@quickback-dev/cli 0.60.9 → 0.61.1

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  1. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +1 -1
  2. package/dist/commands/compile.js +10 -1
  3. package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
  4. package/dist/docs/content.d.ts +7 -0
  5. package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/docs/content.js +737 -0
  7. package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -0
  8. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  9. package/dist/lib/compiler-stubs.d.ts +4 -0
  10. package/dist/lib/compiler-stubs.d.ts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/lib/compiler-stubs.js +4 -0
  12. package/dist/lib/compiler-stubs.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +11 -0
  14. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +35 -0
  16. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/lib/helpers.d.ts +39 -0
  18. package/dist/lib/helpers.d.ts.map +1 -0
  19. package/dist/lib/helpers.js +299 -0
  20. package/dist/lib/helpers.js.map +1 -0
  21. package/dist/skill/SKILL.md +3 -0
  22. package/dist/skill/docs/api/errors.md +1 -0
  23. package/dist/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +26 -0
  24. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +85 -0
  25. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +17 -12
  26. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  27. package/dist/skill/docs/configure/index.md +6 -6
  28. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +37 -1
  29. package/dist/skill/docs/define/actions/index.md +18 -0
  30. package/dist/skill/docs/define/areas.md +90 -7
  31. package/dist/skill/docs/define/feature.md +88 -27
  32. package/dist/skill/docs/define/index.md +7 -1
  33. package/dist/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +1 -1
  34. package/dist/skill/docs/define/security.md +10 -0
  35. package/dist/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +11 -35
  36. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +15 -3
  37. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/database/d1.md +6 -1
  38. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/email/index.md +112 -0
  39. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/index.md +1 -0
  40. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/realtime/index.md +17 -0
  41. package/dist/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/outbound.md +31 -6
  42. package/dist/skill/docs/start/deploy-browser.md +15 -6
  43. package/dist/skill/docs/start/first-api.md +16 -0
  44. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +29 -5
  45. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/account/features/index.md +22 -0
  46. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/connecting.md +6 -4
  47. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +49 -10
  48. package/dist/skill/docs/ui/admin/security.md +6 -7
  49. package/package.json +2 -10
  50. package/src/skill/SKILL.md +3 -0
  51. package/src/skill/docs/api/errors.md +1 -0
  52. package/src/skill/docs/api/query-params.md +26 -0
  53. package/src/skill/docs/changelog/index.md +85 -0
  54. package/src/skill/docs/configure/auth.md +17 -12
  55. package/src/skill/docs/configure/domains.md +1 -1
  56. package/src/skill/docs/configure/index.md +6 -6
  57. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/defining.md +37 -1
  58. package/src/skill/docs/define/actions/index.md +18 -0
  59. package/src/skill/docs/define/areas.md +90 -7
  60. package/src/skill/docs/define/feature.md +88 -27
  61. package/src/skill/docs/define/index.md +7 -1
  62. package/src/skill/docs/define/scopes.md +1 -1
  63. package/src/skill/docs/define/security.md +10 -0
  64. package/src/skill/docs/define/transitions.md +11 -35
  65. package/src/skill/docs/platform/auth/jwt-optimization.md +15 -3
  66. package/src/skill/docs/platform/database/d1.md +6 -1
  67. package/src/skill/docs/platform/email/index.md +112 -0
  68. package/src/skill/docs/platform/index.md +1 -0
  69. package/src/skill/docs/platform/realtime/index.md +17 -0
  70. package/src/skill/docs/platform/webhooks/outbound.md +31 -6
  71. package/src/skill/docs/start/deploy-browser.md +15 -6
  72. package/src/skill/docs/start/first-api.md +16 -0
  73. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/admin.md +29 -5
  74. package/src/skill/docs/ui/account/features/index.md +22 -0
  75. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/connecting.md +6 -4
  76. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/index.md +49 -10
  77. package/src/skill/docs/ui/admin/security.md +6 -7
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
1
+ # Email (Inbound)
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+
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+ `defineEmail` is the inbound-mail mirror of [`defineSchedule`](/platform/schedules). Drop a file in `services/email/` and the compiler emits a shared `deliverInboundEmail()` dispatcher. **Execute is provider-agnostic** — you parse RFC 822 bytes and write the store. Ingress is an adapter:
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+
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+ | Provider | Ingress | How it reaches `execute` |
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+ |----------|---------|--------------------------|
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+ | Cloudflare (`email.provider: 'cloudflare'`, default) | Email Routing → Worker `email()` | Compiler emits `email` on the Worker export. Buffers `message.raw` once, then calls `deliverInboundEmail`. |
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+ | Amazon SES (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) | Receipt rule → S3 + SNS | Build the same `InboundEmailMessage` (`provider: 'ses'`, `raw` = the `.eml` bytes) and call `deliverInboundEmail(message, env)`. |
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+
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+ Outbound sending is a separate surface (`email.provider` already switches Cloudflare `send_email` vs AWS SES) — see [Email Configuration](/configure#email-configuration).
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+
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+ ## Define a handler
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+
14
+ ```typescript
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+ // services/email/inbound.ts
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+ import { defineEmail } from "quickback";
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+ import { ingestMessage } from "../../features/mail/lib/ingest";
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+
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+ export default defineEmail({
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+ name: "inbound", // identifier + audit actor (system:email-<name>)
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+ to: "paul@kardoe.com", // optional; omit to match every recipient
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+ description: "Ingest inbound mail",
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+ execute: async ({ message, db, env, services }) => {
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+ // message.raw is already-buffered RFC 822 bytes (not a stream).
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+ await ingestMessage(db, env, services, message.raw);
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+ },
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+ });
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+ ```
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+
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+ One file per handler under `services/email/*.ts`. Files prefixed with `_` are ignored. `name` must be a valid camelCase identifier (it's used as a generated symbol and the audit actor). The same file is what runs on Cloudflare and on SES — do not import `ForwardableEmailMessage` or SES receipt types in `execute`.
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+
