@quickback-dev/cli 0.47.9 → 0.47.11
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/compile.js +2 -2
- package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +13 -8
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +7 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +17 -15
- package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +93 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/bindings.md +41 -2
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +21 -12
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +39 -17
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/triggers.md +5 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +47 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/index.md +6 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +12 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/schedules/index.md +78 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +69 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/bindings.md +41 -2
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +21 -12
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +39 -17
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +47 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/index.md +6 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +12 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/schedules/index.md +19 -1
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> A table **without** `defineTable()` is a supporting table — used internally by actions or handlers, but never exposed as its own API endpoint. See [Internal Tables](/compiler/definitions/schema#internal-tables-no-routes) for details.
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## The
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## The Five Security Layers
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Every API request passes through
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Every API request passes through five security layers, in order:
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```
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Request → Firewall → Access → Guards → Masking → Response
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Request → Rate Limit → Firewall → Access → Guards → Masking → Response
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│ │ │ │ │
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│ │ │ │ └── Hide sensitive fields
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│ │ │ └── Block field modifications
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│ │ └── Check roles & conditions
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│ └── Isolate data by owner/org/team
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└── Cap requests per user / op
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```
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> **Security Applies Everywhere**
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[Learn more about Masking →](/compiler/definitions/masking)
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### 5. Rate Limiting (Request Caps)
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Rate limiting caps **how often** an operation can be called, backed by Cloudflare's native Rate Limiting binding — no extra storage, no third-party libraries. Unlike the other four layers, it's applied to **every resource by default** (read `1000/60s`, writes `200/60s`) and runs first, before any data is touched.
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```typescript
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rateLimit: {
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delete: { limit: 5, period: 60 }, // tighter than the 200/60s default
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},
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// read / create / update keep shipped defaults
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```
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Override per-op, per-resource, or project-wide; set `false` at any scope to opt out. Limits are keyed by `<resource>:<op>:<userId>` (falling back to client IP for anonymous callers), and over-cap requests get a `429` with `Retry-After`.
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[Learn more about Rate Limiting →](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit)
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## How They Work Together
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**Scenario:** An interviewer requests `GET /candidates/cnd_123`
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1. **
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1. **Rate Limit** checks: Is this user under their `read` cap on `candidates`?
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- Yes → Continue
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- No → 429 Too Many Requests (with `Retry-After`)
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2. **Firewall** checks: Is candidate `cnd_123` in the user's organization?
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- Yes → Continue
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- No → 404 Not Found (as if it doesn't exist)
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3. **Access** checks: Can interviewers perform GET?
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- Yes → Continue
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- No → 403 Forbidden
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4. **Guards** don't apply to GET (they're for writes)
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5. **Masking** applies: User is an `interviewer`, not `recruiter` or `hiring-manager`
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- Email: `jane@company.com` → `j***@c******.com`
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- Phone: `555-123-4567` → `******4567`
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6. **Response** sent with masked data
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## Locked Down by Default
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| Firewall | AUTO | Auto-detects from `organization_id`/`user_id` columns. Only configure for exceptions. |
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| Access | DENIED | Explicitly define `access` rules with roles |
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| Guards | LOCKED | Explicitly list `createable`, `updatable` fields |
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| Rate Limit | ON | Applied to every resource (read 1000/60s, write 200/60s). Override or set `false` to opt out. |
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| Actions | BLOCKED | Explicitly define `access` for each action |
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**You must deliberately open each door.** This prevents accidental data exposure.
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## Other Resource Options
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Beyond the
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Beyond the five security layers, `defineTable` accepts a handful of declarative hints that shape the generated API and the CMS without touching your security posture.
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| Option | What it does | Full reference |
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|---|---|---|
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3. [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) — Configure read and write permissions
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4. [Guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) — Control field modifications
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5. [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Hide sensitive data
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6. [
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7. [
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8. [
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6. [Rate Limit](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit) — Per-operation request caps
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7. [Views](/compiler/definitions/views) — Column-level security
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8. [Validation](/compiler/definitions/validation) — Field validation rules
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9. [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) — Add custom business logic
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when a `before*` handler is used as a guard — if a rule must hold for every
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write path, use the `sql:` lane with `RAISE(ABORT)`.
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> Cron jobs themselves are first-class — declare them with
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> [`defineSchedule`](/stack/schedules) and the compiler emits the Worker
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> `scheduled()` handler + `wrangler.toml` triggers. This note is only about
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> the table-trigger `handler:` lane not firing inside them.
