@quickback-dev/cli 0.70.45 → 0.72.3

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (232) hide show
  1. package/dist/commands/build.d.ts.map +1 -1
  2. package/dist/commands/build.js +10 -1
  3. package/dist/commands/build.js.map +1 -1
  4. package/dist/commands/deploy.d.ts.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/commands/deploy.js +7 -1
  6. package/dist/commands/deploy.js.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/commands/mcp.d.ts.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/commands/mcp.js +6 -5
  9. package/dist/commands/mcp.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  11. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/lib/access-manifest-diff.d.ts +6 -0
  13. package/dist/lib/access-manifest-diff.d.ts.map +1 -1
  14. package/dist/lib/access-manifest-diff.js +10 -0
  15. package/dist/lib/access-manifest-diff.js.map +1 -1
  16. package/dist/lib/action-harvest.d.ts.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/lib/action-harvest.js +36 -0
  18. package/dist/lib/action-harvest.js.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/lib/api-client.d.ts +8 -0
  20. package/dist/lib/api-client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/lib/api-client.js.map +1 -1
  22. package/dist/lib/deployment-target.d.ts +13 -0
  23. package/dist/lib/deployment-target.d.ts.map +1 -1
  24. package/dist/lib/deployment-target.js +4 -0
  25. package/dist/lib/deployment-target.js.map +1 -1
  26. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +22 -0
  27. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
  28. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +80 -18
  29. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/lib/file-writer.js +9 -0
  31. package/dist/lib/file-writer.js.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/lib/harness.d.ts +10 -0
  33. package/dist/lib/harness.d.ts.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/lib/harness.js +31 -0
  35. package/dist/lib/harness.js.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/lib/migrations/executor.js +5 -1
  37. package/dist/lib/migrations/executor.js.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/lib/migrations/plan.js +3 -0
  39. package/dist/lib/migrations/plan.js.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  41. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/index.js +23 -2
  42. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/index.js.map +1 -1
  43. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/tenant-bundle.d.ts +30 -0
  44. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/tenant-bundle.d.ts.map +1 -0
  45. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/tenant-bundle.js +109 -0
  46. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/tenant-bundle.js.map +1 -0
  47. package/dist/lib/migrations/prior-state.d.ts +13 -1
  48. package/dist/lib/migrations/prior-state.d.ts.map +1 -1
  49. package/dist/lib/migrations/prior-state.js +33 -2
  50. package/dist/lib/migrations/prior-state.js.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/lib/migrations/types.d.ts +2 -2
  52. package/dist/lib/migrations/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  53. package/dist/lib/migrations/types.js +3 -0
  54. package/dist/lib/migrations/types.js.map +1 -1
  55. package/dist/lib/wrangler-resources.d.ts +14 -1
  56. package/dist/lib/wrangler-resources.d.ts.map +1 -1
  57. package/dist/lib/wrangler-resources.js +29 -7
  58. package/dist/lib/wrangler-resources.js.map +1 -1
  59. package/dist/skill/SKILL.md +64 -0
  60. package/dist/skill/docs/api/actions.md +73 -2
  61. package/dist/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +2 -0
  62. package/dist/skill/docs/api/caching.md +2 -2
  63. package/dist/skill/docs/api/crud.md +13 -0
  64. package/dist/skill/docs/api/errors.md +111 -10
  65. package/dist/skill/docs/api/index.md +24 -0
  66. package/dist/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +8 -0
  67. package/dist/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +6 -0
  68. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/agents.md +73 -1
  69. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +7 -1
  70. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/bindings.md +55 -0
  71. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/cloudflare-access.md +191 -0
  72. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  73. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -2
  74. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/providers.md +2 -1
  75. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/tenancy.md +3 -0
  76. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/tenant-databases.md +2407 -0
  77. package/dist/skill/docs/define/access.md +33 -1
  78. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +118 -1
  79. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/scoped-db.md +32 -8
  80. package/dist/skill/docs/define/areas.md +145 -2
  81. package/dist/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +160 -21
  82. package/dist/skill/docs/define/encryption.md +13 -2
  83. package/dist/skill/docs/define/fga.md +320 -42
  84. package/dist/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +4 -0
  85. package/dist/skill/docs/define/index.md +1 -0
  86. package/dist/skill/docs/define/read.md +46 -5
  87. package/dist/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +30 -12
  88. package/dist/skill/docs/define/schema.md +2 -0
  89. package/dist/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +393 -9
  90. package/dist/skill/docs/define/sealed-protocol.md +67 -12
  91. package/dist/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +4 -1
  92. package/dist/skill/docs/define/triggers.md +55 -1
  93. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/api-contract/index.md +9 -3
  94. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +13 -1
  95. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/using-auth.md +1 -1
  96. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/database/d1.md +112 -3
  97. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/database/data-migrations.md +3 -1
  98. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/database/neon.md +10 -2
  99. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/queues/handlers.md +48 -16
  100. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/queues/using-queues.md +16 -0
  101. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +294 -17
  102. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/index.md +9 -6
  103. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/named-invalidations.md +3 -1
  104. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/using-realtime.md +28 -3
  105. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/schedules/index.md +1 -1
  106. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/storage/r2.md +10 -1
  107. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/storage/using-r2.md +42 -1
  108. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +9 -2
  109. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +5 -3
  110. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/hooks.md +9 -2
  111. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/connecting.md +3 -3
  112. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
  113. package/package.json +1 -1
  114. package/src/skill/SKILL.md +64 -0
  115. package/src/skill/docs/api/actions.md +73 -2
  116. package/src/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +2 -0
  117. package/src/skill/docs/api/caching.md +2 -2
  118. package/src/skill/docs/api/crud.md +13 -0
  119. package/src/skill/docs/api/errors.md +111 -10
  120. package/src/skill/docs/api/index.md +24 -0
  121. package/src/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +8 -0
  122. package/src/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +6 -0
  123. package/src/skill/docs/configure/agents.md +73 -1
  124. package/src/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +7 -1
  125. package/src/skill/docs/configure/bindings.md +55 -0
  126. package/src/skill/docs/configure/cloudflare-access.md +191 -0
  127. package/src/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  128. package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -2
  129. package/src/skill/docs/configure/providers.md +2 -1
  130. package/src/skill/docs/configure/tenancy.md +3 -0
  131. package/src/skill/docs/configure/tenant-databases.md +2407 -0
  132. package/src/skill/docs/define/access.md +33 -1
  133. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +118 -1
  134. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/scoped-db.md +32 -8
  135. package/src/skill/docs/define/areas.md +145 -2
  136. package/src/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +160 -21
  137. package/src/skill/docs/define/encryption.md +13 -2
  138. package/src/skill/docs/define/fga.md +320 -42
  139. package/src/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +4 -0
  140. package/src/skill/docs/define/index.md +1 -0
  141. package/src/skill/docs/define/read.md +46 -5
  142. package/src/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +30 -12
  143. package/src/skill/docs/define/schema.md +2 -0
  144. package/src/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +393 -9
  145. package/src/skill/docs/define/sealed-protocol.md +67 -12
  146. package/src/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +4 -1
  147. package/src/skill/docs/define/triggers.md +55 -1
  148. package/src/skill/docs/platform/api-contract/index.md +9 -3
  149. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +13 -1
  150. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/using-auth.md +1 -1
  151. package/src/skill/docs/platform/database/d1.md +112 -3
  152. package/src/skill/docs/platform/database/data-migrations.md +3 -1
  153. package/src/skill/docs/platform/database/neon.md +10 -2
  154. package/src/skill/docs/platform/queues/handlers.md +48 -16
  155. package/src/skill/docs/platform/queues/using-queues.md +16 -0
  156. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +294 -17
  157. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/index.md +9 -6
  158. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/named-invalidations.md +3 -1
  159. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/using-realtime.md +28 -3
  160. package/src/skill/docs/platform/schedules/index.md +1 -1
  161. package/src/skill/docs/platform/storage/r2.md +10 -1
  162. package/src/skill/docs/platform/storage/using-r2.md +42 -1
  163. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +9 -2
  164. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +5 -3
  165. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/hooks.md +9 -2
  166. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/connecting.md +3 -3
  167. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
  168. package/dist/codex/AGENTS.md +0 -290
  169. package/dist/commands/build.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  170. package/dist/commands/codex.d.ts +0 -16
  171. package/dist/commands/codex.d.ts.map +0 -1
  172. package/dist/commands/codex.js +0 -159
  173. package/dist/commands/codex.js.map +0 -1
  174. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts +0 -62
  175. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +0 -1
  176. package/dist/commands/compile.js +0 -830
  177. package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +0 -1
  178. package/dist/commands/compile.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  179. package/dist/commands/init.d.ts +0 -6
  180. package/dist/commands/init.d.ts.map +0 -1
  181. package/dist/commands/init.js +0 -405
  182. package/dist/commands/init.js.map +0 -1
  183. package/dist/commands/migrate.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  184. package/dist/commands/migrations.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  185. package/dist/commands/push.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  186. package/dist/commands/schema.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  187. package/dist/docs/content.d.ts +0 -7
  188. package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +0 -1
  189. package/dist/docs/content.js +0 -672
  190. package/dist/docs/content.js.map +0 -1
  191. package/dist/docs/index.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  192. package/dist/lib/action-harvest.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  193. package/dist/lib/api-client.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  194. package/dist/lib/artifact-routing.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  195. package/dist/lib/auth.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  196. package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  197. package/dist/lib/compiler-floor.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  198. package/dist/lib/config-id-splice.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  199. package/dist/lib/config-sync.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  200. package/dist/lib/copy-public-assets.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  201. package/dist/lib/copy-source-apps.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  202. package/dist/lib/drizzle-meta-routing.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  203. package/dist/lib/file-loader-typescript-fallback.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  204. package/dist/lib/file-loader.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  205. package/dist/lib/file-writer.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  206. package/dist/lib/helpers.d.ts +0 -39
  207. package/dist/lib/helpers.d.ts.map +0 -1
  208. package/dist/lib/helpers.js +0 -299
  209. package/dist/lib/helpers.js.map +0 -1
  210. package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle-prompts.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  211. package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  212. package/dist/lib/migrations/executor.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  213. package/dist/lib/migrations/inventory.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  214. package/dist/lib/migrations/lock.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  215. package/dist/lib/migrations/paths.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  216. package/dist/lib/migrations/plan.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  217. package/dist/lib/migrations/postprocessors/index.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  218. package/dist/lib/migrations/prompt-runner.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  219. package/dist/lib/migrations/staging.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  220. package/dist/lib/neon-canary.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  221. package/dist/lib/neon-target.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  222. package/dist/lib/neon.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  223. package/dist/lib/prepare-output.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  224. package/dist/lib/prepare-state-output.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  225. package/dist/lib/schema-sync/index.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  226. package/dist/lib/shell.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  227. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts +0 -25
  228. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts.map +0 -1
  229. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js +0 -179
  230. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js.map +0 -1
  231. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
  232. package/dist/lib/wrangler-resources.test.d.ts.map +0 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Roles and one-hop relationship joins can't express:
24
24
  - **Hierarchical** permissions — a document inherits viewers from its folder.
25
25
  - **Group** permissions — every member of `team:eng` is a viewer.
26
26
  - **Per-record grants** — assign one person to one record without a global role.
27
- - **Public sharing** — make one object viewable by everyone, with a share link.
27
+ - **Share links** — one object, one role, per-link expiry and revocation, no account.
28
28
 
