@quickback-dev/cli 0.47.8 → 0.47.9

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (61) hide show
  1. package/README.md +3 -1
  2. package/dist/codex/AGENTS.md +290 -0
  3. package/dist/commands/codex.d.ts +16 -0
  4. package/dist/commands/codex.d.ts.map +1 -0
  5. package/dist/commands/codex.js +159 -0
  6. package/dist/commands/codex.js.map +1 -0
  7. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts +5 -0
  8. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +1 -1
  9. package/dist/commands/compile.js +12 -2
  10. package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/commands/create.d.ts.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/commands/create.js +1 -1
  13. package/dist/commands/create.js.map +1 -1
  14. package/dist/commands/dev.d.ts +16 -0
  15. package/dist/commands/dev.d.ts.map +1 -0
  16. package/dist/commands/dev.js +117 -0
  17. package/dist/commands/dev.js.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/commands/init.d.ts +6 -0
  19. package/dist/commands/init.d.ts.map +1 -0
  20. package/dist/commands/init.js +405 -0
  21. package/dist/commands/init.js.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/docs/content.js +15 -5
  24. package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/index.js +4 -2
  26. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/lib/api-client.d.ts +13 -1
  28. package/dist/lib/api-client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/lib/api-client.js +47 -20
  30. package/dist/lib/api-client.js.map +1 -1
  31. package/dist/lib/api-client.test.js +78 -0
  32. package/dist/lib/api-client.test.js.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts +11 -0
  34. package/dist/lib/file-loader.d.ts.map +1 -1
  35. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js +35 -0
  36. package/dist/lib/file-loader.js.map +1 -1
  37. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts +25 -0
  38. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.d.ts.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js +179 -0
  40. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.js.map +1 -0
  41. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts +2 -0
  42. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.d.ts.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js +130 -0
  44. package/dist/lib/sweep-stale.test.js.map +1 -0
  45. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +19 -0
  46. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +3 -0
  47. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +117 -1
  48. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +32 -0
  49. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/rate-limit.md +216 -0
  50. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol.md +332 -0
  51. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/inbound.md +62 -5
  52. package/package.json +1 -1
  53. package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +43 -0
  54. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +3 -0
  55. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +117 -1
  56. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +32 -0
  57. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/rate-limit.md +216 -0
  58. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol.md +332 -0
  59. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/triggers.md +5 -0
  60. package/src/skill/docs/stack/schedules/index.md +60 -0
  61. package/src/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/inbound.md +62 -5
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
3
3
  export const DOCS = {
4
4
  "changelog": {
5
5
  "title": "Changelog",
6
- "content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Envelope encryption — `q.text().encrypted()` (encryption pillar, Phase 1)\n\nMark a text column `.encrypted()` and it is AES-256-GCM-encrypted at rest\nunder a **per-organization key**: a database breach (backup, export, leaked\ntoken, SQL injection, insider read) yields only ciphertext for that column.\nSee [Encryption](/compiler/definitions/encryption).\n\n- Per-org DEKs live wrapped under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret in a\n compiler-owned `org_data_keys` table (lazily created, versioned for\n rotation). Deleting an org's row **crypto-shreds** every value it wrote.\n- One write chokepoint: CRUD, batch, and action-layer `db.insert/update`\n all encrypt through the audit wrapper — audit snapshots, webhook\n payloads, and realtime deltas carry ciphertext by construction.\n- Reads decrypt behind the firewall then apply masking; encrypted columns\n are compile-time excluded from `?search`/`?filter`/`?sort`, view query\n allowlists, and embedding sources.\n- `ctx.crypto.encrypt/decrypt` for explicit server-side processing in\n actions; boot guard refuses to serve without the KEK (503 `MISSING_ENV`);\n scaffolded `.dev.vars` now includes a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK`.\n- The sealed (E2EE) and vault tiers remain compile-gated until built —\n roadmap in `apps/compiler/research/encryption-vault-spec.md`.\n\n### Postgres-style table triggers (`defineTable` / `feature` `triggers:`)\n\nTables can now declare `before`/`after` triggers on `insert`/`update`/\n`delete`, with two lowering lanes and a per-trigger compile report. See\n[Triggers](/compiler/definitions/triggers) for the full reference.\n\n- **`sql:` entries** compile to real SQLite `CREATE TRIGGER` statements,\n shipped in the journaled features migration (content-addressed — an\n unchanged trigger set appends nothing; removing a trigger drops it on the\n next migrate). They fire for **every** write path including raw SQL, run\n atomically with the triggering statement (the only transactional option\n on D1), support `when:` guards and `RAISE(ABORT, ...)` rejection, and\n `OLD.`/`NEW.` column references are validated at compile time. The\n compiler owns the `BEGIN`/`END` frame — emitted uppercase, since\n lowercase `begin` breaks remote D1's statement splitter. On soft-delete\n tables, `*Delete` events map to the `deleted_at` transition (plus a\n hard-delete variant) and `*Update` events exclude it, so a soft delete\n fires delete triggers exactly once. D1 only.\n- **`handler:` entries** run as application hooks at the audit-wrapper\n write chokepoint (REST CRUD + actions). `before*` hooks are synchronous\n and can mutate the payload or throw to reject — the write never executes\n and the request gets `TRIGGER_REJECTED` (422); audit fields are\n re-stamped after hooks and cannot be forged. `after*` hooks run once per\n returned row and are **awaited** — a throw surfaces as\n `TRIGGER_AFTER_FAILED` (500) with `details.committed: true` since the\n write already persisted. Handlers get `{ table, op, values|row, ctx, db,\n env }`; the `db` is audit-wrapped at cascade depth + 1, so hook writes\n stamp audit fields, emit live-view deltas, and fire nested triggers,\n bounded by a depth cap of 5. Each table's drizzle object is auto-imported\n into the generated registry under its authored name, and handler imports\n are usage-filtered and hoisted.\n\nThe compile output includes a lowering/coverage report and fail-closed\nwarnings: `handler:` triggers do **not** fire for queue handlers, cron, or\nraw SQL — guards that must hold universally should use `sql:` +\n`RAISE(ABORT)`. `async: true` (queue-dispatched after-hooks) and\n`withOld: true` (previous-row access) are reserved and rejected at compile\ntime until they ship.\n\nAlso in this change:\n\n- New `trigger` error layer with `TRIGGER_REJECTED` / `TRIGGER_AFTER_FAILED`\n codes in the generated error catalog, OpenAPI spec, and SDK types.\n- Parser: function-valued properties in `defineTable`/`feature` configs now\n parse as compile-time source carriers instead of failing the whole config\n with \"no dynamic expressions\" — unblocks trigger handlers (and\n function-form `access:` / custom masks) through the CLI source path.\n- Fixed a column-injection bug where a comment merely mentioning a column\n name (e.g. `\"deleted_at\"` in a docblock) suppressed audit/soft-delete\n column injection for the table.\n- Fixed a silent no-op: a project declaring `services/queues/*.ts` handlers\n without embeddings or `additionalQueues` deployed a wired `queue` export\n with no `[[queues.consumers]]` to feed it — the handlers were dead code.\n The primary queue (and its typed env binding) is now emitted for\n handlers-only projects, with a compile notice that Cloudflare Queues\n requires the paid Workers plan. Queue emission remains strictly opt-in by\n usage: projects with no queue-backed features (embeddings, queue\n handlers, `additionalQueues`, webhooks) emit no queue configuration and\n deploy on the free plan.\n## v0.47.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: zero-false-positive analyzer checks are now compile errors\n\nThe authz/authn analyzer (v0.37) shipped warn-only. After a release cycle of\ndata, the checks whose every trip is a definite misconfiguration — never a\nlegitimate config — are **promoted to compile errors**. Warnings nobody is\nforced to read are documentation; the pillar guarantees are now enforced.\n\n**Breaking** — a config that previously compiled with one of these warnings\nnow fails the compile:\n\n- `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` — a permission that is structurally unsatisfiable\n (`allOf(a, not(a))`: a fact AND its exact negation at the same AND-level).\n- `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` — a resource's firewall grants a\n `scope:<kind>:<role>` role access beyond its capability profile (or the\n role has no profile at all). This is the M0.2 pillar guarantee — it was\n authored as an error all along and is now enforced.\n- `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT`,\n `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY`,\n `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` — the structural-authn set (route auth coverage,\n bearer-only `/mcp`/agent surfaces + INTERNAL unreachability, mint↔verify\n key/issuer/audience pairing, anchored credential delivery, verifier-only\n identity claims). These still run against empty route/credential metadata\n on a real compile (no-ops until the generators emit it), but the severity\n contract is locked in now — they fail the build the moment they can fire.\n\nThe heuristic/advisory checks are unchanged: `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM`,\n`AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE`, `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW`, and\n`AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` stay warnings; `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` stays an info\nreport. `QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true` still promotes those warnings too.