@quickback-dev/cli 0.66.4 → 0.66.6
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +0 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/SKILL.md +0 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +8 -8
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -4
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/security.md +3 -3
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/access.md +52 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +2 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +1 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/areas.md +14 -15
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +5 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +2 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/fga.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +5 -5
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/guards.md +17 -11
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/masking.md +2 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +8 -10
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +2 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/index.md +0 -6
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +2 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +4 -4
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/claude-skill.md +0 -7
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +7 -6
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/owned-records.md +81 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +16 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/SKILL.md +0 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +8 -8
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -4
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/security.md +3 -3
- package/src/skill/docs/define/access.md +52 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +1 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/define/areas.md +14 -15
- package/src/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +5 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/define/fga.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +5 -5
- package/src/skill/docs/define/guards.md +17 -11
- package/src/skill/docs/define/masking.md +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +8 -10
- package/src/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +2 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/index.md +0 -6
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +4 -4
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/claude-skill.md +0 -7
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +7 -6
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/organizations.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/owned-records.md +81 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +16 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +0 -928
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.1x.md +0 -1202
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.2x.md +0 -589
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.3x.md +0 -1152
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.4x.md +0 -1108
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.5x.md +0 -885
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +0 -928
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.1x.md +0 -1202
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.2x.md +0 -589
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.3x.md +0 -1152
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.4x.md +0 -1108
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.5x.md +0 -885
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When several standalone actions share a path prefix and the same relationship gate — `/event/:eventId/announce`, `/event/:eventId/cancel`, `/event/:eventId/respond` — declaring the gate per-action means writing the same `roles: ['attendee']` over and over AND paying the relationship-resolver cost N times per request (one subquery + one row-load, multiplied by the number of actions).
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Namespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the per-namespace helper
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Namespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the [per-namespace helper](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing), that field is also statically typed as the loaded row.
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### When to use roles vs. relationships
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Use **relationships** when membership is specific to *this row* — external collaborators who aren't in your org, attendees, anyone connected to the resource by virtue of data rather than payroll. Use **roles / team** when staff at your org/team should see everything in their scope by default.
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The two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and
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The two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and at the namespace level: `namespace.via` accepts an array of lanes, first match wins.
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> **Rule of thumb.** If the answer is *"yes if you work here,"* reach for org/team roles. If the answer is *"yes if you have something to do with **this** row,"* reach for a per-row relationship. Reach for both together — at the namespace or via `access.or` — when an action should let either side in.
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Two declaration sites depending on whether the participating actions live in one feature or many:
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### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })`
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### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })`
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Use when every action under the prefix lives in the same feature directory. The namespace travels with the table that owns it — no addition to `quickback.config.ts` needed.
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The compiler emits one `app.use(...)` on the events feature's Hono app. Every standalone action in `features/events/actions/` whose path starts with `/event/:eventId/` joins the namespace automatically.
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Multi-lane
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Multi-lane and bulk-grant lanes work identically on the table-level declaration — `via:` accepts the same shapes documented below for the project-level form.
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### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces`
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### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces`
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Use when the namespace spans multiple features. The declaration sits next to your other authz config in `quickback.config.ts`.
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The compiler emits one synthetic `src/routes/__namespace-event-scope.routes.ts` that imports each contributing feature's `actions` map under a distinct alias, mounts the resolver middleware once, and dispatches to the matching action. Worker-root mount order ensures the middleware fires before any per-feature route handler under the prefix.
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### Multi-lane via
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### Multi-lane via — first match wins
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When more than one relationship can authorize a caller for the namespaced resource, pass `via:` as an array. The middleware tries each lane in declaration order and stops at the first match — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated from whichever lane fired.
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}
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```
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Hydration is **per matched lane
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Hydration is **per matched lane**: each lane fills `ctx.<its own exposeAs>` from its own `loads:` table, so lanes may load different tables into different keys. Both lanes above name `events` / `event`, so `ctx.event` is populated whichever fires. A lane declaring neither `loads:` nor `exposeAs:` is authorization-only — it opens the gate and hydrates nothing.
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### Bulk-grant lanes
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### Bulk-grant lanes
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Relationship lanes cover "specifically connected to this row." Bulk-grant lanes cover "anyone with this role / team membership in the row's tenant" — the case where an org admin or a team member should see every event in their scope without writing per-event relationship rows.
