@quickback-dev/cli 0.67.1 → 0.67.2

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Files changed (54) hide show
  1. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  2. package/dist/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +5 -0
  3. package/dist/skill/docs/api/errors.md +7 -4
  4. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +26 -0
  5. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +28 -9
  6. package/dist/skill/docs/define/access.md +15 -2
  7. package/dist/skill/docs/define/authz-roles.md +1 -1
  8. package/dist/skill/docs/define/encryption.md +39 -7
  9. package/dist/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +6 -0
  10. package/dist/skill/docs/define/schema.md +31 -2
  11. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/api-keys.md +77 -1
  12. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/agent-auth.md +1 -1
  13. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/index.md +33 -34
  14. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/security.md +53 -6
  15. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/using-auth.md +1 -1
  16. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +2 -0
  17. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/storage/r2.md +2 -0
  18. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/storage/using-kv.md +6 -36
  19. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +2 -1
  20. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +4 -0
  21. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +12 -8
  22. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/api-keys.md +2 -1
  23. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/index.md +7 -6
  24. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/passwordless.md +1 -1
  25. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/hooks.md +1 -1
  26. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/index.md +2 -2
  27. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/actions.md +2 -1
  28. package/package.json +1 -1
  29. package/src/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +5 -0
  30. package/src/skill/docs/api/errors.md +7 -4
  31. package/src/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +26 -0
  32. package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +28 -9
  33. package/src/skill/docs/define/access.md +15 -2
  34. package/src/skill/docs/define/authz-roles.md +1 -1
  35. package/src/skill/docs/define/encryption.md +39 -7
  36. package/src/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +6 -0
  37. package/src/skill/docs/define/schema.md +31 -2
  38. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/api-keys.md +77 -1
  39. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/agent-auth.md +1 -1
  40. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/index.md +33 -34
  41. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/security.md +53 -6
  42. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/using-auth.md +1 -1
  43. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +2 -0
  44. package/src/skill/docs/platform/storage/r2.md +2 -0
  45. package/src/skill/docs/platform/storage/using-kv.md +6 -36
  46. package/src/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +2 -1
  47. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +4 -0
  48. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +12 -8
  49. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/api-keys.md +2 -1
  50. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/index.md +7 -6
  51. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/passwordless.md +1 -1
  52. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/hooks.md +1 -1
  53. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/index.md +2 -2
  54. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/actions.md +2 -1
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ export default defineConfig({
40
40
  - `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/send-verification-otp`
41
41
  - `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/verify-otp`
42
42
 
43
+ Codes are stored hashed and expire after 300 seconds by default; set `plugins: { emailOtp: { expiresIn: 600 } }` to change it — the email states the configured lifetime.
44
+
43
45
  **Email readiness check:**
44
46
 
45
47
  Use this to show UI warnings when SES isn't configured.
@@ -67,11 +69,12 @@ auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
67
69
  }),
68
70
  ```
69
71
 
70
- > `emailOtp.disableSignUp` **inherits the global signup gate**: when
71
- > `account.auth.signup: false` (i.e. `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`) is
72
- > set, the OTP plugin is gated automatically so it can't be used to bypass it. Set
73
- > `emailOtp: { disableSignUp: false }` explicitly to opt the OTP path back open
74
- > while password sign-up stays closed.
72
+ > `emailOtp.disableSignUp` **inherits `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`**, so
73
+ > the OTP path can't bypass a hard password-signup block. Set
74
+ > `emailOtp: { disableSignUp: false }` explicitly to opt the OTP path back open.
75
+ > `account.auth.signup: false` is different: it sets the invite-only
76
+ > [signup policy](/platform/auth/security#signup-policy), which covers every
77
+ > sign-in method and still admits invitees.
75
78
 
76
79
 
77
80
  ### SMS OTP (with AWS SNS)
@@ -125,19 +128,23 @@ Optional vars:
125
128
 
126
129
  ### Magic Links
127
130
 
128
- Magic links provide passwordless authentication by sending a unique login link to the user's email. When clicked, the link authenticates the user without requiring a password.
131
+ Magic links provide passwordless authentication by emailing a single-use sign-in link.
129
132
 
130
133
  **Enable in config:**
131
134
 
132
135
  ```ts
133
136
  auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
134
- plugins: ["magicLink"],
137
+ plugins: { magicLink: { expiresIn: 900 } }, // seconds; default 300
135
138
  }),
136
139
  ```
137
140
 
138
141
  **Endpoints:**
139
- - `POST /auth/v1/magic-link/send` - Send magic link email
140
- - `GET /auth/v1/magic-link/verify` - Verify magic link token
142
+ - `POST /auth/v1/sign-in/magic-link` - Send the magic link email (`{ email, callbackURL? }`)
143
+ - `GET /auth/v1/magic-link/verify` - Spend the token, set the session, redirect to `callbackURL`
144
+
145
+ **The emailed link opens a confirm page.** Mail scanners fetch every link in a message, which would spend a single-use token before the recipient clicks. So the email links to `<ACCOUNT_URL>/magic-link?token=…` — the [Account UI](/ui/account/features/passwordless) confirm page — and only its **Continue signing in** button navigates to `/magic-link/verify`. If you serve your own frontend at `ACCOUNT_URL`, give it a `/magic-link` page that does the same: forward the query string to `/auth/v1/magic-link/verify` on a user click.
146
+
147
+ Tokens are stored hashed, and the email states the configured `expiresIn`.
141
148
 
142
149
  **Disabling sign-up via magic link:**
143
150
 
@@ -154,31 +161,28 @@ auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
154
161
  }),
155
162
  ```
156
163
 