\n\n**The override escape hatch** — every promoted finding can be explicitly\naccepted, per finding, with a required reason:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n analyzer: {\n allow: [\n {\n check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',\n target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer', // from the rendered finding\n reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nAn override downgrades that exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning\nthat cites the reason — even under strict mode (it's an explicit, reasoned\nacceptance). Every rendered error prints its exact override recipe. Guard\nrails: `check` must be one of the promoted ids (unknown or keep-warn ids are\nrejected at config validation), `reason` is required, and an `allow` entry\nthat matches no current finding is itself a compile error — no dead\noverrides accumulating after the underlying issue is fixed.\n\nAnalyzer-internal defects are still fail-open: a bug in the analyzer itself\ndowngrades to a single warning and the compile continues. Only real findings\nfail builds.\n\n### CLI: live views now compile through the CLI\n\n`defineView` files under `quickback/services/views/` were never loaded by\nthe CLI — the compile payload simply omitted them, so\n[live views](/stack/realtime/live-views) (v0.35) only worked when driving\nthe compiler API directly. The CLI now discovers and ships them like every\nother service definition, and the compile summary counts them\n(`Loaded services: … 1 live view(s)`). If you declared views and wondered\nwhy no surface ever went live: upgrade the CLI and recompile.\n\n### CLI: deterministic compile output across machines\n\nFeature and service discovery used raw `readdir` order, which differs\nbetween macOS and Linux — route registration order, schema re-exports,\nOpenAPI paths, and the Neon RLS document's content hash could all churn when\nthe same project was recompiled on a different machine. All discovery sites\nnow sort by codepoint, so the same input compiles to the same bytes\neverywhere. Expect a one-time diff on the first recompile if your previous\noutput was generated in a different filesystem order.\n\n### Fixes\n\n- Read-only resources (no `crud` block) generated routes importing a\n `CRUD_ACCESS` symbol their resource file never exported — a tsc/bundle\n break. The export is now unconditional.\n- The `blog` starter template gated writes on the removed `ADMIN`\n pseudo-role, which hard-fails current compiles; it now uses the\n org-membership `admin` role.\n- `reports/operations.manifest.json` and `reports/conformance.manifest.json`\n now also cover the realtime (`/broadcast/v1`), storage (`/storage/v1`),\n and FGA (`/fga/v1`) surfaces.\n- The dead free/pro tier plumbing is gone: no Tier row in\n `quickback whoami`, no upsell copy at login. Compiling complete projects\n requires login, exactly as before — there was never a paid gate behind it.\n- The CLI is published to npm via trusted publishing (GitHub OIDC) — signed\n provenance, no long-lived npm token in the pipeline.\n\n## v0.46.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: \"no organization context\" responses unified on HTTP 403\n\nGenerated APIs used to answer the same semantic condition — *the caller has no\nactive organization context* — with two different statuses: `400 ORG_REQUIRED`\nfrom the collection list guard and the create/PUT/batch org validation, but\n`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG` from standalone actions and `403\nACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` from unsafe org-scoped actions. Clients and SDKs\nhad to special-case the split.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required; every \"no org context\" denial is\nnow **403**:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/<resource>` (and views) without an active org or\n `?organizationId=` → `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- `POST /`, `PUT /:id`, `POST /batch`, `PUT /batch` without an active org →\n `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- Standalone actions (`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG`) and unsafe org-scoped actions\n (`403 ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED`) were already 403 and are unchanged.\n\nError **codes are unchanged** — `ORG_REQUIRED`, `ACCESS_NO_ORG`, and\n`ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` keep their identities, so clients that\ndiscriminate on `code` need no changes. Only clients that branch on the raw\n`400` status for these responses must update to `403`.\n\n### Breaking: root-mounted actions lose their nested alias URLs\n\nA standalone action whose declared `path:` lives outside its feature prefix\n(e.g. `path: \"/reports/orders\"` in the `orders` feature) mounts at the root:\n`/api/v1/reports/orders`. That root URL is the one the OpenAPI spec, the MCP\nsurface, and the operations manifest have always advertised — but the\ngenerated per-feature routes file *also* carried an undocumented, fully-gated\ncopy at the nested `/api/v1/<feature><path>` URL (e.g.\n`/api/v1/orders/reports/orders`).\n\n**Breaking** — the nested alias is no longer emitted. One URL per operation:\na root-mounted action exists only at its advertised `/api/v1<path>` mount.\nAnything calling the unadvertised nested URL gets a 404 after recompile +\nredeploy; switch to the documented root URL. Actions declared *under* the\nfeature prefix are untouched, and a feature whose standalone actions are all\nroot-mounted no longer emits an (empty) feature actions routes file.\n\n### Behavior change: `PUBLIC` inside `or:` arms admits anonymous callers\n\n[Access](/compiler/definitions/access) has always documented `PUBLIC` as\nworking on every access node, but the emitted auth gate only honored it in a\nflat `roles: [...]` list. A tree like\n\n```ts\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n { roles: [\"admin\"] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nstill answered anonymous callers with `401`. The auth gate is now tree-aware\nand matches the documented semantics: a `PUBLIC` `or:` arm admits anonymous\ncallers past the authentication gate (an `and:` group admits them only when\n*every* arm does), and the access / org / firewall layers still evaluate the\nfull tree. One shared predicate now drives the emitted gates, the OpenAPI\n`security` blocks, and view routes (which gate per view on the\nview-effective access).\n\n**Worth a loud note:** if you have a nested `PUBLIC` arm that was silently\n401-ing, that endpoint becomes anonymously reachable after recompile —\nexactly what the config declares, but verify it's what you meant. `PUBLIC`\naudit logging applies to the newly-admitted routes as usual.\n\n### Realtime broadcasts now enforce `requiredRoles` and masking\n\nA table's declared realtime gates weren't being applied to the generated\nCRUD broadcasts: `realtime: { requiredRoles: [...] }` and column masking were\nhonored on the HTTP surface but not on the WebSocket fanout. The docs\npromised per-role, masked realtime delivery; the generated broadcasts now\nmatch it. **Recompile and redeploy** any project using realtime on\nrole-gated or masked tables.\n\nGenerated `realtime.insert / update / delete` calls now carry:\n\n- **`targetRoles`** — the table's `realtime.requiredRoles` (post role-\n hierarchy `+` expansion), enforced per subscriber at fanout.\n- **`maskingConfig`** — serialized from the same effective masking\n (declared + auto-detected sensitive columns) the HTTP mask functions are\n generated from. What HTTP masks is what the WebSocket wire masks.\n\nLive-view `view_changes` deltas honor the same table-level `requiredRoles`\nat fanout, so a role-gated table can't leak through a\n[live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) subscription either.\n\nNotes:\n\n- Recompile suffices — no config change needed.\n- If you worked around this with hand-written `realtime.*` calls passing\n `targetRoles` / `maskingConfig`, those workaround broadcasts can be\n removed.\n- `type: 'custom'` mask functions can't ride the wire — the Broadcaster\n fails closed and broadcasts `[REDACTED]` for those columns.\n- Tables without `requiredRoles` or masking are byte-identical: the open\n broadcast default is unchanged.\n\n### Batch operations inherit the base operation's access\n\nWhen a batch operation was declared without its own `access`, it didn't pick\nup the base operation's role requirement:\n\n```ts\ncrud: {\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n batchUpdate: { maxBatchSize: 25 }, // ← no access of its own\n}\n```\n\nA batch config declared without `access` now inherits the base operation's\naccess at compile time — fail closed, so runtime, the OpenAPI spec, and the\ngenerated code all agree. Explicit batch `access` still wins (including\nper-side on upserts); a base op without access still yields an\nauthenticated-only batch op. The flat `update: { batch: true }` shape and\nauto-promoted batch ops were never affected. **Recompile and redeploy** if\nyou use the explicit-batch shape without per-batch access.\n\n### Record actions, PUT upserts, and legacy firewall arms fail closed\n\nThree fail-closed hardening fixes, found and verified against the new\nconformance catalog (route × principal expectations derived from the\ncompiler's own IR — see the\n[conformance manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest)).\nAll apply on recompile + redeploy; no config change needed:\n\n- **Record actions evaluate the role gate before fetching the record**, so\n the denial response no longer varies with record state — a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`. (Bulk actions already had this order; unsafe\n actions write their audit row on the pre-record denial.)\n- **PUT upsert treats an out-of-scope id as a firewall miss** (`403` reveal /\n `404` hide, per your firewall error mode; a standard 207 miss entry on\n `PUT /batch`) instead of routing it into the create path. Genuinely new\n ids keep the create path.\n- **Legacy (array-form) firewall arms deny cleanly when a bound context\n claim is absent at runtime** (e.g. no active org), rather than surfacing a\n database error — the same deny-when-absent behavior the explicit `all:` /\n `any:` group forms already had.\n\n### Root-mounted standalone actions use the standard gate stack\n\nStandalone actions mounted outside their feature prefix\n(`path: \"/reports/orders\"`) were emitted through a separate code path that\ndid not apply the full access / audit / scoped-database treatment that\nin-feature standalone actions receive. They now render through the same\ngenerator, so the same access checks, security-audit writes, and\ntenant-scoped database wrapping apply everywhere. If you use root-mounted\nstandalone actions, recompile and redeploy. (Unifying the two code paths is\nalso what surfaced the two breaking changes above.)\n\n### Namespace routing fixes\n\n- An action whose declared `path` exactly equals its namespace prefix is now\n claimed by the namespace like any nested action (Hono's `/x/*` mount\n already matched the bare `/x`) — it's served through the namespace's gate\n instead of carrying a second inline copy of the resolver.\n- A namespace with zero claimed standalone actions (e.g. record-based-only)\n no longer mounts its middleware at all — a dead gate can no longer\n intercept requests under its prefix.