a separa
 | `POST /session/:id/resume`                          | The client already has the turns on screen and only needs the daemon-side handle back. Model context is restored on the agent side without UI replay — the SSE stream stays clean. Capability tag: `session_resume` (`unstable_session_resume` remains a deprecated alias for older clients).     |
 | `GET /session/:id/transcript`                       | The client needs the complete active persisted transcript. It returns id-less replay frames in cursor pages and does not call `/load`, attach a client, seed the live EventBus, create a live session, or change the live replay window. Capability tag: `session_transcript`.                    |
 | `GET /workspaces/:workspace/session/:id/transcript` | The client needs an active persisted transcript from a selected workspace without starting ACP or loading workspace settings. Registered untrusted secondary workspaces may use this read-only path. Capability tag: `workspace_persisted_transcript`.                                            |
+| `GET /workspaces/:workspace/session/:id/export`     | The client needs a complete `html`, `md`, `json`, or `jsonl` attachment from a selected trusted workspace. It reads active persisted storage without starting ACP or falling back to primary. Capability tag: `workspace_session_export`.                                                         |
 
 For load and resume, the TypeScript SDK exposes static factories on
 `DaemonSessionClient`:
@@ -482,6 +485,8 @@ curl "http://127.0.0.1:4170/session/$SESSION_ID/transcript?limit=100"
 
 For a registered workspace, use `client.workspaceById(workspaceId).getSessionTranscriptPage(sessionId, { cursor, limit })` or `/workspaces/:workspace/session/:id/transcript`. The workspace-qualified method always uses native REST even when the SDK client has a replaceable ACP transport. Its cursors are daemon-lifetime-only and must be restarted from page one after a daemon restart.
 
+For a full attachment from a trusted registered workspace, pre-flight `workspace_session_export` and call `client.workspaceById(workspaceId).exportSession(sessionId, { format: 'html' })` or the raw `/workspaces/:workspace/session/:id/export` route. Do not infer support from `session_export` or `workspace_qualified_rest_core`: older daemons can advertise both while retaining primary-only export. The current Web Shell export action remains primary-only; use the SDK or REST route for another workspace.
+
 `limit` counts active chat records, not emitted replay frames; one record can produce several `session_update` events. The first response freezes the JSONL snapshot size and returns `nextCursor` while `hasMore` is true. Later pages ignore appends after page 1, but return `409` if the file is deleted, truncated, replaced, archived, or otherwise conflicts with the frozen cursor. Very large snapshots return `413 transcript_too_large` before indexing so the daemon does not scan unbounded transcript files on the request path.
 
 For repeated paging through the legacy singular route, set `--channel-idle-timeout-ms` to a positive value. With the default `0`, an idle workspace's ACP child — and the in-process transcript index cache it holds — is reaped after every page, so each page re-spawns the child and rebuilds the index by re-scanning the whole frozen prefix (`O(snapshotSize)` per page). A positive timeout keeps the child alive across the cursor walk so it reuses its cached transcript index and replay config. The workspace-qualified persisted route never starts an ACP child and is unaffected by this timeout.

package/bundled/review/SKILL.md

@@ -249,7 +249,22 @@ Every agent reads the whole diff, **by walking the `chunks[]` ranges** — usual
 
 Eleven agents all reading the same diff (every 3A agent except Build & Test walks the whole chunk plan) multiplies redundant reading of the early hunks; it does not add coverage. Once there is enough production code to divide, fan out along **territory** as well: one agent per chunk, with the review dimensions folded into that agent's brief, plus a small set of whole-diff agents for the concerns that only exist at diff scale.
 
