@qwen-code/channel-base 0.19.3 → 0.19.4

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
 export { getGlobalQwenDir, resolvePath } from './paths.js';
 export { AcpBridge } from './AcpBridge.js';
-export type { AcpBridgeOptions, AvailableCommand, ToolCallEvent, } from './AcpBridge.js';
+export type { AvailableCommand, ChannelAgentBridge, SessionDiedEvent, ToolCallEvent, } from './ChannelAgentBridge.js';
+export type { AcpBridgeOptions } from './AcpBridge.js';
 export { DaemonChannelBridge } from './DaemonChannelBridge.js';
 export type { DaemonChannelBridgeOptions, DaemonChannelEvent, DaemonChannelSessionClient, DaemonChannelSessionFactory, DaemonChannelSessionFactoryRequest, DaemonPromptCompleteEvent, DaemonPermissionRequestEvent, DaemonPermissionResolvedEvent, } from './DaemonChannelBridge.js';
 export { BlockStreamer } from './BlockStreamer.js';
 export type { BlockStreamerOptions } from './BlockStreamer.js';
 export { ChannelBase } from './ChannelBase.js';
-export type { ChannelBaseOptions } from './ChannelBase.js';
+export type { ChannelBaseOptions, ChannelLoopController, } from './ChannelBase.js';
+export { ChannelLoopScheduler } from './ChannelLoopScheduler.js';
+export type { ChannelLoopSchedulerOptions, ChannelLoopRunner, } from './ChannelLoopScheduler.js';
+export { ChannelLoopStore } from './ChannelLoopStore.js';
+export type { ChannelLoop, ChannelLoopInput, ChannelLoopPatch, ChannelLoopStatus, ChannelLoopStoreOptions, } from './ChannelLoopStore.js';
 export { PairingStore } from './PairingStore.js';
 export type { PairingRequest } from './PairingStore.js';
 export { GroupGate } from './GroupGate.js';
@@ -14,4 +19,5 @@ export type { GroupCheckResult } from './GroupGate.js';
 export { SenderGate } from './SenderGate.js';
 export type { SenderCheckResult } from './SenderGate.js';
 export { SessionRouter } from './SessionRouter.js';
+export { sanitizeSenderName, sanitizePromptText, sanitizeLogText, } from './sanitize.js';
 export type { Attachment, BlockStreamingChunkConfig, BlockStreamingCoalesceConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelPlugin, ChannelType, DispatchMode, Envelope, GroupConfig, GroupPolicy, SenderPolicy, SessionScope, SessionTarget, } from './types.js';

package/dist/index.js

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ export { AcpBridge } from './AcpBridge.js';
 export { DaemonChannelBridge } from './DaemonChannelBridge.js';
 export { BlockStreamer } from './BlockStreamer.js';
 export { ChannelBase } from './ChannelBase.js';
+export { ChannelLoopScheduler } from './ChannelLoopScheduler.js';
+export { ChannelLoopStore } from './ChannelLoopStore.js';
 export { PairingStore } from './PairingStore.js';
 export { GroupGate } from './GroupGate.js';
 export { SenderGate } from './SenderGate.js';
 export { SessionRouter } from './SessionRouter.js';
+export { sanitizeSenderName, sanitizePromptText, sanitizeLogText, } from './sanitize.js';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAQ3C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAW/D,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAEnD,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAK/C,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAKjE,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAQzD,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEjD,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAE3C,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE7C,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EACL,kBAAkB,EAClB,kBAAkB,EAClB,eAAe,GAChB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC"}