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+ ## Envelope matching
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+
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+ | `to` | Behavior |
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+ |------|----------|
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+ | omitted | Handler runs for every inbound message |
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+ | `"user@example.com"` | Exact, case-insensitive match against `message.to` |
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+
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+ Multiple handlers can match the same message (a catch-all plus an address-specific handler). Failures are isolated so one throwing handler does not abort the others.
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+
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+ If **no** handler matches, the runner logs a warning and returns. It does **not** call Cloudflare `setReject()` — Email Routing can still fall through, and SES has already accepted the message.
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+
43
+ ## Importing feature code
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+
45
+ Email files live at `quickback/services/email/<name>.ts`, so imports are relative to **that** location. To reach a feature table, a feature `lib/` helper, or `db/`, climb up to the `quickback/` root first (`../../`):
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+
47
+ ```typescript
48
+ // quickback/services/email/inbound.ts
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+ import { messages } from "../../features/mail/messages";
50
+ import { ingestMessage } from "../../features/mail/lib/ingest";
51
+ import { parseRfc822 } from "../../lib/rfc822";
52
+ ```
53
+
54
+ Two `../` — up from `services/email/` to `quickback/`, then down into `features/` (or `lib/`, `db/`). The compiler relocates the handler into the generated `src/lib/email.ts` and **rewrites these paths to resolve from there automatically** — you always write them relative to your own source file, exactly as your editor resolves them.
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+
56
+ > A single `../features/…` is the common mistake — from `services/email/` that resolves to `services/features/…`, which doesn't exist. Use `../../features/…`.
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+
58
+
59
+ ## What the compiler emits
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+
61
+ 1. **`deliverInboundEmail(message, env)`** in `src/lib/email.ts` — the shared dispatcher.
62
+ 2. **`email(cfMessage, env, ctx)`** on the Worker default export — Cloudflare adapter. Regenerated on every `quickback compile`.
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+ 3. **No wrangler inbound binding.** Cloudflare: configure Email Routing in the dashboard. SES: Receipt rule + S3 + SNS; call `deliverInboundEmail` with the fetched `.eml`.
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+ 4. The existing outbound `[[send_email]]` binding (Cloudflare) / SES plugin (aws-ses) is unchanged.
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+
66
+ ## Execute context
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+
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+ | Field | Type | Notes |
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+ |-------|------|-------|
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+ | `message` | `InboundEmailMessage` | `{ provider, from, to, headers, raw }`. `raw` is `ArrayBuffer`. |
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+ | `message.provider` | `'cloudflare' \| 'ses'` | Ingress tag for logs. Parse `raw`, don't branch on this. |
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+ | `db` | Drizzle instance | The same DB the queue/schedule handlers get |
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+ | `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | All worker bindings |
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+ | `services` | `Services` | The services layer (`createServices(env)`) |
75
+ | `withInternalContext` | helper | Opt into the `INTERNAL` trust zone for `roles: ['INTERNAL']`-gated rows |
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+
77
+ Cloudflare-only methods (`setReject`, `forward`, `reply`) are **not** on `InboundEmailMessage`. SES has already accepted the mail; Cloudflare fall-through is the adapter's job (it does not reject unmatched recipients).
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+
79
+ ## Amazon SES inbound
80
+
81
+ SES cannot invoke a Worker `email()` export — receipt is S3 + SNS. After you verify the SNS signature and fetch the object:
82
+
83
+ ```typescript
84
+ import { deliverInboundEmail } from "../lib/email";
85
+
86
+ await deliverInboundEmail({
87
+ provider: "ses",
88
+ from: receipt.mail.source,
89
+ to: receipt.receipt.recipients[0],
90
+ headers: new Headers(/* from the .eml or commonHeaders */),
91
+ raw: await s3.getObject(bucket, key).arrayBuffer(),
92
+ }, env);
93
+ ```
94
+
95
+ `execute` does not change. MX, Receipt rules, the S3 bucket, and the SNS subscription stay in AWS — the compiler does not emit those.
96
+
97
+ ## Audit & trust
98
+
99
+ Inbound email runs are **server-internal**: there's no authenticated user, no request, no org scope. A delivered message gets a plain `db` (unscoped Drizzle) plus a `withInternalContext` helper:
100
+
101
+ ```typescript
102
+ execute: async ({ db, withInternalContext, message }) => {
103
+ // `db` here is unscoped — no firewall WHERE, no audit actor.
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+
105
+ await withInternalContext(async ({ ctx, db, services }) => {
106
+ // ctx.internal = true, ctx.userId = "system:email-<name>"
107
+ // audited writes are attributable to e.g. system:email-inbound
108
+ });
109
+ },
110
+ ```
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+
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+ `withInternalContext` builds a context with `internal: true` and `userId: "system:email-<name>"`, so audited writes made through it are attributable to the handler and can reach `roles: ['INTERNAL']`-gated rows.
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
11
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  | [Realtime](/platform/realtime) | Durable Objects | WebSocket for live updates |
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  | [Queues](/platform/queues) | Cloudflare Queues | Background jobs, webhook delivery |
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  | [Schedules](/platform/schedules) | Cron Triggers | `defineSchedule` cron jobs, server-internal |
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+ | [Email](/platform/email) | Email Workers | `defineEmail` inbound handlers, server-internal |
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  | [Vector & AI](/platform/vector) | Workers AI | Embeddings, semantic search |
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  | [Webhooks](/platform/webhooks) | Hono + Queues | Signed inbound, retried outbound |
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  | [Push](/platform/push) | Web Push | VAPID subscriptions, typed payloads |
@@ -90,6 +90,23 @@ export default feature("applications", {
90
90
  > `access.roles` — it still compiles but should be migrated.)
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91
 
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+ Omitting it fails the compile:
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+
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+ ```text
96
+ Resource "conversations" enables realtime broadcasts but declares no audience.
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+ A broadcast fans out to every subscriber in the room, so the audience is not
98
+ optional. Declare realtime.access: { roles: [...] } naming who may receive it
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+ (use roles: ['PUBLIC'] to broadcast to everyone in the room, deliberately).
100
+ ```
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+