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- **`{ roles: [...] }`** — passes when the caller's BA org-role for the loaded resource's tenant includes any listed role. Short-circuits the relationship loop entirely; the role check is in-memory and cheap. Use for the "company admin sees everything" case.
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- **`{ team: true }`** — passes when `ctx.activeTeamId` is set. The loads-table firewall does the actual `events.teamId === ctx.activeTeamId` check during hydration. Use when the resource is team-scoped and you want active-team membership to grant access.
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Both bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping.
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Both bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping. When a relationship lane anchors hydration, declare `loads:` + `exposeAs:` on that lane.
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When a request misses every lane, the 403 deny payload lists every authorization path the caller could have taken — relationship names, role names, and `"team-membership"` for `{ team: true }` lanes — so a developer debugging an unexpected 403 sees the full surface they need to satisfy.
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Both forms share the same shape checks:
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- **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name
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- **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name, an array of relationship names (first match wins), or an array mixing relationship names with bulk-grant guards (`{ roles: [...] }`, `{ team: true }`). **A bare string is always a relationship name.** There is no string form for a role: `{ roles: [...] }` is a bulk-grant lane against Better Auth org roles, even when the name you put in it is a composed role defined `via` a relationship.
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- **Each relationship lane declares `loads` + `exposeAs`, or neither.** Both → the lane hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` from `loads` when it matches. Neither → an authorization-only lane. Exactly one is a compile error.
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- **Bulk-grant lanes inherit `loads:` + `exposeAs:` from sibling relationship lanes.** Pure bulk-grant namespaces (no relationship lane at all) are also accepted — set `loads:` + `exposeAs:` directly on the namespace declaration so hydration has somewhere to anchor.
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- **`prefix:` must contain at least one `:param` segment** (e.g. `/event/:eventId`). The middleware reads the relationship key from `c.req.param()` because no request body has been parsed at middleware time.
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- Tenant context (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId`) is stamped from the matched relationship row when its `from` table carries those columns. Downstream scoped queries work without further setup.
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- The action's own `access:` block (additional roles, userRole, record predicates, OTHER relationship arms) still runs after the namespace gate — namespace handles entry, per-action gates further.
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### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing
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### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing
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The namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime
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The namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime. The static type of that field is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature: useful for not blocking access, but a missed opportunity for autocomplete and typo-catching.
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The compiler emits one **per-namespace `defineAction` helper** alongside the standard `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts`. Importing from the narrowed helper retypes `ctx.<exposeAs>` inside `execute({ ctx })` to the loaded row's `$inferSelect` shape. Nothing else changes — runtime behavior, action discovery, and the `path:` namespace match are identical.
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```ts title="features/feeds/actions/feedMoments.ts"
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// One-line flip per namespace-scoped action:
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#### Opt-in, not breaking
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Actions that import `defineAction` from `../.quickback/define-action` compile with `ctx.<exposeAs>` as `any` via the `AppContext` index signature. Use the per-namespace helper for the narrowed type.
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#### Compile-time advisory
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#### Why per-namespace and not per-action
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A `defineAction` helper that's narrow to *one* exposed key (the namespace's `exposeAs`) is enough — every action under a namespace sees the same hydrated key. The alternative (per-action emit) duplicates the same prelude N times for the same shape; per-namespace keeps emission proportional to the number of distinct hydration shapes in the project.
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update: { access: { roles: ["member", "admin", "owner"] }, routes: false },
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```
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The registry records these ops in `routesDisabled`, so the
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still rendering the relation inline on the root's record page — its writes
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are changeset ops, which `routes: false` deliberately leaves open.
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## The wire contract
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One blessed path — **RFC 5789 media-type dispatch** on the routes you already
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source location, fix hint, and — for promoted errors — the exact override
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## Errors vs warnings
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## Errors vs warnings
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check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',
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target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer',
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reason: '
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reason: 'temporary exception while the organizer grant profile is implemented',
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},
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],
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},
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access, even if it was written out-of-band — the model is the ceiling.
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## Limitations
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## Limitations
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A flat array can only express AND. To grant access through **either** of two independent paths — "an org member **OR** an event attendee" — nest an `any` group. The top-level array stays sugar for `all`, so every existing firewall is byte-identical.
