@quickback-dev/cli 0.66.20 → 0.66.22
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/migrate.js +2 -2
- package/dist/commands/migrate.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle-prompts.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle-prompts.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle-prompts.js +11 -0
- package/dist/lib/migrations/drizzle-prompts.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/file-envelopes.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/file-envelopes.js +21 -51
- package/dist/lib/migrations/file-envelopes.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/prompt-runner.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/prompt-runner.js +6 -1
- package/dist/lib/migrations/prompt-runner.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/actions.md +13 -6
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +6 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/crud.md +72 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/errors.md +86 -6
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +8 -7
- package/dist/skill/docs/api/typescript.md +196 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +36 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/configure/providers.md +37 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +16 -7
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +10 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/scoped-db.md +18 -3
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +2 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +39 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/guards.md +7 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/masking.md +14 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/read.md +3 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +9 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/schema.md +14 -10
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +12 -5
- package/dist/skill/docs/define/triggers.md +2 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/index.md +1 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/agent-auth.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/database/neon.md +110 -30
- package/dist/skill/docs/platform/payments/index.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/start/frontend.md +278 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/start/index.md +1 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cli.md +28 -7
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +6 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +42 -11
- package/dist/skill/docs/tooling/troubleshooting.md +67 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/actions.md +6 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/inline-editing.md +6 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +74 -36
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-registry.md +22 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/security.md +2 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/action-dialog.md +62 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/auth.md +90 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/index.md +48 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/install.md +118 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/quickback-provider.md +123 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/resource-form.md +80 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/ui/components/resource-table.md +46 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/api/actions.md +13 -6
- package/src/skill/docs/api/batch-operations.md +6 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/api/crud.md +72 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/api/errors.md +86 -6
- package/src/skill/docs/api/openapi.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +8 -7
- package/src/skill/docs/api/typescript.md +196 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +36 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/configure/providers.md +37 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +16 -7
- package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/record-and-standalone.md +10 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/scoped-db.md +18 -3
- package/src/skill/docs/define/changesets.md +2 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/firewall.md +39 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/guards.md +7 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/define/masking.md +14 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/read.md +3 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/relationships.md +9 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/define/schema.md +14 -10
- package/src/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +12 -5
- package/src/skill/docs/define/triggers.md +2 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/index.md +1 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/plugins/agent-auth.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/database/neon.md +110 -30
- package/src/skill/docs/platform/payments/index.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/start/frontend.md +278 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/start/index.md +1 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cli.md +28 -7
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +6 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/output.md +42 -11
- package/src/skill/docs/tooling/troubleshooting.md +67 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/actions.md +6 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/inline-editing.md +6 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-format.md +74 -36
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/schema-registry.md +22 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/security.md +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/action-dialog.md +62 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/auth.md +90 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/index.md +48 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/install.md +118 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/quickback-provider.md +123 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/resource-form.md +80 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/ui/components/resource-table.md +46 -0
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@@ -224,6 +224,16 @@ with a mounted prefix, two more forms apply:
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An action's `access:` and `anchor:` may reference vocabulary declared by an ancestor area —
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and never vocabulary of an area the feature is not inside (compile error).
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A standalone path under a feature's own collection, like `path: "/users/:id/likes"`, is still
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standalone. It binds to nothing, so there is no record fetch. Read `:id` yourself and check it
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through the scoped `db`. If you want the record fetched and firewalled for you, drop `path:`
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and write a record-based action.
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A standalone path may not land on a route the compiler already mounts. That includes a record
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action with the same name (`actions/users/likes.ts` → `POST /users/:id/likes`) and the
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generated CRUD routes (`GET /users/:id`). Parameter names don't matter to the router, so
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`/users/:userId/likes` collides too. Either case is a compile error naming both routes.
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### Feature-area transition adapter
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A record [state transition](/define/transitions) normally lives on a
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@@ -9,13 +9,22 @@ the same generated `WHERE` clause the table's CRUD routes use:
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|-----------|---------------------------|
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| `SELECT` | the table's firewall (org / owner / team / scope / `via:` arms) AND soft-delete filter |
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| `UPDATE` / `DELETE` | the same firewall `WHERE`, AND-merged with yours |
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| `INSERT` | every required claim column the firewall binds (e.g. `organizationId` from `ctx.activeOrgId`), overwriting any value you passed |
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| `INSERT … onConflictDoUpdate` | the firewall AND-merged into `setWhere` — a conflict with a row the caller can't update (another tenant's id) is a no-op, never an overwrite |
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| `INSERT` | every required claim column the firewall binds (e.g. `organizationId` from `ctx.activeOrgId`), overwriting any value you passed — then, where those stamps can't guarantee the row passes the firewall (a `via:` / `{ permission }` / literal / `any:` arm), the [firewall-on-write check](/define/firewall#firewall-on-write): every row of `.values(row)` or `.values([rows])` must pass the table's firewall, or nothing is written and the action answers **403 `FIREWALL_WRITE_DENIED`** |
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| `INSERT … onConflictDoUpdate` / `onConflictDoNothing` | the insert branch runs the same firewall-on-write check; the conflict update gets the firewall AND-merged into `setWhere` — a conflict with a row the caller can't update (another tenant's id) is a no-op, never an overwrite |
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The firewall is set on the builder when you call `.from()` / `.set()` /
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`.delete()`, so every executor gets it: `await`, `.all()`, `.get()`,
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`.values()`, `.run()`, `.execute()`, `.prepare()`, and the builder embedded as
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a subquery (`inArray(col, db.select(...).from(t))`).