\n\n### Custom org roles work with Better Auth member management\n\nCustom roles referenced in access trees (e.g. `roles: [\"support\"]`) are now\nauto-registered with the Better Auth organization plugin. They were already\nenforceable on routes but unprovisionable through Better Auth —\n`invite-member` / `update-member-role` rejected them with\n`400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, so there was no supported way to actually give a\nmember the role. Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent permissions\n(this is about assignability; your access trees remain the authorization\nmodel). If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization plugin\noptions, those win and auto-registration is skipped. Built-in, pseudo, and\n`scope:` roles are excluded; projects with no custom roles emit\nbyte-identical output.\n\n### snake_case tables: dropped record actions and broken helpers fixed\n\nTwo fixes for tables declared with snake_case names (`event_notes`):\n\n- The generated `.quickback/define-action.ts` helpers imported the camelCase\n identifier while the generated alias file exports the verbatim declared\n name (`export { event_notes }`) — a TS2724 compile failure for any\n snake_case table with action files. The helpers now import the real export\n aliased to the camelCase local.\n- Record actions on a snake-declared table living in a kebab-named feature\n file (`event-notes/actions/pin.ts`) were not emitted — missing from both\n the generated routes and OpenAPI. They now emit and document consistently.\n\nIf you have snake_case tables with record actions, recompiling **adds routes\nthat previously didn't exist** — review the new surface.\n\n### First-class MCP OAuth config: `auth.oauth`\n\nThe OAuth 2.1 surface behind `agents.mcp.requireAuth` (v0.42.0) gains a\nfirst-class config block — env-resolvable issuer / login / consent URLs,\nscopes, RFC 8707 audiences, and a dynamic-client-registration toggle:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n oauth: {\n enabled: true,\n issuerUrl: { env: \"OAUTH_ISSUER_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/auth/v1\" },\n loginPage: { env: \"OAUTH_LOGIN_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/login\" },\n consentPage: { env: \"OAUTH_CONSENT_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/consent\" },\n scopes: [\"openid\", \"profile\", \"email\", \"offline_access\"],\n audiences: [{ env: \"OAUTH_MCP_AUDIENCE\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/mcp\" }],\n allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,\n },\n}),\n```\n\nSetting it auto-enables the `oauthProvider`, `jwt`, and `bearer` plugins,\nemits the RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 discovery documents, and accepts the\nprovider's JWKS-signed access tokens in the standard auth middleware. A new\nproject hook, `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`, lets you derive\ntenant fields (`activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` / roles) from the validated\nOAuth identity. On Neon, the auth schema is now owned by the Better Auth CLI\nend to end (the compiler no longer emits its placeholder `src/auth/schema.ts`\nor `src/lib/neon.ts`). See\n[OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)\nand [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks#oauth-context-resolver).\n\n### Neon RLS covers force-enabled plugin tables\n\nOn Neon, row-level-security policies are generated for the Better Auth\ntables. The list of tables receiving policies was derived from your declared\nauth config and didn't account for plugins the compiler force-enables\nautomatically — so some auth-owned tables could be created without RLS\npolicies. The list now derives from the fully resolved plugin set, so every\ngenerated auth table receives appropriate policies (self-scoped where there\nis a clear owner, service-role-only otherwise — fail closed). The RLS\nmigration is content-addressed, so the update arrives as a new journaled\nentry on the next recompile + `db:migrate`. **Neon projects should recompile\nand run `db:migrate`.**\n\n### New compile reports: operations + conformance manifests\n\nEvery compile now writes two machine-readable reports next to\n`openapi.json`:\n\n- **`reports/operations.manifest.json`** — a stable, sorted index of every\n operation: `{ operationId, method, path, auth, feature, kind }`, covering\n the resource, action, view, auth, realtime, storage, and FGA surfaces. An\n extend-only public contract — the recommended integration point for\n scripting against the generated surface.\n- **`reports/conformance.manifest.json`** — for each route × principal\n class, the expected outcome (allow / 401 / 403 / cross-tenant miss …),\n derived from the same IR the emitters consume. This is the artifact the\n conformance fixes above were found and verified against.\n\nThe OpenAPI generator itself now reads the same IR as the route emitters, so\nthe spec follows the emitted surface by construction — including four\naccuracy fixes: `PUT /{id}` is documented only when actually enabled, the\nbatch surface documents the emitter's auto-promotion + access inheritance,\nand views document their effective (view-level, falling back to read-level)\naccess. See\n[Operations manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest).\n\n## v0.45.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'` — sub-TTL JWT revocation\n\nThe JWT fast-path trusts signed claims for their full lifetime — that's what\nmakes it a fast-path. Until now the only revocation bounds were the TTL\n(plain claims) and the carry-forward cap (scope claims, v0.44.0). The\nlong-promised `'kv'` mode is now real on the **Cloudflare runtime**:\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { revocationCheck: 'kv' } }\n```\n\n- **Per-principal revocation timestamps, not per-token denylists.** A\n revocation event writes \"everything for this principal minted before now is\n dead\" to the project's **existing `KV` binding** (keys prefixed `qbrev:`) —\n nothing extra to provision. Entries self-expire after the maximum token\n lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n- **The bearer fast-path checks before trusting.** A verified token whose\n `iat` (or `sct`, for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored\n timestamp is rejected and falls through to session auth, which re-checks\n membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers\n transparently. Costs 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify; the\n explicit trade the opt-in buys.\n- **Written automatically where revocation actually happens:** org-member\n removal and role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`), and\n UPDATE/DELETE of scope-conferring relationship rows — through the same\n audit-wrapper write chokepoint Live Views uses, plus the single DELETE\n route (which has the row in hand but no `.returning()`). Revoke-on-touch:\n a false positive just forces a cheap re-prove.\n- **User bans flip automatically.** The Better Auth admin plugin's ban lands\n as a user-row update, so a generated `databaseHooks.user.update.after` hook\n stamps the user-level revocation the moment `banned` flips — every\n outstanding JWT dies on its next use, and the cookie/session path already\n rejects banned sessions, completing the lockout. When outbound webhooks are\n configured, the same hook emits a `user.banned` event so subscribed\n endpoints are notified.\n- **App-code helpers** for everything else: `src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts`\n exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens`\n (e.g. call `revokeUserTokens` from a custom revoke-all flow).\n- **Fails open.** A KV outage degrades revocation to the TTL /\n carry-forward-cap bound — it never locks every bearer out.\n\nBun/Node + `'kv'` fails at compile time with a clear message (the store rides\nthe Cloudflare KV binding; those runtimes own immediate-revoke via the\ncookie/session path). Default remains `'none'`; without the flag the emitted\nmiddleware is byte-identical to v0.44.0.\n\n### Neon: `npm run db:migrate` now applies the RLS layer\n\nThe RLS SQL (helper functions, policies, triggers) used to be emitted as\norphaned `drizzle/migrations/0099–0102` files that no tool ever applied —\n`db:migrate` ran the schema migrations and silently skipped the security\nlayer. The RLS document now rides the journaled drizzle set in\n`quickback/drizzle/` as a content-addressed migration\n(`<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>`), so one `npm run db:migrate` applies schema\n**and** security, in dependency order. The migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create), so it converges over databases where\nthe old files were applied by hand; an unchanged security config appends\nnothing (the journal stays byte-stable across recompiles), and a changed one\nappends a new content-addressed entry — append-only, like every other\nmigration. Existing Neon projects: recompile + `db:migrate`, nothing breaks.\n\n### Neon: `user_sessions` is real, and the SQL layer speaks TEXT ids\n\n`get_active_org_id()` — the helper every org-scoped RLS policy reads — was\nquerying a `public.user_sessions` table that **no migration created**, and\nthe helper layer was typed `uuid` against Better Auth's TEXT ids\n(`org_abc123`), which would throw on first contact. Now:\n\n- `user_sessions` is compiler-owned migration state\n (`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by the normal journaled flow\n with a FK to the users table — outside `src/auth/schema.ts`, which the\n Better Auth CLI rewrites.\n- Generated Better Auth session hooks mirror the session's active\n organization (and team, in teams mode) into it on create/update.\n Switching to \"no org\" nulls it through — SQL-side access revokes, fail\n closed.\n- The RLS helper layer (`get_active_org_id`, `get_active_team_id`,\n `is_owner`, the audit helpers) is TEXT-typed to match Better Auth ids.\n- Policies for Better Auth's own tables use the plural physical names the\n BA CLI actually generates on Neon, and BA tables no longer get Quickback\n audit triggers for columns they don't have.\n\n### Hard deletes wire into the audit pipeline correctly\n\nTwo codegen bugs around `delete: { mode: 'hard' }`:\n\n- Firewall auto-detection emitted an `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate for\n tables with no soft-delete column — every read on a hard-delete table\n referenced a column that doesn't exist.\n- Hard-delete routes import the `logHardDelete` audit helper, but the helper\n file was only emitted when the project also had unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions\n — a project with hard deletes and neither failed at deploy time. Hard\n deletes are now a first-class trigger of the security-audit pipeline\n (helper file, `AUDIT_DB` binding, env types, audit migration); on D1 that\n means [`auditDatabaseId`](/compiler/config/providers) is required, and the\n compile error says so.\n\n### Generated output is now typechecked — with the first crop of fixes\n\nEvery compiler change now compiles a matrix of fixture projects and runs\n`tsc` + `wrangler deploy --dry-run` against the **generated output** — the\nclass of bug where the compiler emits syntactically valid TypeScript that\nfails downstream. The first runs caught real ones, all fixed here:\n\n- **Neon:** `src/db/org.schema.ts` re-exported tables that don't exist after\n the Better Auth CLI's plural rewrite; a missing `AuthDatabase` type\n export; transaction callbacks typed bare `(tx)` failing `noImplicitAny`;\n the auth middleware's member-table fallback hardcoded the singular name.