@quickback-dev/cli 0.51.0 → 0.51.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/compile.js +34 -19
- package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +19 -19
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.d.ts +35 -4
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.js +233 -50
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.test.js +130 -2
- package/dist/lib/action-harvest.test.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/auth.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/lib/auth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/auth.js +18 -1
- package/dist/lib/auth.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/auth.test.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/lib/auth.test.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/auth.test.js +19 -0
- package/dist/lib/auth.test.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.js +69 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.test.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.test.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.test.js +76 -0
- package/dist/lib/compile-next-steps.test.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.js +20 -5
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.test.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.test.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.test.js +90 -0
- package/dist/lib/file-writer.test.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/shell.test.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/lib/shell.test.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/shell.test.js +39 -0
- package/dist/lib/shell.test.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +401 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +16 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +4 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler.md +17 -5
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/auth.md +17 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +271 -12
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/output.md +49 -3
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +12 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/variables.md +5 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +7 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +156 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +6 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +12 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +353 -20
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/index.md +7 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +104 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/aws-sns.md +20 -3
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-format.md +4 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-registry.md +4 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +401 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +16 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +4 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler.md +17 -5
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/auth.md +17 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +271 -12
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/output.md +49 -3
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +12 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/variables.md +5 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +7 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +156 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +6 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +12 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +353 -20
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/index.md +7 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +104 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/aws-sns.md +20 -3
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-format.md +4 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-registry.md +4 -2
package/dist/docs/content.js
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"content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Action rate limits now emit — documented since the rate-limit pillar, wired now\n\nThe [rate-limit docs](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit#actions) have described\nper-action rate limiting since the pillar shipped: record-based actions inherit\nthe resource's `update` bucket, standalone actions inherit the project-default\n`update` bucket, and actions may declare a `rateLimit` override or opt out with\n`rateLimit: false`. The generated routes never contained the checks. They now\ndo, exactly per the documented contract:\n\n- Record-based actions (and their bulk variants, which share the same counter —\n one token per batch request) are keyed\n `<resource>:action:<name>:<user>`; standalone actions are keyed\n `standalone:<declaredPath>:<user>`. The `:action:`/`standalone:` infixes mean\n action counters never collide with CRUD counters.\n- `rateLimit: { limit, period }` on an action emits its own binding\n (deduped by tuple, same `RL_<limit>_<period>` scheme); `rateLimit: false`\n opts the action out entirely.\n- Record-based action routes are now **exempted** from the per-resource CRUD\n catch-all middleware. Previously a `POST /:id/approve` was incidentally\n counted against the resource's `create` bucket — wrong bucket, wrong key.\n- Actions-only (tableless) projects now provision the project-default binding;\n previously they shipped with none.\n\n**Behavior change:** standalone actions were previously *unlimited*; they now\ninherit the project-default `update` bucket (200 requests / 60s per user/IP\nwith shipped defaults). PUBLIC webhook-style endpoints that absorb provider\nbursts should declare their own budget (`rateLimit: { limit: 1000, period: 10 }`)\nor opt out (`rateLimit: false`). The compiler emits a warning when a PUBLIC\nstandalone action silently inherits the default, so affected actions are\nflagged at compile time.\n\n### Better Auth CLI pinned and shipped as a generated devDependency\n\nThe generated `auth:schema` script runs `npx better-auth generate`, but the\n`better-auth` runtime package ships no executable — the `better-auth` bin\nlives in the npm package `auth` (the official Better Auth CLI; the team took\nover that name at 1.5.0, superseding the frozen `@better-auth/cli`). Generated\nprojects now declare `auth` as a devDependency pinned to the runtime's minor\nline, so `npm run build` resolves the CLI locally instead of requiring a\nglobal install. The compiler image's global CLI is pinned to the same version,\neliminating silent skew between the CLI on `latest` and the pinned runtime.\n\n### Compile warning when an action's input schema degrades to untyped\n\nWhen action input schemas aren't harvested client-side (older CLI, or a direct\n`/compile` API call), the static Zod parser supplies OpenAPI/MCP input schemas\n— and silently degrades unrecognized constructs (discriminated unions,\nrefinements, `z.record`, transforms) to the accept-anything `{}`. That\ndegradation is no longer silent: the compile result now carries a warning per\naffected action naming the route, source file, and the exact untyped field\npaths. Actions covered by the CLI harvest are never warned on, and actions\nthat declare no input are skipped.\n\n### Auth docs: JWT security posture stated up front\n\nThe [Auth & JWT page](/compiler/config/auth) now leads with the posture\nsummary instead of burying it: the default 180-second auto-refreshed TTL plus\n`revocationCheck: 'kv'` (seconds-level revocation, auto-stamped on ban /\nmember removal / role change / scope-conferring row changes) is the\nrecommended configuration and covers the vast majority of deployments — with\nthe residual trade-offs (per-principal granularity, fail-open on KV outage,\n~60s cross-PoP propagation) stated explicitly for strict threat models.\n\n### Neon via-user reads: generated list handlers now typecheck against the concretely-typed service handle\n\nOn Neon, a read firewall carrying a via-user multi-hop relationship predicate\nroutes the generated read handlers to `createServiceDb(c.env)` — a genuine\n`NeonHttpDatabase<typeof schema>` — instead of the loosely-typed request db.\nThe list handler's query construction declared drizzle select builders with\n`let` and reassigned them (`query = query.where(…)`, `.orderBy(…)`,\n`.limit(…).offset(…)`, and the count/aggregation/group-by variants), which is\na type error against drizzle's immutable builder typing: `.where()` returns\n`Omit\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
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"content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Generated builds no longer rewrite the auth schema\n\nGenerated Better Auth projects now run `tsc` directly from `npm run build`.\n`quickback compile` already generates, qualifies, and envelopes\n`src/auth/schema.ts`; invoking `auth:schema` again during every build rewrote\nthat compiler-owned artifact and made an otherwise clean release worktree\ndirty. The explicit `auth:schema` diagnostic command remains available, while\nnormal build, Wrangler, and deployment preflight paths are source-read-only.\nWhen recompiling an existing project, compiler-owned `package.json` script\nnames now converge to their current generated commands while unrelated custom\nscripts are preserved. This upgrades projects whose previous generated\n`build` script still invoked `auth:schema`.\n\n### Non-cross-tenant unsafe actions preserve delegated RLS claims\n\nGenerated Neon handlers now reserve `createServiceDb` for actions that\nexplicitly enable `unsafe.crossTenant`. An action that enables raw database\naccess with `crossTenant: false` keeps the request database, so organization\nand delegated-principal claims survive into Hyperdrive transactions instead of\nbeing cleared by the service-role preamble. True cross-tenant sysadmin actions\nretain their audited RLS bypass.\n\nNeon Hyperdrive guidance now also calls out Postgres' `SELECT … FOR UPDATE`\nauthorization rule: a locked row must pass both `SELECT` and `UPDATE` policies.\nDelegated actions should use ordinary selects for read-only eligibility tables\nand lock only mutable rows they are authorized to update. A PGlite regression\nproves that ordinary delegated reads remain visible while the generated\nrestrictive update fence blocks an unauthorized row lock.\n\n### Atomic email-OTP auth routing no longer recurses on ordinary requests\n\nThe generated atomic email-OTP wrapper now captures and binds Better Auth's\noriginal request handler before replacing the public `handler` property.\nSession reads and every other non-atomic auth route therefore forward to Better\nAuth exactly once instead of re-entering the wrapper until the Worker exhausts\nits call stack. The exact email-OTP sign-in route retains its transactional\nadmission and rollback behavior.\n\n### Generated Better Auth CLI dependencies no longer retain vulnerable Lodash\n\nBetter Auth projects now emit a root npm override for `lodash@4.18.1`. This\nkeeps the supported stable `auth@1.6.x` CLI and its `better-auth` executable,\nwhile lifting the CLI's dev-only Prisma parser chain off Lodash releases\naffected by the 2026 code-injection and prototype-pollution advisories. Runtime\nBetter Auth packages and generated authentication behavior are unchanged.\n\nThe CLI now merges generated npm overrides explicitly when recompiling an\nexisting project: unrelated user overrides remain, while compiler-owned\nsecurity pins win a conflict. Recompile and reinstall dependencies to refresh\nthe project lockfile. `npm audit --omit=dev` remains the production dependency\nview; upstream development-server advisories may still appear separately.\n\n### Postgres constraint replacements apply in dependency-safe order\n\nNeon migration post-processing now orders both halves of a Drizzle constraint\nreplacement. A dependent foreign key is dropped before its referenced unique\nor primary-key constraint, then the replacement key is added before the\nforeign key that consumes it. This prevents Postgres `2BP01` failures when\nDrizzle emits the parent key drop first, while preserving byte-identical output\nfor already-correct migrations and the relative order of unrelated statements.\n\n### Schema registry output is byte-reproducible\n\n`schema-registry.json` no longer includes the wall-clock `generatedAt` field.\nIts remaining metadata and schema content are derived entirely from compiler\ninputs, so consecutive compiles of identical logical input now produce the\nsame registry bytes. This makes artifact hashes, caches, and deployment diffs\nstable without timestamp normalization.\n\n### Generated auth and discovery surfaces now remain truthful and type-safe\n\nAtomic email-OTP generation now imports and invokes\n`before-email-otp-activate.ts` exactly once and preserves the transaction's\nreal Drizzle `select` capability in the hook context. Strict generated\nTypeScript therefore accepts both the base Neon service database and its\ninteractive transaction without erasing the hook's read contract.\n\nContract-v2 projects that omit `auth.jwt` no longer advertise the disabled\nQuickback JWT fast path in `llms.txt` or RFC 8414 metadata. Bearer-JWT guidance,\nthe fallback `/api/v2/token` endpoint, and JWT scopes are emitted only when the\ncorresponding JWT surface exists; real Better Auth OAuth-provider discovery is\nunchanged.\n\nCloudflare Email callbacks now all enter the shared credential-delivery\nscheduler exactly once. The scheduler anchors the observed rejection with\n`waitUntil`, emits the metadata-only `auth.credential_delivery_failed` event,\nand never leaks the provider error. Generated CRUD routes also keep delegated\nprincipal and account authority disjoint: `?organizationId=` is rejected for a\ndelegated principal instead of synthesizing `activeOrgId` on its context. This\ncloses both the authority ambiguity and the generated `AppContext` union type\nerrors.\n\n### Email-OTP activation can be admitted atomically in the API layer\n\nContract-v2 Cloudflare projects using one Neon Hyperdrive database can opt the\nexact Better Auth `POST /sign-in/email-otp` handler into an interactive\ntransaction with `atomicAuthRoutes: [\"emailOtpSignIn\"]`. The paired recognized\nhook, `quickback/hooks/before-email-otp-activate.ts`, receives a proven dormant\nuser `{ userId, email, user }` plus transaction-bound `db` / full `schema` and\n`authDb` / `authSchema` handles. Quickback owns only identity proof and atomic\norchestration; application admission, status, event, pass, and eligibility\nrules remain authored in the project API hook.\n\nThe hook executes after OTP validation but in Better Auth's\n`databaseHooks.user.update.before`, before the user update lock. This preserves\napplication-first lock ordering and avoids the user-to-application inversion a\nsession-create hook would introduce. Unknown-email signup must be disabled;\nalready-verified users do not rerun dormant activation.\n\nThe generated handler rebuilds Better Auth over the transaction handle, so OTP\nconsumption, project hook writes, the `emailVerified` update, and session insert\ncommit together. Admission denial, a non-ok response after activation starts,\nand any 5xx response throw a private rollback sentinel. Expected policy denial\nreturns a generic 403. Operational rollback emits the metadata-only\n`auth.atomic_email_otp_operational_rollback` event and returns a generic 503,\nwithout exposing raw errors. Ordinary invalid-OTP 4xx responses still commit\nBetter Auth's attempt accounting, and the OTP-send route remains outside the\ntransaction. Unsupported contracts, runtimes, database modes,\nmissing/duplicated config, enabled signup,\nand a hook/config mismatch now fail at compile time.\n\n### Neon migrations can declare cross-schema foreign keys\n\nNeon projects can now declare fully qualified, single-column or composite\nforeign keys under `compiler.migrations.foreignKeys`. Each entry names the\nconstraint, source and target schema/table/column tuples, and explicit\n`onDelete` / `onUpdate` actions. The compiler rejects unsafe identifiers,\nmismatched tuple arity, duplicate or ambiguous declarations, unknown keys,\nand non-Neon providers before generating SQL.\n\nDeclared constraints are sorted deterministically and folded into Quickback's\ncontent-addressed Postgres journal after the Drizzle schema migration. A new\nconstraint is added `NOT VALID` and then validated, so existing orphan rows\nfail the migration; replay verifies an exact catalog match and rejects a\nsame-named constraint with different semantics. This surface enforces\nrelational integrity only—business rules remain in generated or authored API\nactions, not database triggers.\n\n### Compile completion steps honor the Neon connection mode\n\nThe CLI's successful-compile footer now distinguishes Neon HTTP from\nHyperdrive. HTTP projects retain the direct `DATABASE_URL` Worker setup.\nHyperdrive projects show `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` only as a local or CI\nmigration input, point local development at the configured Hyperdrive\n`localConnectionString`, and never recommend deploying `DATABASE_URL` as a\nWorker secret.\n\nNamed Hyperdrive environments also show their configured Neon branches,\nrequired-secret inventories, and explicit Wrangler `--env` targets. The footer\nno longer suggests the unnamed `.env.neon` / `.dev.vars` workflow or a bare\ndeploy for an isolated `dev` / `prod` setup.\n\n### Cloudflare email delivery and named Neon targets fail visibly and deploy explicitly\n\nGenerated Cloudflare email code now uses the native Workers `SendEmail`,\n`EmailAddress`, attachment, and `EmailSendResult` contracts. The Workers\nbuilder keeps its camel-case fields and `{ email, name }` address shape, while\nthe REST transport retains its separate snake-case fields and `{ address,\nname }` shape. Generated projects move to `@cloudflare/workers-types` v5 with\nWrangler 4.110 so the binding and result types agree without `any` casts.\n\nEvery Better Auth email callback now creates an observed delivery promise. On\nWorkers, the callback hands that still-rejecting promise to\n`executionCtx.waitUntil(...)` and returns after the task is accepted; outside a\nrequest lifecycle it returns the promise for the caller to await. Failures emit\nonly a structured generic event, never provider error content, and remain\nrejected instead of being detached or swallowed. SES and SNS background sends\nuse the same lifecycle rule.\n\nNeon Hyperdrive's generated postgres.js client now caps each request-scoped\npool at five connections. Named environments gain explicit `deploy:dev` and\n`deploy:prod` package scripts (mapped to their configured Wrangler environment\nnames), while the unsafe bare `deploy` script remains absent and migrations\nremain a separate target-owned step.\n\n### Contract v2 auth and Neon authority boundaries are fail-closed\n\nContract-v2 projects no longer emit Quickback's generic JWT mint endpoint,\nJWT helper, middleware verification/mint fast-path, or related imports unless\nthe project explicitly declares `auth.jwt`. Contract v1 retains its existing\ndefault for compatibility. Adding `auth.jwt: {}` to a v2 config opts back into\nthe custom Quickback JWT with its normal default settings.\n\nConfigured delegated authenticators now produce closed TypeScript unions in\nboth generated `AppContext` and Neon RLS context. Request contexts contain only\nresolved principal variants; the compiler-internal credential-lookup variants\nexist only in the database context. Delegated standalone actions do not require\nBetter Auth `activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` before their declared principal\naccess tree runs, and their context cannot acquire account, organization, team,\nmembership, or scope authority.\n\nOn Cloudflare + Neon, the API-key organization membership lookup now runs with\nrequest-scoped user/org RLS claims before it stamps verified organization and\nrole authority into `AppContext`. Generated security migrations also converge\ndirect privilege drift: the audit schema/table revoke all direct grants from\n`PUBLIC`, the runtime, and admin before restoring their exact write-only/admin\nsets, while the Drizzle journal schema/table/sequences and database `CREATE`\ncapability explicitly revoke `PUBLIC` and runtime access before granting the\nmigration role.\n\n### Standalone action routes preserve their exact authority context\n\nGenerated standalone routes now pass each action the context and scoped\ndatabase types inferred from that action's own `execute` signature. Account actions therefore receive a\nrequired account identity, while `event_pass`, `event_delegate`, and other\ndelegated-principal actions retain their exact principal literal at the route\nboundary. Relationship `loads` / `exposeAs` hydration is intersected with that\nauthority context, including required shared targets and optional distinct\nmulti-lane targets, instead of replacing it with the broad application\ncontext.\n\nThe same boundary keeps ordinary request databases and temporary\nservice-role-backed scoped databases assignable to the generated Hyperdrive\naction helper without widening the handler's schema-aware `db` type.\n\nGenerated principal-auth identity guards also emit explicit strict TypeScript\nparameter and return types. Contract-v2 Cloudflare + Neon output no longer\nfails `tsc` on implicit-`any` guard parameters.\n\n### Parameterized actions keep complete v2 schema harvests\n\nThe action-input harvest plan now converts Hono-style `:param` segments to the\nOpenAPI `{param}` form for standalone actions and parameterized resource paths.\nPreviously the CLI could harvest every schema successfully, but the compiler\ncould apply only parameter-free actions because it looked up parameterized\noperations under the wrong OpenAPI key. Contract v2 now counts and patches the\nsame canonical path emitted by OpenAPI and MCP.\n\nGenerated standalone-action routes also remove template-only trailing spaces\nwhen optional audit blocks are absent, keeping regenerated source diffs clean.\n\n### Action-schema harvest uses the generated runtime dependency tree\n\nThe CLI now resolves action-harvest dependencies from the configured\n`build.outputDir/node_modules` before unrelated ancestor installs. This fixes\nisolated projects that keep authored definitions under `quickback/` and the\ngenerated runtime under a sibling directory such as `src/`: their actions can\nuse the runtime's Zod 4 and Drizzle installation without adding workspace-root\nsymlinks. An older user-level or monorepo-level Zod can no longer shadow the\nruntime's declared version during schema evaluation.\n\nSchema-only evaluation also emits inert named table proxies for authored\nDrizzle exports. Shared input/DTO modules may therefore construct top-level\nselection objects such as `{ id: records.id }` without executing a database\noperation or losing the action's Zod schema.\n\nHarvest failures now retain the exact action key, failing phase (`bundle` or\n`evaluation`), and bounded underlying error. Contract v2 includes those\nper-action diagnostics in its fail-closed compile error; v1 retains its\nbest-effort static-schema fallback.\n\n### Contract v2 delegated principals and RLS-only action tables\n\nCloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive projects on `contract.version: \"v2\"` can now\ndeclare framework-generic delegated authenticators under `auth.principals`.\nEach named principal owns an exact, non-`Bearer` Authorization scheme, a\nproject hook that proves the credential and returns only `{ digest }`, and one\ncompiler-owned indexed lookup that resolves the actor, optional session/family,\nstring claims, and active status. The hook receives no database handle. Proof\nhooks authored under `quickback/lib` are staged into generated `src/lib`, even\nwhen no action imports them directly.\n\nDelegated authority is structurally disjoint from Better Auth accounts:\n`ctx.principal` is populated while user, organization, team, and membership\nfields remain absent. Access arms may use `principals: [...]`; fields inside an\narm are ANDed and sibling arms are ORed. Generated action helpers preserve\nthat boundary in TypeScript, including the anonymous possibility of a\n`PUBLIC` sibling arm. Mixed credential transport rejects Authorization plus an\nAPI key or an actual Better Auth session cookie, while unrelated analytics\ncookies do not create a false conflict. `Bearer` remains reserved for account\nauthentication.\n\nResources can also declare operation-specific `databaseAccess` policies for\nauthored actions and support tables. This is an RLS-only surface: it emits no\ngeneric route or OpenAPI operation and is accepted only on Cloudflare + Neon\nHyperdrive. Every authorization path must contain a nonempty SQL-lowerable\nrecord equality; unbounded principal/role leaves, any unbounded OR arm, empty\nrecords, ambiguous mixed boolean nodes, app-only predicates, and unsupported\nproviders fail compilation. This keeps business logic in authored API actions\nwhile Postgres independently enforces the same event/person or account/org row\nboundary.\n\nPrincipal claims use the same transaction-local Hyperdrive preamble as account\nclaims, with query caching disabled. Restrictive per-operation principal\nfences prevent a public, exception, or legacy permissive policy from admitting\nthe wrong principal type. Credential lookup indexes and RLS journal entries are\ncontent-addressed and converge when a table, digest column, or definition\nchanges; generated Postgres identifiers include collision-resistant hashes and\nstay within the 63-byte limit. Each security migration also drops the complete\ncompiler-owned `databaseAccess` policy family before recreating the current\noperations, so removing or moving an operation revokes the old permissive\npolicy instead of leaving it active. Record fields resolve through authoritative\nDrizzle metadata to exact quoted physical identifiers, unknown fields fail the\ncompile, and DB-only pseudo-roles follow the same ADMIN/SYSADMIN/INTERNAL\ncontract as the application surface.\n\n### Action execute helpers preserve their typed boundary\n\nGenerated per-feature `defineAction` helpers no longer erase `services`, the\nHono request context, record predicates, or the action's return value to\n`any`. Zod input and record inference remain intact, `whereRecord` and\n`whereTransition` accept only the helper's bound table, and the existing D1 /\nNeon Hyperdrive scoped `db` and interactive `tx` types now flow through the\nsame execute boundary. The returned value is inferred exactly; this does not\nadd a response schema, invalid-return rule, or new output contract.\n\nHTTP/WebSocket Neon retains its intentionally dynamic `db`, and `AppContext`\nretains its open index signature for runtime-hydrated namespace fields.\n\n### Neon Hyperdrive is now the only Worker database lane, including Better Auth\n\nFor `connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\"`, generated Better Auth code now uses the\nsame HYPERDRIVE-backed, service-role-scoped database handle as the rest of the\ngenerated API. `DATABASE_URL` is no longer emitted or required as a Worker\nsecret in Hyperdrive mode; migration credentials remain inputs to the compiler\nor CI environment. HTTP-mode Neon retains its existing `DATABASE_URL` runtime\ncontract.\n\n### Public contract v2 now compiles as one coherent API/auth surface\n\nProjects may set `contract: { version: \"v2\" }` to select `/api/v2/*` feature\nroutes and `/auth/v2/*` Better Auth routes. The compiler now threads that\nselection through generated route mounts, Better Auth configuration and\nmiddleware, OpenAPI paths and server metadata, MCP internal tool calls, OAuth\ndiscovery, `llms.txt`, schema/embeddings/system routes, live views, namespace\nactions, and dedicated-domain `/v2/*` shortcuts. The option is no longer\nfail-closed. Omitting `contract` or selecting `v1` preserves the existing v1\noutput.\n\nBundled CMS and Account clients now receive the selected API and auth base\npaths through both their Vite build environment and the Worker-injected runtime\nconfig. CMS CRUD, schema, sysadmin, and live-view requests and Account auth,\ndata, and live-view requests therefore stay on `/api/v2` and `/auth/v2` for a\nv2 project instead of falling back to client-side v1 literals. V1 SPA config\nretains its historical byte shape.\n\nV2 compiles also require a complete client-side action input-schema harvest.\nThe current CLI reports the exact action files that failed to produce a JSON\nSchema, and the compiler independently rejects missing, invalid, or partial\nmaps at the shared parse boundary used by both complete and validation-only\ncompiles. `POST /compile?complete=false` can no longer bypass the v2 gate. For\nrecord actions with `bulkVariant: true`, the harvested schema now patches both\nthe single-record request body and the bulk operation's nested `input`; the\naction is counted complete only when both OpenAPI targets exist. Harvest\nplanning also normalizes filename-based action bindings to the table's declared\nname and resource path, so kebab-case filenames exporting snake/camel-case\ntables are not silently omitted. V1 remains best-effort for backward\ncompatibility.\n\n### Complete, isolated Wrangler targets for named Neon environments\n\n`providers.database.environments` now defines deployable Neon Hyperdrive\ntargets instead of emitting empty `[env.*]` shells. Because Wrangler does not\ninherit vars or bindings into named environments, each target must explicitly\nown its generated vars, required-secret contract, Hyperdrive and KV IDs,\nrate-limit namespace IDs, and Cloudflare Email binding. The compiler rejects\nmissing overrides, shared stateful IDs, optional secret declarations, invalid\ntarget semantics, and unsupported binding families rather than generating a\nWorker that starts without part of its runtime.\n\nThe required-secret inventory is now centralized and includes generated\ncredentials as well as custom declarations: `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`, a configured\n`auth.jwt.secretEnv`, `ENCRYPTION_KEK` when envelope encryption is present, and\nevery `bindings.secrets` entry marked `required`. Generated Better Auth SES/SNS\ncredentials, AWS-backed anonymous-upgrade credentials, enabled social-provider\nclient id/secret pairs, and R2 presign credential env names are included as\nwell. Cloudflare social auth now reads those credentials from the Worker `env`\nbinding instead of relying on `process.env` compatibility behavior. Named\ntargets also reject every generated top-level custom-domain source — including\nruntime routes, the primary/CMS/Account/Admin/Auth/API domains, and app domains\nor aliases — until routes can be declared with explicit per-environment\nownership; top-level routes can no longer produce an ambiguous deployment\ntarget.\n\nNamed targets are currently limited to Neon Hyperdrive with Better Auth.\nExternal auth remains fail-closed until its service binding can be declared\nindependently for every named environment.\n\nFor named-environment projects, the base Worker has no deployable stateful\nbindings, local development selects a named target, and that selected target\nis always the required logical `dev` environment, which must own an explicit\ndevelopment-only Hyperdrive `localConnectionString`. Quickback emits it only\nin the selected named binding, rejects a top-level\noverride when named environments exist, and rejects local URLs on staging or\nproduction targets; deployed targets continue to resolve the remote\nHyperdrive configuration by ID. The generated package omits the unsafe bare\ndeploy script. Existing projects that omit\n`environments` keep byte-identical Wrangler output and the existing dev/deploy\nscripts. See [Neon → Named Cloudflare deployment environments](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon#named-cloudflare-deployment-environments).\n\n### Local compiler trust boundary and deterministic Drizzle commands\n\nThe supported Docker launcher now opts into unauthenticated local compilation\nexplicitly and publishes the compiler only on `127.0.0.1`; missing or unknown\ncompiler modes retain hosted authentication. The CLI recognizes only exact\nloopback hostnames as local. Migration post-commands now use the configured\npackage manager's local binary execution form, with npm forced offline and its\nimplicit install prompt disabled, so a missing `drizzle-kit` fails clearly\ninstead of fetching an unpinned package.\n\n### Action rate limits now emit — documented since the rate-limit pillar, wired now\n\nThe [rate-limit docs](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit#actions) have described\nper-action rate limiting since the pillar shipped: record-based actions inherit\nthe resource's `update` bucket, standalone actions inherit the project-default\n`update` bucket, and actions may declare a `rateLimit` override or opt out with\n`rateLimit: false`. The generated routes never contained the checks. They now\ndo, exactly per the documented contract:\n\n- Record-based actions (and their bulk variants, which share the same counter —\n one token per batch request) are keyed\n `<resource>:action:<name>:<user>`; standalone actions are keyed\n `standalone:<declaredPath>:<user>`. The `:action:`/`standalone:` infixes mean\n action counters never collide with CRUD counters.\n- `rateLimit: { limit, period }` on an action emits its own binding\n (deduped by tuple, same `RL_<limit>_<period>` scheme); `rateLimit: false`\n opts the action out entirely.\n- Record-based action routes are now **exempted** from the per-resource CRUD\n catch-all middleware. Previously a `POST /:id/approve` was incidentally\n counted against the resource's `create` bucket — wrong bucket, wrong key.\n- Actions-only (tableless) projects now provision the project-default binding;\n previously they shipped with none.\n\n**Behavior change:** standalone actions were previously *unlimited*; they now\ninherit the project-default `update` bucket (200 requests / 60s per user/IP\nwith shipped defaults). PUBLIC webhook-style endpoints that absorb provider\nbursts should declare their own budget (`rateLimit: { limit: 1000, period: 10 }`)\nor opt out (`rateLimit: false`). The compiler emits a warning when a PUBLIC\nstandalone action silently inherits the default, so affected actions are\nflagged at compile time.\n\n### Better Auth CLI pinned and shipped as a generated devDependency\n\nThe generated `auth:schema` script runs `npx better-auth generate`, but the\n`better-auth` runtime package ships no executable — the `better-auth` bin\nlives in the npm package `auth` (the official Better Auth CLI; the team took\nover that name at 1.5.0, superseding the frozen `@better-auth/cli`). Generated\nprojects now declare `auth` as a devDependency pinned to the runtime's minor\nline, so `npm run auth:schema` resolves the CLI locally instead of requiring a\nglobal install. The compiler image's global CLI is pinned to the same version,\neliminating silent skew between the CLI on `latest` and the pinned runtime.\n\n### Compile warning when an action's input schema degrades to untyped\n\nWhen action input schemas aren't harvested client-side (older CLI, or a direct\n`/compile` API call), the static Zod parser supplies OpenAPI/MCP input schemas\n— and silently degrades unrecognized constructs (discriminated unions,\nrefinements, `z.record`, transforms) to the accept-anything `{}`. That\ndegradation is no longer silent: the compile result now carries a warning per\naffected action naming the route, source file, and the exact untyped field\npaths. Actions covered by the CLI harvest are never warned on, and actions\nthat declare no input are skipped.\n\n### Auth docs: JWT security posture stated up front\n\nThe [Auth & JWT page](/compiler/config/auth) now leads with the posture\nsummary instead of burying it: the default 180-second auto-refreshed TTL plus\n`revocationCheck: 'kv'` (seconds-level revocation, auto-stamped on ban /\nmember removal / role change / scope-conferring row changes) is the\nrecommended configuration and covers the vast majority of deployments — with\nthe residual trade-offs (per-principal granularity, fail-open on KV outage,\n~60s cross-PoP propagation) stated explicitly for strict threat models.\n\n### Neon via-user reads: generated list handlers now typecheck against the concretely-typed service handle\n\nOn Neon, a read firewall carrying a via-user multi-hop relationship predicate\nroutes the generated read handlers to `createServiceDb(c.env)` — a genuine\n`NeonHttpDatabase<typeof schema>` — instead of the loosely-typed request db.\nThe list handler's query construction declared drizzle select builders with\n`let` and reassigned them (`query = query.where(…)`, `.orderBy(…)`,\n`.limit(…).offset(…)`, and the count/aggregation/group-by variants), which is\na type error against drizzle's immutable builder typing: `.where()` returns\n`Omit\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
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"content": "The Quickback CLI is the fastest way to create, compile, and manage your backend projects.\n\n## Installation\n\n```bash\n# One-shot via npx — recommended for first run\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# Or install globally for repeat use\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\n## Commands\n\n### Start a Project (interactive)\n\n```bash\nquickback start\n```\n\nInteractive onboarding designed for new users. No flags required.\n\n- Prompts for a template (`cloudflare`, `todos`, `blog`, `empty`)\n- Prompts for a project name (defaults to the current directory's name if empty)\n- Auto-detects whether to scaffold in-place or create a `./<name>/` subdirectory\n- Defers login until just before the compile step — cancel at the auth prompt and the scaffold stays on disk, ready for `quickback compile` later\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Create a Project (scriptable)\n\n```bash\nquickback create <template> <name>\n```\n\n**Templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working todos example with masking + actions + a named view\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `empty` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS: orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks, split databases, realtime\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nquickback create todos my-app\n```\n\nThis scaffolds a complete project with:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Example feature with full security configuration (for `todos` / `blog` / `saas`)\n\nSee the [Templates](/compiler/getting-started/templates) page for a deeper guide on choosing between them.\n\n### Compile Definitions\n\n```bash\nquickback compile\n```\n\nUse `quickback compile --verbose` when a remote compile fails and you need the\nunderlying command, exit code, stderr/stdout tail, and compiler-suggested fixes.\n\nReads your definitions and generates:\n- Database migrations (Drizzle)\n- API route handlers (Hono)\n- TypeScript client SDK\n- OpenAPI specification\n\nRun this after making changes to your definitions.\n\n#### Generated `src/` is hermetic\n\nEvery file under `src/` carries a `Generated by quickback.dev` header and is owned by the compiler. Before each compile writes its output, the CLI:\n\n1. Snapshots the existing `src/` tree to `quickback/.archives/src-<ISO-timestamp>/` (a plain recursive copy — `cp -R` semantics, no compression).\n2. Wipes `src/` entirely.\n3. Writes the fresh manifest from the compiler.\n\nThis prevents stale output: removed features stop leaving orphan folders, deleted SPA assets with old content hashes get cleared, and `.DS_Store` files don't keep retired directories alive.\n\nThe most recent **3** archives are retained (older ones are pruned automatically). If a compile produces unexpected output, your last-known-good tree is sitting in `quickback/.archives/` ready to grep or copy back:\n\n```bash\nls quickback/.archives/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-31-02-014/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-29-44-882/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-12-19-301/\n```\n\nAs a safety net, the wipe is **skipped** when the manifest contains zero files for the target directory — that's almost always an upstream compile bug, and we'd rather keep your last working tree than overwrite it with nothing.\n\n### View Documentation\n\n```bash\nquickback docs # List available topics\nquickback docs <topic> # Show documentation for a topic\n```\n\n**Available topics:**\n- `firewall` - Data isolation layer\n- `access` - Role-based permissions\n- `guards` - Field protection\n- `masking` - PII redaction\n- `actions` - Custom business logic\n- `api` - CRUD endpoints reference\n- `config` - Configuration reference\n- `features` - Schema definitions\n\nDocumentation is bundled with the CLI and works offline.\n\n### Manage Claude Code Skill\n\n```bash\nquickback claude install # Interactive install\nquickback claude install --global # Install to ~/.claude/skills/\nquickback claude install --local # Install to ./.claude/\nquickback claude update # Update to latest version\nquickback claude remove # Remove installed skill\nquickback claude status # Check installation status\n```\n\nThe Quickback skill for Claude Code provides AI assistance for:\n- Creating resource definitions with proper security layers\n- Configuring Firewall, Access, Guards, and Masking\n- Debugging configuration issues\n- Understanding security patterns\n\n## Authentication\n\n### Login\n\n```bash\nquickback login\n```\n\nUses the [OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628) (RFC 8628) to authenticate securely without exposing tokens in URLs.\n\n**How it works:**\n\n1. The CLI requests a one-time device code from the Quickback API.\n2. A code is displayed in your terminal (e.g., `AUL8-H93S`).\n3. Your browser opens to the Quickback account page where you approve the code.\n4. The CLI detects approval and exchanges it for a session token.\n5. If you belong to one organization, it's auto-selected. If you have multiple, you choose one.\n6. Credentials are stored locally.\n\n```\n$ quickback login\n\n🔐 Quickback Login\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n Your code: AUL8-H93S\n\n Visit: https://account.quickback.dev/cli/authorize\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n✓ Login successful!\nWelcome, Paul Stenhouse!\n\nUsing organization: Acme\n✓ Active organization: Acme\n```\n\nThis flow works in headless environments (SSH, containers, WSL) since it doesn't require a localhost callback.\n\n### Logout\n\n```bash\nquickback logout\n```\n\nClears stored credentials from `~/.quickback/credentials.json`.\n\n### Check Auth Status\n\n```bash\nquickback whoami\n```\n\nShows the currently authenticated user, organization, and token expiration.\n\n### Credential Storage\n\nCredentials are stored at `~/.quickback/credentials.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"token\": \"...\",\n \"user\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"email\": \"paul@example.com\",\n \"name\": \"Paul Stenhouse\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": \"2026-02-16T01:42:21.519Z\",\n \"organization\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"name\": \"Acme\",\n \"slug\": \"acme\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nSessions expire after 7 days. Run `quickback login` again to re-authenticate.\n\n### Organizations\n\nAfter login, the CLI auto-selects your organization:\n- **One organization** - automatically set as active.\n- **Multiple organizations** - you're prompted to choose one.\n\nThe active organization is stored in your credentials and sent with compile requests, so the compiler knows which org context to use.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a new project (interactive — picks template, scaffolds,\n# prompts for login only when needed)\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# 2. Run locally\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nOr the scriptable form:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create the project (scaffolds + compiles + installs)\nquickback create todos my-app # prompts for login on first compile\ncd my-app\n\n# 2. Run\nnpm run dev\n\n# 3. Recompile after editing definitions\nquickback compile\n```\n\n## Options\n\n| Flag | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `-v, --version` | Show version number |\n| `-h, --help` | Show help message |\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for authentication (alternative to `quickback login`) |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Override compiler API URL |\n\n### API Key Authentication\n\nUse an API key instead of interactive login. Useful for CI/CD pipelines and automated workflows:\n\n```bash\n# Pass API key for a single command\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key\nquickback compile\n```\n\nThe API key takes precedence over stored credentials from `quickback login`.\n\nYou can create API keys from your [Quickback account](https://account.quickback.dev/profile). Each key is scoped to your organization.\n\n### Custom Compiler URL\n\nPoint the CLI to a different compiler (local or custom):\n\n```bash\n# Use a local compiler\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020 quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020\nquickback compile\n```\n\nSee [Local Compiler](/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler) for running the compiler locally with Docker.\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### \"Command not found: quickback\"\n\nMake sure the CLI is installed globally:\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\nOr use npx (no global install needed):\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Compile errors\n\n1. Check your `quickback.config.ts` exists and is valid\n2. Ensure all tables in `quickback/features/` have valid exports\n3. Run `quickback compile` with `--verbose` for detailed output\n4. For rename-related Drizzle failures in CI/headless runs, configure `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`\n\n### Authentication issues\n\nClear credentials and re-authenticate:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```\n\n### \"Could not load organizations\"\n\nThis can happen if your session token expired or if the API is temporarily unavailable. Re-login:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```"
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"content": "The Quickback CLI is the fastest way to create, compile, and manage your backend projects.\n\n## Installation\n\n```bash\n# One-shot via npx — recommended for first run\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# Or install globally for repeat use\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\n## Commands\n\n### Start a Project (interactive)\n\n```bash\nquickback start\n```\n\nInteractive onboarding designed for new users. No flags required.\n\n- Prompts for a template (`cloudflare`, `todos`, `blog`, `empty`)\n- Prompts for a project name (defaults to the current directory's name if empty)\n- Auto-detects whether to scaffold in-place or create a `./<name>/` subdirectory\n- Defers login until just before the compile step — cancel at the auth prompt and the scaffold stays on disk, ready for `quickback compile` later\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Create a Project (scriptable)\n\n```bash\nquickback create <template> <name>\n```\n\n**Templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working todos example with masking + actions + a named view\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `empty` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS: orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks, split databases, realtime\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nquickback create todos my-app\n```\n\nThis scaffolds a complete project with:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Example feature with full security configuration (for `todos` / `blog` / `saas`)\n\nSee the [Templates](/compiler/getting-started/templates) page for a deeper guide on choosing between them.\n\n### Compile Definitions\n\n```bash\nquickback compile\n```\n\nUse `quickback compile --verbose` when a remote compile fails and you need the\nunderlying command, exit code, stderr/stdout tail, and compiler-suggested fixes.\n\nReads your definitions and generates:\n- Database migrations (Drizzle)\n- API route handlers (Hono)\n- TypeScript client SDK\n- OpenAPI specification\n\nRun this after making changes to your definitions.\n\n#### Configuration-aware completion steps\n\nAfter a successful compile, the CLI derives its next steps from the configured\ndatabase connection mode. Neon HTTP projects receive the direct\n`DATABASE_URL`, `.dev.vars`, migration, and deploy workflow. Hyperdrive\nprojects instead receive migration-only `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` guidance and\nlocal development instructions for the configured Hyperdrive\n`localConnectionString`; the CLI never recommends `DATABASE_URL` as a Worker\nsecret for that mode.\n\nWhen `providers.database.environments` defines isolated targets, the footer\nlists the configured Neon branches, each target's required Worker secrets, and\nexplicit `wrangler ... --env <target>` deploy commands. It does not suggest a\nbare deploy or the unnamed `.env.neon` / `.dev.vars` workflow for named\nHyperdrive environments.\n\n#### Generated `src/` is hermetic\n\nEvery file under `src/` carries a `Generated by quickback.dev` header and is owned by the compiler. Before each compile writes its output, the CLI:\n\n1. Snapshots the existing `src/` tree to `quickback/.archives/src-<ISO-timestamp>/` (a plain recursive copy — `cp -R` semantics, no compression).\n2. Wipes `src/` entirely.\n3. Writes the fresh manifest from the compiler.\n\nThis prevents stale output: removed features stop leaving orphan folders, deleted SPA assets with old content hashes get cleared, and `.DS_Store` files don't keep retired directories alive.\n\nThe most recent **3** archives are retained (older ones are pruned automatically). If a compile produces unexpected output, your last-known-good tree is sitting in `quickback/.archives/` ready to grep or copy back:\n\n```bash\nls quickback/.archives/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-31-02-014/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-29-44-882/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-12-19-301/\n```\n\nAs a safety net, the wipe is **skipped** when the manifest contains zero files for the target directory — that's almost always an upstream compile bug, and we'd rather keep your last working tree than overwrite it with nothing.\n\n### View Documentation\n\n```bash\nquickback docs # List available topics\nquickback docs <topic> # Show documentation for a topic\n```\n\n**Available topics:**\n- `firewall` - Data isolation layer\n- `access` - Role-based permissions\n- `guards` - Field protection\n- `masking` - PII redaction\n- `actions` - Custom business logic\n- `api` - CRUD endpoints reference\n- `config` - Configuration reference\n- `features` - Schema definitions\n\nDocumentation is bundled with the CLI and works offline.\n\n### Manage Claude Code Skill\n\n```bash\nquickback claude install # Interactive install\nquickback claude install --global # Install to ~/.claude/skills/\nquickback claude install --local # Install to ./.claude/\nquickback claude update # Update to latest version\nquickback claude remove # Remove installed skill\nquickback claude status # Check installation status\n```\n\nThe Quickback skill for Claude Code provides AI assistance for:\n- Creating resource definitions with proper security layers\n- Configuring Firewall, Access, Guards, and Masking\n- Debugging configuration issues\n- Understanding security patterns\n\n## Authentication\n\n### Login\n\n```bash\nquickback login\n```\n\nUses the [OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628) (RFC 8628) to authenticate securely without exposing tokens in URLs.\n\n**How it works:**\n\n1. The CLI requests a one-time device code from the Quickback API.\n2. A code is displayed in your terminal (e.g., `AUL8-H93S`).\n3. Your browser opens to the Quickback account page where you approve the code.\n4. The CLI detects approval and exchanges it for a session token.\n5. If you belong to one organization, it's auto-selected. If you have multiple, you choose one.\n6. Credentials are stored locally.\n\n```\n$ quickback login\n\n🔐 Quickback Login\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n Your code: AUL8-H93S\n\n Visit: https://account.quickback.dev/cli/authorize\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n✓ Login successful!\nWelcome, Paul Stenhouse!\n\nUsing organization: Acme\n✓ Active organization: Acme\n```\n\nThis flow works in headless environments (SSH, containers, WSL) since it doesn't require a localhost callback.\n\n### Logout\n\n```bash\nquickback logout\n```\n\nClears stored credentials from `~/.quickback/credentials.json`.\n\n### Check Auth Status\n\n```bash\nquickback whoami\n```\n\nShows the currently authenticated user, organization, and token expiration.\n\n### Credential Storage\n\nCredentials are stored at `~/.quickback/credentials.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"token\": \"...\",\n \"user\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"email\": \"paul@example.com\",\n \"name\": \"Paul Stenhouse\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": \"2026-02-16T01:42:21.519Z\",\n \"organization\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"name\": \"Acme\",\n \"slug\": \"acme\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nSessions expire after 7 days. Run `quickback login` again to re-authenticate.\n\n### Organizations\n\nAfter login, the CLI auto-selects your organization:\n- **One organization** - automatically set as active.\n- **Multiple organizations** - you're prompted to choose one.\n\nThe active organization is stored in your credentials and sent with compile requests, so the compiler knows which org context to use.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a new project (interactive — picks template, scaffolds,\n# prompts for login only when needed)\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# 2. Run locally\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nOr the scriptable form:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create the project (scaffolds + compiles + installs)\nquickback create todos my-app # prompts for login on first compile\ncd my-app\n\n# 2. Run\nnpm run dev\n\n# 3. Recompile after editing definitions\nquickback compile\n```\n\n## Options\n\n| Flag | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `-v, --version` | Show version number |\n| `-h, --help` | Show help message |\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for authentication (alternative to `quickback login`) |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Override compiler API URL |\n\n### API Key Authentication\n\nUse an API key instead of interactive login. Useful for CI/CD pipelines and automated workflows:\n\n```bash\n# Pass API key for a single command\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key\nquickback compile\n```\n\nThe API key takes precedence over stored credentials from `quickback login`.\n\nYou can create API keys from your [Quickback account](https://account.quickback.dev/profile). Each key is scoped to your organization.\n\n### Custom Compiler URL\n\nPoint the CLI to a different compiler (local or custom):\n\n```bash\n# Use a local compiler\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020 quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020\nquickback compile\n```\n\nSee [Local Compiler](/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler) for running the compiler locally with Docker.\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### \"Command not found: quickback\"\n\nMake sure the CLI is installed globally:\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\nOr use npx (no global install needed):\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Compile errors\n\n1. Check your `quickback.config.ts` exists and is valid\n2. Ensure all tables in `quickback/features/` have valid exports\n3. Run `quickback compile` with `--verbose` for detailed output\n4. For rename-related Drizzle failures in CI/headless runs, configure `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`\n\n### Authentication issues\n\nClear credentials and re-authenticate:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```\n\n### \"Could not load organizations\"\n\nThis can happen if your session token expired or if the API is temporarily unavailable. Re-login:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```"
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"content": "The cloud compiler API is hosted at `https://compiler.quickback.dev`.\n\n## Public (No Auth)\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Description |\n|----------|--------|-------------|\n| `/health` | GET | Health check |\n| `/templates` | GET | List available templates |\n\n## Authenticated\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Description |\n|----------|--------|-------------|\n| `/compile` | POST | Compile definitions into backend files |\n\nThe `/compile` endpoint requires either a session token (from `quickback login`) or an API key (via `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` header). See [Authentication](/compiler/cloud-compiler/authentication) for details.\n\n## Raw-files mode (`POST /compile`)\n\n`/compile` normally expects the parsed `CompilerInput` the CLI assembles client-side. Thin clients (agents, web builders, CI without the CLI) can instead send the project sources verbatim and let the compiler organize them server-side:\n\n```json\n{\n \"rawFiles\": {\n \"quickback/quickback.config.ts\": \"import { defineConfig } from …\",\n \"quickback/features/todos/todos.ts\": \"import { feature, q } from …\",\n \"quickback/features/todos/actions/complete.ts\": \"…\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe map uses project-root-relative paths and follows the same layout `quickback compile` reads from disk: `quickback/quickback.config.ts`, `quickback/features/**`, `quickback/services/**`, `quickback/{lib,hooks,plugins,middlewares,email-templates}/**`, plus `quickback/drizzle/**/meta/**` and `wrangler.toml` for incremental builds.\n\nTwo constraints, both fail-closed:\n\n- **The config must be fully static.** The compiler parses `quickback.config.ts` with a literals-only evaluator — it never executes user code. Object/array/string/number/boolean literals, substitution-free template literals, and the `define*` helper calls all work; variables, computed values, and imports-as-values are rejected with a 400 that names the offending construct and line.\n- **Action input schemas are
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"content": "The cloud compiler API is hosted at `https://compiler.quickback.dev`.\n\n## Public (No Auth)\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Description |\n|----------|--------|-------------|\n| `/health` | GET | Health check |\n| `/templates` | GET | List available templates |\n\n## Authenticated\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Description |\n|----------|--------|-------------|\n| `/compile` | POST | Compile definitions into backend files |\n\nThe `/compile` endpoint requires either a session token (from `quickback login`) or an API key (via `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` header). See [Authentication](/compiler/cloud-compiler/authentication) for details.\n\n## Raw-files mode (`POST /compile`)\n\n`/compile` normally expects the parsed `CompilerInput` the CLI assembles client-side. Thin clients (agents, web builders, CI without the CLI) can instead send the project sources verbatim and let the compiler organize them server-side:\n\n```json\n{\n \"rawFiles\": {\n \"quickback/quickback.config.ts\": \"import { defineConfig } from …\",\n \"quickback/features/todos/todos.ts\": \"import { feature, q } from …\",\n \"quickback/features/todos/actions/complete.ts\": \"…\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe map uses project-root-relative paths and follows the same layout `quickback compile` reads from disk: `quickback/quickback.config.ts`, `quickback/features/**`, `quickback/services/**`, `quickback/{lib,hooks,plugins,middlewares,email-templates}/**`, plus `quickback/drizzle/**/meta/**` and `wrangler.toml` for incremental builds.\n\nTwo constraints, both fail-closed:\n\n- **The config must be fully static.** The compiler parses `quickback.config.ts` with a literals-only evaluator — it never executes user code. Object/array/string/number/boolean literals, substitution-free template literals, and the `define*` helper calls all work; variables, computed values, and imports-as-values are rejected with a 400 that names the offending construct and line.\n- **Action input schemas are contract-sensitive.** For v1, raw-files requests may omit `actionInputSchemas` and use the compiler's lower-fidelity static parser. V2 requires one usable client-harvested `z.toJSONSchema(action.input)` entry for every authored action. The CLI reports each missing action with its local bundle or evaluation error; the API independently reports missing or invalid action keys.\n\nRaw-files requests work with both `?complete=true` and `?complete=false`\n(validation-only) compiles. The v2 action-schema completeness gate applies to\nboth modes; `complete=false` is not an escape hatch for a partial harvest.\n\n## Edge validation backend\n\nValidation compiles (`POST /compile?complete=false`) may be served by an edge Worker instead of the compiler container. This is **transparent to clients**: same endpoint, same auth, same request and response shapes (plain or gzipped JSON, raw-files or parsed input, identical payload limits, error shapes, and generated-file envelopes) — just no container cold start.\n\nThe response header `X-Quickback-Compile-Backend` says which backend answered:\n\n| Value | Meaning |\n|-------|---------|\n| `edge` | Served by the edge Worker |\n| `container-fallback` | Edge is enabled but failed (5xx/unreachable); the container answered instead |\n| _(absent)_ | Edge routing is not enabled; the container answered, as before |\n\nComplete compiles (`?complete=true`, the default) always run in the container — they need the CLI toolchain (drizzle-kit, SPA builds). The edge Worker rejects them with a 400 pointing at the container endpoint.\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for authentication (alternative to `quickback login`) |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Override compiler API URL (default: `https://compiler.quickback.dev`) |\n\n### Custom Compiler URL\n\nPoint the CLI to a different compiler (local or custom):\n\n```bash\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020 quickback compile\n```\n\nSee [Local Compiler](/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler) for running the compiler locally with Docker.\n\n## Streaming Protocol (`POST /compile`)\n\nBy default `/compile` returns a single JSON response. If the request includes `Accept: text/event-stream`, the compiler upgrades to Server-Sent Events so the CLI can render progress while the build runs.\n\nThere are two stream protocol versions, negotiated via the `X-Quickback-Stream` request header:\n\n| Header | Protocol | Behavior |\n|--------|----------|----------|\n| _(absent)_ | **v1** | Sends `progress` events during the build, then a single `result` event with the entire compilation payload (config, generated files, drizzle output, SPA bundles, etc.) JSON-encoded as one frame. |\n| `X-Quickback-Stream: v2` | **v2 (chunked)** | Sends `progress` events during the build, then a `meta` event with the file count, then one `file` event per generated file, then a final `done` event with metadata, commands, and warnings. |\n\nThe server echoes the chosen version back as the response `X-Quickback-Stream` header so the CLI knows which framing to parse.\n\n### Why v2\n\nMulti-megabyte SPA bundles (CMS + Account, with sourcemaps) take long enough to `JSON.stringify` that the v1 single-frame `result` event blocks Cloudflare's container event loop. Two things break: Docker's `HEALTHCHECK` fails, and the CLI's 120-second connection timeout fires before the body flushes. v2 emits files one at a time and yields back to the event loop every 10 files (`setImmediate`), keeping `/health` responsive and TCP backpressure alive.\n\nThe `@quickback-dev/cli` v0.10.x and later send `X-Quickback-Stream: v2` automatically. v1 is preserved for older clients.\n\n### Event shapes (v2)\n\n```\nevent: progress\ndata: { \"stage\": \"vite-cms\", \"message\": \"...\" }\n\nevent: meta\ndata: { \"fileCount\": 412, \"version\": \"0.10.3\" }\n\nevent: file\ndata: { \"path\": \"src/...\", \"content\": \"...\", ... }\n…\n\nevent: done\ndata: { \"meta\": {...}, \"commands\": [...], \"warnings\": [...] }\n```\n\nOn failure, an `error` event is emitted in either protocol:\n\n```\nevent: error\ndata: { \"error\": \"Compilation failed\", \"code\": \"...\", \"message\": \"...\" }\n```"
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"content": "Run the Quickback compiler locally using Docker. The local compiler uses the exact same Docker image as the cloud compiler, ensuring identical behavior — including SPA builds with correct environment variables.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Docker Desktop installed and running\n- Quickback monorepo cloned locally\n
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"content": "Run the Quickback compiler locally using Docker. The local compiler uses the exact same Docker image as the cloud compiler, ensuring identical behavior — including SPA builds with correct environment variables.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Docker Desktop installed and running\n- Quickback monorepo cloned locally\n\n## Quick Start\n\nFrom the monorepo root:\n\n```bash\ncd apps/compiler-local && bash dev.sh\n```\n\nThis will:\n1. Ensure Docker Desktop is running\n2. Stop any existing compiler container\n3. Build the Docker image from `apps/compiler/Dockerfile`\n4. Start it in explicit local mode, published only on `127.0.0.1:3000`\n\n### Custom Port\n\n```bash\nbash dev.sh 3001\n```\n\n## Compiling a Project\n\nPoint the CLI to your local compiler:\n\n```bash\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3000 quickback compile\n```\n\nOr export it for the session:\n\n```bash\nexport QUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3000\nquickback compile\n```\n\nThe supported launcher does not require `quickback login`. It opts the compiler\ninto local mode and binds Docker's host port to loopback, so the unauthenticated\ncompile endpoint is not exposed to the LAN. The CLI skips its login prompt only\nwhen `QUICKBACK_API_URL` has the exact hostname `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or\n`::1`; longer hostnames and URLs that merely contain those strings still use\nhosted authentication.\n\n## Manual Build & Run\n\nYou can also build and run the Docker image directly from the monorepo root:\n\n```bash\n# Build\ndocker build -t quickback-compiler -f apps/compiler/Dockerfile .\n\n# Run with the same security boundary as the supported launcher\ndocker run --rm \\\n -e QUICKBACK_COMPILER_MODE=local \\\n -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \\\n quickback-compiler\n```\n\n`QUICKBACK_COMPILER_MODE` is fail-closed: only the exact value `local` bypasses\ncompile authentication. If the variable is absent or misspelled, the compiler\nuses hosted authentication. Never publish a local-mode container on\n`0.0.0.0` or a non-loopback interface.\n\n## Verify\n\nCheck the compiler is running:\n\n```bash\ncurl http://localhost:3000/health\n```\n\n## How It Works\n\nThe Docker image includes:\n- Pre-installed dependencies for compiled projects (`/deps/node_modules`)\n- CMS and Account SPA source code (`/spa/cms/`, `/spa/account/`)\n- Pre-installed SPA dependencies (`/spa-deps/cms/`, `/spa-deps/account/`)\n\nWhen compiling a project with `cms: true` or `account: true`, the compiler builds the SPAs from source inside the container with the correct Vite environment variables (e.g., `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL`, `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL`). This ensures each project gets properly configured SPA assets without manual intervention.\n\nThe generated worker additionally injects the same per-project values into every served SPA shell as `window.__QUICKBACK_RUNTIME`, and the SPAs prefer that runtime blob over the baked env — so the served behavior is identical even with a generic (no-`.env`) SPA build.\n\n## Deploying to Cloud\n\nAfter making changes to the compiler, deploy to `compiler.quickback.dev`:\n\n```bash\ncd apps/compiler-cloud && bash deploy.sh\n```\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### Container not starting\n\n```bash\ndocker logs quickback-compiler-local\n```\n\n### Port already in use\n\n```bash\n# Find what's using the port\nlsof -i :3000\n\n# Use a different port\nbash dev.sh 3001\n```\n\n### Docker out of disk space\n\n```bash\ndocker system prune -af\n```\n\n### SPA build warnings\n\nIf you see SPA build warnings during compilation, ensure the SPA dependency files are up to date:\n- `apps/compiler/deps-spa-cms-package.json`\n- `apps/compiler/deps-spa-account-package.json`\n\nThese must include all dependencies from `packages/cms/package.json` and `packages/account/package.json` respectively."