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a subquery (`inArray(col, db.select(...).from(t))`). The firewall-on-write
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check on an `INSERT` is async, so it runs when the insert executes — on
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`await`, on any executor, and ahead of `db.batch([...])`. A `.prepare()`d
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insert into a table that needs the check is refused (`FIREWALL_WRITE_CHECK_UNSUPPORTED`):
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it would run later with nothing to check it.
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The same refusal comes back from Postgres itself when an `INSERT` reaches the
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database outside the caller's firewall (RLS `42501`): the action route maps it
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to the same **403 `FIREWALL_WRITE_DENIED`** Problem, never a generic action
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failure — so D1 and Postgres answer alike.
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It is not a guess from column names. `any:` groups, `optional` arms, scope
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(`ctx.scope.*`) and `via:` relationship arms, the null-claim deny, the
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Actions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.
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`unsafeDb` and a raw `createDb()` handle are **unchecked by design**: no
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firewall `WHERE`, no claim stamping, no firewall-on-write check. On Postgres a
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non-cross-tenant `unsafeDb` still runs under the caller's RLS claims, so an
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insert the policy refuses comes back as 403 `FIREWALL_WRITE_DENIED`; on D1 it
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lands. That is the point of the escape hatch — and why it is audited.
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`unsafe` is the only sanctioned way around the scoped `db`. The compiler warns
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when a non-`unsafe` action — or a file it imports from the feature's `lib/`,
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the project's `lib/`, `hooks/` or `plugins/` (relative or `~/` imports) —
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8. **Server-minted child ids** — a client-supplied child primary key on an
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insert is rejected (like the plain POST's strict body schema), unless the
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project is configured for client-provided ids (`generateId: false`).
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There the id is exempt from the child's `guards.createable`, as on the
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plain POST.
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Child `delete` ops stamp the **fixed `deletedAt`** audit column — exactly what
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the plain DELETE route stamps (the audit wrapper then auto-stamps
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firewallErrorMode?: 'reveal' | 'hide';
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```
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An `equals` value that doesn't start with `ctx.` is a **literal**: `{ field: 'visibility', equals: 'studio' }` emits `eq(table.visibility, "studio")`. Like any status filter it is enforced by the API only — in Postgres RLS a literal arm lowers to `true`, so `any: [studio, { all: [private, owner] }]` keeps its OR shape instead of hardening into an owner-only policy.
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On Postgres the RLS scope policy mirrors the firewall's `all`/`any` tree arm for arm, and the **database enforces relationship arms too**:
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- A `via:` arm lowers to `project_id IN (SELECT r.project_id FROM public.qb_rel_<relationship>() r)` — a `SECURITY DEFINER` helper that runs the same relationship lookup as the API (subject = the caller's claim, the `where:` literals, the related table's soft delete). The generated API calls the same helper for every relationship lookup on Postgres, so a caller with no active org gets the same rows from the API as the policy admits. `[org, { any: [owner, { via }] }]` becomes `org AND (owner OR project_id IN (…))`, never `org AND owner`. See [Relationship arms in SQL](/platform/database/neon#relationship-arms-in-sql).
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- A `{ permission }` arm expands exactly as the API expands it: relation leaves become `via:` helpers, arrows become `qb_arrow_…` helpers (a recursive arrow is a `maxDepth`-bounded closure).
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- Inside an `any` group that also has an org arm, the relationship, scope and principal arms are tenant-bound exactly where the API binds them — `(<arm> AND (organization_id = <active org> OR <no active org>))` — so an org-claiming caller never rides them into another org.
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- The soft-delete filter the API adds to a table carrying `deletedAt` reaches the policy too, as `deleted_at IS NULL OR public.in_soft_delete()` in `USING` only — see [the soft-delete lane](/platform/database/neon#the-soft-delete-lane).
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- Literals, literal `in` lists, and claims the Worker never writes into the transaction (`ctx.scope.<kind>.<subKey>`, area anchors like `ctx.event.id`, string `in` sets) stay API-only and lower to `true` — the policy has nothing to compare them against, and a literal conjunct would refuse status-changing updates.