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+ **The audience is a second read surface, and it does not inherit `read.access`.**
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+ Whatever gates the REST read must gate the broadcast too, or the live channel
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+ publishes rows the REST route would have withheld — private messages being the
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+ usual casualty. Copy the read rule across, and where the read is gated by a
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+ relationship (participants of a conversation, accepted followers), use
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+ `access: { authzRole: "<relationship-role>" }` here rather than falling back to
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+ `roles: ["AUTHENTICATED"]`, which reaches every signed-in subscriber.
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+
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  And enable the realtime **transport** in your database config. This is a
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  project-level switch that stands up the Broadcaster Durable Object + the
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  connection route; it does **not** by itself make any resource broadcast
@@ -170,13 +170,38 @@ Endpoints are scoped by `userId` or `organizationId`. Users can only manage thei
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  ### URL Validation (anti-SSRF)
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173
- Registered URLs are validated at registration and again before each delivery attempt. The default policy rejects:
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+ The destination policy lives in `src/lib/webhooks/url-policy.ts` and runs at **four** points: on register, on update, and again immediately before **each** test send and **each** queued delivery attempt. Re-checking before every send is the point — a name that was public when it was registered can be re-pointed afterwards.
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+
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+ The default policy rejects:
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175
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  - Any scheme other than `https:` (matches Stripe, GitHub, and Slack webhook conventions)
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- - Loopback hosts (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`)
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- - Cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`)
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- - RFC 1918 private ranges (`10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`), `169.254/16`, and `0.0.0.0/8`
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- - Hosts ending in `.internal` or `.local`
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+ - URLs carrying credentials (`https://user:pass@host/`)
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+ - Loopback, private, and reserved **IPv4** literals: `0/8`, `10/8`, `100.64/10` (CGNAT), `127/8`, `169.254/16` (link-local + cloud metadata), `172.16/12`, `192.0.0/24`, `192.0.2/24`, `192.88.99/24`, `192.168/16`, `198.18/15`, `198.51.100/24`, `203.0.113/24`, `224/4` (multicast), `240/4` (reserved), and the broadcast address — in any notation the URL parser accepts, including octal and decimal
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+ - The equivalent **IPv6** literals: `::`, `::1`, unique-local `fc00::/7`, link-local `fe80::/10`, site-local `fec0::/10`, multicast `ff00::/8`, documentation `2001:db8::/32` and `3fff::/20`, `2001::/23` (Teredo), `2002::/16` (6to4), `64:ff9b::/96` (NAT64), `100::/64`, and IPv4-mapped forms such as `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`
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+ - Internal names: `localhost`, `metadata.goog`, anything ending in `.localhost`, `.local`, `.internal`, or `.home.arpa`, and any single-label host (`http://intranet/`)
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+
183
+ > **Host names are resolved, not just pattern-matched.** For any name that survives the checks above, the runtime resolves both **A and AAAA** records and rejects the destination if **any** answer is a non-public address. One private record among several public ones is enough to refuse the whole name — that is the case a literal-only check misses.
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+
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+
186
+ Resolution is fail-closed. If the resolver errors, times out, returns a malformed answer, or is unavailable, the destination is **not** contacted:
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+
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+ | Outcome | Register / update | Queued delivery |
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+ |---------|-------------------|-----------------|
190
+ | All answers public | Accepted | Delivered |
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+ | Any answer non-public | `400` | Terminal failure, no retry |
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+ | No A/AAAA records (NXDOMAIN) | `400` | Terminal failure, no retry |
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+ | Resolver error, timeout, or malformed answer | `503` | Failed **attempt**, retried with backoff |
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+ | Answer larger than 32 records | `503` | Failed **attempt**, retried with backoff |
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+
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+ DNS is always resolved through a fixed trusted resolver — an endpoint never gets to nominate who answers for it. An answer of more than 32 records is refused rather than truncated: silently cutting the list would let a zone owner pad it with public records and hide a private one past the cut.
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+
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+ > **A resolver outage fails deliveries permanently, and it fails them all at once.** The three retries above elapse in seconds, so a DNS outage lasting longer than that exhausts them and marks every in-flight delivery `failed` — across every endpoint and every project on the same resolver. There is no outbound replay endpoint (`/webhooks/v1/inbound/events/:id/retry` covers inbound events only), so those deliveries are not recoverable; the source event has to be re-emitted.
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+ >
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+ > This is the deliberate cost of fail-closed: the runtime will not contact a destination it could not verify. It also means outbound webhook failures are **correlated** — a shared dependency, not independent per-endpoint faults. Alert on a spike in `failed` deliveries rather than on any single endpoint.
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+
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+
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+ > **This validates the DNS answer, not the socket.** It is not connection pinning, so a deployment that attaches private egress (a VPC, a tunnel, a service binding) must **also** enforce a network-layer egress policy. Application-level DNS validation cannot close the gap between the answer it checked and the address the runtime later connects to.
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+
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206
  Plaintext `http:` is rejected by default. To allow `http:` (e.g. for a self-hosted dev environment without TLS), set `webhookAllowInsecure: true` on the database provider config:
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@@ -193,7 +218,7 @@ providers: {
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  }
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  ```
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220
 