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## Choosing a lane
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| Need | Use |
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# Auth Hooks
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Quickback discovers project-level auth hooks at `quickback/hooks
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Quickback discovers project-level auth hooks at `quickback/hooks/`. The `before-`/`after-` lifecycle hooks wire into [Better Auth's `databaseHooks`](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/concepts/database#database-hooks); the `resolve-*` hooks are trusted server resolvers called from generated middleware (OAuth) or the email send, not databaseHooks. Use them for post-signup bootstrap, signup gating, tenant resolution, and per-recipient email context.
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The classic case is multi-tenant: when `account.auth.organizations: true` is set, a freshly signed-up user has no `activeOrganizationId`, so every authenticated `/api/v1/*` returns `403 ORG_REQUIRED`. An `after-user-create` hook can auto-provision a personal workspace + member row so the next request just works.
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before-user-create.ts
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after-session-create.ts
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after-admin-user-create.ts
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resolve-oauth-context.ts
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resolve-email-context.ts
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```
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Each file has a single default export — an `async (entity, ctx) => ...` function. The filename determines which Better Auth event the hook fires on.
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| `after-session-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.session.create.after` | `Session` | `void` |
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| `after-admin-user-create.ts` | `databaseHooks.user.create.after` (filtered) | `User` | `void` |
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| `resolve-oauth-context.ts` | OAuth bearer middleware | OAuth identity + session | Partial `AppContext` tenant fields |
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| `resolve-email-context.ts` | emailOTP `sendVerificationOTP` | `{ email, type, name }` | Extra fields merged into the email template context |
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`after-admin-user-create.ts` is a **virtual event** — it wires into the same Better Auth `user.create.after` slot as the generic `after-user-create.ts`, but the compiler wraps the call in a runtime filter on the BA context path so it only fires when the row was created via the admin plugin's `POST /admin/create-user` endpoint. Use it for first-time-user provisioning (welcome email, default org assignment) without inspecting `_baCtx?.context?.path` by hand. The generic `after-user-create.ts` still runs for every signup, including admin-created ones.
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always preserves the validated `authenticated`, `userId`, and `user` fields,
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so this hook cannot replace the OAuth identity.
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## Email context resolver
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Better Auth routes OTP emails by **type** (`sign-in`, `email-verification`,
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`forget-password`), not by audience, and a template only receives fixed
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`appName` / `appUrl` / `supportEmail`. When you need **per-recipient** context —
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a branded palette for organizers vs. attendees, a plan tier, a locale —
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add `quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts`. The emailOTP send calls it for
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each recipient and **spreads the returned object into your email templates**.
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```ts title="quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts"
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export default async ({ email, type, name, db, schema, eq, and }) => {
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// Is this recipient a member of any organization?
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const [u] = await db.select({ id: schema.user.id })
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.from(schema.user).where(eq(schema.user.email, email)).limit(1);
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&& (await db.select({ id: schema.member.id })
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.from(schema.member).where(eq(schema.member.userId, u.id)).limit(1)).length > 0;
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return { audience: isOrgMember ? "organizer" : "attendee" };
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};
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```
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Your [email template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) then reads the extra field:
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```ts title="quickback/email-templates/sign-in.ts"
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export default ({ otp, appName, audience }) => ({
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subject: `Your ${appName} code`,
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html: renderOtp({ otp, theme: audience === "organizer" ? "eggplant" : "blue" }),
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text: `Your code is ${otp}`,
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});
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```
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Notes:
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- **Fail-open.** If the hook throws, the context falls back to `{}` and the OTP
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still sends — a hook bug can never lock users out of sign-in.
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- **Spread into user templates only.** The packaged default templates have a
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fixed signature; convert a type to a [custom template](/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses#per-type-template-overrides) to consume the extra context.
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- `db`, `schema`, `eq`, and `and` are passed in (the same Drizzle handle Better
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Auth uses) so you can look the recipient up without an import.