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The top-level array is AND'd together. `firewallErrorMode` lives at the resource top level — it's a presentation-layer choice (403 vs 404), not a query-shape one.
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## Boolean groups: `all` / `any`
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});
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```
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### Firewall on write
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A create may not land a row the caller could not read. When a firewall's
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admission isn't guaranteed by the values a create stamps — a `via:` or
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`{ permission }` arm (a task in a project you have no relationship to), a
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literal or `in` arm, any `any:` group — every create path (`POST /`,
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`POST /batch`, the create side of `PUT /:id` and `PUT /batch`, and a changeset's
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root and owned-child inserts) evaluates the table's own firewall against the new
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row before inserting it — and so does an action's [scoped `db`](/define/actions/scoped-db)
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on every `insert(...).values(...)` (single row or array, and the insert branch
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of an upsert) — and refuses with:
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```json
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{
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"error": "Record would be outside your firewall",
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"code": "FIREWALL_WRITE_DENIED",
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"layer": "firewall"
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}
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```
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Status `403`. The verdict is the same on D1 and Postgres: it is the table's
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generated `buildFirewallConditions` — the same WHERE every read applies —
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evaluated over the candidate row. (On Postgres the RLS policy would refuse the
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row anyway; a refusal that still reaches the database maps to the same Problem,
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never a raw `42501` — in a CRUD route or an action.) Firewalls made only of
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stamped `ctx.*` equalities and `isNull` skip the check — the stamps already
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guarantee admission. An action's `unsafeDb` and a raw `createDb()` handle are
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unchecked by design (see [Unsafe Mode](/define/actions/scoped-db#unsafe-mode)).
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### Foreign-Key Referential Checks
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Every generated write handler — `POST /`, `POST /batch`, `PATCH /:id`, `PATCH /batch`, `PUT /:id` (both its update and create paths), `PUT /batch`, and the root of a [changeset](/define/changesets) — validates foreign-key columns against the **target table's** firewall before writing. Creates check every FK in the body; updates check every FK whose value **changes** (a value equal to the stored one costs no query). If a record references a row that the caller can't see (wrong org, soft-deleted, or non-existent), the request fails with:
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| `protected` | Fields blocked from direct writes; writable only by the actions named for them |
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| `immutable` | Fields allowed on create, then never written again — by CRUD, batch, changeset, **or actions** |
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| `'short'` | No | Server generates 6-char alphanumeric ID (e.g. `a3F9xK`) |
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| `'prefixed'` | No | Server generates prefixed ID (e.g. `room_abc123`) |
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| `false` | Yes (if guards: false) | Client provides ID |
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| `false` | Yes (if guards: false) | Client provides ID (required on create) |
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client-supplied `id` is compiler-managed, not a guarded field, so it is exempt
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from `createable` — list only the fields the client may set. Guards keep
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rejecting every other field outside `createable`.
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Need client-generated ids without giving up server minting or guards? Set
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### Non-string columns
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The string-shaped masks (`email`, `phone`, `ssn`, `creditCard`, `name`) format
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text, so they are a compile error on a column whose value isn't a string —
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`q.int()`, `q.bigint()`, `q.smallint()`, `q.bool()`, `q.json()`,
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`q.timestamp()` (a `Date` on Postgres), or any `.array()`. Use `'redact'` or
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`'custom'` there.
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A redacted non-string value arrives as the string `"[REDACTED]"` — a masked
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`q.int()` is not a number for that caller. The generated types say so:
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[`Qb.Masked<number>`](/api/typescript#masked-columns) admits `Qb.Redacted`,
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and OpenAPI documents the column as
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`anyOf: [{ type: "integer" }, { type: "string", enum: ["[REDACTED]"] }]`.
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```typescript
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404-vs-403 ID-probe channel:
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- **Id shape** — 400 `INVALID_ID` if `:id` can't be one of this table's ids
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(see [Malformed ids](/api/crud#malformed-ids-400-invalid_id)); depends on
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the URL string alone, so it reveals nothing about which rows exist
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2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)
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3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership
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4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates
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>
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> Adding `defineTable` does not force a public API onto the join table — gate or omit its
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> `read` / `crud` blocks as you would any other table. What it supplies is the firewall.
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>
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> The `from:` table may also be the table that consumes the relationship — e.g.
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> `projectMemberOf = { from: 'projectMembers', … }` used as `{ field: 'projectId', via: 'projectMemberOf' }`
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> on `projectMembers` itself ("see the members of projects I belong to"). The subquery then
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> calls the module's own firewall with `skipTenantScopes`, which returns before any `via:`
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> arm is built, so it cannot recurse. On Postgres the API and the database both read the
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> relationship through a `SECURITY DEFINER` helper (`public.qb_rel_<relationship>()`) that reads
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> the relationship table without its own policy, so neither can recurse — see
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> [Relationship arms in SQL](/platform/database/neon#relationship-arms-in-sql).