196
- The other validation rules (private/loopback/metadata blocking) still apply when this flag is on.
221
+ `webhookAllowInsecure` relaxes the **scheme and nothing else**. Every address rule above — including DNS resolution and the fail-closed behaviour — still applies when the flag is on. There is no configuration that permits a private destination.
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198
223
  ### Redirect Handling
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224
 
@@ -69,7 +69,12 @@ Blocked, fail-closed at the compile phase — the deploy stops with the reason,
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  ## Connecting your Cloudflare account
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71
 
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- The first deploy starts with **Continue with Cloudflare** — a standard OAuth consent against Cloudflare's own dashboard, shown by the **Quickback** OAuth client. You pick the account, see exactly which permissions are requested, and can revoke at any time from Cloudflare under **My Profile → Access Management → Connected Applications** (or disconnect from Start).
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+ Deploying takes two distinct grants, and the card labels them differently on purpose:
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+
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+ - **Continue with Cloudflare** signs you in to Quickback. Identity only — none of the deploy permissions below.
75
+ - **Grant deploy access** gives Quickback permission to deploy into your Cloudflare account — a standard OAuth consent against Cloudflare's own dashboard, shown by the **Quickback** OAuth client. You pick the account, see exactly which permissions are requested, and can revoke at any time from Cloudflare under **My Profile → Access Management → Connected Applications** (or disconnect from Start).
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+
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+ One click covers both: if you weren't signed in yet, sign-in chains straight into the deploy consent. First-time users see two Cloudflare screens back to back; after that, Cloudflare skips consent screens it has already approved, so re-authenticating is a ribbon of silent redirects.
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  What's requested, and why:
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80
 
@@ -85,7 +90,7 @@ What's requested, and why:
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86
91
  Nothing broader is requested — no zone, DNS, billing, or account-management access.
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- If you cancel at Cloudflare's consent screen — or Cloudflare ends the attempt for any other reason — you land back in Start with the card explaining what happened and a **Try Cloudflare again** button. Nothing is stored on a cancelled attempt, and a connection you already had is left untouched.
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+ If you cancel at Cloudflare's consent screen — or Cloudflare ends the attempt for any other reason — you land back in Start with the card explaining what happened and a **Try again** button. Nothing is stored on a cancelled attempt, and a connection you already had is left untouched.
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  ## Connection states and recovery
91
96
 
@@ -93,10 +98,10 @@ The deploy card is the whole connection UI: it reports the state of your Cloudfl
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  | What you see | What happened | What to do |
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  |---|---|---|
96
- | **Connect your Cloudflare account** | No connection stored | **Continue with Cloudflare** |
101
+ | "Grant Quickback permission to deploy…" | Signed in, but no deploy permission stored yet | **Grant deploy access** |
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102
  | Masked email badge, green | Connected and healthy | Deploy |
98
- | "This connection expires in N minutes" | The access token is near the end of its life | Nothing yet — reconnect when it lapses |
99
- | Badge turns amber, "· reconnect" | Token expired, grant revoked in Cloudflare, or the connection was deleted | **Reconnect Cloudflare** — one consent, same connection record |
103
+ | Badge turns amber, "· reconnect" | Grant revoked in Cloudflare, or the connection was deleted (plain expiry never surfaces — tokens refresh server-side) | **Reconnect Cloudflare** — one consent, same connection record |
104
+ | "…also linked to a different Quickback login" | This Cloudflare account is connected under another Quickback account too — apps deployed there are listed there, not here | Nothing, unless an app you expected is missing: sign in with the Quickback account you deployed it from |
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105
  | "This Cloudflare connection can't …" | The grant is missing a permission a deploy needs (an older connection, or a scope your OAuth client didn't allow) | **Reconnect Cloudflare** to grant the rest |
101
106
  | "This Cloudflare login isn't a member of any account" | The identity you connected belongs to no Cloudflare account | Create or join an account in the Cloudflare dashboard, then reconnect |
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107
  | "Couldn't reach the deploy service…" | Transient failure talking to Quickback or Cloudflare | **Try again** |
@@ -114,6 +119,8 @@ Deploy is disabled while a reconnect is pending, so a deploy never starts on a c
114
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115
120
  Connect a second Cloudflare login with **Connect another** and the card grows a login picker above the account picker. Start remembers which one you deployed with last and preselects it.
116
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122
+ To make every Cloudflare login land on the **same** Quickback account (rather than each minting its own), link them under **Connected accounts** in the [Account UI](/ui/account) — after that, "Continue with Cloudflare" signs you in to that one account no matter which Cloudflare identity your dashboard is holding.
123
+
117
124
  ### Disconnecting vs. revoking
118
125
 
119
126
  Two different things, and you usually want both:
@@ -129,7 +136,9 @@ The OAuth token never reaches your browser, the chat model, or the compiler. It
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136
  - bound to its connection record (the ciphertext is unusable if copied elsewhere);
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137
  - decrypted only inside the API calls of an active deploy, then discarded.
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138
 
132
- Tokens expire; when one does, Start shows a reconnect prompt and a fresh consent re-issues it onto the same connection. Revoking in Cloudflare kills the token immediately — the stored ciphertext becomes useless, and the card turns the next failed call into that same reconnect prompt. See [Connection states and recovery](#connection-states-and-recovery) for the full set.
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+ The grant is standing permission carried by short-lived credentials. The token that can actually touch your account expires every hour; the deploy service refreshes it server-side, so expiry never reaches you as a prompt — a leaked working token goes stale within the hour either way. What persists is the sealed refresh token, which can only mint the next short-lived token.
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+
141
+ Revoking in Cloudflare (**My Profile → Access Management → Connected Applications**) kills the whole chain immediately — the stored ciphertext becomes useless, and the card turns the next failed call into a reconnect prompt. See [Connection states and recovery](#connection-states-and-recovery) for the full set.
133
142
 