29
29
  These are exactly what Zanzibar's *userset rewrites* and *tuple-to-userset*
30
30
  relations solve, and what the FGA pillar gives you.
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ relation, and `from` reference must resolve, or the compile fails loud.
79
79
  | --- | --- |
80
80
  | `define viewer: [user]` | Direct assignment — a stored tuple grants `viewer`. |
81
81
  | `define viewer: [user, user:*]` | `user:*` = **type-bound public access** (everyone). |
82
+ | `define viewer: [user, link]` | `link` = a **share link** subject (`link:<id>`). Requires `type link`. |
82
83
  | `define viewer: [team#member]` | A **userset** — every `member` of a `team` is a `viewer`. |
83
84
  | `define viewer: [user] or editor` | **Union** — `editor`s are also `viewer`s (derived). |
84
85
  | `define viewer: editor and member` | **Intersection** — must be both. |
@@ -104,14 +105,16 @@ await ctx.fga.write([
104
105
  // POST /api/v1/fga/v1/write
105
106
  // { "writes": [{ "user": "user:anne", "relation": "recruiter", "object": "job:123" }] }
106
107
 
107
- // 3. A public share link (see Public sharing below)
108
+ // 3. A share link (see Share links below)
108
109
  ```
109
110
 
110
111
  ## Checking access
111
112
 
112
113
  ### `ctx.fga` in handlers and actions
113
114
 
114
- Every authenticated request gets an org-scoped `ctx.fga` client:
115
+ Every authenticated request with an active organization — and every
116
+ [share-link principal](#the-link-principal) — gets an org-scoped `ctx.fga`
117
+ client. An anonymous request has no tenant, so it has no `ctx.fga`:
115
118
 
116
119
  ```typescript
117
120
  const allowed = await ctx.fga.check('user:' + ctx.userId, 'can_manage', 'job:' + jobId);
@@ -202,25 +205,232 @@ request fails with a hard **422 `FGA_LIST_TOO_LARGE`** whose hint points to
202
205
  page. Raise the cap or paginate via the API for collections that legitimately
203
206
  authorize more than `maxIds` rows per caller.
204
207
 