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"content": "The top-level `auth` config block holds provider-agnostic auth knobs that affect how Quickback emits the auth middleware, JWT helpers, and access-rule expansion.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 60,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n // audience, secretEnv, algorithm, revocationCheck...\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## `auth.roleHierarchy`\n\nLowest-to-highest privilege list. Lets access rules use `'role+'` shorthand to mean \"this role and above\". Documented in detail under [Access — Role hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n## `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path\n\nQuickback ships its own custom HMAC-SHA256 JWT (not Better Auth's JWT plugin) so it can embed `orgId` and `role` claims the fast-path needs to reconstruct `AppContext` without a database round-trip. The signing secret is shared with Better Auth (`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`) by default — users only manage one secret.\n\n### Security posture at a glance\n\nThe short version, before the knob-by-knob detail:\n\n- **Default: 180-second TTL, auto-refreshed.** Every authenticated call returns a fresh token via the `set-auth-token` header, so the low TTL is invisible to logged-in users. The worst-case window for a stolen or pre-revocation token is 3 minutes — and you can shrink it to 30 seconds with one config line.\n- **Need revocation faster than the TTL?** Set [`revocationCheck: 'kv'`](#revocationcheck-none--kv--token-revocation-strategy). Revoked tokens are rejected within seconds; revocation stamps are written automatically on user ban, org-member removal, role change, and changes to scope-conferring relationship rows.\n\nThose two knobs — `expiresIn` and `revocationCheck` — cover the vast majority of deployments. The honest residual for the strictest threat models: the KV check revokes per-principal (not per-session), fails open if KV is unreachable (degrading to the TTL bound), and propagates cross-PoP in ~60s. If you need fail-closed, per-session kill semantics, set `expiresIn: 30` for a hard 30-second ceiling — and [tell us about your use case](https://github.com/kardoe/quickback/issues); an opaque-session mode is under consideration.\n\n### Behavior recap\n\n1. The browser SPA gets a JWT via the `set-auth-token` response header on every authenticated call.\n2. On subsequent requests the SPA sends `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`.\n3. The auth middleware's **fast-path** verifies the signature only — no DB query, no session lookup. `AppContext` is reconstructed from JWT claims.\n4. If verification fails (or no JWT is present), the middleware falls back to session auth.\n5. After successful session auth, a fresh JWT is minted and returned via `set-auth-token`. The cycle continues.\n\nThe fast-path is intentionally stateless: it trusts the claims for the full TTL. **Stolen or pre-revocation tokens are valid until they expire.** That's the trade-off the fast-path makes — and the reason `expiresIn` and `revocationCheck` are the two most-tuned knobs below: the first bounds the window, the second shrinks it to seconds.\n\n### `expiresIn?: number` — TTL in seconds\n\nDefault `180` (3 minutes).\n\nLowering this shrinks the worst-case window where a stolen / pre-revocation token still works. Browser SPAs auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call, so a low TTL is invisible to logged-in users; only stale server-to-server bearer tokens feel it.\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 30 } } // 30s — tight post-revocation window\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 3600 } } // 1h — longer-lived tokens for CLI / CI\n```\n\n### `issuer?: string` — `iss` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when other services need to distinguish JWTs minted by this Worker from other issuers. The compiler bakes the issuer into both the mint side (added to claims) and the verify side (rejects tokens with mismatched `iss`).\n\n### `audience?: string` — `aud` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when this Worker's JWTs are consumed by a sibling service that should reject tokens minted for a different audience. Same mint-and-verify treatment as `issuer`.\n\n### `secretEnv?: string` — signing secret env var\n\nDefault `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'`.\n\nOverride this if you want JWT signing isolated from the Better Auth secret (e.g. rotating one without invalidating the other).\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET' } }\n```\n\nThe compiler emits `c.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` (or `process.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` on Bun/Node) in the auth middleware's verify and mint sites and the `/api/v1/token` endpoint.\n\n> **Note:** the files-worker (separate Worker for R2 access) still reads `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` directly. If you override `secretEnv`, set both env vars to the same value or the files worker's JWT verification will fall back to DB session lookup. Threading `secretEnv` through the files worker is on the roadmap.\n\n### `algorithm?: 'HS256'`\n\nOnly `HS256` is supported in 0.10.14. `RS256` (asymmetric, public-key verify / private-key sign) is on the roadmap.\n\n### `revocationCheck?: 'none' | 'kv'` — token revocation strategy\n\nDefault `'none'`.\n\n| Value | Behavior | Cost per verify |\n|---|---|---|\n| `'none'` | No revocation check. Stolen / pre-revocation tokens valid until TTL expires (scope claims: until the carry-forward cap). Use a low `expiresIn` to bound the replay window. | 0 |\n| `'kv'` | Fast-path checks per-principal revocation timestamps in the project's existing `KV` binding before trusting a verified token. | 2+ KV reads (~5-15ms, edge-cached) |\n\n`'kv'` (v0.45+, **Cloudflare runtime only**) keeps the fast-path stateless against the auth DB (still 0 D1 queries). There is nothing extra to provision — entries ride the `KV` binding every project already has, prefixed `qbrev:` and self-expiring after the maximum token lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n\nA token is rejected when its mint timestamp (`iat`, or `sct` for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored timestamp for any principal key it rides on:\n\n| Key | Revokes | Written automatically on |\n|---|---|---|\n| `qbrev:user:<userId>` | every JWT for the user | user ban (`databaseHooks.user.update.after` — flipping `banned` stamps the key and, when outbound webhooks are enabled, emits a `user.banned` event). Call `revokeUserTokens` for custom flows (revoke-all, etc.) |\n| `qbrev:member:<userId>:<orgId>` | the user's org-membership claims | member removal / role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`) |\n| `qbrev:scope:<userId>:<kind>:<id>` | the user's carried scope claim | UPDATE/DELETE of a scope-conferring relationship row (audit-wrapper chokepoint + the single DELETE route) |\n\n`src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts` exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens` for explicit calls from actions. A rejected token falls through to session auth, which re-checks membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers transparently.\n\nSemantics worth knowing:\n\n- **Revoke-on-touch for scopes:** any update or delete of a conferring row stamps the revocation, without evaluating whether the change actually ended the relationship. A false positive just forces a cheap re-prove (`/scope/v1/enter` or a minting namespace route).\n- **Fails open:** a missing binding or KV outage skips the check (logged) — revocation degrades to the TTL / carry-forward-cap bound rather than locking every bearer out.\n- **Eventual consistency:** KV propagates cross-PoP in ~60s. \"Immediate\" means seconds at the writing location, bounded-seconds globally — still far inside the 15-minute carry-forward cap that bounds revocation without this check.\n- **Coverage gap:** batch *hard* deletes don't return rows through the chokepoint; call `revokeScopeTokens` explicitly if you bulk-hard-delete conferring rows.\n\n## Defaults preserve 0.10.13 behavior\n\nAdding the `auth.jwt` block without setting any field is a no-op vs. the 0.10.13 baseline. Each missing field falls back to its hardcoded value:\n\n| Field | Default |\n|---|---|\n| `expiresIn` | 180 |\n| `issuer` | omitted |\n| `audience` | omitted |\n| `secretEnv` | `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'` |\n| `algorithm` | `'HS256'` |\n| `revocationCheck` | `'none'` |\n\n## Tuning recommendations\n\n- **B2C SaaS, mostly browser traffic:** keep defaults. The 180s TTL + auto-refresh model just works.\n- **Pentest engagement / enterprise compliance:** set `expiresIn: 30`. Tokens stay invisible to logged-in users (auto-refreshed every authed call) but stolen-token windows shrink to 30s.\n- **CLI-heavy / long-running CI tokens:** `expiresIn: 3600` for one-hour bearer tokens. Pair with `issuer` / `audience` if multiple services consume the same JWT.\n- **Need immediate revocation:** set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (Cloudflare runtime) — revoked tokens are rejected within seconds, and stamps are written automatically on user ban, member removal, role change, and scope-conferring row changes (see the [scope revocation notes](/compiler/definitions/scopes#revocation--ttl)). Or drop TTL to ~30s — similar effect with bounded delay and zero KV reads.\n\n## `auth.loginUrl` / `auth.profileUrl` — external sign-in for consumer Workers\n\nWhen a Quickback Worker doesn't host its own Account SPA — e.g. an internal-app mesh where one Worker on the parent domain owns identity (`auth.example.com`) and other Workers share cookies — the compiler-emitted CMS access gates need to redirect unauthenticated visitors to the central sign-in surface, not the local `/account/login` (which doesn't exist there).\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n auth: {\n loginUrl: 'https://auth.example.com/login',\n profileUrl: 'https://auth.example.com/profile',\n },\n});\n```\n\nBoth fields override compiler-emitted browser redirects in the CMS shell:\n\n- **Unauthenticated visitor hits a CMS route** → `302 → <loginUrl>?redirect=<original-url>`\n- **Authenticated user fails the `cms.access: 'admin'` platform-role check** → `302 → <profileUrl>`\n\nThe `?redirect=…` query param is preserved unchanged so the central sign-in surface can bounce the user back after authentication.\n\n### Resolution precedence\n\nMost-specific wins:\n\n1. Explicit `auth.loginUrl` / `auth.profileUrl` — the cookie-trusting consumer-Worker case (this section).\n2. `https://<account.domain>/login` — inferred when this project hosts its own Account SPA on a custom domain.\n3. `/account/login` — built-in fallback, when neither knob is set.\n\n### Independent from `account.domain`\n\n`account.domain` does *two* things: redirect targets *and* hostname-based asset routing for an Account SPA hosted by this project. Consumer Workers don't host Account at all — they only need the URL. `auth.loginUrl` is a redirect-target string with no routing side effects, which is why it's a separate knob.\n\n### When both are set\n\nSetting `auth.loginUrl` *and* `account.domain` is legal — the explicit override beats the inferred URL at the redirect site, while `account.domain` still drives the local Account SPA's hostname routing as usual. Useful when you want to host Account on one custom domain (`account.foo.com`) but redirect *somewhere else* for sign-in (e.g. an SSO surface at `auth.foo.com`)."
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"content": "The top-level `auth` config block holds provider-agnostic auth knobs that affect how Quickback emits the auth middleware, JWT helpers, and access-rule expansion.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 60,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n // audience, secretEnv, algorithm, revocationCheck...\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## `auth.roleHierarchy`\n\nLowest-to-highest privilege list. Lets access rules use `'role+'` shorthand to mean \"this role and above\". Documented in detail under [Access — Role hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n## `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path\n\nQuickback ships its own custom HMAC-SHA256 JWT (not Better Auth's JWT plugin) so it can embed `orgId` and `role` claims the fast-path needs to reconstruct `AppContext` without a database round-trip. The signing secret is shared with Better Auth (`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`) by default — users only manage one secret.\n\n### Security posture at a glance\n\nThe short version, before the knob-by-knob detail:\n\n- **Default: 180-second TTL, auto-refreshed.** Every authenticated call returns a fresh token via the `set-auth-token` header, so the low TTL is invisible to logged-in users. The worst-case window for a stolen or pre-revocation token is 3 minutes — and you can shrink it to 30 seconds with one config line.\n- **Need revocation faster than the TTL?** Set [`revocationCheck: 'kv'`](#revocationcheck-none--kv--token-revocation-strategy). Revoked tokens are rejected within seconds; revocation stamps are written automatically on user ban, org-member removal, role change, and changes to scope-conferring relationship rows.\n\nThose two knobs — `expiresIn` and `revocationCheck` — cover the vast majority of deployments. The honest residual for the strictest threat models: the KV check revokes per-principal (not per-session), fails open if KV is unreachable (degrading to the TTL bound), and propagates cross-PoP in ~60s. If you need fail-closed, per-session kill semantics, set `expiresIn: 30` for a hard 30-second ceiling — and [tell us about your use case](https://github.com/kardoe/quickback/issues); an opaque-session mode is under consideration.\n\n### Behavior recap\n\n1. The browser SPA gets a JWT via the `set-auth-token` response header on every authenticated call.\n2. On subsequent requests the SPA sends `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`.\n3. The auth middleware's **fast-path** verifies the signature only — no DB query, no session lookup. `AppContext` is reconstructed from JWT claims.\n4. If verification fails (or no JWT is present), the middleware falls back to session auth.\n5. After successful session auth, a fresh JWT is minted and returned via `set-auth-token`. The cycle continues.\n\nThe fast-path is intentionally stateless: it trusts the claims for the full TTL. **Stolen or pre-revocation tokens are valid until they expire.** That's the trade-off the fast-path makes — and the reason `expiresIn` and `revocationCheck` are the two most-tuned knobs below: the first bounds the window, the second shrinks it to seconds.\n\n### `expiresIn?: number` — TTL in seconds\n\nDefault `180` (3 minutes).\n\nLowering this shrinks the worst-case window where a stolen / pre-revocation token still works. Browser SPAs auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call, so a low TTL is invisible to logged-in users; only stale server-to-server bearer tokens feel it.\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 30 } } // 30s — tight post-revocation window\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 3600 } } // 1h — longer-lived tokens for CLI / CI\n```\n\n### `issuer?: string` — `iss` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when other services need to distinguish JWTs minted by this Worker from other issuers. The compiler bakes the issuer into both the mint side (added to claims) and the verify side (rejects tokens with mismatched `iss`).\n\n### `audience?: string` — `aud` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when this Worker's JWTs are consumed by a sibling service that should reject tokens minted for a different audience. Same mint-and-verify treatment as `issuer`.\n\n### `secretEnv?: string` — signing secret env var\n\nDefault `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'`.\n\nOverride this if you want JWT signing isolated from the Better Auth secret (e.g. rotating one without invalidating the other).\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET' } }\n```\n\nThe compiler emits `c.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` (or `process.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` on Bun/Node) in the auth middleware's verify and mint sites and the `/api/v1/token` endpoint.\n\n> **Note:** the files-worker (separate Worker for R2 access) still reads `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` directly. If you override `secretEnv`, set both env vars to the same value or the files worker's JWT verification will fall back to DB session lookup. Threading `secretEnv` through the files worker is on the roadmap.\n\n### `algorithm?: 'HS256'`\n\nOnly `HS256` is supported in 0.10.14. `RS256` (asymmetric, public-key verify / private-key sign) is on the roadmap.\n\n### `revocationCheck?: 'none' | 'kv'` — token revocation strategy\n\nDefault `'none'`.\n\n| Value | Behavior | Cost per verify |\n|---|---|---|\n| `'none'` | No revocation check. Stolen / pre-revocation tokens valid until TTL expires (scope claims: until the carry-forward cap). Use a low `expiresIn` to bound the replay window. | 0 |\n| `'kv'` | Fast-path checks per-principal revocation timestamps in the project's existing `KV` binding before trusting a verified token. | 2+ KV reads (~5-15ms, edge-cached) |\n\n`'kv'` (v0.45+, **Cloudflare runtime only**) keeps the fast-path stateless against the auth DB (still 0 D1 queries). There is nothing extra to provision — entries ride the `KV` binding every project already has, prefixed `qbrev:` and self-expiring after the maximum token lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n\nA token is rejected when its mint timestamp (`iat`, or `sct` for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored timestamp for any principal key it rides on:\n\n| Key | Revokes | Written automatically on |\n|---|---|---|\n| `qbrev:user:<userId>` | every JWT for the user | user ban (`databaseHooks.user.update.after` — flipping `banned` stamps the key and, when outbound webhooks are enabled, emits a `user.banned` event). Call `revokeUserTokens` for custom flows (revoke-all, etc.) |\n| `qbrev:member:<userId>:<orgId>` | the user's org-membership claims | member removal / role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`) |\n| `qbrev:scope:<userId>:<kind>:<id>` | the user's carried scope claim | UPDATE/DELETE of a scope-conferring relationship row (audit-wrapper chokepoint + the single DELETE route) |\n\n`src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts` exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens` for explicit calls from actions. A rejected token falls through to session auth, which re-checks membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers transparently.\n\nSemantics worth knowing:\n\n- **Revoke-on-touch for scopes:** any update or delete of a conferring row stamps the revocation, without evaluating whether the change actually ended the relationship. A false positive just forces a cheap re-prove (`/scope/v1/enter` or a minting namespace route).\n- **Fails open:** a missing binding or KV outage skips the check (logged) — revocation degrades to the TTL / carry-forward-cap bound rather than locking every bearer out.\n- **Eventual consistency:** KV propagates cross-PoP in ~60s. \"Immediate\" means seconds at the writing location, bounded-seconds globally — still far inside the 15-minute carry-forward cap that bounds revocation without this check.\n- **Coverage gap:** batch *hard* deletes don't return rows through the chokepoint; call `revokeScopeTokens` explicitly if you bulk-hard-delete conferring rows.\n\n## Defaults when the JWT surface is enabled\n\nAdding `auth.jwt: {}` enables the surface with the historical defaults. Each\nmissing field falls back to its hardcoded value:\n\n| Field | Default |\n|---|---|\n| `expiresIn` | 180 |\n| `issuer` | omitted |\n| `audience` | omitted |\n| `secretEnv` | `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'` |\n| `algorithm` | `'HS256'` |\n| `revocationCheck` | `'none'` |\n\n## Tuning recommendations\n\n- **B2C SaaS, mostly browser traffic:** keep defaults. The 180s TTL + auto-refresh model just works.\n- **Pentest engagement / enterprise compliance:** set `expiresIn: 30`. Tokens stay invisible to logged-in users (auto-refreshed every authed call) but stolen-token windows shrink to 30s.\n- **CLI-heavy / long-running CI tokens:** `expiresIn: 3600` for one-hour bearer tokens. Pair with `issuer` / `audience` if multiple services consume the same JWT.\n- **Need immediate revocation:** set `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (Cloudflare runtime) — revoked tokens are rejected within seconds, and stamps are written automatically on user ban, member removal, role change, and scope-conferring row changes (see the [scope revocation notes](/compiler/definitions/scopes#revocation--ttl)). Or drop TTL to ~30s — similar effect with bounded delay and zero KV reads.\n\n## `auth.loginUrl` / `auth.profileUrl` — external sign-in for consumer Workers\n\nWhen a Quickback Worker doesn't host its own Account SPA — e.g. an internal-app mesh where one Worker on the parent domain owns identity (`auth.example.com`) and other Workers share cookies — the compiler-emitted CMS access gates need to redirect unauthenticated visitors to the central sign-in surface, not the local `/account/login` (which doesn't exist there).\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n auth: {\n loginUrl: 'https://auth.example.com/login',\n profileUrl: 'https://auth.example.com/profile',\n },\n});\n```\n\nBoth fields override compiler-emitted browser redirects in the CMS shell:\n\n- **Unauthenticated visitor hits a CMS route** → `302 → <loginUrl>?redirect=<original-url>`\n- **Authenticated user fails the `cms.access: 'admin'` platform-role check** → `302 → <profileUrl>`\n\nThe `?redirect=…` query param is preserved unchanged so the central sign-in surface can bounce the user back after authentication.\n\n### Resolution precedence\n\nMost-specific wins:\n\n1. Explicit `auth.loginUrl` / `auth.profileUrl` — the cookie-trusting consumer-Worker case (this section).\n2. `https://<account.domain>/login` — inferred when this project hosts its own Account SPA on a custom domain.\n3. `/account/login` — built-in fallback, when neither knob is set.\n\n### Independent from `account.domain`\n\n`account.domain` does *two* things: redirect targets *and* hostname-based asset routing for an Account SPA hosted by this project. Consumer Workers don't host Account at all — they only need the URL. `auth.loginUrl` is a redirect-target string with no routing side effects, which is why it's a separate knob.\n\n### When both are set\n\nSetting `auth.loginUrl` *and* `account.domain` is legal — the explicit override beats the inferred URL at the redirect site, while `account.domain` still drives the local Account SPA's hostname routing as usual. Useful when you want to host Account on one custom domain (`account.foo.com`) but redirect *somewhere else* for sign-in (e.g. an SSO surface at `auth.foo.com`)."
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"content": "The `quickback.config.ts` file configures your Quickback project. It defines which providers to use, which features to enable, and how the compiler generates code.\n\n```typescript\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n auth: {\n // Required for \"+\" role expansion in access rules (e.g. roles: [\"member+\"]).\n // Lowest → highest. Omit if you always list roles explicitly.\n roleHierarchy: [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"],\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Discoverable options block\n\nAfter your first `quickback compile`, the file gets a managed block bracketed by sentinel comments:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: cloudflare({}),\n\n // [quickback:options-start]\n // ── Project ──\n //\n // Primary custom domain (auto-inferred from cms/account/api domains if unset).\n // domain: \"example.com\",\n //\n // ── Embedded UIs (CMS / Account) ──\n //\n // Login/signup/profile/orgs SPA. Set `true` for default, or object to customize.\n // account: {\n // fileUploads: false, // show the avatar upload UI on the profile page\n // auth: { passkey: false, emailOTP: false, ... },\n // ...\n // },\n //\n // ... every other option Quickback supports\n // [quickback:options-end]\n});\n```\n\nThis block is **regenerated on every compile** — the compiler is the source of truth, so newly added options surface automatically when you upgrade Quickback (no CLI bump needed).\n\n**To enable an option**, copy the line you care about *above* the `[quickback:options-start]` sentinel and uncomment it:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: cloudflare({}),\n\n account: {\n fileUploads: true, // ← lifted out of the managed block\n },\n\n // [quickback:options-start]\n // ... account is now omitted from this block on next compile\n // [quickback:options-end]\n});\n```\n\nQuickback notices that `account` is set above the marker and drops it from the managed block on the next compile to avoid duplicate definitions. Anything outside the marker block is yours and never touched.\n\nIf you ever want to opt out of the auto-managed block, run:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile --no-sync-config\n```\n\n## Required Fields\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `name` | `string` | Project name |\n| `template` | `\"hono\"` | Application template (`\"nextjs\"` is experimental) |\n| `providers` | `object` | Runtime, database, and auth provider configuration |\n\n## Optional Fields\n\nEvery optional top-level key the config accepts is listed below. You never have to memorize them — after your first compile, the [discoverable options block](#discoverable-options-block) lists each one (minus the ones you've set) right inside your `quickback.config.ts`. This table is the human reference; follow the links for detailed pages.\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | Primary custom domain (auto-inferred from `cms`/`account`/`api` domains if unset) — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `api` | `object` | Dedicated hostname for the feature API surface (`/api/v1/*`); additive alias — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `auth` | `object` | App-level auth settings (`roleHierarchy`, `jwt`, `loginUrl`/`profileUrl`, `domain`) — see [Access](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) |\n| `authz` | `object` | Relationship-based authorization (`relationships`, `roles`, `permissions`, `arrows`) — see [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions) |\n| `trustedOrigins` | `string[]` | CORS trusted origins for cross-domain auth |\n| `features` | `object` | Feature flags such as `organizations` / `pinnedOrganizationId` — see [Pinned Organization Mode](/compiler/config/single-tenant) |\n| `cms` | `boolean \\| object` | Embed CMS in compiled Worker (`domain`, `access`, `sysadmin`) — see [CMS](/stack/cms) |\n| `account` | `boolean \\| object` | Embed Account UI in compiled Worker (`domain`, `name`, `auth.*`, branding) — see [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) |\n| `apps` | `object` | Mount hand-authored SPAs on their own hostname or path prefix — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `agents` | `boolean \\| object` | AI/agent discovery surface (`robots.txt`, `llms.txt`, MCP, OAuth discovery) — see [Agents](/compiler/config/agents) |\n| `security` | `object \\| false` | HTTP response security headers (CSP, HSTS, COOP/COEP, Referrer/Permissions-Policy) — see [Security Headers](/compiler/config/security) |\n| `openapi` | `object` | OpenAPI spec generation (`generate`, `publish`, `docs: 'scalar' \\| 'swagger'`, `types`) — see [OpenAPI](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi) |\n| `schemaRegistry` | `object` | Schema registry generation for the CMS (`{ generate: false }` to disable) — see [Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry) |\n| `etag` | `object` | ETag caching for GET responses (`{ enabled: false }` to disable) — see [Caching & ETags](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching) |\n| `email` | `object` | Email delivery config (`provider`, `from`, `fromName`, `region`) — see [Email Configuration](#email-configuration) |\n| `bindings` | `object` | Extra Cloudflare bindings (durable objects, queues, R2, services, `vars`, AI) — see [Bindings](/compiler/config/bindings) |\n| `compiler` | `object` | Compiler internals — `features.auditFields: false`, `migrations.renames` (headless CI), `securityContracts`, `injectId`, `routes` |\n| `build` | `object` | Build options (`outputDir`, `packageManager`, `dependencies`) — see [Custom Dependencies](#custom-dependencies) |\n| `dev` | `object` | Local development settings (`port`, `api`, `cms`, `account`, `hostnames`) — see [Variables](/compiler/config/variables) |\n| `preset` | `string` | Inherit defaults from a named preset |\n\n## Custom Dependencies\n\nAdd third-party npm packages to the generated `package.json` using `build.dependencies`. This is useful when your action handlers import external libraries.\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n build: {\n dependencies: {\n \"fast-xml-parser\": \"^4.5.0\",\n \"lodash-es\": \"^4.17.21\",\n },\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\nThese are merged into the generated `package.json` alongside Quickback's own dependencies. Run `npm install` after compiling to install them.\n\n## Headless Migration Rename Hints\n\nWhen `drizzle-kit generate` detects a potential rename, it normally prompts for confirmation. Cloud/CI compiles are non-interactive, so you must provide explicit rename hints.\n\nAdd hints in `compiler.migrations.renames`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n migrations: {\n renames: {\n // Keys are NEW names, values are OLD names\n tables: {\n events_v2: \"events\",\n },\n columns: {\n events: {\n summary_text: \"summary\",\n },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nRules:\n- `tables`: `new_table_name -> old_table_name`\n- `columns.<table>`: `new_column_name -> old_column_name`\n- Keys must match the names in your current schema (the new names)\n- Validation fails fast for malformed rename config, unsupported keys, or conflicting legacy/new rename paths.\n\n## Disable Audit Field Injection\n\nBy default, Quickback auto-injects four **audit fields** (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`) into every feature table, plus two **soft-delete fields** (`deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) into tables that use soft delete (the default delete mode). The audit fields drive record-provenance queries and the CMS audit panel; the soft-delete pair drives soft-delete filtering.\n\nTo opt out project-wide:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // skip audit-field injection globally\n },\n },\n providers: { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\nWhen disabled, you're responsible for supplying these columns yourself if you want soft delete, audit trails, or modifiedAt-based optimistic concurrency. See the [Schema → Audit Fields](/compiler/definitions/schema#audit-fields) section for the full list and what each field drives.\n\n## Security Contract Reports and Signing\n\nAfter generation, Quickback verifies machine-checkable security contracts for Hono routes and RLS SQL.\n\nIt also emits a report artifact and signature artifact by default:\n\n- `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n- `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n\nYou can configure output paths and signing behavior:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n securityContracts: {\n failMode: \"error\", // or \"warn\"\n report: {\n path: \"reports/security-contracts.report.json\",\n signature: {\n enabled: true,\n required: true,\n keyEnv: \"QUICKBACK_SECURITY_REPORT_SIGNING_KEY\",\n keyId: \"prod-k1\",\n path: \"reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json\",\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nIf `signature.required: true` and no key is available, compilation fails with a clear error message (or warning in `failMode: \"warn\"`).\n\n## Hostname architecture (v0.33+)\n\nA modern Quickback project runs on **one Cloudflare Worker** that serves multiple URL surfaces. By default, everything lives under a single unified backend hostname (auto-inferred as `quickback.{baseDomain}` from your other configured subdomains, or overridable via `config.domain`). For larger deployments, you can opt-in to **dedicated hostnames** for specific surfaces — they're additive aliases, never replacements.\n\n### The unified backend contract\n\nWhen any subdomain is configured (`account.domain`, `cms.domain`, `auth.domain`, `api.domain`, `apps.<n>.domain`), the compiler always emits a unified backend host where **every compiler-emitted backend route** is reachable:\n\n- `/api/v1/*` — feature routes\n- `/auth/v1/*` — Better Auth\n- `/storage/*` — R2 file storage\n- `/health`, `/openapi.json` — monitoring/discovery\n- `/account/*`, `/cms/*` — bundled SPAs (when enabled)\n- `/broadcast/v1/*` (realtime), `/mcp` (MCP), etc.\n\nThe unified hostname is `quickback.{baseDomain}` by default (where baseDomain is extracted from your first configured subdomain). Override with `config.domain` if you prefer a different name.\n\nThis contract is forward-pointing: it gives a stable URL pattern for future management tooling — `https://quickback.{baseDomain}/...` will always reach a Quickback backend regardless of how the operator splits their surfaces.\n\n### Dedicated hostnames (optional, additive)\n\nFor branding or operational separation, you can opt specific surfaces onto their own hostnames:\n\n```ts\n{\n // Bundled SPAs on their own hosts (already-shipped pattern):\n cms: { domain: 'cms.example.com' },\n account: { domain: 'account.example.com' },\n\n // v0.33+ — backend surfaces on their own hosts:\n auth: { domain: 'auth.example.com' },\n api: { domain: 'api.example.com' },\n\n // User SPAs (existing pattern):\n apps: {\n www: { domain: 'app.example.com' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nOn a dedicated hostname, **the hostname IS the namespace** — the path drops the prefix that matches the hostname:\n\n| URL on dedicated host | Internally rewritten to | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `https://api.example.com/v1/users` | `/api/v1/users` | Worker-entry rewriter prepends `/api` |\n| `https://auth.example.com/v1/sign-in/email` | `/auth/v1/sign-in/email` | Same shape with `/auth` |\n| `https://api.example.com/api/v1/users` | (unchanged) | Long form also accepted |\n| `https://api.example.com/auth/v1/sign-in` | **404** | Auth doesn't live on the API hostname |\n| `https://api.example.com/health` | (unchanged) | Explicit exception — monitoring agents expect `/health` everywhere |\n\nDual-reach is preserved on the unified host:\n\n| URL on unified host | Handler | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `https://quickback.example.com/api/v1/users` | feature route | Works whether `api.domain` is set or not |\n| `https://quickback.example.com/auth/v1/sign-in/email` | Better Auth | Works whether `auth.domain` is set or not |\n| `https://quickback.example.com/v1/users` | **404** | Shortcut only applies on dedicated hostnames |\n\nEach dedicated hostname also:\n\n- Gets a `{ pattern, custom_domain: true }` route in `wrangler.toml` automatically\n- Joins `trustedOrigins` for CORS\n- Joins the cross-subdomain cookie inference (auto-enables `crossSubDomainCookies` when ≥2 same-parent subdomains are configured, so `auth.example.com` and `app.example.com` can share session cookies)\n- Joins CSP `connect-src` so SPAs can fetch from it\n\n### Why two URL shapes (Shape 1 vs Shape 2)\n\nIf you only want Better Auth to **advertise** itself on a different URL (e.g. so verification emails link to `auth.example.com` instead of the unified host), set the `BETTER_AUTH_URL` env var on the Worker — no code change required. BA generates outgoing URLs against that value. This is sufficient when the goal is branding email/OAuth callback URLs without changing where requests actually land.\n\n`auth.domain` (Shape 1, above) is the heavier option: it binds an actual hostname to the Worker, configures CORS/cookies/CSP for it, and adds the path-shortcut rewriter. Use it when you want the dedicated hostname as a real ingress, not just a label.\n\n## CMS Configuration\n\nEmbed the [Quickback CMS](/stack/cms) in your compiled Worker. The CMS reads your schema registry and renders a complete admin interface — zero UI code per table.\n\n```typescript\n// Simple — embed CMS at root\ncms: true,\n\n// With custom domain\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\" },\n\n// With access control (only admins can access CMS)\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", access: \"admin\" },\n\n// Cross-tenant DB-admin tier — sysadmins see every tenant's data\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", sysadmin: true },\n```\n\n| Option | Type | Default | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | — | Custom domain for CMS. Adds a `custom_domain` route to `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `access` | `\"user\" \\| \"admin\"` | `\"admin\"` | Controls who can access the CMS. When `\"admin\"`, platform control-plane users (`user.role === \"appmanager\"`) can enter; when `sysadmin` mode is also on, `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` is admitted too. The gate is enforced at the Worker level (SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD all return 403 to callers outside those roles) and in the SPA. Also hides the CMS link in Account UI. See [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) for the full enforcement model. |\n| `sysadmin` | `boolean` | `false` | Cross-tenant DB-admin tier. When `true`, opts into the `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (`user.role === \"sysadmin\"`), the firewall escape hatch (sysadmins bypass tenant scopes, soft-delete still enforced), the cross-tenant `/auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint (sibling of Better Auth's `/auth/v1/admin/list-users`, gated to sysadmin only), and the SPA's \"All organizations\" sentinel. The CMS HTML gate admits `userRole === \"sysadmin\"` alongside `\"appmanager\"`. Off by default. See [`SYSADMIN` pseudo-role](/compiler/definitions/access#sysadmin--cross-tenant-db-admin-tier). |\n\n### Sysadmin tier (`cms.sysadmin: true`)\n\nQuickback's default model assumes every CMS user belongs to at least one organization (`member` row in the auth DB). For platforms that need a Supabase-style cross-tenant DB-admin tool — debugging a tenant's data, running cross-tenant queries, supporting a customer — that's a poor fit: a sysadmin without `member` rows would dead-end, and auto-filling their active org from \"first membership\" silently scopes them to a tenant they have no relationship with.\n\n`cms: { sysadmin: true }` introduces a separate role tier:\n\n- **Role**: `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` (set on the Better Auth user table). Distinct from `\"appmanager\"` — appmanagers keep platform control-plane access (CMS shell, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling), while sysadmins get true cross-tenant data access. `ADMIN` is now a rejected legacy pseudo-role; use `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` for control-plane gates and `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for cross-tenant access.\n- **Firewall**: every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits an `if (ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\") return undefined` (or just the soft-delete predicate when present) at the top, so sysadmins see every tenant's rows. See [Firewall escape hatch](/compiler/definitions/firewall#sysadmin-escape-hatch).\n- **Org listing**: a `GET /auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint selects directly from the auth-schema `organization` table — every row, every tenant. Sits under Better Auth's admin URL namespace (sibling of `/auth/v1/admin/list-users`) so the URL shape matches BA convention; the handler is Quickback-emitted and gated to `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` only. For the membership-bound caller's-orgs listing, use BA's own `/auth/v1/organization/list`.\n- **CMS SPA**: when the user is a sysadmin, the header switcher loads from the cross-tenant endpoint, defaults to \"All organizations\" (which omits `?organizationId=` and reaches the firewall escape), and pins selected tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call. Org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher.\n- **CMS HTML gate**: admits `userRole === \"sysadmin\"` alongside `\"appmanager\"`. Org admins are not locked out when you set `cms.access: \"user\"`; `cms.access: \"admin\"` is specifically the platform control-plane gate.\n\nOff by default. Projects that don't enable it get zero behavior change; setting `cms.sysadmin: true` and granting a user `user.role = \"sysadmin\"` is the only way to unlock the cross-tenant view.\n\n## Account UI Configuration\n\nEmbed the [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) in your compiled Worker. Provides login, signup, profile management, organization management, and admin — all built from your config at compile time.\n\nFor post-signup logic — auto-provisioning a workspace, gating signup, setting an active organization — drop a file in `quickback/hooks/`. See [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks).\n\n```typescript\n// Simple — embed Account UI with defaults\naccount: true,\n\n// Full configuration\naccount: {\n domain: \"auth.example.com\",\n adminDomain: \"admin.example.com\",\n name: \"My App\",\n companyName: \"My Company\",\n auth: {\n password: true,\n emailOTP: false,\n passkey: true,\n organizations: true,\n admin: true,\n },\n},\n```\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | Custom domain for Account UI (e.g., `auth.example.com`) |\n| `adminDomain` | `string` | Custom domain for admin-only access (e.g., `admin.example.com`). Serves the same Account SPA — the client-side router handles admin routing. |\n| `appUrl` | `string` | URL of the tenant's main application — where users are redirected after login. Baked into the Account SPA as `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL`. Independent from `domain`. |\n| `name` | `string` | App display name shown on login, profile, and email templates |\n| `companyName` | `string` | Company name for branding |\n| `tagline` | `string` | App tagline shown on login page |\n| `description` | `string` | App description |\n\n### Auth Feature Flags\n\nControl which authentication features are exposed. Disabled features are excluded from the Account UI bundle at compile time (routes removed before the Vite build, keeping bundle sizes minimal) **and** enforced on the server side via the Better Auth config — so \"signup off\" actually closes `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email`, not just the SPA's signup screen.\n\n`account.auth.*` is a shorthand for `providers.auth.config` — the compiler maps each flag onto the Better Auth server config before any code is generated. You can write either side directly; setting both incompatibly (e.g. `account.auth.signup: false` and `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false`) fails the compile with a precise error rather than picking a silent winner.\n\n| Flag | Type | Default | Maps to (server) | Description |\n|------|------|---------|------------------|-------------|\n| `auth.password` | `boolean` | `true` | `emailAndPassword.enabled` | Email/password authentication — both server endpoint and UI |\n| `auth.emailOTP` | `boolean` | `false` | adds `emailOtp` plugin | Email one-time password login — adds plugin server-side, surfaces UI |\n| `auth.passkey` | `boolean` | `false` | adds `passkey` plugin | WebAuthn/FIDO2 passkey authentication — adds plugin server-side, surfaces UI |\n| `auth.signup` | `boolean` | `true` | `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted) | Self-service account registration — false hides the UI **and** rejects the server endpoint with 403 |\n| `auth.organizations` | `boolean` | `true` | UI surface only | Organization management UI (dashboard, invitations, roles). Server-side organization support stays on regardless; set `features.pinnedOrganizationId` when you want one fixed org with no switching UI |\n| `auth.admin` | `boolean` | `false` | UI surface only | Admin panel for user management in the Account SPA. The Better Auth admin plugin is compiler-managed separately from this UI toggle |\n| `auth.emailVerification` | `boolean` | `false` | `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification` | Require email verification before sessions are issued. False = sessions usable immediately after signup |\n\n## Trusted Origins\n\nList of origins allowed to make cross-origin requests to your API. Required when your CMS, Account UI, or frontend app run on different domains.\n\n```typescript\ntrustedOrigins: [\n \"https://auth.example.com\",\n \"https://admin.example.com\",\n \"https://cms.example.com\",\n \"https://app.example.com\",\n],\n```\n\n## Local Development\n\nConfigure local development URLs. These are automatically added to the trusted origins list for CORS and Better Auth, so authentication works out of the box during local development.\n\n```typescript\ndev: {\n port: 8787, // wrangler dev port (default: 8787)\n api: \"http://localhost:8787\", // API backend URL\n cms: \"http://localhost:8787/cms\", // CMS URL (path on same worker)\n account: \"http://localhost:8787/account\", // Account URL (path on same worker)\n},\n```\n\nIf you run a SPA standalone on its own Vite dev server, set its URL here so CORS allows it:\n\n```typescript\ndev: {\n port: 8787,\n api: \"http://localhost:8787\",\n account: \"http://localhost:5173\", // standalone Account dev server\n},\n```\n\n| Field | Type | Default | Description |\n|-------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `port` | `number` | `8787` | Local dev server port (sets `[dev].port` in wrangler.toml) |\n| `api` | `string` | `http://localhost:{port}` | API backend URL |\n| `cms` | `string` | — | CMS dev URL (added to trusted origins if set) |\n| `account` | `string` | — | Account dev URL (added to trusted origins if set) |\n\n## Email Configuration\n\nConfigure email delivery for authentication emails (verification, password reset, invitations).\n\n> **Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta** and is Quickback's default transport for Cloudflare deploys. The Workers `send_email` binding is zero-config — no API keys, no third-party accounts. AWS SES remains supported as an explicit opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups.\n\n```typescript\n// Cloudflare Email Service (default) — uses send_email binding, no API keys needed\nemail: {\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n},\n\n// AWS SES — requires AWS credentials set as Wrangler secrets\nemail: {\n provider: \"aws-ses\",\n region: \"us-east-2\",\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n},\n```\n\n| Field | Type | Default | Description |\n|-------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `provider` | `\"cloudflare\" \\| \"aws-ses\"` | `\"cloudflare\"` | Email transport |\n| `from` | `string` | `\"noreply@example.com\"` | Sender email address |\n| `fromName` | `string` | `\"{name} \\| Account Services\"` | Sender display name |\n| `region` | `string` | `\"us-east-2\"` | AWS SES region (aws-ses only) |\n\n### Auto-wiring\n\nFor the Cloudflare provider (the default), the compiler automatically:\n- Emits `[[send_email]] EMAIL` into `wrangler.toml`\n- Generates `src/lib/cloudflare-email.ts`\n- Wires `sendResetPassword`, `sendVerificationEmail`, `sendInvitationEmail`, etc. into Better Auth\n\n…whenever any auth surface needs to send mail — `emailAndPassword.enabled`, the `emailOtp` / `magicLink` / `organization` plugins — or you set the top-level `email: {…}` config. You don't need to add `bindings.sendEmail` by hand for the standard cases.\n\n> **Cloudflare Email Routing setup is required.** The binding alone does not deliver mail. Enable Email Routing on the sending zone and add at least one verified destination address ([Cloudflare docs](https://developers.cloudflare.com/email-routing/get-started/)). Otherwise sends fail at runtime even with the binding present and the `/auth/v1/ses/status` check passing locally.\n\n## Multi-Domain Example\n\nA complete config with CMS, Account UI, and Admin on separate subdomains:\n\n```typescript\nexport default {\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n cms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", access: \"admin\" },\n account: {\n domain: \"auth.example.com\",\n adminDomain: \"admin.example.com\",\n name: \"My App\",\n companyName: \"Example Inc.\",\n auth: {\n password: true,\n emailOTP: false,\n passkey: true,\n organizations: false,\n admin: true,\n },\n },\n email: {\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n },\n trustedOrigins: [\n \"https://auth.example.com\",\n \"https://admin.example.com\",\n \"https://cms.example.com\",\n \"https://example.com\",\n ],\n providers: {\n runtime: { name: \"cloudflare\", config: {\n routes: [{ pattern: \"api.example.com\", custom_domain: true }],\n }},\n database: { name: \"cloudflare-d1\", config: { binding: \"DB\" } },\n auth: { name: \"better-auth\", config: { plugins: [\"admin\"] } },\n },\n};\n```\n\nThis produces a single Cloudflare Worker serving five domains. See [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) for details on hostname routing, cross-subdomain cookies, and the unified fallback domain.\n\n---\n\nSee the sub-pages for detailed reference on each section:\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Runtime, database, and auth options\n- [Variables](/compiler/config/variables) — Environment variables and flags\n- [Output](/compiler/config/output) — Generated file structure\n- [Pinned Organization Mode](/compiler/config/single-tenant) — Fixed-org deployments without org switching UI\n- [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) — Custom domains, hostname routing, and cross-subdomain auth"
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"content": "The `quickback.config.ts` file configures your Quickback project. It defines which providers to use, which features to enable, and how the compiler generates code.\n\n```typescript\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n auth: {\n // Required for \"+\" role expansion in access rules (e.g. roles: [\"member+\"]).\n // Lowest → highest. Omit if you always list roles explicitly.\n roleHierarchy: [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"],\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Discoverable options block\n\nAfter your first `quickback compile`, the file gets a managed block bracketed by sentinel comments:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: cloudflare({}),\n\n // [quickback:options-start]\n // ── Project ──\n //\n // Primary custom domain (auto-inferred from cms/account/api domains if unset).\n // domain: \"example.com\",\n //\n // ── Embedded UIs (CMS / Account) ──\n //\n // Login/signup/profile/orgs SPA. Set `true` for default, or object to customize.\n // account: {\n // fileUploads: false, // show the avatar upload UI on the profile page\n // auth: { passkey: false, emailOTP: false, ... },\n // ...\n // },\n //\n // ... every other option Quickback supports\n // [quickback:options-end]\n});\n```\n\nThis block is **regenerated on every compile** — the compiler is the source of truth, so newly added options surface automatically when you upgrade Quickback (no CLI bump needed).\n\n**To enable an option**, copy the line you care about *above* the `[quickback:options-start]` sentinel and uncomment it:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: cloudflare({}),\n\n account: {\n fileUploads: true, // ← lifted out of the managed block\n },\n\n // [quickback:options-start]\n // ... account is now omitted from this block on next compile\n // [quickback:options-end]\n});\n```\n\nQuickback notices that `account` is set above the marker and drops it from the managed block on the next compile to avoid duplicate definitions. Anything outside the marker block is yours and never touched.\n\nIf you ever want to opt out of the auto-managed block, run:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile --no-sync-config\n```\n\n## Required Fields\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `name` | `string` | Project name |\n| `template` | `\"hono\"` | Application template (`\"nextjs\"` is experimental) |\n| `providers` | `object` | Runtime, database, and auth provider configuration |\n\n## Optional Fields\n\nEvery optional top-level key the config accepts is listed below. You never have to memorize them — after your first compile, the [discoverable options block](#discoverable-options-block) lists each one (minus the ones you've set) right inside your `quickback.config.ts`. This table is the human reference; follow the links for detailed pages.\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | Primary custom domain (auto-inferred from `cms`/`account`/`api` domains if unset) — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `contract` | `{ version?: \"v1\" \\| \"v2\" }` | Public API/auth contract version. Omit for the backward-compatible v1 default; select v2 for `/api/v2/*` and `/auth/v2/*` across generated routes, Better Auth, OpenAPI, MCP, and discovery. |\n| `api` | `object` | Dedicated hostname for the selected feature API contract (`/api/v1/*` or `/api/v2/*`); additive alias — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `auth` | `object` | App-level auth settings (`roleHierarchy`, `jwt`, delegated `principals`, `loginUrl`/`profileUrl`, `domain`) — see [Access](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) and [Delegated principals](#delegated-principals-contract-v2) |\n| `authz` | `object` | Relationship-based authorization (`relationships`, `roles`, `permissions`, `arrows`) — see [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions) |\n| `trustedOrigins` | `string[]` | CORS trusted origins for cross-domain auth |\n| `features` | `object` | Feature flags such as `organizations` / `pinnedOrganizationId` — see [Pinned Organization Mode](/compiler/config/single-tenant) |\n| `cms` | `boolean \\| object` | Embed CMS in compiled Worker (`domain`, `access`, `sysadmin`) — see [CMS](/stack/cms) |\n| `account` | `boolean \\| object` | Embed Account UI in compiled Worker (`domain`, `name`, `auth.*`, branding) — see [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) |\n| `apps` | `object` | Mount hand-authored SPAs on their own hostname or path prefix — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |\n| `agents` | `boolean \\| object` | AI/agent discovery surface (`robots.txt`, `llms.txt`, MCP, OAuth discovery) — see [Agents](/compiler/config/agents) |\n| `security` | `object \\| false` | HTTP response security headers (CSP, HSTS, COOP/COEP, Referrer/Permissions-Policy) — see [Security Headers](/compiler/config/security) |\n| `openapi` | `object` | OpenAPI spec generation (`generate`, `publish`, `docs: 'scalar' \\| 'swagger'`, `types`) — see [OpenAPI](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi) |\n| `schemaRegistry` | `object` | Schema registry generation for the CMS (`{ generate: false }` to disable) — see [Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry) |\n| `etag` | `object` | ETag caching for GET responses (`{ enabled: false }` to disable) — see [Caching & ETags](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching) |\n| `email` | `object` | Email delivery config (`provider`, `from`, `fromName`, `region`) — see [Email Configuration](#email-configuration) |\n| `bindings` | `object` | Extra Cloudflare bindings (durable objects, queues, R2, services, `vars`, AI) — see [Bindings](/compiler/config/bindings) |\n| `compiler` | `object` | Compiler internals — `features.auditFields: false`, `migrations.renames` (headless CI), Neon `migrations.foreignKeys`, `securityContracts`, `injectId`, `routes` |\n| `build` | `object` | Build options (`outputDir`, `packageManager`, `dependencies`) — see [Custom Dependencies](#custom-dependencies) |\n| `dev` | `object` | Local development settings (`port`, `api`, `cms`, `account`, `hostnames`) — see [Variables](/compiler/config/variables) |\n| `preset` | `string` | Inherit defaults from a named preset |\n\n## Public contract version\n\nQuickback defaults to the existing v1 HTTP contract. New applications can opt\ninto v2 explicitly:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n contract: { version: \"v2\" },\n providers: cloudflare({}),\n});\n```\n\nThe selection is atomic: feature routes move to `/api/v2/*`, Better Auth moves\nto `/auth/v2/*`, and generated OpenAPI, MCP tool calls, OAuth discovery,\n`llms.txt`, schema/embeddings routes, and dedicated-domain `/v2/*` shortcuts\nuse the same version. When CMS or Account is enabled, Quickback also bakes\nthose paths into the SPA build and injects them at runtime, so CRUD, schema,\nlive-view, and authentication requests use the selected contract. Quickback\ndoes not expose a mixed v1/v2 surface from one compiled Worker. Omitting\n`contract` remains byte-compatible with v1 projects.\n\nV2 also makes action input-schema fidelity a compile gate. The CLI must\nsuccessfully harvest `z.toJSONSchema(action.input)` for every authored action;\npartial or missing harvests fail with the exact action file keys, bundle or\nevaluation phase, and underlying local error. Dependencies are resolved from\nthe generated runtime's `build.outputDir/node_modules` before unrelated\nancestor installs, so an isolated `quickback/` definition tree can use a\nsibling `src/` runtime without a workspace-root symlink. The compiler enforces\nthe same invariant at its shared input boundary, including\n`POST /compile?complete=false`, so validation-only or raw API calls cannot\nbypass it. V1 retains the historical best-effort static-schema fallback.\n\n## Delegated principals (contract v2)\n\n`auth.principals` defines non-account authority such as an event pass or a\nshort-lived event session. It is available only with all three of:\n\n- `contract: { version: \"v2\" }`\n- the Cloudflare runtime\n- Neon with `connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\"`\n\nEach principal type owns an exact Authorization scheme. `Bearer` is reserved\nfor Quickback account authentication, including case variants, and two\nprincipal types cannot share a scheme.\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"attend-v2\",\n template: \"hono\",\n contract: { version: \"v2\" },\n auth: {\n principals: {\n event_pass: {\n scheme: \"EventPass\",\n authenticate: {\n module: \"./event-pass-proof\",\n export: \"authenticateEventPass\",\n },\n lookup: {\n table: {\n module: \"../features/event-access/event-access\",\n export: \"eventAccess\",\n sqlName: \"event_access\",\n },\n digest: { field: \"digest\", column: \"digest\" },\n actorId: { field: \"personId\", column: \"person_id\" },\n claims: {\n eventId: { field: \"eventId\", column: \"event_id\" },\n personId: { field: \"personId\", column: \"person_id\" },\n },\n status: { field: \"status\", column: \"status\", allow: [\"active\"] },\n },\n },\n event_delegate: {\n scheme: \"EventSession\",\n authenticate: {\n module: \"./event-session-proof\",\n export: \"authenticateEventSession\",\n },\n lookup: {\n table: {\n module: \"../features/event-sessions/event-sessions\",\n export: \"eventSessions\",\n sqlName: \"event_sessions\",\n },\n digest: { field: \"digest\", column: \"digest\" },\n actorId: { field: \"personId\", column: \"person_id\" },\n sessionId: { field: \"id\", column: \"id\" },\n familyId: { field: \"familyId\", column: \"family_id\" },\n claims: {\n eventId: { field: \"eventId\", column: \"event_id\" },\n personId: { field: \"personId\", column: \"person_id\" },\n },\n status: { field: \"status\", column: \"status\", allow: [\"active\"] },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\",\n hyperdrive: { id: \"<32-character-hyperdrive-id>\" },\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe `authenticate.module` path is relative to generated\n`src/lib/principal-auth.ts`. Put project proof hooks under `quickback/lib`; the\ncompiler stages them into `src/lib` even if no action imports them. A hook has\none job: prove the presented credential and return its stable digest.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/lib/event-session-proof.ts\nexport async function authenticateEventSession({ credential, env, request }: {\n credential: string;\n env: Env;\n request: Request;\n}): Promise<{ digest: string } | null> {\n const valid = await verifySignedEventSession(credential, env, request);\n return valid ? { digest: await sha256(credential) } : null;\n}\n```\n\nThe hook receives no `db`, and it must not implement row authorization or\nbusiness behavior. Quickback performs exactly one narrow, unique digest lookup\nunder a lookup-only RLS principal. A digest must be 16–512 non-whitespace\ncharacters; resolved identity strings must be 1–512 characters and serialized\nclaims are limited to 4096 characters. A lookup must resolve exactly one active\nrow or authentication fails.\n\nOn success, actions receive `ctx.principal`:\n\n```typescript\n{\n type: \"event_delegate\",\n actor: { type: \"event_delegate\", id: \"person_123\" },\n session: { id: \"session_123\", familyId: \"family_123\" },\n claims: { eventId: \"event_123\", personId: \"person_123\" },\n}\n```\n\nQuickback never synthesizes `userId`, `activeOrgId`, `activeTeamId`, or\nmembership roles from a delegated credential. Use `principals` in an access\narm to admit it. Values inside one arm are ANDed; sibling `or` arms are ORed:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n { principals: [\"event_delegate\"], record: {\n eventId: { equals: \"$ctx.principal.claims.eventId\" },\n } },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAn Authorization header cannot be combined with `x-api-key` or a Better Auth\nsession cookie. Quickback recognizes only Better Auth's exact session cookie\nnames for this conflict check, so analytics and preference cookies remain\nharmless.\n\n## Custom Dependencies\n\nAdd third-party npm packages to the generated `package.json` using `build.dependencies`. This is useful when your action handlers import external libraries.\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n build: {\n dependencies: {\n \"fast-xml-parser\": \"^4.5.0\",\n \"lodash-es\": \"^4.17.21\",\n },\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\nThese are merged into the generated `package.json` alongside Quickback's own dependencies. Run `npm install` after compiling to install them.\n\n## Headless Migration Rename Hints\n\nWhen `drizzle-kit generate` detects a potential rename, it normally prompts for confirmation. Cloud/CI compiles are non-interactive, so you must provide explicit rename hints.\n\nAdd hints in `compiler.migrations.renames`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n migrations: {\n renames: {\n // Keys are NEW names, values are OLD names\n tables: {\n events_v2: \"events\",\n },\n columns: {\n events: {\n summary_text: \"summary\",\n },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nRules:\n- `tables`: `new_table_name -> old_table_name`\n- `columns.<table>`: `new_column_name -> old_column_name`\n- Keys must match the names in your current schema (the new names)\n- Validation fails fast for malformed rename config, unsupported keys, or conflicting legacy/new rename paths.\n\n## Neon Foreign Key Migrations\n\nUse `compiler.migrations.foreignKeys` when a Neon relationship cannot be\nexpressed in one generated Drizzle schema file—for example, a feature table\nthat references a Better Auth table, or a composite integrity relationship\nbetween independently authored feature modules.\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", { connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\" }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n compiler: {\n migrations: {\n foreignKeys: [\n {\n name: \"person_account_links_user_fk\",\n source: {\n schema: \"app\",\n table: \"person_account_links\",\n columns: [\"user_id\"],\n },\n target: {\n schema: \"auth\",\n table: \"users\",\n columns: [\"id\"],\n },\n onDelete: \"restrict\",\n onUpdate: \"restrict\",\n },\n {\n name: \"event_access_grants_consumed_family_fk\",\n source: {\n schema: \"app\",\n table: \"event_access_grants\",\n columns: [\n \"consumed_by_family_id\",\n \"id\",\n \"organization_id\",\n \"event_id\",\n \"event_person_id\",\n ],\n },\n target: {\n schema: \"app\",\n table: \"event_session_families\",\n columns: [\n \"id\",\n \"source_grant_id\",\n \"organization_id\",\n \"event_id\",\n \"event_person_id\",\n ],\n },\n onDelete: \"restrict\",\n onUpdate: \"restrict\",\n },\n ],\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nAll identifiers must be lowercase Postgres identifiers of at most 63\ncharacters. Source and target tuples must be nonempty and have equal arity;\ncolumn order is significant. Supported actions are `\"no action\"`,\n`\"restrict\"`, `\"cascade\"`, `\"set null\"`, and `\"set default\"`.\n\nConstraint names and source tuples must be unique in the config. On replay,\nQuickback verifies that an existing same-named constraint has the exact target,\nordered columns, and referential actions. It fails instead of silently\naccepting an ambiguous definition. Existing rows are validated during\nmigration, so clean up orphans before deploying.\n\nThis API is for database integrity, not business behavior. Keep authorization,\nstate transitions, event-pass consumption, and other business rules in the API\naction layer.\n\n## Disable Audit Field Injection\n\nBy default, Quickback auto-injects four **audit fields** (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`) into every feature table, plus two **soft-delete fields** (`deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) into tables that use soft delete (the default delete mode). The audit fields drive record-provenance queries and the CMS audit panel; the soft-delete pair drives soft-delete filtering.\n\nTo opt out project-wide:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // skip audit-field injection globally\n },\n },\n providers: { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\nWhen disabled, you're responsible for supplying these columns yourself if you want soft delete, audit trails, or modifiedAt-based optimistic concurrency. See the [Schema → Audit Fields](/compiler/definitions/schema#audit-fields) section for the full list and what each field drives.\n\n## Security Contract Reports and Signing\n\nAfter generation, Quickback verifies machine-checkable security contracts for Hono routes and RLS SQL.\n\nIt also emits a report artifact and signature artifact by default:\n\n- `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n- `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n\nYou can configure output paths and signing behavior:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n securityContracts: {\n failMode: \"error\", // or \"warn\"\n report: {\n path: \"reports/security-contracts.report.json\",\n signature: {\n enabled: true,\n required: true,\n keyEnv: \"QUICKBACK_SECURITY_REPORT_SIGNING_KEY\",\n keyId: \"prod-k1\",\n path: \"reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json\",\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nIf `signature.required: true` and no key is available, compilation fails with a clear error message (or warning in `failMode: \"warn\"`).\n\n## Hostname architecture (v0.33+)\n\nA modern Quickback project runs on **one Cloudflare Worker** that serves multiple URL surfaces. By default, everything lives under a single unified backend hostname (auto-inferred as `quickback.{baseDomain}` from your other configured subdomains, or overridable via `config.domain`). For larger deployments, you can opt-in to **dedicated hostnames** for specific surfaces — they're additive aliases, never replacements.\n\n### The unified backend contract\n\nWhen any subdomain is configured (`account.domain`, `cms.domain`, `auth.domain`, `api.domain`, `apps.<n>.domain`), the compiler always emits a unified backend host where **every compiler-emitted backend route** is reachable:\n\n- `/api/v1/*` and `/auth/v1/*` for the default contract, or `/api/v2/*` and\n `/auth/v2/*` when `contract.version` is `\"v2\"`\n- `/storage/*` — R2 file storage\n- `/health`, `/openapi.json` — monitoring/discovery\n- `/account/*`, `/cms/*` — bundled SPAs (when enabled)\n- `/broadcast/v1/*` (realtime), `/mcp` (MCP), etc.\n\nThe unified hostname is `quickback.{baseDomain}` by default (where baseDomain is extracted from your first configured subdomain). Override with `config.domain` if you prefer a different name.\n\nThis contract is forward-pointing: it gives a stable URL pattern for future management tooling — `https://quickback.{baseDomain}/...` will always reach a Quickback backend regardless of how the operator splits their surfaces.\n\n### Dedicated hostnames (optional, additive)\n\nFor branding or operational separation, you can opt specific surfaces onto their own hostnames:\n\n```ts\n{\n // Bundled SPAs on their own hosts (already-shipped pattern):\n cms: { domain: 'cms.example.com' },\n account: { domain: 'account.example.com' },\n\n // v0.33+ — backend surfaces on their own hosts:\n auth: { domain: 'auth.example.com' },\n api: { domain: 'api.example.com' },\n\n // User SPAs (existing pattern):\n apps: {\n www: { domain: 'app.example.com' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nOn a dedicated hostname, **the hostname IS the namespace** — the path drops the prefix that matches the hostname:\n\n| URL on dedicated host | Internally rewritten to | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `https://api.example.com/{version}/users` | `/api/{version}/users` | `{version}` is the selected `v1` or `v2`; the rewriter prepends `/api` |\n| `https://auth.example.com/{version}/sign-in/email` | `/auth/{version}/sign-in/email` | Same selected version with `/auth` |\n| `https://api.example.com/api/{version}/users` | (unchanged) | Long form also accepted |\n| `https://api.example.com/auth/{version}/sign-in` | **404** | Auth doesn't live on the API hostname |\n| `https://api.example.com/health` | (unchanged) | Explicit exception — monitoring agents expect `/health` everywhere |\n\nDual-reach is preserved on the unified host:\n\n| URL on unified host | Handler | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `https://quickback.example.com/api/{version}/users` | feature route | Works for the selected version whether `api.domain` is set or not |\n| `https://quickback.example.com/auth/{version}/sign-in/email` | Better Auth | Works for the selected version whether `auth.domain` is set or not |\n| `https://quickback.example.com/{version}/users` | **404** | Shortcut only applies on dedicated hostnames |\n\nEach dedicated hostname also:\n\n- Gets a `{ pattern, custom_domain: true }` route in `wrangler.toml` automatically\n- Joins `trustedOrigins` for CORS\n- Joins the cross-subdomain cookie inference (auto-enables `crossSubDomainCookies` when ≥2 same-parent subdomains are configured, so `auth.example.com` and `app.example.com` can share session cookies)\n- Joins CSP `connect-src` so SPAs can fetch from it\n\n### Why two URL shapes (Shape 1 vs Shape 2)\n\nIf you only want Better Auth to **advertise** itself on a different URL (e.g. so verification emails link to `auth.example.com` instead of the unified host), set the `BETTER_AUTH_URL` env var on the Worker — no code change required. BA generates outgoing URLs against that value. This is sufficient when the goal is branding email/OAuth callback URLs without changing where requests actually land.\n\n`auth.domain` (Shape 1, above) is the heavier option: it binds an actual hostname to the Worker, configures CORS/cookies/CSP for it, and adds the path-shortcut rewriter. Use it when you want the dedicated hostname as a real ingress, not just a label.\n\n## CMS Configuration\n\nEmbed the [Quickback CMS](/stack/cms) in your compiled Worker. The CMS reads your schema registry and renders a complete admin interface — zero UI code per table.\n\n```typescript\n// Simple — embed CMS at root\ncms: true,\n\n// With custom domain\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\" },\n\n// With access control (only admins can access CMS)\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", access: \"admin\" },\n\n// Cross-tenant DB-admin tier — sysadmins see every tenant's data\ncms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", sysadmin: true },\n```\n\n| Option | Type | Default | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | — | Custom domain for CMS. Adds a `custom_domain` route to `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `access` | `\"user\" \\| \"admin\"` | `\"admin\"` | Controls who can access the CMS. When `\"admin\"`, platform control-plane users (`user.role === \"appmanager\"`) can enter; when `sysadmin` mode is also on, `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` is admitted too. The gate is enforced at the Worker level (SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD all return 403 to callers outside those roles) and in the SPA. Also hides the CMS link in Account UI. See [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) for the full enforcement model. |\n| `sysadmin` | `boolean` | `false` | Cross-tenant DB-admin tier. When `true`, opts into the `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (`user.role === \"sysadmin\"`), the firewall escape hatch (sysadmins bypass tenant scopes, soft-delete still enforced), the cross-tenant `/auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint (sibling of Better Auth's `/auth/v1/admin/list-users`, gated to sysadmin only), and the SPA's \"All organizations\" sentinel. The CMS HTML gate admits `userRole === \"sysadmin\"` alongside `\"appmanager\"`. Off by default. See [`SYSADMIN` pseudo-role](/compiler/definitions/access#sysadmin--cross-tenant-db-admin-tier). |\n\n### Sysadmin tier (`cms.sysadmin: true`)\n\nQuickback's default model assumes every CMS user belongs to at least one organization (`member` row in the auth DB). For platforms that need a Supabase-style cross-tenant DB-admin tool — debugging a tenant's data, running cross-tenant queries, supporting a customer — that's a poor fit: a sysadmin without `member` rows would dead-end, and auto-filling their active org from \"first membership\" silently scopes them to a tenant they have no relationship with.