134
143
  ## Secrets on the deployed app
135
144
 
@@ -436,3 +436,19 @@ POST /candidates
436
436
  3. **All layers work together** - Firewall -> Access -> Guards -> Masking
437
437
  4. **Code is readable and auditable** - no magic, just TypeScript
438
438
  5. **Type-safe from definition to API** - Drizzle schema drives everything
439
+
440
+ ## Keep going in the same file
441
+
442
+ Everything above is one config object, and it takes more keys than security and
443
+ CRUD. Each adds a real endpoint on the same pipeline, so reach for these before
444
+ writing a custom action:
445
+
446
+ - [`transitions`](/define/transitions) — a guarded state change (`publish`,
447
+ `approve`, `checkIn`) generated as `POST /candidates/:id/{name}`
448
+ - [`realtime`](/platform/realtime/using-realtime) — broadcast inserts, updates,
449
+ and deletes to subscribed clients
450
+ - [`triggers`](/define/triggers) — run a data rule or side-effect on every write
451
+ - [`owns`](/define/changesets) — write a parent row and its children atomically
452
+
453
+ The `views` you already declared are the same idea: a whole endpoint from a few
454
+ lines. See [the full option list](/define#other-resource-options).
@@ -22,25 +22,49 @@ When `auth.admin` is `false` (the default), the admin surface does not exist for
22
22
 
23
23
  ## What It Can Do
24
24
 
25
+ **Users** — every account in the app, independent of organization:
26
+
25
27
  - **View all users** — Paginated list with search
26
28
  - **Create users** — Manually create accounts with email/password
27
29
  - **Ban/unban users** — Suspend or reactivate user accounts
28
30
  - **Reset passwords** — Generate password reset for any user
29
31
  - **View sessions** — See active sessions for any user
30
32
 
33
+ **Organizations** — every tenant, whether or not you belong to it:
34
+
35
+ - **List all organizations** — cross-tenant, not just your memberships
36
+ - **Create an organization** — you name the **owner**; the operator creating it is deliberately not seated (see below)
37
+ - **Seat, re-role and remove members** — manage a tenant's roster without joining it
38
+
39
+ These run on `/auth/v1/admin/*`, emitted by Quickback because Better Auth's organization plugin cannot serve them: every one of its endpoints resolves through the *caller's* membership, and an operator administers organizations it does not belong to.
40
+
41
+ > **Users sign themselves up.** Self-serve signup stays on — a new account simply has no organization, and lands on a screen saying so until someone invites or seats them. What operators control is *organizations*, not accounts.
42
+
43
+
31
44
  ## Access Control
32
45
 
33
- The admin panel is restricted to users with `role: "admin"` on their Better Auth user record. Non-admin users are redirected away from `/admin`.
46
+ The admin panel is restricted to platform roles on the Better Auth user record: **`appmanager`** (the control plane) and **`sysadmin`** (which adds cross-tenant data access on top). Everyone else is redirected away from `/admin`.
34
47
 
35
- To grant admin access to a user, use the Better Auth admin plugin:
48
+ > **`role: "admin"` is not a platform role.** The compiler seeds the admin plugin with `adminRoles: ["appmanager", "sysadmin"]`, so a user set to `"admin"` passed the UI guard and then got `403` from every admin API call — an operator who looked promoted and could not act. Removed in v0.62; migrate those rows to `"appmanager"`.
49
+
50
+
51
+ To grant operator access to a user:
36
52
 
37
53
  ```bash
38
54
  curl -X POST https://api.example.com/auth/v1/admin/set-role \
39
55
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
40
56
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
41
- -d '{ "userId": "user_123", "role": "admin" }'
57
+ -d '{ "userId": "user_123", "role": "appmanager" }'
42
58
  ```
43
59
 
60
+ ### Why creating an organization names an owner
61
+
62
+ Better Auth's `organization.create` seats whoever calls it. For an operator that is an escalation rather than a convenience: the membership it grants is tenant-data access — under `cms.access: "member"`, access to that organization's records — which is exactly what the `appmanager`/`sysadmin` split withholds.
63
+
64
+ So organization creation asks for an `ownerUserId`, seats that user, and never seats the caller. Self-serve creation (`POST /auth/v1/organization/create`) is closed by default for the same reason; a project that wants it sets `plugins.organization.allowUserToCreateOrganization: true`.
65
+
66
+ An operator who genuinely wants their own organization creates one naming themselves as owner — explicit, and visible in the audit trail rather than implied by whoever happened to make the call.
67
+
44
68
  ## Custom Admin Domain
45
69
 
46
70
  Give the admin panel its own subdomain with `adminDomain`:
@@ -64,10 +88,10 @@ The admin domain serves the same Account SPA at root (`/`). The SPA's client-sid
64
88
  When both CMS and Account UI are enabled, the admin panel's profile page shows a "Go to CMS" button. You can restrict this to admin users only:
65
89
 
66
90
  ```typescript
67
- cms: { domain: "cms.example.com", access: "admin" },
91
+ cms: { domain: "cms.example.com", access: "sysadmin" },
68
92
  ```
69
93
 
70
- With `access: "admin"`, callers outside the platform control-plane roles can't access the CMS at any layer: the link is hidden in Account UI, the SPA shell returns `403` before serving `index.html`, `/api/v1/schema` returns `403`, and the `custom_view` CRUD is locked to `userRole: ["appmanager"]` (plus `sysadmin` when enabled). See [CMS Connecting](/ui/admin/connecting#restrict-cms-access-to-admin-users-only) for the full enforcement model.
94
+ With `access: "sysadmin"`, only the cross-tenant `sysadmin` tier reaches the CMS: the link is hidden in Account UI, `/api/v1/schema` returns `403`, and `custom_view` CRUD is locked to `userRole: ["sysadmin"]`. Note that an **appmanager does not get in** — `/account/admin` (this page) is the appmanager's surface, and the CMS is not. See [CMS access gate](/ui/admin#access-gate) for the full model.
71
95
 
72
96
  ## Related
73
97
 
@@ -179,6 +179,28 @@ VITE_ENABLE_GOOGLE_OAUTH=false # default: false
179
179
  **Requirements:**
180
180
  - Google OAuth credentials configured on the Better Auth side
181
181
 