package/dist/sanitize.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/**
+ * Characters that must be neutralized in ANY attacker-controlled text we embed
+ * into a prompt, independent of the wrapper's own delimiters: the C1 control
+ * block (U+0080-U+009F) - notably NEL (U+0085), a Unicode line break (UAX#14 BK
+ * class) that renders as a new line, i.e. prompt-line injection - plus the
+ * Unicode line/paragraph separators (U+2028/U+2029, likewise rendered as
+ * newlines) and the bidirectional override/isolate controls (U+202A-U+202E,
+ * U+2066-U+2069 -> trojan-source, where the visual order differs from the
+ * logical byte order). Also strips common zero-width format chars that make
+ * visually identical names/text compare differently. ASCII C0/DEL (incl. CR/LF)
+ * are stripped by each caller.
+ */
+export declare const PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES: RegExp;
+/**
+ * Neutralize a platform display name before embedding it in a `[name]` prompt
+ * tag: strip the bracket/newline delimiters, C0/DEL control chars, and the
+ * Unicode line/bidi controls above that would let a crafted nickname break out
+ * of the tag, inject extra lines, or smuggle terminal escape sequences, then
+ * cap the length. Shared by ChannelBase group attribution and adapters that
+ * self-prefix (e.g. QQ), so the rules stay identical everywhere.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeSenderName(name: string): string;
+/**
+ * Neutralize attacker-controlled text embedded inside a `"..."` prompt wrapper
+ * (reply quotes, attachment filenames): strip C0/DEL control chars, the
+ * wrapper's own quote/bracket delimiters, and the Unicode line/bidi controls
+ * above, then cap the length. Shared so the reply-quote and filename paths
+ * can't drift apart. On truncation a single-char ellipsis is appended (kept
+ * within maxLen) so the agent can tell a quote/filename was cut rather than
+ * silently ending mid-token.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeQuotedText(text: string, maxLen: number): string;
+export declare function sanitizePromptText(text: string): string;
+/**
+ * Neutralize an attacker-influenced filesystem path before rendering it on
+ * its own line in a prompt (`... saved to: <path>`). Unlike
+ * sanitizeQuotedText, this PRESERVES `[`, `]`, `"`, and spaces: those are
+ * valid, common path characters (e.g. Next.js `app/[slug]/page.tsx`, a
+ * quoted segment, a space in a folder name), and a path rendered alone on a
+ * line cannot use them to break out of that line, so stripping them would
+ * only corrupt the path and make the agent's read-file tool miss a file that
+ * exists on disk. We strip ONLY what can break or reorder the line: C0/DEL
+ * controls (incl. CR/LF -> prompt-line injection) and the Unicode line/para
+ * separators + bidi overrides (trojan-source). Length is capped generously
+ * (1024) as defense-in-depth: well beyond any real path, but enough to stop a
+ * pathological attacker filename from ballooning the prompt unboundedly.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizePromptPath(path: string): string;
+/**
+ * Neutralize attacker-controlled text before it is written to a single-line
+ * stderr audit/diagnostic log. Caps to `maxLen` code points, renders ASCII
+ * newlines as a visible `\n` escape (so a multi-line payload stays one readable
+ * log line instead of collapsing to a space), then strips everything that could
+ * forge or corrupt a log line: PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES (the C1 block incl. NEL
+ * U+0085, the Unicode line/paragraph separators U+2028/U+2029, and the bidi
+ * override/isolate controls — all of which render as a line break or reorder
+ * text) AND the C0/DEL controls (CR could overwrite the line, ESC could inject
+ * ANSI/OSC). Shared by every audit-log site so the strip set can't drift apart.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeLogText(text: string, maxLen: number): string;