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- This is **not** a Better Auth `databaseHook` — it's consumed only by the
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## ctx shape
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Every hook receives `(entity, ctx)`:
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| [Storage](/stack/storage) | KV, R2 | Sessions, cache, files |
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| [Realtime](/stack/realtime) | Durable Objects | WebSocket for live updates |
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| [Queues](/stack/queues) | Cloudflare Queues | Background jobs, webhook delivery |
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| [Schedules](/stack/schedules) | Cron Triggers | `defineSchedule` cron jobs, server-internal |
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| [Vector & AI](/stack/vector) | Workers AI | Embeddings, semantic search |
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| [Webhooks](/stack/webhooks) | Hono + Queues | Signed inbound, retried outbound |
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| [Quickback CMS](/stack/cms) | Embedded SPA | Schema-driven admin UI |
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│ │ Queues │ │ Better Auth │ │
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│ │ (Background)│ │ (Email OTP, Passkeys, etc.) │ │
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│ └─────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────┘ │
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│ │
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│ ┌─────────────┐ │
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│ │ (Cron) │ │
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│ └─────────────┘ │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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access: { resource: { feature: 'event-pages', table: 'eventPages', key: 'yjsRoomId' } },
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// per-org room. No DB query — it's a string compare against ctx.
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},
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- **`access: { resource: { feature, table, key } }`** — same gate, but it matches the roomId against `table.<key>` instead of `table.id`. Use it when the room is addressed by a unique non-PK column — e.g. a Yjs editor keyed by `event_pages.yjsRoomId` (`ns.idFromName(row.yjsRoomId)`). `key` defaults to `'id'`, so existing pins are unchanged. The compiler validates the column exists at compile time. `key` also works inside each multi-resource branch.
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- **Multi-resource form** — same gate but with a regex parser dispatching to per-kind firewall lookups. Unknown kinds 400 at the gate. Each `resources[kind].resource` accepts either form (string shorthand or `{ feature, table, key? }`).
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- **`access: { roomIdEquals: 'ctx.userId' }`** — an **identity gate** for rooms with no backing table, where the roomId *is* the caller's own id. Emits `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that 401s anonymous, 400s a missing segment, and 403s unless the decoded room segment equals `ctx.userId`. No schema import, no firewall, no DB query — a string compare against the server-resolved `ctx`. Use `'ctx.activeOrgId'` for a per-org room. This is the right gate for per-user gateways, presence, or inbox DOs keyed on `ns.idFromName(ctx.userId)`. Only `'ctx.userId'` and `'ctx.activeOrgId'` are accepted (validated at compile time); anything else is a build error. Distinct from `resource` because there's no row to firewall — it closes the cross-user hole that "no `access` declared" leaves open (any authenticated user could otherwise open another user's room via the catchall).
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- **`access: 'public'`** — `app.use('/realtime/<kebab>/*', …)` that just passes through. Use for anonymous game lobbies / public collab pads where the room itself is the unit of access.
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2. **roomId is a unique non-PK column** (a slug, a `yjsRoomId`) → add `key`: `access: { resource: { feature, table, key: 'yjsRoomId' } }`.
|
|
190
201
|
3. **one DO class serves several room kinds** (e.g. `conv-<id>` / `ticket-<id>`) → the multi-resource form with a `pattern` that captures the kind and id.
|
|
191
202
|
4. **access depends on membership, not just tenant** (e.g. "is this user an attendee of the event that owns this page") → you do **not** need hand-written code. Declare the pinned table's firewall with a `via:` relationship; the gate runs the table's *full* `buildFirewallConditions`, relationship subqueries included.
|
|
203
|
+
5. **roomId is the caller's own identity** (a per-user gateway/presence/inbox where the room *is* `ctx.userId`, with no backing table) → `access: { roomIdEquals: 'ctx.userId' }` (or `'ctx.activeOrgId'`). Do **not** enforce this inside the DO from request data — a Durable Object has no session and only sees client-settable headers, so trusting an `x-user-id` header lets any authenticated user open another user's room. The gate belongs at the Worker edge, which is exactly what this arm emits.
|
|
192
204
|
|
|
193
205
|
The declarative gate runs the exact firewall the CRUD `GET /:id` handler enforces, with the same 401/403 semantics, *before* the WebSocket upgrade — so by the time `onConnect` fires the caller is already authorized. Dropping the hand-rolled check also closes a common gap: a room with no `access` block is reachable by **any** authenticated user who can guess a room id, regardless of tenant.
|
|
194
206
|
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Schedules (Cron)
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
`defineSchedule` is the trigger-side mirror of [`defineQueue`](/stack/queues). Drop a file in `services/schedules/` and the compiler emits a Worker `scheduled()` (cron) handler plus the matching `[triggers] crons` in `wrangler.toml` — no separate cron Worker, no hand-patching the generated entry.