182
+ ### Cloudflare OAuth
183
+
184
+ ```bash
185
+ VITE_ENABLE_CLOUDFLARE_OAUTH=false # default: false
186
+ ```
187
+
188
+ **When enabled:**
189
+ - "Continue with Cloudflare" button on the login and signup pages
190
+ - Cloudflare rows in the profile page's Connected Accounts card — unlike
191
+ Google, more than one Cloudflare identity can be linked to the same user
192
+ (**Connect another Cloudflare account**), and every linked identity signs
193
+ in to this user. Link work and personal Cloudflare logins here so each one
194
+ doesn't mint its own separate account.
195
+
196
+ **When disabled:**
197
+ - No Cloudflare sign-in button, no Connected Accounts rows
198
+
199
+ **Requirements:**
200
+ - `socialProviders.cloudflare.enabled` in the auth config (Cloudflare rides
201
+ the genericOAuth plugin, not a Better Auth built-in) and the
202
+ `AUTH_CLOUDFLARE_CLIENT_ID` / `AUTH_CLOUDFLARE_CLIENT_SECRET` secrets
203
+
182
204
  ## Account Management Features
183
205
 
184
206
  ### File Uploads
@@ -136,22 +136,24 @@ cms: { domain: "cms.example.com" }
136
136
 
137
137
  This adds a custom domain route to `wrangler.toml`. Both `api.example.com` and `cms.example.com` point to the same Worker. The compiler auto-configures hostname-based routing and cross-subdomain cookies.
138
138
 
139
- CMS access defaults to `access: "admin"` — only `user.role === "appmanager"` (the Better Auth platform control-plane tier) can reach `/cms/*`. When `cms.sysadmin: true`, `user.role === "sysadmin"` is also admitted. Other authenticated users are redirected to `/account/profile`. The gate is enforced at multiple layers:
139
+ CMS access defaults to `access: "sysadmin"` — only `user.role === "sysadmin"` (the cross-tenant data-plane tier) can use `/cms/*`. Set `access: "member"` to also admit anyone holding an organization membership. `user.role === "appmanager"` opens the CMS in neither mode: it is the control-plane tier and belongs at `/account/admin`. The gate is enforced at multiple layers:
140
140
 
141
141
  - **Account UI** hides the "Go to CMS" button for callers outside those roles.
142
142
  - **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker returns `403` (or redirects unauthenticated requests to login) before serving `index.html` to a non-operator. A non-operator who types the CMS URL directly cannot load the app.
143
143
  - **`/api/v1/schema`** returns `403 Platform operator access required` to callers outside those roles, so schema metadata can't be scraped by hitting the API directly.
144
144
  - **`custom_view` routes** are gated on `userRole: ["appmanager"]` rather than org membership, so saved views can't be listed or modified without platform-control-plane rights.
145
- - **In-SPA gate** — if any earlier layer is bypassed, the SPA still redirects the user to `/account/profile`.
145
+ - **In-SPA screen** — a signed-in caller who isn't admitted is served the shell and shown a screen naming what they'd need. There is no wrong-role redirect.
146
146
 
147
147
  Your resource API endpoints (the ones generated for your features) are unaffected — they continue to use the per-resource `read`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, and `upsert` access rules you defined.
148
148
 
149
- To allow any authenticated user to access the CMS, opt out explicitly:
149
+ To let organization members in as well as sysadmins:
150
150
 
151
151
  ```typescript
152
- cms: { access: "user" }
152
+ cms: { access: "member" }
153
153
  ```
154
154
 
155
+ See [Access gate](/ui/admin#access-gate) for the full model — including why `appmanager` opens the CMS in neither mode.
156
+
155
157
  See [Multi-Domain Architecture](/configure/domains) for details on multi-domain routing.
156
158
 
157
159
  ## Default Org Mode vs Pinned Organization Mode
@@ -112,22 +112,61 @@ cms: { domain: "cms.example.com" }
112
112
 
113
113
  This adds a custom domain route to `wrangler.toml`. Both domains serve the same Worker — `api.example.com` for the API, `cms.example.com` for the CMS. The compiler also auto-infers a unified `quickback.example.com` domain where everything is available. See [Multi-Domain Architecture](/configure/domains).
114
114
 
115
- ### Access gate (platform-control-plane by default)
115
+ ### Access gate
116
116
 
117
- CMS access defaults to `access: "admin"` — only `user.role === "appmanager"` (the user-table platform control-plane role) can reach `/cms/*`. When `cms.sysadmin: true`, `user.role === "sysadmin"` is also admitted. Other authenticated users are redirected to `/account/profile`. The gate is enforced at **four layers** — defense in depth:
117
+ `cms.access` answers one question: **can anyone in the organization hierarchy use the CMS, or only a platform sysadmin?**
118
118
 