157
- It inherits the global signup gate the same way `emailOtp.disableSignUp` does:
158
- `account.auth.signup: false` gates the magic-link path automatically; set
159
- `magicLink: { disableSignUp: false }` to opt it back open.
164
+ It inherits `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true` the same way
165
+ `emailOtp.disableSignUp` does; set `magicLink: { disableSignUp: false }` to opt
166
+ it back open. The invite-only [signup policy](/platform/auth/security#signup-policy)
167
+ applies to magic links too.
160
168
 
161
- **Email customization:**
169
+ **Email delivery:**
162
170
 
163
- Magic link emails use the same AWS SES configuration as Email OTP. Customize the email template via environment variables:
164
-
165
- - `APP_NAME` - Application name in email subject
166
- - `APP_URL` - Base URL for magic link redirect
167
- - `EMAIL_FROM` - Sender email address
168
- - `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` - Sender display name
171
+ Magic link emails go through your configured `email.provider` — Cloudflare Email Sending by default, or AWS SES with the same variables as Email OTP (`APP_NAME`, `EMAIL_FROM`, `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`). `ACCOUNT_URL` sets where the confirm page lives.
169
172
 
170
173
  **Frontend integration:**
171
174
 
172
175
  ```ts
173
- // Request magic link
174
- await fetch('/auth/v1/magic-link/send', {
176
+ // Request a magic link
177
+ await fetch('/auth/v1/sign-in/magic-link', {
175
178
  method: 'POST',
176
179
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
177
- body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'user@yourdomain.com' })
180
+ credentials: 'include',
181
+ body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'user@yourdomain.com', callbackURL: 'https://app.yourdomain.com/' }),
178
182
  });
179
183
 
180
- // User clicks link in email, which redirects to your app
181
- // The token is verified automatically via the callback URL
184
+ // The user opens the link, lands on <ACCOUNT_URL>/magic-link, clicks
185
+ // "Continue signing in", and is redirected to callbackURL signed in.
182
186
  ```
183
187
 
184
188
  ### Passkeys
@@ -283,18 +287,13 @@ Static, long-lived credentials for cron jobs, scripts, and machine-to-machine in
283
287
 
284
288
  **Authenticating requests:**
285
289
 
286
- Pass the key as the `x-api-key` header (preferred) or as an `?api_key=` / `?key=` query parameter:
290
+ Pass the key as the `x-api-key` header, or a prefixed key as `Authorization: Bearer <key>` (query parameters are not accepted, so keys never land in access logs or `Referer`):
287
291
 
288
292
  ```bash
289
- # Header form (preferred — keys don't leak into access logs or Referer)
290
- curl -H "x-api-key: ${KEY}" https://api.example.com/v1/jobs
291
-
292
- # Query-param form (for clients that can't inject custom headers,
293
- # e.g., claude.ai's MCP connector)
294
- curl "https://api.example.com/v1/jobs?api_key=${KEY}"
293
+ curl -H "x-api-key: ${KEY}" https://api.example.com/api/v1/jobs
295
294
  ```
296
295
 
297
- The header takes precedence when both are present. The query-param form lands in nginx / Cloudflare access logs and `Referer` headers when the page navigates away — prefer headers whenever the client supports them.
296
+ Sending `x-api-key` together with a session cookie or an `Authorization` header is a `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`.
298
297
 
299
298
  **Endpoints (managed by Better Auth):**
300
299
  - `POST /auth/v1/api-key/create` — issue a new key (returns the secret once; store it)
@@ -303,7 +302,7 @@ The header takes precedence when both are present. The query-param form lands in
303
302
 