\n\n`cms: { sysadmin: true }` introduces a separate role tier:\n\n- **Role**: `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` (set on the Better Auth user table). Distinct from `\"appmanager\"` — appmanagers keep platform control-plane access (CMS shell, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling), while sysadmins get true cross-tenant data access. `ADMIN` is now a rejected legacy pseudo-role; use `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` for control-plane gates and `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for cross-tenant access.\n- **Firewall**: every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits an `if (ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\") return undefined` (or just the soft-delete predicate when present) at the top, so sysadmins see every tenant's rows. See [Firewall escape hatch](/compiler/definitions/firewall#sysadmin-escape-hatch).\n- **Org listing**: a `GET /auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint selects directly from the auth-schema `organization` table — every row, every tenant. Sits under Better Auth's admin URL namespace (sibling of `/auth/v1/admin/list-users`) so the URL shape matches BA convention; the handler is Quickback-emitted and gated to `user.role === \"sysadmin\"` only. For the membership-bound caller's-orgs listing, use BA's own `/auth/v1/organization/list`.\n- **CMS SPA**: when the user is a sysadmin, the header switcher loads from the cross-tenant endpoint, defaults to \"All organizations\" (which omits `?organizationId=` and reaches the firewall escape), and pins selected tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call. Org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher.\n- **CMS HTML gate**: admits `userRole === \"sysadmin\"` alongside `\"appmanager\"`. Org admins are not locked out when you set `cms.access: \"user\"`; `cms.access: \"admin\"` is specifically the platform control-plane gate.\n\nOff by default. Projects that don't enable it get zero behavior change; setting `cms.sysadmin: true` and granting a user `user.role = \"sysadmin\"` is the only way to unlock the cross-tenant view.\n\n## Account UI Configuration\n\nEmbed the [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) in your compiled Worker. Provides login, signup, profile management, organization management, and admin — all built from your config at compile time.\n\nFor post-signup logic — auto-provisioning a workspace, gating signup, setting an active organization — drop a file in `quickback/hooks/`. See [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks).\n\n```typescript\n// Simple — embed Account UI with defaults\naccount: true,\n\n// Full configuration\naccount: {\n domain: \"auth.example.com\",\n adminDomain: \"admin.example.com\",\n name: \"My App\",\n companyName: \"My Company\",\n auth: {\n password: true,\n emailOTP: false,\n passkey: true,\n organizations: true,\n admin: true,\n },\n},\n```\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `domain` | `string` | Custom domain for Account UI (e.g., `auth.example.com`) |\n| `adminDomain` | `string` | Custom domain for admin-only access (e.g., `admin.example.com`). Serves the same Account SPA — the client-side router handles admin routing. |\n| `appUrl` | `string` | URL of the tenant's main application — where users are redirected after login. Baked into the Account SPA as `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL`. Independent from `domain`. |\n| `name` | `string` | App display name shown on login, profile, and email templates |\n| `companyName` | `string` | Company name for branding |\n| `tagline` | `string` | App tagline shown on login page |\n| `description` | `string` | App description |\n\n### Auth Feature Flags\n\nControl which authentication features are exposed. Disabled features are excluded from the Account UI bundle at compile time (routes removed before the Vite build, keeping bundle sizes minimal) **and** enforced on the server side via the Better Auth config — so \"signup off\" actually closes `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email`, not just the SPA's signup screen.\n\n`account.auth.*` is a shorthand for `providers.auth.config` — the compiler maps each flag onto the Better Auth server config before any code is generated. You can write either side directly; setting both incompatibly (e.g. `account.auth.signup: false` and `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false`) fails the compile with a precise error rather than picking a silent winner.\n\n| Flag | Type | Default | Maps to (server) | Description |\n|------|------|---------|------------------|-------------|\n| `auth.password` | `boolean` | `true` | `emailAndPassword.enabled` | Email/password authentication — both server endpoint and UI |\n| `auth.emailOTP` | `boolean` | `false` | adds `emailOtp` plugin | Email one-time password login — adds plugin server-side, surfaces UI |\n| `auth.passkey` | `boolean` | `false` | adds `passkey` plugin | WebAuthn/FIDO2 passkey authentication — adds plugin server-side, surfaces UI |\n| `auth.signup` | `boolean` | `true` | `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted) | Self-service account registration — false hides the UI **and** rejects the server endpoint with 403 |\n| `auth.organizations` | `boolean` | `true` | UI surface only | Organization management UI (dashboard, invitations, roles). Server-side organization support stays on regardless; set `features.pinnedOrganizationId` when you want one fixed org with no switching UI |\n| `auth.admin` | `boolean` | `false` | UI surface only | Admin panel for user management in the Account SPA. The Better Auth admin plugin is compiler-managed separately from this UI toggle |\n| `auth.emailVerification` | `boolean` | `false` | `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification` | Require email verification before sessions are issued. False = sessions usable immediately after signup |\n\n## Trusted Origins\n\nList of origins allowed to make cross-origin requests to your API. Required when your CMS, Account UI, or frontend app run on different domains.\n\n```typescript\ntrustedOrigins: [\n \"https://auth.example.com\",\n \"https://admin.example.com\",\n \"https://cms.example.com\",\n \"https://app.example.com\",\n],\n```\n\n## Local Development\n\nConfigure local development URLs. These are automatically added to the trusted origins list for CORS and Better Auth, so authentication works out of the box during local development.\n\n```typescript\ndev: {\n port: 8787, // wrangler dev port (default: 8787)\n api: \"http://localhost:8787\", // API backend URL\n cms: \"http://localhost:8787/cms\", // CMS URL (path on same worker)\n account: \"http://localhost:8787/account\", // Account URL (path on same worker)\n},\n```\n\nIf you run a SPA standalone on its own Vite dev server, set its URL here so CORS allows it:\n\n```typescript\ndev: {\n port: 8787,\n api: \"http://localhost:8787\",\n account: \"http://localhost:5173\", // standalone Account dev server\n},\n```\n\n| Field | Type | Default | Description |\n|-------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `port` | `number` | `8787` | Local dev server port (sets `[dev].port` in wrangler.toml) |\n| `api` | `string` | `http://localhost:{port}` | API backend URL |\n| `cms` | `string` | — | CMS dev URL (added to trusted origins if set) |\n| `account` | `string` | — | Account dev URL (added to trusted origins if set) |\n\n## Email Configuration\n\nConfigure email delivery for authentication emails (verification, password reset, invitations).\n\n> **Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta** and is Quickback's default transport for Cloudflare deploys. The Workers `send_email` binding is zero-config — no API keys, no third-party accounts. AWS SES remains supported as an explicit opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups.\n\n```typescript\n// Cloudflare Email Service (default) — uses send_email binding, no API keys needed\nemail: {\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n},\n\n// AWS SES — requires AWS credentials set as Wrangler secrets\nemail: {\n provider: \"aws-ses\",\n region: \"us-east-2\",\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n},\n```\n\n| Field | Type | Default | Description |\n|-------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `provider` | `\"cloudflare\" \\| \"aws-ses\"` | `\"cloudflare\"` | Email transport |\n| `from` | `string` | `\"noreply@example.com\"` | Sender email address |\n| `fromName` | `string` | `\"{name} \\| Account Services\"` | Sender display name |\n| `region` | `string` | `\"us-east-2\"` | AWS SES region (aws-ses only) |\n\n### Auto-wiring\n\nFor the Cloudflare provider (the default), the compiler automatically:\n- Emits `[[send_email]] EMAIL` into `wrangler.toml`\n- Generates `src/lib/cloudflare-email.ts`\n- Wires `sendResetPassword`, `sendVerificationEmail`, `sendInvitationEmail`, etc. into Better Auth\n- Types the binding with Cloudflare's native `SendEmail` / `EmailSendResult`\n contract (`{ email, name }`, `replyTo`, and `contentId` on Workers). The REST\n helper remains a separate `{ address, name }` / `reply_to` / `content_id`\n contract.\n- Anchors each authentication delivery to `executionCtx.waitUntil(...)`. The\n background promise records a structured generic failure and stays rejected;\n outside a Worker request, the callback returns the observed promise for the\n caller to await. Every Cloudflare Email callback is wired through that shared\n scheduler exactly once, so no auth action can bypass failure observation or\n double-schedule the send. Provider error bodies are never written to\n generated logs.\n\n…whenever any auth surface needs to send mail — `emailAndPassword.enabled`, the `emailOtp` / `magicLink` / `organization` plugins — or you set the top-level `email: {…}` config. You don't need to add `bindings.sendEmail` by hand for the standard cases.\n\n> **Cloudflare Email Routing setup is required.** The binding alone does not deliver mail. Enable Email Routing on the sending zone and add at least one verified destination address ([Cloudflare docs](https://developers.cloudflare.com/email-routing/get-started/)). Otherwise sends fail at runtime even with the binding present and the `/auth/v1/ses/status` check passing locally.\n\n## Multi-Domain Example\n\nA complete config with CMS, Account UI, and Admin on separate subdomains:\n\n```typescript\nexport default {\n name: \"my-app\",\n template: \"hono\",\n cms: { domain: \"cms.example.com\", access: \"admin\" },\n account: {\n domain: \"auth.example.com\",\n adminDomain: \"admin.example.com\",\n name: \"My App\",\n companyName: \"Example Inc.\",\n auth: {\n password: true,\n emailOTP: false,\n passkey: true,\n organizations: false,\n admin: true,\n },\n },\n email: {\n from: \"noreply@example.com\",\n fromName: \"My App\",\n },\n trustedOrigins: [\n \"https://auth.example.com\",\n \"https://admin.example.com\",\n \"https://cms.example.com\",\n \"https://example.com\",\n ],\n providers: {\n runtime: { name: \"cloudflare\", config: {\n routes: [{ pattern: \"api.example.com\", custom_domain: true }],\n }},\n database: { name: \"cloudflare-d1\", config: { binding: \"DB\" } },\n auth: { name: \"better-auth\", config: { plugins: [\"admin\"] } },\n },\n};\n```\n\nThis produces a single Cloudflare Worker serving five domains. See [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) for details on hostname routing, cross-subdomain cookies, and the unified fallback domain.\n\n---\n\nSee the sub-pages for detailed reference on each section:\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Runtime, database, and auth options\n- [Variables](/compiler/config/variables) — Environment variables and flags\n- [Output](/compiler/config/output) — Generated file structure\n- [Pinned Organization Mode](/compiler/config/single-tenant) — Fixed-org deployments without org switching UI\n- [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) — Custom domains, hostname routing, and cross-subdomain auth"
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"content": "The compiler generates a complete project structure based on your definitions and provider configuration. The output varies depending on your runtime (Cloudflare vs Bun) and enabled features.\n\n**Warning:** Never edit files in `src/` directly. They are overwritten on every compile. Make changes in your `quickback/` definitions instead.\n\n## Cloudflare Output\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── index.ts # Hono app entry point (Workers export)\n├── env.d.ts # Cloudflare bindings TypeScript types\n├── db/\n│ ├── index.ts # Database connection factory\n│ ├── auth-schema.ts # Auth table schemas (dual mode)\n│ └── features-schema.ts # Feature table schemas (dual mode)\n├── auth/\n│ └── index.ts # Better Auth instance & config\n├── features/\n│ └── {feature}/\n│ ├── schema.ts # Drizzle table definition\n│ ├── routes.ts # CRUD + action endpoints\n│ └── actions.ts # Action handlers (if defined)\n├── lib/\n│ ├── access.ts # Access control helpers\n│ ├── types.ts # Runtime type definitions\n│ ├── masks.ts # Field masking utilities\n│ ├── services.ts # Service layer\n│ ├── audit-wrapper.ts # Auto-inject audit fields\n│ └── security-audit.ts # Unsafe cross-tenant audit logger (when needed)\n└── middleware/\n ├── auth.ts # Auth context middleware\n ├── db.ts # Database instance middleware\n └── services.ts # Service injection middleware\n\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── auth/ # Auth migrations (dual mode)\n│ ├── meta/\n│ │ ├── _journal.json\n│ │ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n│ └── 0000_initial.sql\n├── features/ # Feature migrations (dual mode)\n│ ├── meta/\n│ │ ├── _journal.json\n│ │ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n│ └── 0000_initial.sql\n└── audit/ # Unsafe cross-tenant action audit migrations (when needed)\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_initial.sql\n\n# Root config files\n├── package.json\n├── tsconfig.json\n├── wrangler.toml # Cloudflare Workers config\n├── drizzle.config.ts # Features DB drizzle config\n├── drizzle.auth.config.ts # Auth DB drizzle config (dual mode)\n└── drizzle.audit.config.ts # Audit DB drizzle config (when unsafe actions exist)\n```\n\n## Bun Output\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── index.ts # Hono app entry point (Bun server)\n├── db/\n│ ├── index.ts # SQLite connection (bun:sqlite)\n│ └── schema.ts # Combined schema (single DB)\n├── auth/\n│ └── index.ts # Better Auth instance\n├── features/\n│ └── {feature}/\n│ ├── schema.ts\n│ ├── routes.ts\n│ └── actions.ts\n├── lib/\n│ ├── access.ts\n│ ├── types.ts\n│ ├── masks.ts\n│ ├── services.ts\n│ └── audit-wrapper.ts\n└── middleware/\n ├── auth.ts\n ├── db.ts\n └── services.ts\n\nquickback/drizzle/ # Single migration directory\n├── meta/\n│ ├── _journal.json\n│ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n└── 0000_initial.sql\n\ndata/ # SQLite database files\n└── app.db\n\n├── package.json\n├── tsconfig.json\n└── drizzle.config.ts\n```\n\n## Key Differences by Runtime\n\n| Aspect | Cloudflare | Bun |\n|--------|-----------|-----|\n| Entry point | Workers `export default` | `Bun.serve()` with port |\n| Database | D1 bindings (dual mode) | SQLite file (single DB) |\n| Types | `env.d.ts` for bindings | No extra types needed |\n| Config | `wrangler.toml` | `.env` file |\n| Migrations | `quickback/drizzle/auth/` + `quickback/drizzle/features/` | `quickback/drizzle/` |\n| Drizzle configs | 2 configs (auth + features) | 1 config |\n\n## Optional Output Files\n\nThese files are generated only when the corresponding features are configured:\n\n### Embeddings\n\nWhen any feature has `embeddings` configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── lib/\n│ └── embeddings.ts # Embedding helpers\n├── routes/\n│ └── embeddings.ts # POST /api/v1/embeddings endpoint\n└── queue-consumer.ts # Queue handler for async embedding jobs\n```\n\n### File Storage (R2)\n\nWhen `fileStorage` is configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── routes/\n └── storage.ts # File upload/download endpoints\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── files/ # File metadata migrations\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n```\n\n### Webhooks\n\nWhen webhooks are enabled:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── lib/\n └── webhooks/\n ├── index.ts # Webhook module entry\n ├── sign.ts # Webhook payload signing\n ├── handlers.ts # Handler registry\n ├── emit.ts # Queue emission helpers\n ├── routes.ts # Inbound/outbound endpoints\n └── providers/\n ├── index.ts\n └── stripe.ts # Stripe webhook handler\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── webhooks/ # Webhook schema migrations\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n```\n\n### Security Audit Database (Unsafe Actions)\n\nWhen any action enables unsafe cross-tenant mode (`unsafe.crossTenant: true`):\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── db/\n│ └── audit-schema.ts # audit_events table\n└── lib/\n └── security-audit.ts # mandatory audit writer\n\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── audit/\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n\n# Root\n└── drizzle.audit.config.ts\n```\n\nCloudflare output also includes an `AUDIT_DB` D1 binding in `wrangler.toml` and migration scripts:\n\n- `db:migrate:audit:local`\n- `db:migrate:audit:remote`\n\n### Security Contract Report and Signature\n\nGenerated on every compile (unless disabled via `compiler.securityContracts.report.enabled: false`):\n\n```\nreports/\n├── security-contracts.report.json # Contract evaluation summary + violations\n└── security-contracts.report.sig.json # Signature / digest envelope for the report\n```\n\nThe signature file uses HMAC-SHA256 when a signing key is configured, otherwise it falls back to SHA-256 digest mode. \nSet `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required: true` to fail compilation when a signing key is missing.\n\n### Realtime\n\nWhen any feature has `realtime` configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── lib/\n│ ├── realtime.ts # Broadcast helpers\n│ ├── Broadcaster.ts # Durable Object class (inline in main worker)\n│ └── ws-ticket.ts # WebSocket ticket auth utility\n└── routes/\n └── ws-ticket.ts # POST /realtime/v1/ws-ticket endpoint\n```\n\nThe Broadcaster DO class is exported from your main worker entry point and runs inline — no separate `cloudflare-workers/broadcast/` deployment needed.\n\n### Device Authorization\n\nWhen the `deviceAuthorization` plugin is enabled:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── routes/\n └── cli-auth.ts # Device auth flow endpoints\n```\n\n## Database Schemas\n\n### Dual Database Mode (Cloudflare Default)\n\nThe compiler separates schemas into two files:\n\n**`src/db/auth-schema.ts`** — Re-exports Better Auth table schemas:\n- `users`, `sessions`, `accounts`\n- `organizations`, `members`, `invitations` (if organizations enabled)\n- Plugin-specific tables (`apiKeys`, etc.)\n\n**`src/db/features-schema.ts`** — Re-exports your feature schemas:\n- All tables defined with `defineTable()`\n- Audit field columns added automatically\n\n### Single Database Mode (Bun Default)\n\n**`src/db/schema.ts`** — Combined re-export of all schemas (auth + features).\n\n## Generated Routes\n\nFor each feature, the compiler generates a routes file at `src/features/{name}/routes.ts` containing:\n\n| Route | Generated When |\n|-------|----------------|\n| `GET /` | `crud.list` configured |\n| `GET /:id` | `crud.get` configured |\n| `POST /` | `crud.create` configured |\n| `PATCH /:id` | `crud.update` configured |\n| `DELETE /:id` | `crud.delete` configured |\n| `PUT /:id` | `crud.put` configured |\n| `POST /batch` | `crud.create` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `PATCH /batch` | `crud.update` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `DELETE /batch` | `crud.delete` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `PUT /batch` | `crud.put` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `GET /views/{name}` | `views` configured |\n| `POST /:id/{action}` | Record-based actions defined |\n| `POST /{action}` | Standalone actions defined |\n\nAll routes are mounted under `/api/v1/{feature}` in the main app.\n\n## Migrations\n\nThe compiler runs `drizzle-kit generate` during compilation to produce SQL migration files. On subsequent compiles, it uses `existingFiles` (your current migration state) to generate only incremental changes.\n\nThe CLI loads migration meta JSON from one location only — `<project>/quickback/drizzle/`:\n\n- `quickback/drizzle/auth/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/features/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/files/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/webhooks/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/audit/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/meta/` (single-database mode)\n\nQuickback owns this state — nothing under a project-root `drizzle/` folder is ever read or written.\n\nMigration and report artifacts are written to the `quickback/` state directory:\n\n- `quickback/drizzle/...` for Drizzle migration SQL/meta artifacts\n- `quickback/reports/...` for security contract report artifacts\n\nFor non-interactive environments (cloud compile, CI), table/column renames must be declared with `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`. This avoids interactive rename prompts during migration generation.\n\nMigration files follow the Drizzle Kit naming convention:\n```\n0000_initial.sql\n0001_add_status_column.sql\n0002_create_orders_table.sql\n```\n\n## CMS and Account UI Assets\n\nWhen `cms` and/or `account` are enabled, the compiler builds the SPAs from source at compile time and includes the assets in the output.\n\nEach SPA is placed in its own subdirectory under `src/apps/`:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/ # Root assets directory\n├── cms/ # CMS SPA (served at /cms/ on unified domain)\n│ ├── index.html\n│ └── assets/\n│ ├── app.abc123.js # Content-hashed filenames from Vite\n│ └── app.xyz456.css\n└── account/ # Account SPA (served at /account/ on unified domain)\n ├── index.html\n └── assets/\n ├── app.def789.js\n └── app.ghi012.css\n```\n\nOn custom domains, each SPA is served at root (`/`) via hostname-based routing. On the unified domain, CMS is at `/cms/` and Account is at `/account/`.\n\n### Static Assets (`quickback/public/`)\n\nAnything you drop under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile. The compiler does not parse, template, or otherwise touch these files — they are bytes that ride past it into the Cloudflare ASSETS binding.\n\n```\nquickback/public/ # Source — checked into your repo\n├── favicon.ico\n├── robots.txt\n├── og/\n│ └── og-image.png\n└── pdfs/\n └── whitepaper.pdf\n```\n\nAfter compile:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/ # Destination — written by the CLI\n├── favicon.ico # Served at https://your-domain/favicon.ico\n├── robots.txt # Served at /robots.txt\n├── og/og-image.png # Served at /og/og-image.png\n├── pdfs/whitepaper.pdf\n├── cms/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n└── account/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n```\n\nNotes:\n\n- The folder is optional. If it doesn't exist, this step is a no-op.\n- Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear from `src/apps/` on the next compile — `src/` is wiped and rewritten each run.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, `.git/`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- A file in `quickback/public/` that would overwrite a compiler-emitted path (e.g. `quickback/public/cms/index.html`) fails the compile with a clear error rather than silently shadowing the SPA shell.\n- Binaries (images, fonts, PDFs) are copied byte-for-byte — there is no string round-trip.\n\n### Source Apps (`quickback/apps/`)\n\nFor hand-authored TypeScript apps and prebuilt SPA bundles that live alongside the compiler-emitted SPA shells, drop them under `quickback/apps/<name>/`. The CLI copies the tree into `src/apps/<name>/` on every compile, byte-for-byte, after the compiler has finished writing. Bind a directory to a hostname via [`config.apps`](/compiler/config/domains#app-domains) — the compiler emits the matching Worker middleware automatically.\n\n```\nquickback/apps/ # Source — checked into your repo\n├── m/ # A hand-authored mobile companion app\n│ ├── index.tsx\n│ ├── components/Button.tsx\n│ └── lib/utils.ts\n└── admin/ # A hand-authored admin tool\n └── index.tsx\n```\n\nAfter compile:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/\n├── m/index.tsx # Hand-authored — preserved across compiles\n├── m/components/Button.tsx\n├── m/lib/utils.ts\n├── admin/index.tsx\n├── cms/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n└── account/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n```\n\nWhen to choose `apps/` vs `public/`:\n\n| | `quickback/public/` | `quickback/apps/` |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Use for** | Static binaries (logos, fonts, OG images, PDFs, robots.txt) | Hand-authored TS/TSX/JS app source |\n| **Skips** | Hidden entries only (`.DS_Store`, `.git/`) | Hidden entries + `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `build/`, `.next/`, `.turbo/`, `.cache/` |\n| **Folder layout** | Files at any depth — flat or nested | Apps under named subfolders (`m/`, `admin/`, …) |\n\nNotes:\n\n- The folder is optional. If it doesn't exist, this step is a no-op.\n- Files removed from `quickback/apps/<name>/` disappear from `src/apps/<name>/` on the next compile — `src/` is wiped and rewritten each run.\n- A file in `quickback/apps/` that would overwrite a compiler-emitted path (e.g. `quickback/apps/cms/index.tsx` while `cms: true`) fails the compile with a clear error.\n- Migrating from hand-edited `src/apps/<name>/`: move the entire folder under `quickback/apps/<name>/` once, then trust the compile cycle. The hermetic `src/` contract holds again.\n\n### Generated Wrangler Assets Config\n\nThe compiler always generates `run_worker_first = true` when SPAs are enabled — the Worker handles all SPA routing (per hostname and per path prefix):\n\n```toml\n[assets]\nbinding = \"ASSETS\"\ndirectory = \"src/apps\"\nnot_found_handling = \"none\"\nrun_worker_first = true\n```\n\nSee [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) for details on hostname routing.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Configure runtime, database, and auth providers\n- [Environment variables](/compiler/config/variables) — Required variables by runtime\n- [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) — Custom domains and hostname routing"
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"content": "The compiler generates a complete project structure based on your definitions and provider configuration. The output varies depending on your runtime (Cloudflare vs Bun) and enabled features.\n\n**Warning:** Never edit files in `src/` directly. They are overwritten on every compile. Make changes in your `quickback/` definitions instead.\n\n## Cloudflare Output\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── index.ts # Hono app entry point (Workers export)\n├── env.d.ts # Cloudflare bindings TypeScript types\n├── db/\n│ ├── index.ts # Database connection factory\n│ ├── auth-schema.ts # Auth table schemas (dual mode)\n│ └── features-schema.ts # Feature table schemas (dual mode)\n├── auth/\n│ └── index.ts # Better Auth instance & config\n├── features/\n│ └── {feature}/\n│ ├── schema.ts # Drizzle table definition\n│ ├── routes.ts # CRUD + action endpoints\n│ └── actions.ts # Action handlers (if defined)\n├── lib/\n│ ├── access.ts # Access control helpers\n│ ├── types.ts # Runtime type definitions\n│ ├── masks.ts # Field masking utilities\n│ ├── services.ts # Service layer\n│ ├── audit-wrapper.ts # Auto-inject audit fields\n│ └── security-audit.ts # Unsafe cross-tenant audit logger (when needed)\n└── middleware/\n ├── auth.ts # Auth context middleware\n ├── db.ts # Database instance middleware\n └── services.ts # Service injection middleware\n\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── auth/ # Auth migrations (dual mode)\n│ ├── meta/\n│ │ ├── _journal.json\n│ │ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n│ └── 0000_initial.sql\n├── features/ # Feature migrations (dual mode)\n│ ├── meta/\n│ │ ├── _journal.json\n│ │ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n│ └── 0000_initial.sql\n└── audit/ # Unsafe cross-tenant action audit migrations (when needed)\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_initial.sql\n\n# Root config files\n├── package.json\n├── tsconfig.json\n├── wrangler.toml # Cloudflare Workers config\n├── drizzle.config.ts # Features DB drizzle config\n├── drizzle.auth.config.ts # Auth DB drizzle config (dual mode)\n└── drizzle.audit.config.ts # Audit DB drizzle config (when unsafe actions exist)\n```\n\n## Bun Output\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── index.ts # Hono app entry point (Bun server)\n├── db/\n│ ├── index.ts # SQLite connection (bun:sqlite)\n│ └── schema.ts # Combined schema (single DB)\n├── auth/\n│ └── index.ts # Better Auth instance\n├── features/\n│ └── {feature}/\n│ ├── schema.ts\n│ ├── routes.ts\n│ └── actions.ts\n├── lib/\n│ ├── access.ts\n│ ├── types.ts\n│ ├── masks.ts\n│ ├── services.ts\n│ └── audit-wrapper.ts\n└── middleware/\n ├── auth.ts\n ├── db.ts\n └── services.ts\n\nquickback/drizzle/ # Single migration directory\n├── meta/\n│ ├── _journal.json\n│ └── 0000_snapshot.json\n└── 0000_initial.sql\n\ndata/ # SQLite database files\n└── app.db\n\n├── package.json\n├── tsconfig.json\n└── drizzle.config.ts\n```\n\n## Key Differences by Runtime\n\n| Aspect | Cloudflare | Bun |\n|--------|-----------|-----|\n| Entry point | Workers `export default` | `Bun.serve()` with port |\n| Database | D1 bindings (dual mode) | SQLite file (single DB) |\n| Types | `env.d.ts` for bindings | No extra types needed |\n| Config | `wrangler.toml` | `.env` file |\n| Migrations | `quickback/drizzle/auth/` + `quickback/drizzle/features/` | `quickback/drizzle/` |\n| Drizzle configs | 2 configs (auth + features) | 1 config |\n\n## Generated Package Dependency Security\n\nFor projects using Better Auth, the generated `package.json` keeps the stable\n`auth@1.6.x` development dependency that provides the `better-auth` executable\nused by `auth:schema`. It also emits this npm override:\n\n```json\n{\n \"overrides\": {\n \"lodash\": \"4.18.1\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe override lifts the CLI's dev-only Prisma schema-parser chain off Lodash\nversions affected by the 2026 code-injection and prototype-pollution\nadvisories. It does not change the Better Auth runtime package or generated\nauthentication behavior. Quickback preserves unrelated overrides already in\nyour package manifest, but the compiler-owned Lodash security pin wins if an\nexisting override conflicts.\n\nAfter recompiling, run your package manager's install command so its lockfile\nrecords the patched transitive version. Use `npm audit --omit=dev` when\nevaluating the production dependency tree; development-tool advisories are a\nseparate review surface.\n\nFor Better Auth projects, `quickback compile` owns auth-schema generation.\nThe generated `build` script runs TypeScript only and never rewrites\n`src/auth/schema.ts`, so build and deployment preflight checks preserve a clean\ngenerated worktree. `auth:schema` remains an explicit diagnostic command; run\n`quickback compile` afterward to restore canonical generated bytes.\n\nOn recompilation, Quickback replaces commands for script names it generates,\nincluding `build`, with the current compiler output. Scripts with other names\nare treated as project customizations and preserved. This lets existing\nprojects acquire build and deployment fixes without losing unrelated tooling.\n\n## Optional Output Files\n\nThese files are generated only when the corresponding features are configured:\n\n### Embeddings\n\nWhen any feature has `embeddings` configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── lib/\n│ └── embeddings.ts # Embedding helpers\n├── routes/\n│ └── embeddings.ts # POST /api/{v1|v2}/embeddings endpoint\n└── queue-consumer.ts # Queue handler for async embedding jobs\n```\n\n### File Storage (R2)\n\nWhen `fileStorage` is configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── routes/\n └── storage.ts # File upload/download endpoints\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── files/ # File metadata migrations\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n```\n\n### Webhooks\n\nWhen webhooks are enabled:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── lib/\n └── webhooks/\n ├── index.ts # Webhook module entry\n ├── sign.ts # Webhook payload signing\n ├── handlers.ts # Handler registry\n ├── emit.ts # Queue emission helpers\n ├── routes.ts # Inbound/outbound endpoints\n └── providers/\n ├── index.ts\n └── stripe.ts # Stripe webhook handler\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── webhooks/ # Webhook schema migrations\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n```\n\n### Security Audit Database (Unsafe Actions)\n\nWhen any action enables unsafe cross-tenant mode (`unsafe.crossTenant: true`):\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── db/\n│ └── audit-schema.ts # audit_events table\n└── lib/\n └── security-audit.ts # mandatory audit writer\n\nquickback/drizzle/\n└── audit/\n ├── meta/\n └── 0000_*.sql\n\n# Root\n└── drizzle.audit.config.ts\n```\n\nCloudflare output also includes an `AUDIT_DB` D1 binding in `wrangler.toml` and migration scripts:\n\n- `db:migrate:audit:local`\n- `db:migrate:audit:remote`\n\n### Security Contract Report and Signature\n\nGenerated on every compile (unless disabled via `compiler.securityContracts.report.enabled: false`):\n\n```\nreports/\n├── security-contracts.report.json # Contract evaluation summary + violations\n└── security-contracts.report.sig.json # Signature / digest envelope for the report\n```\n\nThe signature file uses HMAC-SHA256 when a signing key is configured, otherwise it falls back to SHA-256 digest mode. \nSet `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required: true` to fail compilation when a signing key is missing.\n\n### Realtime\n\nWhen any feature has `realtime` configured:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── lib/\n│ ├── realtime.ts # Broadcast helpers\n│ ├── Broadcaster.ts # Durable Object class (inline in main worker)\n│ └── ws-ticket.ts # WebSocket ticket auth utility\n└── routes/\n └── ws-ticket.ts # POST /realtime/v1/ws-ticket endpoint\n```\n\nThe Broadcaster DO class is exported from your main worker entry point and runs inline — no separate `cloudflare-workers/broadcast/` deployment needed.\n\n### Device Authorization\n\nWhen the `deviceAuthorization` plugin is enabled:\n\n```\nsrc/\n└── routes/\n └── cli-auth.ts # Device auth flow endpoints\n```\n\n## Database Schemas\n\n### Dual Database Mode (Cloudflare Default)\n\nThe compiler separates schemas into two files:\n\n**`src/db/auth-schema.ts`** — Re-exports Better Auth table schemas:\n- `users`, `sessions`, `accounts`\n- `organizations`, `members`, `invitations` (if organizations enabled)\n- Plugin-specific tables (`apiKeys`, etc.)\n\n**`src/db/features-schema.ts`** — Re-exports your feature schemas:\n- All tables defined with `defineTable()`\n- Audit field columns added automatically\n\n### Single Database Mode (Bun Default)\n\n**`src/db/schema.ts`** — Combined re-export of all schemas (auth + features).\n\n## Generated Routes\n\nFor each feature, the compiler generates a routes file at `src/features/{name}/routes.ts` containing:\n\n| Route | Generated When |\n|-------|----------------|\n| `GET /` | `crud.list` configured |\n| `GET /:id` | `crud.get` configured |\n| `POST /` | `crud.create` configured |\n| `PATCH /:id` | `crud.update` configured |\n| `DELETE /:id` | `crud.delete` configured |\n| `PUT /:id` | `crud.put` configured |\n| `POST /batch` | `crud.create` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `PATCH /batch` | `crud.update` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `DELETE /batch` | `crud.delete` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `PUT /batch` | `crud.put` exists (auto-enabled) |\n| `GET /views/{name}` | `views` configured |\n| `POST /:id/{action}` | Record-based actions defined |\n| `POST /{action}` | Standalone actions defined |\n\nRoutes are mounted under `/api/v1/{feature}` for the default contract or\n`/api/v2/{feature}` when `contract: { version: \"v2\" }` is selected.\n\n## Migrations\n\nThe compiler runs the project-local `drizzle-kit generate` binary during compilation to produce SQL migration files. On subsequent compiles, it uses `existingFiles` (your current migration state) to generate only incremental changes.\n\nIf a compiler response returns migration generation as a post-compile command,\nthe command matches `build.packageManager`: `npm exec`, `pnpm exec`, `yarn exec`,\nor `bun run`. These forms resolve the binary from the generated project's\ndependencies. The npm form runs offline and declines npm's missing package\ninstall prompt, so Quickback never downloads an unpinned Drizzle CLI as a\nfallback. If the local binary is missing, install the generated project's\ndependencies and compile again.\n\nThe CLI loads migration meta JSON from one location only — `<project>/quickback/drizzle/`:\n\n- `quickback/drizzle/auth/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/features/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/files/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/webhooks/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/audit/meta/`\n- `quickback/drizzle/meta/` (single-database mode)\n\nQuickback owns this state — nothing under a project-root `drizzle/` folder is ever read or written.\n\nMigration and report artifacts are written to the `quickback/` state directory:\n\n- `quickback/drizzle/...` for Drizzle migration SQL/meta artifacts\n- `quickback/reports/...` for security contract report artifacts\n\nFor non-interactive environments (cloud compile, CI), table/column renames must be declared with `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`. This avoids interactive rename prompts during migration generation.\n\nMigration files follow the Drizzle Kit naming convention:\n```\n0000_initial.sql\n0001_add_status_column.sql\n0002_create_orders_table.sql\n```\n\n## CMS and Account UI Assets\n\nWhen `cms` and/or `account` are enabled, the compiler builds the SPAs from source at compile time and includes the assets in the output.\n\nEach SPA is placed in its own subdirectory under `src/apps/`:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/ # Root assets directory\n├── cms/ # CMS SPA (served at /cms/ on unified domain)\n│ ├── index.html\n│ └── assets/\n│ ├── app.abc123.js # Content-hashed filenames from Vite\n│ └── app.xyz456.css\n└── account/ # Account SPA (served at /account/ on unified domain)\n ├── index.html\n └── assets/\n ├── app.def789.js\n └── app.ghi012.css\n```\n\nOn custom domains, each SPA is served at root (`/`) via hostname-based routing. On the unified domain, CMS is at `/cms/` and Account is at `/account/`.\n\n### Static Assets (`quickback/public/`)\n\nAnything you drop under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile. The compiler does not parse, template, or otherwise touch these files — they are bytes that ride past it into the Cloudflare ASSETS binding.\n\n```\nquickback/public/ # Source — checked into your repo\n├── favicon.ico\n├── robots.txt\n├── og/\n│ └── og-image.png\n└── pdfs/\n └── whitepaper.pdf\n```\n\nAfter compile:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/ # Destination — written by the CLI\n├── favicon.ico # Served at https://your-domain/favicon.ico\n├── robots.txt # Served at /robots.txt\n├── og/og-image.png # Served at /og/og-image.png\n├── pdfs/whitepaper.pdf\n├── cms/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n└── account/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n```\n\nNotes:\n\n- The folder is optional. If it doesn't exist, this step is a no-op.\n- Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear from `src/apps/` on the next compile — `src/` is wiped and rewritten each run.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, `.git/`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- A file in `quickback/public/` that would overwrite a compiler-emitted path (e.g. `quickback/public/cms/index.html`) fails the compile with a clear error rather than silently shadowing the SPA shell.\n- Binaries (images, fonts, PDFs) are copied byte-for-byte — there is no string round-trip.\n\n### Source Apps (`quickback/apps/`)\n\nFor hand-authored TypeScript apps and prebuilt SPA bundles that live alongside the compiler-emitted SPA shells, drop them under `quickback/apps/<name>/`. The CLI copies the tree into `src/apps/<name>/` on every compile, byte-for-byte, after the compiler has finished writing. Bind a directory to a hostname via [`config.apps`](/compiler/config/domains#app-domains) — the compiler emits the matching Worker middleware automatically.\n\n```\nquickback/apps/ # Source — checked into your repo\n├── m/ # A hand-authored mobile companion app\n│ ├── index.tsx\n│ ├── components/Button.tsx\n│ └── lib/utils.ts\n└── admin/ # A hand-authored admin tool\n └── index.tsx\n```\n\nAfter compile:\n\n```\nsrc/apps/\n├── m/index.tsx # Hand-authored — preserved across compiles\n├── m/components/Button.tsx\n├── m/lib/utils.ts\n├── admin/index.tsx\n├── cms/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n└── account/ # Compiler-emitted SPA (don't shadow)\n```\n\nWhen to choose `apps/` vs `public/`:\n\n| | `quickback/public/` | `quickback/apps/` |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Use for** | Static binaries (logos, fonts, OG images, PDFs, robots.txt) | Hand-authored TS/TSX/JS app source |\n| **Skips** | Hidden entries only (`.DS_Store`, `.git/`) | Hidden entries + `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `build/`, `.next/`, `.turbo/`, `.cache/` |\n| **Folder layout** | Files at any depth — flat or nested | Apps under named subfolders (`m/`, `admin/`, …) |\n\nNotes:\n\n- The folder is optional. If it doesn't exist, this step is a no-op.\n- Files removed from `quickback/apps/<name>/` disappear from `src/apps/<name>/` on the next compile — `src/` is wiped and rewritten each run.\n- A file in `quickback/apps/` that would overwrite a compiler-emitted path (e.g. `quickback/apps/cms/index.tsx` while `cms: true`) fails the compile with a clear error.\n- Migrating from hand-edited `src/apps/<name>/`: move the entire folder under `quickback/apps/<name>/` once, then trust the compile cycle. The hermetic `src/` contract holds again.\n\n### Generated Wrangler Assets Config\n\nThe compiler always generates `run_worker_first = true` when SPAs are enabled — the Worker handles all SPA routing (per hostname and per path prefix):\n\n```toml\n[assets]\nbinding = \"ASSETS\"\ndirectory = \"src/apps\"\nnot_found_handling = \"none\"\nrun_worker_first = true\n```\n\nSee [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) for details on hostname routing.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Configure runtime, database, and auth providers\n- [Environment variables](/compiler/config/variables) — Required variables by runtime\n- [Multi-Domain Architecture](/compiler/config/domains) — Custom domains and hostname routing"
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"content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\nThe Quickback Stack is **Cloudflare-only**. `cloudflare` is the single supported runtime.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n### Runtime Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `compatibilityDate` | `string` | Emits Cloudflare `compatibility_date` in `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `placement.mode` | `\"smart\" \\| \"standard\"` | Emits Cloudflare's `[placement]` block. |\n| `observability.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits top-level Workers Logs persistence under `[observability]`. |\n| `observability.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Top-level Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.logs]`. |\n| `observability.logs.invocationLogs` | `boolean` | Enables or suppresses invocation logs. |\n| `observability.logs.destinations` | `string[]` | Named log export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.logs.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported logs in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `observability.traces.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.traces]`. |\n| `observability.traces.destinations` | `string[]` | Named trace export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.traces.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Traces sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.traces.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported traces in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `routes` | `{ pattern, custom_domain? }[]` | Custom domain routes for the generated Worker. |\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\", {\n compatibilityDate: \"2026-05-13\",\n placement: { mode: \"smart\" },\n observability: {\n enabled: true,\n logs: {\n enabled: true,\n invocationLogs: false,\n destinations: [\"logs-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.6,\n },\n traces: {\n enabled: true,\n destinations: [\"otel-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.05,\n persist: false,\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\nTwo databases are supported, both Cloudflare-native:\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite at the edge) |\n| `neon` | Neon serverless PostgreSQL (`@neondatabase/serverless` over HTTP) |\n\nOne database provider per app: auth tables and feature tables always share the\nselected database. On `neon`, Better Auth uses its PostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter\nin the same Postgres database as your features; on `cloudflare-d1`, both use\nD1. A per-service map (`database: { auth: ..., features: ... }`) is rejected at\ncompile time — mixed database providers are not supported.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\nOptions from `splitDatabases` down apply to `cloudflare-d1` only — Neon uses a\nsingle Postgres database with no bindings or split mode (see\n[Neon options](#neon-options) below).\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases (D1 only) |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `experimentalRemote` | `{ auth?, features?, audit?, webhooks?, files? }` | `{}` | Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag for `wrangler dev` (see [below](#sharing-deployed-d1-in-dev-experimental_remote)) |\n| `realtime` | `boolean \\| { enabled?, wsTicket? }` | `false` | Enables the Broadcaster Durable Object and optional resource-scoped ws-ticket auth (see [below](#realtime-broadcast-config)) |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Neon Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `connectionMode` | `\"auto\" \\| \"http\" \\| \"websocket\"` | `\"auto\"` | How the generated runtime connects (`auto` detects the runtime) |\n| `pooled` | `boolean` | `true` | Use the pooled Neon connection string (recommended for Workers) |\n\nThe Worker connects through a single `DATABASE_URL` secret — auth and feature\nqueries share it. See [Neon](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon) for\nconnection modes, RLS, and the migration workflow.\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n#### Sharing deployed D1 in dev (`experimental_remote`)\n\nWrangler can read or write the **deployed** D1 for a specific binding while `wrangler dev` runs locally. A common workflow: share the production auth DB in dev so real sessions and users work against the running local Worker, while feature writes stay sandboxed in the local SQLite shadow.\n\nQuickback regenerates `wrangler.toml` on every compile, so flags like `experimental_remote = true` need to live in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys map to logical bindings, not the runtime binding string:\n\n| Key | Binding affected |\n|-----|------------------|\n| `auth` | `AUTH_DB` (also applied to the files worker's auth binding) |\n| `features` | `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding when `splitDatabases: false`) |\n| `audit` | `AUDIT_DB` |\n| `webhooks` | `WEBHOOKS_DB` |\n| `files` | `FILES_DB` (also applied to the files worker) |\n\nOnly `true` flips the flag on; `false` or omitted leaves the binding local. Off by default — only enable against databases you intend to share.\n\n#### Realtime Broadcast Config\n\nSet `realtime: true` to enable the generated Broadcaster Durable Object with the default organization-scoped routing model:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: true,\n }),\n}\n```\n\nFor resource-scoped tickets, use the object form. The mint gate is a discriminated `access` union — exactly one arm:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n access: { authzRole: \"attendee\" }, // or { roles: [\"member+\"] } or { fga: { relation, object } }\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n`wsTicket` tells the compiler how to authorize `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` and what scope to stamp into the short-lived websocket ticket:\n\n- `access`: the mint gate — one of `{ roles: [\"member+\"] }` (org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion; also verifies the scope row is in the caller's active org), `{ authzRole: \"attendee\" }` (an authz role declared under `authz.roles` with a direct relationship `{ via: \"...\" }`), or `{ fga: { relation: \"viewer\", object: \"event:{id}\" } }` (an FGA relation on the object derived from the scope row). The legacy `role: \"attendee\"` string is the shorthand for `{ authzRole }`.\n- `requestField`: the JSON body field the client posts to `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket`\n- `scopeTable`: the parent resource table that defines the broadcast scope key\n\nIn other words: the declared gate proves access, and the `scopeTable` row defines the channel. For an attendee flow, `guests` (or RSVP) would be the relationship evidence and `events` would be the `scopeTable`; see [Realtime](/stack/realtime#enabling-realtime) for the full per-arm semantics.\n\nQuickback keeps Better Auth as the front door, then mints its own 60-second websocket ticket after the authz check succeeds. The generated `createRealtime()` helper and Broadcaster share the same targeting model:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nSee [Realtime](/stack/realtime) for the client-side connection flow and helper examples.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins (default) |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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"content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\nThe Quickback Stack is **Cloudflare-only**. `cloudflare` is the single supported runtime.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n### Runtime Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `compatibilityDate` | `string` | Emits Cloudflare `compatibility_date` in `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `placement.mode` | `\"smart\" \\| \"standard\"` | Emits Cloudflare's `[placement]` block. |\n| `observability.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits top-level Workers Logs persistence under `[observability]`. |\n| `observability.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Top-level Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.logs]`. |\n| `observability.logs.invocationLogs` | `boolean` | Enables or suppresses invocation logs. |\n| `observability.logs.destinations` | `string[]` | Named log export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.logs.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported logs in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `observability.traces.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.traces]`. |\n| `observability.traces.destinations` | `string[]` | Named trace export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.traces.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Traces sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.traces.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported traces in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `routes` | `{ pattern, custom_domain? }[]` | Custom domain routes for the generated Worker. |\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\", {\n compatibilityDate: \"2026-05-13\",\n placement: { mode: \"smart\" },\n observability: {\n enabled: true,\n logs: {\n enabled: true,\n invocationLogs: false,\n destinations: [\"logs-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.6,\n },\n traces: {\n enabled: true,\n destinations: [\"otel-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.05,\n persist: false,\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\nTwo databases are supported, both Cloudflare-native:\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite at the edge) |\n| `neon` | Neon serverless PostgreSQL (`@neondatabase/serverless` over HTTP) |\n\nOne database provider per app: auth tables and feature tables always share the\nselected database. On `neon`, Better Auth uses its PostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter\nin the same Postgres database as your features; on `cloudflare-d1`, both use\nD1. A per-service map (`database: { auth: ..., features: ... }`) is rejected at\ncompile time — mixed database providers are not supported.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\nOptions from `splitDatabases` down apply to `cloudflare-d1` only — Neon uses a\nsingle Postgres database with no bindings or split mode (see\n[Neon options](#neon-options) below).\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases (D1 only) |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `experimentalRemote` | `{ auth?, features?, audit?, webhooks?, files? }` | `{}` | Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag for `wrangler dev` (see [below](#sharing-deployed-d1-in-dev-experimental_remote)) |\n| `realtime` | `boolean \\| { enabled?, wsTicket? }` | `false` | Enables the Broadcaster Durable Object and optional resource-scoped ws-ticket auth (see [below](#realtime-broadcast-config)) |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Neon Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `connectionMode` | `\"auto\" \\| \"http\" \\| \"websocket\" \\| \"hyperdrive\"` | `\"auto\"` | How the generated runtime connects (`hyperdrive` enables interactive Postgres transactions on Workers) |\n| `hyperdrive.id` | `string` | — | Required Cloudflare Hyperdrive configuration ID when `connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\"` |\n| `hyperdrive.localConnectionString` | `string` | — | Optional local-only Postgres connection used by Wrangler dev |\n| `pooled` | `boolean` | `true` | Use the pooled Neon connection string (recommended for Workers) |\n\nThe Worker connects through a single `DATABASE_URL` secret — auth and feature\nqueries share it. See [Neon](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon) for\nconnection modes, RLS, and the migration workflow.\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n#### Sharing deployed D1 in dev (`experimental_remote`)\n\nWrangler can read or write the **deployed** D1 for a specific binding while `wrangler dev` runs locally. A common workflow: share the production auth DB in dev so real sessions and users work against the running local Worker, while feature writes stay sandboxed in the local SQLite shadow.\n\nQuickback regenerates `wrangler.toml` on every compile, so flags like `experimental_remote = true` need to live in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys map to logical bindings, not the runtime binding string:\n\n| Key | Binding affected |\n|-----|------------------|\n| `auth` | `AUTH_DB` (also applied to the files worker's auth binding) |\n| `features` | `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding when `splitDatabases: false`) |\n| `audit` | `AUDIT_DB` |\n| `webhooks` | `WEBHOOKS_DB` |\n| `files` | `FILES_DB` (also applied to the files worker) |\n\nOnly `true` flips the flag on; `false` or omitted leaves the binding local. Off by default — only enable against databases you intend to share.\n\n#### Realtime Broadcast Config\n\nSet `realtime: true` to enable the generated Broadcaster Durable Object with the default organization-scoped routing model:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: true,\n }),\n}\n```\n\nFor resource-scoped tickets, use the object form. The mint gate is a discriminated `access` union — exactly one arm:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n access: { authzRole: \"attendee\" }, // or { roles: [\"member+\"] } or { fga: { relation, object } }\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n`wsTicket` tells the compiler how to authorize `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` and what scope to stamp into the short-lived websocket ticket:\n\n- `access`: the mint gate — one of `{ roles: [\"member+\"] }` (org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion; also verifies the scope row is in the caller's active org), `{ authzRole: \"attendee\" }` (an authz role declared under `authz.roles` with a direct relationship `{ via: \"...\" }`), or `{ fga: { relation: \"viewer\", object: \"event:{id}\" } }` (an FGA relation on the object derived from the scope row). The legacy `role: \"attendee\"` string is the shorthand for `{ authzRole }`.\n- `requestField`: the JSON body field the client posts to `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket`\n- `scopeTable`: the parent resource table that defines the broadcast scope key\n\nIn other words: the declared gate proves access, and the `scopeTable` row defines the channel. For an attendee flow, `guests` (or RSVP) would be the relationship evidence and `events` would be the `scopeTable`; see [Realtime](/stack/realtime#enabling-realtime) for the full per-arm semantics.\n\nQuickback keeps Better Auth as the front door, then mints its own 60-second websocket ticket after the authz check succeeds. The generated `createRealtime()` helper and Broadcaster share the same targeting model:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nSee [Realtime](/stack/realtime) for the client-side connection flow and helper examples.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins (default) |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `atomicAuthRoutes` | `(\"emailOtpSignIn\")[]` | Runs the exact email-OTP sign-in handler and `before-email-otp-activate.ts` admission hook in one Neon Hyperdrive transaction. Contract v2 only. |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n`emailOtp` also accepts an options object. Set `expiresIn` to a positive integer\nnumber of seconds to override Better Auth's OTP lifetime. The setting is\ntransport-neutral and is emitted identically for Cloudflare Email and AWS SES:\n\n```typescript\nplugins: { emailOtp: { expiresIn: 1200 } }\n```\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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"content": "## CLI Environment Variables\n\nThese variables configure the Quickback CLI itself.\n\n| Variable | Description | Default |\n|----------|-------------|---------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Compiler API endpoint | `https://compiler.quickback.dev` |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for headless authentication (CI/CD) | — |\n| `QUICKBACK_AUTH_URL` | Auth server URL (custom deployments) | — |\n\n### Authentication\n\nThe CLI authenticates via two methods:\n\n1. **Interactive login** — `quickback login` stores credentials in `~/.quickback/credentials.json`\n2. **API key** — Set `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` for CI/CD environments\n\n```bash\n# Use the cloud compiler (default)\nquickback compile\n\n# Use a local compiler instance\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3000 quickback compile\n\n# CI/CD with API key\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=qb_key_... quickback compile\n```\n\n## Compiler Service Variables\n\nThese variables are used by the compiler service/runtime itself.\n\n| Variable | Description | Default |\n|----------|-------------|---------|\n| `QUICKBACK_SECURITY_REPORT_SIGNING_KEY` | HMAC key for signing `security-contracts.report.json` artifacts | — |\n\nWhen `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required` is `true`, this variable (or `signature.key`) must be set or compile fails.\n\n## Cloudflare Variables\n\n### Wrangler Bindings\n\nThese are configured as bindings in `wrangler.toml`, not environment variables. The compiler generates them automatically.\n\n| Binding | Type | Description |\n|---------|------|-------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | D1 Database | Better Auth tables (dual mode) |\n| `DB` | D1 Database | Feature tables (dual mode) |\n| `DATABASE` | D1 Database | All tables (single DB mode) |\n| `KV` | KV Namespace | Key-value storage |\n| `R2_BUCKET` | R2 Bucket | File storage (if configured) |\n| `AI` | Workers AI | Embedding generation (if configured) |\n| `VECTORIZE` | Vectorize | Vector similarity search (if configured) |\n| `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` | Queue | Async embedding jobs (if configured) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_DB` | D1 Database | Webhook events (if configured) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_QUEUE` | Queue | Webhook delivery (if configured) |\n| `FILES_DB` | D1 Database | File metadata (if R2 configured) |\n| `BROADCASTER` | Durable Object | Realtime Broadcaster DO (if configured) |\n| `EMAIL` | send_email | Cloudflare Email Service (if email configured) |\n\n### Worker Variables\n\nSet these in `wrangler.toml` under `[vars]` or in the Cloudflare dashboard:\n\n| Variable | Description | Required |\n|----------|-------------|----------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_URL` | Public URL of your auth endpoint | Yes |\n| `APP_NAME` | Application name (used in emails) | No |\n\n### Email (Cloudflare Email Service — default)\n\nUses the Cloudflare `send_email` binding. No API keys needed — the binding is configured automatically in `wrangler.toml`.\n\n| Variable | Description | Where |\n|----------|-------------|-------|\n| `EMAIL_FROM` | Sender email address | `[vars]` |\n| `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` | Sender display name | `[vars]` |\n| `APP_NAME` | Application name (used in templates) | `[vars]` |\n\nThe `EMAIL` binding is added to `wrangler.toml` automatically when using the `emailOtp` plugin.\n\n### Email (AWS SES)\n\nRequired when using `email: { provider: 'aws-ses' }`:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | AWS access key |\n| `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | AWS secret key |\n| `AWS_SES_REGION` | SES region (e.g., `us-east-2`) |\n| `EMAIL_FROM` | Sender email address |\n| `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` | Sender display name |\n| `EMAIL_REPLY_TO` | Reply-to address |\n\n### Drizzle Kit (Migrations)\n\nFor running remote migrations with `drizzle-kit`, set these in `.env`:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` | Your Cloudflare account ID |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` | API token with D1 permissions |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_AUTH_DATABASE_ID` | Auth D1 database ID (dual mode) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_FEATURES_DATABASE_ID` | Features D1 database ID (dual mode) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_AUDIT_DATABASE_ID` | Security audit D1 database ID (unsafe cross-tenant actions) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_DATABASE_ID` | Database ID (single DB mode) |\n\n## Social Login Providers\n\nWhen social login is configured in your auth provider:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` | Google OAuth client ID |\n| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | Google OAuth client secret |\n| `GITHUB_CLIENT_ID` | GitHub OAuth client ID |\n| `GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET` | GitHub OAuth client secret |\n| `DISCORD_CLIENT_ID` | Discord OAuth client ID |\n| `DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET` | Discord OAuth client secret |\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Output Structure](/compiler/config/output) — Generated file structure\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Provider configuration reference\n- [Cloudflare Template](/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare) — Cloudflare setup guide"
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"content": "## CLI Environment Variables\n\nThese variables configure the Quickback CLI itself.\n\n| Variable | Description | Default |\n|----------|-------------|---------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Compiler API endpoint | `https://compiler.quickback.dev` |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for headless authentication (CI/CD) | — |\n| `QUICKBACK_AUTH_URL` | Auth server URL (custom deployments) | — |\n\n### Authentication\n\nThe CLI authenticates via two methods:\n\n1. **Interactive login** — `quickback login` stores credentials in `~/.quickback/credentials.json`\n2. **API key** — Set `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` for CI/CD environments\n\n```bash\n# Use the cloud compiler (default)\nquickback compile\n\n# Use a local compiler instance\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3000 quickback compile\n\n# CI/CD with API key\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=qb_key_... quickback compile\n```\n\n## Compiler Service Variables\n\nThese variables are used by the compiler service/runtime itself.\n\n| Variable | Description | Default |\n|----------|-------------|---------|\n| `QUICKBACK_SECURITY_REPORT_SIGNING_KEY` | HMAC key for signing `security-contracts.report.json` artifacts | — |\n\nWhen `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required` is `true`, this variable (or `signature.key`) must be set or compile fails.\n\n## Cloudflare Variables\n\n### Wrangler Bindings\n\nThese are configured as bindings in `wrangler.toml`, not environment variables. The compiler generates them automatically.\n\n| Binding | Type | Description |\n|---------|------|-------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | D1 Database | Better Auth tables (dual mode) |\n| `DB` | D1 Database | Feature tables (dual mode) |\n| `DATABASE` | D1 Database | All tables (single DB mode) |\n| `KV` | KV Namespace | Key-value storage |\n| `R2_BUCKET` | R2 Bucket | File storage (if configured) |\n| `AI` | Workers AI | Embedding generation (if configured) |\n| `VECTORIZE` | Vectorize | Vector similarity search (if configured) |\n| `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` | Queue | Async embedding jobs (if configured) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_DB` | D1 Database | Webhook events (if configured) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_QUEUE` | Queue | Webhook delivery (if configured) |\n| `FILES_DB` | D1 Database | File metadata (if R2 configured) |\n| `BROADCASTER` | Durable Object | Realtime Broadcaster DO (if configured) |\n| `EMAIL` | send_email | Cloudflare Email Service (if email configured) |\n\n### Worker Variables\n\nSet these in `wrangler.toml` under `[vars]` or in the Cloudflare dashboard:\n\n| Variable | Description | Required |\n|----------|-------------|----------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_URL` | Public URL of your auth endpoint | Yes |\n| `APP_NAME` | Application name (used in emails) | No |\n\n### Email (Cloudflare Email Service — default)\n\nUses the Cloudflare `send_email` binding. No API keys needed — the binding is configured automatically in `wrangler.toml`.\n\nGenerated TypeScript uses the native Workers `SendEmail` binding and its\n`EmailSendResult`; do not replace it with a hand-written `send(any)` interface.\nWorker address objects use `{ email, name }`. The HTTP REST API is a different\ncontract and uses `{ address, name }`.\n\n| Variable | Description | Where |\n|----------|-------------|-------|\n| `EMAIL_FROM` | Sender email address | `[vars]` |\n| `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` | Sender display name | `[vars]` |\n| `APP_NAME` | Application name (used in templates) | `[vars]` |\n\nThe `EMAIL` binding is added to `wrangler.toml` automatically when using the `emailOtp` plugin.\n\n### Email (AWS SES)\n\nRequired when using `email: { provider: 'aws-ses' }`:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | AWS access key |\n| `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | AWS secret key |\n| `AWS_SES_REGION` | SES region (e.g., `us-east-2`) |\n| `EMAIL_FROM` | Sender email address |\n| `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` | Sender display name |\n| `EMAIL_REPLY_TO` | Reply-to address |\n\n### Drizzle Kit (Migrations)\n\nFor running remote migrations with `drizzle-kit`, set these in `.env`:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID` | Your Cloudflare account ID |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` | API token with D1 permissions |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_AUTH_DATABASE_ID` | Auth D1 database ID (dual mode) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_FEATURES_DATABASE_ID` | Features D1 database ID (dual mode) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_AUDIT_DATABASE_ID` | Security audit D1 database ID (unsafe cross-tenant actions) |\n| `CLOUDFLARE_DATABASE_ID` | Database ID (single DB mode) |\n\n## Social Login Providers\n\nWhen social login is configured in your auth provider:\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` | Google OAuth client ID |\n| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` | Google OAuth client secret |\n| `GITHUB_CLIENT_ID` | GitHub OAuth client ID |\n| `GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET` | GitHub OAuth client secret |\n| `DISCORD_CLIENT_ID` | Discord OAuth client ID |\n| `DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET` | Discord OAuth client secret |\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Output Structure](/compiler/config/output) — Generated file structure\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — Provider configuration reference\n- [Cloudflare Template](/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare) — Cloudflare setup guide"