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
## Define a schedule
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
```typescript
|
|
8
|
+
// services/schedules/sweepDigests.ts
|
|
9
|
+
import { defineSchedule } from "quickback";
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
export default defineSchedule({
|
|
12
|
+
name: "sweepDigests", // identifier + audit actor (system:cron-<name>)
|
|
13
|
+
cron: "* * * * *", // Cloudflare cron syntax
|
|
14
|
+
description: "Send pending unread-email digests",
|
|
15
|
+
execute: async ({ db, env, services }) => {
|
|
16
|
+
await runDigestSweep(db, env, services);
|
|
17
|
+
},
|
|
18
|
+
});
|
|
19
|
+
```
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
One file per schedule under `services/schedules/*.ts`. Files prefixed with `_` are ignored. `name` must be a valid camelCase identifier (it's used as a generated symbol and the audit actor).
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
## What the compiler emits
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
1. **`scheduled(event, env, ctx)`** in the Worker's default export, dispatching to every schedule whose cron matches `event.cron`. Multiple schedules can share a cron; a failure in one is isolated from the others.
|
|
26
|
+
2. **`[triggers] crons = [...]`** in `wrangler.toml` — one deduped, sorted list across all schedules.
|
|
27
|
+
3. **`src/lib/schedules.ts`** — the generated runner. Regenerated on every `quickback compile`, so there's nothing to hand-maintain.
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
## Execute context
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
| Field | Type | Notes |
|
|
32
|
+
|-------|------|-------|
|
|
33
|
+
| `db` | Drizzle instance | The same DB the queue handlers get |
|
|
34
|
+
| `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | All worker bindings |
|
|
35
|
+
| `services` | `Services` | The services layer (`createServices(env)`) |
|
|
36
|
+
| `cron` | `string` | The cron pattern that fired |
|
|
37
|
+
| `scheduledTime` | `number` | `event.scheduledTime` (ms epoch) |
|
|
38
|
+
| `withInternalContext` | helper | Opt into the `INTERNAL` trust zone for `roles: ['INTERNAL']`-gated rows |
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
## Audit & trust
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
Cron runs are **server-internal**: there's no authenticated user, no request, no org scope. A fired tick gets a plain `db` (unscoped Drizzle) plus a `withInternalContext` helper:
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
```typescript
|
|
45
|
+
execute: async ({ db, withInternalContext }) => {
|
|
46
|
+
// `db` here is unscoped — no firewall WHERE, no audit actor.
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
// Opt into the INTERNAL trust zone for cross-tenant work:
|
|
49
|
+
await withInternalContext(async ({ ctx, db, services }) => {
|
|
50
|
+
// ctx.internal = true, ctx.userId = "system:cron-<name>"
|
|
51
|
+
// audited writes are attributable to e.g. system:cron-sweepDigests
|
|
52
|
+
});
|
|
53
|
+
},
|
|
54
|
+
```
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
`withInternalContext` builds a context with `internal: true` and `userId: "system:cron-<name>"`, so audited writes made through it are attributable to the schedule (e.g. `system:cron-sweepDigests`) and can reach `roles: ['INTERNAL']`-gated rows. Reach for it whenever the schedule legitimately operates across tenants.
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
## Failure isolation
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
The generated `scheduled()` dispatcher runs every schedule whose cron matches `event.cron` concurrently (`Promise.all`), and each handler's errors are caught individually — one failing schedule logs `[Cron] Schedule error` and the others still run to completion. A cron with no registered handler logs `[Cron] No schedule registered` and returns.
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
## Cron syntax
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
Standard Cloudflare cron (`minute hour day-of-month month day-of-week`):
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
| Pattern | Runs |
|
|
67
|
+
|---------|------|
|
|
68
|
+
| `* * * * *` | every minute |
|
|
69
|
+
| `0 * * * *` | top of every hour |
|
|
70
|
+
| `0 0 * * *` | daily at 00:00 UTC |
|
|
71
|
+
| `*/5 * * * *` | every 5 minutes |
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
See Cloudflare's [Cron Triggers](https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/cron-triggers/) docs for the full grammar and limits.