119
- 1. **Account UI link** — the "Go to CMS" button is hidden for callers outside those roles.
120
- 2. **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker returns `403 Platform operator access required` before serving `index.html` to a non-operator. Unauthenticated requests are redirected to the login page.
121
- 3. **`/api/v1/schema`** — the CMS metadata endpoint checks `ctx.userRole === "appmanager"` (and admits `sysadmin` when enabled) and returns `403` otherwise.
122
- 4. **`custom_view` routes** — the CMS-internal saved-views table is gated on `userRole: ["appmanager"]` (see the [`userRole` access primitive](/define/access#userrole)) rather than org membership.
119
+ | Value | Who gets in |
120
+ |-------|-------------|
121
+ | `"sysadmin"` (default) | Only `user.role === "sysadmin"` — the cross-tenant data-plane tier. They choose a tenant from the org picker. |
122
+ | `"member"` | The above, **plus** any caller holding a membership in an organization, scoped to that organization. |
123
+
124
+ ```typescript
125
+ cms: { access: "member" } // let organization members in
126
+ ```
127
+
128
+ > **`user.role === "appmanager"` does not open the CMS in either mode.** appmanager is the *control plane* — users, organizations, and subscriptions at [`/account/admin`](/ui/account) — and deliberately holds no tenant-data powers. Keeping those separable is the entire point of the appmanager/sysadmin split. An appmanager who is also a member of an organization gets in as that member, on the membership, not on the platform role.
129
+
130
+
131
+ #### Where the gate actually lives
132
+
133
+ The CMS **shell** is served to any signed-in caller. Authorization is decided in the SPA, which renders a screen naming the caller's state and what to do about it — a signed-in user who can't get in is told why, instead of being silently bounced.
134
+
135
+ That is a deliberate trade: the old gate answered a wrong-role caller with a `302` so it couldn't be used to probe roles. The shell is a generic prebuilt bundle with no project data in it, and being unable to distinguish a permissions problem from a broken deploy cost more than the deniability was worth.
136
+
137
+ The gates that carry real data:
138
+
139
+ 1. **`/api/v1/schema`** — the metadata endpoint. Admits `sysadmin`, plus any caller with a membership when `access: "member"`. Otherwise `403` with `CMS_ACCESS_DENIED` and a hint naming the requirement. Without the registry there is no CMS.
140
+ 2. **`custom_view` routes** — saved views follow whoever is admitted: the `sysadmin` tier in `"sysadmin"` mode, org membership *or* sysadmin in `"member"` mode.
141
+ 3. **Account UI link** — the "Go to CMS" button is hidden for callers who wouldn't get in.
123
142
 
124
143
  Your resource API endpoints (`/api/v1/<resource>`) are **not** affected — they continue to use the per-resource `read`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, and `upsert` access rules you defined.
125
144
 
126
- To allow any authenticated user, opt out explicitly:
145
+ > **Breaking in v0.62.** `cms.access` was renamed from `"admin" | "user"`, and both old values meant something different: `"admin"` admitted `appmanager`, and `"user"` admitted *any* authenticated caller — including one belonging to no organization, who then reached a CMS with nothing in it. The old spellings are rejected at compile time rather than aliased, because aliasing would preserve the old behaviour under a familiar name. Migrate `"admin"` → `"sysadmin"`, `"user"` → `"member"`.
127
146
 
128
- ```typescript
129
- cms: { access: "user" }
130
- ```
147
+
148
+ #### What a blocked caller actually sees
149
+
150
+ The shell is served to any signed-in caller, and the SPA resolves one of six states — each its own screen naming what is true and what to do next. Nothing redirects: a signed-in user bounced elsewhere cannot tell a permissions problem from a broken deploy.
151
+
152
+ | State | Screen |
153
+ |-------|--------|
154
+ | Not signed in | Redirect to sign-in (the one redirect that remains — it is where you were going anyway) |
155
+ | `sysadmin`, no tenant chosen | Tenant picker, filterable, with **All organizations** as a first-class choice |
156
+ | `sysadmin`, tenant chosen | The CMS, scoped to that tenant |
157
+ | `appmanager`, `access: "sysadmin"` | *"The CMS shows organization data"* → **Go to admin** |
158
+ | Anyone else, `access: "sysadmin"` | *"This CMS is restricted"* — names the config value that would admit them |
159
+ | `access: "member"`, no membership | *"You're not in any organization yet"* → **View invitations** (an appmanager gets **Go to admin** instead — telling them to ask an admin for an invite when they are the admin is a dead end) |
160
+ | `access: "member"`, one membership | Auto-selected; straight in |
161
+ | `access: "member"`, several | Membership picker |
162
+
163
+ The decision is a pure function (`resolveCmsAccess`), so the table above is tested rather than described.
164
+
165
+ Sysadmin scope lives in the browser and rides every request as `?organizationId=` — it is not part of the session, because a sysadmin holds no membership row for Better Auth to make active. Change it from the sidebar.
166
+
167
+ #### `access: "sysadmin"` without `cms.sysadmin`
168
+
169
+ A sysadmin can still pin a single tenant — `?organizationId=` cross-tenant addressing is admitted for sysadmins unconditionally. The **"All organizations"** unfiltered view is what needs the firewall escape that `cms.sysadmin: true` emits.
131
170
 
132
171
  ### Optional: Skip SPA rebuild
133
172
 
@@ -2,19 +2,18 @@
2
2
 
3
3
  The CMS respects all four Quickback security layers. Every UI element — buttons, form fields, table columns, action menus — adapts based on the current user's role and the security rules defined in your feature files.
4
4
 
5
- ## CMS Access (platform-control-plane by default)
5
+ ## CMS Access
6
6
 
7
- The CMS is restricted to Better Auth platform control-plane users (`user.role === "appmanager"`) by default. If `cms.sysadmin: true` is enabled, `user.role === "sysadmin"` is also admitted. Other authenticated users are redirected to `/account/profile`. To allow any authenticated user, opt out explicitly:
7
+ `cms.access` decides whether the CMS is for platform sysadmins only (`"sysadmin"`, the default) or for organization members too (`"member"`). `user.role === "appmanager"` opens it in neither mode — that tier is the control plane, not the data plane.
8
8
 
9
9
  ```typescript
10
- cms: { access: "user" }
10
+ cms: { access: "member" }
11
11
  ```
12
12
 
13
- Under the default `access: "admin"`, the compiler emits server-side gates on every CMS-facing surface so a non-operator can't reach the CMS even by bypassing the SPA:
13
+ The shell is served to any signed-in caller so the SPA can explain who is and isn't admitted; the gates that carry data are:
14
14
 