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"content": "Define who can perform read and write operations and under what conditions.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable('applications', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text('candidate_id').notNull(),\n jobId: text('job_id').notNull(),\n stage: text('stage').notNull(),\n notes: text('notes'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: { createable: [\"candidateId\", \"jobId\", \"notes\"], updatable: [\"notes\"] },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n## Role Hierarchy\n\nIf your project uses a tiered role system (e.g., `member` < `admin` < `owner`), you can define a hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'], // lowest → highest\n },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThen in your resource definitions:\n\n```typescript\nread: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\ncreate: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\ndelete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only (no +)\n```\n\nThe `+` suffix expands at compile time — `\"member+\"` becomes `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]` in the generated code. You can mix hierarchical and exact roles: `roles: [\"member+\", \"finance\"]` expands to `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\", \"finance\"]`.\n\n- Roles without `+` are exact matches (no expansion)\n- Pseudo-roles / reserved markers (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `ADMIN`, `SYSADMIN`) cannot use the `+` suffix — they're terminal markers\n- Using `+` with a role not in the hierarchy throws a compile error\n- Using `+` without configuring `auth.roleHierarchy` throws a compile error\n\n## Custom org roles\n\nYou're not limited to Better Auth's built-in `owner` / `admin` / `member` —\nany lowercase role name you reference in an access tree (`\"recruiter\"`,\n`\"hiring-manager\"`, `\"support\"`, …) is a custom org-membership role, matched\nagainst `ctx.roles` like the built-ins.\n\nAs of v0.46, custom roles declared in access trees are **auto-registered\nwith the Better Auth organization plugin**, so members can actually be\nprovisioned into them: `invite-member` and `update-member-role` accept them\n(previously they rejected custom roles with `400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`).\nAuto-registered roles carry member-equivalent Better Auth permissions —\nregistration is about assignability; your access trees remain the\nauthorization model. If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization\nplugin options, those win and auto-registration is skipped.\n\n## Configuration Options\n\n```typescript\ninterface Access {\n // Org-membership roles (OR logic — user needs at least one)\n // Matched against ctx.roles. Use \"role+\" suffix for hierarchy expansion.\n roles?: string[];\n\n // User-table role (OR logic). Matched against ctx.userRole from the\n // user.role column — independent of org membership. See userRole below.\n userRole?: string[];\n\n // Record-level conditions\n record?: {\n [field: string]: FieldCondition;\n };\n\n // Combinators\n or?: Access[];\n and?: Access[];\n}\n```\n\n## `userRole` vs `roles`\n\n`roles` and `userRole` check **two different fields** and are often confused — get this wrong and you'll grant access too broadly.\n\n| Primitive | Checks | Source | Example values |\n|-----------|--------|--------|----------------|\n| `roles` | `ctx.roles` | Org membership roles | `\"owner\"`, `\"admin\"`, `\"member\"` |\n| `userRole` | `ctx.userRole` | The `user.role` column (Better Auth / platform control-plane roles) | `\"user\"`, `\"appmanager\"`, `\"sysadmin\"` |\n\nIn multi-tenant mode, **`roles: [\"admin\"]` means \"org admin\" — not a platform-wide role.** An org-admin of Acme Corp has no elevated rights across other orgs. If you want platform control-plane operators through regardless of org membership (CMS, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling), use `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]`. If you need true cross-tenant data-plane access, use `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` (with `cms: { sysadmin: true }`).\n\nPinned organization mode does not change this split. `roles` still come from organization membership in the pinned org, while `userRole` still comes from Better Auth's `user.role` column.\n\n### When to use `userRole`\n\n```typescript\n// Platform control-plane users can see SSNs on every customer record, regardless of org\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\n}\n\n// Platform ops (user.role === 'appmanager') OR the org owner can refund\naccess: {\n or: [\n { userRole: ['appmanager'] },\n { roles: ['owner'] },\n ],\n}\n\n// CMS-internal resource: only platform control-plane users\nread: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\ncreate: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\nupdate: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\ndelete: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\n```\n\nWhen `roles` and `userRole` both appear in a single `Access` node, they're combined with AND — the user must satisfy both. Use `or:` to express \"one or the other\".\n\n`userRole` doesn't expand with the `+` hierarchy suffix — user-table roles are flat (typically just `\"user\"`, `\"appmanager\"`, and `\"sysadmin\"`). If you've added custom user-table roles via Better Auth, list them explicitly.\n\n### Pseudo-roles\n\nQuickback ships five reserved UPPERCASE markers. Four are real pseudo-roles handled directly by the compiler; `ADMIN` is retained only as a reserved legacy marker so the compiler can fail loudly with migration guidance. The casing carries the boundary: UPPERCASE = compiler-owned marker, lowercase = real role from a plugin's table (e.g. `members.role` from the org plugin).\n\n| Role | Auth gate | Compile-time requirement | Runtime check |\n|------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------|\n| `PUBLIC` | bypassed | none — explicit opt-in for unauthenticated access | always passes (auth skipped) |\n| `AUTHENTICATED` | required | none | `ctx.authenticated === true` |\n| `USER` | required | resource firewall **must** scope by `userId` | `ctx.authenticated` AND (`ctx.userRole` is unset OR `ctx.userRole === \"user\"`) |\n| `ADMIN` | required | reserved legacy marker — compiler rejects it | `false` |\n| `SYSADMIN` | required | `cms: { sysadmin: true }` **must** be set on the project | `ctx.authenticated && ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"` |\n\nYou can mix pseudo-roles with real roles in the same list — they're OR'd together.\n\n#### `PUBLIC` — unauthenticated access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for public-facing endpoints like contact forms, public listings, or webhooks. Skips both the auth gate and the role check.\n\n```typescript\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n```\n\n**Important:**\n- `PUBLIC` skips authentication and role checks — anyone can call the endpoint\n- **`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access.** It works on every access node — reads, top-level writes (`create`/`update`/`delete`/`upsert`), views, and actions. The compiler trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from the firewall, masking, and (for token-gated endpoints like RSVP confirm, magic-link redemption, List-Unsubscribe-Post, webhook ingest) your handler's own validation. Anonymous write endpoints typically pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n- **Firewall still applies** — data is scoped by the firewall (organization, owner, team)\n- **Tree semantics:** `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers from anywhere in the access tree, not just a flat `roles` list. An `or:` arm containing `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers past the authentication gate; an `and:` group admits them only when *every* arm does. The access, org, and firewall layers still evaluate the full tree afterwards. (Before v0.46 the emitted auth gate only honored `PUBLIC` in a flat `roles` list — a nested `PUBLIC` arm incorrectly answered `401`.)\n- Every `PUBLIC` action invocation is **mandatory audit logged** to the security audit table (IP address, input, result, timing)\n- The wildcard `\"*\"` is **not supported** — using it throws a compile-time error\n- Tables with no isolation columns and any `PUBLIC` route do not require `firewall: [{ exception: true }]`\n\nFor org-scoped tables, `PUBLIC` routes still filter by organization. Since the user isn't authenticated, the organization ID must be passed as a query parameter:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/listings?organizationId=org_abc123\n```\n\nThe firewall WHERE clause is always enforced. If no `organizationId` is provided, the API returns a `403` with code `ORG_REQUIRED`.\n\n```typescript\n// Public listing page — anyone can browse, but scoped to an org\nexport default defineTable(listings, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } }, // Public browsing + detail\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"member\"] } }, // Auth required to create\n});\n```\n\n#### `AUTHENTICATED` — any signed-in user\n\nUse `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` for endpoints that any logged-in user can hit, regardless of role or org membership. No plugin context required.\n\n```typescript\n// Public events feed — any signed-in user can list/read; anonymous gets 401\nread: { access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] } }\n```\n\n#### `USER` — per-user records\n\nUse `roles: [\"USER\"]` for resources where each user only sees their own records. **Requires the firewall to scope by `userId`** — the role marker is the access half of the pair, the firewall is the row-filter half.\n\n```typescript\n// \"My todos\" — each caller sees only their own rows\nexport default defineTable(todos, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nIf you forget the `userId` firewall predicate, the compiler throws:\n\n> `roles: [\"USER\"]` requires the resource to be scoped per-user. Add a `userId` column (auto-scoped) or an explicit owner predicate. If you want any signed-in user to read all records, use `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` instead.\n\nWhen the Better Auth admin plugin is enabled, `USER` matches `user.role === \"user\"` specifically — appmanagers and sysadmins are excluded. If the same route should serve both, express it explicitly with `or: [{ roles: [\"USER\"] }, { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }]`.\n\n#### `ADMIN` — legacy reserved marker (compile-time error)\n\n`roles: [\"ADMIN\"]` is no longer supported. The compiler fails hard on any use of `ADMIN` so platform and tenant roles can't be confused.\n\n```typescript\n// Platform control-plane audit log\nread: { access: { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] } }\n```\n\nUse one of these instead:\n\n- `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` for platform control-plane access\n- `roles: [\"admin\"]` for org-membership admin access\n- `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for true cross-tenant access\n\n#### `SYSADMIN` — cross-tenant DB-admin tier\n\nUse `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for endpoints that should only be reachable by platform sysadmins — the cross-tenant DB-admin tier introduced in v0.15.0. Compiles to `ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`. **Requires `cms: { sysadmin: true }` on the project config**; without that flag, using `SYSADMIN` fails the compile so the role can't sit as dead code.\n\n```typescript\n// Cross-tenant audit dashboard, sysadmin-only\nread: { access: { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\n`SYSADMIN` is distinct from `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]`. Appmanager is the platform control-plane tier (CMS shell, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling); sysadmin is the cross-tenant data-plane tier. The one place sysadmin gets implicit extra powers is **the firewall escape hatch**: when `cms.sysadmin: true`, every `buildFirewallConditions` emits an `if (ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin') return undefined;` (or just the soft-delete predicate when present) at the top — so sysadmins see every tenant's rows, not just their own org's. That escape hatch does NOT fire for `userRole === 'appmanager'`; appmanagers still go through the firewall like everyone else.\n\nThis separation exists so Better Auth admin-plugin powers (user management, impersonation, org creation) and DB-admin powers (cross-tenant data inspection) stay decoupled. A user can have `user.role === 'appmanager'` without DB-level cross-tenant access; a user can have `user.role === 'sysadmin'` without org-membership context. See [CMS Configuration](/compiler/config#cms-configuration) for the `cms.sysadmin` flag, the cross-tenant `/auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint, and the SPA's \"All organizations\" sentinel.\n\n#### Mixing pseudo-roles with real roles\n\nPseudo-roles and lowercase real roles compose with OR:\n\n```typescript\n// Record owner OR a platform control-plane user can read\nread: { access: { or: [{ roles: [\"USER\"] }, { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }] } }\n\n// Org owner OR sysadmin\ndelete: { access: { or: [{ roles: [\"owner\"] }, { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] }] } }\n```\n\n> Note: `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` never bypasses a `userId` firewall scope. If you need cross-user visibility, expose a separate route with `firewall: { exception: true }` or a `SYSADMIN`-gated cross-tenant surface.\n\n#### Quick reference\n\n```typescript\n// Unauthenticated public\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n\n// Any signed-in user, no scoping\naccess: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] }\n\n// Per-user records (requires userId firewall scope)\naccess: { roles: [\"USER\"] }\n\n// Platform control-plane\naccess: { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }\n\n// Cross-tenant DB-admin tier\naccess: { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] }\n\n// Org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion\n// (\"+\" requires auth.roleHierarchy in quickback.config.ts — see Role Hierarchy above)\naccess: { roles: [\"member+\"] } // expands to [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } // expands to [\"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin\"] } // exact match (no expansion)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// Field conditions - value can be string | number | boolean\ntype FieldCondition =\n | { equals: value | '$ctx.userId' | '$ctx.activeOrgId' }\n | { notEquals: value }\n | { in: value[] }\n | { notIn: value[] }\n | { lessThan: number }\n | { greaterThan: number }\n | { lessThanOrEqual: number }\n | { greaterThanOrEqual: number };\n```\n\n## Relationship-based authorization\n\nBeyond Better Auth roles (org membership, user-table role) and pseudo-roles, Quickback supports **relationship-based authorization roles** — names that bind to a declared relationship between the caller and a resource. Use these when access should follow a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org/admin gate.\n\n### `authz.relationships`\n\nDeclare relationships once in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...providers...\n authz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests', // table name string\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side\n resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side\n where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional filter\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n // Composite: any guest OR an org owner/admin\n eventStaff: {\n or: [\n { via: 'guestOf' },\n { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] },\n ],\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Using relationship-roles in resources\n\nResource definitions reference declared roles by name in `roles: [...]` arrays exactly like BA roles or pseudo-roles. The compiler rewrites the access tree at build time so the runtime route does an inline relationship lookup against the declared table.\n\n**Today (v1) this works on:**\n\n| Surface | Status | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `firewall:` `via:` predicate | ✓ Supported | Subquery composes as outermost AND |\n| `crud.*.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported | Inline async lookup per request |\n| `read.access` / `read.views.*.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported | Same inline path |\n| `masking.<field>.show` `roles: ['guest']` | ⚠ Refused at compile | v1 limitation — async/batched mask functions deferred |\n| **Standalone** `actions.<name>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported (v0.19+) | Inline gate; surface must expose `resource.column` as path param or input field |\n| **Record-based** `actions.<name>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ⚠ Fail-closed at runtime | Runtime helper denies; inline emission is a planned follow-up. Use `firewall: { exception: true }` or move the check into `execute()` until then |\n\nFor the surfaces that are not yet supported, the compiler refuses at build time with a clear error pointing to a workaround. The runtime evaluator fails closed on relationship arms regardless, so silent grants are impossible.\n\n### Standalone actions: surface keys and `loads` / `exposeAs` (v0.19+)\n\nWhen a standalone action's `access.roles` references a relationship-role, the compiler emits a runtime gate between input validation and `execute()`. The gate reads the relationship's `resource.column` value from the action surface — either a path parameter (`:eventId`) or an input field (`input.eventId`). If neither is present, the compiler:\n\n- **v0.19** — emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission. The action's own hand-rolled gate (if any) keeps the route working at runtime.\n- **v0.20** — hard compile error. Set `firewall: { exception: true }` to opt out (cross-tenant/admin routes only).\n\nPair the relationship with `loads` + `exposeAs` to hydrate the loaded resource onto `ctx`:\n\n```typescript\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events', // ← v0.19+: load matching event row\n exposeAs: 'event', // ← onto ctx.event for the action body\n },\n },\n roles: {\n attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe resolver (v0.20):\n\n1. **Cheap in-memory role check** first — `ctx.roles?.includes('admin')` and friends. If the caller has a qualifying role, this short-circuits and no DB queries fire for the access gate.\n2. **Firewall-gated relationship match** if the role check failed — `SELECT { organizationId, teamId } FROM guests WHERE userId=ctx.userId AND eventId=input.eventId AND status='confirmed'` with the `guests` table's full firewall AND-applied. If neither role nor relationship qualifies → 403.\n3. **Tenant stamping from the matched row** — for any tenant column the `from` table carries (`organizationId`, `teamId`), the resolver stamps `ctx.activeOrgId ??= matchedRow.organizationId` (and similar for team). This is **in-memory mutation of the request-scoped ctx only** — no JWT remint, no session-record write, no persistent grant.\n4. **Firewall-gated load of the loaded resource** — `SELECT * FROM events WHERE id = :eventId AND buildEventsFirewallConditions(ctx, db)`. The events firewall is applied as normal; it succeeds for attendees because tenant was just stamped from the relationship row.\n5. Assigns the loaded row to `ctx.event` for the action body.\n\n**No firewall bypass anywhere.** Both queries run with their respective tables' full firewalls. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant columns are the source of the stamped claim.\n\n### Conditional tenant preconditions (v0.20+)\n\nStandalone actions in features with org/team-scoped tables previously emitted unconditional preconditions:\n\n```ts\nif (!ctx.activeOrgId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noOrg(), 403);\nif (!ctx.activeTeamId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noTeam(), 403);\n```\n\nThese ran **before** the relationship resolver, which 403'd attendees whose sessions don't carry an active tenant claim (the canonical event-attendee shape).\n\nv0.20 makes these preconditions **conditional on relationship supply**. If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` still bypass the preconditions as before. `ADMIN` is now rejected at compile time.\n\nTypical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins still get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session as today; attendees get it from the relationship row, mid-request. Both paths converge on a valid tenant claim before `execute()` runs.\n\n### Requirement on the relationship's `from` table\n\nFor the v0.20 tenant-stamping to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:\n\n- For org stamping: an `organizationId` column (or whatever spelling the project's auth-provider defaults pick).\n- For team stamping: a `teamId` column.\n\nWhen the `from` table has **neither**, the compiler emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning at compile time:\n\n```\nRelationship \"X\" at authz.relationships.X has no organization or team columns\non its `from` table (\"guests\"). Action \"Y\" will compile, but downstream\nscoped-db queries inside execute() may 403 because ctx.activeOrgId /\nactiveTeamId cannot be stamped from the match row. Either add the tenant\ncolumn to \"guests\", or set firewall: { exception: true } on the action.\n```\n\nThe relationship match still works (existence check), but no tenant gets stamped — so the conventional precondition still fires and the action still 403s for callers without a session-resident tenant claim. Add the tenant column (or denormalize it onto the relationship table during writes) to enable the stamping path.\n\nThe body can then trust `ctx.event` and drop the hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` boilerplate:\n\n```ts\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] }, // attendee is a relationship-role\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // No hand-rolled attendance check needed — the resolver already ran.\n // ctx.event is the loaded events row. Typed as `any` here because the\n // hand-rolled `roles: ['attendee']` action gates per-action, not per-\n // namespace — see \"Narrow ctx.<exposeAs> typing\" below for the typed\n // import flip available when the same hydration runs through a\n // namespace mount.\n const event = ctx.event as typeof events.$inferSelect;\n // … domain logic only.\n },\n});\n```\n\n`loads` and `exposeAs` are co-required (set both or neither). `exposeAs` must be a valid JS identifier and must not collide with built-in `ctx` fields (`userId`, `activeOrgId`, `activeTeamId`, `db`, etc.).\n\n### Action firewall escape hatch (v0.19+)\n\n`defineAction({ firewall: { exception: true } })` opts the action out of the inherited session-key preconditions (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId` requirements) AND the relationship resolver. The handler receives `unsafeDb` for raw Drizzle access. Use for cross-tenant or admin routes whose surface intentionally doesn't name a session/relationship key:\n\n```ts\ndefineAction({\n path: '/admin/cross-tenant-report',\n firewall: { exception: true },\n unsafe: { reason: 'cross-tenant audit', adminOnly: true, targetScope: 'all' },\n access: { roles: ['ADMIN'] },\n execute: async ({ unsafeDb, ctx }) => { /* cross-org query */ },\n});\n```\n\n`firewall: { exception: true }` is the declarative twin of `unsafe: true` — they're conceptually distinct: `firewall.exception` opts out of the gate-emission pillars; `unsafe` signals audit/cross-tenant intent (and still applies for logging). Most cross-tenant actions set both.\n\n### Recommended pattern: gate at the firewall layer\n\nMost of the time, relationship-based row visibility is what you want, and putting it at the **firewall** layer is the cleanest expression. The firewall is row-filter; the access layer is route/role-filter; let each do its job:\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row visibility\n],\nread: {\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member'] }, // ← who can hit the route\n views: {\n cms: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member'] }, fields: [...] },\n guest: { access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, fields: [...] },\n },\n},\n```\n\nA guest who's in your org as `member` can hit the endpoint and the firewall filters them down to events they're guests of. Cross-tenant access is impossible because the org filter is the outermost AND.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" dashboards are NOT this\n\nA common adjacent pattern — \"logged-in user wants `GET /my-events` returning events they're a guest of *across all tenants*\" — is **not** solved by relationship-roles. The tenant firewall is enforced at the outermost AND, so a guest of an event in another tenant remains correctly blocked.\n\nFor cross-tenant aggregation, use one of:\n\n- **User-scoped firewall**: `firewall: { owner: { column: 'userId' } }` — a flat per-user table.\n- **A standalone action that walks the relationship table itself** — see worked example below.\n\nDon't reach for relationship-roles first and then get confused when the tenant firewall blocks. The two patterns serve different problems.\n\n#### Worked example: `GET /my-events` standalone action\n\nThe cleanest expression of the cross-tenant attendee dashboard is a standalone action with a custom path that does its own join against the relationship table. The action is gated by `roles: ['AUTHENTICATED']` (any signed-in user can hit it; per-row scoping is the query itself), and the SQL filters by `ctx.userId` so each caller sees exactly the events they're a guest of:\n\n```ts\n// features/dashboard/actions/myEvents.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"List events the caller is a confirmed guest of, across all tenants.\",\n path: '/my-events',\n method: 'GET',\n input: z.object({}),\n // Any signed-in user. Row visibility comes from the query, not the role.\n access: { roles: ['AUTHENTICATED'] },\n async execute({ db, ctx }) {\n // 1. Find every event the caller has a confirmed guest row for.\n const guestRows = await db\n .select({ eventId: guests.eventId })\n .from(guests)\n .where(\n and(\n eq(guests.userId, ctx.userId!),\n eq(guests.status, 'confirmed'),\n // guests.organizationId is NOT filtered here — that's the whole\n // point of the cross-tenant lane. The relationship row's org is\n // ambient information that this action explicitly traverses.\n )\n );\n\n if (guestRows.length === 0) return { events: [] };\n\n // 2. Pull the matching events. NOTE: this query also bypasses\n // `events.organizationId` scope — by design — so explicitly filter\n // out soft-deleted rows yourself if your `events` table uses them.\n const eventIds = guestRows.map((r) => r.eventId);\n const rows = await db\n .select()\n .from(events)\n .where(inArray(events.id, eventIds));\n\n return { events: rows };\n },\n});\n```\n\nWhy this is a standalone action and not a CRUD route:\n\n- **Tenant firewall would block it.** The default `firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` on `events` is correct for every other read — only the cross-tenant dashboard wants to step outside it, and that's a deliberate, explicit step taken in handler code.\n- **The join is the access control.** A relationship-role at the firewall layer can't express \"filter by this user's relationships, ignoring the org context.\" The handler does that join directly.\n- **Audit-logged automatically.** Standalone actions are mandatorily audit-logged in the runtime — the cross-tenant traversal is recorded with `ctx.userId`, IP, and timing.\n\nTwo important guardrails when you write one of these:\n\n1. **Always filter by `ctx.userId` in the relationship lookup.** If you accept a `userId` from the request body and trust it, you've built an IDOR. The example above uses `ctx.userId!` directly so the only events returned are the caller's.\n2. **You take responsibility for soft-delete and other invariants the firewall would otherwise apply.** Add the `deletedAt` filter, status checks, and any other row-level predicates by hand. The action is OUTSIDE the firewall pipeline by design — the cost is that you can't lean on the auto-applied predicates.\n\nIf you find yourself writing more than one of these per project, that's usually a signal to revisit the schema (could a user-owned `userEvents` materialized view replace the join?) rather than a sign Quickback should ship a higher-level abstraction. Cross-tenant lanes are intentionally explicit.\n\n### Compile-time refusals (consolidated)\n\nThe validator and resolver reject:\n\n- Unknown key in `authz` block (typo guard — `realtionships` would otherwise silently produce a permanently-denied role).\n- Reserved role-name (auth-provider-derived). Names like `guest`, `speaker`, `attendee` are free; `admin`/`owner`/`member` are reserved when the BA org plugin is on.\n- Cycle in role composition (`a → b → a`).\n- Relationship `from` references unknown table.\n- Relationship-role used on a resource missing the `resource.column`.\n- Relationship table with `firewall: { exception: true }` (would let cross-tenant grants slip through).\n- `lowering: 'session'` (reserved for v2 — staleness/invalidation ergonomics not yet shipped).\n- `+` hierarchy suffix on a relationship-role name (terminal, like pseudo-roles).\n- Relationship-roles in `masking.show` / `actions.access` (deferred surfaces — see the table above).\n\n## Namespace mounts (hoisted relationship middleware)\n\nWhen several standalone actions share a path prefix and the same relationship gate — `/event/:eventId/announce`, `/event/:eventId/cancel`, `/event/:eventId/respond` — declaring the gate per-action means writing the same `roles: ['attendee']` over and over AND paying the relationship-resolver cost N times per request (one subquery + one row-load, multiplied by the number of actions).\n\nNamespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the per-namespace helper (v0.27+, [below](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing-v027)), that field is also statically typed as the loaded row.\n\n### When to use roles vs. relationships\n\nA user is authorized for a row when **any** of the following is true:\n\n- they have a **per-row relationship** to it (e.g. an attendee row, a named organizer row), or\n- they have a **role on the row's tenant** (org admin/owner of the row's `organizationId`), or\n- they have **team membership** matching the row's `teamId`.\n\nUse **relationships** when membership is specific to *this row* — external collaborators who aren't in your org, attendees, anyone connected to the resource by virtue of data rather than payroll. Use **roles / team** when staff at your org/team should see everything in their scope by default.\n\nThe two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and — as of v0.25 — at the namespace level too: `namespace.via` accepts an array of lanes, first match wins.\n\n> **Rule of thumb.** If the answer is *\"yes if you work here,\"* reach for org/team roles. If the answer is *\"yes if you have something to do with **this** row,\"* reach for a per-row relationship. Reach for both together — at the namespace or via `access.or` — when an action should let either side in.\n\nTwo declaration sites depending on whether the participating actions live in one feature or many:\n\n### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })` (v0.23+)\n\nUse when every action under the prefix lives in the same feature directory. The namespace travels with the table that owns it — no addition to `quickback.config.ts` needed.\n\n```typescript\n// features/events/events.ts\nexport default defineTable(events, {\n firewall: [...],\n crud: { ... },\n namespace: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId', // absolute URL path\n via: 'attendeeOf', // relationship gate (must exist in authz.relationships)\n },\n});\n\n// features/events/actions/post-announcement.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/announcements',\n method: 'POST',\n // No gate boilerplate. ctx.event is typed inside execute().\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one `app.use(...)` on the events feature's Hono app. Every standalone action in `features/events/actions/` whose path starts with `/event/:eventId/` joins the namespace automatically.\n\nMulti-lane via (v0.25+) and bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+) work identically on the table-level declaration — `via:` accepts the same shapes documented below for the project-level form.\n\n### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces` (v0.24+)\n\nUse when the namespace spans multiple features. The declaration sits next to your other authz config in `quickback.config.ts`.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n namespaces: {\n eventScope: { prefix: '/event/:eventId', via: 'attendeeOf' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nWith the namespace declared, any standalone action whose `path:` matches the prefix joins the gate — regardless of which feature owns it:\n\n```typescript\n// features/feeds/actions/feed-moments.ts (in one feature)\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/feed-moments',\n method: 'POST',\n});\n\n// features/rsvp/actions/respond.ts (in a different feature)\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/respond',\n method: 'POST',\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one synthetic `src/routes/__namespace-event-scope.routes.ts` that imports each contributing feature's `actions` map under a distinct alias, mounts the resolver middleware once, and dispatches to the matching action. Worker-root mount order ensures the middleware fires before any per-feature route handler under the prefix.\n\n### Multi-lane via (v0.25+) — first match wins\n\nWhen more than one relationship can authorize a caller for the namespaced resource, pass `via:` as an array. The middleware tries each lane in declaration order and stops at the first match — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated from whichever lane fired.\n\n```typescript\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n // Named per-event organizers (potentially EXTERNAL — these users may\n // not be a member of the event's org. That's the point: lets you grant\n // event-level access to freelancers / partner staff without adding\n // them to the org's member list.)\n organizerOf: {\n from: 'eventOrganizers',\n subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n namespaces: {\n eventScope: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId',\n via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf'],\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAll relationship lanes in a namespace **must agree on `loads:` + `exposeAs:`** — that's what guarantees `ctx.event` has the same shape regardless of which lane matched. The compiler rejects heterogeneous lanes at parse time.\n\n### Bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+)\n\nRelationship lanes cover \"specifically connected to this row.\" Bulk-grant lanes cover \"anyone with this role / team membership in the row's tenant\" — the case where an org admin or a team member should see every event in their scope without writing per-event relationship rows.\n\n```typescript\nnamespaces: {\n eventScope: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId',\n via: [\n 'attendeeOf',\n 'organizerOf',\n { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }, // org-role bulk grant\n { team: true }, // active-team-membership bulk grant\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach bulk-grant lane:\n\n- **`{ roles: [...] }`** — passes when the caller's BA org-role for the loaded resource's tenant includes any listed role. Short-circuits the relationship loop entirely; the role check is in-memory and cheap. Use for the \"company admin sees everything\" case.\n- **`{ team: true }`** — passes when `ctx.activeTeamId` is set. The loads-table firewall does the actual `events.teamId === ctx.activeTeamId` check during hydration. Use when the resource is team-scoped and you want active-team membership to grant access.\n\nBoth bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping. **At least one relationship lane is required** alongside bulk-grant lanes in v0.26 (to anchor `loads:` + `exposeAs:`).\n\nWhen a request misses every lane, the 403 deny payload lists every authorization path the caller could have taken — relationship names, role names, and `\"team-membership\"` for `{ team: true }` lanes — so a developer debugging an unexpected 403 sees the full surface they need to satisfy.\n\nA namespace can also fold the scope machinery into this same gate: `mintScope: true` **mints** a scope token on a matched userId lane, and `acceptScope: '<kind>'` **accepts** an already-minted scope claim as proof of entry — one handler under the prefix serves both a Better-Auth user and a sessionless scope principal. See [Scopes → `acceptScope`](/compiler/definitions/scopes#acceptscope--accept-an-incoming-scope-claim-as-proof-of-entry).\n\n### Discovery is path-prefix-only\n\nActions opt in by matching `path:` against a declared namespace prefix. There's no `namespace: 'foo'` field on `defineAction` — the path string is the discoverable surface, consistent with how `path:` already determines an action's URL.\n\n### Requirements (enforced at compile time)\n\nBoth forms share the same shape checks:\n\n- **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name (v0.23+), an array of relationship names (v0.25+, first match wins), or — as of v0.26 — an array mixing relationship names with bulk-grant guards (`{ roles: [...] }`, `{ team: true }`).\n- **Every relationship lane must declare `loads + exposeAs`.** Without `loads` there's nothing for the middleware to hydrate; the namespace gate would be indistinguishable from a per-action access rule.\n- **All relationship lanes in one namespace must agree on `loads:` + `exposeAs:`.** Otherwise `ctx.<exposeAs>` would change shape depending on which lane matched.\n- **Bulk-grant lanes inherit `loads:` + `exposeAs:` from sibling relationship lanes.** Pure bulk-grant namespaces (no relationship lane at all) are also accepted — set `loads:` + `exposeAs:` directly on the namespace declaration so hydration has somewhere to anchor.\n- **`prefix:` must contain at least one `:param` segment** (e.g. `/event/:eventId`). The middleware reads the relationship key from `c.req.param()` because no request body has been parsed at middleware time.\n- **One declaration per namespace name.** The same name in both `defineTable({ namespace })` and `authz.namespaces` is rejected. The project-level form is canonical for cross-feature; the table-level form is the single-feature shorthand.\n\nProject-level only:\n\n- **Ambiguous prefixes** like `/a/:x` and `/a/:y` (same shape, different `:param` names) are rejected. Strict super/sub-set relationships (`/event/:e` vs `/event/:e/admin`) are fine — the harvester routes each action to the longest matching prefix.\n- **Unused namespace** emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning when no action's path matches the declared prefix. Not a hard error — the namespace may be staged ahead of the actions.\n\n### What namespace actions get for free\n\nInside a namespace action's `execute()`:\n\n- `ctx.<exposeAs>` is populated by the middleware with the loaded resource row. Statically `any` by default — narrowed to `typeof <loadsTable>.$inferSelect` when the action's import points at the per-namespace helper (see [below](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing-v027)).\n- Tenant context (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId`) is stamped from the matched relationship row when its `from` table carries those columns. Downstream scoped queries work without further setup.\n- The action's own `access:` block (additional roles, userRole, record predicates, OTHER relationship arms) still runs after the namespace gate — namespace handles entry, per-action gates further.\n\n### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing (v0.27+)\n\nThe namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime — that's been true since v0.23. The static type of that field, though, is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature: useful for not blocking access, but a missed opportunity for autocomplete and typo-catching.\n\nv0.27 emits one **per-namespace `defineAction` helper** alongside the standard `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts`. Importing from the narrowed helper retypes `ctx.<exposeAs>` inside `execute({ ctx })` to the loaded row's `$inferSelect` shape. Nothing else changes — runtime behavior, action discovery, and the `path:` namespace match are identical.\n\n```ts title=\"features/feeds/actions/feed-moments.ts\"\n// One-line flip per namespace-scoped action:\n\n// └──────┬──────┘\n// kebab(namespaceName)\n\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/feed-moments',\n method: 'POST',\n input: z.object({ body: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: ['attendee'] },\n async execute({ ctx, input }) {\n ctx.event.id // ✓ string\n ctx.event.startsAt // ✓ Date — autocomplete works\n ctx.event.organizerId // ✓ narrows on the field's declared type\n\n ctx.event.idd // ✗ TS2339 — typo caught at compile time\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one helper per `(feature, namespace)` pair where the feature owns at least one action whose `path:` falls under the namespace prefix. Filename is `define-action.<kebab(namespaceName)>.ts` — `eventScope` becomes `define-action.event-scope.ts`. Helpers live next to the standard `define-action.ts` in `<feature>/.quickback/`, so the relative import is the same shape as every other action file in your project.\n\n#### Opt-in, not breaking\n\nActions that keep their existing `import { defineAction } from '../.quickback/define-action'` continue to compile unchanged — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature, which is exactly the v0.23–v0.26 behavior. You flip imports per action at your own pace.\n\n#### Compile-time advisory\n\nWhen `quickback compile` sees a namespace-scoped action still importing the generic helper, it emits a one-line advisory pointing at the narrowed path:\n\n```text\n[quickback:typing] action \"feedMoments\" in feature \"feeds\" lives under\n namespace \"eventScope\" — switch its import to\n `../.quickback/define-action.event-scope` for narrow ctx.<exposeAs> typing.\n (Runtime behavior is unchanged; the narrowed helper only refines TS types.)\n```\n\nNon-blocking — same `[quickback:typing]` family as `[quickback:authz]`. The advisory only mentions actions the compiler can be confident about (namespace-claimed actions whose source still imports the generic helper).\n\n#### Multi-namespace features\n\nA single feature can contribute actions to several namespaces — say, an `interviews` feature with actions under both `interviewScope` and `eventScope`. The compiler emits one narrowed helper per namespace the feature participates in, and each action picks the import that matches its path.\n\n```text\nsrc/features/interviews/.quickback/\n├── define-action.ts # generic — standard fallback\n├── define-action.interview-scope.ts # ctx.interview typed\n└── define-action.event-scope.ts # ctx.event typed\n```\n\n#### Why per-namespace and not per-action\n\nA `defineAction` helper that's narrow to *one* exposed key (the namespace's `exposeAs`) is enough — every action under a namespace sees the same hydrated key. The alternative (per-action emit) duplicates the same prelude N times for the same shape; per-namespace keeps emission proportional to the number of distinct hydration shapes in the project.\n\n## Read & Write Configuration\n\nReads (`GET /` and `GET /:id`) live under `read:`; mutations live under top-level `create:`, `update:`, `delete:`, and `upsert:`. See [Read](/compiler/definitions/read) for the full read pipeline reference.\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n // LIST + GET - GET /resource and GET /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25, // Default page size\n maxPageSize: 100, // Client can't exceed this\n views: { // Per-view field projections\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'candidateId', 'jobId', 'stage'],\n access: { roles: [\"interviewer\"] },\n },\n },\n}\n\ncreate: {\n // CREATE - POST /resource\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n defaults: { // Default values for new records\n stage: 'applied',\n },\n},\n\nupdate: {\n // UPDATE - PATCH /resource/:id\n access: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n { roles: [\"interviewer\"], record: { stage: { equals: \"interview\" } } }\n ]\n },\n},\n\ndelete: {\n // DELETE - DELETE /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // 'soft' (default) or 'hard'\n},\n\nupsert: {\n // PUT - PUT /resource/:id (only when generateId: false + guards: false)\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"sync-service\"] },\n}\n```\n\n## Evaluation Order\n\nGenerated `/:id` and batch handlers evaluate access in this fixed order:\n\n1. **Auth gate** — 401 if unauthenticated\n2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)\n3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership\n4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates\n5. **Masking** — applied to the response\n\nStep 2 closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel: an unauthorized caller without\na matching role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they can't tell\napart \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" A caller with the\nright role but the wrong tenant gets 403 by default (firewall reveals via\nthe access layer); set\n[`firewallErrorMode: 'hide'`](/compiler/definitions/firewall) to return an\nopaque 404 instead.\n\nFunction-form access (`access: async (ctx, record) => ...`) is opaque to\nthe pre-record phase and always passes there; it's fully evaluated post-record.\n\n## List Filtering (Query Parameters)\n\nThe LIST endpoint automatically supports filtering via query params:\n\n```\nGET /jobs?status=open # Exact match\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gt=50000 # Greater than\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gte=50000 # Greater than or equal\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lt=200000 # Less than\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lte=200000 # Less than or equal\nGET /jobs?status.ne=closed # Not equal\nGET /jobs?title.like=Engineer # Pattern match (LIKE %value%)\nGET /jobs?status.in=open,draft # IN clause\n```\n\n| Operator | Query Param | SQL Equivalent |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| Equals | `?field=value` | `WHERE field = value` |\n| Not equals | `?field.ne=value` | `WHERE field != value` |\n| Greater than | `?field.gt=value` | `WHERE field > value` |\n| Greater or equal | `?field.gte=value` | `WHERE field >= value` |\n| Less than | `?field.lt=value` | `WHERE field < value` |\n| Less or equal | `?field.lte=value` | `WHERE field <= value` |\n| Pattern match | `?field.like=value` | `WHERE field LIKE '%value%'` |\n| In list | `?field.in=a,b,c` | `WHERE field IN ('a','b','c')` |\n\n## Sorting & Pagination\n\n```\nGET /jobs?sort=createdAt&order=desc # Sort by field\nGET /jobs?limit=25&offset=50 # Pagination\n```\n\n- **Default limit**: 50\n- **Max limit**: 100 (or `maxPageSize` if configured)\n- **Default order**: `asc`\n\n## Delete Modes\n\n```typescript\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // Sets deletedAt/deletedBy, record stays in DB\n}\n\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"hard\", // Permanent deletion from database\n}\n```\n\n## Context Variables\n\nUse `$ctx.` prefix to reference context values in conditions:\n\n```typescript\n// User can only view their own records\naccess: {\n record: { userId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n}\n\n// Nested path support for complex context objects\naccess: {\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.user.id\" } }\n}\n```\n\n### AppContext Reference\n\n| Property | Type | Description |\n|----------|------|-------------|\n| `$ctx.userId` | `string` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `$ctx.activeOrgId` | `string` | User's active organization ID |\n| `$ctx.activeTeamId` | `string \\| null` | User's active team ID (if applicable) |\n| `$ctx.roles` | `string[]` | User's roles in current context |\n| `$ctx.isAnonymous` | `boolean` | Whether user is anonymous |\n| `$ctx.user` | `object` | Full user object from auth provider |\n| `$ctx.user.id` | `string` | User ID (nested path example) |\n| `$ctx.user.email` | `string` | User's email address |\n| `$ctx.{property}` | `any` | Any custom context property |\n\n## Function-Based Access\n\nFor complex access logic that can't be expressed declaratively, use a function:\n\n```typescript\nupdate: {\n access: async (ctx, record) => {\n // Custom logic - return true to allow, false to deny\n if (ctx.roles.includes('admin')) return true;\n if (record.ownerId === ctx.userId) return true;\n\n // Check custom business logic\n const membership = await checkTeamMembership(ctx.userId, record.teamId);\n return membership.canEdit;\n }\n}\n```\n\nFunction access receives:\n- `ctx`: The full AppContext object\n- `record`: The record being accessed (for get/update/delete operations)"
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"content": "Define who can perform read and write operations and under what conditions.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable('applications', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text('candidate_id').notNull(),\n jobId: text('job_id').notNull(),\n stage: text('stage').notNull(),\n notes: text('notes'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: { createable: [\"candidateId\", \"jobId\", \"notes\"], updatable: [\"notes\"] },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n## Role Hierarchy\n\nIf your project uses a tiered role system (e.g., `member` < `admin` < `owner`), you can define a hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'], // lowest → highest\n },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThen in your resource definitions:\n\n```typescript\nread: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\ncreate: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\ndelete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only (no +)\n```\n\nThe `+` suffix expands at compile time — `\"member+\"` becomes `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]` in the generated code. You can mix hierarchical and exact roles: `roles: [\"member+\", \"finance\"]` expands to `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\", \"finance\"]`.\n\n- Roles without `+` are exact matches (no expansion)\n- Pseudo-roles / reserved markers (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `ADMIN`, `SYSADMIN`) cannot use the `+` suffix — they're terminal markers\n- Using `+` with a role not in the hierarchy throws a compile error\n- Using `+` without configuring `auth.roleHierarchy` throws a compile error\n\n## Custom org roles\n\nYou're not limited to Better Auth's built-in `owner` / `admin` / `member` —\nany lowercase role name you reference in an access tree (`\"recruiter\"`,\n`\"hiring-manager\"`, `\"support\"`, …) is a custom org-membership role, matched\nagainst `ctx.roles` like the built-ins.\n\nAs of v0.46, custom roles declared in access trees are **auto-registered\nwith the Better Auth organization plugin**, so members can actually be\nprovisioned into them: `invite-member` and `update-member-role` accept them\n(previously they rejected custom roles with `400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`).\nAuto-registered roles carry member-equivalent Better Auth permissions —\nregistration is about assignability; your access trees remain the\nauthorization model. If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization\nplugin options, those win and auto-registration is skipped.\n\n## Configuration Options\n\n```typescript\ninterface Access {\n // Org-membership roles (OR logic — user needs at least one)\n // Matched against ctx.roles. Use \"role+\" suffix for hierarchy expansion.\n roles?: string[];\n\n // User-table role (OR logic). Matched against ctx.userRole from the\n // user.role column — independent of org membership. See userRole below.\n userRole?: string[];\n\n // Record-level conditions\n record?: {\n [field: string]: FieldCondition;\n };\n\n // Combinators\n or?: Access[];\n and?: Access[];\n}\n```\n\n## `userRole` vs `roles`\n\n`roles` and `userRole` check **two different fields** and are often confused — get this wrong and you'll grant access too broadly.\n\n| Primitive | Checks | Source | Example values |\n|-----------|--------|--------|----------------|\n| `roles` | `ctx.roles` | Org membership roles | `\"owner\"`, `\"admin\"`, `\"member\"` |\n| `userRole` | `ctx.userRole` | The `user.role` column (Better Auth / platform control-plane roles) | `\"user\"`, `\"appmanager\"`, `\"sysadmin\"` |\n\nIn multi-tenant mode, **`roles: [\"admin\"]` means \"org admin\" — not a platform-wide role.** An org-admin of Acme Corp has no elevated rights across other orgs. If you want platform control-plane operators through regardless of org membership (CMS, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling), use `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]`. If you need true cross-tenant data-plane access, use `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` (with `cms: { sysadmin: true }`).\n\nPinned organization mode does not change this split. `roles` still come from organization membership in the pinned org, while `userRole` still comes from Better Auth's `user.role` column.\n\n### When to use `userRole`\n\n```typescript\n// Platform control-plane users can see SSNs on every customer record, regardless of org\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\n}\n\n// Platform ops (user.role === 'appmanager') OR the org owner can refund\naccess: {\n or: [\n { userRole: ['appmanager'] },\n { roles: ['owner'] },\n ],\n}\n\n// CMS-internal resource: only platform control-plane users\nread: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\ncreate: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\nupdate: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\ndelete: { access: { userRole: ['appmanager'] } },\n```\n\nWhen `roles` and `userRole` both appear in a single `Access` node, they're combined with AND — the user must satisfy both. Use `or:` to express \"one or the other\".\n\n`userRole` doesn't expand with the `+` hierarchy suffix — user-table roles are flat (typically just `\"user\"`, `\"appmanager\"`, and `\"sysadmin\"`). If you've added custom user-table roles via Better Auth, list them explicitly.\n\n### Pseudo-roles\n\nQuickback ships five reserved UPPERCASE markers. Four are real pseudo-roles handled directly by the compiler; `ADMIN` is retained only as a reserved legacy marker so the compiler can fail loudly with migration guidance. The casing carries the boundary: UPPERCASE = compiler-owned marker, lowercase = real role from a plugin's table (e.g. `members.role` from the org plugin).\n\n| Role | Auth gate | Compile-time requirement | Runtime check |\n|------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------|\n| `PUBLIC` | bypassed | none — explicit opt-in for unauthenticated access | always passes (auth skipped) |\n| `AUTHENTICATED` | required | none | `ctx.authenticated === true` |\n| `USER` | required | resource firewall **must** scope by `userId` | `ctx.authenticated` AND (`ctx.userRole` is unset OR `ctx.userRole === \"user\"`) |\n| `ADMIN` | required | reserved legacy marker — compiler rejects it | `false` |\n| `SYSADMIN` | required | `cms: { sysadmin: true }` **must** be set on the project | `ctx.authenticated && ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"` |\n\nYou can mix pseudo-roles with real roles in the same list — they're OR'd together.\n\n#### `PUBLIC` — unauthenticated access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for public-facing endpoints like contact forms, public listings, or webhooks. Skips both the auth gate and the role check.\n\n```typescript\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n```\n\n**Important:**\n- `PUBLIC` skips authentication and role checks — anyone can call the endpoint\n- **`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access.** It works on every access node — reads, top-level writes (`create`/`update`/`delete`/`upsert`), views, and actions. The compiler trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from the firewall, masking, and (for token-gated endpoints like RSVP confirm, magic-link redemption, List-Unsubscribe-Post, webhook ingest) your handler's own validation. Anonymous write endpoints typically pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n- **Firewall still applies** — data is scoped by the firewall (organization, owner, team)\n- **Tree semantics:** `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers from anywhere in the access tree, not just a flat `roles` list. An `or:` arm containing `PUBLIC` admits anonymous callers past the authentication gate; an `and:` group admits them only when *every* arm does. The access, org, and firewall layers still evaluate the full tree afterwards. (Before v0.46 the emitted auth gate only honored `PUBLIC` in a flat `roles` list — a nested `PUBLIC` arm incorrectly answered `401`.)\n- Every `PUBLIC` action invocation is **mandatory audit logged** to the security audit table (IP address, input, result, timing)\n- The wildcard `\"*\"` is **not supported** — using it throws a compile-time error\n- Tables with no isolation columns and any `PUBLIC` route do not require `firewall: [{ exception: true }]`\n\nFor org-scoped tables, `PUBLIC` routes still filter by organization. Since the user isn't authenticated, the organization ID must be passed as a query parameter:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/listings?organizationId=org_abc123\n```\n\nThe firewall WHERE clause is always enforced. If no `organizationId` is provided, the API returns a `403` with code `ORG_REQUIRED`.\n\n`?organizationId=` is an account/public addressing surface. A request using a\nconfigured delegated principal cannot use it to acquire account organization\nauthority: the generated route returns `403 CROSS_TENANT_FORBIDDEN` and never\nadds `activeOrgId` or account roles to the delegated `AppContext`. Delegated\nscope continues to come only from the verified principal claims and database\nRLS policy.\n\n```typescript\n// Public listing page — anyone can browse, but scoped to an org\nexport default defineTable(listings, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } }, // Public browsing + detail\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"member\"] } }, // Auth required to create\n});\n```\n\n#### `AUTHENTICATED` — any signed-in user\n\nUse `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` for endpoints that any logged-in user can hit, regardless of role or org membership. No plugin context required.\n\n```typescript\n// Public events feed — any signed-in user can list/read; anonymous gets 401\nread: { access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] } }\n```\n\n#### `USER` — per-user records\n\nUse `roles: [\"USER\"]` for resources where each user only sees their own records. **Requires the firewall to scope by `userId`** — the role marker is the access half of the pair, the firewall is the row-filter half.\n\n```typescript\n// \"My todos\" — each caller sees only their own rows\nexport default defineTable(todos, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nIf you forget the `userId` firewall predicate, the compiler throws:\n\n> `roles: [\"USER\"]` requires the resource to be scoped per-user. Add a `userId` column (auto-scoped) or an explicit owner predicate. If you want any signed-in user to read all records, use `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` instead.\n\nWhen the Better Auth admin plugin is enabled, `USER` matches `user.role === \"user\"` specifically — appmanagers and sysadmins are excluded. If the same route should serve both, express it explicitly with `or: [{ roles: [\"USER\"] }, { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }]`.\n\n#### `ADMIN` — legacy reserved marker (compile-time error)\n\n`roles: [\"ADMIN\"]` is no longer supported. The compiler fails hard on any use of `ADMIN` so platform and tenant roles can't be confused.\n\n```typescript\n// Platform control-plane audit log\nread: { access: { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] } }\n```\n\nUse one of these instead:\n\n- `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` for platform control-plane access\n- `roles: [\"admin\"]` for org-membership admin access\n- `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for true cross-tenant access\n\n#### `SYSADMIN` — cross-tenant DB-admin tier\n\nUse `roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"]` for endpoints that should only be reachable by platform sysadmins — the cross-tenant DB-admin tier introduced in v0.15.0. Compiles to `ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`. **Requires `cms: { sysadmin: true }` on the project config**; without that flag, using `SYSADMIN` fails the compile so the role can't sit as dead code.\n\n```typescript\n// Cross-tenant audit dashboard, sysadmin-only\nread: { access: { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\n`SYSADMIN` is distinct from `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]`. Appmanager is the platform control-plane tier (CMS shell, Better Auth admin surfaces, support tooling); sysadmin is the cross-tenant data-plane tier. The one place sysadmin gets implicit extra powers is **the firewall escape hatch**: when `cms.sysadmin: true`, every `buildFirewallConditions` emits an `if (ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin') return undefined;` (or just the soft-delete predicate when present) at the top — so sysadmins see every tenant's rows, not just their own org's. That escape hatch does NOT fire for `userRole === 'appmanager'`; appmanagers still go through the firewall like everyone else.\n\nThis separation exists so Better Auth admin-plugin powers (user management, impersonation, org creation) and DB-admin powers (cross-tenant data inspection) stay decoupled. A user can have `user.role === 'appmanager'` without DB-level cross-tenant access; a user can have `user.role === 'sysadmin'` without org-membership context. See [CMS Configuration](/compiler/config#cms-configuration) for the `cms.sysadmin` flag, the cross-tenant `/auth/v1/admin/list-organizations` endpoint, and the SPA's \"All organizations\" sentinel.\n\n#### Mixing pseudo-roles with real roles\n\nPseudo-roles and lowercase real roles compose with OR:\n\n```typescript\n// Record owner OR a platform control-plane user can read\nread: { access: { or: [{ roles: [\"USER\"] }, { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }] } }\n\n// Org owner OR sysadmin\ndelete: { access: { or: [{ roles: [\"owner\"] }, { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] }] } }\n```\n\n> Note: `userRole: [\"appmanager\"]` never bypasses a `userId` firewall scope. If you need cross-user visibility, expose a separate route with `firewall: { exception: true }` or a `SYSADMIN`-gated cross-tenant surface.\n\n#### Quick reference\n\n```typescript\n// Unauthenticated public\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n\n// Any signed-in user, no scoping\naccess: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] }\n\n// Per-user records (requires userId firewall scope)\naccess: { roles: [\"USER\"] }\n\n// Platform control-plane\naccess: { userRole: [\"appmanager\"] }\n\n// Cross-tenant DB-admin tier\naccess: { roles: [\"SYSADMIN\"] }\n\n// Org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion\n// (\"+\" requires auth.roleHierarchy in quickback.config.ts — see Role Hierarchy above)\naccess: { roles: [\"member+\"] } // expands to [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } // expands to [\"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin\"] } // exact match (no expansion)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// Field conditions - value can be string | number | boolean\ntype FieldCondition =\n | { equals: value | '$ctx.userId' | '$ctx.activeOrgId' }\n | { notEquals: value }\n | { in: value[] }\n | { notIn: value[] }\n | { lessThan: number }\n | { greaterThan: number }\n | { lessThanOrEqual: number }\n | { greaterThanOrEqual: number };\n```\n\n## Relationship-based authorization\n\nBeyond Better Auth roles (org membership, user-table role) and pseudo-roles, Quickback supports **relationship-based authorization roles** — names that bind to a declared relationship between the caller and a resource. Use these when access should follow a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org/admin gate.\n\n### `authz.relationships`\n\nDeclare relationships once in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...providers...\n authz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests', // table name string\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side\n resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side\n where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional filter\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n // Composite: any guest OR an org owner/admin\n eventStaff: {\n or: [\n { via: 'guestOf' },\n { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] },\n ],\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Using relationship-roles in resources\n\nResource definitions reference declared roles by name in `roles: [...]` arrays exactly like BA roles or pseudo-roles. The compiler rewrites the access tree at build time so the runtime route does an inline relationship lookup against the declared table.\n\n**Today (v1) this works on:**\n\n| Surface | Status | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `firewall:` `via:` predicate | ✓ Supported | Subquery composes as outermost AND |\n| `crud.*.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported | Inline async lookup per request |\n| `read.access` / `read.views.*.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported | Same inline path |\n| `masking.<field>.show` `roles: ['guest']` | ⚠ Refused at compile | v1 limitation — async/batched mask functions deferred |\n| **Standalone** `actions.<name>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ✓ Supported (v0.19+) | Inline gate; surface must expose `resource.column` as path param or input field |\n| **Record-based** `actions.<name>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | ⚠ Fail-closed at runtime | Runtime helper denies; inline emission is a planned follow-up. Use `firewall: { exception: true }` or move the check into `execute()` until then |\n\nFor the surfaces that are not yet supported, the compiler refuses at build time with a clear error pointing to a workaround. The runtime evaluator fails closed on relationship arms regardless, so silent grants are impossible.\n\n### Standalone actions: surface keys and `loads` / `exposeAs` (v0.19+)\n\nWhen a standalone action's `access.roles` references a relationship-role, the compiler emits a runtime gate between input validation and `execute()`. The gate reads the relationship's `resource.column` value from the action surface — either a path parameter (`:eventId`) or an input field (`input.eventId`). If neither is present, the compiler:\n\n- **v0.19** — emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission. The action's own hand-rolled gate (if any) keeps the route working at runtime.\n- **v0.20** — hard compile error. Set `firewall: { exception: true }` to opt out (cross-tenant/admin routes only).\n\nPair the relationship with `loads` + `exposeAs` to hydrate the loaded resource onto `ctx`:\n\n```typescript\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events', // ← v0.19+: load matching event row\n exposeAs: 'event', // ← onto ctx.event for the action body\n },\n },\n roles: {\n attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe resolver (v0.20):\n\n1. **Cheap in-memory role check** first — `ctx.roles?.includes('admin')` and friends. If the caller has a qualifying role, this short-circuits and no DB queries fire for the access gate.\n2. **Firewall-gated relationship match** if the role check failed — `SELECT { organizationId, teamId } FROM guests WHERE userId=ctx.userId AND eventId=input.eventId AND status='confirmed'` with the `guests` table's full firewall AND-applied. If neither role nor relationship qualifies → 403.\n3. **Tenant stamping from the matched row** — for any tenant column the `from` table carries (`organizationId`, `teamId`), the resolver stamps `ctx.activeOrgId ??= matchedRow.organizationId` (and similar for team). This is **in-memory mutation of the request-scoped ctx only** — no JWT remint, no session-record write, no persistent grant.\n4. **Firewall-gated load of the loaded resource** — `SELECT * FROM events WHERE id = :eventId AND buildEventsFirewallConditions(ctx, db)`. The events firewall is applied as normal; it succeeds for attendees because tenant was just stamped from the relationship row.\n5. Assigns the loaded row to `ctx.event` for the action body.\n\n**No firewall bypass anywhere.** Both queries run with their respective tables' full firewalls. The relationship row's existence is the proof that the caller is authorized; its tenant columns are the source of the stamped claim.\n\n### Conditional tenant preconditions (v0.20+)\n\nStandalone actions in features with org/team-scoped tables previously emitted unconditional preconditions:\n\n```ts\nif (!ctx.activeOrgId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noOrg(), 403);\nif (!ctx.activeTeamId) return c.json(AccessErrors.noTeam(), 403);\n```\n\nThese ran **before** the relationship resolver, which 403'd attendees whose sessions don't carry an active tenant claim (the canonical event-attendee shape).\n\nv0.20 makes these preconditions **conditional on relationship supply**. If the access tree contains a relationship arm whose `from` table carries the matching tenant column, the precondition is skipped — the resolver runs first and stamps the value. Pseudo-role short-circuits (PUBLIC / AUTHENTICATED / USER / SYSADMIN) and `firewall: { exception: true }` still bypass the preconditions as before. `ADMIN` is now rejected at compile time.\n\nTypical event-attendee setup (`guests` table carries `organizationId`): the org precondition is dropped on every action whose access references `attendee` or `eventStaff`. Org admins still get `ctx.activeOrgId` from their session as today; attendees get it from the relationship row, mid-request. Both paths converge on a valid tenant claim before `execute()` runs.\n\n### Requirement on the relationship's `from` table\n\nFor the v0.20 tenant-stamping to work, the relationship's `from` table must carry tenant columns:\n\n- For org stamping: an `organizationId` column (or whatever spelling the project's auth-provider defaults pick).\n- For team stamping: a `teamId` column.\n\nWhen the `from` table has **neither**, the compiler emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning at compile time:\n\n```\nRelationship \"X\" at authz.relationships.X has no organization or team columns\non its `from` table (\"guests\"). Action \"Y\" will compile, but downstream\nscoped-db queries inside execute() may 403 because ctx.activeOrgId /\nactiveTeamId cannot be stamped from the match row. Either add the tenant\ncolumn to \"guests\", or set firewall: { exception: true } on the action.\n```\n\nThe relationship match still works (existence check), but no tenant gets stamped — so the conventional precondition still fires and the action still 403s for callers without a session-resident tenant claim. Add the tenant column (or denormalize it onto the relationship table during writes) to enable the stamping path.\n\nThe body can then trust `ctx.event` and drop the hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` boilerplate:\n\n```ts\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] }, // attendee is a relationship-role\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // No hand-rolled attendance check needed — the resolver already ran.\n // ctx.event is the loaded events row. Typed as `any` here because the\n // hand-rolled `roles: ['attendee']` action gates per-action, not per-\n // namespace — see \"Narrow ctx.<exposeAs> typing\" below for the typed\n // import flip available when the same hydration runs through a\n // namespace mount.\n const event = ctx.event as typeof events.$inferSelect;\n // … domain logic only.\n },\n});\n```\n\n`loads` and `exposeAs` are co-required (set both or neither). `exposeAs` must be a valid JS identifier and must not collide with built-in `ctx` fields (`userId`, `activeOrgId`, `activeTeamId`, `db`, etc.).\n\n### Action firewall escape hatch (v0.19+)\n\n`defineAction({ firewall: { exception: true } })` opts the action out of the inherited session-key preconditions (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId` requirements) AND the relationship resolver. The handler receives `unsafeDb` for raw Drizzle access. Use for cross-tenant or admin routes whose surface intentionally doesn't name a session/relationship key:\n\n```ts\ndefineAction({\n path: '/admin/cross-tenant-report',\n firewall: { exception: true },\n unsafe: { reason: 'cross-tenant audit', adminOnly: true, targetScope: 'all' },\n access: { roles: ['ADMIN'] },\n execute: async ({ unsafeDb, ctx }) => { /* cross-org query */ },\n});\n```\n\n`firewall: { exception: true }` is the declarative twin of `unsafe: true` — they're conceptually distinct: `firewall.exception` opts out of the gate-emission pillars; `unsafe` signals audit/cross-tenant intent (and still applies for logging). Most cross-tenant actions set both.\n\n### Recommended pattern: gate at the firewall layer\n\nMost of the time, relationship-based row visibility is what you want, and putting it at the **firewall** layer is the cleanest expression. The firewall is row-filter; the access layer is route/role-filter; let each do its job:\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row visibility\n],\nread: {\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member'] }, // ← who can hit the route\n views: {\n cms: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member'] }, fields: [...] },\n guest: { access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, fields: [...] },\n },\n},\n```\n\nA guest who's in your org as `member` can hit the endpoint and the firewall filters them down to events they're guests of. Cross-tenant access is impossible because the org filter is the outermost AND.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" dashboards are NOT this\n\nA common adjacent pattern — \"logged-in user wants `GET /my-events` returning events they're a guest of *across all tenants*\" — is **not** solved by relationship-roles. The tenant firewall is enforced at the outermost AND, so a guest of an event in another tenant remains correctly blocked.\n\nFor cross-tenant aggregation, use one of:\n\n- **User-scoped firewall**: `firewall: { owner: { column: 'userId' } }` — a flat per-user table.\n- **A standalone action that walks the relationship table itself** — see worked example below.\n\nDon't reach for relationship-roles first and then get confused when the tenant firewall blocks. The two patterns serve different problems.\n\n#### Worked example: `GET /my-events` standalone action\n\nThe cleanest expression of the cross-tenant attendee dashboard is a standalone action with a custom path that does its own join against the relationship table. The action is gated by `roles: ['AUTHENTICATED']` (any signed-in user can hit it; per-row scoping is the query itself), and the SQL filters by `ctx.userId` so each caller sees exactly the events they're a guest of:\n\n```ts\n// features/dashboard/actions/myEvents.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"List events the caller is a confirmed guest of, across all tenants.\",\n path: '/my-events',\n method: 'GET',\n input: z.object({}),\n // Any signed-in user. Row visibility comes from the query, not the role.\n access: { roles: ['AUTHENTICATED'] },\n async execute({ db, ctx }) {\n // 1. Find every event the caller has a confirmed guest row for.\n const guestRows = await db\n .select({ eventId: guests.eventId })\n .from(guests)\n .where(\n and(\n eq(guests.userId, ctx.userId!),\n eq(guests.status, 'confirmed'),\n // guests.organizationId is NOT filtered here — that's the whole\n // point of the cross-tenant lane. The relationship row's org is\n // ambient information that this action explicitly traverses.\n )\n );\n\n if (guestRows.length === 0) return { events: [] };\n\n // 2. Pull the matching events. NOTE: this query also bypasses\n // `events.organizationId` scope — by design — so explicitly filter\n // out soft-deleted rows yourself if your `events` table uses them.