@quickback-dev/cli 0.66.4 → 0.66.6

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Files changed (77) hide show
  1. package/README.md +0 -1
  2. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  3. package/dist/skill/SKILL.md +0 -2
  4. package/dist/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
  5. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +8 -8
  6. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  7. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -4
  8. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/security.md +3 -3
  9. package/dist/skill/docs/define/access.md +52 -9
  10. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +2 -2
  11. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +1 -2
  12. package/dist/skill/docs/define/areas.md +14 -15
  13. package/dist/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +5 -0
  14. package/dist/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +2 -2
  15. package/dist/skill/docs/define/fga.md +1 -1
  16. package/dist/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +5 -5
  17. package/dist/skill/docs/define/guards.md +17 -11
  18. package/dist/skill/docs/define/masking.md +2 -2
  19. package/dist/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +8 -10
  20. package/dist/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +2 -1
  21. package/dist/skill/docs/index.md +0 -6
  22. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +2 -2
  23. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +1 -1
  24. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +4 -4
  25. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +1 -1
  26. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/claude-skill.md +0 -7
  27. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +1 -1
  28. package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +7 -6
  29. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +1 -1
  30. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/organizations.md +1 -1
  31. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
  32. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/owned-records.md +81 -0
  33. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +16 -0
  34. package/package.json +1 -1
  35. package/src/skill/SKILL.md +0 -2
  36. package/src/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
  37. package/src/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +8 -8
  38. package/src/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  39. package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +4 -4
  40. package/src/skill/docs/configure/security.md +3 -3
  41. package/src/skill/docs/define/access.md +52 -9
  42. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +2 -2
  43. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +1 -2
  44. package/src/skill/docs/define/areas.md +14 -15
  45. package/src/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +5 -0
  46. package/src/skill/docs/define/diagnostics.md +2 -2
  47. package/src/skill/docs/define/fga.md +1 -1
  48. package/src/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +5 -5
  49. package/src/skill/docs/define/guards.md +17 -11
  50. package/src/skill/docs/define/masking.md +2 -2
  51. package/src/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +8 -10
  52. package/src/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +2 -1
  53. package/src/skill/docs/index.md +0 -6
  54. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +2 -2
  55. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/durable-objects.md +1 -1
  56. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +4 -4
  57. package/src/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/inbound.md +1 -1
  58. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/claude-skill.md +0 -7
  59. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +1 -1
  60. package/src/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +7 -6
  61. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +1 -1
  62. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/organizations.md +1 -1
  63. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
  64. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/owned-records.md +81 -0
  65. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +16 -0
  66. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +0 -928
  67. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.1x.md +0 -1202
  68. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.2x.md +0 -589
  69. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.3x.md +0 -1152
  70. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.4x.md +0 -1108
  71. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/v0.5x.md +0 -885
  72. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +0 -928
  73. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.1x.md +0 -1202
  74. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.2x.md +0 -589
  75. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.3x.md +0 -1152
  76. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.4x.md +0 -1108
  77. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/v0.5x.md +0 -885
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ doubt: if only one folder's features reference it, it belongs in that folder's a
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  When several standalone actions share a path prefix and the same relationship gate — `/event/:eventId/announce`, `/event/:eventId/cancel`, `/event/:eventId/respond` — declaring the gate per-action means writing the same `roles: ['attendee']` over and over AND paying the relationship-resolver cost N times per request (one subquery + one row-load, multiplied by the number of actions).
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- Namespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the per-namespace helper (v0.27+, [below](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing-v027)), that field is also statically typed as the loaded row.
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+ Namespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the [per-namespace helper](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing), that field is also statically typed as the loaded row.
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  ### When to use roles vs. relationships
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@@ -317,13 +317,13 @@ A user is authorized for a row when **any** of the following is true:
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  Use **relationships** when membership is specific to *this row* — external collaborators who aren't in your org, attendees, anyone connected to the resource by virtue of data rather than payroll. Use **roles / team** when staff at your org/team should see everything in their scope by default.
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- The two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and — as of v0.25 — at the namespace level too: `namespace.via` accepts an array of lanes, first match wins.
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+ The two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and at the namespace level: `namespace.via` accepts an array of lanes, first match wins.
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  > **Rule of thumb.** If the answer is *"yes if you work here,"* reach for org/team roles. If the answer is *"yes if you have something to do with **this** row,"* reach for a per-row relationship. Reach for both together — at the namespace or via `access.or` — when an action should let either side in.
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  Two declaration sites depending on whether the participating actions live in one feature or many:
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- ### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })` (v0.23+)
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+ ### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })`
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  Use when every action under the prefix lives in the same feature directory. The namespace travels with the table that owns it — no addition to `quickback.config.ts` needed.
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@@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ export default defineAction({
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  The compiler emits one `app.use(...)` on the events feature's Hono app. Every standalone action in `features/events/actions/` whose path starts with `/event/:eventId/` joins the namespace automatically.
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369
- Multi-lane via (v0.25+) and bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+) work identically on the table-level declaration — `via:` accepts the same shapes documented below for the project-level form.
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+ Multi-lane and bulk-grant lanes work identically on the table-level declaration — `via:` accepts the same shapes documented below for the project-level form.
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- ### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces` (v0.24+)
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+ ### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces`
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  Use when the namespace spans multiple features. The declaration sits next to your other authz config in `quickback.config.ts`.
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@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ export default defineAction({
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  The compiler emits one synthetic `src/routes/__namespace-event-scope.routes.ts` that imports each contributing feature's `actions` map under a distinct alias, mounts the resolver middleware once, and dispatches to the matching action. Worker-root mount order ensures the middleware fires before any per-feature route handler under the prefix.
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- ### Multi-lane via (v0.25+) — first match wins
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+ ### Multi-lane via — first match wins
426
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  When more than one relationship can authorize a caller for the namespaced resource, pass `via:` as an array. The middleware tries each lane in declaration order and stops at the first match — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated from whichever lane fired.