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### Using relationship-roles in resources
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| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |
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|---------|---------------------|----------|
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| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |
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| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url({ protocol: /^https?$/ })` |
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| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |
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| `q.bigint()` | `bigint(..., { mode: 'number' })` | `z.number().int()` within ±(2^53 − 1) |
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| `q.smallint()` | `smallint(...)` | `z.number().int()` within −32768..32767 |
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`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).
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`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus
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`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus an absolute-`http(s)`-URL check at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` / `ftp:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.
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`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.
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`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting (default `"uuid"`). This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.
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#### Typed JSON columns
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- using `z` anywhere else in the table file
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- importing anything from `zod` other than `{ z }`
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-
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Under `generateId: "cuid"`, `"nanoid"`, or `"short"`, the `q.id()` default
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calls an npm helper (`createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`, or `nanoid` /
|
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`customAlphabet` from `nanoid`). Don't import it in the table file, which may
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not import either package. The compiler adds the import to the generated
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`schema.ts` and the package to `package.json`, so the default mints the same
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id shape as the CRUD route.
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@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ export default feature("invoices", {
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- **Decimals are strings**, so no value passes through a float. Send `"19.9"` and the API stores and returns `"19.90"`: the value is padded to `scale` digits and leading zeros are dropped, which is how Postgres prints `numeric(p,s)`. D1 stores that same canonical text, so both dialects return identical strings. `precision` (1–1000) and `scale` (0–`precision`) must be number literals, or the compile fails.
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- **Dates have no time zone.** A `q.date()` value is never converted, so `"2026-03-31"` is the same day for every caller. Use `q.timestamp()` for an instant.
|
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+
- **Timestamps are ISO strings on the wire, on both dialects.** On D1, `q.timestamp()` is `text` holding the ISO string. On Postgres it is `timestamptz`. The column accepts a `Date` or an ISO string on write, and its TypeScript type is `Date | string`. Reads come back as a `Date`, which serializes as the same ISO `Z` string. Because Drizzle uses one type for reads and writes, a read is also typed `Date | string` even though it is always a `Date` at runtime — wrap it as `new Date(row.dueAt)` before calling `Date` methods such as `.getTime()` (a breaking type change for Postgres projects written against the earlier `Date`-only type). So `.set({ archivedAt: now })` works and typechecks on either database, on every handle: the scoped `db`, `unsafeDb`, and a raw `createDb()`. Postgres feature schemas import this column's `timestamp` from the generated `src/lib/pg-timestamp.ts` instead of `drizzle-orm/pg-core`. Its SQL type and migrations are unchanged. Filter values for a Postgres timestamp column must parse as a timestamp, or the request returns `400`.
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- **`q.bigint()` values are JSON numbers, and are capped at ±(2^53 − 1).** Past that, a JSON number can't hold an exact integer, and D1 returns every `INTEGER` as a JS number. The cap still takes a cents column past $90 trillion, where `q.int()` (Postgres `integer`) stops at about $21.4 million. Values written to a Postgres `bigint` outside the API beyond 2^53 will read back rounded.
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- **Defaults are checked at compile time** against the same rules, because nothing re-validates a DDL default. `q.smallint().default(40000)` fails the compile. A decimal default must already be in canonical form, so write `.default("0.00")` for scale 2, not `"0"`.
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- **`.array()`** works on `q.text()`, `q.enum()`, `q.int()`, and `q.uuid()`, and must be written once. `.default([])` gives Postgres `'{}'` and D1 `'[]'`. An array column can't declare `.references()`: Postgres has no foreign keys over array elements, so use a join table.
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@@ -228,6 +230,8 @@ What you can query depends on the type. The compiler refuses the rest at compile
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`.searchable()` and `.filterable("like")` are text-only. Masks that format strings (`email`, `phone`, `partial`, and the rest) are refused on `q.bigint()`, `q.smallint()`, and array columns; use `redact` or `custom` there. Decimal and date values are strings, so every mask type works on them. `.defaultNow()` is only accepted on `q.timestamp()`.
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+
`.defaultNow()` stamps the insert time whenever an insert omits the column. On Postgres it is a real `DEFAULT now()`. On SQLite / D1 the column carries a constant `DEFAULT '1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'` (D1 refuses a non-constant default on `ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN`) plus a `$defaultFn`, and the generated `src/db/index.ts` makes every Drizzle insert use the `$defaultFn` — so only raw SQL that omits the column gets the epoch. Compilers from v0.33.2 until this fix wrote the epoch for Drizzle inserts too; see [Troubleshooting → timestamps read 1970-01-01](/tooling/troubleshooting#timestamps-read-1970-01-01-sqlite--d1) to find and repair affected rows.