-**Chunk agents — one per entry in `chunks[]`.** Each is a `general-purpose` subagent whose prompt gives it:
+**Chunk agents — one per entry in `chunks[]`.** Each is a `general-purpose` subagent. **Do not write its prompt. Ask for it:**
+
+```bash
+qwen review agent-prompt \
+  --plan <the plan report from Step 1> \
+  --chunk <id> \
+  [--rules <the rules file from Step 2, if the project has any>]
+```
+
+Pass what it prints to the agent **verbatim**. It already carries the diff path, the agent's exact `offset`/`limit`, its `files[]`, the paging rule, the uncoverable rule, the severity definitions, and the project rules. **Pass `--rules` whenever Step 2 found any** — this command builds the whole prompt, so there is no later step in which you would staple them on, and a review that silently enforces no project rule is one of the things this skill exists to prevent.
+
+Why this is a command and not a paragraph: **the agents were launched blind, and then the check that should have caught it was itself defeated three times.** Measured against the harness's own record of what the agents were actually started with — the first record of each subagent transcript, written at launch — **23 of 23 chunk agents got a prompt that named no diff file at all**: no path, no `read_file`, no offset. All 23 made **zero tool calls**, and all 23 said the sentence their prompt handed them. The receipts that looked like proof of work were in the prompt that launched them. Downstream, the first coverage check asked the orchestrator to copy the agents' returns into a file and read the receipts back — and on the next run it **fabricated** them. The second checked the agents' prose for evidence of work; measured against 129 real transcripts it caught **none** of the 80 agents that made no tool call, because every one of them wrote more than forty characters of confident, specific text. Only the harness's own record sees any of this, because it is the one artifact in the run that the thing being checked does not write.
+
+The prompt it returns deliberately does **not** hand the agent a stock sentence to recite when it finds nothing — it asks the agent to name what it examined instead. A return that names nothing it read is indistinguishable from never having read anything.
+
+Everything below still governs what the agent is asked to do; the command builds it for you.
 
 - `diffPathAbsolute`, its own `offset` (= `startLine - 1`) and `limit` (= `endLine - startLine + 1`), and its `files[]` list. Tell it to read exactly that range, and that the surrounding chunks belong to other agents.
 - **An instruction to page.** Ordinary chunks are sized to fit one un-truncated read, but a chunk whose `oversized` flag is set is a single hunk that offered no safe place to cut, and its `chars` can exceed one read's ~25 000. Tell the agent: if the read comes back with `isTruncated`, keep calling `read_file` with a larger `offset` until it has the whole range. An agent that returns a `Covered:` receipt for a range it only half read makes the coverage guarantee a lie — which is worse than not having one.
@@ -322,24 +337,21 @@ After all agents return, verify that **every chunk id carries exactly one receip
 - **A chunk with no receipt at all** was never reviewed. Relaunch an agent for it before proceeding to Step 4. Without this check the omission is invisible and the review silently reports "no blockers" on code nobody read.
 - **A chunk with an `Uncoverable` receipt** must not be relaunched — the next agent would fail the same way. Carry its id into Step 6 and list it under "Not reviewed". **The verdict may not be Approve while any chunk is uncoverable**, because the review does not know what is in it.
 
-**Do not check the coverage. Show it.** Before Step 4, `write_file` **every agent's return, verbatim**, each preceded by a `=== AGENT: <label> ===` line, to `.qwen/tmp/qwen-review-{target}-returns.txt`. The `<label>` MUST carry the agent's assignment: a chunk agent's label is `chunk <id>` (the receipt is credited only when it matches), a whole-diff agent's is its dimension (`security`, `cross-file tracer`). Then run:
+**Do not check the coverage. It is checked for you, from what the agents actually did.** You do not copy their returns anywhere — the harness already recorded them, along with every tool call each agent made and the prompt each was launched with. Run:
 
 ```bash
 qwen review check-coverage \
   --plan <the plan report from Step 1> \
-  --returns .qwen/tmp/qwen-review-{target}-returns.txt \
-  --topology <territory|dimension> \
-  --expect "<comma-separated labels you launched>" \
   --out .qwen/tmp/qwen-review-{target}-coverage.json
 ```
 
-- `--plan` is the **actual** plan path from Step 1 — `.qwen/tmp/qwen-review-pr-<n>-fetch.json` for a PR, but `.qwen/tmp/qwen-review-<target>-plan.json` for a local, file, or cross-repo review. Do not hardcode the fetch report; a local review has no such file and the command would abort.
-- `--topology` matches the Step 3 fan-out: `territory` for Step 3B (receipts, one per chunk) or `dimension` for Step 3A (no receipts — every agent walks the whole plan, so the check only asks whether each did a walk). Passing `territory` for a 3A run demands receipts that Step 3A forbids, and blocks the review.
-- `--expect` lists every agent you launched. An agent that was never started leaves no return, and without the roster the check cannot miss what is not there — a run that silently dropped the Security agent would pass.
+It reads the harness's own per-agent transcripts: a record you do not author, are not given the path to, and cannot revise. It reports three failures, and they are not the same:
 
-It reads the receipts out of what the agents actually said and tells you which chunks nobody covered, which agents returned nothing, and which expected agents never returned. **It exits 3 when the diff was not covered, and you may not proceed to Step 4 on a non-zero exit** — relaunch each named agent once and run it again (see the relaunch recipe below). **If an agent whiffs a second time**, do not loop: drop it from `--expect`, record its dimension in `unreviewedDimensions` (which caps the verdict at COMMENT just as a missing chunk does), and re-run `check-coverage` without it — it will now exit 0 with that gap disclosed rather than block forever. A twice-whiffed agent is a disclosed unreviewed dimension, not an eternal exit-3.
+- **Agents launched blind** — the launch prompt never named the diff file, so the agent could not have read it. **Do not relaunch it as it was**; the second is as blind as the first. Rebuild the prompt with `qwen review agent-prompt --plan <plan> --chunk <id>` and launch with that.
+- **Agents that made no tool call** — they read nothing, whatever they wrote. Relaunch each once.
+- **Chunks nobody reviewed** — launch an agent for each.
 