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@@ -458,9 +458,9 @@ authz: {
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  }
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  ```
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461
- Hydration is **per matched lane** (v0.37+): each lane fills `ctx.<its own exposeAs>` from its own `loads:` table, so lanes may load different tables into different keys. Both lanes above name `events` / `event`, so `ctx.event` is populated whichever fires. A lane declaring neither `loads:` nor `exposeAs:` is authorization-only — it opens the gate and hydrates nothing.
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+ Hydration is **per matched lane**: each lane fills `ctx.<its own exposeAs>` from its own `loads:` table, so lanes may load different tables into different keys. Both lanes above name `events` / `event`, so `ctx.event` is populated whichever fires. A lane declaring neither `loads:` nor `exposeAs:` is authorization-only — it opens the gate and hydrates nothing.
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463
- ### Bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+)
463
+ ### Bulk-grant lanes
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465
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  Relationship lanes cover "specifically connected to this row." Bulk-grant lanes cover "anyone with this role / team membership in the row's tenant" — the case where an org admin or a team member should see every event in their scope without writing per-event relationship rows.
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@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ Each bulk-grant lane:
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  - **`{ roles: [...] }`** — passes when the caller's BA org-role for the loaded resource's tenant includes any listed role. Short-circuits the relationship loop entirely; the role check is in-memory and cheap. Use for the "company admin sees everything" case.
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  - **`{ team: true }`** — passes when `ctx.activeTeamId` is set. The loads-table firewall does the actual `events.teamId === ctx.activeTeamId` check during hydration. Use when the resource is team-scoped and you want active-team membership to grant access.
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486
- Both bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping. **At least one relationship lane is required** alongside bulk-grant lanes in v0.26 (to anchor `loads:` + `exposeAs:`).
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+ Both bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping. When a relationship lane anchors hydration, declare `loads:` + `exposeAs:` on that lane.
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  When a request misses every lane, the 403 deny payload lists every authorization path the caller could have taken — relationship names, role names, and `"team-membership"` for `{ team: true }` lanes — so a developer debugging an unexpected 403 sees the full surface they need to satisfy.
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@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ Actions opt in by matching `path:` against a declared namespace prefix. There's
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  Both forms share the same shape checks:
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- - **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name (v0.23+), an array of relationship names (v0.25+, first match wins), or — as of v0.26 — an array mixing relationship names with bulk-grant guards (`{ roles: [...] }`, `{ team: true }`). **A bare string is always a relationship name.** There is no string form for a role: `{ roles: [...] }` is a bulk-grant lane against Better Auth org roles, even when the name you put in it is a composed role defined `via` a relationship.
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+ - **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name, an array of relationship names (first match wins), or an array mixing relationship names with bulk-grant guards (`{ roles: [...] }`, `{ team: true }`). **A bare string is always a relationship name.** There is no string form for a role: `{ roles: [...] }` is a bulk-grant lane against Better Auth org roles, even when the name you put in it is a composed role defined `via` a relationship.
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  - **Each relationship lane declares `loads` + `exposeAs`, or neither.** Both → the lane hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` from `loads` when it matches. Neither → an authorization-only lane. Exactly one is a compile error.
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  - **Bulk-grant lanes inherit `loads:` + `exposeAs:` from sibling relationship lanes.** Pure bulk-grant namespaces (no relationship lane at all) are also accepted — set `loads:` + `exposeAs:` directly on the namespace declaration so hydration has somewhere to anchor.
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  - **`prefix:` must contain at least one `:param` segment** (e.g. `/event/:eventId`). The middleware reads the relationship key from `c.req.param()` because no request body has been parsed at middleware time.
@@ -516,11 +516,11 @@ Inside a namespace action's `execute()`:
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  - Tenant context (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId`) is stamped from the matched relationship row when its `from` table carries those columns. Downstream scoped queries work without further setup.
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  - The action's own `access:` block (additional roles, userRole, record predicates, OTHER relationship arms) still runs after the namespace gate — namespace handles entry, per-action gates further.
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- ### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing (v0.27+)
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+ ### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing
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- The namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime — that's been true since v0.23. The static type of that field, though, is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature: useful for not blocking access, but a missed opportunity for autocomplete and typo-catching.
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+ The namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime. The static type of that field is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature: useful for not blocking access, but a missed opportunity for autocomplete and typo-catching.
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- v0.27 emits one **per-namespace `defineAction` helper** alongside the standard `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts`. Importing from the narrowed helper retypes `ctx.<exposeAs>` inside `execute({ ctx })` to the loaded row's `$inferSelect` shape. Nothing else changes — runtime behavior, action discovery, and the `path:` namespace match are identical.
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+ The compiler emits one **per-namespace `defineAction` helper** alongside the standard `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts`. Importing from the narrowed helper retypes `ctx.<exposeAs>` inside `execute({ ctx })` to the loaded row's `$inferSelect` shape. Nothing else changes — runtime behavior, action discovery, and the `path:` namespace match are identical.
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  ```ts title="features/feeds/actions/feedMoments.ts"
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  // One-line flip per namespace-scoped action:
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ The compiler emits one helper per `(feature, namespace)` pair where the feature
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  #### Opt-in, not breaking
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- Actions that keep their existing `import { defineAction } from '../.quickback/define-action'` continue to compile unchanged — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature, which is exactly the v0.23–v0.26 behavior. You flip imports per action at your own pace.
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+ Actions that import `defineAction` from `../.quickback/define-action` compile with `ctx.<exposeAs>` as `any` via the `AppContext` index signature. Use the per-namespace helper for the narrowed type.
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  #### Compile-time advisory
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@@ -578,4 +578,3 @@ src/features/interviews/.quickback/
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  #### Why per-namespace and not per-action
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  A `defineAction` helper that's narrow to *one* exposed key (the namespace's `exposeAs`) is enough — every action under a namespace sees the same hydrated key. The alternative (per-action emit) duplicates the same prelude N times for the same shape; per-namespace keeps emission proportional to the number of distinct hydration shapes in the project.
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-
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ the operations manifest.
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  update: { access: { roles: ["member", "admin", "owner"] }, routes: false },
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  ```
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+ The registry records these ops in `routesDisabled`, so the
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+ [CMS](/ui/admin/owned-records) suppresses raw-CRUD buttons for them while
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+ still rendering the relation inline on the root's record page — its writes
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+ are changeset ops, which `routes: false` deliberately leaves open.
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+
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  ## The wire contract
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  One blessed path — **RFC 5789 media-type dispatch** on the routes you already
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The first line stays greppable (`[quickback:<channel>] CODE: message`); the
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  source location, fix hint, and — for promoted errors — the exact override