304
303
  These need a real session (cookie or session-token bearer). Under `/auth/v1/*` a key authenticates only `GET /auth/v1/get-session`; every other Better Auth endpoint ignores `x-api-key`, so a leaked key cannot mint JWTs, manage keys, or act on organizations. See [API Keys](/platform/auth/api-keys).
305
304
 
306
- Keys can carry organization context via `metadata.organizationId` — when set, the auth middleware looks up the user's role in that org and populates `ctx.roles` accordingly, so a single key inherits the same firewall + access scope as the user who created it.
305
+ Keys can carry organization context via `metadata.organizationId` — when set, the auth middleware looks up the user's role in that org and populates `ctx.roles` accordingly, so a single key inherits the same firewall + access scope as the user who created it. `metadata.scopes` narrows a key to named resources and read/write — see [API Keys → Scopes](/platform/auth/api-keys#scopes). New keys carry a project prefix (`plugins: { apiKey: { prefix } }`), a banned owner's keys stop working, and each key is rate limited.
307
306
 
308
307
  ### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)
309
308
 
@@ -395,7 +394,7 @@ Consent management:
395
394
 
396
395
  **Account SPA wiring:**
397
396
 
398
- The compiled Account SPA already serves `/consent`. When `oauthProvider` is enabled, Better Auth redirects unauthenticated users to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/login?redirect=...` and authenticated users straight to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/consent?client_id=...&scope=...&oauth_query=...`. The bundled consent screen reads those params, fetches client metadata via `/oauth2/public-client`, and POSTs back to `/oauth2/consent`.
397
+ The compiled Account SPA already serves `/consent`. When `oauthProvider` is enabled, Better Auth sends unauthenticated users to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/login` and authenticated users to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/consent`. Both URLs carry the signed authorize query (`client_id`, `scope`, repeated `ba_param` keys, `sig`, and so on). The bundled consent screen fetches client metadata via `/oauth2/public-client`, then POSTs the page's query back to `/oauth2/consent` as `oauth_query`. The login page does the same on sign-in. The SPA router keeps that query verbatim, because any rewrite fails the signature check with `invalid_signature`.
399
398
 
400
399
  **Token and tenant context:**
401
400
 
@@ -76,6 +76,53 @@ auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
76
76
 
77
77
  ---
78
78
 
79
+ ## Signup Policy
80
+
81
+ `signup` decides who may create an account. One server-side gate (Better Auth's `user.create.before`) enforces it on **every** creation path — email + password, email OTP, magic link, and social sign-in — so no sign-in method can be used to slip past it.
82
+
83
+ ```ts
84
+ auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
85
+ signup: { inviteOnly: true }, // invitations + admin-created only
86
+ // or: signup: { allowedEmailDomains: ["example.com"] } // that domain + invitations
87
+ })
88
+ ```
89
+
90
+ | Always admitted | Why |
91
+ |-----------------|-----|
92
+ | Accounts created by an admin (`POST /auth/v1/admin/create-user`) | Operators provision users directly |
93
+ | An email with a **pending, unexpired** organization invitation | Invitees must be able to sign up |
94
+ | The deploy owner's first Cloudflare login | The brokered-deploy owner is promoted to `appmanager` on that login |
95
+
96
+ Everyone else gets `403` with code `SIGNUP_NOT_ALLOWED`. Existing users sign in as before — the gate runs only when an account would be created. `allowedEmailDomains` matches the exact domain (`example.com` admits `me@example.com`, not `me@sub.example.com`).
97
+
98
+ `account.auth.signup: false` is the shorthand for `inviteOnly: true`. The compile fails if you combine `inviteOnly` with `allowedEmailDomains` (allowed domains already admit invitations), or a restricted policy with the `upgradeAnonymous` plugin (it lets an anonymous user claim any email).
99
+
100
+ Invitation acceptance itself still needs the invitation ID from the email, so knowing an invited address isn't enough to join an organization. Pair a restricted policy with `emailVerification` if accounts must prove their email before use.
101
+
102
+ A per-method hard block is separate: `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` and the `emailOtp` / `magicLink` `disableSignUp` options refuse new accounts on that method even for invitees.
103
+
104
+ ## Account Linking
105
+
106
+ When someone signs in with a social provider and an account with the same email already exists, Better Auth links the two only if the provider verified the email (or is listed as trusted) **and** the existing account's email is verified. The second condition stops a pre-registered, unverified account from absorbing a real owner's Google sign-in. The compiler pins both conditions explicitly, so a future Better Auth default can't loosen them; the local-email condition is not configurable.
107
+
108
+ ```ts
109
+ auth: defineAuth("better-auth", {
110
+ socialProviders: { google: { enabled: true } },
111
+ accountLinking: {
112
+ trustedProviders: ["google"], // trust Google's email even when it says unverified
113
+ // enabled: false, // never link implicitly; users link while signed in
114
+ },
115
+ })
116
+ ```
117
+
118
+ `trustedProviders` entries must be enabled `socialProviders`; anything else fails the compile.
119
+
120
+ ## Sign-In Tokens at Rest
121
+
122
+ Magic-link tokens and email OTP codes are stored **hashed** in the verification table (`storeToken: "hashed"`, `storeOTP: "hashed"`), so a leaked database row can't be replayed. Both lifetimes are emitted explicitly (default 300 seconds, `plugins.<name>.expiresIn` to change), and the emails state the same value.
123
+
124
+ ---
125
+
79
126
  ## Rate Limiting
80
127
 