-**The relaunch recipe:** when you re-run an agent, **replace its old block** in the returns file with the new return — do not append. `check-coverage` reads every block, so a bare block left in place keeps the agent on the whiff list forever and the review exits 3 on every re-run. One agent, one block, always its latest return. Its report goes into `compose-review`'s `coverage` input in Step 7, where a failed report forbids an Approve. **Copy the returns; do not summarise them.** A summary of an agent that said nothing says something, and the subcommand would believe it.
+**It exits 3 when the diff was not covered, and you may not proceed to Step 4 on a non-zero exit.** Nothing is carried to Step 7: `compose-review` recomputes coverage from the same transcripts, so there is nothing for you to pass on and nothing to get wrong.
 
 Why this is a command and not a paragraph: **the review approved a pull request that no agent read.** Dogfooded against its own PR, the orchestrator launched 25 agents over an 18-chunk, 4 925-line diff. Twenty-two came back in under two seconds having made **zero tool calls**, returning about nineteen tokens each — the length of the words "No issues found." The three that worked were the three whose jobs do not require opening the diff. The prompt had three defences against this and every one of them was prose: the receipts every chunk agent "MUST" emit, the "exactly one receipt per chunk" verification, and the substantive-return check below. The run performed none of them, reported zero findings, wrote "Not reviewed: none", and filed an **Approve**.
 
@@ -1019,7 +1031,7 @@ Rules:
   - `bodyCriticals` — the descriptions of unmappable or 422-relocated Criticals (their only copy lives in the body; they count toward `C` like anchored ones).
   - `suggestionsDiscarded` — Suggestions whose anchors failed offline validation or the 422 recovery. They still count toward `S`: dropping every anchor must never upgrade the verdict.
   - `cannotTellCriticals` — one line per existing PR Critical whose Step 6 re-check landed on `cannot tell` (location + what could not be determined).
-  - `coverage` — the `check-coverage` report from Step 3, passed through **whole**. **Required for any PR review**: omitting it is itself a cap (`compose-review` refuses to Approve without it), because a run that cannot show what it covered has not shown it covered anything. Its `missingChunks` and `whiffedAgents` become caps here, so a run that cannot show what it covered cannot approve. Omitting it is itself a cap.
+  - `planPath` — the plan report from Step 1. **Coverage is not an input.** `compose-review` recomputes it from the harness's transcripts, because a `coverage` object you typed is a document you write — and the last time this skill trusted one, it was fabricated. You supply the plan; the subcommand finds out for itself what the agents did.
   - `uncoverableChunks` / `unreviewedDimensions` — any _additional_ not-reviewed scope from Step 3 (e.g. `"chunk 5 (src/big.min.js)"`, `"security"`). A bare dimension name gets the standard whiffed-agent explanation in the body; an entry carrying its own reason after an em-dash (`"issue-fidelity — linked issue #123 could not be fetched"`) is rendered verbatim.
   - `contextUnavailable` — the Step 1 state.
   - `presubmit` — `downgradeApprove` / `downgradeRequestChanges` / `downgradeReasons` from the presubmit report.

package/chunks/{MaxSizedBox-QAYHOC4F.js → MaxSizedBox-67ODZ4SZ.js}

@@ -4,16 +4,15 @@ import {
   MINIMUM_MAX_HEIGHT,
   MaxSizedBox,
   setMaxSizedBoxDebugging
-} from "./chunk-EU3U7USF.js";
-import "./chunk-QABSSDQH.js";
+} from "./chunk-H3FQOPPS.js";
+import "./chunk-K4PZ5F5T.js";
 import "./chunk-NHDKSOEY.js";
 import "./chunk-HTHUX2T5.js";
 import "./chunk-Q6TUALBE.js";
-import "./chunk-YWUK7OS7.js";
+import "./chunk-WTSXKLG5.js";
 import "./chunk-QHTIBUWB.js";
 import "./chunk-RKUWKYED.js";
-import "./chunk-SSFDPGFN.js";
-import "./chunk-CU3L64TP.js";
+import "./chunk-K7CRWKOE.js";
 import "./chunk-H6XPXXMH.js";
 import "./chunk-5M6IDOMF.js";
 import "./chunk-E67NFMF4.js";
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ import "./chunk-2Z5UX4KI.js";
 import "./chunk-ARKANCNX.js";
 import "./chunk-L5U3ELZX.js";
 import "./chunk-TYLOFD2U.js";
-import "./chunk-T7FSRWQ5.js";
+import "./chunk-P6LART6G.js";
 import "./chunk-4WKAA4KS.js";
 import "./chunk-CR3C7WXL.js";
 import "./chunk-CARU2RR2.js";