\n const eventIds = guestRows.map((r) => r.eventId);\n const rows = await db\n .select()\n .from(events)\n .where(inArray(events.id, eventIds));\n\n return { events: rows };\n },\n});\n```\n\nWhy this is a standalone action and not a CRUD route:\n\n- **Tenant firewall would block it.** The default `firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` on `events` is correct for every other read — only the cross-tenant dashboard wants to step outside it, and that's a deliberate, explicit step taken in handler code.\n- **The join is the access control.** A relationship-role at the firewall layer can't express \"filter by this user's relationships, ignoring the org context.\" The handler does that join directly.\n- **Audit-logged automatically.** Standalone actions are mandatorily audit-logged in the runtime — the cross-tenant traversal is recorded with `ctx.userId`, IP, and timing.\n\nTwo important guardrails when you write one of these:\n\n1. **Always filter by `ctx.userId` in the relationship lookup.** If you accept a `userId` from the request body and trust it, you've built an IDOR. The example above uses `ctx.userId!` directly so the only events returned are the caller's.\n2. **You take responsibility for soft-delete and other invariants the firewall would otherwise apply.** Add the `deletedAt` filter, status checks, and any other row-level predicates by hand. The action is OUTSIDE the firewall pipeline by design — the cost is that you can't lean on the auto-applied predicates.\n\nIf you find yourself writing more than one of these per project, that's usually a signal to revisit the schema (could a user-owned `userEvents` materialized view replace the join?) rather than a sign Quickback should ship a higher-level abstraction. Cross-tenant lanes are intentionally explicit.\n\n### Compile-time refusals (consolidated)\n\nThe validator and resolver reject:\n\n- Unknown key in `authz` block (typo guard — `realtionships` would otherwise silently produce a permanently-denied role).\n- Reserved role-name (auth-provider-derived). Names like `guest`, `speaker`, `attendee` are free; `admin`/`owner`/`member` are reserved when the BA org plugin is on.\n- Cycle in role composition (`a → b → a`).\n- Relationship `from` references unknown table.\n- Relationship-role used on a resource missing the `resource.column`.\n- Relationship table with `firewall: { exception: true }` (would let cross-tenant grants slip through).\n- `lowering: 'session'` (reserved for v2 — staleness/invalidation ergonomics not yet shipped).\n- `+` hierarchy suffix on a relationship-role name (terminal, like pseudo-roles).\n- Relationship-roles in `masking.show` / `actions.access` (deferred surfaces — see the table above).\n\n## Namespace mounts (hoisted relationship middleware)\n\nWhen several standalone actions share a path prefix and the same relationship gate — `/event/:eventId/announce`, `/event/:eventId/cancel`, `/event/:eventId/respond` — declaring the gate per-action means writing the same `roles: ['attendee']` over and over AND paying the relationship-resolver cost N times per request (one subquery + one row-load, multiplied by the number of actions).\n\nNamespace mounts hoist the resolver into one Hono middleware that runs once per request. Every action under the prefix skips the inline gate; `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated by the middleware before the action's `execute()` runs. With the per-namespace helper (v0.27+, [below](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing-v027)), that field is also statically typed as the loaded row.\n\n### When to use roles vs. relationships\n\nA user is authorized for a row when **any** of the following is true:\n\n- they have a **per-row relationship** to it (e.g. an attendee row, a named organizer row), or\n- they have a **role on the row's tenant** (org admin/owner of the row's `organizationId`), or\n- they have **team membership** matching the row's `teamId`.\n\nUse **relationships** when membership is specific to *this row* — external collaborators who aren't in your org, attendees, anyone connected to the resource by virtue of data rather than payroll. Use **roles / team** when staff at your org/team should see everything in their scope by default.\n\nThe two compose at the action level (`access.or` accepts both relationship-roles and tenant roles) and — as of v0.25 — at the namespace level too: `namespace.via` accepts an array of lanes, first match wins.\n\n> **Rule of thumb.** If the answer is *\"yes if you work here,\"* reach for org/team roles. If the answer is *\"yes if you have something to do with **this** row,\"* reach for a per-row relationship. Reach for both together — at the namespace or via `access.or` — when an action should let either side in.\n\nTwo declaration sites depending on whether the participating actions live in one feature or many:\n\n### Single feature: `defineTable({ namespace })` (v0.23+)\n\nUse when every action under the prefix lives in the same feature directory. The namespace travels with the table that owns it — no addition to `quickback.config.ts` needed.\n\n```typescript\n// features/events/events.ts\nexport default defineTable(events, {\n firewall: [...],\n crud: { ... },\n namespace: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId', // absolute URL path\n via: 'attendeeOf', // relationship gate (must exist in authz.relationships)\n },\n});\n\n// features/events/actions/post-announcement.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/announcements',\n method: 'POST',\n // No gate boilerplate. ctx.event is typed inside execute().\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one `app.use(...)` on the events feature's Hono app. Every standalone action in `features/events/actions/` whose path starts with `/event/:eventId/` joins the namespace automatically.\n\nMulti-lane via (v0.25+) and bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+) work identically on the table-level declaration — `via:` accepts the same shapes documented below for the project-level form.\n\n### Cross-feature: `authz.namespaces` (v0.24+)\n\nUse when the namespace spans multiple features. The declaration sits next to your other authz config in `quickback.config.ts`.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n namespaces: {\n eventScope: { prefix: '/event/:eventId', via: 'attendeeOf' },\n },\n}\n```\n\nWith the namespace declared, any standalone action whose `path:` matches the prefix joins the gate — regardless of which feature owns it:\n\n```typescript\n// features/feeds/actions/feed-moments.ts (in one feature)\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/feed-moments',\n method: 'POST',\n});\n\n// features/rsvp/actions/respond.ts (in a different feature)\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/respond',\n method: 'POST',\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one synthetic `src/routes/__namespace-event-scope.routes.ts` that imports each contributing feature's `actions` map under a distinct alias, mounts the resolver middleware once, and dispatches to the matching action. Worker-root mount order ensures the middleware fires before any per-feature route handler under the prefix.\n\n### Multi-lane via (v0.25+) — first match wins\n\nWhen more than one relationship can authorize a caller for the namespaced resource, pass `via:` as an array. The middleware tries each lane in declaration order and stops at the first match — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is hydrated from whichever lane fired.\n\n```typescript\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n // Named per-event organizers (potentially EXTERNAL — these users may\n // not be a member of the event's org. That's the point: lets you grant\n // event-level access to freelancers / partner staff without adding\n // them to the org's member list.)\n organizerOf: {\n from: 'eventOrganizers',\n subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n namespaces: {\n eventScope: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId',\n via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf'],\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAll relationship lanes in a namespace **must agree on `loads:` + `exposeAs:`** — that's what guarantees `ctx.event` has the same shape regardless of which lane matched. The compiler rejects heterogeneous lanes at parse time.\n\n### Bulk-grant lanes (v0.26+)\n\nRelationship lanes cover \"specifically connected to this row.\" Bulk-grant lanes cover \"anyone with this role / team membership in the row's tenant\" — the case where an org admin or a team member should see every event in their scope without writing per-event relationship rows.\n\n```typescript\nnamespaces: {\n eventScope: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId',\n via: [\n 'attendeeOf',\n 'organizerOf',\n { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }, // org-role bulk grant\n { team: true }, // active-team-membership bulk grant\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach bulk-grant lane:\n\n- **`{ roles: [...] }`** — passes when the caller's BA org-role for the loaded resource's tenant includes any listed role. Short-circuits the relationship loop entirely; the role check is in-memory and cheap. Use for the \"company admin sees everything\" case.\n- **`{ team: true }`** — passes when `ctx.activeTeamId` is set. The loads-table firewall does the actual `events.teamId === ctx.activeTeamId` check during hydration. Use when the resource is team-scoped and you want active-team membership to grant access.\n\nBoth bulk-grant lanes piggyback on the namespace's relationship lane(s) for hydration — they don't fetch a separate per-row subject; they just gate access and let the loads-table firewall handle the tenant scoping. **At least one relationship lane is required** alongside bulk-grant lanes in v0.26 (to anchor `loads:` + `exposeAs:`).\n\nWhen a request misses every lane, the 403 deny payload lists every authorization path the caller could have taken — relationship names, role names, and `\"team-membership\"` for `{ team: true }` lanes — so a developer debugging an unexpected 403 sees the full surface they need to satisfy.\n\nA namespace can also fold the scope machinery into this same gate: `mintScope: true` **mints** a scope token on a matched userId lane, and `acceptScope: '<kind>'` **accepts** an already-minted scope claim as proof of entry — one handler under the prefix serves both a Better-Auth user and a sessionless scope principal. See [Scopes → `acceptScope`](/compiler/definitions/scopes#acceptscope--accept-an-incoming-scope-claim-as-proof-of-entry).\n\n### Discovery is path-prefix-only\n\nActions opt in by matching `path:` against a declared namespace prefix. There's no `namespace: 'foo'` field on `defineAction` — the path string is the discoverable surface, consistent with how `path:` already determines an action's URL.\n\n### Requirements (enforced at compile time)\n\nBoth forms share the same shape checks:\n\n- **`via:` accepts one of three shapes.** A single relationship name (v0.23+), an array of relationship names (v0.25+, first match wins), or — as of v0.26 — an array mixing relationship names with bulk-grant guards (`{ roles: [...] }`, `{ team: true }`).\n- **Every relationship lane must declare `loads + exposeAs`.** Without `loads` there's nothing for the middleware to hydrate; the namespace gate would be indistinguishable from a per-action access rule.\n- **All relationship lanes in one namespace must agree on `loads:` + `exposeAs:`.** Otherwise `ctx.<exposeAs>` would change shape depending on which lane matched.\n- **Bulk-grant lanes inherit `loads:` + `exposeAs:` from sibling relationship lanes.** Pure bulk-grant namespaces (no relationship lane at all) are also accepted — set `loads:` + `exposeAs:` directly on the namespace declaration so hydration has somewhere to anchor.\n- **`prefix:` must contain at least one `:param` segment** (e.g. `/event/:eventId`). The middleware reads the relationship key from `c.req.param()` because no request body has been parsed at middleware time.\n- **One declaration per namespace name.** The same name in both `defineTable({ namespace })` and `authz.namespaces` is rejected. The project-level form is canonical for cross-feature; the table-level form is the single-feature shorthand.\n\nProject-level only:\n\n- **Ambiguous prefixes** like `/a/:x` and `/a/:y` (same shape, different `:param` names) are rejected. Strict super/sub-set relationships (`/event/:e` vs `/event/:e/admin`) are fine — the harvester routes each action to the longest matching prefix.\n- **Unused namespace** emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning when no action's path matches the declared prefix. Not a hard error — the namespace may be staged ahead of the actions.\n\n### What namespace actions get for free\n\nInside a namespace action's `execute()`:\n\n- `ctx.<exposeAs>` is populated by the middleware with the loaded resource row. Statically `any` by default — narrowed to `typeof <loadsTable>.$inferSelect` when the action's import points at the per-namespace helper (see [below](#narrow-ctxexposeas-typing-v027)).\n- Tenant context (`ctx.activeOrgId` / `ctx.activeTeamId`) is stamped from the matched relationship row when its `from` table carries those columns. Downstream scoped queries work without further setup.\n- The action's own `access:` block (additional roles, userRole, record predicates, OTHER relationship arms) still runs after the namespace gate — namespace handles entry, per-action gates further.\n\n### Narrow `ctx.<exposeAs>` typing (v0.27+)\n\nThe namespace middleware hydrates `ctx.<exposeAs>` at runtime — that's been true since v0.23. The static type of that field, though, is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature: useful for not blocking access, but a missed opportunity for autocomplete and typo-catching.\n\nv0.27 emits one **per-namespace `defineAction` helper** alongside the standard `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts`. Importing from the narrowed helper retypes `ctx.<exposeAs>` inside `execute({ ctx })` to the loaded row's `$inferSelect` shape. Nothing else changes — runtime behavior, action discovery, and the `path:` namespace match are identical.\n\n```ts title=\"features/feeds/actions/feed-moments.ts\"\n// One-line flip per namespace-scoped action:\n\n// └──────┬──────┘\n// kebab(namespaceName)\n\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/feed-moments',\n method: 'POST',\n input: z.object({ body: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: ['attendee'] },\n async execute({ ctx, input }) {\n ctx.event.id // ✓ string\n ctx.event.startsAt // ✓ Date — autocomplete works\n ctx.event.organizerId // ✓ narrows on the field's declared type\n\n ctx.event.idd // ✗ TS2339 — typo caught at compile time\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits one helper per `(feature, namespace)` pair where the feature owns at least one action whose `path:` falls under the namespace prefix. Filename is `define-action.<kebab(namespaceName)>.ts` — `eventScope` becomes `define-action.event-scope.ts`. Helpers live next to the standard `define-action.ts` in `<feature>/.quickback/`, so the relative import is the same shape as every other action file in your project.\n\n#### Opt-in, not breaking\n\nActions that keep their existing `import { defineAction } from '../.quickback/define-action'` continue to compile unchanged — `ctx.<exposeAs>` is `any` via the `AppContext` index signature, which is exactly the v0.23–v0.26 behavior. You flip imports per action at your own pace.\n\n#### Compile-time advisory\n\nWhen `quickback compile` sees a namespace-scoped action still importing the generic helper, it emits a one-line advisory pointing at the narrowed path:\n\n```text\n[quickback:typing] action \"feedMoments\" in feature \"feeds\" lives under\n namespace \"eventScope\" — switch its import to\n `../.quickback/define-action.event-scope` for narrow ctx.<exposeAs> typing.\n (Runtime behavior is unchanged; the narrowed helper only refines TS types.)\n```\n\nNon-blocking — same `[quickback:typing]` family as `[quickback:authz]`. The advisory only mentions actions the compiler can be confident about (namespace-claimed actions whose source still imports the generic helper).\n\n#### Multi-namespace features\n\nA single feature can contribute actions to several namespaces — say, an `interviews` feature with actions under both `interviewScope` and `eventScope`. The compiler emits one narrowed helper per namespace the feature participates in, and each action picks the import that matches its path.\n\n```text\nsrc/features/interviews/.quickback/\n├── define-action.ts # generic — standard fallback\n├── define-action.interview-scope.ts # ctx.interview typed\n└── define-action.event-scope.ts # ctx.event typed\n```\n\n#### Why per-namespace and not per-action\n\nA `defineAction` helper that's narrow to *one* exposed key (the namespace's `exposeAs`) is enough — every action under a namespace sees the same hydrated key. The alternative (per-action emit) duplicates the same prelude N times for the same shape; per-namespace keeps emission proportional to the number of distinct hydration shapes in the project.\n\n## Read & Write Configuration\n\nReads (`GET /` and `GET /:id`) live under `read:`; mutations live under top-level `create:`, `update:`, `delete:`, and `upsert:`. See [Read](/compiler/definitions/read) for the full read pipeline reference.\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n // LIST + GET - GET /resource and GET /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25, // Default page size\n maxPageSize: 100, // Client can't exceed this\n views: { // Per-view field projections\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'candidateId', 'jobId', 'stage'],\n access: { roles: [\"interviewer\"] },\n },\n },\n}\n\ncreate: {\n // CREATE - POST /resource\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n defaults: { // Default values for new records\n stage: 'applied',\n },\n},\n\nupdate: {\n // UPDATE - PATCH /resource/:id\n access: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n { roles: [\"interviewer\"], record: { stage: { equals: \"interview\" } } }\n ]\n },\n},\n\ndelete: {\n // DELETE - DELETE /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // 'soft' (default) or 'hard'\n},\n\nupsert: {\n // PUT - PUT /resource/:id (only when generateId: false + guards: false)\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"sync-service\"] },\n}\n```\n\n## Evaluation Order\n\nGenerated `/:id` and batch handlers evaluate access in this fixed order:\n\n1. **Auth gate** — 401 if unauthenticated\n2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)\n3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership\n4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates\n5. **Masking** — applied to the response\n\nStep 2 closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel: an unauthorized caller without\na matching role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they can't tell\napart \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" A caller with the\nright role but the wrong tenant gets 403 by default (firewall reveals via\nthe access layer); set\n[`firewallErrorMode: 'hide'`](/compiler/definitions/firewall) to return an\nopaque 404 instead.\n\nFunction-form access (`access: async (ctx, record) => ...`) is opaque to\nthe pre-record phase and always passes there; it's fully evaluated post-record.\n\n## List Filtering (Query Parameters)\n\nThe LIST endpoint automatically supports filtering via query params:\n\n```\nGET /jobs?status=open # Exact match\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gt=50000 # Greater than\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gte=50000 # Greater than or equal\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lt=200000 # Less than\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lte=200000 # Less than or equal\nGET /jobs?status.ne=closed # Not equal\nGET /jobs?title.like=Engineer # Pattern match (LIKE %value%)\nGET /jobs?status.in=open,draft # IN clause\n```\n\n| Operator | Query Param | SQL Equivalent |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| Equals | `?field=value` | `WHERE field = value` |\n| Not equals | `?field.ne=value` | `WHERE field != value` |\n| Greater than | `?field.gt=value` | `WHERE field > value` |\n| Greater or equal | `?field.gte=value` | `WHERE field >= value` |\n| Less than | `?field.lt=value` | `WHERE field < value` |\n| Less or equal | `?field.lte=value` | `WHERE field <= value` |\n| Pattern match | `?field.like=value` | `WHERE field LIKE '%value%'` |\n| In list | `?field.in=a,b,c` | `WHERE field IN ('a','b','c')` |\n\n## Sorting & Pagination\n\n```\nGET /jobs?sort=createdAt&order=desc # Sort by field\nGET /jobs?limit=25&offset=50 # Pagination\n```\n\n- **Default limit**: 50\n- **Max limit**: 100 (or `maxPageSize` if configured)\n- **Default order**: `asc`\n\n## Delete Modes\n\n```typescript\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // Sets deletedAt/deletedBy, record stays in DB\n}\n\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"hard\", // Permanent deletion from database\n}\n```\n\n## Context Variables\n\nUse `$ctx.` prefix to reference context values in conditions:\n\n```typescript\n// User can only view their own records\naccess: {\n record: { userId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n}\n\n// Nested path support for complex context objects\naccess: {\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.user.id\" } }\n}\n```\n\n### AppContext Reference\n\n| Property | Type | Description |\n|----------|------|-------------|\n| `$ctx.userId` | `string` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `$ctx.activeOrgId` | `string` | User's active organization ID |\n| `$ctx.activeTeamId` | `string \\| null` | User's active team ID (if applicable) |\n| `$ctx.roles` | `string[]` | User's roles in current context |\n| `$ctx.isAnonymous` | `boolean` | Whether user is anonymous |\n| `$ctx.user` | `object` | Full user object from auth provider |\n| `$ctx.user.id` | `string` | User ID (nested path example) |\n| `$ctx.user.email` | `string` | User's email address |\n| `$ctx.{property}` | `any` | Any custom context property |\n\n## Function-Based Access\n\nFor complex access logic that can't be expressed declaratively, use a function:\n\n```typescript\nupdate: {\n access: async (ctx, record) => {\n // Custom logic - return true to allow, false to deny\n if (ctx.roles.includes('admin')) return true;\n if (record.ownerId === ctx.userId) return true;\n\n // Check custom business logic\n const membership = await checkTeamMembership(ctx.userId, record.teamId);\n return membership.canEdit;\n }\n}\n```\n\nFunction access receives:\n- `ctx`: The full AppContext object\n- `record`: The record being accessed (for get/update/delete operations)"
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"content": "Actions are custom API endpoints for business logic beyond CRUD operations. They enable workflows, integrations, and complex operations.\n\n## Overview\n\nQuickback supports two types of actions:\n\n| Aspect | Record-Based | Standalone |\n|--------|--------------|------------|\n| Route | `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}` | Custom `path` (required) |\n| Record fetching | Automatic | None (`record` is `undefined`) |\n| Firewall applied | Yes | No |\n| Preconditions | Supported via `access.record` | Not applicable |\n| Response types | JSON only | JSON, stream, file |\n| Use case | Advance application, reject candidate | AI chat, bulk import from job board, webhooks |\n\nStandalone actions are signalled by the presence of a `path:` field in the action config. Record-based actions omit `path` and bind to the feature's primary table.\n\n## Where do actions live?\n\n**One file per action.** Each action is its own module under the feature's\n`actions/` directory:\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts ← defineTable (primary table)\n├── candidates.ts ← defineTable (sibling table)\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── reject.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── stats.ts ← defineAction, standalone (has `path:`)\n│ └── candidates/\n│ └── disqualify.ts ← defineAction, binds to candidates\n└── lib/\n └── inputs.ts ← shared schemas (optional, copied verbatim)\n```\n\n| Layout | Binds to |\n|--------|----------|\n| `actions/<name>.ts` | The feature's primary table (table file matching the feature name), or standalone if `path:` is set. |\n| `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` | The sibling table file `<table>.ts` at the feature root. Standalone actions inside a subdir ignore the binding. |\n\nThe action's filename (sans `.ts`) is the action name and the URL segment, and\nit must be a valid **camelCase identifier** — `sendMessage.ts`, not\n`send-message.ts` (hyphenated names are a compile error, since the name becomes\na generated identifier).\nUniqueness is enforced per `(bound table, name)` pair — sibling-bound\nactions on **different** tables may share a verb (`actions/episodes/publish.ts`\nand `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and\n`/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly). The compiler errors only when\ntwo action files would mount at the same URL — for example, a flat\n`actions/foo.ts` (binds to primary) plus `actions/<primary>/foo.ts`, or\ntwo standalones with the same `(method, path)`. Standalone actions are\nunique per `(method, path)`.\n\nTableless features have no top-level `*.ts` files; every action under\n`actions/` must be standalone (have `path:`). Use this for utility endpoints\nlike webhooks, reports, or integrations that don't operate on a specific\nrecord.\n\n### Retired layouts\n\nThese are rejected at load time with migration guidance:\n\n- **`actions.ts`** (bundled multi-action file)\n- **`_feature.ts`** (shared schemas + non-table-bound actions)\n- **`handlers/`** (separate handler-file directory)\n- **`defineActions(table, {...})`** (the multi-action factory)\n- **`defineActions(null, {...})`** (tableless variant)\n- **`*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts`** filename patterns\n\nFor shared Zod schemas or helpers, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import\nfrom each action file. Files under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the\ngenerated output.\n\n## Defining Actions\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n> **`defineAction` import.** Import from `\"../.quickback/define-action\"` —\n> the `.quickback/` directory is generated alongside your feature with a\n> typed helper that infers `record` and `input` types from the rest of the\n> action config. Audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`,\n> `modifiedBy`) are hard-stamped by the audit DB wrapper on every\n> `db.insert().values()` and `db.update().set()` — handlers don't pass\n> them and can't override them.\n\n### Configuration Options\n\n| Option | Required | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `description` | Yes | Human-readable description of the action |\n| `input` | Yes | Zod schema for request validation |\n| `access` | Yes | Access control (roles, record conditions, or function) |\n| `execute` | Yes | Inline async arrow function (`async (ctx) => { … }`) |\n| `path` | Standalone only | Custom route path. Presence of `path` makes the action standalone. |\n| `method` | No | HTTP method: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE (default: POST). GET actions parse `input` from query params; all other methods parse from the JSON body. See [GET vs POST for input](#get-vs-post-for-input). |\n| `responseType` | No | Response format: json, stream, file (default: json) |\n| `sideEffects` | No | Hint for AI tools: `'sync'`, `'async'`, or `'fire-and-forget'` |\n| `allowRawSql` | No | Explicit compile-time opt-in for raw SQL in execute code |\n| `unsafe` | No | Unsafe raw DB mode. Object config (`reason`, `adminOnly`, `crossTenant`, `targetScope`). |\n| `transition` | No | State-machine policy enforcing the from/to pair (record-based actions). See [Transitions](#transition-state-machine-policy) |\n| `bulkVariant` | No | Auto-generate a `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` route alongside the per-record route (record-based actions). See [Bulk Variant](#bulk-variant) |\n| `cms` | No | Pass-through metadata blob for CMS surfaces |\n\n`execute` must be an `async (ctx) => { … }` arrow function. `async function`\ndeclarations and non-async forms are rejected at parse time.\n\n## Record-Based Actions\n\nRecord-based actions operate on an existing record. The record is automatically loaded and validated before your action executes.\n\n**Route pattern:** `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}`\n\n```\nPOST /applications/:id/advance\nPOST /applications/:id/reject\nPOST /applications/:id/schedule-interview\n```\n\n### Runtime Flow\n\n1. **Authentication** - User token is validated\n2. **Input Validation** - Request body validated against Zod schema\n3. **Role Gate** - The access roles are checked *before* the record is\n fetched (v0.46+), so a wrong-role caller gets a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED` whether or not the record exists — the\n response can't be used to probe for record ids\n4. **Record Loading** - The record is fetched by ID **through the firewall**\n (a cross-tenant or missing id is a standard firewall miss)\n5. **Access Check** - Record preconditions (`access.record`) and transition\n policy are validated against the loaded record\n6. **Execution** - Your action handler runs\n7. **Response** - Result is returned to client\n\n### Example: Advance Application Stage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move application to the next pipeline stage\",\n input: z.object({\n stage: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\", \"hired\"]),\n notes: z.string().optional(),\n }),\n access: {\n roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n record: { stage: { notEquals: \"rejected\" } },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n stage: input.stage,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(eq(applications.id, record.id))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Request Example\n\n```\nPOST /applications/app_123/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n}\n```\n\n### Response Example\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Bulk variant\n\nSet `bulkVariant: true` to auto-generate a bulk version of the action at\n`POST /:resource/batch/{action}`. The compiler emits a second route alongside\nthe per-record one, looping the same access + transition + execute pipeline\nover an array of ids. This is the answer to \"I need to advance 50\napplications at once\" — you don't have to hand-roll a parallel standalone\naction that duplicates the per-record logic.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({ status: input.nextStatus })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n if (!updated) throw new TransitionLostError(\"status\", record.status, input.nextStatus);\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Request shape:**\n\n```http\nPOST /applications/batch/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_001\", \"app_002\", \"app_003\"],\n \"input\": { \"nextStatus\": \"interview\" },\n \"failFast\": false\n}\n```\n\nThe `input` is shared across the batch — the action's Zod schema is\nvalidated once, not per id. For per-record input variation, use the\nsingle-record endpoint (`POST /:id/{action}`) or write a standalone action.\n\n**Response (207 Multi-Status when any record fails, 200 when clean):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [{ \"id\": \"app_001\", \"status\": \"interview\" }],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"id\": \"app_002\",\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current state\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": { \"field\": \"status\", \"currentValue\": \"rejected\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Per-record pipeline** mirrors the single-record route exactly — the same\nfirewall fetch, access reason split (403 vs 409), transition pre-check,\n`whereTransition` factory, and `TransitionLostError` handling. Per-record\nfailures land in `errors[]` with their original index; successful records\nland in `success[]` masked the same way the single-record response is.\n\n**Transactional matrix** (same as `PATCH /batch`):\n\n| Provider | failFast | transactional | Behavior |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| tx-supporting (postgres, neon over websocket) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any throw rolls back all writes |\n| (any) | `false` | `false` | Independent per-record outcomes, partial success |\n| cloudflare-d1, neon over http (Cloudflare default) | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — earlier records stay committed (the driver has no `db.transaction`; `drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws at runtime) |\n\n**Constraints:**\n\n- Record-based actions only. Standalone actions reject `bulkVariant: true`\n at compile time (no record context to loop over).\n- `unsafe` actions reject `bulkVariant: true` in v1 — the cross-tenant\n per-record audit story is not yet wired through.\n- Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting. The\n semantic asymmetry (one row → many rows) makes inheriting GET/DELETE\n confusing.\n- Max batch size is 100 ids per request.\n\n## Standalone Actions\n\nStandalone actions are independent endpoints that don't require a record context. Set a `path:` to declare the action standalone.\n\n**Route pattern:** Custom `path`\n\n```\nPOST /chat\nGET /reports/summary\nPOST /webhooks/stripe\n```\n\n### Example: AI Chat with Streaming\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/actions/chat.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Send a message to AI\",\n path: \"/chat\",\n method: \"POST\",\n responseType: \"stream\",\n input: z.object({\n message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n async execute({ input, c }) {\n // Stream response back to client...\n return c.newResponse(/* ReadableStream */);\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Streaming Response Example\n\nFor actions with `responseType: 'stream'`:\n\n```\nContent-Type: text/event-stream\n\ndata: {\"type\": \"start\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"Hello\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"! I'm\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \" here to help.\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"done\"}\n```\n\n### Tableless Features\n\nA feature directory with no top-level `*.ts` files is \"tableless\" — every\naction under `actions/` must be standalone. Use this for utility endpoints\nlike reports, integrations, or webhooks that don't map to a specific\nresource.\n\n```\nquickback/features/\n└── reports/\n └── actions/\n ├── trial-balance.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n └── profit-loss.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/reports/actions/trial-balance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate trial balance report\",\n path: \"/reports/trial-balance\",\n method: \"GET\",\n input: z.object({\n startDate: z.string(),\n endDate: z.string(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"accountant\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... build report\n return { rows: [] };\n },\n});\n```\n\n### GET vs POST for input\n\nGET actions read `input` from URL query parameters; every other method (POST,\nPUT, PATCH, DELETE) reads from the JSON body. The Zod schema is the same in\nboth cases — the compiler picks the right parser based on `method`.\n\n```typescript\n// GET — input populated from ?q=…&limit=…\ndefineAction({\n method: \"GET\",\n path: \"/search\",\n input: z.object({\n q: z.string(),\n limit: z.coerce.number().int().positive().max(100).default(20),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ input }) {\n // input is { q: string, limit: number } — fully typed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nRepeated query keys (`?tag=a&tag=b`) come through as arrays automatically;\nsingle values stay as strings. Use Zod's `.coerce.number()` /\n`.coerce.boolean()` when you want typed primitives from the parsed strings.\n\n**Use POST when input is structured.** GET requests cannot carry a JSON body\nin any of the surfaces Quickback APIs are commonly called from:\n\n- Browsers throw on `fetch(url, { method: 'GET', body })`.\n- CDNs and caches key on URL+method; a GET with a body either gets the body\n stripped at the edge or cache-collides with semantically different requests.\n- OpenAPI client generators (axios, openapi-fetch, openapi-typescript-codegen)\n refuse to emit GET-with-body, so the generated SDKs break.\n- The MCP agent surface treats GET as parameter-only — agents calling a GET\n action will only see what the URL exposes.\n\nIf your action takes nested objects, arrays of objects, or large inputs that\ndon't serialize cleanly to a query string, set `method: \"POST\"`. POST doesn't\nimply \"this writes data\" — it's the right method whenever the request body is\nload-bearing. Use the response shape (`responseType: \"json\"`, or just the data\nyour handler returns) to convey read semantics; HTTP method choice is about\ninput transport, not action intent.\n\n## Access Configuration\n\nAccess controls who can execute an action and under what conditions.\n\n### Role-Based Access\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] // OR logic: user needs any of these roles\n}\n```\n\n### Public Access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for unauthenticated endpoints (contact forms, webhooks, public APIs). Every invocation is **mandatory audit logged** with IP address, input, result, and timing.\n\n```typescript\n// features/contact/actions/submit.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Public contact form submission\",\n path: \"/submit\",\n input: z.object({\n name: z.string().min(1),\n email: z.string().email(),\n message: z.string().min(10),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... persist submission\n return { ok: true };\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe wildcard `\"*\"` is not supported and will throw a compile-time error. Use `\"PUBLIC\"` explicitly.\n\n### Record Conditions\n\nFor record-based actions, you can require the record to be in a specific state:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\"],\n record: {\n stage: { equals: \"screening\" } // Precondition\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Supported operators:**\n\n| Operator | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `equals` | Field must equal value |\n| `notEquals` | Field must not equal value |\n| `in` | Field must be one of the values |\n| `notIn` | Field must not be one of the values |\n\n### Context Substitution\n\nUse `$ctx` to reference the current user's context:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n record: {\n ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" },\n organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### OR/AND Combinations\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\"] },\n {\n roles: [\"recruiter\"],\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Function Access\n\nFor complex logic, use an access function:\n\n```typescript\naccess: async (ctx, record) => {\n return ctx.roles.includes('admin') || record.ownerId === ctx.userId;\n}\n```\n\n### Relationship-roles in actions\n\n**v0.19+** — standalone actions now support relationship-roles in `access.roles` directly. Declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` with optional `loads` / `exposeAs` for ctx hydration, and reference the role by name on the action:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n roles: { attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' } },\n}\n\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] },\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // The resolver already verified attendance and loaded ctx.event.\n // No hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` needed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe action's surface (path params + input fields) must expose the relationship's `resource.column`. At v0.19 a missing key emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission; at v0.20 it becomes a compile error. See [Access — standalone actions](/compiler/definitions/access#standalone-actions-surface-keys-and-loads--exposeas-v019) for the full mechanism.\n\n**Record-based actions** are NOT yet supported — the runtime evaluator fail-closes (403) on relationship arms reached without an inline gate. Until inline emission for record-based actions lands, either:\n\n- Set `firewall: { exception: true }` on the action and gate manually in `execute()`, OR\n- Apply the relationship at the resource's firewall layer (worked example below).\n\n**Resource-layer workaround for record-based actions**: gate the action on BA roles only and apply the relationship at the resource layer via a firewall `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts — firewall scopes rows; action gates on BA role\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row-level relationship check\n],\nactions: {\n comment: defineAction({\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, // ← BA role only on the action\n input: z.object({ text: z.string() }),\n execute: async (input, ctx, db, record) => {\n // record is already filtered by the firewall — guest membership\n // is enforced before this handler runs.\n return db.insert(comments).values({ ... });\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThis pattern composes cleanly: the firewall guarantees the caller has the relationship to the record being acted on; the action's access list keeps the role surface obvious.\n\nSee [Access — relationship authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization) for the full picture, including `loads` / `exposeAs` and the `firewall: { exception: true }` escape hatch.\n\n## Scoped Database\n\nAll actions receive a **scoped `db`** instance that automatically enforces security:\n\n| Operation | Org Scoping | Owner Scoping | Soft Delete Filter | Auto-inject on INSERT |\n|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|\n| `SELECT` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `INSERT` | n/a | n/a | n/a | `organizationId`, `ownerId` from ctx |\n| `UPDATE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `DELETE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n\nScoping is duck-typed at runtime — tables with an `organizationId` column get org scoping, tables with `ownerId` get owner scoping, tables with `deletedAt` get soft delete filtering.\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, ctx, input }) {\n // This query automatically includes WHERE organizationId = ? AND deletedAt IS NULL\n const items = await db.select().from(applications).where(eq(applications.stage, 'interview'));\n\n // Inserts automatically include organizationId\n await db.insert(applications).values({ candidateId: input.candidateId, jobId: input.jobId, stage: 'applied' });\n\n return items;\n}\n```\n\n**Not enforced** in scoped DB (by design):\n- **Guards** — actions ARE the authorized way to modify guarded fields\n- **Masking** — actions are backend code that may need raw data\n- **Access** — already checked before action execution\n\n### Relational queries are blocked (fail-closed)\n\nDrizzle's relational query API — `db.query.<table>.findFirst()` /\n`findMany()` (including nested `with:` relations) — builds its SQL from the\nrelations config and your `where` alone, so the scoped wrapper cannot inject\nthe org/owner/team firewall into it. Rather than silently returning rows from\nevery tenant, the scoped `db` **throws** on any `db.query.<table>` access:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, input }) {\n // ❌ Throws: relational queries aren't org-scoped\n const item = await db.query.media.findFirst({ where: eq(media.id, input.id) });\n\n // ✅ Scoped builder — firewall conditions injected automatically\n const [item] = await db.select().from(media).where(eq(media.id, input.id));\n}\n```\n\nIf you genuinely need the relational API, declare the action `unsafe: true`\nand query `unsafeDb.query` with an **explicit** scope predicate in the WHERE\n(e.g. `eq(media.organizationId, ctx.activeOrgId)`), exactly like any other\nunsafe read.\n\n### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.\n\nUse object form for explicit policy and mandatory audit metadata:\n\n```typescript\n// features/admin/actions/cross-tenant-report.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate cross-org hiring report\",\n path: \"/admin/cross-tenant-report\",\n input: z.object({ startDate: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n unsafe: {\n reason: \"Support investigation for enterprise customer\",\n adminOnly: true, // default true\n crossTenant: true, // default true\n targetScope: \"all\", // \"all\" | \"organization\"\n },\n async execute({ unsafeDb, input }) {\n // unsafeDb bypasses scoped filters\n const allOrgs = await unsafeDb.select().from(applications);\n return allOrgs;\n },\n});\n```\n\nUnsafe cross-tenant actions are generated with:\n\n- Better Auth authentication required (no unauthenticated path)\n- sysadmin gate (`ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`)\n- mandatory audit logging on deny/success/error\n\n**Provider note (Neon):** on Neon the request-scoped db enforces Row Level\nSecurity with the *caller's* org claims, which would filter out exactly the\ncross-tenant rows unsafe actions exist to reach. Unsafe handlers therefore\nacquire a dedicated service-role handle (`createServiceDb`) that sets the\n`quickback.service_role` transaction marker instead of caller claims; the\ngenerated RLS grants that context an explicit per-table bypass policy. The\naudit-logging contract is identical to D1. Neon with\n`connectionMode: 'websocket'` does not support unsafe actions yet and fails\nthe compile with a descriptive error.\n\n`PUBLIC` actions also receive mandatory audit logging (same audit table), since unauthenticated endpoints are high-risk by nature.\n\nWithout unsafe mode, `unsafeDb` is `undefined` in the executor params.\n\n### Raw SQL Policy\n\nBy default, the compiler rejects raw SQL in action code. Use Drizzle query-builder syntax whenever possible.\n\nIf a specific action must use raw SQL, opt in explicitly:\n\n```typescript\n// features/ledgers/actions/reconcile.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Run custom reconciliation query\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n allowRawSql: true,\n async execute({ db }) {\n return db.execute(sql`select 1`);\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `allowRawSql: true`, compilation fails with a loud error pointing to the action and snippet.\n\nThe detector checks for SQL keywords in string arguments, so non-SQL method calls like `headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")` or `map.get(\"key\")` will not trigger false positives.\n\n## Sharing Code Between Actions\n\nFor Zod schemas, helpers, or constants used across multiple actions in a\nfeature, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import from each action file.\nFiles under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the generated output.\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts\n│ └── reject.ts\n└── lib/\n ├── inputs.ts ← shared Zod schemas\n └── transitions.ts ← state-machine helpers\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/lib/inputs.ts\n\nexport const advanceInput = z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move forward\",\n input: advanceInput,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n### Importing Tables\n\nAction files import tables from their own feature or other features. The compiler generates alias files for each table, so you import by the table's file name:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\n// Same feature — import from parent directory using the table's file name\n\n// Cross-feature — go up to the features directory, then into the other feature\n\n```\n\n**Path pattern from `features/{name}/actions/`:**\n- Same feature table: `../{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../applications`)\n- Other feature table: `../../{other-feature}/{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../../candidates/candidates`)\n- Generated lib files: `../../../lib/{module}` (e.g., `../../../lib/realtime`, `../../../lib/webhooks`)\n\n### Executor Parameters\n\n```typescript\n\ninterface ActionExecutorParams {\n db: DrizzleDB; // Scoped database (auto-applies org/owner/soft-delete filters)\n unsafeDb?: DrizzleDB; // Unscoped database (only available when unsafe mode is enabled)\n ctx: AppContext; // User context (userId, roles, activeOrgId, activeTeamId, userRole)\n record?: TRecord; // The record (record-based only, undefined for standalone)\n input: TInput; // Validated input from Zod schema\n services: TServices; // Configured integrations (billing, notifications, etc.)\n c: HonoContext; // Raw Hono context for advanced use\n env: Env; // Runtime bindings (Cloudflare env / process env). Alias for c.env.\n auth: Auth; // Better Auth instance — call auth.api.getSession(...) etc. Lazy on Cloudflare.\n whereRecord?: (table) => SQL; // Pre-built WHERE: firewall + soft-delete + eq(table.id, record.id). Record-based actions only.\n whereTransition?: (table) => SQL; // whereRecord plus the transition's \"from\" precondition. Transition actions only.\n}\n```\n\n#### `auth` — Better Auth instance\n\n`auth` is the Better Auth instance, ready to call from inside an action\nhandler. Use it for things like minting an OAuth access token, fetching the\ncurrent session in a custom way, or invoking a Better Auth plugin method\nthat isn't already exposed by the generated middleware.\n\n```typescript\n// features/integrations/actions/connect-google-drive.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Get a fresh Google Drive access token for the signed-in user\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ auth, ctx, c }) {\n // genericOAuth plugin method — needs a cast since the default-generic\n // `Auth` type doesn't carry plugin-specific API surface.\n const token = await (auth.api as any).getAccessToken({\n headers: c.req.raw.headers,\n body: { providerId: \"google\", userId: ctx.userId },\n });\n return { accessToken: token.accessToken };\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Lazy on Cloudflare**: the generated handler emits a `Proxy` so\n`createAuth(c.env, c.req.raw.cf)` only runs the first time you read a\nproperty on `auth`. Actions that never touch `auth` pay zero construction\ncost. On Bun/Node `auth` is the imported singleton (an IIFE that lazy-loads\nthe database adapter) wrapped in the same proxy shape — call sites are\nidentical across runtimes.\n\n**Typing**: `auth` is typed as `Auth` from `better-auth`. The base API\n(`getSession`, `signOut`, `signInEmail`, etc.) is fully typed. Plugin-only\nmethods (`getAccessToken` from `genericOAuth`, admin-plugin methods, etc.)\nneed a cast at the call site — the default-generic `Auth` doesn't infer\nthe project's specific plugin set.\n\n#### `whereRecord` — explicit, scope-safe WHERE\n\nFor protected-field writes inside record-based actions, prefer\n`whereRecord(table)` over `eq(table.id, record.id)`. It returns a Drizzle\nexpression that AND-merges the resource's firewall and soft-delete predicates\nwith the record id, so the WHERE is explicit even if a future refactor swaps\n`db` back to an unscoped client:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Advance\",\n input: /* … */,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereRecord }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereRecord!(applications)) // firewall + soft-delete + id, all in one\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe audit DB wrapper hard-stamps `modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every\n`.set()` call, so handlers don't write them. The same wrapper hard-stamps\n`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every `.values()`.\nCaller-supplied audit fields are dropped on the floor — the audit log\nalways reflects the real actor and the real moment.\n\n`whereRecord` is undefined for standalone actions (they have no record), so\nthe parameter is typed as optional. `whereTransition` extends `whereRecord`\nwith the transition's \"from\" precondition for transition actions.\n\n#### Reaching Better Auth tables (`authDb`)\n\nThe scoped `db` only sees your feature tables. To read Better Auth tables —\nusers, organizations, members — use the auth database connection from the\nHono context plus the generated `lib/org-access.ts` helper:\n\n```typescript\n// features/projects/actions/assign.ts — validate a userId is an org member\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Assign a project to an org member\",\n input: z.object({ assigneeId: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"member\", \"admin\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, ctx, c, whereRecord }) {\n // getOrgMemberRole(authDb, userId, organizationId) → role string | null\n const role = await getOrgMemberRole(c.get(\"authDb\"), input.assigneeId, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n if (!role) {\n throw new ActionError(\"Assignee is not a member of this organization\", \"NOT_A_MEMBER\", 400);\n }\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(projects)\n .set({ assigneeId: input.assigneeId })\n .where(whereRecord!(projects))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n`c.get(\"authDb\")` is the Drizzle connection to the auth database (in dual-DB\nmode it's a separate D1 from your features). For richer queries, import the\nauth schema tables from `../../../auth/schema` and query `authDb` directly.\n\n## HTTP API Reference\n\n### Request Format\n\n| Method | Input Source | Use Case |\n|--------|--------------|----------|\n| `GET` | Query parameters | Read-only operations, fetching data |\n| `POST` | JSON body | Default, state-changing operations |\n| `PUT` | JSON body | Full replacement operations |\n| `PATCH` | JSON body | Partial updates |\n| `DELETE` | JSON body | Deletion with optional payload |\n\n### Response Formats\n\n| Type | Content-Type | Use Case |\n|------|--------------|----------|\n| `json` | `application/json` | Standard API responses (default) |\n| `stream` | `text/event-stream` | Real-time streaming (AI chat, live updates) |\n| `file` | Varies | File downloads (reports, exports) |\n\n### Error Codes\n\n| Status | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `400` | Invalid input / validation error (also `GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED` for direct protected-field writes) |\n| `401` | Not authenticated |\n| `403` | Access role check failed (`ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`) |\n| `404` | Record not found (record-based actions) |\n| `409` | Record is in the wrong state for this action — `access.record` predicate or `transition` policy failed (`ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`) |\n| `500` | Handler execution error |\n\n### Validation Error Response\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Invalid request data\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"VALIDATION_FAILED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"fields\": {\n \"amount\": \"Expected positive number\"\n }\n },\n \"hint\": \"Check the input schema for this action\"\n}\n```\n\n### Error Handling\n\n**Option 1: Return a JSON error response** (recommended for most cases)\n\nSince action handlers receive the Hono context (`c`), you can return error responses directly:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input, c }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n return c.json({\n error: 'Cannot modify a hired application',\n code: 'ALREADY_HIRED',\n details: { currentStage: record.stage },\n }, 400);\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Throw an ActionError**\n\n```typescript\n\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n throw new ActionError('Cannot modify a hired application', 'ALREADY_HIRED', 400, {\n currentStage: record.stage,\n });\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\nThe `ActionError` constructor signature is `(message, code, statusCode = 400, details?)`. The compile step rewrites the `@quickback/compiler` import to the generated runtime class (`src/lib/types.ts`), and the route handler catches it by name and returns `{ error, code, details }` with your `statusCode`.\n\n## Protected Fields\n\nActions can modify fields that are protected from regular CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\n// In the table file (defineTable config)\nguards: {\n protected: {\n status: [\"advance\", \"reject\", \"hire\", \"withdraw\"], // Only these actions can modify status\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis allows the `advance` action to set `status = \"interview\"` even though the field is protected from regular PATCH requests. Direct `PATCH /:id` attempts to set `status` are rejected by the guards layer with **400 GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED**, and the field is omitted from the generated POST/PATCH body Zod schemas — clients cannot even send it past validation.\n\n## Transition (state-machine policy)\n\nFor protected fields that follow a state machine — application status, invoice\nlifecycle, order fulfilment — use `transition` on the action so the compiler\ngenerates a runtime guard that enforces the *from/to pair*, not just the\ncurrent state. Without it, an `advance` action whose input enum allows\n`[\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]` and whose `access.record` allows\n`status in [\"applied\", \"screening\", \"interview\"]` will happily run\n`applied → offer` (a skip) or `interview → screening` (a regression).\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\", // read target from input.nextStatus\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/hire.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Finalize an offer.\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n to: \"hired\", // fixed target — same value every call\n fromTo: { offer: [\"hired\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n| Field | Required | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| `field` | Yes | Record column to validate (e.g. `\"status\"`) |\n| `fromTo` | Yes | Map of current value → permitted next values. Keys also enumerate the legal source states. |\n| `via` | Yes (or `to`) | Input key that carries the target value. Use for variable-target actions like `advance`. |\n| `to` | Yes (or `via`) | Literal target value the action always writes. Use for fixed-target actions like `hire`/`reject`. |\n\nExactly one of `via` or `to` must be provided. The compiler rejects both at\nvalidate time. When `to` is set, it must appear in some `fromTo[*]` array —\notherwise the action would be unreachable, which is almost certainly a bug.\n\n### Wire-level errors\n\nThe compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`** with\nthe field, the current value, the requested target, and the allowed set:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current record state\",\n \"layer\": \"access\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": {\n \"field\": \"status\",\n \"current\": \"interview\",\n \"target\": \"screening\",\n \"allowedTargets\": [\"offer\"]\n },\n \"hint\": \"From \\\"interview\\\", status can transition to: offer\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is distinct from a role failure: if the caller has the wrong role they\nget **403 `ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`** as before. Splitting the two lets clients\ntell *\"you can't do this\"* from *\"you can't do this *yet*\"* — the latter is\nrecoverable by the user, the former isn't.\n\nThe same 409 code is used when an `access.record` predicate (without\n`transition`) fails — for example `record: { status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`\ncalled against a paid invoice now returns 409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`,\nnot a misleading 403.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Bulk Import (Standalone, No Record)\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/actions/bulk-import.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Import candidates from job board CSV\",\n path: \"/candidates/import\",\n input: z.object({\n data: z.array(z.object({\n email: z.string().email(),\n name: z.string(),\n })),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n const inserted = await db\n .insert(candidates)\n .values(input.data)\n .returning();\n return { imported: inserted.length };\n },\n});\n```"
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"content": "Actions are custom API endpoints for business logic beyond CRUD operations. They enable workflows, integrations, and complex operations.\n\n## Overview\n\nQuickback supports two types of actions:\n\n| Aspect | Record-Based | Standalone |\n|--------|--------------|------------|\n| Route | `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}` | Custom `path` (required) |\n| Record fetching | Automatic | None (`record` is `undefined`) |\n| Firewall applied | Yes | No |\n| Preconditions | Supported via `access.record` | Not applicable |\n| Response types | JSON only | JSON, stream, file |\n| Use case | Advance application, reject candidate | AI chat, bulk import from job board, webhooks |\n\nStandalone actions are signalled by the presence of a `path:` field in the action config. Record-based actions omit `path` and bind to the feature's primary table.\n\n## Where do actions live?\n\n**One file per action.** Each action is its own module under the feature's\n`actions/` directory:\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts ← defineTable (primary table)\n├── candidates.ts ← defineTable (sibling table)\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── reject.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── stats.ts ← defineAction, standalone (has `path:`)\n│ └── candidates/\n│ └── disqualify.ts ← defineAction, binds to candidates\n└── lib/\n └── inputs.ts ← shared schemas (optional, copied verbatim)\n```\n\n| Layout | Binds to |\n|--------|----------|\n| `actions/<name>.ts` | The feature's primary table (table file matching the feature name), or standalone if `path:` is set. |\n| `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` | The sibling table file `<table>.ts` at the feature root. Standalone actions inside a subdir ignore the binding. |\n\nThe action's filename (sans `.ts`) is the action name and the URL segment, and\nit must be a valid **camelCase identifier** — `sendMessage.ts`, not\n`send-message.ts` (hyphenated names are a compile error, since the name becomes\na generated identifier).\nUniqueness is enforced per `(bound table, name)` pair — sibling-bound\nactions on **different** tables may share a verb (`actions/episodes/publish.ts`\nand `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and\n`/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly). The compiler errors only when\ntwo action files would mount at the same URL — for example, a flat\n`actions/foo.ts` (binds to primary) plus `actions/<primary>/foo.ts`, or\ntwo standalones with the same `(method, path)`. Standalone actions are\nunique per `(method, path)`.\n\nTableless features have no top-level `*.ts` files; every action under\n`actions/` must be standalone (have `path:`). Use this for utility endpoints\nlike webhooks, reports, or integrations that don't operate on a specific\nrecord.\n\n### Retired layouts\n\nThese are rejected at load time with migration guidance:\n\n- **`actions.ts`** (bundled multi-action file)\n- **`_feature.ts`** (shared schemas + non-table-bound actions)\n- **`handlers/`** (separate handler-file directory)\n- **`defineActions(table, {...})`** (the multi-action factory)\n- **`defineActions(null, {...})`** (tableless variant)\n- **`*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts`** filename patterns\n\nFor shared Zod schemas or helpers, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import\nfrom each action file. Files under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the\ngenerated output.\n\n## Defining Actions\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n> **`defineAction` import.** Import from `\"../.quickback/define-action\"` —\n> the `.quickback/` directory is generated alongside your feature with a\n> typed helper. It infers `record` and Zod `input`, exposes the generated\n> `Services`, types `c` as a Hono request context, binds `whereRecord` and\n> `whereTransition` to the feature table, and preserves the exact value\n> returned by `execute` without imposing an action-output schema. Scoped\n> `db` and interactive `tx` are schema-aware on D1 and Neon Hyperdrive;\n> HTTP/WebSocket Neon keeps its dynamic database escape hatch. `AppContext`\n> also retains its open index for namespace-hydrated fields. Audit fields\n> (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`,\n> `modifiedBy`) are hard-stamped by the audit DB wrapper on every\n> `db.insert().values()` and `db.update().set()` — handlers don't pass\n> them and can't override them.\n\n### Local input-schema harvest\n\nBefore sending a compile request, the CLI loads each action in an isolated\nlocal bundle and converts `action.input` with Zod 4's `z.toJSONSchema`. It does\nnot call `execute`; the hosted compiler never evaluates project code. Under\ncontract v2, every action must produce a schema. A failure names the exact\naction, whether bundling or evaluation failed, and the underlying local error.\nV1 can still fall back to the lower-fidelity static schema parser.\n\nBare imports are resolved from the generated runtime's configured\n`build.outputDir/node_modules` first. If definitions live in `quickback/` and\nthe generated Worker lives in `src/`, install runtime dependencies in `src/`\nas usual; no project-root dependency symlink is required. Shared schema or DTO\nmodules may also declare top-level Drizzle selection objects. Quickback\nreplaces authored table exports with inert proxies during this schema-only\nevaluation, so reading `records.id` to build a projection does not execute\napplication or database logic.\n\nParameterized standalone paths use Hono's `:param` syntax in authored source,\nfor example `path: \"/events/:eventId/check-in\"`. The harvest planner converts\nthose segments to the OpenAPI `{param}` form before applying the schema, so\ncontract-v2 completeness uses the same route key as the emitted OpenAPI and MCP\nsurfaces. The same normalization applies when a record resource path contains\nnamespace parameters.\n\n### Configuration Options\n\n| Option | Required | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `description` | Yes | Human-readable description of the action |\n| `input` | Yes | Zod schema for request validation |\n| `access` | Yes | Access control (roles, record conditions, or function) |\n| `execute` | Yes | Inline async arrow function (`async (ctx) => { … }`) |\n| `path` | Standalone only | Custom route path. Presence of `path` makes the action standalone. |\n| `method` | No | HTTP method: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE (default: POST). GET actions parse `input` from query params; all other methods parse from the JSON body. See [GET vs POST for input](#get-vs-post-for-input). |\n| `responseType` | No | Response format: json, stream, file (default: json) |\n| `sideEffects` | No | Hint for AI tools: `'sync'`, `'async'`, or `'fire-and-forget'` |\n| `allowRawSql` | No | Explicit compile-time opt-in for raw SQL in execute code |\n| `unsafe` | No | Unsafe raw DB mode. Object config (`reason`, `adminOnly`, `crossTenant`, `targetScope`). |\n| `transition` | No | State-machine policy enforcing the from/to pair (record-based actions). See [Transitions](#transition-state-machine-policy) |\n| `bulkVariant` | No | Auto-generate a `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` route alongside the per-record route (record-based actions). See [Bulk Variant](#bulk-variant) |\n| `cms` | No | Pass-through metadata blob for CMS surfaces |\n\n`execute` must be an `async (ctx) => { … }` arrow function. `async function`\ndeclarations and non-async forms are rejected at parse time.\n\n## Record-Based Actions\n\nRecord-based actions operate on an existing record. The record is automatically loaded and validated before your action executes.\n\n**Route pattern:** `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}`\n\n```\nPOST /applications/:id/advance\nPOST /applications/:id/reject\nPOST /applications/:id/schedule-interview\n```\n\n### Runtime Flow\n\n1. **Authentication** - User token is validated\n2. **Input Validation** - Request body validated against Zod schema\n3. **Role Gate** - The access roles are checked *before* the record is\n fetched (v0.46+), so a wrong-role caller gets a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED` whether or not the record exists — the\n response can't be used to probe for record ids\n4. **Record Loading** - The record is fetched by ID **through the firewall**\n (a cross-tenant or missing id is a standard firewall miss)\n5. **Access Check** - Record preconditions (`access.record`) and transition\n policy are validated against the loaded record\n6. **Execution** - Your action handler runs\n7. **Response** - Result is returned to client\n\n### Example: Advance Application Stage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move application to the next pipeline stage\",\n input: z.object({\n stage: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\", \"hired\"]),\n notes: z.string().optional(),\n }),\n access: {\n roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n record: { stage: { notEquals: \"rejected\" } },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n stage: input.stage,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(eq(applications.id, record.id))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Request Example\n\n```\nPOST /applications/app_123/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n}\n```\n\n### Response Example\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Bulk variant\n\nSet `bulkVariant: true` to auto-generate a bulk version of the action at\n`POST /:resource/batch/{action}`. The compiler emits a second route alongside\nthe per-record one, looping the same access + transition + execute pipeline\nover an array of ids. This is the answer to \"I need to advance 50\napplications at once\" — you don't have to hand-roll a parallel standalone\naction that duplicates the per-record logic.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({ status: input.nextStatus })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n if (!updated) throw new TransitionLostError(\"status\", record.status, input.nextStatus);\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Request shape:**\n\n```http\nPOST /applications/batch/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_001\", \"app_002\", \"app_003\"],\n \"input\": { \"nextStatus\": \"interview\" },\n \"failFast\": false\n}\n```\n\nThe `input` is shared across the batch — the action's Zod schema is\nvalidated once, not per id. For per-record input variation, use the\nsingle-record endpoint (`POST /:id/{action}`) or write a standalone action.\n\nThe generated OpenAPI document and MCP tools reuse that exact action schema\nin both places: as the single-record request body and as the bulk wrapper's\nnested `input` property. Under contract v2, Quickback considers the action's\nschema harvest complete only after both operations are patched. This also\nholds when the table filename and declared table name use different casing or\nseparators (for example, `event-guests.ts` exporting `event_guests`); the\noperations follow the table's declared resource path.\n\n**Response (207 Multi-Status when any record fails, 200 when clean):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [{ \"id\": \"app_001\", \"status\": \"interview\" }],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"id\": \"app_002\",\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current state\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": { \"field\": \"status\", \"currentValue\": \"rejected\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Per-record pipeline** mirrors the single-record route exactly — the same\nfirewall fetch, access reason split (403 vs 409), transition pre-check,\n`whereTransition` factory, and `TransitionLostError` handling. Per-record\nfailures land in `errors[]` with their original index; successful records\nland in `success[]` masked the same way the single-record response is.\n\n**Transactional matrix** (same as `PATCH /batch`):\n\n| Provider | failFast | transactional | Behavior |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| tx-supporting (postgres, neon over websocket) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any throw rolls back all writes |\n| (any) | `false` | `false` | Independent per-record outcomes, partial success |\n| cloudflare-d1, neon over http (Cloudflare default) | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — earlier records stay committed (the driver has no `db.transaction`; `drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws at runtime) |\n\n**Constraints:**\n\n- Record-based actions only. Standalone actions reject `bulkVariant: true`\n at compile time (no record context to loop over).\n- `unsafe` actions reject `bulkVariant: true` in v1 — the cross-tenant\n per-record audit story is not yet wired through.\n- Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting. The\n semantic asymmetry (one row → many rows) makes inheriting GET/DELETE\n confusing.\n- Max batch size is 100 ids per request.\n\n## Standalone Actions\n\nStandalone actions are independent endpoints that don't require a record context. Set a `path:` to declare the action standalone.