package/dist/sanitize.js

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/**
+ * Characters that must be neutralized in ANY attacker-controlled text we embed
+ * into a prompt, independent of the wrapper's own delimiters: the C1 control
+ * block (U+0080-U+009F) - notably NEL (U+0085), a Unicode line break (UAX#14 BK
+ * class) that renders as a new line, i.e. prompt-line injection - plus the
+ * Unicode line/paragraph separators (U+2028/U+2029, likewise rendered as
+ * newlines) and the bidirectional override/isolate controls (U+202A-U+202E,
+ * U+2066-U+2069 -> trojan-source, where the visual order differs from the
+ * logical byte order). Also strips common zero-width format chars that make
+ * visually identical names/text compare differently. ASCII C0/DEL (incl. CR/LF)
+ * are stripped by each caller.
+ */
+export const PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES = /[\u0080-\u009f\u200b-\u200d\u2028\u2029\u202a-\u202e\u2060\u2066-\u2069\ufeff]/g;
+/**
+ * Truncate to at most `max` Unicode CODE POINTS (not UTF-16 code units). A cap
+ * applied with `.slice` counts code units, so one landing mid-surrogate-pair
+ * (e.g. an emoji \ud83c\udf89 = 2 units) leaves a lone surrogate that renders as `\ufffd`.
+ * `Array.from` iterates by code point, so slicing it never splits a pair.
+ */
+function truncateCodePoints(str, max) {
+    const cp = Array.from(str);
+    return cp.length > max ? cp.slice(0, max).join('') : str;
+}
+/**
+ * Neutralize a platform display name before embedding it in a `[name]` prompt
+ * tag: strip the bracket/newline delimiters, C0/DEL control chars, and the
+ * Unicode line/bidi controls above that would let a crafted nickname break out
+ * of the tag, inject extra lines, or smuggle terminal escape sequences, then
+ * cap the length. Shared by ChannelBase group attribution and adapters that
+ * self-prefix (e.g. QQ), so the rules stay identical everywhere.
+ */
+export function sanitizeSenderName(name) {
+    // A name made entirely of strippable chars collapses to all-spaces; trim()-ing
+    // it to '' lets the `|| 'unknown'` fallback fire so the [name] tag is never an
+    // anonymous `[]`. Both callers embed the result with no fallback of their own.
+    const cleaned = name
+        .replace(PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES, ' ')
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+        .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, ' ')
+        .replace(/[[\]\r\n]/g, ' ');
+    // Truncate on code-point boundaries so an emoji nick capped mid-pair can't
+    // leave a lone surrogate (renders as `�`).
+    return truncateCodePoints(cleaned, 64).trim() || 'unknown';
+}
+/**
+ * Neutralize attacker-controlled text embedded inside a `"..."` prompt wrapper
+ * (reply quotes, attachment filenames): strip C0/DEL control chars, the
+ * wrapper's own quote/bracket delimiters, and the Unicode line/bidi controls
+ * above, then cap the length. Shared so the reply-quote and filename paths
+ * can't drift apart. On truncation a single-char ellipsis is appended (kept
+ * within maxLen) so the agent can tell a quote/filename was cut rather than
+ * silently ending mid-token.
+ */
+export function sanitizeQuotedText(text, maxLen) {
+    const cleaned = text
+        .replace(PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES, ' ')
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+        .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, ' ')
+        .replace(/["[\]]/g, ' ');
+    // Count/slice by CODE POINT, not UTF-16 unit, so a cap landing mid-surrogate-
+    // pair can't leave a lone surrogate (`�`). On truncation keep maxLen-1 code
+    // points + the single-char ellipsis, so the result stays within maxLen.
+    const cp = Array.from(cleaned);
+    return cp.length > maxLen ? cp.slice(0, maxLen - 1).join('') + '…' : cleaned;
+}
+export function sanitizePromptText(text) {
+    return (text
+        .replace(PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES, ' ')
+        .replace(/^([ \t]*)\[([^\]\r\n]{1,64})\](:?)/gm, '$1$2$3')
+        // Fold ASCII C0/DEL, including CR/LF/TAB, so attacker-controlled group
+        // text cannot create prompt lines outside the adapter's sender attribution.
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+        .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, ' '));
+}
+/**
+ * Neutralize an attacker-influenced filesystem path before rendering it on
+ * its own line in a prompt (`... saved to: <path>`). Unlike
+ * sanitizeQuotedText, this PRESERVES `[`, `]`, `"`, and spaces: those are
+ * valid, common path characters (e.g. Next.js `app/[slug]/page.tsx`, a
+ * quoted segment, a space in a folder name), and a path rendered alone on a
+ * line cannot use them to break out of that line, so stripping them would
+ * only corrupt the path and make the agent's read-file tool miss a file that
+ * exists on disk. We strip ONLY what can break or reorder the line: C0/DEL
+ * controls (incl. CR/LF -> prompt-line injection) and the Unicode line/para
+ * separators + bidi overrides (trojan-source). Length is capped generously
+ * (1024) as defense-in-depth: well beyond any real path, but enough to stop a
+ * pathological attacker filename from ballooning the prompt unboundedly.
+ */
+export function sanitizePromptPath(path) {
+    const cleaned = path
+        .replace(PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES, ' ')
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+        .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, ' ');
+    // Cap by code point so a path ending in an emoji can't be split mid-pair.
+    return truncateCodePoints(cleaned, 1024);
+}
+/**
+ * Neutralize attacker-controlled text before it is written to a single-line
+ * stderr audit/diagnostic log. Caps to `maxLen` code points, renders ASCII
+ * newlines as a visible `\n` escape (so a multi-line payload stays one readable
+ * log line instead of collapsing to a space), then strips everything that could
+ * forge or corrupt a log line: PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES (the C1 block incl. NEL
+ * U+0085, the Unicode line/paragraph separators U+2028/U+2029, and the bidi
+ * override/isolate controls — all of which render as a line break or reorder
+ * text) AND the C0/DEL controls (CR could overwrite the line, ESC could inject
+ * ANSI/OSC). Shared by every audit-log site so the strip set can't drift apart.
+ */
+export function sanitizeLogText(text, maxLen) {
+    return (truncateCodePoints(text, maxLen)
+        // Render real newlines visibly BEFORE the control strip, so the common
+        // ASCII-newline case shows as `\n` rather than collapsing to a space.
+        .replace(/\n/g, '\\n')
+        .replace(PROMPT_UNSAFE_INVISIBLES, ' ')
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+        .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, ' '));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitize.js.map