81
128
  Quickback includes per-IP rate limiting by default to protect against brute-force attacks and abuse.
@@ -194,25 +241,25 @@ Quickback supports three bearer-token flavors alongside the standard browser ses
194
241
  | Session cookie | Browser SPAs (CMS, Account, your app) | Better Auth session lookup |
195
242
  | Session-token bearer | API clients that grabbed `set-auth-token` | Better Auth `bearer` plugin |
196
243
  | JWT bearer | API clients that mint at `GET /auth/v1/token` | In-worker JWT fast-path (no DB hit) |
197
- | API-key bearer | Long-lived programmatic access | `apiKey` plugin / `x-api-key` header (never a query parameter) |
244
+ | API-key bearer | Long-lived programmatic access | `apiKey` plugin / `x-api-key` header, or a prefixed key as `Authorization: Bearer` (never a query parameter) |
198
245
 
199
246
  These match Better Auth's own framing of bearer tokens as **an alternative to cookies, not a supplement** — a request uses one or the other.
200
247
 
201
- ### Precedence: bearer always wins
248
+ ### One transport per request
202
249
 
203
- If a request carries both `Authorization` and `Cookie` headers, the bearer wins universally and the cookie is dropped before session resolution:
250
+ A request carries exactly one credential. Two or more of `Cookie`, `Authorization`, and `x-api-key` is a `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT` — no precedence rules, no silent override:
204
251
 
205
252
  ```
206
253
  Request Resolved as
207
254
  ────────────────────────────────────── ─────────────
208
255
  Cookie only cookie session
209
256
  Authorization: Bearer <jwt> JWT claims
210
- Authorization: Bearer <api-key> API-key owner
211
257
  Authorization: Bearer <session-token> bearer session
212
- Cookie + Authorization: Bearer <token> bearer wins, cookie ignored
258
+ x-api-key: <api-key> API-key owner (narrowed by its scopes)
259
+ Any two of the above 400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT
213
260
  ```
214
261
 
215
- This closes a class of silent-impersonation bugs where an ambient session cookie (multi-account browser tabs, a malicious extension, a misconfigured proxy injecting `Set-Cookie`) would otherwise override an explicit bearer credential. The decision is made before `getSession()` runs, so it applies to every code path in the auth middleware.
262
+ This closes a class of silent-impersonation bugs where an ambient session cookie (multi-account browser tabs, a malicious extension, a misconfigured proxy injecting `Set-Cookie`) would otherwise override an explicit credential. The decision is made before `getSession()` runs, so it applies to every code path in the auth middleware.
216
263
 
217
264
  The api-key and JWT bearers also short-circuit before cookie resolution via dedicated fast-paths — they never touch the database for session lookup. Only session-token bearers reach `getSession()`, where Better Auth's `bearer` plugin resolves the `Authorization` header.
218
265
 
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Better Auth supports multiple sign-in methods:
13
13
 
14
14
  ## Session Handling
15
15
 
16
- Sessions live in the **auth database** — that is the source of truth. When your project uses the `cloudflare-kv` storage provider, the compiler wires that KV namespace up as Better Auth's `secondaryStorage`, which caches session lookups at the edge in front of the database. KV is a cache, not the store.
16
+ Sessions live in the **auth database**, and every session lookup reads it — the compiler does not configure Better Auth `secondaryStorage`, so a KV namespace does not cache sessions. To take session reads off the database hot path, enable the signed cookie cache (`session.cookieCache`), which trades revocation latency (capped by its `maxAge`) for fewer reads.
17
17
 
18
18
  The generated auth middleware resolves the session once per request and hydrates a single Hono context variable, `ctx` — it does **not** set `session` or `user` variables:
19
19
 
@@ -230,6 +230,8 @@ The matching `ws_ticket` issuer is the same one the Broadcaster already uses at
230
230
 