\n- **Embeddings:** the queue consumer's `Ai.run` result and the optional\n `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` binding both failed strict checks — the route now\n returns a structured `503` when the producer binding is missing instead\n of crashing.\n- **snake_case relationship tables:** relationship/arrow emitters imported\n the camelCase identifier where the generated file exports the verbatim\n table name (`export { event_guests }`) — TS2724 for any snake_case\n relationship table. Imports now alias the real export\n (`event_guests as eventGuests`).\n\n## v0.44.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### Scope carry-forward is now bounded (revocation fix)\n\nThe auth middleware's rolling refresh re-signs a verified `scope` claim on\nevery authed call without re-probing the relationship — that's what lets a\nscoped session ride past the short JWT TTL with zero per-request DB cost. But\nunbounded, it defeated the revocation model the docs promised: a removed\nguest/staff who kept polling got a fresh TTL on every request, so \"removal\ntakes effect within one TTL\" only held for *idle* clients, and the refresh\nalso bypassed the ≤180s scope-token ceiling (it re-signed with the raw\n`auth.jwt.expiresIn`).\n\nScope tokens now carry a proof timestamp (`sct`), stamped exclusively by the\nproven mint sites (`POST /scope/v1/enter` and the namespace resolver, via the\nshared mint helper). The rolling refresh:\n\n- **refuses once the claim's proof is older than the carry-forward cap\n (15 minutes)** — past it, the token expires within one TTL and the client\n re-proves via `enter` or any minting namespace route, which won't re-mint a\n revoked role. Worst-case post-revocation window for an active client:\n **cap + one TTL** from the last real proof, instead of unbounded.\n- **carries `sct` forward verbatim** — the refresh can never restart the\n window without an actual relationship probe. Claims without `sct`\n (pre-0.44 tokens) fail closed and simply stop refreshing.\n- **signs through the same ≤180s ceiling as the mint sites** — an\n `auth.jwt.expiresIn` above the ceiling no longer leaks into scope-bearing\n tokens via the refresh path.\n\nNo client changes needed: tokens renew exactly as before inside the window,\nand re-entering is the existing flow. For tables where even the capped window\nis too wide, gate with a `via` arm (live relationship subquery per request)\ninstead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm; immediate revocation\n(`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`) remains on the roadmap.\n\n## v0.43.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Better Auth 1.6\n\nGenerated projects are now pinned to Better Auth **1.6**. The `agents.mcp.requireAuth` work in 0.42.0 surfaced a long-standing version drift: the compiler emitted `better-auth: ^1.5.0`, but `@better-auth/oauth-provider` resolves a tree that requires `@better-auth/core ^1.6.14` and imports `@better-auth/core/utils/host` + `/redirect-uri` — subpaths that only exist in 1.6.x. The result was a `wrangler deploy` that failed at bundle time with `Could not resolve …` and never uploaded.\n\nThis release aligns the **entire** Better Auth dependency set to a coherent 1.6.9 floor so npm resolves one consistent tree:\n\n- `better-auth`, `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter`, `@better-auth/api-key`, `@better-auth/passkey`, `@better-auth/oauth-provider` → `^1.6.9` (generated projects, the baked Docker deps, and the bundled CMS/Account SPAs).\n- Added an explicit `kysely ^0.28.16` pin: Better Auth 1.6's migrator imports `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_TABLE` / `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_LOCK_TABLE` from kysely but doesn't *declare* kysely, so the Worker bundle needs it pinned directly.\n\nNo code migration was required — Quickback already uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (not the now-deprecated OIDC Provider plugin), and emits no `freshAge`/SAML usage affected by 1.6's behavioral changes. Verified end to end: a `requireAuth` project and a normal project both `npm install` a clean 1.6.14 tree and bundle with `wrangler deploy --dry-run` with zero resolution errors.\n\n### Larger migration histories no longer hit the upload ceiling\n\nLong-lived projects accumulate one full-schema drizzle snapshot per migration, and the whole cumulative meta payload (snapshots + journals + `.sql`, across both the auth and features dirs) is re-sent on **every** compile — even a no-schema-change one. Projects with deep migration histories were hitting the compiler's `existingFiles` size limit and failing to compile, with no schema drift and nothing to fix on their end.\n\nThe server-side ceilings are raised so this is no longer the binding constraint:\n\n- `existingFiles` payload: **4 MiB → 16 MiB**\n- total request body: **8 MiB → 32 MiB** (kept above the per-category limits so it doesn't trip first)\n\nThis is enforced entirely on the compiler, so no CLI upgrade is needed — the new headroom applies as soon as `compiler.quickback.dev` is on this release.\n\n### Custom response headers (`security.headers`)\n\nThe generated Worker emitted a fixed set of security headers (CSP, HSTS,\n`X-Content-Type-Options`, …) with no supported way to add your own — teams that\nwanted, say, an `X-Server-Version` build stamp on every response had to\npost-patch the generated middleware after each compile.\n\nNew `security.headers` sets arbitrary response headers natively. Values are\nstatic strings or templates interpolating per-deploy Worker env vars via the\n`{{env.VAR_NAME}}` token:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n headers: {\n // Both vars must be set, or the header is omitted entirely.\n 'X-Server-Version': '{{env.SERVER_VERSION}}+{{env.SERVER_BUILD}}',\n 'X-Powered-By': 'Quickback',\n },\n}\n```\n\n- **Omit-if-unset** — a header that references env vars is emitted only when\n *every* referenced var is set (non-empty) at runtime. A Worker that forgot to\n inject the var emits no header, never `X-Server-Version: undefined`. Static\n headers are always emitted.\n- The value is read from `c.env` per request, so it picks up whatever Worker\n var is injected at deploy time — nothing is baked at compile time.\n- **Managed headers are rejected** — names owned by a dedicated `security` field\n (CSP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, …) error at compile so the\n two emitters can't race. Malformed `{{env…}}` tokens error too, rather than\n leaking literal braces into the wire header.\n\nSurvives a clean `quickback compile` with no post-processing. See\n[Security Headers → Custom response headers](/compiler/config/security#custom-response-headers).\n\n## v0.42.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Interactive OAuth for the generated MCP server\n\nMCP connectors (Claude, Cursor, …) could only connect to a generated `/mcp`\nendpoint **anonymously** — they never launched a sign-in flow, so auth-gated\ntools stayed invisible. The OAuth machinery was already present (Better Auth's\n`oauth-provider` ships `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`, `/register` + PKCE under\n`/auth/v1`); the compiler just never let a connector discover or trigger it.\n\nNew `agents.mcp.requireAuth` makes the MCP surface authenticated-only:\n\n```ts\nagents: { mcp: { requireAuth: true } },\n```\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler:\n\n- **Challenges unauthenticated `/mcp`** with `401` + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer\n resource_metadata=\"…\"` ([RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728) §5.1) — the signal connectors use to start OAuth.\n- **Force-enables `oauthProvider` + `bearer`**, so `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`,\n and `/register` ([RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) dynamic client registration) exist with PKCE.\n- **Delegates `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`** to Better Auth's real\n metadata instead of a hand-rolled stub that advertised a non-existent\n authorization endpoint.\n- Adds the `<origin>/mcp` resource to `validAudiences`\n ([RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707)) so the connector's access token isn't rejected.\n\nLogin and consent are served by your Account SPA, so users authenticate with\nwhatever methods you already enabled. Default is unchanged (anonymous public\ntools); set `requireAuth: true` for servers meant for authenticated users.\n\n## v0.40.2 — June 3, 2026\n\n### Passwordless plugins can no longer bypass the signup gate\n\nBetter Auth's `emailOtp` and `magicLink` plugins auto-create an account when a\ncode/link is verified for an unknown email — and that path is independent of\n`emailAndPassword.disableSignUp`. As a result, `account.auth.signup: false`\nclosed `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` but left OTP / magic-link verification as an\nopen back-door for account creation.\n\nThe compiler now emits each plugin's own `disableSignUp` flag, and new\nper-plugin options expose it directly:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: {\n emailOtp: { disableSignUp: true }, // OTP sign-in only; unknown emails rejected\n magicLink: { disableSignUp: true }, // same for magic links\n },\n}),\n```\n\nBoth default to following the global gate: setting `account.auth.signup: false`\n(→ `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`) now also gates the OTP and magic-link\npaths automatically. Set `{ disableSignUp: false }` on a plugin explicitly to\nkeep its sign-up open while password sign-up stays closed.\n\n## v0.40.1 — June 2, 2026\n\n- The generated `wrangler.toml` and `Env` type now emit the `ASSETS` binding\n type for projects that mount SPAs (CMS / Account), so handler code that\n references `c.env.ASSETS` typechecks.\n- Compiler Docker builds preserve their layer cache across rebuilds, cutting\n local recompile time.\n\n## v0.40.0 — June 2, 2026\n\nR2 file storage is now **presign-only by default**. Adding\n`defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` emits just the `ctx.storage` signer — no\nFILES_DB database, no `/storage/v1/*` endpoints, no files worker. You sign\npresigned URLs against a bucket and store references in your own table. The\nturnkey managed subsystem is still available, now behind `managed: true`.\n\nThis decouples the lightweight primitive from the heavyweight subsystem so you\ncan add uploads without standing up a metadata database you don't use.\n\n### Presign-only by default; managed is opt-in\n\n```ts\n// Presign-only (default) — ctx.storage against a bucket, nothing else\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { bucketName: \"my-app-media\" })\n\n// Managed subsystem — FILES_DB + /storage/v1/* + files worker\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { managed: true })\n```\n\n- New projects can omit `bucketName` — it defaults to `<project>-media`, so\n setup is one `wrangler r2 bucket create` plus the R2 API-token secrets.\n- Existing projects set `bucketName` to a bucket they already have. Presign-only\n emits **no** R2 bucket binding and **no** FILES_DB binding — nothing to\n provision, nothing to migrate.\n\n### Per-call bucket + custom secret names\n\n```ts\n// Sign against a different bucket than the configured default\nawait storage.signPutUrl(key, { bucket: \"my-app-public\", contentType });\n```\n\nIf your project already stores R2 credentials under different env-var names,\nmap them so the signer reads yours:\n\n```ts\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", {\n bucketName: \"my-app-media\",\n presign: { accountIdEnv: \"CF_ACCOUNT_ID\", accessKeyIdEnv: \"S3_KEY\", secretAccessKeyEnv: \"S3_SECRET\" },\n})\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n- `maxFileSize` now accepts a human string (`\"100mb\"`, `\"5gb\"`) as well as a\n number of bytes — previously a string emitted invalid TypeScript.\n- Presign-only no longer emits a stray `FILES_DB` `[[d1_databases]]` block (with\n an invalid `database_id = \"local-files\"`) into `wrangler.toml`, which would\n have made `wrangler deploy` reject the worker.\n\n## v0.39.1 — June 2, 2026\n\nDeduplicate colliding OpenAPI `operationId`s. The auto-generated list id\n`list\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