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  recipe render on continuation lines.
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- ## Errors vs warnings (v0.47+)
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+ ## Errors vs warnings
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  The checks split into two tiers:
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@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ authz: {
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  {
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  check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',
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  target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer',
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- reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',
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+ reason: 'temporary exception while the organizer grant profile is implemented',
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  },
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  ],
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  },
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ stored tuple whose subject shape isn't allowed for the relation is inert. So a
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  `user:*` tuple on a relation declared `[user]` (no wildcard) can never grant
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  access, even if it was written out-of-band — the model is the ceiling.
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- ## Limitations (v0.35)
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+ ## Limitations
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  - `access: { fga }` covers **per-record** operations (`GET /:id`, `update`,
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  `delete`, record-based actions) and **collection filtering** on
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ type FirewallPredicate =
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  | { field: string; isNull: true } // column IS NULL
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  | { field: string; in: string[] | string; optional?: boolean } // column IN (...)
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  | { field: string; via: string } // column IN (relationship subquery)
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- | { field?: string; permission: string } // named authz.permissions reference (v0.35+)
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- | { all: FirewallPredicate[] } // AND group (v0.35+)
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- | { any: FirewallPredicate[] } // OR group (v0.35+)
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+ | { field?: string; permission: string } // named authz.permissions reference
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+ | { all: FirewallPredicate[] } // AND group
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+ | { any: FirewallPredicate[] } // OR group
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  | { exception: true }; // opt out of tenant scoping
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  type FirewallConfig = ReadonlyArray<FirewallPredicate>;
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ firewallErrorMode?: 'reveal' | 'hide';
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  The top-level array is AND'd together. `firewallErrorMode` lives at the resource top level — it's a presentation-layer choice (403 vs 404), not a query-shape one.
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- ## Boolean groups: `all` / `any` (v0.35+)
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+ ## Boolean groups: `all` / `any`
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  A flat array can only express AND. To grant access through **either** of two independent paths — "an org member **OR** an event attendee" — nest an `any` group. The top-level array stays sugar for `all`, so every existing firewall is byte-identical.
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@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ So `firewall: [{ exception: true }]` on the default configuration returns `isNul
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  ## Sysadmin Escape Hatch
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- When `cms: { sysadmin: true }` is set on the project (introduced in v0.15.0), every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits a runtime branch that drops tenant scopes for `ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin'` callers while keeping the soft-delete predicate:
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+ When `cms: { sysadmin: true }` is set on the project, every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits a runtime branch that drops tenant scopes for `ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin'` callers while keeping the soft-delete predicate:
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  ```typescript
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  // Generated for an org-scoped table when cms.sysadmin: true
@@ -67,17 +67,23 @@ guards: {
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  |------|------------------|
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  | `createable` | Fields allowed in create (POST) request body |
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  | `updatable` | Fields allowed in update (PATCH) request body |
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- | `protected` | Fields blocked from direct writes; the named actions are documentation, not enforcement (see below) |
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- | `immutable` | Fields allowed on create, blocked on all generic updates (actions can still write them) |
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-
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- > **Guards bind the generic CRUD surface, not actions.** `createable`,
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- > `updatable`, `immutable`, and `protected` are enforced by the generated
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- > `validateCreate` / `validateUpdate`, which only the CRUD, batch, and changeset
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- > routes call. An action handler writes through a scoped `db` with no field-level
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- > checks, so it can write any column — including an `immutable` one, and including
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- > a `protected` one not listed in that field's action names. Treat the names in
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- > `protected` as intent you are documenting, and keep the enforcement in the
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- > action's own access rules.
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+ | `protected` | Fields blocked from direct writes; writable only by the actions named for them |
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+ | `immutable` | Fields allowed on create, then never written again — by CRUD, batch, changeset, **or actions** |
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+
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+ > **Guards bind actions too.** `createable` and `updatable` shape the CRUD
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+ > request bodies. `immutable` and `protected` are additionally enforced against
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+ > your action handlers at **compile time**: the compiler scans each action bound
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+ > to the table for `db.update(<table>).set({ … })` / `db.insert(<table>).values({ … })`
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+ > and refuses an `immutable` column in any update, or a `protected` column
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+ > written by an action that is not in its list — with an error naming the action,
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+ > the column, and the fix. Every offending action in the project is listed in
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+ > that one error, so a single compile surfaces all of them. The two tiers are therefore distinct: `immutable` is
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+ > written once at create and never again; if a column needs an action to change
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+ > it, it is `protected`, mapped to that action.
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+ >
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+ > The scan sees object-literal payloads only. A spread (`.set({ ...input })`) or
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+ > a variable payload (`.set(patch)`) is not analysed, so keep guarded columns out
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+ > of such payloads yourself — that is the documented residual.
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  **Combining lists:**
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Whether `customers.email` is PII to hide or the display label of a contact list
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  So the compiler asks. A false positive costs you one line (`cc: false`) — which is also a durable, reviewable record that somebody looked.
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- It also removes a bug class outright. When detection can never quietly supply a rule, the set of masked columns is the set you declared, so no two surfaces can disagree about it. That exact disagreement was a real defect: through v0.58.3 the response path applied declared-only masking while realtime and live views applied detected-plus-declared, so an auto-detected secret was redacted over WebSocket and returned in **plaintext** on `GET`.
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+ It also removes a bug class outright. When detection can never quietly supply a rule, the set of masked columns is the set you declared, so no two surfaces can disagree about it.
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  ### What a decision controls
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@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ masking: {
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  }
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  ```
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217
 