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
## See also
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
- [Queues](/stack/queues) — the async-message counterpart (`defineQueue`)
|
|
78
|
+
- [Triggers](/compiler/definitions/triggers) — row-level lifecycle hooks (distinct from cron)
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.47.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.47.11",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
|
|
6
6
|
"license": "MIT",
|
|
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
|
|
|
30
30
|
],
|
|
31
31
|
"type": "module",
|
|
32
32
|
"bin": {
|
|
33
|
-
"quickback": "
|
|
33
|
+
"quickback": "dist/index.js"
|
|
34
34
|
},
|
|
35
35
|
"main": "./dist/index.js",
|
|
36
36
|
"files": [
|
|
@@ -2,6 +2,75 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
## Unreleased
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
|
+
### Custom secrets via `bindings.secrets`
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
Declare a custom secret your feature/action code reads off `env` — name and
|
|
8
|
+
contract only, never the value:
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
```ts
|
|
11
|
+
bindings: {
|
|
12
|
+
secrets: [
|
|
13
|
+
{ name: "WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET", description: "HMAC for webhook callbacks", required: true },
|
|
14
|
+
],
|
|
15
|
+
}
|
|
16
|
+
```
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
It's emitted into the generated `env.d.ts` `Env` interface so `env.<NAME>`
|
|
19
|
+
type-checks, and `required` secrets join the boot-time env guard — the worker
|
|
20
|
+
fails closed with `503 MISSING_ENV` if one is unset. The value is set
|
|
21
|
+
out-of-band (`wrangler secret put`); the schema rejects any inline value so a
|
|
22
|
+
real secret can never be committed. See
|
|
23
|
+
[Bindings → secrets](/compiler/config/bindings#secrets).
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
### Auth: `resolve-email-context.ts` hook for per-recipient OTP context
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
Drop `quickback/hooks/resolve-email-context.ts` and the emailOTP send calls it
|
|
28
|
+
per recipient, spreading the returned object into your email templates — branded
|
|
29
|
+
palettes (organizer vs. attendee), plan tier, locale, etc. — without patching
|
|
30
|
+
generated output. Fail-open, with the Drizzle handle passed in. See
|
|
31
|
+
[Auth Hooks → Email context resolver](/stack/account-ui/hooks#email-context-resolver).
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
### Codegen fixes
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
- **Schedules:** handler import paths are now rebased on relocation, so a cron
|
|
36
|
+
handler importing `../../features/...` resolves correctly from the generated
|
|
37
|
+
`src/lib/schedules.ts` instead of failing the worker build.
|
|
38
|
+
- **OAuth/MCP middleware:** the auth-schema tables are imported under aliased
|
|
39
|
+
names so a function-scoped `const session` can no longer shadow the `session`
|
|
40
|
+
table import — closes a temporal-dead-zone crash that silently 401'd every
|
|
41
|
+
OAuth/MCP bearer.
|
|
42
|
+
- **MCP route:** the large tool-data literal is split into a `mcp-tools.ts` data
|
|
43
|
+
module (suppressed) so it can't overrun `tsc`'s type-instantiation budget; the
|
|
44
|
+
`mcp.ts` route logic stays fully type-checked.
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
### Realtime: identity-gated Durable Object rooms (`roomIdEquals`)
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
Per-user Durable Object entrypoints (gateway / presence / inbox) can now declare
|
|
49
|
+
an identity gate on the binding — `access: { roomIdEquals: 'ctx.userId' }` (or
|
|
50
|
+
`'ctx.activeOrgId'`). The compiler emits a Worker-edge gate at
|
|
51
|
+
`/realtime/<kebab>/*` that 401s anonymous callers, 400s a missing segment, and
|
|
52
|
+
403s unless the decoded room segment equals the server-resolved `ctx` id — a
|
|
53
|
+
string compare with no backing table or DB query. See
|
|
54
|
+
[PartyServer rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms).
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
- Closes the cross-user hole that "no `access` declared" leaves open: a per-user
|
|
57
|
+
room without a gate falls through to the authenticated-only catchall, so any
|
|
58
|
+
authenticated user could open another user's room by guessing the id.
|
|
59
|
+
- The gate lives at the edge, not in the DO — a Durable Object has no session
|
|
60
|
+
and only sees client-settable headers, so it must never re-authorize from
|
|
61
|
+
request data (trusting an `x-user-id` header was the original spoof hole).
|
|
62
|
+
- Only `'ctx.userId'` and `'ctx.activeOrgId'` are accepted; anything else is a
|
|
63
|
+
compile-time error (fail-closed Zod + generator validation).