package/dist/sanitize.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { AcpBridge } from './AcpBridge.js';
+import type { ChannelAgentBridge } from './ChannelAgentBridge.js';
 import type { ChannelBase, ChannelBaseOptions } from './ChannelBase.js';
 export type SenderPolicy = 'allowlist' | 'pairing' | 'open';
 export type SessionScope = 'user' | 'thread' | 'single';
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ export type DispatchMode = 'collect' | 'steer' | 'followup';
 export interface GroupConfig {
     requireMention?: boolean;
     dispatchMode?: DispatchMode;
+    groupHistoryLimit?: number;
 }
 export interface BlockStreamingChunkConfig {
     /** Minimum characters before emitting a block. Default: 400. */
@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ export interface ChannelConfig {
     instructions?: string;
     model?: string;
     groupPolicy: GroupPolicy;
+    groupHistoryLimit?: number;
     groups: Record<string, GroupConfig>;
-    /** Dispatch mode for concurrent messages. Default: 'collect'. */
+    /** Dispatch mode for concurrent messages. Default: 'steer' (resolved in ChannelBase.handleInbound). */
     dispatchMode?: DispatchMode;
     /** Enable block streaming — emit completed blocks as separate messages. */
     blockStreaming?: 'on' | 'off';
@@ -74,12 +76,37 @@ export interface Envelope {
     imageMimeType?: string;
     /** Structured attachments (images, files, audio, video). */
     attachments?: Attachment[];
+    /**
+     * Marks an envelope whose `text` ALREADY carries its `[sender]` attribution, so
+     * handleInbound must NOT re-prefix it. Set in two places: on a synthetic
+     * collect-mode re-entry (coalesced text already carries each message's prefix), AND
+     * by the QQ adapter on a REAL inbound it self-prefixes as `[name]: …`. QQ
+     * neutralizes that embedded name with sanitizeSenderName at the source (QQChannel),
+     * so the self-prefixed name reaching the prompt is already sanitized — setting this
+     * flag does not bypass sanitization.
+     */
+    alreadyPrefixed?: true;
 }
 export interface SessionTarget {
     channelName: string;
     senderId: string;
     chatId: string;
     threadId?: string;
+    isGroup?: boolean;
+}
+export interface ChannelMemoryTarget {
+    channelName: string;
+    chatId: string;
+    threadId?: string;
+}
+export interface ChannelMemoryWriteResult {
+    changed: boolean;
+    filePath?: string;
+}
+export interface ChannelMemoryCallbacks {
+    readChannelMemory(target: ChannelMemoryTarget): Promise<string>;
+    appendChannelMemory(target: ChannelMemoryTarget, text: string): Promise<ChannelMemoryWriteResult>;
+    clearChannelMemory(target: ChannelMemoryTarget): Promise<ChannelMemoryWriteResult>;
 }
 /**
  * A channel plugin registers a channel type and provides a factory
@@ -97,5 +124,5 @@ export interface ChannelPlugin {
      */
     requiredConfigFields?: string[];
     /** Create a channel adapter instance. */
-    createChannel(name: string, config: ChannelConfig & Record<string, unknown>, bridge: AcpBridge, options?: ChannelBaseOptions): ChannelBase;
+    createChannel(name: string, config: ChannelConfig & Record<string, unknown>, bridge: ChannelAgentBridge, options?: ChannelBaseOptions): ChannelBase;
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@qwen-code/channel-base",
-  "version": "0.19.3",
+  "version": "0.19.4",
   "description": "Base channel infrastructure for Qwen Code",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",