218
- `show: { roles: [] }` has the same effect, but it doesn't say the same thing. An empty role list reads as an oversight, and it is also what authors fall back to when the audience they wanted is **inexpressible** — masking gates on org and scoped roles, so a table gated `access: { userRole: ['sysadmin'] }` cannot name its own audience in a mask. Two different intentions, one spelling, and no way for the next reader to tell them apart.
218
+ `show: { roles: [] }` has the same effect, but it doesn't say the same thing. An empty role list reads as an oversight, and it is also what authors fall back to when the audience they wanted is **inexpressible** — masking gates on org and scoped roles, so a table gated `access: { userRole: ['sysadmin'] }` cannot name its own audience in a mask. Two different intentions, one spelling, and no way for the next reader to tell them apart. Note the asymmetry with access, where an empty list would mean *everyone* — which is why [access refuses it at compile time](/define/access#an-empty-list-is-a-compile-error).
219
219
 
220
220
  Write `'never'` when nobody is the intent. Any other string is a compile error rather than a guess — `show: 'admin'` is a plausible typo, and masking-for-everyone is the wrong thing to assume from it.
221
221
 
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ the compiler rejects a relationship-bearing `masking.show` rule and points to a
118
118
  relationship-gated view instead. It never drops the relationship arm or turns
119
119
  it into a broader role grant.
120
120
 
121
- ### Standalone actions: surface keys and `loads` / `exposeAs` (v0.19+)
121
+ ### Standalone actions: surface keys and `loads` / `exposeAs`
122
122
 