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
### OAuth provider: spurious authorization-server warning silenced by default
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
The generated `oauthProvider({...})` now emits
|
|
68
|
+
`silenceWarnings: { oauthAuthServerConfig: true }` by default. The compiler
|
|
69
|
+
always serves the `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` discovery route when
|
|
70
|
+
the provider is enabled, so `@better-auth/oauth-provider`'s
|
|
71
|
+
"please ensure … exists" boot warning was always spurious. Override or extend it
|
|
72
|
+
via `plugins.oauthProvider.silenceWarnings`.
|
|
73
|
+
|
|
5
74
|
### `defineSchedule` — cron jobs from a single source
|
|
6
75
|
|
|
7
76
|
Declare a cron schedule in `services/schedules/*.ts` and the compiler emits the
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# Custom Bindings
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
|
-
Quickback's compiler owns the D1/KV/R2/ASSETS/queue blocks it needs for its own features. Anything else your worker binds to — Cloudflare Email, an extra R2 bucket, a custom queue, a service binding, your own Durable Object, Workers AI,
|
|
3
|
+
Quickback's compiler owns the D1/KV/R2/ASSETS/queue blocks it needs for its own features. Anything else your worker binds to — Cloudflare Email, an extra R2 bucket, a custom queue, a service binding, your own Durable Object, Workers AI, non-secret `[vars]`, or a custom `secret` your code reads off `env` — goes under the top-level `bindings` key:
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
```ts
|
|
6
6
|
import { defineConfig, defineRuntime, defineDatabase, defineAuth } from "@quickback-dev/cli";
|
|
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ export default defineConfig({
|
|
|
22
22
|
vars: {
|
|
23
23
|
MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: "studio.example.com",
|
|
24
24
|
},
|
|
25
|
+
secrets: [
|
|
26
|
+
{ name: "MAIL_INBOUND_SECRET", description: "Verifies inbound mail webhooks", required: true },
|
|
27
|
+
],
|
|
25
28
|
},
|
|
26
29
|
});
|
|
27
30
|
```
|
|
@@ -170,12 +173,48 @@ vars: {
|
|
|
170
173
|
}
|
|
171
174
|
```
|
|
172
175
|
|
|
173
|
-
Secrets do **not** go here.
|
|
176
|
+
Secrets do **not** go here. Declare them under [`secrets`](#secrets) (name only) and set the value with Wrangler's secret store:
|
|
174
177
|
|
|
175
178
|
```bash
|
|
176
179
|
wrangler secret put MAIL_INBOUND_SECRET
|
|
177
180
|
```
|
|
178
181
|
|
|
182
|
+
### `secrets`
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
Declares a custom secret your feature or action code reads off `env`. You record the **name and contract only** — the value is never stored in config, `wrangler.toml`, or git.
|
|
185
|
+
|
|
186
|
+
```ts
|
|
187
|
+
secrets: [
|
|
188
|
+
{
|
|
189
|
+
name: "WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET",
|
|
190
|
+
description: "HMAC secret for outbound webhook callbacks",
|
|
191
|
+
required: true,
|
|
192
|
+
},
|
|
193
|
+
{ name: "PARTNER_API_KEY" }, // optional
|
|
194
|
+
]
|
|
195
|
+
```
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
Each declared secret:
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
- is emitted into the generated `env.d.ts` `Env` interface as an optional `WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET?: string`, so `env.WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET` type-checks in your code;
|
|
200
|
+
- when `required: true`, joins the **boot-time env guard** — the worker fails closed with a `503 MISSING_ENV` if the secret is unset, rather than 500ing on the first request that reads it (same posture as `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`);
|
|
201
|
+
- surfaces its `description` and a `wrangler secret put <NAME>` hint in the generated type's JSDoc.
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
| Field | Type | |
|
|
204
|
+
| --- | --- | --- |
|
|
205
|
+
| `name` | `string` | Env var name. Letters, digits, underscores only — `SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE` by convention. |
|
|
206
|
+
| `description` | `string?` | Human note shown in the JSDoc + secret-setup hint. |
|
|
207
|
+
| `required` | `boolean?` | Fail closed at boot if unset. Default `false`. |
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
Set the value out-of-band — it lands in Cloudflare's encrypted secret store:
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
```bash
|
|
212
|
+
wrangler secret put WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET
|
|
213
|
+
```
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
> `secrets` records a **contract**, not a value. The schema rejects any inline value key, so a real secret can never be pasted into committed config. Use [`vars`](#vars) for non-secret values that are safe to commit.
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
179
218
|
### `ai`
|
|
180
219
|
|
|
181
220
|
Emits a top-level `[ai]` block. Use this if you need Workers AI bound under a name different from Quickback's internal `AI`.
|
|
@@ -84,21 +84,30 @@ quickback compile --no-sync-config
|
|
|
84
84
|
|
|
85
85
|
## Optional Fields
|
|
86
86
|
|
|
87
|
+
Every optional top-level key the config accepts is listed below. You never have to memorize them — after your first compile, the [discoverable options block](#discoverable-options-block) lists each one (minus the ones you've set) right inside your `quickback.config.ts`. This table is the human reference; follow the links for detailed pages.