15
- 1. **Account UI** — the "Go to CMS" button is hidden.
16
- 2. **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === "appmanager"` before serving `index.html`. When `cms.sysadmin: true`, sysadmins are also admitted. Unauthenticated requests are redirected to login; authenticated non-operators get `403 Platform operator access required`.
17
- 3. **`/api/v1/schema`** — the CMS metadata endpoint returns `403` to callers outside those roles.
15
+ 1. **Account UI** — the "Go to CMS" button is hidden for callers who wouldn't get in.
16
+ 2. **`/api/v1/schema`** — the metadata endpoint returns `403` with `CMS_ACCESS_DENIED` and a hint naming the requirement. Without the registry there is no CMS.
18
17
  4. **`custom_view` routes** — the CMS-internal saved-views table uses `userRole: ["appmanager"]` (and, when `cms.sysadmin: true`, also admits `sysadmin`), so saved views can't be read or modified from outside the CMS by non-operator accounts.
19
18
  5. **In-SPA gate** — if any earlier layer is bypassed, the SPA still redirects the user to `/account/profile`.
20
19
 
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,18 +1,10 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
3
- "version": "0.60.9",
3
+ "version": "0.61.1",
4
4
  "description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
5
5
  "author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
6
6
  "license": "MIT",
7
- "homepage": "https://docs.quickback.dev/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli",
8
- "repository": {
9
- "type": "git",
10
- "url": "git+https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler.git",
11
- "directory": "packages/cli"
12
- },
13
- "bugs": {
14
- "url": "https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler/issues"
15
- },
7
+ "homepage": "https://docs.quickback.dev/tooling/cli",
16
8
  "keywords": [
17
9
  "quickback",
18
10
  "cli",
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ Everything you need around the compiled API for a complete Supabase alternative
29
29
  | **Storage** | KV (sessions, cache) and R2 (files) | Cloudflare KV + R2 |
30
30
  | **Realtime** | WebSocket for live updates | Durable Objects |
31
31
  | **Queues** | Background jobs, webhook delivery | Cloudflare Queues |
32
+ | **Schedules** | Cron jobs via `defineSchedule` | Cron Triggers |
33
+ | **Email** | Inbound handlers via `defineEmail` | Email Workers |
32
34
  | **Vector & AI** | Embeddings, semantic search | Workers AI |
33
35
  | **Webhooks** | Signed inbound, retried outbound | Hono + Queues |
34
36
  | **CMS** | Schema-driven admin UI | Embedded SPA |
@@ -402,6 +404,7 @@ The path layout mirrors the public docs site (https://docs.quickback.dev). Open
402
404
  - `api-contract` — the HTTP contract layer: RFC 9457 Problem Details, keyset cursors, `Idempotency-Key`, `?include=`/sparse fields, the contract `v1`→`v2` matrix
403
405
  - `push` — Web Push (VAPID + aes128gcm), queue fan-out, identity-tag targeting, hardened subscriptions schema
404
406
  - `schedules` — `defineSchedule` cron jobs
407
+ - `email` — `defineEmail` inbound Email Worker handlers
405
408
 
406
409
  **Bundled UIs** (`docs/ui/<topic>.md`)
407
410
  - `admin` — schema-driven admin UI, dashboard, record layouts, table views, schema registry
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ Missing or invalid authentication tokens.
98
98
  | `AUTH_EXPIRED` | Token has expired |
99
99
  | `AUTH_RATE_LIMITED` | Too many auth attempts |
100
100
  | `AUTH_SESSION_REQUIRED` | The endpoint requires session (cookie) authentication — returned by `POST /api/v1/token` when called with a JWT, API key, or OAuth bearer, so a stolen or revoked token can't mint its own replacement |
101
+ | `AUTH_REVOCATION_UNAVAILABLE` | **503, retryable.** Only with [`revocationCheck: 'kv'`](/configure/auth#revocationcheck-none--kv--token-revocation-strategy): the bearer's signature verified, but its revocation state could not be read (KV binding missing or unreachable), so it was not trusted. Retry, or authenticate with a session cookie |
101
102
 
102
103
  ### Firewall (403)
103
104
 
@@ -31,6 +31,27 @@ GET /api/v1/jobs?title.like=Engineer
31
31
  GET /api/v1/jobs?department.in=Engineering,Design,Product
32
32
  ```
33
33
 
34
+ ### Unknown filters are rejected, not ignored
35
+
36
+ A filter the handler cannot apply returns `400` (`VALIDATION_INVALID_INPUT`).
37
+ It is never dropped:
38
+
39
+ | Request | Result |
40
+ |---------|--------|
41
+ | `?guestId=g_1` where `guestId` isn't a column | `400` — `Unknown filter field "guestId"` |
42
+ | `?status=open` on a view whose `query.filterable` omits `status` | `400` — `Field "status" is not filterable on this view` |
43
+ | `?title.matches=x` (no such operator) | `400` — `Unknown filter operator "matches"` |
44
+ | `?ssn=123` where `ssn` is masked for your role | `400` — see [Masking](/define/masking) |
45
+
46
+ Silently dropping a predicate would return **every row the firewall allows**
47
+ while still reading as a scoped list — a typo'd or join-table field turns a
48
+ narrow query into a full dump. The same rule closes `?search=` and `?sort=`.
49
+
50
+ > Filtering on a relationship that lives in a join table is not a column filter.
51
+ > `GET /travel-bookings?guestId=...` cannot work when membership is
52
+ > `travel_booking_guests` — expose a view or an `include` for it instead.
53
+
54
+
34
55
  ## Pagination
35
56
 
36
57
  | Parameter | Default | Description |
@@ -110,6 +131,11 @@ GET /api/v1/jobs?sort=title&order=asc
110
131
 
111
132
  When the multi-sort format is detected (comma or `-` prefix), the `order` parameter is ignored.
112
133
 
134
+ A client-supplied `?sort=` naming an unknown column — or one outside a view's
135
+ `query.sortable` — returns `400`, for the same reason unknown filters do: rows
136
+ would come back in some other order that reads as the requested one. A view's
137
+ own `defaultSort` fallback is config, not caller input, and is never rejected.
138
+
113
139
  ## Field Selection
114
140
 
115
141
  Select which columns to return using `?fields=`. Available on LIST and GET routes (not Views — they define their own field set).