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+
|
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235
|
### q.scope() — tenant scope columns
|
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236
|
|
|
233
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`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:
|
|
@@ -671,7 +675,7 @@ Opt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false`
|
|
|
671
675
|
|
|
672
676
|
The scoped `db` injected into actions stamps these four columns for you. A handle built directly from `createDb()` does not — that's the documented escape hatch for system writes, sessionless principals, and broad reads the scoped wrapper over-narrows.
|
|
673
677
|
|
|
674
|
-
Those writes still land in audit-managed tables,
|
|
678
|
+
Those writes still land in audit-managed tables. A Drizzle insert that omits `createdAt` / `modifiedAt` gets the insert time (Postgres `DEFAULT now()`; on SQLite the column's `$defaultFn`), but nothing fills `createdBy` / `modifiedBy` — they stay `NULL`. On SQLite the managed timestamps also carry a DDL default of the unix epoch (so `ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN` works on populated tables), so **raw SQL** that omits them does not fail on `NOT NULL` — it silently persists `1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z`, which reads as a real timestamp everywhere downstream.
|
|
675
679
|
|
|
676
680
|
Spread the stamp instead of hand-writing four columns at each call site:
|
|
677
681
|
|
|
@@ -770,7 +774,7 @@ If this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.
|
|
|
770
774
|
Two paths to fix it, depending on intent:
|
|
771
775
|
|
|
772
776
|
- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.
|
|
773
|
-
- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution.
|
|
777
|
+
- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. `createdAt`/`modifiedAt` still get the insert time from their column default (a raw SQL insert that omits them on SQLite gets the epoch — set them yourself); `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`.
|
|
774
778
|
|
|
775
779
|
### Disabling Audit Fields
|
|
776
780
|
|
|
@@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ Semantics:
|
|
|
123
123
|
- **`field: null`** declares a pure stamp transition (check-in/check-out
|
|
124
124
|
style) — guards + stamps with no state column.
|
|
125
125
|
- **`actx.now`**: every action's execute context now carries `now` — one ISO
|
|
126
|
-
timestamp per invocation. Prefer it over `new Date().toISOString()`.
|
|
126
|
+
timestamp per invocation. Prefer it over `new Date().toISOString()`. It
|
|
127
|
+
writes into a `q.timestamp()` column as-is, on every database and every
|
|
128
|
+
`db` handle — see [Column types](/define/schema#decimals-dates-64-bit-integers-and-arrays).
|
|
127
129
|
|
|
128
130
|
### On a feature-area route
|
|
129
131
|
|
|
@@ -254,14 +256,19 @@ otherwise the action would be unreachable, which is almost certainly a bug.
|
|
|
254
256
|
|
|
255
257
|
### Wire-level errors
|
|
256
258
|
|
|
257
|
-
The compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`**
|
|
258
|
-
|
|
259
|
+
The compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`** as
|
|
260
|
+
`application/problem+json` (like every [API error](/api/errors)), with the
|
|
261
|
+
field, the current value, the requested target, and the allowed set:
|
|
259
262
|
|
|
260
263
|
```json
|
|
261
264
|
{
|
|
262
|
-
"
|
|
263
|
-
"
|
|
265
|
+
"type": "https://quickback.dev/problems/access-action-not-allowed-for-state",
|
|
266
|
+
"title": "Access action not allowed for state",
|
|
267
|
+
"status": 409,
|
|
264
268
|
"code": "ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE",
|
|
269
|
+
"detail": "Action not allowed for current record state",
|
|
270
|
+
"instance": "/api/v1/applications/app_123/advance",
|
|
271
|
+
"layer": "access",
|
|
265
272
|
"details": {
|
|
266
273
|
"field": "status",
|
|
267
274
|
"current": "interview",
|
|
@@ -372,5 +372,6 @@ execute: async ({ db, effects }) => {
|
|
|
372
372
|
|
|
373
373
|
Effects enqueued by an `execute` that later throws are dropped. The context
|
|
374
374
|
also carries `now` — one ISO timestamp per invocation; prefer it over
|
|
375
|
-
`new Date().toISOString()`.
|
|
375
|
+
`new Date().toISOString()`. See [Column types](/define/schema#decimals-dates-64-bit-integers-and-arrays) for
|
|
376
|
+
writing it into a `q.timestamp()` column.
|
|
376
377
|
|
package/src/skill/docs/index.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -76,5 +76,6 @@ The runtime services around your compiled code. Everything you need for a comple
|
|
|
76
76
|
- **[Webhooks](/platform/webhooks)** — Inbound (signed) and outbound (retried)
|
|
77
77
|
- **[Admin UI](/ui/admin)** — Schema-driven admin UI
|
|
78
78
|
- **[Account UI](/ui/account)** — Pre-built auth and profile pages
|
|
79
|
+
- **[Components](/ui/components)** — shadcn tables, forms, and action dialogs for your own React app
|
|
79
80
|
|
|
80
81
|
Everything runs on **your own Cloudflare account** — no Quickback infrastructure between you and your data.