6
+ "content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Rate limiting — the fifth security pillar\n\nPer-operation request caps on every CRUD endpoint, backed by Cloudflare's\nnative [Rate Limiting binding](/compiler/definitions/rate-limit) — no extra\nstorage, no third-party libraries. Applied to every resource by default\n(read 1000/60s, write 200/60s), overridable per-op, per-resource, or\nproject-wide; `false` opts out at any scope.\n\n- One middleware per feature router maps method→op, keys the limit by\n `<resource>:<op>:<userId>` (falling back to the client IP for anonymous\n callers), and returns `429` + `Retry-After` when over the cap.\n- Unique `(limit, period)` tuples collapse onto shared bindings — a project\n that never declares `rateLimit` ships exactly two (`RL_1000_60`,\n `RL_200_60`), emitted as GA `[[ratelimits]]` blocks in `wrangler.toml` and\n typed `RateLimit` on `CloudflareBindings`.\n- `period` is compile-time constrained to `10` or `60` (Cloudflare binding\n limit); the check no-ops when a binding is absent, so local dev never\n hard-depends on it.\n\n### Envelope encryption — `q.text().encrypted()` (encryption pillar, Phase 1)\n\nMark a text column `.encrypted()` and it is AES-256-GCM-encrypted at rest\nunder a **per-organization key**: a database breach (backup, export, leaked\ntoken, SQL injection, insider read) yields only ciphertext for that column.\nSee [Encryption](/compiler/definitions/encryption).\n\n- Per-org DEKs live wrapped under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret in a\n compiler-owned `org_data_keys` table (lazily created, versioned for\n rotation). Deleting an org's row **crypto-shreds** every value it wrote.\n- One write chokepoint: CRUD, batch, and action-layer `db.insert/update`\n all encrypt through the audit wrapper — audit snapshots, webhook\n payloads, and realtime deltas carry ciphertext by construction.\n- Reads decrypt behind the firewall then apply masking; encrypted columns\n are compile-time excluded from `?search`/`?filter`/`?sort`, view query\n allowlists, and embedding sources.\n- `ctx.crypto.encrypt/decrypt` for explicit server-side processing in\n actions; boot guard refuses to serve without the KEK (503 `MISSING_ENV`);\n scaffolded `.dev.vars` now includes a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK`.\n- The sealed (E2EE) and vault tiers remain compile-gated until built —\n roadmap in `apps/compiler/research/encryption-vault-spec.md`.\n\n### Postgres-style table triggers (`defineTable` / `feature` `triggers:`)\n\nTables can now declare `before`/`after` triggers on `insert`/`update`/\n`delete`, with two lowering lanes and a per-trigger compile report. See\n[Triggers](/compiler/definitions/triggers) for the full reference.\n\n- **`sql:` entries** compile to real SQLite `CREATE TRIGGER` statements,\n shipped in the journaled features migration (content-addressed — an\n unchanged trigger set appends nothing; removing a trigger drops it on the\n next migrate). They fire for **every** write path including raw SQL, run\n atomically with the triggering statement (the only transactional option\n on D1), support `when:` guards and `RAISE(ABORT, ...)` rejection, and\n `OLD.`/`NEW.` column references are validated at compile time. The\n compiler owns the `BEGIN`/`END` frame — emitted uppercase, since\n lowercase `begin` breaks remote D1's statement splitter. On soft-delete\n tables, `*Delete` events map to the `deleted_at` transition (plus a\n hard-delete variant) and `*Update` events exclude it, so a soft delete\n fires delete triggers exactly once. D1 only.\n- **`handler:` entries** run as application hooks at the audit-wrapper\n write chokepoint (REST CRUD + actions). `before*` hooks are synchronous\n and can mutate the payload or throw to reject — the write never executes\n and the request gets `TRIGGER_REJECTED` (422); audit fields are\n re-stamped after hooks and cannot be forged. `after*` hooks run once per\n returned row and are **awaited** — a throw surfaces as\n `TRIGGER_AFTER_FAILED` (500) with `details.committed: true` since the\n write already persisted. Handlers get `{ table, op, values|row, ctx, db,\n env }`; the `db` is audit-wrapped at cascade depth + 1, so hook writes\n stamp audit fields, emit live-view deltas, and fire nested triggers,\n bounded by a depth cap of 5. Each table's drizzle object is auto-imported\n into the generated registry under its authored name, and handler imports\n are usage-filtered and hoisted.\n\nThe compile output includes a lowering/coverage report and fail-closed\nwarnings: `handler:` triggers do **not** fire for queue handlers, cron, or\nraw SQL — guards that must hold universally should use `sql:` +\n`RAISE(ABORT)`. `async: true` (queue-dispatched after-hooks) and\n`withOld: true` (previous-row access) are reserved and rejected at compile\ntime until they ship.\n\nAlso in this change:\n\n- New `trigger` error layer with `TRIGGER_REJECTED` / `TRIGGER_AFTER_FAILED`\n codes in the generated error catalog, OpenAPI spec, and SDK types.\n- Parser: function-valued properties in `defineTable`/`feature` configs now\n parse as compile-time source carriers instead of failing the whole config\n with \"no dynamic expressions\" — unblocks trigger handlers (and\n function-form `access:` / custom masks) through the CLI source path.\n- Fixed a column-injection bug where a comment merely mentioning a column\n name (e.g. `\"deleted_at\"` in a docblock) suppressed audit/soft-delete\n column injection for the table.\n- Fixed a silent no-op: a project declaring `services/queues/*.ts` handlers\n without embeddings or `additionalQueues` deployed a wired `queue` export\n with no `[[queues.consumers]]` to feed it — the handlers were dead code.\n The primary queue (and its typed env binding) is now emitted for\n handlers-only projects, with a compile notice that Cloudflare Queues\n requires the paid Workers plan. Queue emission remains strictly opt-in by\n usage: projects with no queue-backed features (embeddings, queue\n handlers, `additionalQueues`, webhooks) emit no queue configuration and\n deploy on the free plan.\n## v0.47.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: zero-false-positive analyzer checks are now compile errors\n\nThe authz/authn analyzer (v0.37) shipped warn-only. After a release cycle of\ndata, the checks whose every trip is a definite misconfiguration — never a\nlegitimate config — are **promoted to compile errors**. Warnings nobody is\nforced to read are documentation; the pillar guarantees are now enforced.\n\n**Breaking** — a config that previously compiled with one of these warnings\nnow fails the compile:\n\n- `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` — a permission that is structurally unsatisfiable\n (`allOf(a, not(a))`: a fact AND its exact negation at the same AND-level).\n- `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` — a resource's firewall grants a\n `scope:<kind>:<role>` role access beyond its capability profile (or the\n role has no profile at all). This is the M0.2 pillar guarantee — it was\n authored as an error all along and is now enforced.\n- `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT`,\n `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY`,\n `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` — the structural-authn set (route auth coverage,\n bearer-only `/mcp`/agent surfaces + INTERNAL unreachability, mint↔verify\n key/issuer/audience pairing, anchored credential delivery, verifier-only\n identity claims). These still run against empty route/credential metadata\n on a real compile (no-ops until the generators emit it), but the severity\n contract is locked in now — they fail the build the moment they can fire.\n\nThe heuristic/advisory checks are unchanged: `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM`,\n`AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE`, `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW`, and\n`AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` stay warnings; `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` stays an info\nreport. `QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true` still promotes those warnings too.\n\n**The override escape hatch** — every promoted finding can be explicitly\naccepted, per finding, with a required reason:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n analyzer: {\n allow: [\n {\n check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',\n target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer', // from the rendered finding\n reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nAn override downgrades that exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning\nthat cites the reason — even under strict mode (it's an explicit, reasoned\nacceptance). Every rendered error prints its exact override recipe. Guard\nrails: `check` must be one of the promoted ids (unknown or keep-warn ids are\nrejected at config validation), `reason` is required, and an `allow` entry\nthat matches no current finding is itself a compile error — no dead\noverrides accumulating after the underlying issue is fixed.\n\nAnalyzer-internal defects are still fail-open: a bug in the analyzer itself\ndowngrades to a single warning and the compile continues. Only real findings\nfail builds.\n\n### CLI: live views now compile through the CLI\n\n`defineView` files under `quickback/services/views/` were never loaded by\nthe CLI — the compile payload simply omitted them, so\n[live views](/stack/realtime/live-views) (v0.35) only worked when driving\nthe compiler API directly. The CLI now discovers and ships them like every\nother service definition, and the compile summary counts them\n(`Loaded services: … 1 live view(s)`). If you declared views and wondered\nwhy no surface ever went live: upgrade the CLI and recompile.