231
231
  Drop in [`Y-PartyServer`](https://github.com/cloudflare/partykit) when you need true concurrent text/document editing. It's a `Server` subclass that wraps Yjs's sync protocol; everything else above stays the same.
232
232
 
233
+ Add `y-partyserver` and `yjs` to `build.dependencies` alongside `partyserver`. The cloud compiler image ships all three — plus `y-prosemirror` and the `prosemirror-*` packages for rich-text docs — so hosted complete compiles can bundle-check the room.
234
+
233
235
  ```ts
234
236
  import { YServer } from 'y-partyserver';
235
237
 
@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ has no effect.
233
233
  > `readRoles` are applied on every route that can reveal an object — downloads,
234
234
  > `GET /object` listings, and `POST /url` lookups alike. Being a member of the
235
235
  > owning organization is not sufficient on its own.
236
+ > Downloads and `HEAD` also require a live metadata row for every read scope;
237
+ > soft-deleted objects return `404` even if bytes remain in R2.
236
238
  >
237
239
  > - **Listing** (`GET /object`) returns only objects in buckets you may read.
238
240
  > The filter is applied in the query, so `limit` and `offset` page over your
@@ -1,45 +1,15 @@
1
1
  # Using KV
2
2
 
3
- Cloudflare KV is used by the Quickback Stack for session storage, caching, and rate limiting.
3
+ Cloudflare KV is a namespace your handlers can use for caching. The compiler itself keeps very little in it.
4
4
 
5
- ## Session Storage
5
+ ## What the compiler stores in KV
6
6
 
7
- Better Auth stores sessions in KV by default for fast edge-based lookups. This is auto-configured by the compiler — no setup needed.
7
+ - **JWT revocation stamps** — with [`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`](/configure/auth) the generated auth writes a timestamp when a user is banned or a membership is removed or changed, and the JWT fast path refuses tokens issued before it.
8
8
 
9
- ```typescript
10
- // How sessions work internally (auto-generated)
11
- // On login: session stored in KV
12
- await kv.put(`session:${sessionToken}`, JSON.stringify(sessionData), {
13
- expirationTtl: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7, // 7 days
14
- });
15
-
16
- // On each request: session retrieved from KV
17
- const session = await kv.get(`session:${sessionToken}`, "json");
18
- ```
19
-
20
- Sessions are automatically:
21
- - **Created** on sign-in (email/password, passkey, magic link, etc.)
22
- - **Validated** on every authenticated request via the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header
23
- - **Expired** after the configured TTL (default: 7 days)
24
- - **Deleted** on sign-out
25
-
26
- ## Rate Limiting
27
-
28
- KV powers the rate limiting middleware that protects auth endpoints:
29
-
30
- ```typescript
31
- // Rate limit key structure (auto-generated)
32
- // Key: ratelimit:{ip}:{endpoint}
33
- // Value: request count
34
- // TTL: rate limit window (e.g., 60 seconds)
35
- const key = `ratelimit:${ip}:${endpoint}`;
36
- const count = await kv.get(key);
37
- if (count && parseInt(count) > limit) {
38
- return c.json({ error: "Too many requests" }, 429);
39
- }
40
- ```
9
+ ## What is *not* in KV
41
10
 
42
- See [Auth Security](/platform/auth/security) for rate limiting configuration options.
11
+ - **Sessions** live in the auth database. The compiler does not configure Better Auth `secondaryStorage`; see [Session Handling](/platform/auth/using-auth#session-handling).
12
+ - **Auth rate-limit counters** live in the auth database on Cloudflare (`rateLimit.storage: "database"`, the default there). See [Auth Security](/platform/auth/security#counter-storage).
43
13
 
44
14
  ## Caching
45
15
 
@@ -376,7 +376,8 @@ export default defineAction({
376
376
 
377
377
  // ctx.crypto is hydrated for authenticated requests only — a PUBLIC
378
378
  // action reads an .encrypted() column through decryptValue directly.
379
- const secret = await decryptValue(env, unsafeDb, conn.organizationId, conn.signingSecret);
379
+ const secret = await decryptValue(env, unsafeDb, conn.organizationId, conn.signingSecret,
380
+ { table: "connections", column: "signingSecret" });
380
381
  // verify `rawBody` + the provider's signature headers with `secret`;
381
382
  // throw a 401 ActionError on failure — BEFORE touching any tenant data.