123
123
  When a standalone action's `access.roles` references a relationship-role, the compiler emits a runtime gate between input validation and `execute()`. The gate reads the relationship's `resource.column` value from the action surface — either a path parameter (`:eventId`) or an input field (`input.eventId`). If neither is present, the current compiler stops with a clear build error; an action can never ship with a relationship rule it has no key to evaluate.
124
124
 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ authz: {
132
132
  subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },
133
133
  resource: { column: 'eventId' },
134
134
  where: { status: 'confirmed' },
135
- loads: 'events', // ← v0.19+: load matching event row
135
+ loads: 'events', // load matching event row
136
136
  exposeAs: 'event', // ← onto ctx.event for the action body
137
137
  },
138
138
  },
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ authz: {
142
142
  }
143
143
  ```
144
144
 
145
- The resolver (v0.20):
145
+ The resolver:
146
146
 
147
147
  1. **Cheap in-memory role check** first — `ctx.roles?.includes('admin')` and friends. If the caller has a qualifying role, this short-circuits and no DB queries fire for the access gate.
148
148
  2. **Firewall-gated relationship match** if the role check failed — `SELECT { organizationId, teamId } FROM guests WHERE userId=ctx.userId AND eventId=input.eventId AND status='confirmed'` with the `guests` table's full firewall AND-applied. If neither role nor relationship qualifies → 403.
@@ -152,24 +152,22 @@ The resolver (v0.20):
152
152
 
153
153
  **No firewall bypass anywhere.** Both queries run with their respective tables' full firewalls. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant columns are the source of the stamped claim.
154
154
 
155
- ### Conditional tenant preconditions (v0.20+)
155
+ ### Conditional tenant preconditions
156
156
 
157
- Standalone actions in features with org/team-scoped tables previously emitted unconditional preconditions:
157
+ Standalone actions in features with org/team-scoped tables emit tenant preconditions only when a relationship cannot supply the tenant:
158
158
 
159
159
  ```ts
160
160
  if (!ctx.activeOrgId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noOrg(), 403);
161
161
  if (!ctx.activeTeamId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noTeam(), 403);
162
162
  ```
163
163
 
164
- These ran **before** the relationship resolver, which 403'd attendees whose sessions don't carry an active tenant claim (the canonical event-attendee shape).
165
-
166
- v0.20 makes these preconditions **conditional on relationship supply**. If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` still bypass the preconditions as before. `ADMIN` is now rejected at compile time.
164
+ If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` also bypass the preconditions. `ADMIN` is rejected at compile time.
167
165
 
168
166
  Typical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins still get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session as today; attendees get it from the relationship row, mid-request. Both paths converge on a valid tenant claim before `execute()` runs.
169
167
 
170
168
  ### Requirement on the relationship's `from` table
171
169
 
172
- For the v0.20 tenant-stamping to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:
170
+ For tenant-stamping to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:
173
171
 
174
172
  - For org stamping: an `organizationId` column (or whatever spelling the project's auth-provider defaults pick).
175
173
  - For team stamping: a `teamId` column.
@@ -213,7 +211,7 @@ export default defineAction({
213
211
 
214
212
  `loads` and `exposeAs` are co-required (set both or neither). `exposeAs` must be a valid JS identifier and must not collide with built-in `ctx` fields (`userId`, `activeOrgId`, `activeTeamId`, `db`, etc.).
215
213
 
216
- ### Action firewall escape hatch (v0.19+)
214
+ ### Action firewall escape hatch
217
215
 
218
216
  `defineAction({ firewall: { exception: true } })` opts the action out of the inherited session-key preconditions (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId` requirements) AND the relationship resolver. The handler receives `unsafeDb` for raw Drizzle access. Use for cross-tenant or admin routes whose surface intentionally doesn't name a session/relationship key:
219
217
 
@@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ so it can only ever carry the role the caller actually proved this request.
348
348
  - A **multi-lane `via:`** (e.g. `via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf']`) mints the matched lane's role — `attendeeOf` → `scope.event.roles = ['attendee']`, `organizerOf` → `['organizer']`. The resolver records which lane opened the gate, so there is no ambiguity.
349
349
  - A **bulk-grant lane** (`{ roles: [...] }` or `{ team: true }`) mints **no** scope role — it opens the gate via the caller's org role without proving a relationship. The gate passes; the caller carries their org role, not a minted scope role.
350
350
  - **The org claim is only ever signed beside a membership role.** Every mint site — `/scope/v1/enter`, the namespace resolver, `/api/v1/token` — writes `orgId` into the token only when a membership `role` accompanies it, and the auth middleware ignores an `orgId` claim that arrives without a `role`. A relationship-promoted tenant (the in-request `ctx.activeOrgId` stamped from the proven row so the firewall resolves) is never persisted as a bare tenant grant.
351
+ - **`/scope/v1/enter` drops the org claims for a foreign-tenant instance.** When the relationship's `from` table carries an organization column, the enter route reads it off the proven row (the same row the probe already fetched — no extra query) and compares it with `ctx.activeOrgId`. A mismatch — an org-B member entering an org-A event — mints the token **without** `orgId` / `role`: a relationship-only principal, exactly the state the namespace resolver gives the same caller. The caller keeps their org seat for org-B requests by using their session or a plain `/api/v1/token`; the scope token is for the scope. A `from` table with no organization column (a global reference relationship) leaves the claim untouched.
351
352
 
352
353
  ### The bulk-grant lane is tenant-bound
353
354
 
@@ -671,7 +672,7 @@ The scope claim is trusted between proofs — it is never re-checked against the
671
672
 
672
673
  So removing a guest/staff row takes effect within **cap + one TTL** for a client that keeps polling, and within one TTL once it goes idle. Two ways to tighten that:
673
674
 
674
- - **`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`** (v0.45+, Cloudflare runtime) — sub-TTL revocation: updating or deleting a conferring relationship row stamps a revocation timestamp in KV, and the bearer fast-path rejects a carried scope claim whose proof is at or before it — no same-second gap. Each kind is compared against **its own** proof time (`sctMs` on the entry; older tokens without one fall back to the token-level `sct`/`sctMs`), so a mint of one kind can't carry a revoked kind past its marker. Neither the refresh nor a re-mint ever substitutes its own clock for a proof it didn't take. The check fails closed — a scope claim whose revocation state can't be read is not trusted either. See [auth config](/configure/auth).
675
+ - **`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`** (Cloudflare runtime) — sub-TTL revocation: updating or deleting a conferring relationship row stamps a revocation timestamp in KV, and the bearer fast-path rejects a carried scope claim whose proof is at or before it — no same-second gap. Each kind is compared against **its own** proof time (`sctMs` on the entry; tokens without one fall back to the token-level `sct`/`sctMs`), so a mint of one kind can't carry a revoked kind past its marker. Neither the refresh nor a re-mint ever substitutes its own clock for a proof it didn't take. The check fails closed — a scope claim whose revocation state can't be read is not trusted either. See [auth config](/configure/auth).
675
676
  - **`via` arms** — for tables where any caching is too wide, gate with a `via` arm instead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm: `via` emits a live subquery against the relationship table on every request, immune to a stale claim entirely.
676
677
 
677
678
  ## Reference
@@ -76,9 +76,3 @@ The runtime services around your compiled code. Everything you need for a comple
76
76
  - **[Account UI](/ui/account)** — Pre-built auth and profile pages
77
77
 
78
78
  Everything runs on **your own Cloudflare account** — no Quickback infrastructure between you and your data.
79
-
80
- ---
81
-
82
- ### Changelog
83
-
84
- [**Changelog**](/changelog) — what's new in Quickback. Release notes, new features, and improvements.
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ The fast-path is stateless by default: it verifies the signature and **trusts th
110
110
 
111
111
  **Lower the TTL.** `auth.jwt.expiresIn: 30` gives a hard 30-second ceiling. Browser SPAs auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call, so a low TTL is invisible to logged-in users; only stale server-to-server bearer tokens feel it.
112
112
 
113
- **Or enable sub-TTL revocation.** Set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (v0.45+, Cloudflare runtime only):
113
+ **Or enable sub-TTL revocation.** Set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (Cloudflare runtime only):
114
114
 
115
115
  ```ts title="quickback.config.ts"
116
116
  auth: {
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ auth: {
120
120
 