\n\n### CLI: deterministic compile output across machines\n\nFeature and service discovery used raw `readdir` order, which differs\nbetween macOS and Linux — route registration order, schema re-exports,\nOpenAPI paths, and the Neon RLS document's content hash could all churn when\nthe same project was recompiled on a different machine. All discovery sites\nnow sort by codepoint, so the same input compiles to the same bytes\neverywhere. Expect a one-time diff on the first recompile if your previous\noutput was generated in a different filesystem order.\n\n### Fixes\n\n- Read-only resources (no `crud` block) generated routes importing a\n `CRUD_ACCESS` symbol their resource file never exported — a tsc/bundle\n break. The export is now unconditional.\n- The `blog` starter template gated writes on the removed `ADMIN`\n pseudo-role, which hard-fails current compiles; it now uses the\n org-membership `admin` role.\n- `reports/operations.manifest.json` and `reports/conformance.manifest.json`\n now also cover the realtime (`/broadcast/v1`), storage (`/storage/v1`),\n and FGA (`/fga/v1`) surfaces.\n- The dead free/pro tier plumbing is gone: no Tier row in\n `quickback whoami`, no upsell copy at login. Compiling complete projects\n requires login, exactly as before — there was never a paid gate behind it.\n- The CLI is published to npm via trusted publishing (GitHub OIDC) — signed\n provenance, no long-lived npm token in the pipeline.\n\n## v0.46.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: \"no organization context\" responses unified on HTTP 403\n\nGenerated APIs used to answer the same semantic condition — *the caller has no\nactive organization context* — with two different statuses: `400 ORG_REQUIRED`\nfrom the collection list guard and the create/PUT/batch org validation, but\n`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG` from standalone actions and `403\nACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` from unsafe org-scoped actions. Clients and SDKs\nhad to special-case the split.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required; every \"no org context\" denial is\nnow **403**:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/<resource>` (and views) without an active org or\n `?organizationId=` → `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- `POST /`, `PUT /:id`, `POST /batch`, `PUT /batch` without an active org →\n `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- Standalone actions (`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG`) and unsafe org-scoped actions\n (`403 ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED`) were already 403 and are unchanged.\n\nError **codes are unchanged** — `ORG_REQUIRED`, `ACCESS_NO_ORG`, and\n`ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` keep their identities, so clients that\ndiscriminate on `code` need no changes. Only clients that branch on the raw\n`400` status for these responses must update to `403`.\n\n### Breaking: root-mounted actions lose their nested alias URLs\n\nA standalone action whose declared `path:` lives outside its feature prefix\n(e.g. `path: \"/reports/orders\"` in the `orders` feature) mounts at the root:\n`/api/v1/reports/orders`. That root URL is the one the OpenAPI spec, the MCP\nsurface, and the operations manifest have always advertised — but the\ngenerated per-feature routes file *also* carried an undocumented, fully-gated\ncopy at the nested `/api/v1/<feature><path>` URL (e.g.\n`/api/v1/orders/reports/orders`).\n\n**Breaking** — the nested alias is no longer emitted. One URL per operation:\na root-mounted action exists only at its advertised `/api/v1<path>` mount.\nAnything calling the unadvertised nested URL gets a 404 after recompile +\nredeploy; switch to the documented root URL. Actions declared *under* the\nfeature prefix are untouched, and a feature whose standalone actions are all\nroot-mounted no longer emits an (empty) feature actions routes file.\n\n### Behavior change: `PUBLIC` inside `or:` arms admits anonymous callers\n\n[Access](/compiler/definitions/access) has always documented `PUBLIC` as\nworking on every access node, but the emitted auth gate only honored it in a\nflat `roles: [...]` list. A tree like\n\n```ts\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n { roles: [\"admin\"] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nstill answered anonymous callers with `401`. The auth gate is now tree-aware\nand matches the documented semantics: a `PUBLIC` `or:` arm admits anonymous\ncallers past the authentication gate (an `and:` group admits them only when\n*every* arm does), and the access / org / firewall layers still evaluate the\nfull tree. One shared predicate now drives the emitted gates, the OpenAPI\n`security` blocks, and view routes (which gate per view on the\nview-effective access).\n\n**Worth a loud note:** if you have a nested `PUBLIC` arm that was silently\n401-ing, that endpoint becomes anonymously reachable after recompile —\nexactly what the config declares, but verify it's what you meant. `PUBLIC`\naudit logging applies to the newly-admitted routes as usual.\n\n### Realtime broadcasts now enforce `requiredRoles` and masking\n\nA table's declared realtime gates weren't being applied to the generated\nCRUD broadcasts: `realtime: { requiredRoles: [...] }` and column masking were\nhonored on the HTTP surface but not on the WebSocket fanout. The docs\npromised per-role, masked realtime delivery; the generated broadcasts now\nmatch it. **Recompile and redeploy** any project using realtime on\nrole-gated or masked tables.\n\nGenerated `realtime.insert / update / delete` calls now carry:\n\n- **`targetRoles`** — the table's `realtime.requiredRoles` (post role-\n hierarchy `+` expansion), enforced per subscriber at fanout.\n- **`maskingConfig`** — serialized from the same effective masking\n (declared + auto-detected sensitive columns) the HTTP mask functions are\n generated from. What HTTP masks is what the WebSocket wire masks.\n\nLive-view `view_changes` deltas honor the same table-level `requiredRoles`\nat fanout, so a role-gated table can't leak through a\n[live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) subscription either.\n\nNotes:\n\n- Recompile suffices — no config change needed.\n- If you worked around this with hand-written `realtime.*` calls passing\n `targetRoles` / `maskingConfig`, those workaround broadcasts can be\n removed.\n- `type: 'custom'` mask functions can't ride the wire — the Broadcaster\n fails closed and broadcasts `[REDACTED]` for those columns.\n- Tables without `requiredRoles` or masking are byte-identical: the open\n broadcast default is unchanged.\n\n### Batch operations inherit the base operation's access\n\nWhen a batch operation was declared without its own `access`, it didn't pick\nup the base operation's role requirement:\n\n```ts\ncrud: {\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n batchUpdate: { maxBatchSize: 25 }, // ← no access of its own\n}\n```\n\nA batch config declared without `access` now inherits the base operation's\naccess at compile time — fail closed, so runtime, the OpenAPI spec, and the\ngenerated code all agree. Explicit batch `access` still wins (including\nper-side on upserts); a base op without access still yields an\nauthenticated-only batch op. The flat `update: { batch: true }` shape and\nauto-promoted batch ops were never affected. **Recompile and redeploy** if\nyou use the explicit-batch shape without per-batch access.\n\n### Record actions, PUT upserts, and legacy firewall arms fail closed\n\nThree fail-closed hardening fixes, found and verified against the new\nconformance catalog (route × principal expectations derived from the\ncompiler's own IR — see the\n[conformance manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest)).\nAll apply on recompile + redeploy; no config change needed:\n\n- **Record actions evaluate the role gate before fetching the record**, so\n the denial response no longer varies with record state — a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`. (Bulk actions already had this order; unsafe\n actions write their audit row on the pre-record denial.)\n- **PUT upsert treats an out-of-scope id as a firewall miss** (`403` reveal /\n `404` hide, per your firewall error mode; a standard 207 miss entry on\n `PUT /batch`) instead of routing it into the create path. Genuinely new\n ids keep the create path.\n- **Legacy (array-form) firewall arms deny cleanly when a bound context\n claim is absent at runtime** (e.g. no active org), rather than surfacing a\n database error — the same deny-when-absent behavior the explicit `all:` /\n `any:` group forms already had.\n\n### Root-mounted standalone actions use the standard gate stack\n\nStandalone actions mounted outside their feature prefix\n(`path: \"/reports/orders\"`) were emitted through a separate code path that\ndid not apply the full access / audit / scoped-database treatment that\nin-feature standalone actions receive. They now render through the same\ngenerator, so the same access checks, security-audit writes, and\ntenant-scoped database wrapping apply everywhere. If you use root-mounted\nstandalone actions, recompile and redeploy. (Unifying the two code paths is\nalso what surfaced the two breaking changes above.)\n\n### Namespace routing fixes\n\n- An action whose declared `path` exactly equals its namespace prefix is now\n claimed by the namespace like any nested action (Hono's `/x/*` mount\n already matched the bare `/x`) — it's served through the namespace's gate\n instead of carrying a second inline copy of the resolver.\n- A namespace with zero claimed standalone actions (e.g. record-based-only)\n no longer mounts its middleware at all — a dead gate can no longer\n intercept requests under its prefix.\n\n### Custom org roles work with Better Auth member management\n\nCustom roles referenced in access trees (e.g. `roles: [\"support\"]`) are now\nauto-registered with the Better Auth organization plugin. They were already\nenforceable on routes but unprovisionable through Better Auth —\n`invite-member` / `update-member-role` rejected them with\n`400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, so there was no supported way to actually give a\nmember the role. Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent permissions\n(this is about assignability; your access trees remain the authorization\nmodel). If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization plugin\noptions, those win and auto-registration is skipped. Built-in, pseudo, and\n`scope:` roles are excluded; projects with no custom roles emit\nbyte-identical output.\n\n### snake_case tables: dropped record actions and broken helpers fixed\n\nTwo fixes for tables declared with snake_case names (`event_notes`):\n\n- The generated `.quickback/define-action.ts` helpers imported the camelCase\n identifier while the generated alias file exports the verbatim declared\n name (`export { event_notes }`) — a TS2724 compile failure for any\n snake_case table with action files. The helpers now import the real export\n aliased to the camelCase local.\n- Record actions on a snake-declared table living in a kebab-named feature\n file (`event-notes/actions/pin.ts`) were not emitted — missing from both\n the generated routes and OpenAPI. They now emit and document consistently.