205
- ## Public sharing
208
+ ## Share links
206
209
 
207
- The FGA pillar is also Quickback's public-sharing mechanism — two
208
- complementary tools.
210
+ A share link is a capability, not an account: one object, one role, its own
211
+ expiry and revocation, no Better Auth user. Quickback has two kinds, chosen per
212
+ relation by the model:
209
213
 
210
- ### Type-bound public access (`user:*`)
214
+ | Relation declares | Minting writes | Each link has its own | Use for |
215
+ | --- | --- | --- | --- |
216
+ | `[user, link]` | `(link:<id>, relation, object)` | role, expiry, revocation, scope instance, restriction | Kitchen sheets, guest lists, anything with personal data |
217
+ | `[user, user:*]` | `(user:*, relation, object)` | expiry (signed token) | "Make this object public" |
218
+
219
+ ### Link subjects (`link:<id>`)
211
220
 
212
- A model relation that lists `user:*` (e.g. `define viewer: [user, user:*] …`)
213
- can be granted to *everyone* by writing one tuple:
221
+ Declare `type link` and list it on the relations a link may be granted:
214
222
 
215
223
  ```typescript
216
- await ctx.fga.write([{ user: 'user:*', relation: 'viewer', object: 'job:' + id }]);
224
+ authz: {
225
+ fga: {
226
+ model: `
227
+ model
228
+ schema 1.1
229
+ type user
230
+ type link
231
+ type doc
232
+ relations
233
+ define editor: [user, link]
234
+ define viewer: [user, link] or editor
235
+ `,
236
+ sharing: {
237
+ enabled: true,
238
+ // Default link lifetime in seconds. Required (> 0) when the table masks a column.
239
+ ttlSeconds: 86400,
240
+ // Every type a link can point at names its table. `fields` is the landing projection.
241
+ resources: { doc: { table: 'docs', fields: ['id', 'title'] } },
242
+ links: { cookieTtlSeconds: 900, rateLimitPerMinute: 60 },
243
+ },
244
+ },
245
+ }
246
+ ```
247
+
248
+ Mint, list and revoke on the FGA API:
249
+
250
+ ```bash
251
+ POST /fga/v1/share { "object": "doc:d1", "relation": "viewer", "ttlSeconds": 3600 }
252
+ → 201 { id: "lnk_…", token, url, expiresAt }
253
+ url = https://api.acme.dev/share/v1/open#share=<token>
254
+ GET /fga/v1/share/links?object=doc:d1 → { links: [{ id, relation, scope, expiresAt, active }] }
255
+ POST /fga/v1/share/revoke { "id": "lnk_…" }
217
256
  ```
218
257
 