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
87
89
|
| Field | Type | Description |
|
|
88
90
|
|-------|------|-------------|
|
|
89
|
-
| `
|
|
90
|
-
| `
|
|
91
|
-
| `
|
|
92
|
-
| `
|
|
93
|
-
| `schemaRegistry` | `object` | Schema registry generation for the CMS (enabled by default, `{ generate: false }` to disable) — see [Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry) |
|
|
94
|
-
| `etag` | `object` | ETag caching for GET responses (enabled by default, `{ enabled: false }` to disable) — see [Caching & ETags](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching) |
|
|
95
|
-
| `cms` | `boolean \| object` | Embed CMS in compiled Worker — see [CMS](/stack/cms) |
|
|
96
|
-
| `account` | `boolean \| object` | Embed Account UI in compiled Worker — see [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) |
|
|
91
|
+
| `domain` | `string` | Primary custom domain (auto-inferred from `cms`/`account`/`api` domains if unset) — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |
|
|
92
|
+
| `api` | `object` | Dedicated hostname for the feature API surface (`/api/v1/*`); additive alias — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |
|
|
93
|
+
| `auth` | `object` | App-level auth settings (`roleHierarchy`, `jwt`, `loginUrl`/`profileUrl`, `domain`) — see [Access](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) |
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| `authz` | `object` | Relationship-based authorization (`relationships`, `roles`, `permissions`, `arrows`) — see [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions) |
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| `trustedOrigins` | `string[]` | CORS trusted origins for cross-domain auth |
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| `features` | `object` | Feature flags such as `organizations` / `pinnedOrganizationId` — see [Pinned Organization Mode](/compiler/config/single-tenant) |
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| `cms` | `boolean \| object` | Embed CMS in compiled Worker (`domain`, `access`, `sysadmin`) — see [CMS](/stack/cms) |
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| `account` | `boolean \| object` | Embed Account UI in compiled Worker (`domain`, `name`, `auth.*`, branding) — see [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) |
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| `apps` | `object` | Mount hand-authored SPAs on their own hostname or path prefix — see [Domains](/compiler/config/domains) |
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| `agents` | `boolean \| object` | AI/agent discovery surface (`robots.txt`, `llms.txt`, MCP, OAuth discovery) — see [Agents](/compiler/config/agents) |
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| `security` | `object \| false` | HTTP response security headers (CSP, HSTS, COOP/COEP, Referrer/Permissions-Policy) — see [Security Headers](/compiler/config/security) |
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| `openapi` | `object` | OpenAPI spec generation (`generate`, `publish`, `docs: 'scalar' \| 'swagger'`, `types`) — see [OpenAPI](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi) |
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| `schemaRegistry` | `object` | Schema registry generation for the CMS (`{ generate: false }` to disable) — see [Schema Registry](/stack/cms/schema-registry) |
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| `etag` | `object` | ETag caching for GET responses (`{ enabled: false }` to disable) — see [Caching & ETags](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching) |
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| `email` | `object` | Email delivery config (`provider`, `from`, `fromName`, `region`) — see [Email Configuration](#email-configuration) |
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| `bindings` | `object` | Extra Cloudflare bindings (durable objects, queues, R2, services, `vars`, AI) — see [Bindings](/compiler/config/bindings) |
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| `compiler` | `object` | Compiler internals — `features.auditFields: false`, `migrations.renames` (headless CI), `securityContracts`, `injectId`, `routes` |
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| `build` | `object` | Build options (`outputDir`, `packageManager`, `dependencies`) — see [Custom Dependencies](#custom-dependencies) |
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| `dev` | `object` | Local development settings (`port`, `api`, `cms`, `account`, `hostnames`) — see [Variables](/compiler/config/variables) |
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| `preset` | `string` | Inherit defaults from a named preset |
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## Custom Dependencies
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> A table **without** `defineTable()` is a supporting table — used internally by actions or handlers, but never exposed as its own API endpoint. See [Internal Tables](/compiler/definitions/schema#internal-tables-no-routes) for details.