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## Sysadmin Escape Hatch
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> your action handlers at **compile time**: the compiler scans each action bound
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> to the table for `db.update(<table>).set({ … })` / `db.insert(<table>).values({ … })`
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>
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It also removes a bug class outright. When detection can never quietly supply a rule, the set of masked columns is the set you declared, so no two surfaces can disagree about it.
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`show: { roles: [] }` has the same effect, but it doesn't say the same thing. An empty role list reads as an oversight, and it is also what authors fall back to when the audience they wanted is **inexpressible** — masking gates on org and scoped roles, so a table gated `access: { userRole: ['sysadmin'] }` cannot name its own audience in a mask. Two different intentions, one spelling, and no way for the next reader to tell them apart.
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`show: { roles: [] }` has the same effect, but it doesn't say the same thing. An empty role list reads as an oversight, and it is also what authors fall back to when the audience they wanted is **inexpressible** — masking gates on org and scoped roles, so a table gated `access: { userRole: ['sysadmin'] }` cannot name its own audience in a mask. Two different intentions, one spelling, and no way for the next reader to tell them apart. Note the asymmetry with access, where an empty list would mean *everyone* — which is why [access refuses it at compile time](/define/access#an-empty-list-is-a-compile-error).
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When a standalone action's `access.roles` references a relationship-role, the compiler emits a runtime gate between input validation and `execute()`. The gate reads the relationship's `resource.column` value from the action surface — either a path parameter (`:eventId`) or an input field (`input.eventId`). If neither is present, the current compiler stops with a clear build error; an action can never ship with a relationship rule it has no key to evaluate.
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1. **Cheap in-memory role check** first — `ctx.roles?.includes('admin')` and friends. If the caller has a qualifying role, this short-circuits and no DB queries fire for the access gate.
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2. **Firewall-gated relationship match** if the role check failed — `SELECT { organizationId, teamId } FROM guests WHERE userId=ctx.userId AND eventId=input.eventId AND status='confirmed'` with the `guests` table's full firewall AND-applied. If neither role nor relationship qualifies → 403.
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**No firewall bypass anywhere.** Both queries run with their respective tables' full firewalls. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant columns are the source of the stamped claim.
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```ts
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if (!ctx.activeOrgId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noOrg(), 403);
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v0.20 makes these preconditions **conditional on relationship supply**. If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` still bypass the preconditions as before. `ADMIN` is now rejected at compile time.
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If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` also bypass the preconditions. `ADMIN` is rejected at compile time.
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Typical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins still get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session as today; attendees get it from the relationship row, mid-request. Both paths converge on a valid tenant claim before `execute()` runs.
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`loads` and `exposeAs` are co-required (set both or neither). `exposeAs` must be a valid JS identifier and must not collide with built-in `ctx` fields (`userId`, `activeOrgId`, `activeTeamId`, `db`, etc.).
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### Action firewall escape hatch
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### Action firewall escape hatch
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`defineAction({ firewall: { exception: true } })` opts the action out of the inherited session-key preconditions (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId` requirements) AND the relationship resolver. The handler receives `unsafeDb` for raw Drizzle access. Use for cross-tenant or admin routes whose surface intentionally doesn't name a session/relationship key:
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@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ so it can only ever carry the role the caller actually proved this request.
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- A **multi-lane `via:`** (e.g. `via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf']`) mints the matched lane's role — `attendeeOf` → `scope.event.roles = ['attendee']`, `organizerOf` → `['organizer']`. The resolver records which lane opened the gate, so there is no ambiguity.
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- A **bulk-grant lane** (`{ roles: [...] }` or `{ team: true }`) mints **no** scope role — it opens the gate via the caller's org role without proving a relationship. The gate passes; the caller carries their org role, not a minted scope role.
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- **The org claim is only ever signed beside a membership role.** Every mint site — `/scope/v1/enter`, the namespace resolver, `/api/v1/token` — writes `orgId` into the token only when a membership `role` accompanies it, and the auth middleware ignores an `orgId` claim that arrives without a `role`. A relationship-promoted tenant (the in-request `ctx.activeOrgId` stamped from the proven row so the firewall resolves) is never persisted as a bare tenant grant.
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+
- **`/scope/v1/enter` drops the org claims for a foreign-tenant instance.** When the relationship's `from` table carries an organization column, the enter route reads it off the proven row (the same row the probe already fetched — no extra query) and compares it with `ctx.activeOrgId`. A mismatch — an org-B member entering an org-A event — mints the token **without** `orgId` / `role`: a relationship-only principal, exactly the state the namespace resolver gives the same caller. The caller keeps their org seat for org-B requests by using their session or a plain `/api/v1/token`; the scope token is for the scope. A `from` table with no organization column (a global reference relationship) leaves the claim untouched.