121
121
  The fast-path then consults per-principal revocation timestamps in your project's existing `KV` binding (keys prefixed `qbrev:`, self-expiring) *before* trusting a token. A token is rejected when its mint timestamp (`iat`/`iatMs`, or the proof time of the scope kind being checked) is **at or before** the stored timestamp. Cost: 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify.
122
122
 
123
- There is no same-second gap: markers are epoch milliseconds (written `m<ms>`, v0.61.0+), tokens carry millisecond companions, and the comparison denies a tie — so a token minted a few milliseconds *before* the revocation is rejected, while one legitimately re-minted *after* it in that same second is still accepted. Pre-v0.61.0 workers don't understand that marker format and read it as "not revoked" — don't roll back across the upgrade or share one KV namespace between versions; see [`revocationCheck`](/configure/auth#revocationcheck-none--kv--token-revocation-strategy).
123
+ There is no same-second gap: markers are epoch milliseconds (written `m<ms>`), tokens carry millisecond companions, and the comparison denies a tie — so a token minted a few milliseconds *before* the revocation is rejected, while one legitimately re-minted *after* it in that same second is still accepted.
124
124
 
125
125
  Revocation stamps are written **automatically** on:
126
126
 
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ await realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {
367
367
  });
368
368
  ```
369
369
 
370
- **Fail-closed (v0.48+):** an omitted or empty `targetRoles` delivers to
370
+ **Fail-closed:** an omitted or empty `targetRoles` delivers to
371
371
  **nobody** — there is no implicit "everyone" fallback. To reach every
372
372
  authenticated subscriber in the scope, say so explicitly with
373
373
  `targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED']`. UPPERCASE pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`,
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ The auto-mounted middleware is **secure by default** — anonymous WebSocket upg
119
119
 
120
120
  The default gate only checks **whether** the caller is authenticated, not whether they're allowed in *this* room. For per-room authorization, the `access` field on the binding lets the compiler emit a path-scoped gate that runs your existing resource firewall + `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade — no hand-written code, same status semantics as `GET /api/v1/<resource>/:id`.
121
121
 
122
- ### Per-room authorization via `access` (v0.12+)
122
+ ### Per-room authorization via `access`
123
123
 
124
124
  ```ts
125
125
  // quickback/quickback.config.ts
@@ -149,13 +149,13 @@ bindings: {
149
149
  },
150
150
 
151
151
  // Multi-table feature: pin the gate to a specific table so the
152
- // firewall + id query is unambiguous (v0.16.1+).
152
+ // firewall + id query is unambiguous.
153
153
  {
154
154
  name: 'NotepadInteractions', className: 'NotepadInteractions', from: 'lib/NotepadInteractions',
155
155
  access: { resource: { feature: 'interactions', table: 'interactions' } },
156
156
  },
157
157
 
158
- // Room keyed by a unique non-PK column (v0.36+). A Yjs page editor is
158
+ // Room keyed by a unique non-PK column. A Yjs page editor is
159
159
  // addressed by `event_pages.yjsRoomId`, not the row id — `key` tells the
160
160
  // gate which column the roomId matches.
161
161
  {
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ What the compiler emits:
188
188
  - **Multi-resource form** — same gate but with a regex parser dispatching to per-kind firewall lookups. Unknown kinds 400 at the gate. Each `resources[kind].resource` accepts either form (string shorthand or `{ feature, table, key? }`).
189
189
  - **`access: { roomIdEquals: 'ctx.userId' }`** — an **identity gate** for rooms with no backing table, where the roomId *is* the caller's own id. Emits `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that 401s anonymous, 400s a missing segment, and 403s unless the decoded room segment equals `ctx.userId`. No schema import, no firewall, no DB query — a string compare against the server-resolved `ctx`. Use `'ctx.activeOrgId'` for a per-org room. This is the right gate for per-user gateways, presence, or inbox DOs keyed on `ns.idFromName(ctx.userId)`. Only `'ctx.userId'` and `'ctx.activeOrgId'` are accepted (validated at compile time); anything else is a build error. Distinct from `resource` because there's no row to firewall — it closes the cross-user hole that "no `access` declared" leaves open (any authenticated user could otherwise open another user's room via the catchall).
190
190
  - **`access: 'public'`** — `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that just passes through. Use for anonymous game lobbies / public collab pads where the room itself is the unit of access.
191
- - **No `access` declared** — falls through to the catchall `/realtime/*` gate that just checks `ctx.authenticated`. (v0.11.1 behavior.)
191
+ - **No `access` declared** — falls through to the catchall `/realtime/*` gate that just checks `ctx.authenticated`.
192
192
 
193
193
  Compile-time validation: every `resource` / `resources[].resource` value is checked against the project's feature names so typos surface as build errors, not as runtime 400s on the first WS upgrade. The string shorthand requires the feature to have exactly one resourceful table; multi-table features must use the long form `{ feature, table }` to pin a specific table. When `key` is set, the column is checked against the pinned table's schema.
194
194
 
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ Events without an `externalId` (NULL) are not deduplicated. SQLite treats NULLs
178
178
 
179
179
  ### Migrating an existing deployment
180
180
 
181
- The unique index was added in v0.10.x. Existing deployments may have duplicate rows from before the constraint existed; drizzle-kit's migration will fail until they are cleaned up. Run this once before applying the migration:
181
+ If an existing deployment contains duplicate rows, drizzle-kit's unique-index migration will fail until they are cleaned up. Run this once before applying the migration:
182
182
 