\n\nIf you have snake_case tables with record actions, recompiling **adds routes\nthat previously didn't exist** — review the new surface.\n\n### First-class MCP OAuth config: `auth.oauth`\n\nThe OAuth 2.1 surface behind `agents.mcp.requireAuth` (v0.42.0) gains a\nfirst-class config block — env-resolvable issuer / login / consent URLs,\nscopes, RFC 8707 audiences, and a dynamic-client-registration toggle:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n oauth: {\n enabled: true,\n issuerUrl: { env: \"OAUTH_ISSUER_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/auth/v1\" },\n loginPage: { env: \"OAUTH_LOGIN_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/login\" },\n consentPage: { env: \"OAUTH_CONSENT_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/consent\" },\n scopes: [\"openid\", \"profile\", \"email\", \"offline_access\"],\n audiences: [{ env: \"OAUTH_MCP_AUDIENCE\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/mcp\" }],\n allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,\n },\n}),\n```\n\nSetting it auto-enables the `oauthProvider`, `jwt`, and `bearer` plugins,\nemits the RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 discovery documents, and accepts the\nprovider's JWKS-signed access tokens in the standard auth middleware. A new\nproject hook, `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`, lets you derive\ntenant fields (`activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` / roles) from the validated\nOAuth identity. On Neon, the auth schema is now owned by the Better Auth CLI\nend to end (the compiler no longer emits its placeholder `src/auth/schema.ts`\nor `src/lib/neon.ts`). See\n[OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)\nand [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks#oauth-context-resolver).\n\n### Neon RLS covers force-enabled plugin tables\n\nOn Neon, row-level-security policies are generated for the Better Auth\ntables. The list of tables receiving policies was derived from your declared\nauth config and didn't account for plugins the compiler force-enables\nautomatically — so some auth-owned tables could be created without RLS\npolicies. The list now derives from the fully resolved plugin set, so every\ngenerated auth table receives appropriate policies (self-scoped where there\nis a clear owner, service-role-only otherwise — fail closed). The RLS\nmigration is content-addressed, so the update arrives as a new journaled\nentry on the next recompile + `db:migrate`. **Neon projects should recompile\nand run `db:migrate`.**\n\n### New compile reports: operations + conformance manifests\n\nEvery compile now writes two machine-readable reports next to\n`openapi.json`:\n\n- **`reports/operations.manifest.json`** — a stable, sorted index of every\n operation: `{ operationId, method, path, auth, feature, kind }`, covering\n the resource, action, view, auth, realtime, storage, and FGA surfaces. An\n extend-only public contract — the recommended integration point for\n scripting against the generated surface.\n- **`reports/conformance.manifest.json`** — for each route × principal\n class, the expected outcome (allow / 401 / 403 / cross-tenant miss …),\n derived from the same IR the emitters consume. This is the artifact the\n conformance fixes above were found and verified against.\n\nThe OpenAPI generator itself now reads the same IR as the route emitters, so\nthe spec follows the emitted surface by construction — including four\naccuracy fixes: `PUT /{id}` is documented only when actually enabled, the\nbatch surface documents the emitter's auto-promotion + access inheritance,\nand views document their effective (view-level, falling back to read-level)\naccess. See\n[Operations manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest).\n\n## v0.45.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'` — sub-TTL JWT revocation\n\nThe JWT fast-path trusts signed claims for their full lifetime — that's what\nmakes it a fast-path. Until now the only revocation bounds were the TTL\n(plain claims) and the carry-forward cap (scope claims, v0.44.0). The\nlong-promised `'kv'` mode is now real on the **Cloudflare runtime**:\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { revocationCheck: 'kv' } }\n```\n\n- **Per-principal revocation timestamps, not per-token denylists.** A\n revocation event writes \"everything for this principal minted before now is\n dead\" to the project's **existing `KV` binding** (keys prefixed `qbrev:`) —\n nothing extra to provision. Entries self-expire after the maximum token\n lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n- **The bearer fast-path checks before trusting.** A verified token whose\n `iat` (or `sct`, for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored\n timestamp is rejected and falls through to session auth, which re-checks\n membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers\n transparently. Costs 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify; the\n explicit trade the opt-in buys.\n- **Written automatically where revocation actually happens:** org-member\n removal and role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`), and\n UPDATE/DELETE of scope-conferring relationship rows — through the same\n audit-wrapper write chokepoint Live Views uses, plus the single DELETE\n route (which has the row in hand but no `.returning()`). Revoke-on-touch:\n a false positive just forces a cheap re-prove.\n- **User bans flip automatically.** The Better Auth admin plugin's ban lands\n as a user-row update, so a generated `databaseHooks.user.update.after` hook\n stamps the user-level revocation the moment `banned` flips — every\n outstanding JWT dies on its next use, and the cookie/session path already\n rejects banned sessions, completing the lockout. When outbound webhooks are\n configured, the same hook emits a `user.banned` event so subscribed\n endpoints are notified.\n- **App-code helpers** for everything else: `src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts`\n exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens`\n (e.g. call `revokeUserTokens` from a custom revoke-all flow).\n- **Fails open.** A KV outage degrades revocation to the TTL /\n carry-forward-cap bound — it never locks every bearer out.\n\nBun/Node + `'kv'` fails at compile time with a clear message (the store rides\nthe Cloudflare KV binding; those runtimes own immediate-revoke via the\ncookie/session path). Default remains `'none'`; without the flag the emitted\nmiddleware is byte-identical to v0.44.0.\n\n### Neon: `npm run db:migrate` now applies the RLS layer\n\nThe RLS SQL (helper functions, policies, triggers) used to be emitted as\norphaned `drizzle/migrations/0099–0102` files that no tool ever applied —\n`db:migrate` ran the schema migrations and silently skipped the security\nlayer. The RLS document now rides the journaled drizzle set in\n`quickback/drizzle/` as a content-addressed migration\n(`<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>`), so one `npm run db:migrate` applies schema\n**and** security, in dependency order. The migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create), so it converges over databases where\nthe old files were applied by hand; an unchanged security config appends\nnothing (the journal stays byte-stable across recompiles), and a changed one\nappends a new content-addressed entry — append-only, like every other\nmigration. Existing Neon projects: recompile + `db:migrate`, nothing breaks.\n\n### Neon: `user_sessions` is real, and the SQL layer speaks TEXT ids\n\n`get_active_org_id()` — the helper every org-scoped RLS policy reads — was\nquerying a `public.user_sessions` table that **no migration created**, and\nthe helper layer was typed `uuid` against Better Auth's TEXT ids\n(`org_abc123`), which would throw on first contact. Now:\n\n- `user_sessions` is compiler-owned migration state\n (`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by the normal journaled flow\n with a FK to the users table — outside `src/auth/schema.ts`, which the\n Better Auth CLI rewrites.\n- Generated Better Auth session hooks mirror the session's active\n organization (and team, in teams mode) into it on create/update.\n Switching to \"no org\" nulls it through — SQL-side access revokes, fail\n closed.\n- The RLS helper layer (`get_active_org_id`, `get_active_team_id`,\n `is_owner`, the audit helpers) is TEXT-typed to match Better Auth ids.\n- Policies for Better Auth's own tables use the plural physical names the\n BA CLI actually generates on Neon, and BA tables no longer get Quickback\n audit triggers for columns they don't have.\n\n### Hard deletes wire into the audit pipeline correctly\n\nTwo codegen bugs around `delete: { mode: 'hard' }`:\n\n- Firewall auto-detection emitted an `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate for\n tables with no soft-delete column — every read on a hard-delete table\n referenced a column that doesn't exist.\n- Hard-delete routes import the `logHardDelete` audit helper, but the helper\n file was only emitted when the project also had unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions\n — a project with hard deletes and neither failed at deploy time. Hard\n deletes are now a first-class trigger of the security-audit pipeline\n (helper file, `AUDIT_DB` binding, env types, audit migration); on D1 that\n means [`auditDatabaseId`](/compiler/config/providers) is required, and the\n compile error says so.\n\n### Generated output is now typechecked — with the first crop of fixes\n\nEvery compiler change now compiles a matrix of fixture projects and runs\n`tsc` + `wrangler deploy --dry-run` against the **generated output** — the\nclass of bug where the compiler emits syntactically valid TypeScript that\nfails downstream. The first runs caught real ones, all fixed here:\n\n- **Neon:** `src/db/org.schema.ts` re-exported tables that don't exist after\n the Better Auth CLI's plural rewrite; a missing `AuthDatabase` type\n export; transaction callbacks typed bare `(tx)` failing `noImplicitAny`;\n the auth middleware's member-table fallback hardcoded the singular name.\n- **Embeddings:** the queue consumer's `Ai.run` result and the optional\n `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` binding both failed strict checks — the route now\n returns a structured `503` when the producer binding is missing instead\n of crashing.\n- **snake_case relationship tables:** relationship/arrow emitters imported\n the camelCase identifier where the generated file exports the verbatim\n table name (`export { event_guests }`) — TS2724 for any snake_case\n relationship table. Imports now alias the real export\n (`event_guests as eventGuests`).\n\n## v0.44.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### Scope carry-forward is now bounded (revocation fix)\n\nThe auth middleware's rolling refresh re-signs a verified `scope` claim on\nevery authed call without re-probing the relationship — that's what lets a\nscoped session ride past the short JWT TTL with zero per-request DB cost. But\nunbounded, it defeated the revocation model the docs promised: a removed\nguest/staff who kept polling got a fresh TTL on every request, so \"removal\ntakes effect within one TTL\" only held for *idle* clients, and the refresh\nalso bypassed the ≤180s scope-token ceiling (it re-signed with the raw\n`auth.jwt.expiresIn`).