382
383
 
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ The `/compile` endpoint requires either a session token (from `quickback login`)
35
35
 
36
36
  The map uses project-root-relative paths and follows the same layout `quickback build` reads from disk: `quickback/quickback.config.ts`, `quickback/features/**`, `quickback/services/**`, `quickback/{lib,hooks,plugins,middlewares,email-templates}/**`, plus `quickback/drizzle/**/meta/**` and `wrangler.toml` for incremental builds.
37
37
 
38
+ Raw-files requests may contain at most 30,000 paths, with at most 32 path
39
+ segments per entry. Both compiler backends reject larger maps before organizing
40
+ the project.
41
+
38
42
  Three constraints, all fail-closed:
39
43
 
40
44
  - **The config must be fully static.** The compiler parses `quickback.config.ts` with a literals-only evaluator — it never executes user code. Object/array/string/number/boolean literals, substitution-free template literals, and the `define*` helper calls all work; variables, computed values, and imports-as-values are rejected with a 400 that names the offending construct and line.
@@ -150,18 +150,22 @@ reaches Wrangler first, apply the same fix above and rebuild Generated Backend
150
150
  before Deploy.
151
151
 
152
152
  The compile sandbox has no network and bundles against the compiler image's
153
- own dependencies, so anything you declare in
154
- [`build.dependencies`](/configure#custom-dependencies) is not installed there.
155
- Rather than fail on `Could not resolve "yjs"`, the compiler **skips** the
156
- bundle check for those projects and says so in the compile warnings:
153
+ own dependencies. A dependency declared in
154
+ [`build.dependencies`](/configure#custom-dependencies) may not be available
155
+ there. In that case, a hosted complete compile fails before the bundle check:
157
156
 
158
157
  ```
159
- Skipped the Worker bundle check — build.dependencies not installed in the
160
- compiler image: yjs, y-prosemirror
158
+ Worker bundle check cannot run: build.dependencies not installed in the
159
+ compiler image: fast-xml-parser
161
160
  ```
162
161
 
163
- The compile still succeeds and the generated output is unchanged; unresolved
164
- imports and missing named exports surface at `wrangler deploy` instead.
162
+ The image preinstalls a set of [supported build
163
+ dependencies](/configure#custom-dependencies) — PartyServer, Yjs,
164
+ ProseMirror, `drizzle-zod`, and React Email among them. Type-only `@types/*`
165
+ packages never block the check. For any other package, build locally with it
166
+ installed or request that it be added to the compiler image. Validation
167
+ compiles (`complete=false`) still generate output without running the Worker
168
+ bundle check.
165
169
 
166
170
  Store the Better Auth id as plain text:
167
171
 
@@ -9,11 +9,12 @@ API keys are a user credential. Manage them at `/api-keys`, linked from `/profil
9
9
  - Scoped to an organization via `metadata.organizationId` so the key inherits your role in that tenant
10
10
  - One organization: stamped automatically
11
11
  - Several organizations: pick one when creating
12
+ - Optional **Scopes** — space-separated `read`, `write`, `<resource>:read`, `<resource>:write`. Empty means full access as your role; scopes only narrow it. Unknown scopes are rejected. See [Scopes](/platform/auth/api-keys#scopes)
12
13
 
13
14
  ## Managing Keys
14
15
 
15
16
  - List every key you own (not filtered to the current org)
16
- - See last-used timestamp and which organization the key is scoped to
17
+ - See last-used timestamp, which organization the key is scoped to, and its scopes
17
18
  - Revoke individual keys
18
19
 
19
20
  `/$slug/api-keys` redirects here so old bookmarks still work.
@@ -355,14 +355,15 @@ Full-featured SaaS with organizations, teams, and admin panel.
355
355
 
356
356
  ### Invite-Only Platform
357
357
 
358
- ```bash
359
- VITE_ENABLE_SIGNUP=false
360
- VITE_ENABLE_PASSKEY=true
361
- VITE_ENABLE_ORGANIZATIONS=true
362
- VITE_ENABLE_ADMIN=true
358
+ Set it on the server, not with a `VITE_*` flag — a flag only hides the signup screen:
359
+
360
+ ```ts
361
+ account: {
362
+ auth: { signup: false, passkey: true, organizations: true, admin: true },
363
+ },
363
364
  ```
364
365
 