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### The bulk-grant lane is tenant-bound
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@@ -671,7 +672,7 @@ The scope claim is trusted between proofs — it is never re-checked against the
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So removing a guest/staff row takes effect within **cap + one TTL** for a client that keeps polling, and within one TTL once it goes idle. Two ways to tighten that:
|
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|
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-
- **`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`** (
|
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+
- **`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`** (Cloudflare runtime) — sub-TTL revocation: updating or deleting a conferring relationship row stamps a revocation timestamp in KV, and the bearer fast-path rejects a carried scope claim whose proof is at or before it — no same-second gap. Each kind is compared against **its own** proof time (`sctMs` on the entry; tokens without one fall back to the token-level `sct`/`sctMs`), so a mint of one kind can't carry a revoked kind past its marker. Neither the refresh nor a re-mint ever substitutes its own clock for a proof it didn't take. The check fails closed — a scope claim whose revocation state can't be read is not trusted either. See [auth config](/configure/auth).
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- **`via` arms** — for tables where any caching is too wide, gate with a `via` arm instead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm: `via` emits a live subquery against the relationship table on every request, immune to a stale claim entirely.
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## Reference
|
package/src/skill/docs/index.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -76,9 +76,3 @@ The runtime services around your compiled code. Everything you need for a comple
|
|
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- **[Account UI](/ui/account)** — Pre-built auth and profile pages
|
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|
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Everything runs on **your own Cloudflare account** — no Quickback infrastructure between you and your data.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
-
---
|
|
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|
-
|
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-
### Changelog
|
|
83
|
-
|
|
84
|
-
[**Changelog**](/changelog) — what's new in Quickback. Release notes, new features, and improvements.
|
|
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ The fast-path is stateless by default: it verifies the signature and **trusts th
|
|
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|
|
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**Lower the TTL.** `auth.jwt.expiresIn: 30` gives a hard 30-second ceiling. Browser SPAs auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call, so a low TTL is invisible to logged-in users; only stale server-to-server bearer tokens feel it.
|
|
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|
|
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-
**Or enable sub-TTL revocation.** Set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (
|
|
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|
+
**Or enable sub-TTL revocation.** Set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (Cloudflare runtime only):
|
|
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|
|
|
115
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```ts title="quickback.config.ts"
|
|
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auth: {
|
|
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ auth: {
|
|
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The fast-path then consults per-principal revocation timestamps in your project's existing `KV` binding (keys prefixed `qbrev:`, self-expiring) *before* trusting a token. A token is rejected when its mint timestamp (`iat`/`iatMs`, or the proof time of the scope kind being checked) is **at or before** the stored timestamp. Cost: 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify.
|
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-
There is no same-second gap: markers are epoch milliseconds (written `m<ms
|
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+
There is no same-second gap: markers are epoch milliseconds (written `m<ms>`), tokens carry millisecond companions, and the comparison denies a tie — so a token minted a few milliseconds *before* the revocation is rejected, while one legitimately re-minted *after* it in that same second is still accepted.
|
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Revocation stamps are written **automatically** on:
|
|
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|
|
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ await realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {
|
|
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|
});
|
|
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|
```
|
|
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-
**Fail-closed
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|
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|
+
**Fail-closed:** an omitted or empty `targetRoles` delivers to
|
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**nobody** — there is no implicit "everyone" fallback. To reach every
|
|
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authenticated subscriber in the scope, say so explicitly with
|
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`targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED']`. UPPERCASE pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`,
|
|
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ The auto-mounted middleware is **secure by default** — anonymous WebSocket upg
|
|
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The default gate only checks **whether** the caller is authenticated, not whether they're allowed in *this* room. For per-room authorization, the `access` field on the binding lets the compiler emit a path-scoped gate that runs your existing resource firewall + `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade — no hand-written code, same status semantics as `GET /api/v1/<resource>/:id`.
|
|
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|
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|
-
### Per-room authorization via `access`
|
|
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|
+
### Per-room authorization via `access`
|
|
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123
|
|
|
124
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|
```ts
|
|
125
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|
// quickback/quickback.config.ts
|
|
@@ -149,13 +149,13 @@ bindings: {
|
|
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},
|
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// Multi-table feature: pin the gate to a specific table so the
|
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-
// firewall + id query is unambiguous
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+
// firewall + id query is unambiguous.