219
- Now every Check for `viewer` on that object passes.
258
+ The token is returned **once**. Only `HMAC-SHA256(BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, token)`
259
+ is stored, in the compiler-owned `fga_share_links` table. Revoking sets
260
+ `revoked_at` and deletes the link's tuple; either one alone stops the link.
261
+
262
+ **Who may mint and revoke** is a Better Auth access statement, not a parallel
263
+ permission system. The compiler registers the organization plugin's access
264
+ control with `share: ['create', 'revoke']` (from
265
+ `src/lib/fga/share-access.ts`): `owner` and every `writeRoles` role hold both,
266
+ `member` holds neither. `auth.api.hasPermission` and the client's
267
+ `organization.hasPermission({ permissions: { share: ['create'] } })` answer from
268
+ the same statements the share routes check. A caller without `share:create`
269
+ gets 403. Minting needs that permission through a real membership role — a
270
+ sysadmin without one can revoke links but not mint them.
271
+
272
+ **The creator is an edge.** A link is honoured only while the user who minted
273
+ it is still a member of the link's organization whose **current** role holds
274
+ `share:create`. Every resolution reads that role from Better Auth; nothing is
275
+ stored. Remove the creator from the organization, or move them to a role
276
+ without `share:create`, and every link they minted stops working — and with it
277
+ every request that was admitted only through those links. Restore the role and
278
+ the links work again (revoke them to end them for good).
279
+
280
+ #### Opening a link
281
+
282
+ 1. The share URL is `/share/v1/open#share=<token>`. The token is in the
283
+ **fragment**, which browsers never send — not in the request line, not in
284
+ `Referer` — so it never reaches access logs. `GET /share/v1/open` serves a
285
+ page with no token in it; its script (`/share/v1/open.js`, CSP
286
+ `script-src 'self'` compatible) reads the fragment, clears it from the
287
+ address bar, and `POST`s `{ "token": "…" }` as `application/json` to
288
+ `/share/v1/exchange` (any other content type is 415, so a cross-site form
289
+ cannot plant a cookie). The exchange sets a short-lived `HttpOnly` cookie
290
+ `qb_share` holding a signed link id — never the token — and the page moves
291
+ to the clean URL `/share/v1/link`.
292
+ An IP that has spent its failed-lookup budget is refused (429) before any
293
+ hash or database query; valid lookups never spend budget.
294
+ 2. `GET /share/v1/link` re-checks the link's tuple and returns `{ link, record }`:
295
+ what the link grants and the `resources.<type>.fields` projection of its
296
+ object (never a soft-deleted row). A signed-in visitor sees it too.
297
+ 3. Every later request carries the cookie. API clients send the token in the
298
+ `x-share-token` header instead.
299
+
300
+ Every link and share-router response sets `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` and
301
+ `Cache-Control: no-store`. A revoked or expired link returns 404 at open and 401
302
+ on the API.
303
+
304
+ `GET /share/v1/<token>` (the token in the path, 303 to the landing URL) still
305
+ works for links minted before the fragment URL and will be removed in the next
306
+ minor. Its token does appear in request logs — revoke any link whose URL may
307
+ have been logged.
308
+
309
+ #### The link principal
310
+
311
+ A request with a valid link credential runs as `link:<id>` through the
312
+ **normal generated routes**:
313
+
314
+ - `ctx.authMethod === 'link'`, `ctx.link = { id, organizationId, relation, object, expiresAt, scope, viaUserId }`.
315
+ - No `userId`, no org role (`ctx.roles = []`), no `/me/*`. `AUTHENTICATED`,
316
+ `SESSION` and `USER` do not admit it.
317
+ - It exists **only on routes whose access has an `fga` arm for the link's
318
+ object type** (the compiler marks them in each resource router). On every
319
+ other route — a `PUBLIC` create, a standalone action, an action or resource
320
+ of another type — the link credential is ignored and the request runs as the
321
+ caller it otherwise is (anonymous, or their own session). A link never lends
322
+ an organization to a `PUBLIC` route.
323
+ - Each operation and concrete named view uses its own effective access and
324
+ object types. A PUBLIC view cannot borrow authority from an FGA sibling
325
+ view, and batch access is independent of single-record access.
326
+ - On a link-capable route, only `fga` arms (checked against `link:<id>`'s own
327
+ tuples) admit it. A `PUBLIC` sibling does not bypass that check. A roles-less arm (`record:` only) and function-form access
328
+ deny it, so `and: [{ fga }, { record }]` and `{ fga, record }` **never**
329
+ admit a link — put the
330
+ record condition in the model (or a separate `fga` relation) instead.
331
+ - `ctx.fga` is hydrated for the link's organization, so `access: { fga }`
332
+ gates, collection filtering, and `ctx.fga.check(...)` in actions work.
333
+ - Masking evaluates its (empty) role set: masked columns stay masked.
334
+ - Writes are audited as `created_by` / `modified_by` = `link:<id>`.
335
+ - The link middleware runs on `/api/*` and `/share/v1/link` only. The FGA API,
336
+ `/auth`, storage and realtime never see a link principal.
337
+
338
+ ```typescript
339
+ // docs.ts — members read everything in the org; a link reads only what its tuples grant.
340
+ read: {
341
+ access: {
342
+ or: [
343
+ { roles: ['owner', 'admin', 'member'] },
344
+ { fga: { relation: 'viewer', object: 'doc:{id}' } },
345
+ ],
346
+ },
347
+ },
348
+ ```
349
+
350
+ A signed-in caller keeps their own identity over an ambient `qb_share` cookie
351
+ on API routes; the `x-share-token` header always applies.
352
+
353
+ > **Custom code must check `ctx.link`.** A link principal has
354
+ > `ctx.authenticated === true`, and an org-level link also has `ctx.activeOrgId`
355
+ > set. Code that gates on those alone — a function-form access rule, a
356
+ > project middleware, an action that reads `ctx.activeOrgId` — treats a link
357
+ > holder as an org caller. Branch on `ctx.link` (or `ctx.authMethod === 'link'`)
358
+ > first. Generated code already does: function-form access denies a link, and an
359
+ > action without an `fga` arm (a `PUBLIC` action) runs a link holder as an
360
+ > anonymous caller, never with the link's org-scoped `db`.
361
+
362
+
363
+ #### Placement: two locks
364
+
365
+ Links and their tuples live with the object they protect. At mint, the object
366
+ row must exist in the minter's organization (404 otherwise), and its
367
+ non-tenant scope column (`q.scope('event')`, …) binds the link to that scope
368
+ instance:
369
+
370
+ - **Scoped object** (an `event_id` row): the principal gets
371
+ `ctx.scope = { event: { id } }` and no org claim, exactly like an event-bound
372
+ token. The table's `ctx.scope.event` firewall arm runs first; a link for
373
+ `evt_A`'s doc returns `FIREWALL_NOT_FOUND` on `evt_B`'s rows before FGA is
374
+ consulted. The FGA Check is the second lock.
375
+ - **Org-level object**: the principal gets `activeOrgId` = the link's
376
+ organization, so the object's own routes resolve; FGA alone decides per
377
+ object. A link holder is not an org member, so the action `db` never sees
378
+ that claim: inside a link-capable action, an org-scoped table answers
379
+ `403 FIREWALL_CLAIM_MISSING` (the action already has its object as
380
+ `record`). Without this, any org arm reached through the action's `db`
381
+ admitted the link holder to the whole organization's rows. Rows loaded by
382
+ `?include=` on the object's own routes still see the link's organization:
383
+ they are joined to the shared row by foreign key.
384
+
385
+ Compile errors:
386
+
387
+ - A type with `link` relations and no `sharing.resources.<type>` entry.
388
+ - A `resources.<type>.table` without a `q.scope('organization')` column.
389
+ - A table that declares `masking` while `sharing.ttlSeconds` is unset or 0 —
390
+ every link to personal data must expire. At mint, `ttlSeconds: 0` or a value
391
+ above `sharing.ttlSeconds` is a 400 for those types.
392
+ - `link` relations without `sharing.enabled`, or without the Better Auth
393
+ organization plugin.
394
+
395
+ #### Restricted links
396
+
397
+ Add `restrict` at mint to also require a signed-in user:
398
+
399
+ ```bash
400
+ POST /fga/v1/share { "object": "doc:d1", "relation": "viewer",
401
+ "restrict": { "orgMembers": true, "emailDomains": ["acme.dev"] } }
402
+ ```
403
+
404
+ - `orgMembers` — the user's active organization must be the link's.
405
+ - `emailDomains` — the user's email must be **verified** (`user.emailVerified`)
406
+ and its domain listed. JWT-lane callers carry no verification flag, so they
407
+ never satisfy it.
408
+
409
+ Anonymous or non-matching callers get 403 at open and on the API. A matching
410
+ user runs as `link:<id>` (with `ctx.link.viaUserId` set) — the link grants, not
411
+ their own roles. The cookie a restricted link sets is bound to the user who
412
+ opened it and applies only on `/share/v1/link` and paths naming the link's
413
+ object; anywhere else (or for anyone else) it is ignored and the caller's own
414
+ session applies. It never replaces a session that already holds a role in the
415
+ link's organization — an admin who opens a restricted viewer link keeps admin.
416
+
417
+ ### Type-bound public access (`user:*`)
418
+
419
+ A relation that lists `user:*` (`define viewer: [user, user:*]`) can be granted
420
+ to everyone with one tuple:
220
421
 
221
- ### Share links
422
+ ```typescript
423
+ await ctx.fga.write([{ user: 'user:*', relation: 'viewer', object: 'job:' + id }]);
424
+ ```
222
425
 
223
- Enable signed, unauthenticated share links:
426
+ `POST /fga/v1/share` on such a relation (write-role gated) writes that tuple and
427
+ returns an HMAC-signed `{ token, url }`. `GET /share/v1/:token` needs no
428
+ session: it verifies the signature and expiry (`ttlSeconds`, default never),
429
+ re-checks the stored `user:*` grant, and returns the public projection.
430
+ Revoke by deleting the `user:*` tuple — that revokes **every** link to the
431
+ object at once, and every holder sees the same thing. Use `link` subjects when
432
+ links need their own role or revocation. If the relation has neither `link` nor
433
+ `user:*`, minting returns 400.
224
434
 