\n\n**Route pattern:** Custom `path`\n\n```\nPOST /chat\nGET /reports/summary\nPOST /webhooks/stripe\n```\n\n### Example: AI Chat with Streaming\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/actions/chat.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Send a message to AI\",\n path: \"/chat\",\n method: \"POST\",\n responseType: \"stream\",\n input: z.object({\n message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n async execute({ input, c }) {\n // Stream response back to client...\n return c.newResponse(/* ReadableStream */);\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Streaming Response Example\n\nFor actions with `responseType: 'stream'`:\n\n```\nContent-Type: text/event-stream\n\ndata: {\"type\": \"start\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"Hello\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"! I'm\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \" here to help.\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"done\"}\n```\n\n### Tableless Features\n\nA feature directory with no top-level `*.ts` files is \"tableless\" — every\naction under `actions/` must be standalone. Use this for utility endpoints\nlike reports, integrations, or webhooks that don't map to a specific\nresource.\n\n```\nquickback/features/\n└── reports/\n └── actions/\n ├── trial-balance.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n └── profit-loss.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/reports/actions/trial-balance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate trial balance report\",\n path: \"/reports/trial-balance\",\n method: \"GET\",\n input: z.object({\n startDate: z.string(),\n endDate: z.string(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"accountant\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... build report\n return { rows: [] };\n },\n});\n```\n\n### GET vs POST for input\n\nGET actions read `input` from URL query parameters; every other method (POST,\nPUT, PATCH, DELETE) reads from the JSON body. The Zod schema is the same in\nboth cases — the compiler picks the right parser based on `method`.\n\n```typescript\n// GET — input populated from ?q=…&limit=…\ndefineAction({\n method: \"GET\",\n path: \"/search\",\n input: z.object({\n q: z.string(),\n limit: z.coerce.number().int().positive().max(100).default(20),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ input }) {\n // input is { q: string, limit: number } — fully typed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nRepeated query keys (`?tag=a&tag=b`) come through as arrays automatically;\nsingle values stay as strings. Use Zod's `.coerce.number()` /\n`.coerce.boolean()` when you want typed primitives from the parsed strings.\n\n**Use POST when input is structured.** GET requests cannot carry a JSON body\nin any of the surfaces Quickback APIs are commonly called from:\n\n- Browsers throw on `fetch(url, { method: 'GET', body })`.\n- CDNs and caches key on URL+method; a GET with a body either gets the body\n stripped at the edge or cache-collides with semantically different requests.\n- OpenAPI client generators (axios, openapi-fetch, openapi-typescript-codegen)\n refuse to emit GET-with-body, so the generated SDKs break.\n- The MCP agent surface treats GET as parameter-only — agents calling a GET\n action will only see what the URL exposes.\n\nIf your action takes nested objects, arrays of objects, or large inputs that\ndon't serialize cleanly to a query string, set `method: \"POST\"`. POST doesn't\nimply \"this writes data\" — it's the right method whenever the request body is\nload-bearing. Use the response shape (`responseType: \"json\"`, or just the data\nyour handler returns) to convey read semantics; HTTP method choice is about\ninput transport, not action intent.\n\n## Access Configuration\n\nAccess controls who can execute an action and under what conditions.\n\n### Role-Based Access\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] // OR logic: user needs any of these roles\n}\n```\n\n### Public Access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for unauthenticated endpoints (contact forms, webhooks, public APIs). Every invocation is **mandatory audit logged** with IP address, input, result, and timing.\n\n```typescript\n// features/contact/actions/submit.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Public contact form submission\",\n path: \"/submit\",\n input: z.object({\n name: z.string().min(1),\n email: z.string().email(),\n message: z.string().min(10),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... persist submission\n return { ok: true };\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe wildcard `\"*\"` is not supported and will throw a compile-time error. Use `\"PUBLIC\"` explicitly.\n\n### Record Conditions\n\nFor record-based actions, you can require the record to be in a specific state:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\"],\n record: {\n stage: { equals: \"screening\" } // Precondition\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Supported operators:**\n\n| Operator | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `equals` | Field must equal value |\n| `notEquals` | Field must not equal value |\n| `in` | Field must be one of the values |\n| `notIn` | Field must not be one of the values |\n\n### Context Substitution\n\nUse `$ctx` to reference the current user's context:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n record: {\n ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" },\n organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### OR/AND Combinations\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\"] },\n {\n roles: [\"recruiter\"],\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Function Access\n\nFor complex logic, use an access function:\n\n```typescript\naccess: async (ctx, record) => {\n return ctx.roles.includes('admin') || record.ownerId === ctx.userId;\n}\n```\n\n### Relationship-roles in actions\n\n**v0.19+** — standalone actions now support relationship-roles in `access.roles` directly. Declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` with optional `loads` / `exposeAs` for ctx hydration, and reference the role by name on the action:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n roles: { attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' } },\n}\n\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] },\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // The resolver already verified attendance and loaded ctx.event.\n // No hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` needed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe action's surface (path params + input fields) must expose the relationship's `resource.column`. At v0.19 a missing key emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission; at v0.20 it becomes a compile error. See [Access — standalone actions](/compiler/definitions/access#standalone-actions-surface-keys-and-loads--exposeas-v019) for the full mechanism.\n\n**Record-based actions** are NOT yet supported — the runtime evaluator fail-closes (403) on relationship arms reached without an inline gate. Until inline emission for record-based actions lands, either:\n\n- Set `firewall: { exception: true }` on the action and gate manually in `execute()`, OR\n- Apply the relationship at the resource's firewall layer (worked example below).\n\n**Resource-layer workaround for record-based actions**: gate the action on BA roles only and apply the relationship at the resource layer via a firewall `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts — firewall scopes rows; action gates on BA role\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row-level relationship check\n],\nactions: {\n comment: defineAction({\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, // ← BA role only on the action\n input: z.object({ text: z.string() }),\n execute: async (input, ctx, db, record) => {\n // record is already filtered by the firewall — guest membership\n // is enforced before this handler runs.\n return db.insert(comments).values({ ... });\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThis pattern composes cleanly: the firewall guarantees the caller has the relationship to the record being acted on; the action's access list keeps the role surface obvious.\n\nSee [Access — relationship authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization) for the full picture, including `loads` / `exposeAs` and the `firewall: { exception: true }` escape hatch.\n\n## Scoped Database\n\nAll actions receive a **scoped `db`** instance that automatically enforces security:\n\n| Operation | Org Scoping | Owner Scoping | Soft Delete Filter | Auto-inject on INSERT |\n|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|\n| `SELECT` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `INSERT` | n/a | n/a | n/a | `organizationId`, `ownerId` from ctx |\n| `UPDATE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `DELETE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n\nScoping is duck-typed at runtime — tables with an `organizationId` column get org scoping, tables with `ownerId` get owner scoping, tables with `deletedAt` get soft delete filtering.\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, ctx, input }) {\n // This query automatically includes WHERE organizationId = ? AND deletedAt IS NULL\n const items = await db.select().from(applications).where(eq(applications.stage, 'interview'));\n\n // Inserts automatically include organizationId\n await db.insert(applications).values({ candidateId: input.candidateId, jobId: input.jobId, stage: 'applied' });\n\n return items;\n}\n```\n\n**Not enforced** in scoped DB (by design):\n- **Guards** — actions ARE the authorized way to modify guarded fields\n- **Masking** — actions are backend code that may need raw data\n- **Access** — already checked before action execution\n\n### Delegated principals and `databaseAccess`\n\nOn a contract-v2 Cloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive project, an action can admit a\nconfigured delegated principal with `access.principals`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Confirm attendance from an event session\",\n path: \"/attendance/confirm\",\n input: z.object({ response: z.enum([\"yes\", \"no\"]) }),\n access: { principals: [\"event_delegate\"] },\n async execute({ ctx, db, input }) {\n // ctx.principal is guaranteed and narrowed by the generated helper.\n const { eventId, personId } = ctx.principal.claims;\n return confirmAttendance(db, { eventId, personId, response: input.response });\n },\n});\n```\n\nThis is a separate authority lane, not an account impersonation. A delegated\naction context has no `userId`, active organization/team, or membership roles.\nIf access has a `PUBLIC` sibling arm, the generated type includes the anonymous\nlane and code must narrow `ctx.principal` before reading it.\n\nFor an organization- or team-scoped host feature, the standalone route does\nnot run the Better Auth `activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` precondition before a\nprincipal access tree. Authentication and `evaluateAccessPreRecord` still run;\nthe declared `principals` arm is the authority decision. This avoids turning an\naccount-session field into an accidental prerequisite for delegated callers.\n\nThe generated standalone route reuses that action-specific `execute` context\nafter its runtime access gates. Account, `event_pass`, and `event_delegate`\nactions therefore keep distinct compile-time authority types all the way into\nthe handler. The route also reuses the action's schema-aware scoped `db` type,\nincluding when an unsafe/service-role client is wrapped before the call. If a\nrelationship uses `loads` / `exposeAs`, the loaded row type is\nintersected with the same authority context: a single or shared hydration\ntarget is required, while targets selected by distinct relationship lanes are\noptional and must be narrowed by the handler.\n\nFor tables queried by authored actions, `resource.databaseAccess` adds an\nindependent Postgres RLS policy without adding HTTP surface. It never mounts a\nread/CRUD route and never adds an OpenAPI operation. The action remains the API\nlayer where validation, state transitions, side effects, and business logic\nbelong; `databaseAccess` is only the database's row-level upper bound.\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(attendanceEvidence, {\n // Ordinary account CRUD remains organization-scoped.\n firewall: [\n { field: \"organizationId\", equals: \"ctx.activeOrgId\" },\n ],\n\n // Authored actions can use their caller-scoped db under one of two exact\n // row lanes. Sibling arms OR; fields in each arm AND.\n databaseAccess: {\n select: {\n or: [\n {\n roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"],\n record: {\n organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" },\n },\n },\n {\n principals: [\"event_delegate\"],\n record: {\n eventId: { equals: \"$ctx.principal.claims.eventId\" },\n personId: { equals: \"$ctx.principal.claims.personId\" },\n },\n },\n ],\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n`databaseAccess` supports `select`, `insert`, `update`, and `delete`. Its rule\nlanguage is intentionally smaller than application access: `principals`,\n`roles`, recursive `or`/`and`, and record `equals` against a DB-visible account\nor principal context value. `userRole`, functions, request/body values, and\nother predicate operators are compile errors.\n\nEvery authorization path must contain at least one nonempty record equality.\nA principal-only or role-only leaf is rejected; every `or` arm must be bounded.\nAn `and` group is bounded when at least one child bounds every expansion (for\nexample, a principal child AND an event-id record child). A node cannot mix\nleaf fields with `or`/`and`, because the boolean node is the complete rule.\nThis mandatory shape prevents an action declaration from accidentally granting\nthe delegated principal an entire table.\n\nThe supported equality sources are `ctx.userId`, `ctx.activeOrgId`,\n`ctx.activeTeamId`, `ctx.principal.actor.id`, optional principal session/family\nids, and `ctx.principal.claims.<name>` (with or without a leading `$`). The\nrecord keys are Drizzle/JavaScript table field names; Quickback resolves them\nthrough the table metadata and quotes the exact physical PostgreSQL identifier,\nso a field such as `eventId: text(\"event-id\")` is safe. Unknown fields fail the\ncompile. `ADMIN` and the app-only `INTERNAL` marker are forbidden on this DB\nsurface, while `SYSADMIN` retains its explicit `cms.sysadmin` prerequisite. The\nfeature is rejected outside Cloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive because those targets\ncannot guarantee request-scoped Postgres claims.\n\n### Relational queries are blocked (fail-closed)\n\nDrizzle's relational query API — `db.query.<table>.findFirst()` /\n`findMany()` (including nested `with:` relations) — builds its SQL from the\nrelations config and your `where` alone, so the scoped wrapper cannot inject\nthe org/owner/team firewall into it. Rather than silently returning rows from\nevery tenant, the scoped `db` **throws** on any `db.query.<table>` access:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, input }) {\n // ❌ Throws: relational queries aren't org-scoped\n const item = await db.query.media.findFirst({ where: eq(media.id, input.id) });\n\n // ✅ Scoped builder — firewall conditions injected automatically\n const [item] = await db.select().from(media).where(eq(media.id, input.id));\n}\n```\n\nIf you genuinely need the relational API, declare the action `unsafe: true`\nand query `unsafeDb.query` with an **explicit** scope predicate in the WHERE\n(e.g. `eq(media.organizationId, ctx.activeOrgId)`), exactly like any other\nunsafe read.\n\n### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.\n\nUse object form for explicit policy and mandatory audit metadata:\n\n```typescript\n// features/admin/actions/cross-tenant-report.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate cross-org hiring report\",\n path: \"/admin/cross-tenant-report\",\n input: z.object({ startDate: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n unsafe: {\n reason: \"Support investigation for enterprise customer\",\n adminOnly: true, // default true\n crossTenant: true, // default true\n targetScope: \"all\", // \"all\" | \"organization\"\n },\n async execute({ unsafeDb, input }) {\n // unsafeDb bypasses scoped filters\n const allOrgs = await unsafeDb.select().from(applications);\n return allOrgs;\n },\n});\n```\n\nUnsafe cross-tenant actions are generated with:\n\n- Better Auth authentication required (no unauthenticated path)\n- sysadmin gate (`ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`)\n- mandatory audit logging on deny/success/error\n\n**Provider note (Neon):** `unsafe.enabled` controls app-layer scoped-query\nbypass, while `unsafe.crossTenant` controls database-layer RLS bypass. An\nunsafe action with `crossTenant: false` receives a raw Drizzle handle backed by\nthe request database, so the caller's organization or delegated-principal\nclaims remain active—including inside `db.transaction()`. Its code must still\nprovide every intended scope predicate explicitly.\n\nOnly an action with `crossTenant: true` acquires the dedicated service-role\nhandle (`createServiceDb`). That handle sets the `quickback.service_role`\ntransaction marker instead of caller claims, and generated RLS grants it an\nexplicit per-table bypass policy. The sysadmin guard and mandatory audit log\ntherefore protect the same boundary that receives the RLS bypass. The\naudit-logging contract is otherwise identical to D1. Neon with\n`connectionMode: 'websocket'` does not support unsafe actions yet and fails\nthe compile with a descriptive error.\n\n`PUBLIC` actions also receive mandatory audit logging (same audit table), since unauthenticated endpoints are high-risk by nature.\n\nWithout unsafe mode, `unsafeDb` is `undefined` in the executor params.\n\n### Raw SQL Policy\n\nBy default, the compiler rejects raw SQL in action code. Use Drizzle query-builder syntax whenever possible.\n\nIf a specific action must use raw SQL, opt in explicitly:\n\n```typescript\n// features/ledgers/actions/reconcile.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Run custom reconciliation query\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n allowRawSql: true,\n async execute({ db }) {\n return db.execute(sql`select 1`);\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `allowRawSql: true`, compilation fails with a loud error pointing to the action and snippet.\n\nThe detector checks for SQL keywords in string arguments, so non-SQL method calls like `headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")` or `map.get(\"key\")` will not trigger false positives.\n\n## Sharing Code Between Actions\n\nFor Zod schemas, helpers, or constants used across multiple actions in a\nfeature, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import from each action file.\nFiles under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the generated output.\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts\n│ └── reject.ts\n└── lib/\n ├── inputs.ts ← shared Zod schemas\n └── transitions.ts ← state-machine helpers\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/lib/inputs.ts\n\nexport const advanceInput = z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move forward\",\n input: advanceInput,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n### Importing Tables\n\nAction files import tables from their own feature or other features. The compiler generates alias files for each table, so you import by the table's file name:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\n// Same feature — import from parent directory using the table's file name\n\n// Cross-feature — go up to the features directory, then into the other feature\n\n```\n\n**Path pattern from `features/{name}/actions/`:**\n- Same feature table: `../{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../applications`)\n- Other feature table: `../../{other-feature}/{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../../candidates/candidates`)\n- Generated lib files: `../../../lib/{module}` (e.g., `../../../lib/realtime`, `../../../lib/webhooks`)\n\n### Executor Parameters\n\n```typescript\n\ninterface ActionExecutorParams {\n db: DrizzleDB; // Scoped database (auto-applies org/owner/soft-delete filters)\n unsafeDb?: DrizzleDB; // Unscoped database (only available when unsafe mode is enabled)\n ctx: AppContext; // User context (userId, roles, activeOrgId, activeTeamId, userRole)\n record?: TRecord; // The record (record-based only, undefined for standalone)\n input: TInput; // Validated input from Zod schema\n services: TServices; // Configured integrations (billing, notifications, etc.)\n c: HonoContext; // Raw Hono context for advanced use\n env: Env; // Runtime bindings (Cloudflare env / process env). Alias for c.env.\n auth: Auth; // Better Auth instance — call auth.api.getSession(...) etc. Lazy on Cloudflare.\n whereRecord?: (table) => SQL; // Pre-built WHERE: firewall + soft-delete + eq(table.id, record.id). Record-based actions only.\n whereTransition?: (table) => SQL; // whereRecord plus the transition's \"from\" precondition. Transition actions only.\n}\n```\n\n#### `auth` — Better Auth instance\n\n`auth` is the Better Auth instance, ready to call from inside an action\nhandler. Use it for things like minting an OAuth access token, fetching the\ncurrent session in a custom way, or invoking a Better Auth plugin method\nthat isn't already exposed by the generated middleware.\n\n```typescript\n// features/integrations/actions/connect-google-drive.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Get a fresh Google Drive access token for the signed-in user\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ auth, ctx, c }) {\n // genericOAuth plugin method — needs a cast since the default-generic\n // `Auth` type doesn't carry plugin-specific API surface.\n const token = await (auth.api as any).getAccessToken({\n headers: c.req.raw.headers,\n body: { providerId: \"google\", userId: ctx.userId },\n });\n return { accessToken: token.accessToken };\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Lazy on Cloudflare**: the generated handler emits a `Proxy` so\n`createAuth(c.env, c.req.raw.cf)` only runs the first time you read a\nproperty on `auth`. Actions that never touch `auth` pay zero construction\ncost. On Bun/Node `auth` is the imported singleton (an IIFE that lazy-loads\nthe database adapter) wrapped in the same proxy shape — call sites are\nidentical across runtimes.\n\n**Typing**: `auth` is typed as `Auth` from `better-auth`. The base API\n(`getSession`, `signOut`, `signInEmail`, etc.) is fully typed. Plugin-only\nmethods (`getAccessToken` from `genericOAuth`, admin-plugin methods, etc.)\nneed a cast at the call site — the default-generic `Auth` doesn't infer\nthe project's specific plugin set.\n\n#### `whereRecord` — explicit, scope-safe WHERE\n\nFor protected-field writes inside record-based actions, prefer\n`whereRecord(table)` over `eq(table.id, record.id)`. It returns a Drizzle\nexpression that AND-merges the resource's firewall and soft-delete predicates\nwith the record id, so the WHERE is explicit even if a future refactor swaps\n`db` back to an unscoped client:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Advance\",\n input: /* … */,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereRecord }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereRecord!(applications)) // firewall + soft-delete + id, all in one\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe audit DB wrapper hard-stamps `modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every\n`.set()` call, so handlers don't write them. The same wrapper hard-stamps\n`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every `.values()`.\nCaller-supplied audit fields are dropped on the floor — the audit log\nalways reflects the real actor and the real moment.\n\n`whereRecord` is undefined for standalone actions (they have no record), so\nthe parameter is typed as optional. `whereTransition` extends `whereRecord`\nwith the transition's \"from\" precondition for transition actions.\n\n#### Reaching Better Auth tables (`authDb`)\n\nThe scoped `db` only sees your feature tables. To read Better Auth tables —\nusers, organizations, members — use the auth database connection from the\nHono context plus the generated `lib/org-access.ts` helper:\n\n```typescript\n// features/projects/actions/assign.ts — validate a userId is an org member\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Assign a project to an org member\",\n input: z.object({ assigneeId: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"member\", \"admin\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, ctx, c, whereRecord }) {\n // getOrgMemberRole(authDb, userId, organizationId) → role string | null\n const role = await getOrgMemberRole(c.get(\"authDb\"), input.assigneeId, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n if (!role) {\n throw new ActionError(\"Assignee is not a member of this organization\", \"NOT_A_MEMBER\", 400);\n }\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(projects)\n .set({ assigneeId: input.assigneeId })\n .where(whereRecord!(projects))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n`c.get(\"authDb\")` is the Drizzle connection to the auth database (in dual-DB\nmode it's a separate D1 from your features). For richer queries, import the\nauth schema tables from `../../../auth/schema` and query `authDb` directly.\n\n## HTTP API Reference\n\n### Request Format\n\n| Method | Input Source | Use Case |\n|--------|--------------|----------|\n| `GET` | Query parameters | Read-only operations, fetching data |\n| `POST` | JSON body | Default, state-changing operations |\n| `PUT` | JSON body | Full replacement operations |\n| `PATCH` | JSON body | Partial updates |\n| `DELETE` | JSON body | Deletion with optional payload |\n\n### Response Formats\n\n| Type | Content-Type | Use Case |\n|------|--------------|----------|\n| `json` | `application/json` | Standard API responses (default) |\n| `stream` | `text/event-stream` | Real-time streaming (AI chat, live updates) |\n| `file` | Varies | File downloads (reports, exports) |\n\n### Error Codes\n\n| Status | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `400` | Invalid input / validation error (also `GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED` for direct protected-field writes) |\n| `401` | Not authenticated |\n| `403` | Access role check failed (`ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`) |\n| `404` | Record not found (record-based actions) |\n| `409` | Record is in the wrong state for this action — `access.record` predicate or `transition` policy failed (`ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`) |\n| `500` | Handler execution error |\n\n### Validation Error Response\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Invalid request data\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"VALIDATION_FAILED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"fields\": {\n \"amount\": \"Expected positive number\"\n }\n },\n \"hint\": \"Check the input schema for this action\"\n}\n```\n\n### Error Handling\n\n**Option 1: Return a JSON error response** (recommended for most cases)\n\nSince action handlers receive the Hono context (`c`), you can return error responses directly:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input, c }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n return c.json({\n error: 'Cannot modify a hired application',\n code: 'ALREADY_HIRED',\n details: { currentStage: record.stage },\n }, 400);\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Throw an ActionError**\n\n```typescript\n\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n throw new ActionError('Cannot modify a hired application', 'ALREADY_HIRED', 400, {\n currentStage: record.stage,\n });\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\nThe `ActionError` constructor signature is `(message, code, statusCode = 400, details?)`. The compile step rewrites the `@quickback/compiler` import to the generated runtime class (`src/lib/types.ts`), and the route handler catches it by name and returns `{ error, code, details }` with your `statusCode`.\n\n## Protected Fields\n\nActions can modify fields that are protected from regular CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\n// In the table file (defineTable config)\nguards: {\n protected: {\n status: [\"advance\", \"reject\", \"hire\", \"withdraw\"], // Only these actions can modify status\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis allows the `advance` action to set `status = \"interview\"` even though the field is protected from regular PATCH requests. Direct `PATCH /:id` attempts to set `status` are rejected by the guards layer with **400 GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED**, and the field is omitted from the generated POST/PATCH body Zod schemas — clients cannot even send it past validation.\n\n## Transition (state-machine policy)\n\nFor protected fields that follow a state machine — application status, invoice\nlifecycle, order fulfilment — use `transition` on the action so the compiler\ngenerates a runtime guard that enforces the *from/to pair*, not just the\ncurrent state. Without it, an `advance` action whose input enum allows\n`[\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]` and whose `access.record` allows\n`status in [\"applied\", \"screening\", \"interview\"]` will happily run\n`applied → offer` (a skip) or `interview → screening` (a regression).\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\", // read target from input.nextStatus\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/hire.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Finalize an offer.\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n to: \"hired\", // fixed target — same value every call\n fromTo: { offer: [\"hired\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n| Field | Required | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| `field` | Yes | Record column to validate (e.g. `\"status\"`) |\n| `fromTo` | Yes | Map of current value → permitted next values. Keys also enumerate the legal source states. |\n| `via` | Yes (or `to`) | Input key that carries the target value. Use for variable-target actions like `advance`. |\n| `to` | Yes (or `via`) | Literal target value the action always writes. Use for fixed-target actions like `hire`/`reject`. |\n\nExactly one of `via` or `to` must be provided. The compiler rejects both at\nvalidate time. When `to` is set, it must appear in some `fromTo[*]` array —\notherwise the action would be unreachable, which is almost certainly a bug.\n\n### Wire-level errors\n\nThe compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`** with\nthe field, the current value, the requested target, and the allowed set:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current record state\",\n \"layer\": \"access\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": {\n \"field\": \"status\",\n \"current\": \"interview\",\n \"target\": \"screening\",\n \"allowedTargets\": [\"offer\"]\n },\n \"hint\": \"From \\\"interview\\\", status can transition to: offer\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is distinct from a role failure: if the caller has the wrong role they\nget **403 `ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`** as before. Splitting the two lets clients\ntell *\"you can't do this\"* from *\"you can't do this *yet*\"* — the latter is\nrecoverable by the user, the former isn't.\n\nThe same 409 code is used when an `access.record` predicate (without\n`transition`) fails — for example `record: { status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`\ncalled against a paid invoice now returns 409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`,\nnot a misleading 403.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Bulk Import (Standalone, No Record)\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/actions/bulk-import.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Import candidates from job board CSV\",\n path: \"/candidates/import\",\n input: z.object({\n data: z.array(z.object({\n email: z.string().email(),\n name: z.string(),\n })),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n const inserted = await db\n .insert(candidates)\n .values(input.data)\n .returning();\n return { imported: inserted.length };\n },\n});\n```"
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"content": "The firewall generates WHERE clauses automatically to isolate data by user, organization, or team.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\nThe cleanest pattern is `q.scope()` — declare the tenant column once and the firewall is auto-derived:\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required(),\n email: q.text().required(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // Auto-derives the firewall\n },\n // No firewall: block needed — auto-derived as\n // [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n // { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }]\n // ... guards, crud, read\n});\n```\n\nIf you need to declare the firewall explicitly, two forms are accepted — pick whichever reads better:\n\n**Named-scope** (compact, default for simple overrides):\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true } // opt out of tenant scoping entirely\n```\n\n**Predicate array** (explicit, required for `in`-lists or custom non-scope predicates):\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n```\n\nBoth shapes compile to the same canonical predicate array internally — the named-scope object is coerced at parse time. Pick by readability.\n\n## Auto-detected column synonyms\n\nWhen you omit the `firewall:` block entirely, the compiler scans the schema for one of these isolation columns and auto-derives the predicates:\n\n| Scope | Accepted column names |\n|---|---|\n| Organization | `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` |\n| User | `userId` |\n| Team | `teamId` |\n\n`ownerId` is **not** auto-detected — it's reserved for business-logic ownership (who owns this record), not access control. A table that has only `ownerId` and no isolation column raises a targeted error explaining the distinction; either rename to `userId` if the column controls access, add an isolation column, or specify `firewall:` explicitly.\n\n## Predicate Shape\n\n```typescript\ntype FirewallPredicate =\n | { field: string; equals: string; optional?: boolean } // column = ctx.* (or literal)\n | { field: string; isNull: true } // column IS NULL\n | { field: string; in: string[] | string; optional?: boolean } // column IN (...)\n | { field: string; via: string } // column IN (relationship subquery)\n | { field?: string; permission: string } // named authz.permissions reference (v0.35+)\n | { all: FirewallPredicate[] } // AND group (v0.35+)\n | { any: FirewallPredicate[] } // OR group (v0.35+)\n | { exception: true }; // opt out of tenant scoping\n\ntype FirewallConfig = ReadonlyArray<FirewallPredicate>;\n\n// Resource top-level (sibling to `firewall:`)\nfirewallErrorMode?: 'reveal' | 'hide';\n```\n\nThe top-level array is AND'd together. `firewallErrorMode` lives at the resource top level — it's a presentation-layer choice (403 vs 404), not a query-shape one.\n\n## Boolean groups: `all` / `any` (v0.35+)\n\nA flat array can only express AND. To grant access through **either** of two independent paths — \"an org member **OR** an event attendee\" — nest an `any` group. The top-level array stays sugar for `all`, so every existing firewall is byte-identical.\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: {\n any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, // org-member grant\n { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' }, // attendee grant (token-verified)\n ],\n}\n```\n\nNull-safe scope semantics make this safe (these apply **inside `all`/`any` groups**, opt-in via the new syntax):\n\n- A **scope** arm (`ctx.activeOrgId`, `ctx.activeTeamId`, `ctx.scope.*`) whose claim is **absent never binds `undefined`** (the classic 500 / \"match every row\" trap). In an `any` group an absent arm **drops**; if **every** arm drops, the group denies with `sql\\`1 = 0\\`` (the empty-guard) — never a full-table read. In an `all` group an absent required scope **denies** the group.\n- Mark an arm `{ optional: true }` to **drop-instead-of-deny** when absent inside an `all` group (the teamless rest-of-org slice — `ctx.activeTeamId` is implicitly optional).\n- **Owner** (`ctx.userId`) and **soft-delete** (`isNull deletedAt`) are always present / always AND'd — never relaxed.\n\n```typescript\n// (org OR event) AND owner AND not-deleted\nfirewall: {\n all: [\n { any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' },\n ] },\n { field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nThe `ctx.scope.*` arms are how **relationship-derived scopes** (attendees, shuttle drivers, vendors) reach event-scoped rows without org membership — see [Scopes & capability grants](/compiler/definitions/scopes).\n\n## Relationship-based scoping (`via:`)\n\nFor relationship authorization — \"this user can see rows X if they have a confirmed `event_guests` row pointing at X\" — declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` in `quickback.config.ts`, then reference it from `firewall:` with a `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests', // table name\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side\n resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side\n where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional row filter\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n]\n```\n\nCompiles to:\n\n```sql\nWHERE sessions.organizationId = ?\n AND sessions.eventId IN (\n SELECT eventId FROM event_guests\n WHERE userId = ?\n AND status = 'confirmed'\n AND <event_guests' own firewall — tenant scope + soft-delete>\n )\n```\n\nKey properties:\n\n- **Firewall stays the outermost AND.** A guest of an event in another tenant is still blocked by your tenant predicate. Relationship-based scoping never bypasses tenant isolation.\n- **The relationship table's own firewall is AND'd into the subquery.** Soft-deleting a `event_guests` row revokes access immediately; cross-tenant relationship rows can't grant access.\n- **Anonymous callers fail closed.** `ctx.userId` is null-guarded; the subquery short-circuits to `WHERE 1 = 0` for unauthenticated requests.\n- **The relationship table must be tenant-scoped** (`firewall: { exception: true }` is rejected at compile time on relationship tables).\n\nSee [Access — relationships](/compiler/definitions/access#authz-relationships) for the full `authz.relationships` shape and role-binding patterns.\n\n## Named permissions (`{ permission }`)\n\nA `via:` arm references **one** relationship. When the same grant rule —\n\"organizer **or** confirmed attendee\" — recurs across several resources,\nname it **once** under `authz.permissions` and reference it from any\nfirewall with a `{ permission }` arm. See [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions)\nfor the full DSL.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: { organizerOf: { /* … */ }, attendeeOf: { /* … */ } },\n permissions: {\n 'event:view': { anyOf: ['organizerOf', 'attendeeOf'] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', permission: 'event:view' },\n]\n```\n\nThe compiler lowers `{ permission }` to the same `all` / `any` relationship\nsubqueries the expression names — `anyOf` becomes an OR of subqueries,\n`allOf` an AND. `field` is the resource-side column those subqueries\nconstrain (the same column you'd put on a `via:` arm).\n\nA permission referenced from a firewall can also resolve an\n[**arrow**](/compiler/definitions/arrows) — an `{ arrowRef, permission }`\nleaf that traverses a foreign key to inherit authority from a parent object\n(\"org admins of the event's org can see its announcements\", \"anyone who\nadministers an ancestor folder can read this one\"). An arrow leaf lowers to\nan FK-hop subquery (non-recursive) or a bounded `WITH RECURSIVE` CTE\n(self-FK hierarchy), tenant-constrained at every row.\n\n**M1 limit — firewall arms must be SQL-pushable.** A firewall runs as a\nWHERE clause, so a permission referenced from one may only resolve to\nrelationship subqueries. A permission whose expression contains a\n**claim-site leaf** (`{ role }`, `{ scopeRole }`, `{ pseudoRole }`) or a\n`not` is rejected at compile time when referenced from a firewall — those\nshapes are valid in the DSL but reserved for future claim/runtime\nenforcement sites. Use a role gate on `read.access` / `crud.*.access` for\nmembership checks.\n\nThe compile-time analyzer additionally flags a referenced permission that can\nnever be satisfied, an arm shadowed by a broader one, and the SQL / CTE cost\nof each permission — see [Diagnostics](/compiler/definitions/diagnostics).\n\n## Context Sources\n\nWhen `equals` references the request context, use these standard sources:\n\n| Source | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `ctx.userId` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `ctx.activeOrgId` | User's active organization ID |\n| `ctx.activeTeamId` | User's active team ID |\n\nThese values are populated by the auth middleware from the user's session. Any predicate where `equals` starts with `ctx.` is treated as server-derived: the column lands in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` (clients cannot submit it) and is auto-populated on create / upsert from the context.\n\n## Auto-Derivation\n\nWhen the `firewall:` block is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for known scope columns and synthesises the predicate array:\n\n| Column found | Predicate emitted |\n|--------------|-------------------|\n| `organizationId` / `organisationId` / `orgId` / `organization` / `organisation` / `org` | `{ field: '...', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }` |\n| `userId` | `{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }` |\n| `teamId` | `{ field: 'teamId', equals: 'ctx.activeTeamId' }` |\n| `deletedAt` (always present via audit injection) | `{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }` — appended automatically whenever the schema carries the column, regardless of which firewall shape you wrote |\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare the column — auto-derivation works the same way for plain `q.text().required()` or Drizzle `text(...).notNull()` columns named to match the convention.\n\n**Rules:**\n- Exactly one isolation column → auto-derived.\n- Zero columns AND no PUBLIC route → compile-time error (\"missing isolation column\").\n- Two or more (e.g. `organizationId` + `ownerId`) → compile-time error; declare `firewall:` explicitly.\n\n## What `{ exception: true }` Actually Does\n\n`{ exception: true }` disables **tenant scoping only** — the generated `buildFirewallConditions()` emits no tenant `WHERE` clauses. It does **not** affect:\n\n- **Audit field injection.** `createdAt`, `modifiedAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` are always added to every table unless you disable them globally with `compiler.features.auditFields: false`.\n- **Soft-delete filtering.** If the table has a `deletedAt` column (which it does by default, thanks to audit injection), the firewall still emits `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` so soft-deleted records stay hidden. To opt out of soft-delete filtering on an exception resource, either set `compiler.features.auditFields: false` globally or hand-author a schema without `deletedAt`.\n\nSo `firewall: [{ exception: true }]` on the default configuration returns `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` from `buildFirewallConditions()` — no tenant filter, soft-delete filter still applied.\n\n## Sysadmin Escape Hatch\n\nWhen `cms: { sysadmin: true }` is set on the project (introduced in v0.15.0), every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits a runtime branch that drops tenant scopes for `ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin'` callers while keeping the soft-delete predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// Generated for an org-scoped table when cms.sysadmin: true\nexport function buildFirewallConditions(ctx: AppContext): SQL | undefined {\n if (ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin') {\n return isNull(invoices.deletedAt); // tenant predicate dropped, soft-delete kept\n }\n return and(\n eq(invoices.organizationId, ctx.activeOrgId!),\n isNull(invoices.deletedAt),\n );\n}\n```\n\nThe escape branch is **only** emitted when:\n\n- `cms.sysadmin: true` is set on the project config\n- The table has at least one tenant-scope predicate (org / owner / team / `via:` relationship). Tables with no tenant scopes already return what a sysadmin would see, so the runtime check would be dead code.\n- The firewall does not declare `{ exception: true }` (no tenant scopes to drop).\n\n**Sysadmin is distinct from appmanager.** `userRole === 'appmanager'` callers still go through the firewall normally — only `userRole === 'sysadmin'` triggers the bypass. Appmanager is the platform control-plane tier, expressed with plain `userRole` checks; sysadmin is the opt-in cross-tenant DB-admin tier. See [CMS Configuration](/compiler/config#cms-configuration).\n\nIf your project doesn't set `cms.sysadmin: true`, the escape branch is never emitted and the role value is functionally inert.\n\n## Common Patterns\n\n```typescript\n// Public/system table - no tenant filtering (soft-delete still applied)\nfirewall: [{ exception: true }]\n\n// Organization-scoped (auto-derived when organizationId is present — block can be omitted)\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// User-owned personal data\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// Multi-tenant + per-team scoping\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'teamId', equals: 'ctx.activeTeamId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// Custom ctx field\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'workspaceId', equals: 'ctx.activeWorkspaceId' },\n]\n\n// Status-gated (literal value, not ctx-derived — does NOT add to systemManaged)\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'status', in: ['active', 'pending'] },\n]\n```\n\n## Error Responses\n\nWhen a record isn't found behind the firewall (wrong org, soft-deleted, or genuinely doesn't exist), the error response depends on `firewallErrorMode`:\n\n### Reveal Mode (Default)\n\nReturns **403** with a structured error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Record not found or not accessible\",\n \"layer\": \"firewall\",\n \"code\": \"FIREWALL_NOT_FOUND\",\n \"hint\": \"Check the record ID and your organization membership\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is developer-friendly and helps debug access issues during development.\n\n### Hide Mode\n\nReturns **404** with a generic error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Not found\",\n \"code\": \"NOT_FOUND\"\n}\n```\n\nUse `firewallErrorMode: 'hide'` for security-hardened deployments where you don't want attackers to distinguish between \"record exists but you can't access it\" and \"record doesn't exist\":\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(records, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n firewallErrorMode: 'hide', // Opaque 404s prevent record enumeration\n});\n```\n\n### Foreign-Key Referential Checks\n\nGenerated `POST /` and `POST /batch` handlers validate every foreign-key column against the **target table's** firewall before inserting. If a record references a row that the caller can't see (wrong org, soft-deleted, or non-existent), the request fails with:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Referenced jobs row not found\",\n \"code\": \"FK_NOT_FOUND\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"field\": \"jobId\"\n}\n```\n\nThis closes a cross-tenant injection vector: even if an attacker knows a foreign tenant's row ID, they cannot attach a child record to it, and they cannot trigger a cross-tenant cascade delete. The check uses the target table's `buildXFirewallConditions(ctx)` helper, so it honors whatever firewall predicates the target declared (organization, owner, team, custom). FKs to tables with `{ exception: true }` get a plain existence check (still verifies the row exists, doesn't tenant-scope it).\n\nThe check runs after guards but before the insert, so it appears as `layer: \"validation\"` in error responses. Status code is `400`, not `404` — returning `404` would leak existence of out-of-scope rows.\n\n### Pre-Record ID-Probe Defense\n\nIndependent of `firewallErrorMode`, generated `/:id` handlers run a\n**role-only access check before** the firewall query (see\n[Access ordering](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order)). A caller\nwithout the right role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they\ncan't distinguish \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist\" via\nresponse timing or status differences.\n\n`firewallErrorMode` controls what happens **after** the role check passes\nbut the firewall hides the row — i.e., when an authorized caller asks for\na record in another tenant. Use `'hide'` to make that case indistinguishable\nfrom a non-existent ID.\n\n## Rules\n\n- Every resource MUST have at least one tenant predicate OR `{ exception: true }` OR a PUBLIC route\n- `{ exception: true }` cannot be combined with tenant predicates in the same array\n\n## Why Can't You Mix `{ exception: true }` with Tenant Predicates?\n\nThey represent opposite intentions:\n- `{ exception: true }` = \"Don't generate tenant `WHERE` clauses, data is public/global\"\n- Tenant predicates = \"Generate tenant `WHERE` clauses to isolate data\"\n\nCombining them would be contradictory — you can't both isolate and not isolate. (Note: soft-delete filtering is independent of this decision, see above.)\n\n## Handling \"Some Public, Some Private\" Data\n\nIf you need records that are sometimes public and sometimes scoped, you have two options:\n\n### Option 1: Two Separate Tables\n\nSplit into two tables - one public, one scoped:\n\n```typescript\n// features/job-templates/template-library.ts - Public job templates\nexport default defineTable(templateLibrary, {\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n // ...\n});\n\n// features/job-templates/custom-templates.ts - Org's custom job templates\nexport default defineTable(customTemplates, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n // ...\n});\n```\n\n### Option 2: Use Access Control Instead\n\nKeep tenant scope but make access permissive, then control visibility via `access`:\n\n```typescript\n// features/jobs/jobs.ts\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: {\n // Anyone in the org can list — visibility differences are handled\n // via record-level access conditions on /:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n // Use record conditions to allow public jobs OR owned jobs on GET /:id\n // (single-record GET inherits read.access, with optional record-level overrides)\n // ...\n});\n```\n\n### Which to Choose?\n\n| Scenario | Recommendation |\n|----------|----------------|\n| Truly global data (app config, public job templates) | `exception: true` in separate resource |\n| \"Public within org\" but still org-isolated | Ownership scope + permissive access rules |\n| Recruiter can toggle job postings public/private | Ownership scope + `visibility` field + access conditions |"
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"content": "The firewall generates WHERE clauses automatically to isolate data by user, organization, or team.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\nThe cleanest pattern is `q.scope()` — declare the tenant column once and the firewall is auto-derived:\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required(),\n email: q.text().required(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // Auto-derives the firewall\n },\n // No firewall: block needed — auto-derived as\n // [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n // { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }]\n // ... guards, crud, read\n});\n```\n\nIf you need to declare the firewall explicitly, two forms are accepted — pick whichever reads better:\n\n**Named-scope** (compact, default for simple overrides):\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true } // opt out of tenant scoping entirely\n```\n\n**Predicate array** (explicit, required for `in`-lists or custom non-scope predicates):\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n```\n\nBoth shapes compile to the same canonical predicate array internally — the named-scope object is coerced at parse time. Pick by readability.\n\n## Auto-detected column synonyms\n\nWhen you omit the `firewall:` block entirely, the compiler scans the schema for one of these isolation columns and auto-derives the predicates:\n\n| Scope | Accepted column names |\n|---|---|\n| Organization | `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` |\n| User | `userId` |\n| Team | `teamId` |\n\n`ownerId` is **not** auto-detected — it's reserved for business-logic ownership (who owns this record), not access control. A table that has only `ownerId` and no isolation column raises a targeted error explaining the distinction; either rename to `userId` if the column controls access, add an isolation column, or specify `firewall:` explicitly.\n\n## Predicate Shape\n\n```typescript\ntype FirewallPredicate =\n | { field: string; equals: string; optional?: boolean; nullable?: true } // column = ctx.* (or literal)\n | { field: string; isNull: true } // column IS NULL\n | { field: string; in: string[] | string; optional?: boolean } // column IN (...)\n | { field: string; via: string } // column IN (relationship subquery)\n | { field?: string; permission: string } // named authz.permissions reference (v0.35+)\n | { all: FirewallPredicate[] } // AND group (v0.35+)\n | { any: FirewallPredicate[] } // OR group (v0.35+)\n | { exception: true }; // opt out of tenant scoping\n\ntype FirewallConfig = ReadonlyArray<FirewallPredicate>;\n\n// Resource top-level (sibling to `firewall:`)\nfirewallErrorMode?: 'reveal' | 'hide';\n```\n\nThe top-level array is AND'd together. `firewallErrorMode` lives at the resource top level — it's a presentation-layer choice (403 vs 404), not a query-shape one.\n\n## Boolean groups: `all` / `any` (v0.35+)\n\nA flat array can only express AND. To grant access through **either** of two independent paths — \"an org member **OR** an event attendee\" — nest an `any` group. The top-level array stays sugar for `all`, so every existing firewall is byte-identical.\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: {\n any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, // org-member grant\n { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' }, // attendee grant (token-verified)\n ],\n}\n```\n\nNull-safe scope semantics make this safe (these apply **inside `all`/`any` groups**, opt-in via the new syntax):\n\n- A **scope** arm (`ctx.activeOrgId`, `ctx.activeTeamId`, `ctx.scope.*`) whose claim is **absent never binds `undefined`** (the classic 500 / \"match every row\" trap). In an `any` group an absent arm **drops**; if **every** arm drops, the group denies with `sql\\`1 = 0\\`` (the empty-guard) — never a full-table read. In an `all` group an absent required scope **denies** the group.\n- Mark an arm `{ optional: true }` to **drop-instead-of-deny** when absent inside an `all` group (the teamless rest-of-org slice — `ctx.activeTeamId` is implicitly optional).\n- **Owner** (`ctx.userId`) and **soft-delete** (`isNull deletedAt`) are always present / always AND'd — never relaxed.\n\n`nullable: true` is a separate database-schema opt-in, supported only on an\nowner predicate whose source is exactly `ctx.userId`. It allows the persisted\nowner column to be NULL; NULL rows still do not match the owner arm because SQL\nequality never matches NULL. It does not make the request claim optional.\n\n```typescript\n// (org OR event) AND owner AND not-deleted\nfirewall: {\n all: [\n { any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' },\n ] },\n { field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nThe `ctx.scope.*` arms are how **relationship-derived scopes** (attendees, shuttle drivers, vendors) reach event-scoped rows without org membership — see [Scopes & capability grants](/compiler/definitions/scopes).\n\n## Relationship-based scoping (`via:`)\n\nFor relationship authorization — \"this user can see rows X if they have a confirmed `event_guests` row pointing at X\" — declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` in `quickback.config.ts`, then reference it from `firewall:` with a `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests', // table name\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side\n resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side\n where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional row filter\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n]\n```\n\nCompiles to:\n\n```sql\nWHERE sessions.organizationId = ?\n AND sessions.eventId IN (\n SELECT eventId FROM event_guests\n WHERE userId = ?\n AND status = 'confirmed'\n AND <event_guests' own firewall — tenant scope + soft-delete>\n )\n```\n\nKey properties:\n\n- **Firewall stays the outermost AND.** A guest of an event in another tenant is still blocked by your tenant predicate. Relationship-based scoping never bypasses tenant isolation.\n- **The relationship table's own firewall is AND'd into the subquery.** Soft-deleting a `event_guests` row revokes access immediately; cross-tenant relationship rows can't grant access.\n- **Anonymous callers fail closed.** `ctx.userId` is null-guarded; the subquery short-circuits to `WHERE 1 = 0` for unauthenticated requests.\n- **The relationship table must be tenant-scoped** (`firewall: { exception: true }` is rejected at compile time on relationship tables).\n\nSee [Access — relationships](/compiler/definitions/access#authz-relationships) for the full `authz.relationships` shape and role-binding patterns.\n\n## Named permissions (`{ permission }`)\n\nA `via:` arm references **one** relationship. When the same grant rule —\n\"organizer **or** confirmed attendee\" — recurs across several resources,\nname it **once** under `authz.permissions` and reference it from any\nfirewall with a `{ permission }` arm. See [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions)\nfor the full DSL.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: { organizerOf: { /* … */ }, attendeeOf: { /* … */ } },\n permissions: {\n 'event:view': { anyOf: ['organizerOf', 'attendeeOf'] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', permission: 'event:view' },\n]\n```\n\nThe compiler lowers `{ permission }` to the same `all` / `any` relationship\nsubqueries the expression names — `anyOf` becomes an OR of subqueries,\n`allOf` an AND. `field` is the resource-side column those subqueries\nconstrain (the same column you'd put on a `via:` arm).\n\nA permission referenced from a firewall can also resolve an\n[**arrow**](/compiler/definitions/arrows) — an `{ arrowRef, permission }`\nleaf that traverses a foreign key to inherit authority from a parent object\n(\"org admins of the event's org can see its announcements\", \"anyone who\nadministers an ancestor folder can read this one\"). An arrow leaf lowers to\nan FK-hop subquery (non-recursive) or a bounded `WITH RECURSIVE` CTE\n(self-FK hierarchy), tenant-constrained at every row.\n\n**M1 limit — firewall arms must be SQL-pushable.** A firewall runs as a\nWHERE clause, so a permission referenced from one may only resolve to\nrelationship subqueries. A permission whose expression contains a\n**claim-site leaf** (`{ role }`, `{ scopeRole }`, `{ pseudoRole }`) or a\n`not` is rejected at compile time when referenced from a firewall — those\nshapes are valid in the DSL but reserved for future claim/runtime\nenforcement sites. Use a role gate on `read.access` / `crud.*.access` for\nmembership checks.\n\nThe compile-time analyzer additionally flags a referenced permission that can\nnever be satisfied, an arm shadowed by a broader one, and the SQL / CTE cost\nof each permission — see [Diagnostics](/compiler/definitions/diagnostics).\n\n## Context Sources\n\nWhen `equals` references the request context, use these standard sources:\n\n| Source | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `ctx.userId` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `ctx.activeOrgId` | User's active organization ID |\n| `ctx.activeTeamId` | User's active team ID |\n\nThese values are populated by the auth middleware from the user's session. Any predicate where `equals` starts with `ctx.` is treated as server-derived: the column lands in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` (clients cannot submit it) and is auto-populated on create / upsert from the context.\n\n## Auto-Derivation\n\nWhen the `firewall:` block is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for known scope columns and synthesises the predicate array:\n\n| Column found | Predicate emitted |\n|--------------|-------------------|\n| `organizationId` / `organisationId` / `orgId` / `organization` / `organisation` / `org` | `{ field: '...', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }` |\n| `userId` | `{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }` |\n| `teamId` | `{ field: 'teamId', equals: 'ctx.activeTeamId' }` |\n| `deletedAt` (always present via audit injection) | `{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }` — appended automatically whenever the schema carries the column, regardless of which firewall shape you wrote |\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare the column — auto-derivation works the same way for plain `q.text().required()` or Drizzle `text(...).notNull()` columns named to match the convention.\n\n**Rules:**\n- Exactly one isolation column → auto-derived.\n- Zero columns AND no PUBLIC route → compile-time error (\"missing isolation column\").\n- Two or more (e.g. `organizationId` + `ownerId`) → compile-time error; declare `firewall:` explicitly.\n\n## What `{ exception: true }` Actually Does\n\n`{ exception: true }` disables **tenant scoping only** — the generated `buildFirewallConditions()` emits no tenant `WHERE` clauses. It does **not** affect:\n\n- **Audit field injection.** `createdAt`, `modifiedAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` are always added to every table unless you disable them globally with `compiler.features.auditFields: false`.\n- **Soft-delete filtering.** If the table has a `deletedAt` column (which it does by default, thanks to audit injection), the firewall still emits `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` so soft-deleted records stay hidden. To opt out of soft-delete filtering on an exception resource, either set `compiler.features.auditFields: false` globally or hand-author a schema without `deletedAt`.\n\nSo `firewall: [{ exception: true }]` on the default configuration returns `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` from `buildFirewallConditions()` — no tenant filter, soft-delete filter still applied.\n\n## Sysadmin Escape Hatch\n\nWhen `cms: { sysadmin: true }` is set on the project (introduced in v0.15.0), every `buildFirewallConditions()` emits a runtime branch that drops tenant scopes for `ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin'` callers while keeping the soft-delete predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// Generated for an org-scoped table when cms.sysadmin: true\nexport function buildFirewallConditions(ctx: AppContext): SQL | undefined {\n if (ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin') {\n return isNull(invoices.deletedAt); // tenant predicate dropped, soft-delete kept\n }\n return and(\n eq(invoices.organizationId, ctx.activeOrgId!),\n isNull(invoices.deletedAt),\n );\n}\n```\n\nThe escape branch is **only** emitted when:\n\n- `cms.sysadmin: true` is set on the project config\n- The table has at least one tenant-scope predicate (org / owner / team / `via:` relationship). Tables with no tenant scopes already return what a sysadmin would see, so the runtime check would be dead code.\n- The firewall does not declare `{ exception: true }` (no tenant scopes to drop).\n\n**Sysadmin is distinct from appmanager.** `userRole === 'appmanager'` callers still go through the firewall normally — only `userRole === 'sysadmin'` triggers the bypass. Appmanager is the platform control-plane tier, expressed with plain `userRole` checks; sysadmin is the opt-in cross-tenant DB-admin tier. See [CMS Configuration](/compiler/config#cms-configuration).\n\nIf your project doesn't set `cms.sysadmin: true`, the escape branch is never emitted and the role value is functionally inert.\n\n## Common Patterns\n\n```typescript\n// Public/system table - no tenant filtering (soft-delete still applied)\nfirewall: [{ exception: true }]\n\n// Organization-scoped (auto-derived when organizationId is present — block can be omitted)\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// User-owned personal data\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// Multi-tenant + per-team scoping\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'teamId', equals: 'ctx.activeTeamId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n]\n\n// Custom ctx field\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'workspaceId', equals: 'ctx.activeWorkspaceId' },\n]\n\n// Status-gated (literal value, not ctx-derived — does NOT add to systemManaged)\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'status', in: ['active', 'pending'] },\n]\n```\n\n## Error Responses\n\nWhen a record isn't found behind the firewall (wrong org, soft-deleted, or genuinely doesn't exist), the error response depends on `firewallErrorMode`:\n\n### Reveal Mode (Default)\n\nReturns **403** with a structured error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Record not found or not accessible\",\n \"layer\": \"firewall\",\n \"code\": \"FIREWALL_NOT_FOUND\",\n \"hint\": \"Check the record ID and your organization membership\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is developer-friendly and helps debug access issues during development.\n\n### Hide Mode\n\nReturns **404** with a generic error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Not found\",\n \"code\": \"NOT_FOUND\"\n}\n```\n\nUse `firewallErrorMode: 'hide'` for security-hardened deployments where you don't want attackers to distinguish between \"record exists but you can't access it\" and \"record doesn't exist\":\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(records, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n firewallErrorMode: 'hide', // Opaque 404s prevent record enumeration\n});\n```\n\n### Foreign-Key Referential Checks\n\nGenerated `POST /` and `POST /batch` handlers validate every foreign-key column against the **target table's** firewall before inserting. If a record references a row that the caller can't see (wrong org, soft-deleted, or non-existent), the request fails with:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Referenced jobs row not found\",\n \"code\": \"FK_NOT_FOUND\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"field\": \"jobId\"\n}\n```\n\nThis closes a cross-tenant injection vector: even if an attacker knows a foreign tenant's row ID, they cannot attach a child record to it, and they cannot trigger a cross-tenant cascade delete. The check uses the target table's `buildXFirewallConditions(ctx)` helper, so it honors whatever firewall predicates the target declared (organization, owner, team, custom). FKs to tables with `{ exception: true }` get a plain existence check (still verifies the row exists, doesn't tenant-scope it).\n\nThe check runs after guards but before the insert, so it appears as `layer: \"validation\"` in error responses. Status code is `400`, not `404` — returning `404` would leak existence of out-of-scope rows.\n\n### Pre-Record ID-Probe Defense\n\nIndependent of `firewallErrorMode`, generated `/:id` handlers run a\n**role-only access check before** the firewall query (see\n[Access ordering](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order)). A caller\nwithout the right role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they\ncan't distinguish \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist\" via\nresponse timing or status differences.\n\n`firewallErrorMode` controls what happens **after** the role check passes\nbut the firewall hides the row — i.e., when an authorized caller asks for\na record in another tenant. Use `'hide'` to make that case indistinguishable\nfrom a non-existent ID.\n\n## Rules\n\n- Every resource MUST have at least one tenant predicate OR `{ exception: true }` OR a PUBLIC route\n- `{ exception: true }` cannot be combined with tenant predicates in the same array\n\n## Why Can't You Mix `{ exception: true }` with Tenant Predicates?\n\nThey represent opposite intentions:\n- `{ exception: true }` = \"Don't generate tenant `WHERE` clauses, data is public/global\"\n- Tenant predicates = \"Generate tenant `WHERE` clauses to isolate data\"\n\nCombining them would be contradictory — you can't both isolate and not isolate. (Note: soft-delete filtering is independent of this decision, see above.)\n\n## Handling \"Some Public, Some Private\" Data\n\nIf you need records that are sometimes public and sometimes scoped, you have two options:\n\n### Option 1: Two Separate Tables\n\nSplit into two tables - one public, one scoped:\n\n```typescript\n// features/job-templates/template-library.ts - Public job templates\nexport default defineTable(templateLibrary, {\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n // ...\n});\n\n// features/job-templates/custom-templates.ts - Org's custom job templates\nexport default defineTable(customTemplates, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n // ...\n});\n```\n\n### Option 2: Use Access Control Instead\n\nKeep tenant scope but make access permissive, then control visibility via `access`:\n\n```typescript\n// features/jobs/jobs.ts\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: {\n // Anyone in the org can list — visibility differences are handled\n // via record-level access conditions on /:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n // Use record conditions to allow public jobs OR owned jobs on GET /:id\n // (single-record GET inherits read.access, with optional record-level overrides)\n // ...\n});\n```\n\n### Which to Choose?\n\n| Scenario | Recommendation |\n|----------|----------------|\n| Truly global data (app config, public job templates) | `exception: true` in separate resource |\n| \"Public within org\" but still org-isolated | Ownership scope + permissive access rules |\n| Recruiter can toggle job postings public/private | Ownership scope + `visibility` field + access conditions |"