|
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{
|
|
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name: 'NotepadInteractions', className: 'NotepadInteractions', from: 'lib/NotepadInteractions',
|
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access: { resource: { feature: 'interactions', table: 'interactions' } },
|
|
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},
|
|
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|
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-
// Room keyed by a unique non-PK column
|
|
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|
+
// Room keyed by a unique non-PK column. A Yjs page editor is
|
|
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159
|
// addressed by `event_pages.yjsRoomId`, not the row id — `key` tells the
|
|
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// gate which column the roomId matches.
|
|
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{
|
|
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ What the compiler emits:
|
|
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|
- **Multi-resource form** — same gate but with a regex parser dispatching to per-kind firewall lookups. Unknown kinds 400 at the gate. Each `resources[kind].resource` accepts either form (string shorthand or `{ feature, table, key? }`).
|
|
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- **`access: { roomIdEquals: 'ctx.userId' }`** — an **identity gate** for rooms with no backing table, where the roomId *is* the caller's own id. Emits `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that 401s anonymous, 400s a missing segment, and 403s unless the decoded room segment equals `ctx.userId`. No schema import, no firewall, no DB query — a string compare against the server-resolved `ctx`. Use `'ctx.activeOrgId'` for a per-org room. This is the right gate for per-user gateways, presence, or inbox DOs keyed on `ns.idFromName(ctx.userId)`. Only `'ctx.userId'` and `'ctx.activeOrgId'` are accepted (validated at compile time); anything else is a build error. Distinct from `resource` because there's no row to firewall — it closes the cross-user hole that "no `access` declared" leaves open (any authenticated user could otherwise open another user's room via the catchall).
|
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- **`access: 'public'`** — `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that just passes through. Use for anonymous game lobbies / public collab pads where the room itself is the unit of access.
|
|
191
|
-
- **No `access` declared** — falls through to the catchall `/realtime/*` gate that just checks `ctx.authenticated`.
|
|
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|
+
- **No `access` declared** — falls through to the catchall `/realtime/*` gate that just checks `ctx.authenticated`.
|
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|
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Compile-time validation: every `resource` / `resources[].resource` value is checked against the project's feature names so typos surface as build errors, not as runtime 400s on the first WS upgrade. The string shorthand requires the feature to have exactly one resourceful table; multi-table features must use the long form `{ feature, table }` to pin a specific table. When `key` is set, the column is checked against the pinned table's schema.
|
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|
|
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ Events without an `externalId` (NULL) are not deduplicated. SQLite treats NULLs
|
|
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|
### Migrating an existing deployment
|
|
180
180
|
|
|
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|
-
|
|
181
|
+
If an existing deployment contains duplicate rows, drizzle-kit's unique-index migration will fail until they are cleaned up. Run this once before applying the migration:
|
|
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182
|
|
|
183
183
|
```sql
|
|
184
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|
DELETE FROM webhook_events
|
|
@@ -303,10 +303,3 @@ The MCP server always uses the latest installed version automatically.
|
|
|
303
303
|
- [Getting Started](/start/quickstart) - Get your first Quickback project running
|
|
304
304
|
- [Definitions Overview](/define) - Understand the security layer model
|
|
305
305
|
- [npm package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@quickback-dev/cli) - CLI package
|
|
306
|
-
|
|
307
|
-
## Feedback
|
|
308
|
-
|
|
309
|
-
Found an issue with the AI tools integration?
|
|
310
|
-
|
|
311
|
-
- [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/kardoe/quickback/issues)
|
|
312
|
-
- [Quickback Documentation](https://docs.quickback.dev)
|
|
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ The server echoes the chosen version back as the response `X-Quickback-Stream` h
|
|
|
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94
|
|
|
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|
Multi-megabyte SPA bundles (CMS + Account, with sourcemaps) take long enough to `JSON.stringify` that the v1 single-frame `result` event blocks Cloudflare's container event loop. Two things break: Docker's `HEALTHCHECK` fails, and the CLI's 120-second connection timeout fires before the body flushes. v2 emits files one at a time and yields back to the event loop every 10 files (`setImmediate`), keeping `/health` responsive and TCP backpressure alive.