225
435
  ```typescript
226
436
  authz: {
@@ -228,13 +438,9 @@ authz: {
228
438
  model: `...`,
229
439
  sharing: {
230
440
  enabled: true,
231
- // The dedicated public route (always mounted): GET /share/v1/:token
232
- route: '/share',
233
- // Optional vanity base URL (also add it to your runtime `routes`).
234
- baseUrl: 'https://share.acme.dev',
235
- // Tokens never expire by default; set a TTL in seconds to expire them.
236
- ttlSeconds: 0,
237
- // Public projection: what a `job:<id>` share link may reveal, no login.
441
+ route: '/share', // GET /share/v1/:token (always mounted)
442
+ baseUrl: 'https://share.acme.dev', // optional vanity base URL
443
+ ttlSeconds: 0, // 0 = never expires
238
444
  resources: {
239
445
  job: { table: 'jobs', fields: ['id', 'title', 'department', 'status'] },
240
446
  },
@@ -243,20 +449,7 @@ authz: {
243
449
  }
244
450
  ```
245
451
 
246
- - **Mint** a link: `POST /api/v1/fga/v1/share` `{ "object": "job:123", "relation": "viewer" }`
247
- (write-role gated) → `{ token, url }`. Minting **writes the `(user:*, relation,
248
- object)` tuple** (making the object publicly viewable per the model) and then
249
- signs the link. If the relation has no `user:*` arm in the model, minting
250
- fails with a 400 rather than handing back a dead link.
251
- - **Resolve** a link: `GET /share/v1/:token` — **no authentication**. The route
252
- verifies the HMAC, then **checks the stored grant** (no contextual shortcut):
253
- the object must still have the granted `user:*` relation right now. Only then
254
- does it return the configured public projection. Nothing else leaks — the
255
- token is scoped to exactly that object and relation.
256
- - **Revoke** a link: delete the `(user:*, relation, object)` tuple (via
257
- `POST /fga/v1/write` `deletes`, or your own action). The next `GET` Check
258
- fails and the link stops returning content — revocation is real, not just
259
- token expiry.
452
+ A public projection may not list a masked column (compile error).
260
453
 