183
183
  ```sql
184
184
  DELETE FROM webhook_events
@@ -303,10 +303,3 @@ The MCP server always uses the latest installed version automatically.
303
303
  - [Getting Started](/start/quickstart) - Get your first Quickback project running
304
304
  - [Definitions Overview](/define) - Understand the security layer model
305
305
  - [npm package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@quickback-dev/cli) - CLI package
306
-
307
- ## Feedback
308
-
309
- Found an issue with the AI tools integration?
310
-
311
- - [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/kardoe/quickback/issues)
312
- - [Quickback Documentation](https://docs.quickback.dev)
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ The server echoes the chosen version back as the response `X-Quickback-Stream` h
94
94
 
95
95
  Multi-megabyte SPA bundles (CMS + Account, with sourcemaps) take long enough to `JSON.stringify` that the v1 single-frame `result` event blocks Cloudflare's container event loop. Two things break: Docker's `HEALTHCHECK` fails, and the CLI's 120-second connection timeout fires before the body flushes. v2 emits files one at a time and yields back to the event loop every 10 files (`setImmediate`), keeping `/health` responsive and TCP backpressure alive.
96
96
 
97
- The `@quickback-dev/cli` v0.10.x and later send `X-Quickback-Stream: v2` automatically. v1 is preserved for older clients.
97
+ The `@quickback-dev/cli` sends `X-Quickback-Stream: v2` automatically.
98
98
 
99
99
  ### Event shapes (v2)
100
100
 
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ The compiler's output is a manifest of files to **write**. It has no way to say
151
151
 
152
152
  For most moves that gap is invisible: the CLI wipes `src/` from the manifest
153
153
  before each write, so relocating a file *within* `src/` cleans up after itself.
154
- It bites the moment a path crosses that boundary — v0.60 moved the spec blobs
155
- from the project root into `src/apps/__quickback/spec/`, and the root copies
156
- survived every later compile as multi-MB orphans that tooling kept reading.
154
+ It bites the moment a path crosses that boundary. For example, spec blobs now
155
+ live in `src/apps/__quickback/spec/`; retired root copies can survive as
156
+ multi-MB orphans that tooling keeps reading.
157
157
 
158
158
  So the compiler now also returns **retired paths** — things it used to emit and
159
159
  no longer does — and the CLI deletes them:
@@ -172,9 +172,8 @@ unrecoverable while a missed one is only untidy:
172
172
  actually in this compile's manifest. Disable the surface
173
173
  (`openapi.generate: false`) and neither path is emitted, so nothing is
174
174
  removed.
175
- - A path the current manifest still writes is **never** deleted — that is what
176
- keeps an older compiler, which still writes to the old location, from having
177
- its live output pulled out from under it.
175
+ - A path the current manifest still writes is **never** deleted, so live output
176
+ cannot be pulled out from under the compile.
178
177
  - The CLI re-checks both conditions itself and refuses any path that would
179
178
  escape the output directory.
180
179
 
@@ -342,6 +341,8 @@ reports/
342
341
  The signature file uses HMAC-SHA256 when a signing key is configured, otherwise it falls back to SHA-256 digest mode.
343
342
  Set `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required: true` to fail compilation when a signing key is missing.
344
343
 
344
+ The report names the compiler that produced it twice: `compilerVersion` is the semver, and `compilerBuildId` is `<version>@<gitSha>@<builtAt>` — the same string the compiler's `/health` endpoint reports as `buildId`. The semver is a floor that can serve several hosted builds, so a drift tripwire should pin on `compilerBuildId`, not `compilerVersion`.
345
+
345
346
  ### Realtime
346
347
 
347
348
  When any feature has `realtime` configured:
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ These run on `/auth/v1/admin/*`, emitted by Quickback because Better Auth's orga
45
45
 
46
46
  The admin panel is restricted to platform roles on the Better Auth user record: **`appmanager`** (the control plane) and **`sysadmin`** (which adds cross-tenant data access on top). Everyone else is redirected away from `/admin`.
47
47
 
48
- > **`role: "admin"` is not a platform role.** By default the compiler seeds the admin plugin with `adminRoles: ["appmanager", "sysadmin"]`, so a user set to `"admin"` passed the UI guard and then got `403` from every admin API call — an operator who looked promoted and could not act. Removed in v0.62; migrate those rows to `"appmanager"`.
48
+ > **`role: "admin"` is not a platform role.** By default the compiler seeds the admin plugin with `adminRoles: ["appmanager", "sysadmin"]`. Migrate rows with `role: "admin"` to `"appmanager"`.
49
49
  >
50
50
  > A project that declares `plugins: { admin: { adminRoles, roles } }` gets **exactly** that: the declared `adminRoles` list and role → access-controller map are emitted verbatim (`appmanager: userAc` narrows the provisioning operator to no admin API at all; `adminRoles: ["sysadmin"]` keeps set-role / impersonate / ban for `sysadmin` only). The compiler never re-widens a declared role, and refuses a declaration it cannot honour.
51
51
 
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Account UI provides a complete organization management interface when `VITE_ENAB
16
16
  - Change roles and remove members — actions are filtered per-target by the role hierarchy (non-owners can't manage owner-role members)
17
17
  - Leave the organization
18
18
 
19
- > **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/define/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/define/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above." [Custom org roles](/define/access#custom-org-roles) declared in your access trees are auto-registered with the organization plugin (v0.46+), so `invite-member` / `update-member-role` accept them too.