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"content": "There is **one way to write a feature**: `feature()` — one file, one export, the table and its security contract in a single call. See [feature()](/compiler/definitions/feature) for the full reference.\n\nTwo lower-level forms exist for specific situations, not as alternatives to choose between — both compile to exactly the same runtime, and `feature()` itself is sugar over the first:\n\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form `feature()` expands into. Reach for it only when another file needs to import the table identifier directly (e.g. an action file referencing the table before the default export).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop for bringing an existing Drizzle schema forward, or for dialect-specific column options.\n\nIf you're starting fresh — or you're an agent defining a user's features — use `feature()` for every table.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the expanded form\n\nThis is what `feature()` compiles into. Write it by hand only when another file needs the table identifier as a named export.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Drizzle interop\n\nIf you have an existing Drizzle schema you're bringing forward — or need a dialect-specific column option `q` doesn't expose — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### When Drizzle interop is the right call\n\nDefault to `feature()`. Drop to Drizzle only when:\n\n- You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward\n- You need a Drizzle-specific column option not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types)\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature — so one interop table doesn't force the rest of the project off `feature()`.\n\nOne dialect rule: interop files **without** a `defineTable(...)` default export (internal child tables) are not dialect-translated — author them in the target database's dialect. On Postgres providers (Neon, Supabase), a `sqliteTable` interop source without `defineTable` is a compile-time error; write it with `pgTable` from `drizzle-orm/pg-core` instead. Sources **with** `defineTable(...)` keep compiling across dialects automatically.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated and scheduled for removal. Still compiles with a warning; do not write new code with it — migrate to `feature()` (or `defineTable`).\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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"content": "There is **one way to write a feature**: `feature()` — one file, one export, the table and its security contract in a single call. See [feature()](/compiler/definitions/feature) for the full reference.\n\nTwo lower-level forms exist for specific situations, not as alternatives to choose between — both compile to exactly the same runtime, and `feature()` itself is sugar over the first:\n\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form `feature()` expands into. Reach for it only when another file needs to import the table identifier directly (e.g. an action file referencing the table before the default export).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop for bringing an existing Drizzle schema forward, or for dialect-specific column options.\n\nIf you're starting fresh — or you're an agent defining a user's features — use `feature()` for every table.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the expanded form\n\nThis is what `feature()` compiles into. Write it by hand only when another file needs the table identifier as a named export.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Drizzle interop\n\nIf you have an existing Drizzle schema you're bringing forward — or need a dialect-specific column option `q` doesn't expose — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### When Drizzle interop is the right call\n\nDefault to `feature()`. Drop to Drizzle only when:\n\n- You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward\n- You need a Drizzle-specific column option not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types)\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature — so one interop table doesn't force the rest of the project off `feature()`.\n\nOne dialect rule: interop files **without** a `defineTable(...)` default export (internal child tables) are not dialect-translated — author them in the target database's dialect. On Postgres providers (Neon, Supabase), a `sqliteTable` interop source without `defineTable` is a compile-time error; write it with `pgTable` from `drizzle-orm/pg-core` instead. Sources **with** `defineTable(...)` keep compiling across dialects automatically.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated and scheduled for removal. Still compiles with a warning; do not write new code with it — migrate to `feature()` (or `defineTable`).\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\nDrizzle `relations(...)` describe application-side joins; they do not always\ncreate a database foreign-key constraint. On Neon, use\n[`compiler.migrations.foreignKeys`](/compiler/config#neon-foreign-key-migrations)\nfor fully qualified cross-schema or composite constraints that cannot be\ndeclared alongside a table. The ordered source and target column tuples must\nhave equal arity, and the referenced target tuple must have a matching unique\nor primary-key constraint before the foreign key migration runs.\n\nUse these constraints for relational integrity only. Authorization, pass\nconsumption, state transitions, and other business logic belong in the API\naction layer.\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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"content": "Neon provides serverless PostgreSQL that works with Cloudflare Workers via HTTP connections. Choose Neon when you need PostgreSQL features (JSON operators, full-text search, advanced indexing) or want database-level Row Level Security alongside the generated Hono API.\n\n## Why Neon\n\n- **Full PostgreSQL** — Advanced queries, joins, PostGIS, full-text search\n- **Database-level security** — RLS policies enforce access even if the API is bypassed\n- **Serverless** — HTTP connection mode (`@neondatabase/serverless`) for Cloudflare Workers\n- **Worker-scoped RLS** — the Worker verifies each caller, then writes the trusted user/org/team context into transaction-local Postgres settings that RLS policies read (see [How Worker-scoped RLS works](#how-worker-scoped-rls-works))\n- **Better Auth integration** — Works seamlessly with the Quickback auth provider\n\n## One database for auth and features\n\nQuickback uses a single database provider per app. On Neon, Better Auth tables\nand feature tables live in the same Postgres database: Better Auth runs on its\nPostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter, and everything connects through one `DATABASE_URL`.\nThere is no `AUTH_DATABASE_URL`, and split-database mode is a D1-only option.\n\nMixing providers — for example D1 for auth with Neon for features — is not\nsupported. The per-service config form is rejected at compile time:\n\n```\nproviders.database service-map form is not supported in v2.\nConfigure one database provider; auth and feature data use the same database.\n```\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"auto\", // detects runtime\n pooled: true,\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Connection modes\n\n| Mode | Best for | How it works |\n|------|----------|--------------|\n| **HTTP** (default) | Cloudflare Workers — batch writes | Stateless HTTP queries via `@neondatabase/serverless` |\n| **Hyperdrive** | Cloudflare Workers — interactive transactions | `postgres.js` over a Cloudflare Hyperdrive binding (`drizzle-orm/postgres-js`) |\n| **WebSocket** *(deprecated)* | Node.js, Bun | Persistent WebSocket (`drizzle-orm/neon-serverless`) — superseded by Hyperdrive |\n| **Auto** | Mixed environments | Detects runtime: `http` on `cloudflare`, `websocket` on Node/Bun |\n\nOn the Cloudflare runtime, `auto` resolves to **HTTP** — batch-only, no binding,\nand the mode the rest of this page assumes. Opt a project up to\n`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'` when its actions need real interactive\ntransactions (see [Interactive transactions](#interactive-transactions)).\n\n## Environment variables\n\nThree connection points, each read by a different tool:\n\n| Where | File / store | Read by |\n|-------|--------------|---------|\n| Migrations (local/CI) | `.env` | `drizzle-kit` |\n| `wrangler dev` (local Worker) | `.dev.vars` | Wrangler |\n| Production Worker | `wrangler secret put` | The deployed Worker |\n\nThe compiler emits `.env.neon.example` and `.dev.vars.example` as templates,\nand gitignores `.dev.vars` so local secrets are never committed.\n\n```bash\n# Migrations read .env — copy the template and fill it in:\ncp .env.neon.example .env\n# .env holds:\n# DATABASE_URL — pooled quickback (runtime) role URL\n# DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL — unpooled quickback_admin role URL (optional)\n\n# wrangler dev reads .dev.vars (NOT .env) — copy the template:\ncp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars # gitignored; holds DATABASE_URL + BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n\n# Production: secrets live in Worker secrets, never in files:\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL # pooled quickback role URL\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n```\n\n`DATABASE_URL` is the only connection string the Worker needs at runtime — auth\nand feature queries share it. `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` is used **only** by\n`drizzle-kit`: the generated `drizzle.config.ts` reads\n`process.env.DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL ?? process.env.DATABASE_URL`, so migrations\nrun as the privileged `quickback_admin` role when it is set and fall back to\n`DATABASE_URL` when it is not. Never deploy `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` to the\nWorker.\n\n## Better Auth schema generation\n\n`src/auth/schema.ts` is owned by the Better Auth CLI. The generated `build`\nscript regenerates it before typechecking:\n\n```bash\nnpm run build # runs auth:schema, then tsc\n```\n\n`auth:schema` expands to:\n\n```bash\nnpx better-auth generate --config ./src/lib/auth.ts --output ./src/auth/schema.ts --yes \\\n && node scripts/quickback-qualify-auth-schema.mjs\n```\n\nThe `better-auth` executable comes from the `auth` devDependency in the\ngenerated `package.json` — that's the Better Auth CLI package (the\n`better-auth` runtime package ships no bin).\n\nThe qualifier script adjusts the CLI output for Postgres schema placement.\nDon't hand-edit `src/auth/schema.ts` — regenerate it instead.\n\n## Migrations\n\nNeon uses PostgreSQL migrations, distinct from D1's SQLite migrations. One\nDrizzle journal covers auth tables, feature tables, indexes, FK/cascade\nsemantics, and the RLS layer:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile # generates migrations under quickback/drizzle/\nnpm run db:migrate # applies schema AND the RLS layer, in order\n```\n\nThe RLS layer (helper functions, policies, triggers) rides the same\njournaled migration set as your schema: the compiler appends a\ncontent-addressed `<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>` migration, so one\n`db:migrate` applies everything in order. The RLS migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create) and only a *changed* security config\nappends a new entry — recompiles with unchanged security append nothing. No\nmanual SQL application step exists.\n\n## How Worker-scoped RLS works\n\nQuickback does **not** send browser or mobile clients directly to Neon, and it\ndoes **not** use Neon Authorize / a JWKS endpoint. Clients authenticate with the\nCloudflare Worker; the Worker verifies the Better Auth session or API key, runs\nthe access checks, and then performs the database call as a trusted proxy.\n\nFor every feature-table query, the generated database client opens a Neon HTTP\nbatch (an implicit transaction) whose **first** statement writes the verified\ncaller context into transaction-local Postgres settings:\n\n```sql\n-- Injected by the Worker as the batch's first statement (is_local = true):\nSELECT\n set_config('quickback.service_role', '', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', 'usr_123', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.org_id', 'org_abc', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.team_id', '', true);\n```\n\nRLS policies read those settings through Quickback-defined helper functions —\nthere is no external JWT verification and no persisted session state in the\ndatabase. `auth.user_id()` is a compiler-generated shim, not a Neon Authorize\nfunction:\n\n```sql\n-- Generated by Quickback (granted to the quickback runtime role):\nCREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth.user_id()\nRETURNS TEXT AS $$\n SELECT NULLIF(current_setting('request.jwt.claim.sub', true), '')\n$$ LANGUAGE SQL STABLE SET search_path = public;\n```\n\nBecause the settings are transaction-local (`set_config(..., true)`), they\napply only to the current batch and never leak between requests. If the Worker\nnever stamps a user id, `auth.user_id()` returns `NULL` and the restrictive\n`deny_anon` policy blocks the query — fail closed.\n\n## Row Level Security\n\nQuickback emits RLS policies from your `firewall` and `access` config. Neon's\npolicies read the transaction-local claims described above via `auth.user_id()`\nand the `get_active_org_id()` / `has_any_role()` helpers (the Supabase target\nuses `auth.uid()` instead — same pattern, different function).\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n]\n```\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"documents_select\" ON documents FOR SELECT\nUSING (\n organization_id = public.get_active_org_id()\n AND (public.is_admin() OR user_id = auth.user_id())\n);\n```\n\nEvery feature table also gets a restrictive `deny_anon` policy (blocks queries\nwith no stamped user id) and a `service_role` policy (admits Worker-internal\ncontexts — see [Background jobs and cross-tenant actions](#background-jobs-and-cross-tenant-actions)).\n\n### Firewall patterns\n\n**Organization-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"projects_select\" ON projects FOR SELECT\nUSING (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id());\n```\n\n**User-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"preferences_select\" ON preferences FOR SELECT\nUSING (user_id = auth.user_id());\n```\n\n**Public tables:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_deny_anon\" ON categories FOR ALL TO anon USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_all\" ON categories FOR ALL TO authenticated USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);\n```\n\n### Helper functions\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n|----------|---------|\n| `auth.user_id()` | Reads the verified user id from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.sub` setting |\n| `get_active_org_id()` | Reads the request-scoped org from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.org_id` setting |\n| `get_active_team_id()` | Reads the request-scoped team from `request.jwt.claim.team_id` (teams mode) |\n| `has_any_role(roles[])` | Checks if the user has any specified role in the request org |\n| `has_org_role(role)` | Checks for a single specific role |\n| `is_org_member()` | Checks org membership in the request org |\n| `is_owner(owner_id)` | Checks record ownership against `auth.user_id()` |\n| `is_admin()` | Checks the `auth.admins` table (admin mode) |\n\nAll helpers are TEXT-typed to match Better Auth's prefixed ids (`org_abc123`).\nThe request org/team scope is passed by the Worker **per transaction**, not read\nfrom a persisted mirror. There is no compiler-owned `user_sessions` table and no\nsession hook that syncs the active organization into the database — switching to\n\"no org\" simply means the Worker stamps an empty `request.jwt.claim.org_id`, and\nSQL-side access is revoked immediately. Fail closed.\n\nThe only compiler-owned support tables the RLS layer reads live in\n`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`: a `profiles` table (populated by the\n`sync_profile_display_name()` trigger and protected by the `profiles_*`\npolicies) and, when admin/sysadmin helpers are emitted, an `admins` table (read\nby `is_admin()` / `is_sysadmin()`). Better Auth's own `sessions` table may still\ncarry an `active_organization_id`, but Quickback RLS never reads it.\n\nRLS coverage includes Better Auth's own tables — including those the compiler\nforce-enables (organization, admin, `apikeys`; plus the OAuth/agent table\nfamilies when those surfaces are on, locked to service-role only).\n\n## Background jobs and cross-tenant actions\n\nSome code runs with no HTTP request and therefore no caller claims: queue\nconsumers, cron schedules, and cross-tenant `unsafe` actions. These acquire the\n**service-role handle** `createServiceDb(env)` from the generated `src/db`\nindex. Instead of caller claims, it sets `quickback.service_role = 'true'` (with\nall request claims cleared) — the same marker the Better Auth adapter's\ntransactions use. Every feature table carries a `<table>_service_role` RLS\npolicy that admits exactly that context, so background work can reach rows\nacross tenants while the request-scoped `createDb()` client stays caller-scoped.\n\nThe service-role marker is only ever set by Worker-internal chokepoints\n(`createServiceDb`, the Better Auth adapter) — it is never derived from request\ninput. Unsafe actions keep their mandatory audit contract: cross-tenant writes\nstill land audit events (the `audit` Postgres schema), unchanged from D1.\n\n## Reads through a user-anchored relationship\n\nSome resources are readable not because you own them or belong to their org, but\nbecause you are reachable from them through a **chain of tables** anchored on the\ncaller's user id. A conference attendee, for example, can read their own\nregistrations even though they are not an org member — the grant travels\n`person_account_links.user_id = ctx.userId → people → event_people →\nregistrations`.\n\nDeclare the chain once as an `authz.relationships` entry using the `hops` form\n(each hop names the joined `table`, the column it is joined `on`, and the `prev`\ncolumn on the previous table that points at it). The terminal hop's `table` is\nthe **anchor** — the table carrying the caller's user id:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeReachable: {\n from: 'person_account_links', // the anchor table\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventPersonId' }, // the column on the resource this constrains\n hops: [\n { table: 'event_people', on: 'id', prev: 'eventPersonId' },\n { table: 'people', on: 'id', prev: 'personId' },\n { table: 'person_account_links', on: 'personId', prev: 'id' },\n ],\n },\n },\n},\n```\n\nA resource opts into the grant by referencing the relationship from its\n`firewall` — typically as one arm of an `any:` group so org members keep their\nown path in:\n\n```typescript\n// features/registrations/registrations.ts\nfirewall: [\n {\n any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, // org-member grant\n { field: 'eventPersonId', via: 'attendeeReachable' }, // reachable-attendee grant\n ],\n },\n],\n```\n\n### The anchor must be non-forgeable (fail closed on both targets)\n\nThe reachability chain terminates in `anchor.user_id = ctx.userId`, so whoever\ncan **write** an anchor row can mint themselves reachability to a victim's data.\nQuickback therefore refuses to compile a user-anchored multi-hop relationship\nunless the anchor table is:\n\n- **caller-read-own on the subject column** — its firewall scopes reads to\n `ctx.userId` (e.g. `firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }]`), and\n- **service-role-write-only** — it exposes no caller-reachable `create` / `update`\n / `delete` endpoint, so the link can only be created by Worker-internal code.\n\nThis check is **target-independent**: it fires identically on Neon and D1,\nbecause the reachability join runs in the app layer on both. A forgeable anchor\nis a compile error everywhere, not a Neon-only concern.\n\n### How the read is served\n\nOn **Neon**, a via-relationship reachability predicate cannot be expressed as an\nRLS policy — the correlated multi-hop join reaches across intermediate tables\nthat each `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, so caller-claims RLS would deny the attendee\nto *zero* rows before the app-layer WHERE ever runs. Quickback resolves this by\nrouting that resource's **read** handlers through the service-role handle\n(`createServiceDb(c.env)`) instead of the caller-claims client. RLS stops denying,\nand the compiled `buildFirewallConditions(...)` reachability WHERE — the exact\nsame clause D1 uses — becomes the **sole** row filter.\n\nThis is the D1 trust model, applied to Neon for exactly these reads: the\napplication layer is the firewall, and RLS is a coarse tenant backstop that steps\naside where it cannot express the grant. It is surgical and fail-closed:\n\n- Only the affected resource's reads swap handles. **Org / owner / team reads keep\n caller claims + the RLS backstop** — they resolve to policies RLS *can* express.\n- The swap is gated on a non-empty firewall carrying the reachability predicate;\n a service-handle read with no WHERE is a compile error (it would return every\n tenant's rows). Fail closed.\n- It applies to the **collection `GET /`, `GET /:id`, and views** alike. **Writes\n are unchanged** — creates/updates/deletes keep caller claims and the RLS\n backstop.\n\nThe **same config compiles identically on D1**, where there is no RLS to bypass:\nthe read handlers keep `c.get('db')` and the app-layer reachability WHERE was\nalready the whole story.\n\n## Webhooks on Neon\n\nWebhooks are supported on Neon over HTTP. The store (`webhook_events`,\n`webhook_endpoints`, `webhook_deliveries`) lives in a dedicated `webhooks`\nPostgres schema of the **same** database — following the `audit` schema\nprecedent — so there is no separate `WEBHOOKS_DB` binding.\n\n- Set `webhooksBinding` to enable webhooks. On Neon its value is a pure enable\n flag (no D1 binding is emitted); the queue names stay provider-neutral.\n- The D1-only keys `webhooksDatabaseId` and `webhooksDatabaseName` are rejected\n at compile time — they name a D1 database that cannot exist on Neon.\n- The webhook store is Worker-internal (endpoint signing secrets live there):\n every table in the `webhooks` schema has RLS enabled with a single\n service-role-only policy, so only `createWebhooksDb()` (which wraps\n `createServiceDb`) can touch it. Route handlers gate access at the app layer\n (`requireOrgMember` / endpoint-ownership checks) before querying.\n- Webhooks require `connectionMode: 'http'`.\n\n## Encryption on Neon\n\nThe encryption pillar — `.encrypted()` (envelope) and `.sealed()` /\n`q.vaultRef()` (sealed) columns — is supported on Neon over HTTP. The\n`org_data_keys` and seal-vault tables fold into the single journaled migration\nset, and the encryption RLS section rides the journaled RLS migration:\n`org_data_keys` gets org-scoped RLS (the envelope DEK path needs caller claims),\nand the vault spine is locked to service-role-only. The seal chokepoints\nacquire `createServiceDb`.\n\nBoth tiers require `connectionMode: 'http'`; under WebSocket mode they are a\nfail-closed compile error.\n\n## Batch transactions\n\nWhether a batch handler (`PATCH /batch`, `DELETE /batch`, …) is truly atomic\ndepends on the connection mode, and the response advertises the guarantee via\n`meta.transactional`:\n\n| Mode | `meta.transactional` | Behavior |\n|------|----------------------|----------|\n| Neon HTTP (Cloudflare default) | `false` | Fail-fast per-record loop, no rollback — `drizzle-orm/neon-http` has no interactive transactions, so this matches D1's semantics honestly |\n| Neon Hyperdrive (Cloudflare) | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any failure rolls back every write in the batch |\n| Neon WebSocket (Node/Bun) | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any failure rolls back every write in the batch |\n\n`drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws \"No transactions support in neon-http driver\" at\nruntime, so the HTTP path deliberately treats batches like D1 (fail-fast,\nnon-transactional) rather than emitting code that would 500 on every failed\nbatch. Honest advertisement over runtime surprises. For true atomic batches and\ninteractive transactions on Cloudflare, use\n[`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'`](#interactive-transactions).\n\n## Interactive transactions\n\n`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'` runs the feature database over a Cloudflare\n[Hyperdrive](https://developers.cloudflare.com/hyperdrive/) binding using\n`postgres.js` (`drizzle-orm/postgres-js`), which supports **real interactive\ntransactions** — read current state, lock it, decide in TypeScript, then write\ndependent rows, all committed atomically:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n input: z.object({ registrationId: z.string() }),\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n return db.transaction(async (tx) => { // tx is fully typed\n const [reg] = await tx.select()\n .from(registrations)\n .where(eq(registrations.id, input.registrationId))\n .for(\"update\"); // row lock held to commit\n if (!reg) throw new ActionError(\"Not found\", \"NOT_FOUND\", 404); // → rollback\n const [updated] = await tx.update(registrations)\n .set({ status: nextStatus(reg) })\n .where(eq(registrations.id, reg.id))\n .returning();\n await tx.insert(registrationEvents).values({ registrationId: updated.id });\n return updated; // atomic commit\n });\n },\n});\n```\n\nNote the `tx.select()…for(\"update\")` form: Drizzle's relational query API\n(`tx.query.<table>.findFirst`) is [blocked on the scoped\n`db`/`tx`](/compiler/definitions/actions#relational-queries-are-blocked-fail-closed)\nbecause the tenant firewall can't be injected into relational queries. The\nselect builder gives you the same row lock with scope conditions applied\nautomatically.\n\nConfigure it on the database provider:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: {\n provider: \"neon\",\n config: { connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\", hyperdrive: { id: \"<binding-id>\" } },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler emits the `[[hyperdrive]]` wrangler binding pointing at your Neon\n**direct** connection string.\n\n**Security is preserved, unchanged.** The verified caller claims run as the\nfirst transaction-local statement inside the transaction (the same\n`set_config(..., true)` preamble batches use), so RLS enforces inside the\ncallback and the claims reset at commit/rollback — they never leak across\nHyperdrive's connection pool.\n\n## Capability limits (fail closed)\n\nAnything not yet ported to Postgres is a compile-time error on Neon, never\nsilently-broken output:\n\n- **Managed file storage** (`fileStorage` with `managed: true`) is rejected — its\n metadata store is a D1 database. Use presign-only R2 (the default, without\n `managed`), which is provider-neutral and works on Neon today.\n- **The Better Auth `subscriptions` plugin** is rejected until it gets\n provider-aware db acquisition and a Postgres dialect schema.\n- **Raw `sqliteTable` interop sources** on a Postgres target are rejected — write\n child tables with `pgTable` (see [below](#raw-drizzle-interop-tables-must-use-pg-core)).\n- **WebSocket mode** (deprecated) rejects webhooks, cross-tenant `unsafe`\n actions, and encrypted/sealed columns. Use\n [`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'`](#interactive-transactions) instead — it is the\n full-capability interactive-transaction path and supersedes WebSocket.\n\nMixed database providers (e.g. D1 auth + Neon features) remain unsupported.\n\n## Deploying\n\nThe generated `deploy` script runs migrations, then ships the Worker:\n\n```bash\nnpm run deploy # runs db:migrate (drizzle-kit) then wrangler deploy\n```\n\nBefore the first deploy, put the runtime secrets in Worker secrets and make sure\nthe Worker's KV namespace (used by Better Auth for sessions and JWT revocation)\nis provisioned:\n\n```bash\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL # pooled quickback role URL\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n```\n\nThe generated Neon client fails fast at boot if `DATABASE_URL` is missing, so a\nmisconfigured deploy surfaces immediately rather than on the first query.\n\n## Generated files\n\n```\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── 0000_<name>.sql # schema migrations (drizzle-kit)\n├── 0001_quickback_rls_<hash>.sql # journaled RLS layer (content-addressed)\n└── meta/_journal.json # one journal covers both\nsrc/\n├── db/index.ts # createDb / createServiceDb (claim-scoped clients)\n├── db/schema.ts # Drizzle schema barrel\n├── db/rls-support.schema.ts # profiles (+ admins) — RLS support tables\n└── auth/schema.ts # Better Auth schema (owned by the BA CLI)\n.env.neon.example # migration connection strings (copy to .env)\n.dev.vars.example # wrangler dev secrets (copy to .dev.vars)\ndocs/neon-setup.md # role bootstrap + deploy walkthrough\n```\n\n## Raw Drizzle interop tables must use `pg-core`\n\nInternal child tables authored as raw Drizzle (a table file with **no**\n`export default defineTable(...)`) are not dialect-translated by the\ncompiler — on Neon they must be written with `pgTable` from\n`drizzle-orm/pg-core`. A `sqliteTable` interop source on a Postgres target\nis a **compile-time error**: the mechanical sqlite→pg rewrite would leave\nSQLite-shaped audit columns (`text` ISO strings instead of `timestamptz`,\nwhich the RLS audit triggers stamp) and SQLite-only column options in the\nPostgres schema.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/interviews/interview_scores.ts\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no CRUD routes\n\nexport const interviewScores = pgTable('interview_scores', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n interviewId: text('interview_id').notNull(),\n rating: integer('rating').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\nTables **with** `defineTable(...)` are unaffected — existing `sqliteTable`\nsources with a resource config still compile to the Postgres dialect\nautomatically.\n\n## When to choose Neon vs D1\n\n| Factor | Neon | D1 |\n|--------|------|-----|\n| SQL dialect | PostgreSQL | SQLite |\n| Security model | RLS + application-layer | Application-layer only |\n| Multi-region | Built-in replication | Single region per database |\n| Pricing | Free tier, then usage-based | Free tier, then usage-based |\n| Best for | Complex queries, existing Postgres apps | Edge-first, simple schemas |\n\n## See also\n\n- [D1](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1) — SQLite at the edge\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — All database provider options"
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"content": "Neon provides serverless PostgreSQL that works with Cloudflare Workers via HTTP connections. Choose Neon when you need PostgreSQL features (JSON operators, full-text search, advanced indexing) or want database-level Row Level Security alongside the generated Hono API.\n\n## Why Neon\n\n- **Full PostgreSQL** — Advanced queries, joins, PostGIS, full-text search\n- **Database-level security** — RLS policies enforce access even if the API is bypassed\n- **Serverless** — HTTP connection mode (`@neondatabase/serverless`) for Cloudflare Workers\n- **Worker-scoped RLS** — the Worker verifies each caller, then writes the trusted user/org/team context into transaction-local Postgres settings that RLS policies read (see [How Worker-scoped RLS works](#how-worker-scoped-rls-works))\n- **Better Auth integration** — Works seamlessly with the Quickback auth provider\n\n## One database for auth and features\n\nQuickback uses a single database provider per app. On Neon, Better Auth tables\nand feature tables live in the same Postgres database: Better Auth runs on its\nPostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter, and everything connects through one `DATABASE_URL`.\nThere is no `AUTH_DATABASE_URL`, and split-database mode is a D1-only option.\n\nIn Hyperdrive mode the same one-database rule holds, but the Worker connection\ncomes exclusively from `env.HYPERDRIVE.connectionString`: feature queries and\nBetter Auth share the generated database helpers. `DATABASE_URL` is then a\ncompiler/migration input, not a deployed Worker secret.\n\nMixing providers — for example D1 for auth with Neon for features — is not\nsupported. The per-service config form is rejected at compile time:\n\n```\nproviders.database service-map form is not supported in v2.\nConfigure one database provider; auth and feature data use the same database.\n```\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"auto\", // detects runtime\n pooled: true,\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Connection modes\n\n| Mode | Best for | How it works |\n|------|----------|--------------|\n| **HTTP** (default) | Cloudflare Workers — batch writes | Stateless HTTP queries via `@neondatabase/serverless` |\n| **Hyperdrive** | Cloudflare Workers — interactive transactions | `postgres.js` over a Cloudflare Hyperdrive binding (`drizzle-orm/postgres-js`) |\n| **WebSocket** *(deprecated)* | Node.js, Bun | Persistent WebSocket (`drizzle-orm/neon-serverless`) — superseded by Hyperdrive |\n| **Auto** | Mixed environments | Detects runtime: `http` on `cloudflare`, `websocket` on Node/Bun |\n\nOn the Cloudflare runtime, `auto` resolves to **HTTP** — batch-only, no binding,\nand the mode the rest of this page assumes. Opt a project up to\n`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'` when its actions need real interactive\ntransactions (see [Interactive transactions](#interactive-transactions)).\n\n## Named Cloudflare deployment environments\n\nNeon Hyperdrive projects can declare isolated Worker targets under\n`providers.database.environments`. A logical `dev` / `prod` pair on a project\nnamed `attend-v2` deploys through Wrangler as `attend-v2-dev` and\n`attend-v2-prod`:\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"attend-v2\",\n email: { provider: \"cloudflare\", from: \"hello@attend.vip\" },\n bindings: {\n secrets: [\n { name: \"EVENT_PASS_HMAC_PEPPER_V1\", required: true },\n ],\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: {\n name: \"neon\",\n config: {\n connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\",\n hyperdrive: { id: \"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff\" },\n },\n environments: {\n dev: {\n branch: \"dev\",\n worker: {\n env: \"dev\",\n workersDev: true,\n previewUrls: false,\n vars: {\n ENVIRONMENT: \"dev\",\n BETTER_AUTH_URL: \"https://attend-v2-dev.example.workers.dev\",\n },\n requiredSecrets: [\n \"BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\",\n \"EVENT_PASS_HMAC_PEPPER_V1\",\n ],\n bindings: {\n hyperdrive: {\n id: \"11111111111111111111111111111111\",\n localConnectionString: \"postgresql://quickback:dev-only@127.0.0.1:5432/attend_v2\",\n },\n kv: { id: \"22222222222222222222222222222222\" },\n rateLimits: {\n RL_200_60: \"61001200\",\n RL_1000_60: \"61002000\",\n },\n sendEmail: { name: \"EMAIL\" },\n },\n },\n },\n prod: {\n branch: \"production\",\n worker: {\n env: \"prod\",\n workersDev: true,\n previewUrls: false,\n vars: {\n ENVIRONMENT: \"prod\",\n BETTER_AUTH_URL: \"https://attend-v2-prod.example.workers.dev\",\n },\n requiredSecrets: [\n \"BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\",\n \"EVENT_PASS_HMAC_PEPPER_V1\",\n ],\n bindings: {\n hyperdrive: { id: \"33333333333333333333333333333333\" },\n kv: { id: \"44444444444444444444444444444444\" },\n rateLimits: {\n RL_200_60: \"62001200\",\n RL_1000_60: \"62002000\",\n },\n sendEmail: { name: \"EMAIL\" },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n },\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\nWrangler bindings and variables are non-inheritable. Quickback therefore emits\nthe generated vars, required-secret declaration, Hyperdrive, KV, rate-limit,\nand Cloudflare Email blocks inside **every** `[env.<name>]` target. The base\nWorker carries no deployable stateful binding and has `workers_dev = false` /\n`preview_urls = false`, so a bare deploy cannot accidentally point at shared or\nplaceholder state.\n\nThe environment contract is intentionally exact and fails closed:\n\n- `workersDev: true` and `previewUrls: false` must be explicit for each target.\n- The auth provider must currently be Better Auth. External auth needs a\n non-inheritable service binding, so it remains rejected until named targets\n can require an explicit per-environment service-binding override.\n- Hyperdrive and KV IDs must be real 32-character Cloudflare resource IDs and\n cannot be reused between environments.\n- Named environments must include a logical `dev` target. It is selected by\n `npm run dev` and must own a `bindings.hyperdrive.localConnectionString`.\n Quickback emits that\n development-only URL only inside its named Hyperdrive block and rejects it\n on every other target, so `prod` always resolves its deployed connection\n from the remote Hyperdrive ID.\n- `rateLimits` must contain exactly the binding names generated by the current\n feature set, with account-unique integer namespace IDs. Add or remove a rate\n limit and the next compile tells you which override changed.\n- `requiredSecrets` must exactly match the generated runtime inventory:\n `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`, a custom `auth.jwt.secretEnv` when configured,\n `ENCRYPTION_KEK` when envelope-encrypted columns are present, and every\n custom secret declared with `required: true`. It also includes the shared\n `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` / `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` credentials when generated\n Better Auth code uses SES, SNS, or AWS-backed anonymous-account upgrades;\n every enabled social provider's `AUTH_\n\n## Better Auth schema generation\n\n`src/auth/schema.ts` is a compiler-owned artifact derived with the Better Auth\nCLI during `quickback compile`. The generated `build` script is deliberately\nread-only with respect to generated source:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile # regenerates src/auth/schema.ts and the project output\nnpm run build # runs tsc only; does not rewrite generated files\n```\n\nFor schema-generator diagnostics, the explicit `auth:schema` command expands\nto:\n\n```bash\nnpx better-auth generate --config ./src/lib/auth.ts --output ./src/auth/schema.ts --yes \\\n && node scripts/quickback-qualify-auth-schema.mjs\n```\n\nThe `better-auth` executable comes from the `auth` devDependency in the\ngenerated `package.json` — that's the Better Auth CLI package (the\n`better-auth` runtime package ships no bin).\n\nThe qualifier script adjusts the CLI output for Postgres schema placement.\n`auth:schema` produces the intermediate Better Auth output and may remove\nQuickback's generated-file envelope. Do not commit that intermediate file;\nrerun `quickback compile` to restore the canonical project bytes. Don't\nhand-edit `src/auth/schema.ts`.\n\nRecompiling also replaces previously generated `package.json` lifecycle\ncommands with their current definitions. An existing project whose `build`\nscript still runs `auth:schema` therefore converges to the TypeScript-only\nbuild, while unrelated custom scripts remain intact.\n\n## Migrations\n\nNeon uses PostgreSQL migrations, distinct from D1's SQLite migrations. One\nDrizzle journal covers auth tables, feature tables, indexes, FK/cascade\nsemantics, and the RLS layer:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile # generates migrations under quickback/drizzle/\nnpm run db:migrate # applies schema AND the RLS layer, in order\n```\n\nThe RLS layer (helper functions, policies, triggers) rides the same\njournaled migration set as your schema: the compiler appends a\ncontent-addressed `<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>` migration, so one\n`db:migrate` applies everything in order. The RLS migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create) and only a *changed* security config\nappends a new entry — recompiles with unchanged security append nothing. No\nmanual SQL application step exists.\n\nQuickback also dependency-orders Drizzle's standalone constraint replacements.\nWhen a composite unique or primary key and its consuming foreign key are both\nreplaced, the generated migration drops the dependent foreign key first, drops\nand recreates the referenced key, then recreates the foreign key. This avoids\nPostgres `2BP01` dependency failures without `CASCADE` and without requiring a\nhand-edited migration. Already-correct migrations remain byte-identical.\n\nCross-schema and composite relationships that cannot live in one generated\nDrizzle schema may be declared with\n[`compiler.migrations.foreignKeys`](/compiler/config#neon-foreign-key-migrations).\nQuickback appends them to that same content-addressed migration after the\nschema tables and target unique keys exist. Declarations are deterministic and\nreplay-safe: an existing constraint must match exactly, while existing orphan\nrows fail the `VALIDATE CONSTRAINT` step. Foreign keys enforce integrity only;\nkeep authorization and business state transitions in the API action layer.\n\n## How Worker-scoped RLS works\n\nQuickback does **not** send browser or mobile clients directly to Neon, and it\ndoes **not** use Neon Authorize / a JWKS endpoint. Clients authenticate with the\nCloudflare Worker; the Worker verifies the Better Auth session or API key, runs\nthe access checks, and then performs the database call as a trusted proxy.\n\nFor every feature-table query, the generated database client opens a\nclaims-scoped transaction (an implicit Neon HTTP batch or a Hyperdrive\ntransaction) whose **first** statement writes the verified caller context into\ntransaction-local Postgres settings:\n\n```sql\n-- Injected by the Worker as the batch's first statement (is_local = true):\nSELECT\n set_config('quickback.service_role', '', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', 'usr_123', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.org_id', 'org_abc', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.team_id', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.type', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.actor_type', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.actor_id', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.session_id', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.family_id', '', true),\n set_config('quickback.principal.claims', '{}', true);\n```\n\nRLS policies read those settings through Quickback-defined helper functions —\nthere is no external JWT verification and no persisted session state in the\ndatabase. `auth.user_id()` is a compiler-generated shim, not a Neon Authorize\nfunction:\n\n```sql\n-- Generated by Quickback (granted to the quickback runtime role):\nCREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth.user_id()\nRETURNS TEXT AS $$\n SELECT NULLIF(current_setting('request.jwt.claim.sub', true), '')\n$$ LANGUAGE SQL STABLE SET search_path = public;\n```\n\nBecause the settings are transaction-local (`set_config(..., true)`), they\napply only to the current batch and never leak between requests. If the Worker\nnever stamps a user id, `auth.user_id()` returns `NULL` and the restrictive\n`deny_anon` policy blocks the query unless a verified delegated principal is\npresent — fail closed. Account requests explicitly clear all principal fields;\ndelegated requests explicitly clear the account/org/team fields.\n\nAn API key's organization metadata is only a candidate scope. Before the\nmiddleware stamps it into `AppContext`, the generated Neon membership lookup\nopens a request-scoped database handle with the verified API-key owner as\n`userId` and the candidate organization as `orgId`, then requires the member\nrow to match both values. A missing or RLS-denied row clears organization and\nrole authority.\n\n## Row Level Security\n\nQuickback emits RLS policies from your `firewall` and `access` config. Neon's\npolicies read the transaction-local claims described above via `auth.user_id()`\nand the `get_active_org_id()` / `has_any_role()` helpers (the Supabase target\nuses `auth.uid()` instead — same pattern, different function).\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n]\n```\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"documents_select\" ON documents FOR SELECT\nUSING (\n organization_id = public.get_active_org_id()\n AND (public.is_admin() OR user_id = auth.user_id())\n);\n```\n\nEvery feature table also gets a restrictive `deny_anon` policy (blocks queries\nwith neither a stamped user id nor a delegated principal) and a `service_role`\npolicy (admits Worker-internal contexts — see\n[Background jobs and cross-tenant actions](#background-jobs-and-cross-tenant-actions)).\n\n### Delegated principal RLS (contract v2)\n\nDelegated principals require Cloudflare + Neon Hyperdrive. Their proof hook\nreturns only a digest and receives no database handle. Quickback then runs one\nlookup under an internal lookup-only principal whose RLS policy admits only the\nconfigured table row matching `credentialDigest`, plus any configured active\nstatus condition. The generated unique lookup index is content-addressed: a\nchanged table, digest column, or definition drops the prior logical index and\ncreates the exact replacement. Names are hash-suffixed to avoid collisions and\nremain inside PostgreSQL's 63-byte identifier limit.\n\nAfter the lookup, the normal request database handle carries the resolved\nprincipal type, actor, optional session/family, and JSON claims in the same\ntransaction-local preamble shown above. RLS reads them with:\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n|----------|---------|\n| `get_principal_type()` | Exact configured type such as `event_delegate` |\n| `get_principal_actor_id()` | Stable delegated actor id |\n| `get_principal_session_id()` | Optional session id |\n| `get_principal_family_id()` | Optional session-family id |\n| `get_principal_claim(name)` | One configured string claim such as `eventId` or `personId` |\n\nGenerated request types are a closed union of the configured principal names,\nliteral actor types, exact session shape, and configured claim keys. The Neon\ndatabase context uses the same resolved union plus separate compiler-internal\n`__credential_lookup__:<type>` variants. Lookup-only authority therefore\ncannot appear in an action `AppContext`, and a delegated action context cannot\ncarry account/org/team/membership fields.\n\n`resource.databaseAccess` emits operation-specific, RLS-only policies for\nauthored actions and support tables. It does not mount generic routes or\nOpenAPI operations. Every authorization path must include at least one\nSQL-lowerable record equality; any unbounded OR arm or principal/role-only leaf\nfails compilation. This lets an organization account lane and a disjoint\nevent/person delegated lane share a table without weakening either:\n\n```typescript\ndatabaseAccess: {\n select: {\n or: [\n {\n roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"],\n record: { organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" } },\n },\n {\n principals: [\"event_delegate\"],\n record: {\n eventId: { equals: \"$ctx.principal.claims.eventId\" },\n personId: { equals: \"$ctx.principal.claims.personId\" },\n },\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nPostgres combines the record comparisons inside each arm with AND. Restrictive\nper-operation principal fences also cap every permissive policy, so a public,\nfirewall-exception, or old permissive policy cannot admit the wrong principal\ntype. The action still owns all application behavior; these policies only\nconstrain which rows its caller-scoped `db` or transaction may touch.\n\n### Firewall patterns\n\n**Organization-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"projects_select\" ON projects FOR SELECT\nUSING (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id());\n```\n\n**User-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"preferences_select\" ON preferences FOR SELECT\nUSING (user_id = auth.user_id());\n```\n\n**Public tables:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_deny_anon\" ON categories FOR ALL TO anon USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_all\" ON categories FOR ALL TO authenticated USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);\n```\n\n### Helper functions\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n|----------|---------|\n| `auth.user_id()` | Reads the verified user id from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.sub` setting |\n| `get_active_org_id()` | Reads the request-scoped org from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.org_id` setting |\n| `get_active_team_id()` | Reads the request-scoped team from `request.jwt.claim.team_id` (teams mode) |\n| `has_any_role(roles[])` | Checks if the user has any specified role in the request org |\n| `has_org_role(role)` | Checks for a single specific role |\n| `is_org_member()` | Checks org membership in the request org |\n| `is_owner(owner_id)` | Checks record ownership against `auth.user_id()` |\n| `is_admin()` | Checks the `auth.admins` table (admin mode) |\n\nAll helpers are TEXT-typed to match Better Auth's prefixed ids (`org_abc123`).\nThe request org/team scope is passed by the Worker **per transaction**, not read\nfrom a persisted mirror. There is no compiler-owned `user_sessions` table and no\nsession hook that syncs the active organization into the database — switching to\n\"no org\" simply means the Worker stamps an empty `request.jwt.claim.org_id`, and\nSQL-side access is revoked immediately. Fail closed.\n\nThe only compiler-owned support tables the RLS layer reads live in\n`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`: a `profiles` table (populated by the\n`sync_profile_display_name()` trigger and protected by the `profiles_*`\npolicies) and, when admin/sysadmin helpers are emitted, an `admins` table (read\nby `is_admin()` / `is_sysadmin()`). Better Auth's own `sessions` table may still\ncarry an `active_organization_id`, but Quickback RLS never reads it.\n\nRLS coverage includes Better Auth's own tables — including those the compiler\nforce-enables (organization, admin, `apikeys`; plus the OAuth/agent table\nfamilies when those surfaces are on, locked to service-role only).\n\n## Background jobs and cross-tenant actions\n\nSome code runs with no HTTP request and therefore no caller claims: queue\nconsumers, cron schedules, and cross-tenant `unsafe` actions. These acquire the\n**service-role handle** `createServiceDb(env)` from the generated `src/db`\nindex. Instead of caller claims, it sets `quickback.service_role = 'true'` (with\nall request claims cleared) — the same marker the Better Auth adapter's\ntransactions use. Every feature table carries a `<table>_service_role` RLS\npolicy that admits exactly that context, so background work can reach rows\nacross tenants while the request-scoped `createDb()` client stays caller-scoped.\n\nThe service-role marker is only ever set by Worker-internal chokepoints\n(`createServiceDb`, the Better Auth adapter) — it is never derived from request\ninput. Unsafe actions keep their mandatory audit contract: cross-tenant writes\nstill land audit events (the `audit` Postgres schema), unchanged from D1.\n\n## Reads through a user-anchored relationship\n\nSome resources are readable not because you own them or belong to their org, but\nbecause you are reachable from them through a **chain of tables** anchored on the\ncaller's user id. A conference attendee, for example, can read their own\nregistrations even though they are not an org member — the grant travels\n`person_account_links.user_id = ctx.userId → people → event_people →\nregistrations`.\n\nDeclare the chain once as an `authz.relationships` entry using the `hops` form\n(each hop names the joined `table`, the column it is joined `on`, and the `prev`\ncolumn on the previous table that points at it). The terminal hop's `table` is\nthe **anchor** — the table carrying the caller's user id:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeReachable: {\n from: 'person_account_links', // the anchor table\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventPersonId' }, // the column on the resource this constrains\n hops: [\n { table: 'event_people', on: 'id', prev: 'eventPersonId' },\n { table: 'people', on: 'id', prev: 'personId' },\n { table: 'person_account_links', on: 'personId', prev: 'id' },\n ],\n },\n },\n},\n```\n\nA resource opts into the grant by referencing the relationship from its\n`firewall` — typically as one arm of an `any:` group so org members keep their\nown path in:\n\n```typescript\n// features/registrations/registrations.ts\nfirewall: [\n {\n any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, // org-member grant\n { field: 'eventPersonId', via: 'attendeeReachable' }, // reachable-attendee grant\n ],\n },\n],\n```\n\n### The anchor must be non-forgeable (fail closed on both targets)\n\nThe reachability chain terminates in `anchor.user_id = ctx.userId`, so whoever\ncan **write** an anchor row can mint themselves reachability to a victim's data.\nQuickback therefore refuses to compile a user-anchored multi-hop relationship\nunless the anchor table is:\n\n- **caller-read-own on the subject column** — its firewall scopes reads to\n `ctx.userId` (e.g. `firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }]`), and\n- **service-role-write-only** — it exposes no caller-reachable `create` / `update`\n / `delete` endpoint, so the link can only be created by Worker-internal code.\n\nThis check is **target-independent**: it fires identically on Neon and D1,\nbecause the reachability join runs in the app layer on both. A forgeable anchor\nis a compile error everywhere, not a Neon-only concern.\n\n### How the read is served\n\nOn **Neon**, a via-relationship reachability predicate cannot be expressed as an\nRLS policy — the correlated multi-hop join reaches across intermediate tables\nthat each `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, so caller-claims RLS would deny the attendee\nto *zero* rows before the app-layer WHERE ever runs. Quickback resolves this by\nrouting that resource's **read** handlers through the service-role handle\n(`createServiceDb(c.env)`) instead of the caller-claims client. RLS stops denying,\nand the compiled `buildFirewallConditions(...)` reachability WHERE — the exact\nsame clause D1 uses — becomes the **sole** row filter.\n\nThis is the D1 trust model, applied to Neon for exactly these reads: the\napplication layer is the firewall, and RLS is a coarse tenant backstop that steps\naside where it cannot express the grant. It is surgical and fail-closed:\n\n- Only the affected resource's reads swap handles. **Org / owner / team reads keep\n caller claims + the RLS backstop** — they resolve to policies RLS *can* express.\n- The swap is gated on a non-empty firewall carrying the reachability predicate;\n a service-handle read with no WHERE is a compile error (it would return every\n tenant's rows). Fail closed.\n- It applies to the **collection `GET /`, `GET /:id`, and views** alike. **Writes\n are unchanged** — creates/updates/deletes keep caller claims and the RLS\n backstop.\n\nThe **same config compiles identically on D1**, where there is no RLS to bypass:\nthe read handlers keep `c.get('db')` and the app-layer reachability WHERE was\nalready the whole story.\n\n## Webhooks on Neon\n\nWebhooks are supported on Neon over HTTP. The store (`webhook_events`,\n`webhook_endpoints`, `webhook_deliveries`) lives in a dedicated `webhooks`\nPostgres schema of the **same** database — following the `audit` schema\nprecedent — so there is no separate `WEBHOOKS_DB` binding.\n\n- Set `webhooksBinding` to enable webhooks. On Neon its value is a pure enable\n flag (no D1 binding is emitted); the queue names stay provider-neutral.\n- The D1-only keys `webhooksDatabaseId` and `webhooksDatabaseName` are rejected\n at compile time — they name a D1 database that cannot exist on Neon.\n- The webhook store is Worker-internal (endpoint signing secrets live there):\n every table in the `webhooks` schema has RLS enabled with a single\n service-role-only policy, so only `createWebhooksDb()` (which wraps\n `createServiceDb`) can touch it. Route handlers gate access at the app layer\n (`requireOrgMember` / endpoint-ownership checks) before querying.\n- Webhooks require `connectionMode: 'http'`.\n\n## Encryption on Neon\n\nThe encryption pillar — `.encrypted()` (envelope) and `.sealed()` /\n`q.vaultRef()` (sealed) columns — is supported on Neon over HTTP. The\n`org_data_keys` and seal-vault tables fold into the single journaled migration\nset, and the encryption RLS section rides the journaled RLS migration:\n`org_data_keys` gets org-scoped RLS (the envelope DEK path needs caller claims),\nand the vault spine is locked to service-role-only. The seal chokepoints\nacquire `createServiceDb`.\n\nBoth tiers require `connectionMode: 'http'`; under WebSocket mode they are a\nfail-closed compile error.\n\n## Batch transactions\n\nWhether a batch handler (`PATCH /batch`, `DELETE /batch`, …) is truly atomic\ndepends on the connection mode, and the response advertises the guarantee via\n`meta.transactional`:\n\n| Mode | `meta.transactional` | Behavior |\n|------|----------------------|----------|\n| Neon HTTP (Cloudflare default) | `false` | Fail-fast per-record loop, no rollback — `drizzle-orm/neon-http` has no interactive transactions, so this matches D1's semantics honestly |\n| Neon Hyperdrive (Cloudflare) | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any failure rolls back every write in the batch |\n| Neon WebSocket (Node/Bun) | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any failure rolls back every write in the batch |\n\n`drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws \"No transactions support in neon-http driver\" at\nruntime, so the HTTP path deliberately treats batches like D1 (fail-fast,\nnon-transactional) rather than emitting code that would 500 on every failed\nbatch. Honest advertisement over runtime surprises. For true atomic batches and\ninteractive transactions on Cloudflare, use\n[`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'`](#interactive-transactions).\n\n## Interactive transactions\n\n`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'` runs the feature database over a Cloudflare\n[Hyperdrive](https://developers.cloudflare.com/hyperdrive/) binding using\n`postgres.js` (`drizzle-orm/postgres-js`), which supports **real interactive\ntransactions** — read current state, lock it, decide in TypeScript, then write\ndependent rows, all committed atomically:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n input: z.object({ registrationId: z.string() }),\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n return db.transaction(async (tx) => { // tx is fully typed\n const [reg] = await tx.select()\n .from(registrations)\n .where(eq(registrations.id, input.registrationId))\n .for(\"update\"); // row lock held to commit\n if (!reg) throw new ActionError(\"Not found\", \"NOT_FOUND\", 404); // → rollback\n const [updated] = await tx.update(registrations)\n .set({ status: nextStatus(reg) })\n .where(eq(registrations.id, reg.id))\n .returning();\n await tx.insert(registrationEvents).values({ registrationId: updated.id });\n return updated; // atomic commit\n });\n },\n});\n```\n\nNote the `tx.select()…for(\"update\")` form: Drizzle's relational query API\n(`tx.query.<table>.findFirst`) is [blocked on the scoped\n`db`/`tx`](/compiler/definitions/actions#relational-queries-are-blocked-fail-closed)\nbecause the tenant firewall can't be injected into relational queries. The\nselect builder gives you the same row lock with scope conditions applied\nautomatically.\n\nConfigure it on the database provider:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: {\n provider: \"neon\",\n config: { connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\", hyperdrive: { id: \"<binding-id>\" } },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler emits the `[[hyperdrive]]` wrangler binding pointing at your Neon\n**direct** connection string. Its request-scoped postgres.js client uses\n`max: 5`, disables prepared statements, and skips type-fetch round trips — the\nsmall client pool bounds origin connections per Worker isolate while\nHyperdrive owns the shared connection pool.\n\n**Security is preserved, unchanged.** The verified caller claims run as the\nfirst transaction-local statement inside the transaction (the same\n`set_config(..., true)` preamble batches use), so RLS enforces inside the\ncallback and the claims reset at commit/rollback — they never leak across\nHyperdrive's connection pool.\n\n## Capability limits (fail closed)\n\nAnything not yet ported to Postgres is a compile-time error on Neon, never\nsilently-broken output:\n\n- **Managed file storage** (`fileStorage` with `managed: true`) is rejected — its\n metadata store is a D1 database. Use presign-only R2 (the default, without\n `managed`), which is provider-neutral and works on Neon today.\n- **The Better Auth `subscriptions` plugin** is rejected until it gets\n provider-aware db acquisition and a Postgres dialect schema.\n- **Raw `sqliteTable` interop sources** on a Postgres target are rejected — write\n child tables with `pgTable` (see [below](#raw-drizzle-interop-tables-must-use-pg-core)).\n- **WebSocket mode** (deprecated) rejects webhooks, cross-tenant `unsafe`\n actions, and encrypted/sealed columns. Use\n [`connectionMode: 'hyperdrive'`](#interactive-transactions) instead — it is the\n full-capability interactive-transaction path and supersedes WebSocket.\n\nMixed database providers (e.g. D1 auth + Neon features) remain unsupported.\n\n## Deploying\n\nFor an unnamed target, the generated `deploy` script runs migrations, then\nships the Worker:\n\n```bash\nnpm run deploy # runs db:migrate (drizzle-kit) then wrangler deploy\n```\n\nHTTP mode reads `DATABASE_URL` in the Worker, so set both runtime secrets before\nits first deploy:\n\n```bash\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL # pooled quickback role URL\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n```\n\nThe generated HTTP client fails fast at boot if `DATABASE_URL` is missing.\n\nHyperdrive mode gets its runtime connection string from the `HYPERDRIVE`\nbinding and must **not** receive a Worker `DATABASE_URL` secret. Its\n`DATABASE_URL` / `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` values remain local or CI migration\ninputs only. Set `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and any other exact generated secret\ninventory, then deploy:\n\n```bash\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\nnpm run deploy\n```\n\nNamed Hyperdrive targets intentionally omit the bare `deploy` script and keep\nthe base Worker non-deployable. Apply the target branch's migrations, set each\nsecret with `--env dev` or `--env prod`, then use an explicit target:\n\n```bash\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET --env dev\nnpm run deploy:dev\n\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET --env prod\nnpm run deploy:prod\n```\n\n## Generated files\n\n```\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── 0000_<name>.sql # schema migrations (drizzle-kit)\n├── 0001_quickback_rls_<hash>.sql # journaled RLS layer (content-addressed)\n└── meta/_journal.json # one journal covers both\nsrc/\n├── db/index.ts # createDb / createServiceDb (claim-scoped clients)\n├── db/schema.ts # Drizzle schema barrel\n├── db/rls-support.schema.ts # profiles (+ admins) — RLS support tables\n└── auth/schema.ts # Better Auth schema (owned by the BA CLI)\n.env.neon.example # migration connection strings (copy to .env)\n.dev.vars.example # wrangler dev secrets (copy to .dev.vars)\ndocs/neon-setup.md # role bootstrap + deploy walkthrough\n```\n\n## Raw Drizzle interop tables must use `pg-core`\n\nInternal child tables authored as raw Drizzle (a table file with **no**\n`export default defineTable(...)`) are not dialect-translated by the\ncompiler — on Neon they must be written with `pgTable` from\n`drizzle-orm/pg-core`. A `sqliteTable` interop source on a Postgres target\nis a **compile-time error**: the mechanical sqlite→pg rewrite would leave\nSQLite-shaped audit columns (`text` ISO strings instead of `timestamptz`,\nwhich the RLS audit triggers stamp) and SQLite-only column options in the\nPostgres schema.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/interviews/interview_scores.ts\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no CRUD routes\n\nexport const interviewScores = pgTable('interview_scores', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n interviewId: text('interview_id').notNull(),\n rating: integer('rating').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\nTables **with** `defineTable(...)` are unaffected — existing `sqliteTable`\nsources with a resource config still compile to the Postgres dialect\nautomatically.\n\n## When to choose Neon vs D1\n\n| Factor | Neon | D1 |\n|--------|------|-----|\n| SQL dialect | PostgreSQL | SQLite |\n| Security model | RLS + application-layer | Application-layer only |\n| Multi-region | Built-in replication | Single region per database |\n| Pricing | Free tier, then usage-based | Free tier, then usage-based |\n| Best for | Complex queries, existing Postgres apps | Edge-first, simple schemas |\n\n## See also\n\n- [D1](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1) — SQLite at the edge\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — All database provider options"
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"content": "When you run `quickback compile`, Quickback generates a complete REST API from your definitions. This section covers how to use the generated endpoints.\n\n## Base URL\n\nGenerated endpoints use the contract selected in `quickback.config.ts`. The\nbackward-compatible default is `/api/v1/`; projects with\n`contract: { version: \"v2\" }` use `/api/v2/` (and `/auth/v2/` for Better Auth):\n\n```\nhttps://your-api.com/api/v1/{resource}\n```\n\nThe examples below show the default v1 contract. Replace `/api/v1` with\n`/api/v2` when the project selects v2. The generated OpenAPI document is the\nauthoritative path list for the compiled project.\n\nThe resource name is derived from the filename: `jobs.ts` → `/api/v1/jobs`.\n\n## Endpoint Overview\n\nFor each resource with `export default defineTable(...)`:\n\n| Method | Endpoint | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `GET` | `/api/v1/{resource}` | List records (paginated) |\n| `GET` | `/api/v1/{resource}/:id` | Get single record |\n| `POST` | `/api/v1/{resource}` | Create record |\n| `PATCH` | `/api/v1/{resource}/:id` | Update record |\n| `DELETE` | `/api/v1/{resource}/:id` | Delete record |\n| `POST` | `/api/v1/{resource}/batch` | Batch create |\n| `PATCH` | `/api/v1/{resource}/batch` | Batch update |\n| `DELETE` | `/api/v1/{resource}/batch` | Batch delete |\n\n## Guides\n\n- [CRUD Endpoints](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud) — Detailed CRUD endpoint reference\n- [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params) — Filtering, pagination, and sorting\n- [Batch Operations](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations) — Bulk create, update, delete with atomic mode\n- [Views API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api) — Column-level projections\n- [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api) — Custom business logic endpoints\n- [Errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors) — Error responses and HTTP status codes"
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"content": "# Auth Hooks\n\nQuickback discovers project-level auth hooks at `quickback/hooks/`. The `before-`/`after-` lifecycle hooks wire into [Better Auth's `databaseHooks`](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/concepts/database#database-hooks); the `resolve-*` hooks are trusted server resolvers called from generated middleware (OAuth) or the email send, not databaseHooks. Use them for post-signup bootstrap, signup gating, tenant resolution, and per-recipient email context.\n\nThe classic case is multi-tenant: when `account.auth.organizations: true` is set, a freshly signed-up user has no `activeOrganizationId`, so every authenticated `/api/v1/*` returns `403 ORG_REQUIRED`. An `after-user-create` hook can auto-provision a personal workspace + member row so the next request just works.\n\n## Folder layout\n\n```\nquickback/\n hooks/\n after-user-create.ts\n before-user-create.ts\n after-session-create.ts\n after-admin-user-create.ts\n resolve-oauth-context.ts\n resolve-email-context.ts\n```\n\nEach file has a single default export — an `async (entity, ctx) => ...` function. The filename determines which Better Auth event the hook fires on.\n\n## Recognized events\n\n| Filename | Better Auth path | Entity | Return |\n|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|\n| `before-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.before` | `User` | `void \\| { data?: Partial<User> }` |\n| `after-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.after` | `User` | `void` |\n| `after-session-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.session.create.after` | `Session` | `void` |\n| `after-admin-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.after` (filtered) | `User` | `void` |\n| `resolve-oauth-context.ts` | OAuth bearer middleware | OAuth identity + session | Partial `AppContext` tenant fields |\n| `resolve-email-context.ts` | emailOTP `sendVerificationOTP` | `{ email, type, name }` | Extra fields merged into the email template context |\n\n`after-admin-user-create.ts` is a **virtual event** — it wires into the same Better Auth `user.create.after` slot as the generic `after-user-create.ts`, but the compiler wraps the call in a runtime filter on the BA context path so it only fires when the row was created via the admin plugin's `POST /admin/create-user` endpoint. Use it for first-time-user provisioning (welcome email, default org assignment) without inspecting `_baCtx?.context?.path` by hand. The generic `after-user-create.ts` still runs for every signup, including admin-created ones.\n\nFilenames outside this set are a hard compile-time error so a typo never silently disables a hook. Add events by extending [`apps/compiler/src/parser/hooks.ts`](https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler) (and the matching CLI mirror).\n\n## OAuth context resolver\n\nFirst-class MCP OAuth validates the access token and live Better Auth session\nbefore calling `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`. Use this trusted\nserver hook when tenant selection cannot be derived solely from the session's\nactive organization.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts\"\nexport default async ({ token, session, user, context }, { authDb, authSchema, env }) => {\n return {\n activeOrgId: session.activeOrganizationId ?? null,\n activeTeamId: session.activeTeamId ?? null,\n tenantId: session.activeOrganizationId ?? null,\n roles: context.roles,\n };\n};\n```\n\nThe returned object is merged into the standard `AppContext`. The compiler\nalways preserves the validated `authenticated`, `userId`, and `user` fields,\nso this hook cannot replace the OAuth identity.\n\n## Email context resolver\n\nBetter Auth routes OTP emails by **type** (`sign-in`, `email-verification`,\n`forget-password`), not by audience, and a template only receives fixed\n`appName` / `appUrl` / `supportEmail`. When you need **per-recipient** context —\na branded palette for organizers vs. attendees, a plan tier, a locale —\nadd `quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts`. The emailOTP send calls it for\neach recipient and **spreads the returned object into your email templates**.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts\"\nexport default async ({ email, type, name, db, schema, eq, and }) => {\n // Is this recipient a member of any organization?\n const [u] = await db.select({ id: schema.user.id })\n .from(schema.user).where(eq(schema.user.email, email)).limit(1);\n const isOrgMember = u\n && (await db.select({ id: schema.member.id })\n .from(schema.member).where(eq(schema.member.userId, u.id)).limit(1)).length > 0;\n\n return { audience: isOrgMember ? \"organizer\" : \"attendee\" };\n};\n```\n\nYour [email template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) then reads the extra field:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/email-templates/sign-in.ts\"\nexport default ({ otp, appName, audience }) => ({\n subject: `Your ${appName} code`,\n html: renderOtp({ otp, theme: audience === \"organizer\" ? \"eggplant\" : \"blue\" }),\n text: `Your code is ${otp}`,\n});\n```\n\nNotes:\n\n- **Fail-open.** If the hook throws, the context falls back to `{}` and the OTP\n still sends — a hook bug can never lock users out of sign-in.\n- **Spread into user templates only.** The packaged default templates have a\n fixed signature; convert a type to a [custom template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) to consume the extra context.\n- `db`, `schema`, `eq`, and `and` are passed in (the same Drizzle handle Better\n Auth uses) so you can look the recipient up without an import.\n- This is **not** a Better Auth `databaseHook` — it's consumed only by the\n emailOTP send, so it adds no signup/session latency.\n\n## ctx shape\n\nEvery hook receives `(entity, ctx)`:\n\n```ts\ntype HookCtx = {\n /** Drizzle client bound to the auth DB binding (split-DB aware). */\n authDb: DrizzleClient;\n /**\n * Auth schema namespace — destructure to access the BA-managed tables\n * (`user`, `session`, `organization`, `member`, …) without writing an\n * import path. The hook source lives in `quickback/hooks/` pre-compile\n * and `src/lib/auth-hooks/` post-stage; relying on `authSchema`\n * removes the dual-path import problem.\n */\n authSchema: typeof import('../../auth/schema');\n /** Cloudflare bindings (Cloudflare runtime) or process.env (Bun/Node). */\n env: Bindings;\n /** Better Auth's own context object — request, hook metadata, etc. */\n baContext: any;\n};\n```\n\n`authDb` is the load-bearing piece: hooks must write to the auth DB via Drizzle directly. See the [CSRF caveat](#csrf-caveat-server-side-org-create) below. `authSchema` is the namespace export of the generated auth schema module; destructure the tables you need.\n\n## Writing hooks: use built-ins where possible\n\nHook source files are evaluated by the Better Auth schema-generation step at compile time, which runs in a stripped-down sandbox that **does not see your project's `node_modules`**. A hook that imports `@paralleldrive/cuid2`, `nanoid`, or any other third-party package will fail compile with a \"module not found\" error during the auth-schema-generation step — even if the package is installed and runs fine in the deployed Worker.\n\nStick to runtime built-ins for ID generation, hashing, and similar primitives:\n\n| Need | Built-in |\n|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Random ID | `crypto.randomUUID()` |\n| SHA-256 / digest | `crypto.subtle.digest(...)` (Workers / Node 19+) |\n| Random bytes | `crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(n))` |\n| Time | `Date.now()`, `new Date().toISOString()` |\n\n`drizzle-orm` is already available in the schema-gen sandbox (the auth schema imports from it), so `eq`, `and`, `inArray`, etc. are safe to import.\n\n## Throw semantics\n\nWhat happens when a hook throws is the #1 thing that bites people:\n\n| Hook | Throw effect |\n|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| `before-user-create` | Signup aborts. The user is **not** created. Throw a typed error to gate. |\n| `after-user-create` | The user **is** created (the BA insert already committed). Any derived rows your hook started writing become orphans. |\n| `after-session-create`| Same as above — the session row exists; partial writes leak. |\n\nFor `after-*` hooks, design for **idempotency**: use the entity's `id` as a stable seed for any derived rows so re-running the hook (manually or via a background reconciler) is safe. Don't generate fresh `cuid()`s for derived rows you'd want to recover.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Auto-provision a personal workspace on signup\n\nThe QB-9 case. Without this, `organizations: true` projects break immediately for new users.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/after-user-create.ts\"\n\nexport default async (user, { authDb, authSchema }) => {\n const { organization, member } = authSchema;\n\n // Idempotency: derive a stable org id from the user id so re-running this\n // hook (after a partial failure) doesn't create a second workspace.\n const orgId = `org_${user.id}`;\n const slug = `${(user.name ?? 'workspace').toLowerCase().replace(/\\s+/g, '-')}-${user.id.slice(0, 6)}`;\n\n // Skip if the workspace already exists (idempotent).\n const existing = await authDb\n .select({ id: organization.id })\n .from(organization)\n .where(eq(organization.id, orgId));\n if (existing.length > 0) return;\n\n await authDb.insert(organization).values({\n id: orgId,\n name: `${user.name ?? 'Personal'} Workspace`,\n slug,\n createdAt: new Date(),\n });\n\n await authDb.insert(member).values({\n id: crypto.randomUUID(),\n userId: user.id,\n organizationId: orgId,\n role: 'owner',\n createdAt: new Date(),\n });\n};\n```\n\n### Set the active organization on next session\n\nSetting `activeOrganizationId` from a hook means writing to `session.active_organization_id` via Drizzle directly — calling Better Auth's `setActiveOrganization` API server-side is awkward (see the CSRF caveat). The reliable pattern:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/after-session-create.ts\"\n\nexport default async (newSession, { authDb, authSchema }) => {\n const { session, member } = authSchema;\n\n // Pick the user's first membership as their active org. Projects that\n // want a sticky last-active-org should track that separately.\n const memberships = await authDb\n .select({ organizationId: member.organizationId })\n .from(member)\n .where(eq(member.userId, newSession.userId))\n .limit(1);\n\n if (memberships.length === 0) return;\n\n await authDb\n .update(session)\n .set({ activeOrganizationId: memberships[0].organizationId })\n .where(eq(session.id, newSession.id));\n};\n```\n\n### Normalize and gate signup\n\n`before-*` hooks can return `{ data: Partial<User> }` to mutate the row before insert. Throw to abort.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/before-user-create.ts\"\nexport default async (user: { email: string; name?: string }) => {\n // Block disposable inboxes.\n if (/@(?:mailinator|10minutemail)\\.com$/i.test(user.email)) {\n throw new Error('Disposable email addresses are not allowed.');\n }\n // Trim whitespace from display name.\n return { data: { name: user.name?.trim() } };\n};\n```\n\nThe compiler-generated wrapper merges your `data` onto the original entity, so you only return the fields you actually want to change.\n\n## CSRF caveat — server-side org create\n\n`POST /auth/v1/organization/create` (and Better Auth's `auth.api.createOrganization(...)` server helper) require an `Origin` header. A hook running inside `databaseHooks.user.create.after` is server-side — there is no incoming request, so no `Origin`. Calling those APIs from a hook may also validate `Origin` internally and reject.\n\n**The only safe path is direct Drizzle writes via `authDb`.** Treat the org/member tables as your source of truth and let the SPA call the BA API for user-initiated org creation.\n\n## Generated output\n\nCompile picks up `quickback/hooks/*.ts` and produces:\n\n```\nsrc/lib/auth.ts # imports the hook + adds a databaseHooks block\nsrc/lib/auth-hooks/<file> # your hook source, copied verbatim\n```\n\nInside the generated `auth.ts`:\n\n```ts\n\n// ...inside createAuth(env)...\nreturn betterAuth({\n // ...\n database: drizzleAdapter(db, { /* ... */ }),\n databaseHooks: {\n user: {\n create: {\n after: async (entity, _baCtx) => {\n const _qbCtx = { authDb: db, authSchema: schema, env, baContext: _baCtx };\n await __qbHook_afterUserCreate(entity, _qbCtx);\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nNo hooks → no `databaseHooks` block emitted. The whole feature is opt-in by file presence.\n\n## See also\n\n- [With Quickback Compiler](/stack/account-ui/with-quickback) — how `account.auth.organizations` flows through the build\n- [Configuration → account block](/compiler/config) — `account.appUrl` and other account-level options\n- [Better Auth: Database Hooks](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/concepts/database#database-hooks)"