|
|
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96
|
|
|
97
|
-
The `@quickback-dev/cli`
|
|
97
|
+
The `@quickback-dev/cli` sends `X-Quickback-Stream: v2` automatically.
|
|
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98
|
|
|
99
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|
### Event shapes (v2)
|
|
100
100
|
|
|
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ The compiler's output is a manifest of files to **write**. It has no way to say
|
|
|
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|
|
|
152
152
|
For most moves that gap is invisible: the CLI wipes `src/` from the manifest
|
|
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|
before each write, so relocating a file *within* `src/` cleans up after itself.
|
|
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|
-
It bites the moment a path crosses that boundary
|
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|
-
|
|
156
|
-
|
|
154
|
+
It bites the moment a path crosses that boundary. For example, spec blobs now
|
|
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|
+
live in `src/apps/__quickback/spec/`; retired root copies can survive as
|
|
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|
+
multi-MB orphans that tooling keeps reading.
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So the compiler now also returns **retired paths** — things it used to emit and
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no longer does — and the CLI deletes them:
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@@ -172,9 +172,8 @@ unrecoverable while a missed one is only untidy:
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actually in this compile's manifest. Disable the surface
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(`openapi.generate: false`) and neither path is emitted, so nothing is
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removed.
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- A path the current manifest still writes is **never** deleted
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-
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its live output pulled out from under it.
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- A path the current manifest still writes is **never** deleted, so live output
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cannot be pulled out from under the compile.
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- The CLI re-checks both conditions itself and refuses any path that would
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escape the output directory.
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@@ -342,6 +341,8 @@ reports/
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The signature file uses HMAC-SHA256 when a signing key is configured, otherwise it falls back to SHA-256 digest mode.
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Set `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required: true` to fail compilation when a signing key is missing.
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+
The report names the compiler that produced it twice: `compilerVersion` is the semver, and `compilerBuildId` is `<version>@<gitSha>@<builtAt>` — the same string the compiler's `/health` endpoint reports as `buildId`. The semver is a floor that can serve several hosted builds, so a drift tripwire should pin on `compilerBuildId`, not `compilerVersion`.
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+
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### Realtime
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When any feature has `realtime` configured:
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@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ These run on `/auth/v1/admin/*`, emitted by Quickback because Better Auth's orga
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45
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The admin panel is restricted to platform roles on the Better Auth user record: **`appmanager`** (the control plane) and **`sysadmin`** (which adds cross-tenant data access on top). Everyone else is redirected away from `/admin`.
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47
47
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-
> **`role: "admin"` is not a platform role.** By default the compiler seeds the admin plugin with `adminRoles: ["appmanager", "sysadmin"]
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+
> **`role: "admin"` is not a platform role.** By default the compiler seeds the admin plugin with `adminRoles: ["appmanager", "sysadmin"]`. Migrate rows with `role: "admin"` to `"appmanager"`.
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>
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50
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> A project that declares `plugins: { admin: { adminRoles, roles } }` gets **exactly** that: the declared `adminRoles` list and role → access-controller map are emitted verbatim (`appmanager: userAc` narrows the provisioning operator to no admin API at all; `adminRoles: ["sysadmin"]` keeps set-role / impersonate / ban for `sysadmin` only). The compiler never re-widens a declared role, and refuses a declaration it cannot honour.
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Account UI provides a complete organization management interface when `VITE_ENAB
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16
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- Change roles and remove members — actions are filtered per-target by the role hierarchy (non-owners can't manage owner-role members)
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- Leave the organization
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18
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-
> **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/define/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/define/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above." [Custom org roles](/define/access#custom-org-roles) declared in your access trees are auto-registered with the organization plugin
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+
> **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/define/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/define/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above." [Custom org roles](/define/access#custom-org-roles) declared in your access trees are auto-registered with the organization plugin, so `invite-member` / `update-member-role` accept them too.
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20
20
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21
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## Invitations
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22
22
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@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ The gates that carry real data:
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208
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Your resource API endpoints (`/api/v1/<resource>`) are **not** affected — they continue to use the per-resource `read`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, and `upsert` access rules you defined.
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-
>
|
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210
|
+
> `cms.access` accepts `"sysadmin"` or `"member"`. The retired `"admin"` and `"user"` spellings are rejected at compile time; migrate `"admin"` → `"sysadmin"` and `"user"` → `"member"`.