19
+ > **Note:** These three roles (`owner`, `admin`, `member`) are Better Auth's built-in organization roles and map directly to Account UI's role picker. Use the same roles in your Quickback [Access](/define/access) rules — with [`auth.roleHierarchy`](/define/access#role-hierarchy) configured, you can write `roles: ["member+"]` to mean "member and above." [Custom org roles](/define/access#custom-org-roles) declared in your access trees are auto-registered with the organization plugin, so `invite-member` / `update-member-role` accept them too.
20
20
 
21
21
  ## Invitations
22
22
 
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ The gates that carry real data:
207
207
 
208
208
  Your resource API endpoints (`/api/v1/<resource>`) are **not** affected — they continue to use the per-resource `read`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, and `upsert` access rules you defined.
209
209
 
210
- > **Breaking in v0.62.** `cms.access` was renamed from `"admin" | "user"`, and both old values meant something different: `"admin"` admitted `appmanager`, and `"user"` admitted *any* authenticated caller — including one belonging to no organization, who then reached a CMS with nothing in it. The old spellings are rejected at compile time rather than aliased, because aliasing would preserve the old behaviour under a familiar name. Migrate `"admin"` → `"sysadmin"`, `"user"` → `"member"`.
210
+ > `cms.access` accepts `"sysadmin"` or `"member"`. The retired `"admin"` and `"user"` spellings are rejected at compile time; migrate `"admin"` → `"sysadmin"` and `"user"` → `"member"`.
211
211
 
212
212
 
213
213
  #### What a blocked caller actually sees
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
1
+ # Owned Records
2
+
3
+ A table that declares an [`owns` boundary](/define/changesets) gets its owned
4
+ children rendered **inline on the record page**: each relation appears as a
5
+ section below the record's fields, with a row table and Add / Edit / Delete
6
+ controls. Line items live on the expense report, not in a sidebar collection.
7
+
8
+ ## When a relation renders
9
+
10
+ All three must hold — a relation missing any of them is skipped:
11
+
12
+ 1. The relation is declared in the root's `owns`.
13
+ 2. The relation name is in the root's `read.include` allowlist — reads ride
14
+ `GET /:id?include=<relation>`, and a non-allowlisted include is a 400.
15
+ 3. The child table exists in the schema registry.
16
+
17
+ {/* doc-compile: skip — the fence is the owns + include wiring only; columns, firewall, guards, and the child table are elided. */}
18
+ ```ts title="quickback/features/expenseReports/expenseReports.ts"
19
+ export default feature("expenseReports", {
20
+ // ...columns, firewall, guards, crud...
21
+ owns: {
22
+ lineItems: { table: "lineItems", fk: "reportId", inherit: ["organizationId"] },
23
+ },
24
+ read: {
25
+ access: { roles: ["member+"] },
26
+ include: ["lineItems"], // without this, the CMS has no way to read the rows
27
+ },
28
+ });
29
+ ```
30
+
31
+ ## Writes go through the changeset engine
32
+
33
+ Every Add, Edit, and Delete is a single-op
34
+ [changeset](/define/changesets) `PATCH` on the **root** —
35
+ `Content-Type: application/vnd.quickback.changeset+json` — never a raw child
36
+ route. The generated aggregate engine enforces the child's own access,
37
+ guards, body schema, and firewall on every op, and stamps the spine FK and
38
+ `inherit` columns from the firewall-verified parent row.
39
+
40
+ Consequences in the UI:
41
+
42
+ - The child's `fk` and `inherit` columns are **excluded from the form** — the
43
+ engine stamps them, and a client-supplied value is rejected.
44
+ - The Add / Edit / Delete buttons gate on the **child table's** `create` /
45
+ `update` / `delete` access for the signed-in role, exactly like the child's
46
+ own raw routes would.
47
+ - Child deletes are soft (changeset v1 admits soft-delete children only).
48
+
49
+ ## `routes: false` children
50
+
51
+ The usual shape for a pure composition child — line items that only ever
52
+ exist inside a report — is `routes: false` on every op plus
53
+ `cms: { internal: true }`:
54
+
55
+ {/* doc-compile: skip — crud-op fragments without the surrounding table definition. */}
56
+ ```ts title="quickback/features/expenseReports/lineItems.ts"
57
+ read: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
58
+ create: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
59
+ update: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false },
60
+ delete: { access: { roles: ["member+"] }, routes: false, mode: "soft" },
61
+
62
+ cms: { internal: true }, // no standalone sidebar entry
63
+ ```
64
+
65
+ `routes: false` keeps the access declared (it is the changeset admission
66
+ gate) but mounts no raw HTTP route. The CMS reads the registry's
67
+ `routesDisabled` list and suppresses every raw-CRUD affordance for those ops
68
+ — New button, row Edit/Delete, record-page Edit/Delete, and inline cell
69
+ editing — so it never renders a button whose request can only 405. The
70
+ owned-records section is unaffected: its writes are changeset ops, which
71
+ `routes: false` deliberately leaves open.
72
+
73
+ Note the child's `read` access above is what gates the embedded rows:
74
+ `?include=` inherits the **target's** read access, firewall, and masking. A
75
+ child readable only by `admin+` renders an empty section for members.
76
+
77
+ ## Next Steps
78
+
79
+ - **[Changesets](/define/changesets)** — the `owns` boundary and the wire contract
80
+ - **[Record Layouts](/ui/admin/record-layouts)** — grouping the root's own fields
81
+ - **[Schema Format](/ui/admin/schema-format)** — `ownsRelations`, `readInclude`, `routesDisabled`