261
454
  ### The share URL: route, base URL, or both
262
455
 
@@ -278,8 +471,32 @@ You get **both** by default:
278
471
  },
279
472
  ```
280
473
 
281
- Minted links then use `https://share.acme.dev/v1/:token`; otherwise they use
282
- the API origin + the dedicated route.
474
+ Minted links then use `https://share.acme.dev/share/v1/:token`.
475
+
476
+ ## Membership tuples from Better Auth
477
+
478
+ Don't write tuples that mirror organization membership. Declare the mapping and
479
+ the compiler derives them:
480
+
481
+ ```typescript
482
+ authz: {
483
+ fga: {
484
+ model: `...`, // type organization relations define member: [user] ...
485
+ membership: {
486
+ type: 'organization',
487
+ relations: { member: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'], admin: ['admin', 'owner'] },
488
+ },
489
+ },
490
+ }
491
+ ```
492
+
493
+ The organization plugin's hooks (`afterAddMember`, `afterAcceptInvitation`,
494
+ `afterUpdateMemberRole`, `afterRemoveMember`, `afterDeleteOrganization`) call
495
+ `src/lib/fga/membership.ts`, which recomputes `(user:<id>, <relation>,
496
+ organization:<orgId>)` from the member's current role. Each sync replaces the
497
+ user's full mirrored set, so the next membership event repairs a failed one.
498
+ Each relation must allow `[user]` directly (compile error otherwise). Cloudflare
499
+ runtime only.
283
500
 
284
501
  ## REST API
285
502
 
@@ -293,10 +510,14 @@ When `authz.fga` is set, the compiler mounts an OpenFGA-compatible surface at
293
510
  | `POST /expand` | `{ relation, object }` | `{ tree }` |
294
511
  | `POST /read` | `{ object?, relation?, user? }` | `{ tuples }` |
295
512
  | `POST /write` | `{ writes?, deletes? }` | `{ ok }` (write-role) |
296
- | `POST /share` | `{ object, relation, ttlSeconds? }` | `{ token, url }` (write-role) |
513
+ | `POST /share` | `{ object, relation, ttlSeconds?, restrict? }` | `link` relation: `{ id, token, url, expiresAt }` (`share:create`); `user:*` relation: `{ token, url }` (write-role) |
514
+ | `GET /share/links` | `?object=type:id` | `{ links }` (`share:create`) |
515
+ | `POST /share/revoke` | `{ id }` | `{ ok }` (`share:revoke`) |
297
516
 
298
- `writeRoles` (default `['admin']`) controls who can write tuples and mint share
299
- links. Pseudo-roles and `+` hierarchy suffixes are honored.
517
+ `writeRoles` (default `['admin']`) controls who can write tuples and mint
518
+ `user:*` share links, and which roles get `share: ['create', 'revoke']`
519
+ (plus `owner`). Pseudo-roles and `+` hierarchy suffixes are honored. A
520
+ share-link principal gets 403 on every `/fga/v1` route.
300
521
 
301
522
  ## How it resolves
302
523
 
@@ -310,10 +531,68 @@ default 25).
310
531
  The engine **enforces the model's direct type restrictions at check time**: a
311
532
  stored tuple whose subject shape isn't allowed for the relation is inert. So a
312
533
  `user:*` tuple on a relation declared `[user]` (no wildcard) can never grant
313
- access, even if it was written out-of-band — the model is the ceiling.
534
+ access, even if it was written out-of-band — the model is the ceiling. The
535
+ same holds for tuple-to-userset edges: a stored `parent` tuple pointing at a
536
+ type the relation no longer lists is ignored.
537
+
538
+ A cycle never grants. On the `but not` side of an exclusion a cycle denies
539
+ rather than reading as "not excluded".
540
+
541
+ ### OpenFGA conformance
542
+
543
+ The engine runs OpenFGA's own published suites
544
+ (`assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml` and `abac_tests.yaml` from
545
+ openfga/openfga, vendored under Apache-2.0) in the compiler test suite
546
+ (`fga-openfga-conformance.test.ts`):
547
+
548
+ | Suite | Executed | Pass | Skipped (unsupported) |
549
+ | --- | --- | --- | --- |
550
+ | `consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml` | 606 Check + ListObjects assertions | 606 (100%) | 297 ListUsers, 30 request-validation error codes |
551
+ | `abac_tests.yaml` | 0 | — | 234 conditions, 97 ListUsers |
552
+
553
+ Not implemented: CEL conditions (the parser rejects `condition` blocks and
554
+ `with` restrictions; conditional tuples fail closed), the ListUsers API, and
555
+ OpenFGA's request-validation error codes (an invalid request denies instead of
556
+ erroring). The DSL accepts `#` comments.
314
557
 
315
558
  ## Limitations
316
559
 
560
+ - With [database per tenant](/configure/tenant-databases#fga)
561
+ (`tenancy.isolation: 'durable-object'`), tuples live in each organization's
562
+ object. `ctx.fga` works in tenant actions and `/fga/v1` is forwarded there.
563
+ `sharing`, `membership` and `access: { fga }` arms are not supported yet.
564
+
565
+ - Link sharing requires compiler-managed table metadata. Scoped link sharing
566
+ also requires a managed organization-scoped parent, resolved through
567
+ `authz.scopes.<kind>.instance` or the existing unambiguous scope-instance
568
+ FK/firewall mapping. An unresolved or ambiguous parent fails compilation
569
+ with an actionable mapping error. This requirement applies to link sharing,
570
+ not unrelated `q.scope()` columns. Multiple placement scopes on one shared
571
+ table are currently rejected.
572
+ - Apply the generated trigger migration before serving link routes. Object
573
+ deletion (soft or hard), identity/organization/scope reassignment, and parent
574
+ deletion remove the affected links and tuples. Restoring a soft-deleted row
575
+ or inserting a replacement with the same ID does not revive old tokens or
576
+ cookies. Cleanup also removes incoming object/userset references, plus
577
+ generic tuples for a parent's mapped child objects even when those tuples
578
+ have no scope placement metadata.
579
+ - Cleanup runs in compiler-owned D1 SQL triggers in the same statement as the
580
+ write. It covers generated CRUD, batch, scoped custom writes, imports and raw
581
+ SQL, including writes without `.returning()` and with audit fields disabled.
582
+ A cleanup failure aborts the originating statement; earlier successful
583
+ statements in a nontransactional batch retain the usual partial-success
584
+ semantics. Minting validates the live object and parent and creates its
585
+ primary tuple in one insert statement, so concurrent deletion cannot leave
586
+ a usable late grant. A racing missing target returns 404; other integrity
587
+ failures abort minting without returning a token.
588
+ - Directly disabling/dropping the compiler-owned triggers or restoring old
589
+ link/tuple data bypasses this lifecycle contract. Existing stale grants from
590
+ before this migration cannot be distinguished from intentional grants;
591
+ revoke them before upgrading if their object IDs may already have been reused.
592
+ - `link` subjects compile on **Cloudflare D1 only**. On Postgres the compile
593
+ fails: a link principal carries no RLS claims yet, so its queries would run
594
+ without the row-level backstop. `user:*` share links work on every database.
595
+
317
596
  - `access: { fga }` covers **per-record** operations (`GET /:id`, `update`,
318
597
  `delete`, record-based actions) and **collection filtering** on
319
598
  `read.access` / views (see
@@ -323,8 +602,7 @@ access, even if it was written out-of-band — the model is the ceiling.
323
602
  - **Collection filtering is bounded** by `authz.fga.listObjects.maxIds`
324
603
  (default 1000). A caller authorized for more rows than the cap gets a hard
325
604
  **422 `FGA_LIST_TOO_LARGE`**, not a partial page — paginate via
326
- `POST /fga/v1/list-objects` for those cases. Only the bare/`or`/`and`-with-roles
327
- shapes are filtered; deeper nesting is a compile error.
605
+ `POST /fga/v1/list-objects` for those cases.
328
606
  - **Conditional tuples** (CEL conditions / ABAC) are **not supported, and fail
329
607
  closed**. The tuple table reserves `condition_name` / `condition_context`, but
330
608
  there is no CEL evaluator — so a tuple carrying a condition is treated as
@@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ When `equals` references the request context, use these standard sources:
380
380
  | `ctx.scope.<kind>` / `ctx.scope.<kind>.<subKey>` | A verified scope-principal claim (see [Scopes](/define/scopes)) |
381
381
  | `ctx.<claim>.<subKey>` | A [feature-area](/define/areas) context anchor — a row the area/relationship middleware loaded from a proven route param and exposed on `ctx` (e.g. `ctx.event.id`, `ctx.event.organizationId`). Present only on the area-claimed route; renders null-safe (deny-when-absent) inside `all`/`any` groups |
382
382
 
383
+ `ctx.activeOrgId` is an **org membership** claim: it comes from the caller's session or token, never from a row. A relationship lane or namespace gate that matches an attendee's guest row does not set it, so an `organizationId = ctx.activeOrgId` arm never admits a non-member to the organization's rows. Reach those callers with an arm that names them (`ctx.scope.<kind>`, `via:`, `ctx.<claim>.<subKey>`). See [Relationships](/define/relationships#standalone-actions-surface-keys-and-loads--exposeas).
384
+
385
+ With [`tenancy.isolation: 'durable-object'`](/configure/tenant-databases#tenant-ownership), every tenant table's firewall also gets a compiler-owned pin, `organizationId = ctx.tenantId`, ANDed in front of yours. `ctx.tenantId` is the organization the tenant object serves, set from the object's own name. A firewall that names `ctx.tenantId` itself is a compile error.
386
+
383
387
  These values are populated by the auth middleware (or, for scope/area anchors, the area middleware) from the request. Any predicate where `equals` starts with `ctx.` is treated as server-derived: the column lands in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` (clients cannot submit it) and is **auto-populated on create / changeset-root insert / upsert** from that context source — a raw-Drizzle selected-event fence like `{ field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.event.id' }` stamps `eventId` from `ctx.event.id` the same way `q.scope('organization')` stamps `organizationId`.
384
388
 
385
389
  **Only conjunctive arms auto-populate.** A `ctx.*`-bound column is auto-populated only when its arm is **conjunctive** — reachable through the top-level array or a nested `all:` group, so it holds for every admitted row. A column bound *only* through an `any:` branch is disjunctive and lane-dependent (e.g. an attendee's own `eventPersonId`, which must come from a **proven** scope claim, not the org lane), so the compiler does **not** guess a create value for it. Give such a column its own population source — declare it with [`q.scope()` / `q.stamp()`](/define/schema#qstamp--proven-principal-identity-columns) (a proven-identity column force-stamps from the scope claim), let it inherit through a changeset `inherit`/`fk`, or write it in an authored action. A `NOT NULL` disjunctive-only column with none of these has no create path and will hit the database `NOT NULL` constraint on insert.
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ Beyond the five security layers, `defineTable` accepts a handful of declarative
284
284
  | `embeddings` | Auto-generate vector embeddings for specified fields on insert/update. | [Stack → Embeddings](/platform/vector/using-embeddings) |
285
285
  | `realtime` | Per-table broadcast config (`enabled`, `onInsert`, `onUpdate`, `onDelete`, `requiredRoles`, `fields`). | [Stack → Realtime](/platform/realtime/using-realtime) |
286
286
  | `path` | Override the route base path (defaults to feature name). | — |
287
+ | `legacy` | `{ deprecated, sunset, path? }` on a table a namespace claims: keeps its pre-claim URL serving as a deprecated forward to the namespace route, for org members only. | [Keeping the old URL](/define/areas#keeping-the-old-url-legacy) |
287
288
 
288
289
  All options are optional — omit them and Quickback uses sensible defaults (auto-detected display column, auto-grouped layout, no embeddings, no realtime).
289
290
 
@@ -97,24 +97,65 @@ interface ReadConfig {
97
97
  // and the HYPERDRIVE_CACHED binding. See Neon → Cached public reads.
98
98
  cache?: "hyperdrive";
99
99
 
100
- // Pagination defaults for collection reads.
101
- pageSize?: number; // Default page size (default: 50)
102
- maxPageSize?: number; // Hard cap (default: 100)
100
+ // Pagination for the collection GET and every view (one setting per
101
+ // resource). `?limit=` above maxPageSize is clamped to it; OpenAPI
102
+ // documents both. A pageSize above 100 raises the cap with it.
103
+ pageSize?: number; // Default `limit` (default: 50)
104
+ maxPageSize?: number; // Hard cap on `limit` (default: 100)
103
105
 
104
106
  // Named field projections. Each view has its own access and field list.
105
107
  views?: {
106
108
  [viewName: string]: ViewConfig;
107
109
  };
110
+
111
+ // Mount the generated read routes (GET /, GET /:id, GET /views/*).
112
+ // Default true. See "Tables only your actions read" below.
113
+ routes?: boolean;
108
114
  }
109
115
 
110
116
  interface ViewConfig {
111
117
  fields: string[]; // Columns returned by this view
112
118
  access?: Access; // Per-view access (falls back to read.access)
113
- pageSize?: number;
114
- maxPageSize?: number;
119
+ // No per-view pagination: read.pageSize / read.maxPageSize apply to every
120
+ // view, and a view-level copy is a compile error.
115
121
  }
116
122
  ```
117
123
 