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212
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213
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|
#### What a blocked caller actually sees
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Owned Records
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
A table that declares an [`owns` boundary](/define/changesets) gets its owned
|
|
4
|
+
children rendered **inline on the record page**: each relation appears as a
|
|
5
|
+
section below the record's fields, with a row table and Add / Edit / Delete
|
|
6
|
+
controls. Line items live on the expense report, not in a sidebar collection.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
## When a relation renders
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
All three must hold — a relation missing any of them is skipped:
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
1. The relation is declared in the root's `owns`.
|
|
13
|
+
2. The relation name is in the root's `read.include` allowlist — reads ride
|
|
14
|
+
`GET /:id?include=<relation>`, and a non-allowlisted include is a 400.
|
|
15
|
+
3. The child table exists in the schema registry.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
{/* doc-compile: skip — the fence is the owns + include wiring only; columns, firewall, guards, and the child table are elided. */}
|
|
18
|
+
```ts title="quickback/features/expenseReports/expenseReports.ts"
|
|
19
|
+
export default feature("expenseReports", {
|
|
20
|
+
// ...columns, firewall, guards, crud...
|
|
21
|
+
owns: {
|
|
22
|
+
lineItems: { table: "lineItems", fk: "reportId", inherit: ["organizationId"] },
|
|
23
|
+
},
|
|
24
|
+
read: {
|
|
25
|
+
access: { roles: ["member+"] },
|
|
26
|
+
include: ["lineItems"], // without this, the CMS has no way to read the rows
|
|
27
|
+
},
|
|
28
|
+
});
|
|
29
|
+
```
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
## Writes go through the changeset engine
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
Every Add, Edit, and Delete is a single-op
|
|
34
|
+
[changeset](/define/changesets) `PATCH` on the **root** —
|
|
35
|
+
`Content-Type: application/vnd.quickback.changeset+json` — never a raw child
|
|
36
|
+
route. The generated aggregate engine enforces the child's own access,
|
|
37
|
+
guards, body schema, and firewall on every op, and stamps the spine FK and
|
|
38
|
+
`inherit` columns from the firewall-verified parent row.
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
Consequences in the UI:
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
- The child's `fk` and `inherit` columns are **excluded from the form** — the
|
|
43
|
+
engine stamps them, and a client-supplied value is rejected.
|
|
44
|
+
- The Add / Edit / Delete buttons gate on the **child table's** `create` /
|
|
45
|
+
`update` / `delete` access for the signed-in role, exactly like the child's
|
|
46
|
+
own raw routes would.
|
|
47
|
+
- Child deletes are soft (changeset v1 admits soft-delete children only).
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
## `routes: false` children
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
The usual shape for a pure composition child — line items that only ever
|
|
52
|
+
exist inside a report — is `routes: false` on every op plus
|
|
53
|
+
`cms: { internal: true }`:
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
{/* doc-compile: skip — crud-op fragments without the surrounding table definition. */}
|
|
56
|
+
```ts title="quickback/features/expenseReports/lineItems.ts"
|
|
57
|
+
read: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
|
|
58
|
+
create: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
|
|
59
|
+
update: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
|
|
60
|
+
delete: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false, mode: "soft" },
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
cms: { internal: true }, // no standalone sidebar entry
|
|
63
|
+
```
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
`routes: false` keeps the access declared (it is the changeset admission
|
|
66
|
+
gate) but mounts no raw HTTP route. The CMS reads the registry's
|
|
67
|
+
`routesDisabled` list and suppresses every raw-CRUD affordance for those ops
|
|
68
|
+
— New button, row Edit/Delete, record-page Edit/Delete, and inline cell
|
|
69
|
+
editing — so it never renders a button whose request can only 405. The
|
|
70
|
+
owned-records section is unaffected: its writes are changeset ops, which
|
|
71
|
+
`routes: false` deliberately leaves open.
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
Note the child's `read` access above is what gates the embedded rows:
|
|
74
|
+
`?include=` inherits the **target's** read access, firewall, and masking. A
|
|
75
|
+
child readable only by `admin+` renders an empty section for members.
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
## Next Steps
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
- **[Changesets](/define/changesets)** — the `owns` boundary and the wire contract
|
|
80
|
+
- **[Record Layouts](/ui/admin/record-layouts)** — grouping the root's own fields
|
|
81
|
+
- **[Schema Format](/ui/admin/schema-format)** — `ownsRelations`, `readInclude`, `routesDisabled`
|