|
|
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ When `fromOpenAPI: false`, the emitted call has `capabilities: []` and no proxy
|
|
|
124
124
|
- **WebAuthn step-up isn't wired in the approval UI yet.** Capabilities tagged `approvalStrength: "webauthn"` show a Step-up badge but the actual escalation call isn't made — the upstream API for that escalation is still settling. Until it lands, those capabilities will fail server-side regardless of approval.
|
|
125
125
|
- **No CLI helpers for listing / revoking agents.** Use the BA admin API directly.
|
|
126
126
|
- **Self-fetch on Cloudflare Workers** adds one subrequest per capability call (~50ms). For typical agent traffic this is fine; for very high-frequency agents consider pinning a custom `onExecute` that uses `app.request()` for in-process routing.
|
|
127
|
-
- **`@better-auth/agent-auth` 0.
|
|
127
|
+
- **`@better-auth/agent-auth` 0.6.2 ships ESM-only exports** without a `require` condition. The compiler image patches the package's `package.json` at install time so the Better Auth CLI's `auth generate` step (jiti / CJS) can resolve it. Remove the patch in the Dockerfile when upstream ships proper exports.
|
|
128
128
|
|
|
129
129
|
## Why bearer-only?
|
|
130
130
|
|
|
@@ -42,11 +42,16 @@ so an extra database silently splits the bootstrap: the roles look right in
|
|
|
42
42
|
separating. Two apps means two Neon projects, not two databases.
|
|
43
43
|
|
|
44
44
|
Mixing providers — for example D1 for auth with Neon for features — is not
|
|
45
|
-
supported. The per-service config form is
|
|
45
|
+
supported. The per-service config form is a type error under `quickback check`
|
|
46
|
+
(the config type has no `auth` / `features` keys) and is rejected at compile
|
|
47
|
+
time:
|
|
46
48
|
|
|
47
49
|
```
|
|
48
|
-
providers.database service-map form is not supported in v2.
|
|
49
|
-
Configure
|
|
50
|
+
providers.database service-map form is not supported in v2 ({ auth, features } is the retired v1 shape).
|
|
51
|
+
Configure ONE database provider — auth and feature data share it:
|
|
52
|
+
database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", { ... }) or database: { name: "neon", config: { ... } }.
|
|
53
|
+
On D1, auth keeps its own database by default (splitDatabases: true);
|
|
54
|
+
name the bindings with authBinding / featuresBinding.
|
|
50
55
|
```
|
|
51
56
|
|
|
52
57
|
## Configuration
|
|
@@ -599,8 +604,12 @@ WITH CHECK (
|
|
|
599
604
|
|
|
600
605
|
### The soft-delete lane
|
|
601
606
|
|
|
602
|
-
`deleted_at IS NULL` keeps soft-deleted rows out of every caller's reach.
|
|
603
|
-
|
|
607
|
+
`deleted_at IS NULL` keeps soft-deleted rows out of every caller's reach. It is
|
|
608
|
+
in the scope policy of every table that carries `deleted_at`, exactly where the
|
|
609
|
+
API firewall adds its own `isNull(deletedAt)` — including a `firewall: [...]`
|
|
610
|
+
array that never mentions `deletedAt` (declare a predicate on `deletedAt`
|
|
611
|
+
yourself to take it over). On its own it also blocks the delete that put them
|
|
612
|
+
there.