124
+ ## Tables only your actions read (`routes: false`)
125
+
126
+ `read: { routes: false }` keeps `read.access` declared but mounts **no**
127
+ generated read route: no `GET /`, `GET /:id` or `GET /views/*`, and none in
128
+ OpenAPI or MCP. The schema registry lists `read` in the table's
129
+ `routesDisabled` (the bundled CMS still lists the table; its rows then fail to
130
+ load). Another table cannot `?include=` it either: that fails the build. It is
131
+ the read twin of `create` / `update` / `delete` `routes: false`. Realtime
132
+ broadcasts of the table, if it has `realtime` on, still go to whoever
133
+ `read.access` admits, so leave realtime off on such tables.
134
+
135
+ Use it for tables your own actions read and filter: operator ledgers, job
136
+ state, export and restore records. Access rules do not keep a sysadmin out: a
137
+ `sysadmin` session passes every rule, `roles: ['INTERNAL']` included, so a
138
+ mounted read route on such a table is readable by any sysadmin, outside any
139
+ Cloudflare Access gate on your operator paths.
140
+
141
+ ```ts
142
+ import { feature, q } from "@quickback/compiler";
143
+
144
+ export default feature("data_exports", {
145
+ columns: {
146
+ id: q.id(),
147
+ organizationId: q.scope("organization"),
148
+ ...q.audit(),
149
+ ...q.softDelete(),
150
+ },
151
+ firewall: { organization: {} },
152
+ read: { access: { roles: ["INTERNAL"] }, routes: false },
153
+ create: { access: { roles: ["INTERNAL"] }, routes: false },
154
+ update: { access: { roles: ["INTERNAL"] }, routes: false },
155
+ delete: { access: { roles: ["INTERNAL"] }, routes: false },
156
+ });
157
+ ```
158
+
118
159
  ## Access Ordering on `/:id`
119
160
 
120
161
  Single-record `GET /:id` evaluates checks in this order to close the
@@ -158,11 +158,13 @@ The resolver:
158
158
 
159
159
  1. **Cheap in-memory role check** first — `ctx.roles?.includes('admin')` and friends. If the caller has a qualifying role, this short-circuits and no DB queries fire for the access gate.
160
160
  2. **Firewall-gated relationship match** if the role check failed — `SELECT { organizationId, teamId } FROM guests WHERE userId=ctx.userId AND eventId=input.eventId AND status='confirmed'` with the `guests` table's soft-delete predicates AND-applied — **not** its tenant scope (a cross-tenant attendee has no `activeOrgId` to match; see [Firewall — relationships](/define/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) for the two invariants that make the row trustworthy instead: FK integrity on `resource.column`, and write-gating on the relationship table). If neither role nor relationship qualifies → 403.
161
- 3. **Tenant stamping from the matched row** — for any tenant column the `from` table carries (`organizationId`, `teamId`), the resolver stamps `ctx.activeOrgId ??= matchedRow.organizationId` (and similar for team). This is **in-memory mutation of the request-scoped ctx only** — no JWT remint, no session-record write, no persistent grant.
162
- 4. **Firewall-gated load of the loaded resource** — `SELECT * FROM events WHERE id = :eventId AND buildEventsFirewallConditions(ctx, db)`. The events firewall is applied as normal; it succeeds for attendees because tenant was just stamped from the relationship row.
161
+ 3. **No tenant stamping from the matched row.** `ctx.activeOrgId` and `ctx.activeTeamId` are never set from a relationship row. An `organizationId = ctx.activeOrgId` (or `teamId = ctx.activeTeamId`) firewall arm means *membership*: stamping the attendee's row org or team would make every such arm admit the whole organization's — or team's — rows (every other event's guests, staff and notes) to a caller who is not a member.
162
+ 4. **Firewall-gated load of the loaded resource** — `SELECT * FROM events WHERE id = :eventId AND buildEventsFirewallConditions(…, db)`. The events firewall is applied as normal. For a caller with no active organization (or team), this one load evaluates the firewall with the matched row's `organizationId` (or `teamId`) — pinned to the one instance by its id, and never kept on `ctx`.
163
163
  5. Assigns the loaded row to `ctx.event` for the action body.
164
164
 