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"content": "# Auth Hooks\n\nQuickback discovers project-level auth hooks at `quickback/hooks/`. Most `before-`/`after-` lifecycle hooks wire directly into [Better Auth's `databaseHooks`](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/concepts/database#database-hooks); `before-email-otp-activate.ts` is a narrower compiler-owned atomic ceremony, and the `resolve-*` hooks are trusted server resolvers called from generated middleware (OAuth) or the email send. Use them for post-signup bootstrap, signup gating, tenant resolution, and per-recipient email context.\n\nThe classic case is multi-tenant: when `account.auth.organizations: true` is set, a freshly signed-up user has no `activeOrganizationId`, so every authenticated `/api/v1/*` returns `403 ORG_REQUIRED`. An `after-user-create` hook can auto-provision a personal workspace + member row so the next request just works.\n\n## Folder layout\n\n```\nquickback/\n hooks/\n after-user-create.ts\n before-user-create.ts\n before-email-otp-activate.ts\n after-session-create.ts\n after-admin-user-create.ts\n resolve-oauth-context.ts\n resolve-email-context.ts\n```\n\nEach file has a single default export — an `async (entity, ctx) => ...` function. The filename determines which Better Auth event the hook fires on.\n\n## Recognized events\n\n| Filename | Better Auth path | Entity | Return |\n|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|\n| `before-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.before` | `User` | `void \\| { data?: Partial<User> }` |\n| `after-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.after` | `User` | `void` |\n| `before-email-otp-activate.ts` | Atomic email-OTP activation before `user.update` | `{ userId, email, user }` | `void \\| false` |\n| `after-session-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.session.create.after` | `Session` | `void` |\n| `after-admin-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.after` (filtered) | `User` | `void` |\n| `resolve-oauth-context.ts` | OAuth bearer middleware | OAuth identity + session | Partial `AppContext` tenant fields |\n| `resolve-email-context.ts` | emailOTP `sendVerificationOTP` | `{ email, type, name }` | Extra fields merged into the email template context |\n\n`after-admin-user-create.ts` is a **virtual event** — it wires into the same Better Auth `user.create.after` slot as the generic `after-user-create.ts`, but the compiler wraps the call in a runtime filter on the BA context path so it only fires when the row was created via the admin plugin's `POST /admin/create-user` endpoint. Use it for first-time-user provisioning (welcome email, default org assignment) without inspecting `_baCtx?.context?.path` by hand. The generic `after-user-create.ts` still runs for every signup, including admin-created ones.\n\nFilenames outside this set are a hard compile-time error so a typo never silently disables a hook. Add events by extending [`apps/compiler/src/parser/hooks.ts`](https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler) (and the matching CLI mirror).\n\n## Atomic email-OTP activation\n\nUse `before-email-otp-activate.ts` when an existing dormant account must pass\nproject business rules before email verification and session creation become\ndurable. Quickback owns the transaction and identity proof; your API hook owns\nthe business decision.\n\nThis surface is deliberately explicit and narrow. It requires all of:\n\n- `contract.version: \"v2\"`\n- Cloudflare Workers\n- one Neon database using `connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\"`\n- the Better Auth `emailOtp` plugin with effective `disableSignUp: true`\n- `atomicAuthRoutes: [\"emailOtpSignIn\"]`\n- `quickback/hooks/before-email-otp-activate.ts`\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"hyperdrive\",\n hyperdrive: { id: \"your-hyperdrive-id\" },\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: { emailOtp: { disableSignUp: true } },\n atomicAuthRoutes: [\"emailOtpSignIn\"],\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe hook receives the proven, pre-update user identity and the transaction-bound\nfull application database:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/before-email-otp-activate.ts\"\n\nexport default async function beforeEmailOtpActivate(\n { userId, email, user },\n { db, schema, atomicRoute },\n) {\n // user.emailVerified is authoritatively false here. Keep event/pass/status\n // policy in this project API hook; Quickback supplies only the ceremony.\n if (atomicRoute !== \"emailOtpSignIn\" || user.emailVerified !== false) return false;\n\n const [candidate] = await db\n .select({ id: schema.admissions.id })\n .from(schema.admissions)\n .where(and(\n eq(schema.admissions.userId, userId),\n eq(schema.admissions.email, email),\n ))\n .limit(1);\n\n if (!candidate) return false;\n // Any business writes performed through db remain in this same transaction.\n}\n```\n\nFor the exact `POST <auth-base>/sign-in/email-otp` request, the generated\nWorker opens one `createServiceDb(env).transaction(...)`, builds Better Auth\nwith its Drizzle adapter bound to `tx`, and supplies that same `tx` as both\n`db` and `authDb`. After OTP validation, Quickback proves the target by reading\nthe normalized request email through the transaction-bound Better Auth adapter.\nOnly a matching user whose authoritative `emailVerified` value is `false`\nreaches the hook.\n\nThe generated `user.update.before` wrapper imports and invokes the semantic\nhook exactly once. Its `db` / `authDb` values retain the transaction's real\nDrizzle `select` type, so hooks can declare a narrow\n`Pick<DatabaseInstance, \"select\">` contract without casts.\n\nThe hook runs in `databaseHooks.user.update.before`, before Better Auth takes\nthe user update lock. That preserves the project's business lock order; a\nsession-create hook would take the user lock first and can deadlock with an\nissuance path that locks application rows before the user.\n\nThe transaction commits only after the verification update and session insert\nsucceed. A denied activation, a non-ok response after activation begins, or any\n5xx response throws a private rollback sentinel, so OTP consumption, hook\nwrites, user verification, and session creation roll back together. Invalid OTP\n4xx responses that never begin activation are not converted to exceptions, so\nBetter Auth's attempt counter still commits. Already-verified users do not rerun\nthe dormant-account hook. OTP sending and every other auth route remain outside\nthis transaction. The atomic wrapper preserves Better Auth's original handler\nbefore decorating the auth object, so non-atomic session, account, and plugin\nrequests are forwarded exactly once instead of re-entering the wrapper.\n\nReturn `false` for an expected policy denial. The compiler short-circuits Better\nAuth with a private error and maps the rolled-back ceremony to a generic 403;\nit never lets Better Auth continue to session creation after a false return.\nUnexpected throws are operational failures: the generated handler rolls back,\nemits only the metadata event `auth.atomic_email_otp_operational_rollback`, and\nreturns a generic 503 without raw error content.\n\n## OAuth context resolver\n\nFirst-class MCP OAuth validates the access token and live Better Auth session\nbefore calling `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`. Use this trusted\nserver hook when tenant selection cannot be derived solely from the session's\nactive organization.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts\"\nexport default async ({ token, session, user, context }, { authDb, authSchema, env }) => {\n return {\n activeOrgId: session.activeOrganizationId ?? null,\n activeTeamId: session.activeTeamId ?? null,\n tenantId: session.activeOrganizationId ?? null,\n roles: context.roles,\n };\n};\n```\n\nThe returned object is merged into the standard `AppContext`. The compiler\nalways preserves the validated `authenticated`, `userId`, and `user` fields,\nso this hook cannot replace the OAuth identity.\n\n## Email context resolver\n\nBetter Auth routes OTP emails by **type** (`sign-in`, `email-verification`,\n`forget-password`), not by audience, and a template only receives fixed\n`appName` / `appUrl` / `supportEmail`. When you need **per-recipient** context —\na branded palette for organizers vs. attendees, a plan tier, a locale —\nadd `quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts`. The emailOTP send calls it for\neach recipient and **spreads the returned object into your email templates**.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts\"\nexport default async ({ email, type, name, db, schema, eq, and }) => {\n // Is this recipient a member of any organization?\n const [u] = await db.select({ id: schema.user.id })\n .from(schema.user).where(eq(schema.user.email, email)).limit(1);\n const isOrgMember = u\n && (await db.select({ id: schema.member.id })\n .from(schema.member).where(eq(schema.member.userId, u.id)).limit(1)).length > 0;\n\n return { audience: isOrgMember ? \"organizer\" : \"attendee\" };\n};\n```\n\nYour [email template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) then reads the extra field:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/email-templates/sign-in.ts\"\nexport default ({ otp, appName, audience }) => ({\n subject: `Your ${appName} code`,\n html: renderOtp({ otp, theme: audience === \"organizer\" ? \"eggplant\" : \"blue\" }),\n text: `Your code is ${otp}`,\n});\n```\n\nNotes:\n\n- **Fail-open.** If the hook throws, the context falls back to `{}` and the OTP\n still sends — a hook bug can never lock users out of sign-in.\n- **Spread into user templates only.** The packaged default templates have a\n fixed signature; convert a type to a [custom template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) to consume the extra context.\n- `db`, `schema`, `eq`, and `and` are passed in (the same Drizzle handle Better\n Auth uses) so you can look the recipient up without an import.\n- This is **not** a Better Auth `databaseHook` — it's consumed only by the\n emailOTP send, so it adds no signup/session latency.\n\n## ctx shape\n\nEvery hook receives `(entity, ctx)`:\n\n```ts\ntype HookCtx = {\n /** Drizzle client bound to the auth DB binding (split-DB aware). */\n authDb: DrizzleClient;\n /**\n * Auth schema namespace — destructure to access the BA-managed tables\n * (`user`, `session`, `organization`, `member`, …) without writing an\n * import path. The hook source lives in `quickback/hooks/` pre-compile\n * and `src/lib/auth-hooks/` post-stage; relying on `authSchema`\n * removes the dual-path import problem.\n */\n authSchema: typeof import('../../auth/schema');\n /** Cloudflare bindings (Cloudflare runtime) or process.env (Bun/Node). */\n env: Bindings;\n /** Better Auth's own context object — request, hook metadata, etc. */\n baContext: any;\n};\n```\n\n`authDb` is the load-bearing piece: hooks must write to the auth DB via Drizzle directly. See the [CSRF caveat](#csrf-caveat-server-side-org-create) below. `authSchema` is the namespace export of the generated auth schema module; destructure the tables you need.\n\nThe atomic email-OTP hook additionally receives `db` (the transaction-bound\nfull application Drizzle client), `schema` (the full generated application\nschema), and `atomicRoute: \"emailOtpSignIn\"`. In a single-database Neon project,\n`db` and `authDb` are the same transaction handle; the two schema namespaces\nmake project and Better Auth tables explicit.\n\n## Writing hooks: use built-ins where possible\n\nHook source files are evaluated by the Better Auth schema-generation step at compile time, which runs in a stripped-down sandbox that **does not see your project's `node_modules`**. A hook that imports `@paralleldrive/cuid2`, `nanoid`, or any other third-party package will fail compile with a \"module not found\" error during the auth-schema-generation step — even if the package is installed and runs fine in the deployed Worker.\n\nStick to runtime built-ins for ID generation, hashing, and similar primitives:\n\n| Need | Built-in |\n|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Random ID | `crypto.randomUUID()` |\n| SHA-256 / digest | `crypto.subtle.digest(...)` (Workers / Node 19+) |\n| Random bytes | `crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(n))` |\n| Time | `Date.now()`, `new Date().toISOString()` |\n\n`drizzle-orm` is already available in the schema-gen sandbox (the auth schema imports from it), so `eq`, `and`, `inArray`, etc. are safe to import.\n\n## Throw semantics\n\nWhat happens when a hook throws is the #1 thing that bites people:\n\n| Hook | Throw effect |\n|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| `before-user-create` | Signup aborts. The user is **not** created. Throw a typed error to gate. |\n| `before-email-otp-activate` | The entire atomic ceremony rolls back: OTP consumption, hook writes, verification update, and session insert. |\n| `after-user-create` | The user **is** created (the BA insert already committed). Any derived rows your hook started writing become orphans. |\n| `after-session-create`| Same as above — the session row exists; partial writes leak. |\n\nFor `after-*` hooks, design for **idempotency**: use the entity's `id` as a stable seed for any derived rows so re-running the hook (manually or via a background reconciler) is safe. Don't generate fresh `cuid()`s for derived rows you'd want to recover.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Auto-provision a personal workspace on signup\n\nThe QB-9 case. Without this, `organizations: true` projects break immediately for new users.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/after-user-create.ts\"\n\nexport default async (user, { authDb, authSchema }) => {\n const { organization, member } = authSchema;\n\n // Idempotency: derive a stable org id from the user id so re-running this\n // hook (after a partial failure) doesn't create a second workspace.\n const orgId = `org_${user.id}`;\n const slug = `${(user.name ?? 'workspace').toLowerCase().replace(/\\s+/g, '-')}-${user.id.slice(0, 6)}`;\n\n // Skip if the workspace already exists (idempotent).\n const existing = await authDb\n .select({ id: organization.id })\n .from(organization)\n .where(eq(organization.id, orgId));\n if (existing.length > 0) return;\n\n await authDb.insert(organization).values({\n id: orgId,\n name: `${user.name ?? 'Personal'} Workspace`,\n slug,\n createdAt: new Date(),\n });\n\n await authDb.insert(member).values({\n id: crypto.randomUUID(),\n userId: user.id,\n organizationId: orgId,\n role: 'owner',\n createdAt: new Date(),\n });\n};\n```\n\n### Set the active organization on next session\n\nSetting `activeOrganizationId` from a hook means writing to `session.active_organization_id` via Drizzle directly — calling Better Auth's `setActiveOrganization` API server-side is awkward (see the CSRF caveat). The reliable pattern:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/after-session-create.ts\"\n\nexport default async (newSession, { authDb, authSchema }) => {\n const { session, member } = authSchema;\n\n // Pick the user's first membership as their active org. Projects that\n // want a sticky last-active-org should track that separately.\n const memberships = await authDb\n .select({ organizationId: member.organizationId })\n .from(member)\n .where(eq(member.userId, newSession.userId))\n .limit(1);\n\n if (memberships.length === 0) return;\n\n await authDb\n .update(session)\n .set({ activeOrganizationId: memberships[0].organizationId })\n .where(eq(session.id, newSession.id));\n};\n```\n\n### Normalize and gate signup\n\n`before-*` hooks can return `{ data: Partial<User> }` to mutate the row before insert. Throw to abort.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/hooks/before-user-create.ts\"\nexport default async (user: { email: string; name?: string }) => {\n // Block disposable inboxes.\n if (/@(?:mailinator|10minutemail)\\.com$/i.test(user.email)) {\n throw new Error('Disposable email addresses are not allowed.');\n }\n // Trim whitespace from display name.\n return { data: { name: user.name?.trim() } };\n};\n```\n\nThe compiler-generated wrapper merges your `data` onto the original entity, so you only return the fields you actually want to change.\n\n## CSRF caveat — server-side org create\n\n`POST /auth/v1/organization/create` (and Better Auth's `auth.api.createOrganization(...)` server helper) require an `Origin` header. A hook running inside `databaseHooks.user.create.after` is server-side — there is no incoming request, so no `Origin`. Calling those APIs from a hook may also validate `Origin` internally and reject.\n\n**The only safe path is direct Drizzle writes via `authDb`.** Treat the org/member tables as your source of truth and let the SPA call the BA API for user-initiated org creation.\n\n## Generated output\n\nCompile picks up `quickback/hooks/*.ts` and produces:\n\n```\nsrc/lib/auth.ts # imports the hook + adds a databaseHooks block\nsrc/lib/auth-hooks/<file> # your hook source, copied verbatim\n```\n\nInside the generated `auth.ts`:\n\n```ts\n\n// ...inside createAuth(env)...\nreturn betterAuth({\n // ...\n database: drizzleAdapter(db, { /* ... */ }),\n databaseHooks: {\n user: {\n create: {\n after: async (entity, _baCtx) => {\n const _qbCtx = { authDb: db, authSchema: schema, env, baContext: _baCtx };\n await __qbHook_afterUserCreate(entity, _qbCtx);\n },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nNo hooks → no `databaseHooks` block emitted. The whole feature is opt-in by file presence.\n\n## See also\n\n- [With Quickback Compiler](/stack/account-ui/with-quickback) — how `account.auth.organizations` flows through the build\n- [Configuration → account block](/compiler/config) — `account.appUrl` and other account-level options\n- [Better Auth: Database Hooks](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/concepts/database#database-hooks)"
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"content": "`@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-sns` is the SMS transport package Quickback wires into Better Auth's built-in `phoneNumber` plugin when you opt in to SMS OTP. It signs SNS `Publish` requests with AWS Signature V4 using the Web Crypto API — zero AWS SDK dependency, runs on Cloudflare Workers.\n\n> **Why SMS?** Corporate email gateways aggressively filter or rewrite transactional auth emails (link previews, click-tracking, MITM scanners). For some user bases SMS is the most reliable channel for a six-digit code that has to land in under a minute.\n\n## What it provides\n\nThe package itself does **not** register a Better Auth plugin. Better Auth's builtin [`phoneNumber`](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/plugins/phone-number) plugin owns the endpoints (`/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp`, `/verify`, `/sign-in/phone-number`, password reset). This package fills the `sendOTP` / `sendPasswordResetOTP` callbacks and the `phoneNumberValidator` hook.\n\n| Export | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `sendSMSWithSNS(config, { to, message })` | Publish to SNS with SigV4 + in-memory rate limit + E.164 validation. |\n| `smsTemplates.otp` / `smsTemplates.passwordReset` | Short transactional SMS bodies (single GSM-7 segment). |\n| `isValidE164(phone)` / `normalizeE164(phone)` | Phone number validators. Wired into Better Auth's `phoneNumberValidator`. |\n\n## Enable in config\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n sms: {\n provider: \"aws-sns\",\n region: \"us-east-1\",\n senderId: \"MyApp\", // optional — non-US countries only\n smsType: \"Transactional\", // default\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { phoneNumber: true },\n }),\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler:\n\n1. Adds `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-sns` to the generated `package.json`.\n2. Emits a `getSNSConfig(env)` helper in `src/lib/auth.ts`.\n3. Wires the `phoneNumber` plugin with `sendOTP`, `sendPasswordResetOTP`, and `phoneNumberValidator: isValidE164`.\n4. Drops `AWS_SNS_REGION` / `APP_NAME` (and `SMS_SENDER_ID` / `SMS_TYPE` when set) into `[vars]` in `wrangler.toml`.\n5. Forwards `c.executionCtx` from the Hono handler so OTP sends use `waitUntil(...)` — Better Auth advises **not** awaiting `sendOTP` to keep SMS latency out of the response.\n\n## What you get from Better Auth's `phoneNumber` plugin\n\nSchema (added to your user table):\n\n| Column | Type | Notes |\n|--------|------|-------|\n| `phoneNumber` | `string \\| null` | E.164 format |\n| `phoneNumberVerified` | `boolean` | Set on successful verify |\n\nEndpoints:\n\n| Method | Path | Purpose |\n|--------|------|---------|\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp` | Trigger an OTP SMS |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/verify` | Verify the OTP code |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/sign-in/phone-number` | Phone + password sign-in |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/request-password-reset` | Send a reset OTP |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/reset-password` | Complete password reset |\n\nDefaults: 6-digit codes, 300s expiry, 3 verify attempts (exceeding deletes the OTP and returns 403). See the [Better Auth plugin docs](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/plugins/phone-number) for the full option surface.\n\n## Required environment variables\n\nWrangler `[vars]` (non-secret, emitted by the compiler):\n\n| Name | Default | Notes |\n|------|---------|-------|\n| `AWS_SNS_REGION` | `us-east-1` | Any SNS-enabled region. |\n| `APP_NAME` | `<your config.name>` | Appears in the SMS body. |\n| `SMS_SENDER_ID` | — | Optional. Set only for non-US/CA traffic. |\n| `SMS_TYPE` | `Transactional` | Override only to send promotional traffic. |\n\nSecrets (set with `wrangler secret put`):\n\n| Name | Required | Notes |\n|------|----------|-------|\n| `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | yes | IAM key with `sns:Publish`. Shared with SES if used. |\n| `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | yes | Companion secret. |\n\n## AWS prerequisites\n\nBefore SMS will actually deliver in production, do this in the AWS console:\n\n1. **Pull out of the SNS sandbox.** New accounts can only send to verified numbers and have a low monthly cap. Submit a \"Request production access\" case from the SNS SMS Preferences page.\n2. **Set a monthly spend cap.** SMS gets expensive fast — set a limit before you go live.\n3. **US A2P (10DLC).** Long codes sending app-to-person SMS to US numbers must be registered with TCR (The Campaign Registry) via Pinpoint SMS Voice v2. Carrier filtering rejects unregistered A2P traffic. Allow several weeks for approval.\n4. **Sender ID support.** Alphanumeric sender IDs work in many countries (UK, France, Germany, India, etc.) but **not** the US or Canada. Pick origination identities per country.\n5. **IAM policy.** The access key needs `sns:Publish` on `*` plus `sns:SetSMSAttributes` if you want to manage the spend cap programmatically.\n\n## Validation and rate limiting\n\n- **E.164 only.** `isValidE164` rejects anything that's not `+[country code][7–14 digits]`. There is no automatic country-code inference — capture the country in your UI (e.g. `react-phone-number-input`).\n- **Send-side rate limit.** The package's in-memory map caps sends per phone (hourly + daily) when `rateLimit` is set on the config. It's an isolate-local guard; for stricter limits put a KV-backed limiter in front of `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp`.\n- **Verify-side rate limit.** Better Auth's `phoneNumber` plugin enforces 3 attempts before deleting the OTP. You can additionally tighten Quickback's per-route limit on `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp` via `auth.rateLimit.customRules`.\n\n## Carrier filtering\n\nKeep the SMS body short, transactional, and link-free. The default template is:\n\n```\nYour <AppName> code is 123456. Expires in 5 min. Don't share it.\n```\n\n— under 80 characters, no URL, no marketing copy. Carriers filter long messages, links, and brand-imitation prefixes aggressively. If you customize the body, keep it under one GSM-7 segment (160 chars) to avoid multi-segment billing.\n\n## Verifying the wiring\n\nAfter compile, check the generated `src/lib/auth.ts`:\n\n```ts\n\nfunction getSNSConfig(env: CloudflareBindings | undefined): SNSConfig { /* ... */ }\n\nfunction createAuth(env, cf, executionCtx) {\n const
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"content": "`@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-sns` is the SMS transport package Quickback wires into Better Auth's built-in `phoneNumber` plugin when you opt in to SMS OTP. It signs SNS `Publish` requests with AWS Signature V4 using the Web Crypto API — zero AWS SDK dependency, runs on Cloudflare Workers.\n\n> **Why SMS?** Corporate email gateways aggressively filter or rewrite transactional auth emails (link previews, click-tracking, MITM scanners). For some user bases SMS is the most reliable channel for a six-digit code that has to land in under a minute.\n\n## What it provides\n\nThe package itself does **not** register a Better Auth plugin. Better Auth's builtin [`phoneNumber`](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/plugins/phone-number) plugin owns the endpoints (`/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp`, `/verify`, `/sign-in/phone-number`, password reset). This package fills the `sendOTP` / `sendPasswordResetOTP` callbacks and the `phoneNumberValidator` hook.\n\n| Export | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `sendSMSWithSNS(config, { to, message })` | Publish to SNS with SigV4 + in-memory rate limit + E.164 validation. |\n| `smsTemplates.otp` / `smsTemplates.passwordReset` | Short transactional SMS bodies (single GSM-7 segment). |\n| `isValidE164(phone)` / `normalizeE164(phone)` | Phone number validators. Wired into Better Auth's `phoneNumberValidator`. |\n\n## Enable in config\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n sms: {\n provider: \"aws-sns\",\n region: \"us-east-1\",\n senderId: \"MyApp\", // optional — non-US countries only\n smsType: \"Transactional\", // default\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { phoneNumber: true },\n }),\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler:\n\n1. Adds `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-sns` to the generated `package.json`.\n2. Emits a `getSNSConfig(env)` helper in `src/lib/auth.ts`.\n3. Wires the `phoneNumber` plugin with `sendOTP`, `sendPasswordResetOTP`, and `phoneNumberValidator: isValidE164`.\n4. Drops `AWS_SNS_REGION` / `APP_NAME` (and `SMS_SENDER_ID` / `SMS_TYPE` when set) into `[vars]` in `wrangler.toml`.\n5. Forwards `c.executionCtx` from the Hono handler so OTP sends use `waitUntil(...)` — Better Auth advises **not** awaiting `sendOTP` to keep SMS latency out of the response.\n\n## What you get from Better Auth's `phoneNumber` plugin\n\nSchema (added to your user table):\n\n| Column | Type | Notes |\n|--------|------|-------|\n| `phoneNumber` | `string \\| null` | E.164 format |\n| `phoneNumberVerified` | `boolean` | Set on successful verify |\n\nEndpoints:\n\n| Method | Path | Purpose |\n|--------|------|---------|\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp` | Trigger an OTP SMS |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/verify` | Verify the OTP code |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/sign-in/phone-number` | Phone + password sign-in |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/request-password-reset` | Send a reset OTP |\n| `POST` | `/auth/v1/phone-number/reset-password` | Complete password reset |\n\nDefaults: 6-digit codes, 300s expiry, 3 verify attempts (exceeding deletes the OTP and returns 403). See the [Better Auth plugin docs](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/plugins/phone-number) for the full option surface.\n\n## Required environment variables\n\nWrangler `[vars]` (non-secret, emitted by the compiler):\n\n| Name | Default | Notes |\n|------|---------|-------|\n| `AWS_SNS_REGION` | `us-east-1` | Any SNS-enabled region. |\n| `APP_NAME` | `<your config.name>` | Appears in the SMS body. |\n| `SMS_SENDER_ID` | — | Optional. Set only for non-US/CA traffic. |\n| `SMS_TYPE` | `Transactional` | Override only to send promotional traffic. |\n\nSecrets (set with `wrangler secret put`):\n\n| Name | Required | Notes |\n|------|----------|-------|\n| `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | yes | IAM key with `sns:Publish`. Shared with SES if used. |\n| `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | yes | Companion secret. |\n\n## AWS prerequisites\n\nBefore SMS will actually deliver in production, do this in the AWS console:\n\n1. **Pull out of the SNS sandbox.** New accounts can only send to verified numbers and have a low monthly cap. Submit a \"Request production access\" case from the SNS SMS Preferences page.\n2. **Set a monthly spend cap.** SMS gets expensive fast — set a limit before you go live.\n3. **US A2P (10DLC).** Long codes sending app-to-person SMS to US numbers must be registered with TCR (The Campaign Registry) via Pinpoint SMS Voice v2. Carrier filtering rejects unregistered A2P traffic. Allow several weeks for approval.\n4. **Sender ID support.** Alphanumeric sender IDs work in many countries (UK, France, Germany, India, etc.) but **not** the US or Canada. Pick origination identities per country.\n5. **IAM policy.** The access key needs `sns:Publish` on `*` plus `sns:SetSMSAttributes` if you want to manage the spend cap programmatically.\n\n## Validation and rate limiting\n\n- **E.164 only.** `isValidE164` rejects anything that's not `+[country code][7–14 digits]`. There is no automatic country-code inference — capture the country in your UI (e.g. `react-phone-number-input`).\n- **Send-side rate limit.** The package's in-memory map caps sends per phone (hourly + daily) when `rateLimit` is set on the config. It's an isolate-local guard; for stricter limits put a KV-backed limiter in front of `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp`.\n- **Verify-side rate limit.** Better Auth's `phoneNumber` plugin enforces 3 attempts before deleting the OTP. You can additionally tighten Quickback's per-route limit on `/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp` via `auth.rateLimit.customRules`.\n\n## Carrier filtering\n\nKeep the SMS body short, transactional, and link-free. The default template is:\n\n```\nYour <AppName> code is 123456. Expires in 5 min. Don't share it.\n```\n\n— under 80 characters, no URL, no marketing copy. Carriers filter long messages, links, and brand-imitation prefixes aggressively. If you customize the body, keep it under one GSM-7 segment (160 chars) to avoid multi-segment billing.\n\n## Verifying the wiring\n\nAfter compile, check the generated `src/lib/auth.ts`:\n\n```ts\n\nfunction getSNSConfig(env: CloudflareBindings | undefined): SNSConfig { /* ... */ }\n\nfunction createAuth(env, cf, executionCtx) {\n const scheduleCredentialDelivery = (delivery) => {\n const observed = delivery.catch(() => {\n console.error(JSON.stringify({\n level: \"error\",\n event: \"auth.credential_delivery_failed\",\n }));\n throw new Error(\"Auth credential delivery failed\");\n });\n if (executionCtx) {\n executionCtx.waitUntil(observed);\n return Promise.resolve();\n }\n return observed;\n };\n\n return betterAuth({\n plugins: [\n phoneNumber({\n phoneNumberValidator: isValidE164,\n sendOTP: async ({ phoneNumber, code }) => {\n return scheduleCredentialDelivery(sendSMSWithSNS(getSNSConfig(env), {\n to: phoneNumber,\n message: smsTemplates.otp.message({ code, appName: ... }),\n }));\n },\n // ...\n }),\n ],\n });\n}\n```\n\nThat's the contract: Workers callbacks return after `waitUntil` accepts an\nobserved, still-rejecting task, so provider latency stays out of the response.\nWithout an execution context, the callback returns the observed promise for the\ncaller to await. Failures are logged generically without provider error content\nand are never swallowed.\n\n## Sign-in flow\n\n```ts\n// 1. Request OTP\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/phone-number/send-otp', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ phoneNumber: '+14155550100' }),\n});\n\n// 2. Verify the code the user types in\nconst res = await fetch('/auth/v1/phone-number/verify', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ phoneNumber: '+14155550100', code: '123456' }),\n});\n```\n\nFor Better Auth's signed-in client SDK, use `authClient.phoneNumber.sendOtp(...)` / `authClient.phoneNumber.verify(...)`.\n\n## Compliance reminders\n\n- **TCPA (US).** Capture explicit opt-in for transactional SMS at signup; keep an audit trail. STOP / HELP keyword handling is mandatory for A2P traffic — SNS handles standard keywords automatically on registered origination numbers, but verify it's enabled.\n- **GDPR (EU).** Phone numbers are personal data. Use Quickback's masking pillar to redact them in CMS views where appropriate.\n- **Don't use SMS as your only second factor.** SIM-swap attacks are real; pair phone OTP with passkeys / TOTP for high-value accounts."
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"content": "# Schema Format Reference\n\nThe schema registry is a JSON file with a well-defined structure. Below are the complete TypeScript type definitions used by both the compiler (to generate) and the CMS (to consume).\n\n## SchemaRegistry\n\nThe top-level type:\n\n```typescript\ninterface SchemaRegistry {\n generatedAt: string;\n generatedBy: string;\n version: string;\n features: Record<string, string[]>;\n tables: Record<string, TableMeta>;\n tablesByFeature: Record<string, string[]>;\n featureActions: Record<string, ActionMeta[]>;\n pages: Record<string, PageMeta>;\n pagesByFeature: Record<string, string[]>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `generatedAt` | ISO 8601 timestamp of when the registry was generated |\n| `generatedBy` | Always `\"quickback-compiler\"` |\n| `version` | Compiler version string |\n| `features` | Map of feature name to array of source file names |\n| `tables` | Map of camelCase table name to full table metadata |\n| `tablesByFeature` | Map of feature name to array of table names in that feature |\n| `featureActions` | Map of feature name to standalone actions not attached to one table |\n| `pages` | Map of page slug to full page metadata |\n| `pagesByFeature` | Map of feature name to array of page slugs in that feature |\n\n## TableMeta\n\nFull metadata for a single table:\n\n```typescript\ninterface TableMeta {\n name: string;\n dbName: string;\n feature: string;\n columns: ColumnMeta[];\n firewall: Record<string, unknown>;\n crud: Record<string, CrudConfig>;\n create?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n update?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n delete?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n upsert?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n guards: GuardsConfig;\n masking: Record<string, MaskingRule>;\n views: Record<string, ViewConfig>;\n validation: Record<string, ValidationRule>;\n actions: ActionMeta[];\n displayColumn?: string;\n defaultSort?: { field: string; order: 'asc' | 'desc' };\n inputHints?: Record<string, string>;\n layouts?: Record<string, CmsLayout>;\n internal?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | camelCase table name (e.g., `\"accountCode\"`) |\n| `dbName` | Snake_case SQL table name (e.g., `\"account_code\"`) |\n| `feature` | Parent feature name (e.g., `\"accounting\"`) |\n| `columns` | Ordered array of column metadata |\n| `firewall` | Tenant isolation config (organization, owner, softDelete, exception) |\n| `crud` | Legacy normalized write config kept for backwards compatibility |\n| `create` / `update` / `delete` / `upsert` | Flat write-operation aliases mirroring the authored `defineTable(...)` DSL |\n| `guards` | Field-level create/update/immutable/protected rules |\n| `masking` | Per-field masking rules keyed by column name |\n| `views` | Named column projections keyed by view name |\n| `validation` | Per-field validation rules keyed by column name |\n| `actions` | Array of action definitions scoped to this table |\n| `displayColumn` | Column used as human-readable label (auto-detected or explicit) |\n| `defaultSort` | Default sort for CMS table list view (e.g., `{ field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" }`) |\n| `inputHints` | Map of column name to preferred CMS input type (e.g., `\"richtext\"`, `\"select\"`, `\"textarea\"`, `\"checkbox\"`) |\n| `layouts` | Named record page layouts keyed by layout name (see CmsLayout below) |\n| `internal` | When `true`, table is hidden from CMS sidebar |\n\n## ColumnMeta\n\nMetadata for a single column:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ColumnMeta {\n name: string;\n dbName: string;\n type: \"text\" | \"integer\" | \"real\" | \"blob\";\n mode?: \"boolean\";\n primaryKey: boolean;\n notNull: boolean;\n defaultValue?: string | number | boolean;\n fkTarget?: string;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | camelCase property name |\n| `dbName` | Snake_case SQL column name |\n| `type` | SQLite storage type |\n| `mode` | When `\"boolean\"`, an integer column represents true/false |\n| `primaryKey` | Whether this column is the primary key |\n| `notNull` | Whether the column has a NOT NULL constraint |\n| `defaultValue` | Static default value (strings, numbers, or booleans) |\n| `fkTarget` | Target table name for FK columns (e.g., `\"contact\"` for a `vendorId` column) |\n\n## CRUDConfig\n\nPer-operation access control:\n\n```typescript\ninterface CrudConfig {\n access?: AccessRule;\n mode?: string;\n}\n\ninterface WriteOperationConfig extends CrudConfig {\n defaults?: Record<string, unknown>;\n computed?: Record<string, unknown>;\n fields?: string[];\n maxBatchSize?: number;\n allowFailFast?: boolean;\n batch?: false | Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\ninterface AccessRule {\n roles?: string[];\n or?: Array<{\n roles?: string[];\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n }>;\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `access.roles` | Array of roles allowed for this operation |\n| `access.or` | Alternative access conditions (any must match) |\n| `access.record` | Record-level conditions for access |\n| `mode` | Operation mode (e.g., `\"batch\"` for bulk create) |\n| `defaults` / `computed` | Create-time defaults and computed field metadata |\n| `maxBatchSize` / `allowFailFast` | Batch-write controls when the config describes a batch operation |\n| `batch` | Nested batch config for the flat `create` / `update` / `delete` / `upsert` aliases |\n\n## GuardsConfig\n\nField-level control for create and update operations:\n\n```typescript\ninterface GuardsConfig {\n createable: string[];\n updatable: string[];\n immutable: string[];\n protected: Record<string, string[]>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `createable` | Fields that can be set during record creation |\n| `updatable` | Fields that can be modified on existing records |\n| `immutable` | Fields that can be set on create but never changed |\n| `protected` | Fields only modifiable via named actions (field name to action names) |\n\n## ActionMeta\n\nMetadata for a custom action:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ActionMeta {\n name: string;\n description: string;\n inputFields: ActionInputField[];\n access?: {\n roles: string[];\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n };\n standalone?: boolean;\n path?: string;\n method?: string;\n responseType?: string;\n sideEffects?: string;\n cms?: CmsConfig;\n}\n\ninterface CmsConfig {\n label?: string;\n icon?: string;\n confirm?: string | boolean;\n destructive?: boolean;\n category?: string;\n hidden?: boolean;\n placement?: 'feature' | 'tables';\n tables?: string[];\n successMessage?: string;\n onSuccess?: 'refresh' | 'redirect:list' | 'close';\n order?: number;\n}\n\ninterface ActionInputField {\n name: string;\n type: string;\n required: boolean;\n default?: unknown;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | Action identifier (e.g., `\"approve\"`, `\"applyPayment\"`) |\n| `description` | Human-readable description shown in dialog |\n| `inputFields` | Array of input field definitions |\n| `access.roles` | Roles allowed to execute this action |\n| `access.record` | Record conditions (e.g., `{ status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`) |\n| `standalone` | When `true`, action is not tied to a specific record |\n| `path` | Custom API path (overrides default) |\n| `method` | HTTP method (defaults to POST) |\n| `responseType` | `\"file\"` for download responses |\n| `sideEffects` | `\"sync\"` for actions with synchronous side effects |\n| `cms` | Optional CMS rendering metadata (label, icon, confirm, destructive, category, hidden, placement, tables, successMessage, onSuccess, order) |\n\n### CmsConfig placement rules\n\n`placement` is only relevant for standalone actions in multi-table features:\n\n- `\"feature\"` shows the action in the toolbar for every table in the feature.\n- `\"tables\"` shows the action only for the tables listed in `tables`.\n\nIf the action is already unambiguously table-scoped, the compiler can infer placement and `placement` is optional.\n\n### ActionInputField\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | Field identifier |\n| `type` | Zod type string: `\"string\"`, `\"number\"`, `\"boolean\"`, `\"array<string>\"` |\n| `required` | Whether the field must be provided |\n| `default` | Default value pre-filled in the form |\n\n## ViewConfig\n\nNamed column projection with access control:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ViewConfig {\n fields: string[];\n access: AccessRule;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `fields` | Array of column names to include in this view |\n| `access` | Role-based access rules (same shape as CrudConfig access) |\n\n## CmsLayout\n\nNamed record page layout with ordered sections:\n\n```typescript\ninterface CmsLayout {\n sections: CmsLayoutSection[];\n}\n\ninterface CmsLayoutSection {\n label: string;\n fields: string[];\n columns?: 1 | 2;\n collapsed?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `sections` | Ordered array of field sections |\n\n### CmsLayoutSection\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `label` | Section header text |\n| `fields` | Array of column names to display in this section |\n| `columns` | `1` (default) or `2` for two-column field layout |\n| `collapsed` | When `true`, section starts collapsed with a toggle to expand |\n\nFields not assigned to any section in the active layout are collected into an \"Other Fields\" section.\n\n## MaskingRule\n\nPer-field data masking:\n\n```typescript\ninterface MaskingRule {\n type: \"email\" | \"phone\" | \"ssn\" | \"redact\";\n show: {\n roles: string[];\n or?: string;\n };\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `type` | Masking pattern to apply |\n| `show.roles` | Roles that see the unmasked value |\n| `show.or` | Alternative condition for showing unmasked value |\n\n### Masking Patterns\n\n| Type | Input | Output |\n|------|-------|--------|\n| `email` | `john@acme.com` | `j***@acme.com` |\n| `phone` | `(555) 123-4567` | `***-***-4567` |\n| `ssn` | `123-45-6789` | `***-**-6789` |\n| `redact` | Any string | `------` |\n\n## ValidationRule\n\nPer-field validation constraints:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ValidationRule {\n minLength?: number;\n maxLength?: number;\n min?: number;\n max?: number;\n enum?: string[];\n email?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `minLength` | Minimum string length |\n| `maxLength` | Maximum string length |\n| `min` | Minimum numeric value |\n| `max` | Maximum numeric value |\n| `enum` | Array of allowed string values |\n| `email` | When `true`, validates email format |\n\n## PageMeta\n\nFull metadata for a custom page:\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageMeta {\n slug: string;\n title: string;\n description?: string;\n icon?: string;\n feature: string;\n access?: { roles: string[] };\n dataSources: Record<string, PageDataSource>;\n layout: PageLayout;\n matching?: PageMatching;\n pageActions?: Record<string, PageAction>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `slug` | URL-safe page identifier |\n| `title` | Display title |\n| `description` | Human-readable description |\n| `icon` | Icon name for sidebar |\n| `feature` | Parent feature name |\n| `access` | Role-based access control |\n| `dataSources` | Named data source bindings |\n| `layout` | Layout configuration |\n| `matching` | Matching/reconciliation rules |\n| `pageActions` | Actions triggered from the page |\n\n### PageDataSource\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageDataSource {\n table: string;\n defaultFilters?: Record<string, unknown>;\n defaultSort?: { field: string; order: 'asc' | 'desc' };\n displayColumns?: string[];\n}\n```\n\n### PageLayout\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageLayout {\n type: 'split-panel';\n panels: PagePanel[];\n}\n\ninterface PagePanel {\n id: string;\n title: string;\n dataSource: string;\n position: 'left' | 'right';\n features?: string[];\n}\n```\n\nPanel `features` can include `\"drag-source\"` and `\"drop-target\"` for drag-and-drop interactions.\n\n### PageMatching\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageMatching {\n enabled: boolean;\n rules: MatchingRule[];\n confidenceThreshold?: number;\n}\n\ninterface MatchingRule {\n name: string;\n weight: number;\n condition: {\n left: string;\n right: string;\n operator: 'abs-equals' | 'within-days' | 'fuzzy-match';\n value?: number;\n };\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `enabled` | Whether matching is active |\n| `rules` | Array of matching rules with weights (0-1) |\n| `confidenceThreshold` | Minimum score to display a match suggestion (0-1, default 0.5) |\n| `condition.left` | Left field reference (`dataSourceName.fieldName`) |\n| `condition.right` | Right field reference |\n| `condition.operator` | Comparison operator |\n| `condition.value` | Operator parameter (e.g., max days for `within-days`) |\n\n### PageAction\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageAction {\n table: string;\n action: string;\n inputMapping: Record<string, string>;\n label?: string;\n icon?: string;\n confirm?: string;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `table` | Target table for the action |\n| `action` | Action name on that table |\n| `inputMapping` | Maps action input fields to data source field references (`\"dataSourceName.$fieldName\"`) |\n| `label` | Button label (defaults to action name) |\n| `icon` | Button icon name |\n| `confirm` | Confirmation prompt shown before execution |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- **[Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry)** — How the registry is generated and used\n- **[Components Reference](/stack/cms/components)** — All CMS React components"
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"content": "# Schema Format Reference\n\nThe schema registry is a JSON file with a well-defined structure. Below are the complete TypeScript type definitions used by both the compiler (to generate) and the CMS (to consume).\n\n## SchemaRegistry\n\nThe top-level type:\n\n```typescript\ninterface SchemaRegistry {\n generatedBy: string;\n version: string;\n features: Record<string, string[]>;\n tables: Record<string, TableMeta>;\n tablesByFeature: Record<string, string[]>;\n featureActions: Record<string, ActionMeta[]>;\n pages: Record<string, PageMeta>;\n pagesByFeature: Record<string, string[]>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `generatedBy` | Always `\"quickback-compiler\"` |\n| `version` | Compiler version string |\n| `features` | Map of feature name to array of source file names |\n| `tables` | Map of camelCase table name to full table metadata |\n| `tablesByFeature` | Map of feature name to array of table names in that feature |\n| `featureActions` | Map of feature name to standalone actions not attached to one table |\n| `pages` | Map of page slug to full page metadata |\n| `pagesByFeature` | Map of feature name to array of page slugs in that feature |\n\nThe registry deliberately omits wall-clock generation metadata. Every field is\nderived from compiler inputs, so identical logical input produces\nbyte-identical `schema-registry.json` output across consecutive compiles.\n\n## TableMeta\n\nFull metadata for a single table:\n\n```typescript\ninterface TableMeta {\n name: string;\n dbName: string;\n feature: string;\n columns: ColumnMeta[];\n firewall: Record<string, unknown>;\n crud: Record<string, CrudConfig>;\n create?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n update?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n delete?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n upsert?: WriteOperationConfig | false;\n guards: GuardsConfig;\n masking: Record<string, MaskingRule>;\n views: Record<string, ViewConfig>;\n validation: Record<string, ValidationRule>;\n actions: ActionMeta[];\n displayColumn?: string;\n defaultSort?: { field: string; order: 'asc' | 'desc' };\n inputHints?: Record<string, string>;\n layouts?: Record<string, CmsLayout>;\n internal?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | camelCase table name (e.g., `\"accountCode\"`) |\n| `dbName` | Snake_case SQL table name (e.g., `\"account_code\"`) |\n| `feature` | Parent feature name (e.g., `\"accounting\"`) |\n| `columns` | Ordered array of column metadata |\n| `firewall` | Tenant isolation config (organization, owner, softDelete, exception) |\n| `crud` | Legacy normalized write config kept for backwards compatibility |\n| `create` / `update` / `delete` / `upsert` | Flat write-operation aliases mirroring the authored `defineTable(...)` DSL |\n| `guards` | Field-level create/update/immutable/protected rules |\n| `masking` | Per-field masking rules keyed by column name |\n| `views` | Named column projections keyed by view name |\n| `validation` | Per-field validation rules keyed by column name |\n| `actions` | Array of action definitions scoped to this table |\n| `displayColumn` | Column used as human-readable label (auto-detected or explicit) |\n| `defaultSort` | Default sort for CMS table list view (e.g., `{ field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" }`) |\n| `inputHints` | Map of column name to preferred CMS input type (e.g., `\"richtext\"`, `\"select\"`, `\"textarea\"`, `\"checkbox\"`) |\n| `layouts` | Named record page layouts keyed by layout name (see CmsLayout below) |\n| `internal` | When `true`, table is hidden from CMS sidebar |\n\n## ColumnMeta\n\nMetadata for a single column:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ColumnMeta {\n name: string;\n dbName: string;\n type: \"text\" | \"integer\" | \"real\" | \"blob\";\n mode?: \"boolean\";\n primaryKey: boolean;\n notNull: boolean;\n defaultValue?: string | number | boolean;\n fkTarget?: string;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | camelCase property name |\n| `dbName` | Snake_case SQL column name |\n| `type` | SQLite storage type |\n| `mode` | When `\"boolean\"`, an integer column represents true/false |\n| `primaryKey` | Whether this column is the primary key |\n| `notNull` | Whether the column has a NOT NULL constraint |\n| `defaultValue` | Static default value (strings, numbers, or booleans) |\n| `fkTarget` | Target table name for FK columns (e.g., `\"contact\"` for a `vendorId` column) |\n\n## CRUDConfig\n\nPer-operation access control:\n\n```typescript\ninterface CrudConfig {\n access?: AccessRule;\n mode?: string;\n}\n\ninterface WriteOperationConfig extends CrudConfig {\n defaults?: Record<string, unknown>;\n computed?: Record<string, unknown>;\n fields?: string[];\n maxBatchSize?: number;\n allowFailFast?: boolean;\n batch?: false | Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\ninterface AccessRule {\n roles?: string[];\n or?: Array<{\n roles?: string[];\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n }>;\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `access.roles` | Array of roles allowed for this operation |\n| `access.or` | Alternative access conditions (any must match) |\n| `access.record` | Record-level conditions for access |\n| `mode` | Operation mode (e.g., `\"batch\"` for bulk create) |\n| `defaults` / `computed` | Create-time defaults and computed field metadata |\n| `maxBatchSize` / `allowFailFast` | Batch-write controls when the config describes a batch operation |\n| `batch` | Nested batch config for the flat `create` / `update` / `delete` / `upsert` aliases |\n\n## GuardsConfig\n\nField-level control for create and update operations:\n\n```typescript\ninterface GuardsConfig {\n createable: string[];\n updatable: string[];\n immutable: string[];\n protected: Record<string, string[]>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `createable` | Fields that can be set during record creation |\n| `updatable` | Fields that can be modified on existing records |\n| `immutable` | Fields that can be set on create but never changed |\n| `protected` | Fields only modifiable via named actions (field name to action names) |\n\n## ActionMeta\n\nMetadata for a custom action:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ActionMeta {\n name: string;\n description: string;\n inputFields: ActionInputField[];\n access?: {\n roles: string[];\n record?: Record<string, unknown>;\n };\n standalone?: boolean;\n path?: string;\n method?: string;\n responseType?: string;\n sideEffects?: string;\n cms?: CmsConfig;\n}\n\ninterface CmsConfig {\n label?: string;\n icon?: string;\n confirm?: string | boolean;\n destructive?: boolean;\n category?: string;\n hidden?: boolean;\n placement?: 'feature' | 'tables';\n tables?: string[];\n successMessage?: string;\n onSuccess?: 'refresh' | 'redirect:list' | 'close';\n order?: number;\n}\n\ninterface ActionInputField {\n name: string;\n type: string;\n required: boolean;\n default?: unknown;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | Action identifier (e.g., `\"approve\"`, `\"applyPayment\"`) |\n| `description` | Human-readable description shown in dialog |\n| `inputFields` | Array of input field definitions |\n| `access.roles` | Roles allowed to execute this action |\n| `access.record` | Record conditions (e.g., `{ status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`) |\n| `standalone` | When `true`, action is not tied to a specific record |\n| `path` | Custom API path (overrides default) |\n| `method` | HTTP method (defaults to POST) |\n| `responseType` | `\"file\"` for download responses |\n| `sideEffects` | `\"sync\"` for actions with synchronous side effects |\n| `cms` | Optional CMS rendering metadata (label, icon, confirm, destructive, category, hidden, placement, tables, successMessage, onSuccess, order) |\n\n### CmsConfig placement rules\n\n`placement` is only relevant for standalone actions in multi-table features:\n\n- `\"feature\"` shows the action in the toolbar for every table in the feature.\n- `\"tables\"` shows the action only for the tables listed in `tables`.\n\nIf the action is already unambiguously table-scoped, the compiler can infer placement and `placement` is optional.\n\n### ActionInputField\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `name` | Field identifier |\n| `type` | Zod type string: `\"string\"`, `\"number\"`, `\"boolean\"`, `\"array<string>\"` |\n| `required` | Whether the field must be provided |\n| `default` | Default value pre-filled in the form |\n\n## ViewConfig\n\nNamed column projection with access control:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ViewConfig {\n fields: string[];\n access: AccessRule;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `fields` | Array of column names to include in this view |\n| `access` | Role-based access rules (same shape as CrudConfig access) |\n\n## CmsLayout\n\nNamed record page layout with ordered sections:\n\n```typescript\ninterface CmsLayout {\n sections: CmsLayoutSection[];\n}\n\ninterface CmsLayoutSection {\n label: string;\n fields: string[];\n columns?: 1 | 2;\n collapsed?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `sections` | Ordered array of field sections |\n\n### CmsLayoutSection\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `label` | Section header text |\n| `fields` | Array of column names to display in this section |\n| `columns` | `1` (default) or `2` for two-column field layout |\n| `collapsed` | When `true`, section starts collapsed with a toggle to expand |\n\nFields not assigned to any section in the active layout are collected into an \"Other Fields\" section.\n\n## MaskingRule\n\nPer-field data masking:\n\n```typescript\ninterface MaskingRule {\n type: \"email\" | \"phone\" | \"ssn\" | \"redact\";\n show: {\n roles: string[];\n or?: string;\n };\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `type` | Masking pattern to apply |\n| `show.roles` | Roles that see the unmasked value |\n| `show.or` | Alternative condition for showing unmasked value |\n\n### Masking Patterns\n\n| Type | Input | Output |\n|------|-------|--------|\n| `email` | `john@acme.com` | `j***@acme.com` |\n| `phone` | `(555) 123-4567` | `***-***-4567` |\n| `ssn` | `123-45-6789` | `***-**-6789` |\n| `redact` | Any string | `------` |\n\n## ValidationRule\n\nPer-field validation constraints:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ValidationRule {\n minLength?: number;\n maxLength?: number;\n min?: number;\n max?: number;\n enum?: string[];\n email?: boolean;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `minLength` | Minimum string length |\n| `maxLength` | Maximum string length |\n| `min` | Minimum numeric value |\n| `max` | Maximum numeric value |\n| `enum` | Array of allowed string values |\n| `email` | When `true`, validates email format |\n\n## PageMeta\n\nFull metadata for a custom page:\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageMeta {\n slug: string;\n title: string;\n description?: string;\n icon?: string;\n feature: string;\n access?: { roles: string[] };\n dataSources: Record<string, PageDataSource>;\n layout: PageLayout;\n matching?: PageMatching;\n pageActions?: Record<string, PageAction>;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `slug` | URL-safe page identifier |\n| `title` | Display title |\n| `description` | Human-readable description |\n| `icon` | Icon name for sidebar |\n| `feature` | Parent feature name |\n| `access` | Role-based access control |\n| `dataSources` | Named data source bindings |\n| `layout` | Layout configuration |\n| `matching` | Matching/reconciliation rules |\n| `pageActions` | Actions triggered from the page |\n\n### PageDataSource\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageDataSource {\n table: string;\n defaultFilters?: Record<string, unknown>;\n defaultSort?: { field: string; order: 'asc' | 'desc' };\n displayColumns?: string[];\n}\n```\n\n### PageLayout\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageLayout {\n type: 'split-panel';\n panels: PagePanel[];\n}\n\ninterface PagePanel {\n id: string;\n title: string;\n dataSource: string;\n position: 'left' | 'right';\n features?: string[];\n}\n```\n\nPanel `features` can include `\"drag-source\"` and `\"drop-target\"` for drag-and-drop interactions.\n\n### PageMatching\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageMatching {\n enabled: boolean;\n rules: MatchingRule[];\n confidenceThreshold?: number;\n}\n\ninterface MatchingRule {\n name: string;\n weight: number;\n condition: {\n left: string;\n right: string;\n operator: 'abs-equals' | 'within-days' | 'fuzzy-match';\n value?: number;\n };\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `enabled` | Whether matching is active |\n| `rules` | Array of matching rules with weights (0-1) |\n| `confidenceThreshold` | Minimum score to display a match suggestion (0-1, default 0.5) |\n| `condition.left` | Left field reference (`dataSourceName.fieldName`) |\n| `condition.right` | Right field reference |\n| `condition.operator` | Comparison operator |\n| `condition.value` | Operator parameter (e.g., max days for `within-days`) |\n\n### PageAction\n\n```typescript\ninterface PageAction {\n table: string;\n action: string;\n inputMapping: Record<string, string>;\n label?: string;\n icon?: string;\n confirm?: string;\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `table` | Target table for the action |\n| `action` | Action name on that table |\n| `inputMapping` | Maps action input fields to data source field references (`\"dataSourceName.$fieldName\"`) |\n| `label` | Button label (defaults to action name) |\n| `icon` | Button icon name |\n| `confirm` | Confirmation prompt shown before execution |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- **[Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry)** — How the registry is generated and used\n- **[Components Reference](/stack/cms/components)** — All CMS React components"
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"content": "# Schema Registry\n\nThe schema registry is a static JSON file generated by the Quickback compiler. It contains full metadata about every table in your project — columns, types, guards, masking rules, views, actions, validation, and firewall config. The CMS reads this file to render its entire UI.\n\n## Generation\n\nSchema registry generation is **enabled by default**. Run `quickback compile` and the compiler outputs `schema-registry.json` alongside your compiled API files.\n\nTo disable generation:\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n schemaRegistry: { generate: false },\n // ... rest of your config\n});\n```\n\n## Output Shape\n\nThe top-level structure of `schema-registry.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"
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"content": "# Schema Registry\n\nThe schema registry is a static JSON file generated by the Quickback compiler. It contains full metadata about every table in your project — columns, types, guards, masking rules, views, actions, validation, and firewall config. The CMS reads this file to render its entire UI.\n\n## Generation\n\nSchema registry generation is **enabled by default**. Run `quickback compile` and the compiler outputs `schema-registry.json` alongside your compiled API files.\n\nTo disable generation:\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n schemaRegistry: { generate: false },\n // ... rest of your config\n});\n```\n\n## Output Shape\n\nThe top-level structure of `schema-registry.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"generatedBy\": \"quickback-compiler\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"features\": { ... },\n \"tables\": { ... },\n \"tablesByFeature\": { ... },\n \"featureActions\": { ... },\n \"pages\": { ... },\n \"pagesByFeature\": { ... }\n}\n```\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `generatedBy` | `string` | Always `\"quickback-compiler\"` |\n| `version` | `string` | Compiler version used |\n| `features` | `Record<string, string[]>` | Feature name to file list mapping |\n| `tables` | `Record<string, TableMeta>` | Table name to full metadata |\n| `tablesByFeature` | `Record<string, string[]>` | Feature name to table name list |\n| `featureActions` | `Record<string, ActionMeta[]>` | Feature name to standalone actions not owned by one table |\n| `pages` | `Record<string, PageMeta>` | Page slug to full page metadata |\n| `pagesByFeature` | `Record<string, string[]>` | Feature name to page slug list |\n\nThe registry contains no wall-clock generation timestamp. Its bytes are fully\nderived from the logical compiler input, so repeated compiles are stable for\nartifact hashing, caches, and deployment diffs.\n\n## TableMeta\n\nEach table entry contains everything the CMS needs to render its UI:\n\n```typescript\ninterface TableMeta {\n name: string; // camelCase table name (e.g., \"accountCode\")\n dbName: string; // SQL table name (e.g., \"account_code\")\n feature: string; // Parent feature name\n columns: ColumnMeta[]; // All columns including audit fields\n firewall: Record<string, unknown>; // Tenant isolation config\n crud: Record<string, CrudConfig>; // Legacy normalized write surface\n create?: WriteOperationConfig | false; // Flat create config\n update?: WriteOperationConfig | false; // Flat update config\n delete?: WriteOperationConfig | false; // Flat delete config\n upsert?: WriteOperationConfig | false; // Flat upsert config\n guards: {\n createable: string[]; // Fields allowed on create\n updatable: string[]; // Fields allowed on update\n immutable: string[]; // Fields locked after creation\n protected: Record<string, string[]>; // Fields only updatable via actions\n };\n masking: Record<string, MaskingRule>; // Per-field masking rules\n views: Record<string, ViewConfig>; // Named column projections\n validation: Record<string, ValidationRule>; // Per-field validation\n actions: ActionMeta[]; // Table-scoped actions for this table\n displayColumn?: string; // Human-readable label column\n internal?: boolean; // Hidden from CMS sidebar when true\n}\n```\n\n`create`, `update`, `delete`, and `upsert` mirror the preferred flat DSL from `defineTable(...)`. The legacy `crud` block is still emitted for backwards compatibility with older consumers.\n\n## Feature Actions\n\nStandalone actions do not always belong to a single table. When an action is attached to a multi-table feature root, the compiler emits it under `featureActions[featureName]` instead of duplicating it across every table.\n\n```typescript\ninterface SchemaRegistry {\n featureActions: Record<string, ActionMeta[]>;\n}\n```\n\nThe CMS uses `featureActions` for toolbar-style actions that apply to the feature as a whole. Use `cms.placement` on standalone actions to control whether they show for the whole feature or only selected tables.\n\n## ColumnMeta\n\nEach column in the `columns` array:\n\n```typescript\ninterface ColumnMeta {\n name: string; // Property name (camelCase)\n dbName: string; // SQL column name (snake_case)\n type: \"text\" | \"integer\" | \"real\" | \"blob\"; // SQLite type\n mode?: \"boolean\"; // When an integer represents a boolean\n primaryKey: boolean;\n notNull: boolean;\n defaultValue?: string | number | boolean;\n fkTarget?: string; // Target table name for FK columns\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler automatically includes the system columns (`id`, `organizationId`), the audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`), and the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`, `deletedBy` — when soft delete is enabled) at the beginning of every table's column list.\n\n### fkTarget — FK Resolution\n\nColumns ending in `Id` may have a `fkTarget` property indicating which table they reference. This is resolved in priority order:\n\n1. **Explicit `references`** — from your `defineTable()` config (highest priority)\n2. **Drizzle `.references()`** — parsed from schema source code\n3. **Convention** — strip `Id` suffix, match table name directly\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"vendorId\",\n \"type\": \"text\",\n \"fkTarget\": \"contact\"\n}\n```\n\nThe CMS uses `fkTarget` to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table instead of showing raw IDs.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nTables with `inputHints` configured in `defineTable()` include an `inputHints` map in their metadata:\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"invoice\",\n \"inputHints\": {\n \"status\": \"select\",\n \"sortOrder\": \"radio\",\n \"isPartialPaymentDisabled\": \"checkbox\",\n \"headerMessage\": \"textarea\",\n \"description\": \"richtext\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe CMS reads these hints to render the appropriate form control for each field. The `\"richtext\"` hint renders a tiptap editor in edit mode and formatted HTML in view mode. See [Input Hints](/compiler/definitions/schema#input-hints) for the full list of supported values.\n\n## Display Column\n\nThe `displayColumn` field tells the CMS which column to use as a human-readable label for a record. This is used in:\n\n- FK typeahead dropdowns (showing names instead of IDs)\n- Record titles in detail views\n- Breadcrumb labels\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nIf you don't explicitly set `displayColumn` in your resource config, the compiler auto-detects it by scanning column names in priority order:\n\n1. `name`\n2. `title`\n3. `label`\n4. `headline`\n5. `subject`\n6. `code`\n7. `displayName`\n8. `fullName`\n9. `description`\n\nThe first match wins. If no candidate matches, the table has no display column and the CMS falls back to showing IDs.\n\n### Explicit Config\n\nSet it explicitly in your table definition:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(contacts, {\n displayColumn: \"companyName\",\n // ...\n});\n```\n\n## FK Label Resolution\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (ending in `Id`), the API enriches list responses with `_label` fields. For example, a `roomTypeId` column gets a corresponding `roomType_label` field containing the display column value from the referenced table.\n\nThe CMS uses these `_label` fields to show human-readable names in table cells and FK typeahead dropdowns instead of raw UUIDs.\n\n```\nroomTypeId: \"rt_abc123\" → displayed as \"Master Bedroom\"\naccountCodeId: \"ac_xyz789\" → displayed as \"4100 - Revenue\"\n```\n\nThe FK target table is resolved from the `fkTarget` property on each column. For simple cases like `roomTypeId` → `roomType`, the compiler auto-detects it. For non-obvious mappings (e.g., `vendorId` → `contact`), use explicit [`references`](/compiler/definitions/schema#references) in your `defineTable()` config.\n\n## Pages\n\nWhen features include `definePage()` files (in `features/{name}/pages/`), the compiler includes them in the registry under two fields:\n\n- **`pages`** — Map of page slug to full `PageMeta` object (data sources, layout, matching rules, page actions)\n- **`pagesByFeature`** — Map of feature name to array of page slugs belonging to that feature\n\nThe CMS reads these fields to render custom pages in the sidebar and route to the page renderer. See [Custom Pages](/stack/cms/pages) for the full `definePage()` API.\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- **[Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting)** — Demo mode vs. live mode setup\n- **[Schema Format Reference](/stack/cms/schema-format)** — Full TypeScript types"
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