365
- No public signup — users must be created by admin or invited to organizations.
366
+ `account.auth.signup: false` sets [`signup.inviteOnly`](/platform/auth/security#signup-policy): only admin-created accounts and emails with a pending organization invitation can create an account, on every sign-in method. The SPA hides open signup; an invitee's invitation link still reaches `/signup`.
366
367
 
367
368
  ## Feature Detection
368
369
 
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The sign-in email contains the six-digit code only — no magic-link companion.
14
14
 
15
15
  ## What about magic links?
16
16
 
17
- Account UI does not offer a magic-link sign-in flow. The `magicLink` Better Auth plugin is still available at the API level (see [Auth Plugins](/platform/auth/plugins#magic-links)) for apps that build their own sign-in UI, but the bundled Account SPA is OTP-only by design.
17
+ Account UI's sign-in screen does not request magic links — its passwordless flow is OTP. When the `magicLink` Better Auth plugin is enabled (see [Auth Plugins](/platform/auth/plugins#magic-links)) and your own UI requests a link, the emailed link opens Account UI's `/magic-link` page. Only the **Continue signing in** button there spends the single-use token, so a mail scanner that fetches the link can't burn it.
18
18
 
19
19
  ## Related
20
20
 
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ export default async (newSession, { authDb, authSchema }) => {
380
380
 
381
381
  ### Normalize and gate signup
382
382
 
383
- `before-*` hooks can return `{ data: Partial<User> }` to mutate the row before insert. Throw to abort.
383
+ `before-*` hooks can return `{ data: Partial<User> }` to mutate the row before insert. Throw to abort. For invite-only or allowed-domain signup, use the built-in [signup policy](/platform/auth/security#signup-policy) instead — it runs before this hook on every sign-in method.
384
384
 
385
385
  ```ts title="quickback/hooks/before-user-create.ts"
386
386
  export default async (user: { email: string; name?: string }) => {
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ User management dashboard — view all users, search, create accounts, ban/unban
26
26
 
27
27
  ## How to Enable
28
28
 
29
- Add `account` to your `quickback.config.ts` and compile. The compiler builds the SPA from source with your project-specific settings baked in and bundles it into your Worker.
29
+ Add `account` to your `quickback.config.ts` and compile. The compiler copies the generic prebuilt Account bundle into your Worker; your project's settings reach it at serve time through the worker-injected `window.__QUICKBACK_RUNTIME` config.
30
30
 
31
31
  ```typescript title="quickback/quickback.config.ts"
32
32
  export default {
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ When a flag is `false`, the corresponding routes **guard themselves at runtime**
97
97
 
98
98
  ## Features
99
99
 
100
- - **Authentication** — Email/password, passkeys (WebAuthn), email OTP, magic links, email verification, password reset
100
+ - **Authentication** — Email/password, passkeys (WebAuthn), email OTP, email verification, password reset, and the confirm page that magic-link emails open (`/magic-link`)
101
101
  - **Account Management** — Profile editing, avatar upload, password changes, device/session management, account deletion
102
102
  - **Connected Accounts** — Link Google and Cloudflare logins from `/connected-accounts` (linked from profile)
103
103
  - **Organizations** — Multi-tenant org management with owner/admin/member roles, invitations, and org settings
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ The dialog generates the appropriate input control for each field:
65
65
  | `number` | Number input | Step 0.01, supports decimals |
66
66
  | `boolean` | Checkbox | With label text |
67
67
  | `enum` | Text input | The allowed values are in `inputFields[].enum` |
68
- | `array<…>` | Text input | Comma-separated values, split on save |
68
+ | `array<object>` | JSON textarea | Validated as an array of objects before submission |
69
+ | Other `array<…>` | Text input | Comma-separated values, split on save |
69
70
 
70
71
  The types come from the action's input JSON Schema — see
71
72
  [ActionInputField](/ui/admin/schema-format#actioninputfield).
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
3
- "version": "0.67.1",
3
+ "version": "0.67.2",
4
4
  "description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
5
5
  "author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
6
6
  "license": "MIT",
@@ -220,6 +220,11 @@ PUT /api/v1/{resource}/batch
220
220
 
221
221
  Inserts new records or updates existing ones. Every record must include an `id` field.
222
222
 
223
+ When create and update access policies are configured, batch upsert requires
224
+ create access for the route. Existing records also receive the update access
225
+ check, including any record-level rule. A caller who can create but cannot
226
+ update may insert new IDs; existing IDs fail their update check.
227
+
223
228
  **Note:** Batch upsert requires both `generateId: false` (user-provided IDs) in your database configuration and `guards: false` on the table. Explicitly enabling `crud.batchUpsert` without both settings is a compile error. Use `crud.batchUpdate` for guarded updates.
224
229
 