165
- **What each query enforces.** The relationship match applies the `from` table's soft-delete only; the loaded resource runs under its full firewall, bound to the tenant stamped from the matched row — so a relationship row can only open an instance in its own tenant. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant columns are the source of the stamped claim. That makes the row's integrity load-bearing: declare `resource.column` as a foreign key and guard it against update (`guards: { immutable: ['eventId'] }`), and gate who may write the relationship table as tightly as the access it confers.
165
+ **What each query enforces.** The relationship match applies the `from` table's soft-delete only; the loaded resource runs under its full firewall, bound to the matched row's tenant — so a relationship row can only open an instance in its own tenant. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant column binds the one instance it opens. That makes the row's integrity load-bearing: declare `resource.column` as a foreign key and guard it against update (`guards: { immutable: ['eventId'] }`), and gate who may write the relationship table as tightly as the access it confers.
166
+
167
+ **After the gate, rows come from the arms that name the caller.** Inside `execute()`, the scoped `db` and every CRUD route see an attendee as what it is: no active organization, a hydrated `ctx.event`, and (after the [scope refresh](/define/scopes)) `ctx.scope.event`. A table whose firewall is org-only returns nothing to it (`403 FIREWALL_CLAIM_MISSING` from the scoped `db`, and the [`db` type gate](/define/actions/scoped-db#caught-at-compile-time) refuses the statement at compile time in a namespace with relationship lanes). Give the tables an attendee should read an arm that names it — `firewall: { any: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' }] }` — or read the instance's org from `ctx.event.organizationId` and pin by it explicitly.
166
168
 
167
169
  ### Conditional tenant preconditions
168
170
 
@@ -173,28 +175,28 @@ if (!ctx.activeOrgId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noOrg(), 403);
173
175
  if (!ctx.activeTeamId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noTeam(), 403);
174
176
  ```
175
177
 
176
- If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` also bypass the preconditions. `ADMIN` is rejected at compile time.
178
+ If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and binds the loaded instance to that row's tenant. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` also bypass the preconditions. `ADMIN` is rejected at compile time.
177
179
 
178
- Typical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins still get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session as today; attendees get it from the relationship row, mid-request. Both paths converge on a valid tenant claim before `execute()` runs.
180
+ Typical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session. Attendees get no `ctx.activeOrgId` — they reach rows through `ctx.event` and the scope arms that name them.
179
181
 
180
182
  ### Requirement on the relationship's `from` table
181
183
 
182
- For tenant-stamping to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:
184
+ For the tenant binding to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:
183
185
 
184
- - For org stamping: an `organizationId` column (or whatever spelling the project's auth-provider defaults pick).
185
- - For team stamping: a `teamId` column.
186
+ - For the org binding (skipping the org precondition, binding the loaded instance): an `organizationId` column (or whatever spelling the project's auth-provider defaults pick).
187
+ - For the team binding: a `teamId` column.
186
188
 
187
189
  When the `from` table has **neither**, the compiler emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning at compile time:
188
190
 
189
191
  ```
190
192
  Relationship "X" at authz.relationships.X has no organization or team columns
191
193
  on its `from` table ("guests"). Action "Y" will compile, but downstream
192
- scoped-db queries inside execute() may 403 because ctx.activeOrgId /
193
- activeTeamId cannot be stamped from the match row. Either add the tenant
194
- column to "guests", or set firewall: { exception: true } on the action.
194
+ scoped-db queries inside execute() may 403 because the match row supplies
195
+ no organization or team. Either add the tenant column to "guests", or set
196
+ firewall: { exception: true } on the action.
195
197
  ```
196
198
 
197
- The relationship match still works (existence check), but no tenant gets stamped — so the conventional precondition still fires and the action still 403s for callers without a session-resident tenant claim. Add the tenant column (or denormalize it onto the relationship table during writes) to enable the stamping path.
199
+ The relationship match still works (existence check), but no tenant can be read from it — so the conventional precondition still fires and the action still 403s for callers without a session-resident tenant claim. Add the tenant column (or denormalize it onto the relationship table during writes) to enable the binding.
198
200
 
199
201
  The body can then trust `ctx.event` and drop the hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` boilerplate:
200
202
 
@@ -355,6 +357,22 @@ The validator and resolver reject:
355
357
  - `+` hierarchy suffix on a relationship-role name (terminal, like pseudo-roles).
356
358
  - Relationship-backed rules in `masking.show` (use a relationship-gated view
357
359
  for field projection; action access is fully supported).
360
+ - With [`tenancy.isolation: 'durable-object'`](/configure/tenant-databases#admission-tables-stay-on-the-platform),
361
+ a relationship whose tables live in tenant objects, when anything but a
362
+ [tenant-backed scope kind](/configure/tenant-databases#tenant-backed-scope-kinds), its
363
+ [tenant namespace](/configure/tenant-databases#tenant-namespaces) or its ticket reads it
364
+ from the edge (`TENANCY_ADMISSION_DEPENDENCY`). A scope kind's relationships are
365
+ tenant-backed together with its instance table, in one unpartitioned tenant
366
+ object, each `from` table with an organization column, no `hops` and no SQL
367
+ helper ([full list](/configure/tenant-databases#which-kinds-can-be-tenant-backed)).
368
+ A namespace's lanes, `loads` tables and claimed routes run where its tables
369
+ live: all in the organization object (the gate then runs in the tenant
370
+ Worker) or all on the platform (`TENANCY_NAMESPACE_SPLIT`,
371
+ `TENANCY_NAMESPACE_PARTITIONED`, `TENANCY_NAMESPACE_UNROUTED`).
372
+ - An OAuth scope kind with two or more user-provable relationship roles and no
373
+ [`precedence`](/define/scopes#subject-precedence)
374
+ (`SCOPE_OAUTH_PRECEDENCE_REQUIRED`), or whose namespace `via` lanes are in
375
+ another order (`SCOPE_PRECEDENCE_LANE_CONFLICT`).
358
376
 
359
377
 
360
378
  ## Outgrown this?
@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ export default {
462
462
  };
463
463
  ```
464
464
 
465
+ On Postgres with Better Auth, `namingConvention: 'camelCase'` fails the compile. Better Auth then camel-cases its own tables and columns (`userId`, `organizationId`), and the generated RLS policies on those tables name them in snake_case. Keep `snake_case`, or set `compiler.securityContracts.skipManagedTables: true` and ship your own RLS for the Better Auth tables.
466
+
465
467
  For one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:
466
468
 
467
469
  ```ts