|
|
604
613
|
|
|
605
614
|
PostgreSQL applies a SELECT-applicable policy's `USING` expression to the **new**
|
|
606
615
|
row of an `UPDATE`, not only the existing one, whenever the statement reads the
|
|
@@ -819,6 +828,17 @@ USING (owner_id = auth.user_id())
|
|
|
819
828
|
WITH CHECK (owner_id = auth.user_id());
|
|
820
829
|
```
|
|
821
830
|
|
|
831
|
+
**Relationship-scoped** (`{ field: 'projectId', via: 'projectMemberOf' }`) — see
|
|
832
|
+
[Relationship arms in SQL](#relationship-arms-in-sql):
|
|
833
|
+
|
|
834
|
+
```sql
|
|
835
|
+
CREATE POLICY "tasks_scope" ON "app"."tasks" FOR ALL TO quickback
|
|
836
|
+
USING (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id()
|
|
837
|
+
AND project_id IN (SELECT r.project_id FROM public.qb_rel_project_member_of() r))
|
|
838
|
+
WITH CHECK (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id()
|
|
839
|
+
AND project_id IN (SELECT r.project_id FROM public.qb_rel_project_member_of() r));
|
|
840
|
+
```
|
|
841
|
+
|
|
822
842
|
**Exception tables** (`firewall: [{ exception: true }]`) — no scope predicate,
|
|
823
843
|
so the restrictive deny-anon policy is the only fence left:
|
|
824
844
|
|
|
@@ -827,6 +847,77 @@ CREATE POLICY "categories_all" ON "app"."categories" FOR ALL TO quickback
|
|
|
827
847
|
USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);
|
|
828
848
|
```
|
|
829
849
|
|
|
850
|
+
### Relationship arms in SQL
|
|
851
|
+
|
|
852
|
+
Every relationship lookup is enforced by the database, and the generated API
|
|
853
|
+
reads through the same place. Each declared relationship gets one helper,
|
|
854
|
+
emitted in the RLS migration ahead of the policies that call it:
|
|
855
|
+
|
|
856
|
+
```sql
|
|
857
|
+
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.qb_rel_project_member_of()
|
|
858
|
+
RETURNS SETOF "app"."project_members"
|
|
859
|
+
LANGUAGE sql STABLE SECURITY DEFINER SET search_path = ''
|
|
860
|
+
AS $$
|
|
861
|
+
SELECT a.*
|
|
862
|
+
FROM "app"."project_members" a
|
|
863
|
+
WHERE a."user_id" = auth.user_id()
|
|
864
|
+
AND a."deleted_at" IS NULL
|
|
865
|
+
$$;
|
|
866
|
+
ALTER FUNCTION public.qb_rel_project_member_of() OWNER TO quickback_owner;
|
|
867
|
+
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.qb_rel_project_member_of() FROM PUBLIC;
|
|
868
|
+
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.qb_rel_project_member_of() TO quickback;
|
|
869
|
+
```
|
|
870
|
+
|
|
871
|
+
The scope policy calls it as
|
|
872
|
+
`"project_id" IN (SELECT r."project_id" FROM public.qb_rel_project_member_of() r)`,
|
|
873
|
+
and so does the generated API: a firewall `via:` arm, a relationship-role access
|
|
874
|
+
check, the action resolver's match row, the `/scope/v1/enter` probe and the
|
|
875
|
+
ws-ticket probe all read the caller's relationship rows from the helper, never
|
|
876
|
+
from the relationship table under its own policy.
|
|
877
|
+
|
|
878
|
+
- **Same lookup as D1.** The body is the relationship subquery the API runs on
|
|
879
|
+
D1: the subject column against the caller's claim, the `where:` literals
|
|
880
|
+
(SQL-quoted), and the related table's soft-delete filter — the API's
|
|
881
|
+
`skipTenantScopes` body. Multi-hop (`hops`) relationships join the same chain
|
|
882
|
+
and return the first hop's rows.
|
|
883
|
+
- **Why `SECURITY DEFINER`.** Under the relationship table's own policy the
|
|
884
|
+
lookup would recurse for a relationship that reads the table it protects
|
|
885
|
+
(`projectMemberOf` on `project_members`), and the table's tenant scope would
|
|
886
|
+
zero a caller with no active org — the case the API skips on purpose. The
|
|
887
|
+
helper runs as `quickback_owner`, which reads the related table through one
|
|
888
|
+
`<table>_quickback_owner_read` policy (`FOR SELECT TO quickback_owner USING (true)`).
|
|
889
|
+
Feature tables `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, so the owner needs it; it grants
|
|
890
|
+
nothing new — an owner can always lift `FORCE` on its own table — and the
|
|
891
|
+
runtime role `quickback` is not a member of `quickback_owner`.
|
|
892
|
+
- **Locked down.** `search_path = ''` and fully-qualified names; `EXECUTE` is
|
|
893
|
+
revoked from `PUBLIC` and granted to `quickback` only. The caller comes from
|
|
894
|
+
the transaction's claims, so a lookup on the service handle (no caller)
|
|
895
|
+
returns nothing.
|
|
896
|
+
- **Evaluated once per statement.** The helper takes no arguments, so
|
|
897
|
+
`col IN (SELECT … FROM helper() r)` is an uncorrelated subquery — one hashed
|
|
898
|
+
subplan per statement, the same InitPlan discipline as the claim helpers. A
|
|
899
|
+
per-row `helper(row.col)` call could never be inlined.
|
|
900
|
+
- **Returns the table's own rows.** One helper serves every projection a lookup
|
|
901
|
+
needs (the resource column, the tenant columns the action resolver stamps,
|
|
902
|
+
scope sub-keys), and `CREATE OR REPLACE` stays valid as the table's columns
|
|
903
|
+
change. A helper whose relationship now returns a different table is dropped
|
|
904
|
+
first — with the generated policies that call it, which the same migration
|
|
905
|
+
re-creates.