225
230
  ### Request
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ Missing or invalid authentication tokens.
94
94
  | Code | Description |
95
95
  |------|-------------|
96
96
  | `AUTH_MISSING` | No Authorization header provided |
97
- | `AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN` | Token is malformed or invalid — including a Quickback-minted JWT that no longer verifies (rotated key, tampered, revoked). Presented-and-bad is always `401`, never treated as no credential |
97
+ | `AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN` | Token is malformed or invalid — including a Quickback-minted JWT that no longer verifies (rotated key, tampered, revoked). Presented-and-bad is always `401`, never treated as no credential. An API key whose owner is banned answers with `details.reason: "owner_banned"`; one whose stored scopes are malformed, `"malformed_scopes"` |
98
98
  | `AUTH_EXPIRED` | Token has expired |
99
- | `AUTH_RATE_LIMITED` | Too many auth attempts |
99
+ | `AUTH_RATE_LIMITED` | Too many auth attempts, or an API key over its [per-key limit](/platform/auth/api-keys#rate-limit) (`429`) |
100
100
  | `AUTH_REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE` | **503, retryable.** Only with [`revocationCheck: 'kv'`](/configure/auth#revocationcheck-none--kv--token-revocation-strategy): the bearer's signature verified, but its revocation state could not be read (KV binding missing or unreachable), so it was not trusted. Retry, or authenticate with a session cookie |
101
101
 
102
102
  ### Firewall (403)
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ Access violations return **403 Forbidden** when the user's role doesn't match th
189
189
  | `ACCESS_CONDITION_FAILED` | Record-level access condition not met |
190
190
  | `ACCESS_OWNERSHIP_REQUIRED` | User must own the record |
191
191
  | `ACCESS_NO_ORG` | No active organization set |
192
+ | `ACCESS_KEY_SCOPE_REQUIRED` | A [scoped API key](/platform/auth/api-keys#scopes) does not cover this route and method. `details.required` lists the scope that would admit it (empty outside the API base, which scoped keys never reach); `details.current` is the key's scopes |
192
193
 
193
194
  ### Guards (400)
194
195
 
@@ -320,6 +321,7 @@ form can show the conflict inline. `details.column` is the first of them.
320
321
  |------|--------|-------------|
321
322
  | `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` | 400 | Required column was null at write time |
322
323
  | `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` | 409 | Unique constraint hit |
324
+ | `DB_RELATIONSHIP_MISMATCH` | 400 | A referenced row does not match the required parent column |
323
325
  | `DB_INSERT_FAILED` | 500 | INSERT failed for an unrecognized reason |
324
326
  | `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` | 500 | UPDATE failed for an unrecognized reason |
325
327
  | `ENCRYPTION_UNREADABLE` | 422 | A stored [`.encrypted()`](/define/encryption) value will not decrypt |
@@ -327,8 +329,9 @@ form can show the conflict inline. `details.column` is the first of them.
327
329
  The `details.column` field is only present when the driver's error message identified the offending column (SQLite/D1 do; some PG variants don't).
328
330
 
329
331
  `ENCRYPTION_UNREADABLE` always carries `details: { table, column, id }` — the
330
- row whose stored ciphertext is malformed or was not written under the caller's
331
- organization key. Rewriting the field repairs the row.
332
+ row whose stored ciphertext is malformed, was not written under the caller's
333
+ organization key, was copied from another column or table, or names a key
334
+ version the organization does not have. Rewriting the field repairs the row.
332
335
 
333
336
  ## Batch Errors
334
337
 
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ The top-level `auth` config block holds provider-agnostic auth knobs that affect
6
6
  export default defineConfig({
7
7
  // ...
8
8
  auth: {
9
+ roles: ['bookkeeper'],
9
10
  roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],
10
11
  jwt: {
11
12
  expiresIn: 60,
@@ -16,6 +17,31 @@ export default defineConfig({
16
17
  });
17
18
  ```
18
19
 
20
+ ## `auth.roles`
21
+
22
+ Declares exact role names that your authentication provider supplies and your
23
+ project intentionally uses. This is the acknowledgement mechanism for dynamic
24
+ provider roles: declared names do not produce `AUTHZ_UNKNOWN_ROLE_NAME` typo
25
+ warnings, while nearby misspellings still do.
26
+
27
+ ```ts
28
+ auth: {
29
+ roles: ['bookkeeper'],
30
+ roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],
31
+ }
32
+ ```
33
+
34
+ `auth.roles` does not create privilege inheritance. Put a role in
35
+ `auth.roleHierarchy` only when it belongs in that lowest-to-highest ordering
36
+ and should participate in `role+` expansion.
37
+
38
+ With Quickback's generated Better Auth organization plugin, declared roles are
39
+ also registered as custom organization roles with member-equivalent Better Auth
40
+ permissions, so invitations and member-role updates can assign them. Other auth
41
+ providers must include the declared names in their authenticated role claims.
42
+ If you provide your own Better Auth organization-plugin `roles` or `ac`, that
43
+ explicit provider configuration wins and Quickback skips auto-registration.
44
+
19
45
  ## `auth.roleHierarchy`
20
46
 
21
47
  Lowest-to-highest privilege list. Lets access rules use `'role+'` shorthand to mean "this role and above". Documented in detail under [Access — Role hierarchy](/define/access#role-hierarchy).