package/chunks/{StandaloneSessionPicker-D3R6YYX3.js → StandaloneSessionPicker-SIPBQT5Z.js}

@@ -3,22 +3,22 @@
 import {
   ConfigContext,
   SessionPicker
-} from "./chunk-ZLM3KXBT.js";
-import "./chunk-PHYCWSDG.js";
-import "./chunk-EU3U7USF.js";
-import "./chunk-DNKX35GS.js";
+} from "./chunk-TTUO4DNG.js";
+import "./chunk-LQU7EVFA.js";
+import "./chunk-H3FQOPPS.js";
+import "./chunk-XXJKGHZV.js";
 import {
   SettingsContext
-} from "./chunk-AAS2Q2TV.js";
+} from "./chunk-422XAKCK.js";
 import {
   KeypressProvider
-} from "./chunk-Z56JO4JZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-DK33QJ3V.js";
 import {
   Box_default,
   render_default,
   require_jsx_runtime,
   use_app_default
-} from "./chunk-QABSSDQH.js";
+} from "./chunk-K4PZ5F5T.js";
 import "./chunk-4WGODMVR.js";
 import "./chunk-NHDKSOEY.js";
 import "./chunk-7X7TEQNX.js";
@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-HTHUX2T5.js";
 import "./chunk-Q6TUALBE.js";
 import "./chunk-KW7NOTN6.js";
-import "./chunk-DKXW66XA.js";
-import "./chunk-YWUK7OS7.js";
+import "./chunk-SPUYQB4T.js";
+import "./chunk-WTSXKLG5.js";
 import "./chunk-QHTIBUWB.js";
 import "./chunk-E5Z2AVNV.js";
 import "./chunk-57OAHC2Y.js";
-import "./chunk-OCC3UTWA.js";
-import "./chunk-T2L6SGQY.js";
+import "./chunk-W34A5MJH.js";
+import "./chunk-6GETGQWP.js";
 import "./chunk-RKUWKYED.js";
-import "./chunk-SE74CIZD.js";
-import "./chunk-WN4D7YCI.js";
+import "./chunk-RDRVMDWV.js";
+import "./chunk-5EBKKSBX.js";
 import "./chunk-GOXKNSDZ.js";
 import "./chunk-IDS7MSUP.js";
 import "./chunk-QRUIS3DN.js";
-import "./chunk-X7EBAABW.js";
+import "./chunk-4YWLED2A.js";
 import "./chunk-ALGGS7UH.js";
 import "./chunk-MR3PXB6E.js";
 import {
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ import {
 import {
   SessionService,
   getGitBranch
-} from "./chunk-SSFDPGFN.js";
-import "./chunk-CU3L64TP.js";
+} from "./chunk-K7CRWKOE.js";
 import "./chunk-H6XPXXMH.js";
 import "./chunk-5M6IDOMF.js";
 import "./chunk-E67NFMF4.js";
@@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ import "./chunk-2Z5UX4KI.js";
 import "./chunk-ARKANCNX.js";
 import "./chunk-L5U3ELZX.js";
 import "./chunk-TYLOFD2U.js";
-import "./chunk-T7FSRWQ5.js";
+import "./chunk-P6LART6G.js";
 import "./chunk-4WKAA4KS.js";
 import "./chunk-CR3C7WXL.js";
 import "./chunk-CARU2RR2.js";
@@ -95,7 +94,7 @@ import "./chunk-FCMNKVXT.js";
 import "./chunk-DJ2GSRLV.js";
 import "./chunk-LQIDP6K5.js";
 import "./chunk-7NFB7LBQ.js";
-import "./chunk-AGBFWLA5.js";
+import "./chunk-TISZXPAX.js";
 import "./chunk-75DOP5OR.js";
 import "./chunk-DMTGGOSA.js";
 import "./chunk-YQ3U5MUC.js";