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## The
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## The Five Security Layers
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Every API request passes through
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Every API request passes through five security layers, in order:
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```
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Request → Firewall → Access → Guards → Masking → Response
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Request → Rate Limit → Firewall → Access → Guards → Masking → Response
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│ │ │ │ │
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│ │ │ │ └── Hide sensitive fields
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│ │ │ └── Block field modifications
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│ │ └── Check roles & conditions
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│ └── Isolate data by owner/org/team
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└── Cap requests per user / op
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```
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> **Security Applies Everywhere**
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[Learn more about Masking →](/compiler/definitions/masking)
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### 5. Rate Limiting (Request Caps)
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Rate limiting caps **how often** an operation can be called, backed by Cloudflare's native Rate Limiting binding — no extra storage, no third-party libraries. Unlike the other four layers, it's applied to **every resource by default** (read `1000/60s`, writes `200/60s`) and runs first, before any data is touched.
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```typescript
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rateLimit: {
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|
+
delete: { limit: 5, period: 60 }, // tighter than the 200/60s default
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+
},
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|
+
// read / create / update keep shipped defaults
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|
+
```
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|
+
Override per-op, per-resource, or project-wide; set `false` at any scope to opt out. Limits are keyed by `<resource>:<op>:<userId>` (falling back to client IP for anonymous callers), and over-cap requests get a `429` with `Retry-After`.
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|
+
|
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|
+
[Learn more about Rate Limiting →](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit)
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|
+
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|
## How They Work Together
|
|
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|
|
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|
**Scenario:** An interviewer requests `GET /candidates/cnd_123`
|
|
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|
|
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|
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1. **
|
|
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|
+
1. **Rate Limit** checks: Is this user under their `read` cap on `candidates`?
|
|
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|
+
- Yes → Continue
|
|
179
|
+
- No → 429 Too Many Requests (with `Retry-After`)
|
|
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|
+
|
|
181
|
+
2. **Firewall** checks: Is candidate `cnd_123` in the user's organization?
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|
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|
- Yes → Continue
|
|
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183
|
- No → 404 Not Found (as if it doesn't exist)
|
|
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|
|
|
165
|
-
|
|
185
|
+
3. **Access** checks: Can interviewers perform GET?
|
|
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|
- Yes → Continue
|
|
167
187
|
- No → 403 Forbidden
|
|
168
188
|
|
|
169
|
-
|
|
189
|
+
4. **Guards** don't apply to GET (they're for writes)
|
|
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190
|
|
|
171
|
-
|
|
191
|
+
5. **Masking** applies: User is an `interviewer`, not `recruiter` or `hiring-manager`
|
|
172
192
|
- Email: `jane@company.com` → `j***@c******.com`
|
|
173
193
|
- Phone: `555-123-4567` → `******4567`
|
|
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194
|
|
|
175
|
-
|
|
195
|
+
6. **Response** sent with masked data
|
|
176
196
|
|
|
177
197
|
## Locked Down by Default
|
|
178
198
|
|
|
@@ -183,13 +203,14 @@ Quickback is **secure by default**. Nothing is accessible until you explicitly a
|
|
|
183
203
|
| Firewall | AUTO | Auto-detects from `organization_id`/`user_id` columns. Only configure for exceptions. |
|
|
184
204
|
| Access | DENIED | Explicitly define `access` rules with roles |
|
|
185
205
|
| Guards | LOCKED | Explicitly list `createable`, `updatable` fields |
|
|
206
|
+
| Rate Limit | ON | Applied to every resource (read 1000/60s, write 200/60s). Override or set `false` to opt out. |
|
|
186
207
|
| Actions | BLOCKED | Explicitly define `access` for each action |
|
|
187
208
|
|
|
188
209
|
**You must deliberately open each door.** This prevents accidental data exposure.
|
|
189
210
|
|
|
190
211
|
## Other Resource Options
|
|
191
212
|
|
|
192
|
-
Beyond the
|
|
213
|
+
Beyond the five security layers, `defineTable` accepts a handful of declarative hints that shape the generated API and the CMS without touching your security posture.
|
|
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214
|
|
|
194
215
|
| Option | What it does | Full reference |
|
|
195
216
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
@@ -212,6 +233,7 @@ All options are optional — omit them and Quickback uses sensible defaults (aut
|
|
|
212
233
|
3. [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) — Configure read and write permissions
|
|
213
234
|
4. [Guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) — Control field modifications
|
|
214
235
|
5. [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Hide sensitive data
|
|
215
|
-
6. [
|
|
216
|
-
7. [
|
|
217
|
-
8. [
|
|
236
|
+
6. [Rate Limit](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit) — Per-operation request caps
|
|
237
|
+
7. [Views](/compiler/definitions/views) — Column-level security
|
|
238
|
+
8. [Validation](/compiler/definitions/validation) — Field validation rules
|
|
239
|
+
9. [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) — Add custom business logic
|