|
|
906
|
+
- **Tenant binding.** Beside an org arm in an `any:` group the arm becomes
|
|
907
|
+
`(project_id IN (SELECT …) AND (organization_id = <active org> OR <no active org>))`
|
|
908
|
+
— exactly where the API applies the same binding.
|
|
909
|
+
- **Permissions.** A `{ permission }` arm expands as the API expands it; arrow
|
|
910
|
+
hops become `qb_arrow_…` helpers (recursive arrows are a `maxDepth`-bounded
|
|
911
|
+
closure that re-checks the tenant on every row), called by the API too.
|
|
912
|
+
- **Still API-only.** Literal status filters (a conjunct would refuse
|
|
913
|
+
status-changing updates, because PostgreSQL checks an UPDATE's new row against
|
|
914
|
+
the read policy) and claims the Worker never writes into the transaction —
|
|
915
|
+
`ctx.scope.<kind>.<subKey>`, area anchors such as `ctx.event.id`, and
|
|
916
|
+
relationships whose `subject` binds one. These lower to `true` in the policy,
|
|
917
|
+
and the API keeps the table query for such a relationship.
|
|
918
|
+
|
|
919
|
+
Helpers no compile references any more are dropped at the end of the migration.
|
|
920
|
+
|
|
830
921
|
### Helper functions
|
|
831
922
|
|
|
832
923
|
| Function | Purpose |
|
|
@@ -963,31 +1054,20 @@ is a compile error everywhere, not a Neon-only concern.
|
|
|
963
1054
|
|
|
964
1055
|
### How the read is served
|
|
965
1056
|
|
|
966
|
-
|
|
967
|
-
|
|
968
|
-
|
|
969
|
-
|
|
970
|
-
|
|
971
|
-
|
|
972
|
-
|
|
973
|
-
|
|
974
|
-
|
|
975
|
-
|
|
976
|
-
|
|
977
|
-
|
|
978
|
-
|
|
979
|
-
|
|
980
|
-
caller claims + the RLS backstop** — they resolve to policies RLS *can* express.
|
|
981
|
-
- The swap is gated on a non-empty firewall carrying the reachability predicate;
|
|
982
|
-
a service-handle read with no WHERE is a compile error (it would return every
|
|
983
|
-
tenant's rows). Fail closed.
|
|
984
|
-
- It applies to the **collection `GET /`, `GET /:id`, and views** alike. **Writes
|
|
985
|
-
are unchanged** — creates/updates/deletes keep caller claims and the RLS
|
|
986
|
-
backstop.
|
|
987
|
-
|
|
988
|
-
The **same config compiles identically on D1**, where there is no RLS to bypass:
|
|
989
|
-
the read handlers keep `c.get('db')` and the app-layer reachability WHERE was
|
|
990
|
-
already the whole story.
|
|
1057
|
+
Reads keep the **caller-claims** handle and the full RLS backstop, on Neon as
|
|
1058
|
+
everywhere else. The reachability WHERE (`buildFirewallConditions(...)`) and the
|
|
1059
|
+
resource's scope policy both call the relationship's
|
|
1060
|
+
[helper](#relationship-arms-in-sql), which walks the hop chain without the
|
|
1061
|
+
intermediate tables' tenant policies — so an attendee with no active org gets
|
|
1062
|
+
exactly their reachable rows, from the API and from the database alike.
|
|
1063
|
+
|
|
1064
|
+
Earlier releases routed these reads through the service-role handle
|
|
1065
|
+
(`createServiceDb`) instead, because the multi-hop join read the intermediate
|
|
1066
|
+
tables under their own tenant scopes and came back empty. That bypassed RLS for
|
|
1067
|
+
the whole read; the routing is gone.
|
|
1068
|
+
|
|
1069
|
+
The **same config compiles identically on D1**: the read handlers keep
|
|
1070
|
+
`c.get('db')`, and the app-layer reachability WHERE runs the join directly.
|
|
991
1071
|
|
|
992
1072
|
## Webhooks on Neon
|
|
993
1073
|
|
|
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Condition 2 is broader than it may look, and deliberately so. There is no
|
|
|
39
39
|
per-provider inbound webhook configuration surface: the inbound route registers
|
|
40
40
|
exactly one provider, Stripe, so *any* project that turned webhooks on is a
|
|
41
41
|
project that can receive Stripe events. The same condition adds `stripe` to the
|
|
42
|
-
generated `package.json` (pinned at `^22.
|
|
42
|
+
generated `package.json` (pinned at `^22.6.1`), so the dependency and the client
|
|
43
43
|
can never disagree about whether Stripe is in play.
|
|
44
44
|
|
|
45
45
|
> **Accepted over-trigger.** A project that only *receives* Stripe webhooks and
|