\n\nScope tokens now carry a proof timestamp (`sct`), stamped exclusively by the\nproven mint sites (`POST /scope/v1/enter` and the namespace resolver, via the\nshared mint helper). The rolling refresh:\n\n- **refuses once the claim's proof is older than the carry-forward cap\n (15 minutes)** — past it, the token expires within one TTL and the client\n re-proves via `enter` or any minting namespace route, which won't re-mint a\n revoked role. Worst-case post-revocation window for an active client:\n **cap + one TTL** from the last real proof, instead of unbounded.\n- **carries `sct` forward verbatim** — the refresh can never restart the\n window without an actual relationship probe. Claims without `sct`\n (pre-0.44 tokens) fail closed and simply stop refreshing.\n- **signs through the same ≤180s ceiling as the mint sites** — an\n `auth.jwt.expiresIn` above the ceiling no longer leaks into scope-bearing\n tokens via the refresh path.\n\nNo client changes needed: tokens renew exactly as before inside the window,\nand re-entering is the existing flow. For tables where even the capped window\nis too wide, gate with a `via` arm (live relationship subquery per request)\ninstead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm; immediate revocation\n(`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`) remains on the roadmap.\n\n## v0.43.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Better Auth 1.6\n\nGenerated projects are now pinned to Better Auth **1.6**. The `agents.mcp.requireAuth` work in 0.42.0 surfaced a long-standing version drift: the compiler emitted `better-auth: ^1.5.0`, but `@better-auth/oauth-provider` resolves a tree that requires `@better-auth/core ^1.6.14` and imports `@better-auth/core/utils/host` + `/redirect-uri` — subpaths that only exist in 1.6.x. The result was a `wrangler deploy` that failed at bundle time with `Could not resolve …` and never uploaded.\n\nThis release aligns the **entire** Better Auth dependency set to a coherent 1.6.9 floor so npm resolves one consistent tree:\n\n- `better-auth`, `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter`, `@better-auth/api-key`, `@better-auth/passkey`, `@better-auth/oauth-provider` → `^1.6.9` (generated projects, the baked Docker deps, and the bundled CMS/Account SPAs).\n- Added an explicit `kysely ^0.28.16` pin: Better Auth 1.6's migrator imports `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_TABLE` / `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_LOCK_TABLE` from kysely but doesn't *declare* kysely, so the Worker bundle needs it pinned directly.\n\nNo code migration was required — Quickback already uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (not the now-deprecated OIDC Provider plugin), and emits no `freshAge`/SAML usage affected by 1.6's behavioral changes. Verified end to end: a `requireAuth` project and a normal project both `npm install` a clean 1.6.14 tree and bundle with `wrangler deploy --dry-run` with zero resolution errors.\n\n### Larger migration histories no longer hit the upload ceiling\n\nLong-lived projects accumulate one full-schema drizzle snapshot per migration, and the whole cumulative meta payload (snapshots + journals + `.sql`, across both the auth and features dirs) is re-sent on **every** compile — even a no-schema-change one. Projects with deep migration histories were hitting the compiler's `existingFiles` size limit and failing to compile, with no schema drift and nothing to fix on their end.\n\nThe server-side ceilings are raised so this is no longer the binding constraint:\n\n- `existingFiles` payload: **4 MiB → 16 MiB**\n- total request body: **8 MiB → 32 MiB** (kept above the per-category limits so it doesn't trip first)\n\nThis is enforced entirely on the compiler, so no CLI upgrade is needed — the new headroom applies as soon as `compiler.quickback.dev` is on this release.\n\n### Custom response headers (`security.headers`)\n\nThe generated Worker emitted a fixed set of security headers (CSP, HSTS,\n`X-Content-Type-Options`, …) with no supported way to add your own — teams that\nwanted, say, an `X-Server-Version` build stamp on every response had to\npost-patch the generated middleware after each compile.\n\nNew `security.headers` sets arbitrary response headers natively. Values are\nstatic strings or templates interpolating per-deploy Worker env vars via the\n`{{env.VAR_NAME}}` token:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n headers: {\n // Both vars must be set, or the header is omitted entirely.\n 'X-Server-Version': '{{env.SERVER_VERSION}}+{{env.SERVER_BUILD}}',\n 'X-Powered-By': 'Quickback',\n },\n}\n```\n\n- **Omit-if-unset** — a header that references env vars is emitted only when\n *every* referenced var is set (non-empty) at runtime. A Worker that forgot to\n inject the var emits no header, never `X-Server-Version: undefined`. Static\n headers are always emitted.\n- The value is read from `c.env` per request, so it picks up whatever Worker\n var is injected at deploy time — nothing is baked at compile time.\n- **Managed headers are rejected** — names owned by a dedicated `security` field\n (CSP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, …) error at compile so the\n two emitters can't race. Malformed `{{env…}}` tokens error too, rather than\n leaking literal braces into the wire header.\n\nSurvives a clean `quickback compile` with no post-processing. See\n[Security Headers → Custom response headers](/compiler/config/security#custom-response-headers).\n\n## v0.42.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Interactive OAuth for the generated MCP server\n\nMCP connectors (Claude, Cursor, …) could only connect to a generated `/mcp`\nendpoint **anonymously** — they never launched a sign-in flow, so auth-gated\ntools stayed invisible. The OAuth machinery was already present (Better Auth's\n`oauth-provider` ships `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`, `/register` + PKCE under\n`/auth/v1`); the compiler just never let a connector discover or trigger it.\n\nNew `agents.mcp.requireAuth` makes the MCP surface authenticated-only:\n\n```ts\nagents: { mcp: { requireAuth: true } },\n```\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler:\n\n- **Challenges unauthenticated `/mcp`** with `401` + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer\n resource_metadata=\"…\"` ([RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728) §5.1) — the signal connectors use to start OAuth.\n- **Force-enables `oauthProvider` + `bearer`**, so `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`,\n and `/register` ([RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) dynamic client registration) exist with PKCE.\n- **Delegates `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`** to Better Auth's real\n metadata instead of a hand-rolled stub that advertised a non-existent\n authorization endpoint.\n- Adds the `<origin>/mcp` resource to `validAudiences`\n ([RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707)) so the connector's access token isn't rejected.\n\nLogin and consent are served by your Account SPA, so users authenticate with\nwhatever methods you already enabled. Default is unchanged (anonymous public\ntools); set `requireAuth: true` for servers meant for authenticated users.\n\n## v0.40.2 — June 3, 2026\n\n### Passwordless plugins can no longer bypass the signup gate\n\nBetter Auth's `emailOtp` and `magicLink` plugins auto-create an account when a\ncode/link is verified for an unknown email — and that path is independent of\n`emailAndPassword.disableSignUp`. As a result, `account.auth.signup: false`\nclosed `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` but left OTP / magic-link verification as an\nopen back-door for account creation.\n\nThe compiler now emits each plugin's own `disableSignUp` flag, and new\nper-plugin options expose it directly:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: {\n emailOtp: { disableSignUp: true }, // OTP sign-in only; unknown emails rejected\n magicLink: { disableSignUp: true }, // same for magic links\n },\n}),\n```\n\nBoth default to following the global gate: setting `account.auth.signup: false`\n(→ `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`) now also gates the OTP and magic-link\npaths automatically. Set `{ disableSignUp: false }` on a plugin explicitly to\nkeep its sign-up open while password sign-up stays closed.\n\n## v0.40.1 — June 2, 2026\n\n- The generated `wrangler.toml` and `Env` type now emit the `ASSETS` binding\n type for projects that mount SPAs (CMS / Account), so handler code that\n references `c.env.ASSETS` typechecks.\n- Compiler Docker builds preserve their layer cache across rebuilds, cutting\n local recompile time.\n\n## v0.40.0 — June 2, 2026\n\nR2 file storage is now **presign-only by default**. Adding\n`defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` emits just the `ctx.storage` signer — no\nFILES_DB database, no `/storage/v1/*` endpoints, no files worker. You sign\npresigned URLs against a bucket and store references in your own table. The\nturnkey managed subsystem is still available, now behind `managed: true`.\n\nThis decouples the lightweight primitive from the heavyweight subsystem so you\ncan add uploads without standing up a metadata database you don't use.\n\n### Presign-only by default; managed is opt-in\n\n```ts\n// Presign-only (default) — ctx.storage against a bucket, nothing else\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { bucketName: \"my-app-media\" })\n\n// Managed subsystem — FILES_DB + /storage/v1/* + files worker\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { managed: true })\n```\n\n- New projects can omit `bucketName` — it defaults to `<project>-media`, so\n setup is one `wrangler r2 bucket create` plus the R2 API-token secrets.\n- Existing projects set `bucketName` to a bucket they already have. Presign-only\n emits **no** R2 bucket binding and **no** FILES_DB binding — nothing to\n provision, nothing to migrate.\n\n### Per-call bucket + custom secret names\n\n```ts\n// Sign against a different bucket than the configured default\nawait storage.signPutUrl(key, { bucket: \"my-app-public\", contentType });\n```\n\nIf your project already stores R2 credentials under different env-var names,\nmap them so the signer reads yours:\n\n```ts\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", {\n bucketName: \"my-app-media\",\n presign: { accountIdEnv: \"CF_ACCOUNT_ID\", accessKeyIdEnv: \"S3_KEY\", secretAccessKeyEnv: \"S3_SECRET\" },\n})\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n- `maxFileSize` now accepts a human string (`\"100mb\"`, `\"5gb\"`) as well as a\n number of bytes — previously a string emitted invalid TypeScript.\n- Presign-only no longer emits a stray `FILES_DB` `[[d1_databases]]` block (with\n an invalid `database_id = \"local-files\"`) into `wrangler.toml`, which would\n have made `wrangler deploy` reject the worker.\n\n## v0.39.1 — June 2, 2026\n\nDeduplicate colliding OpenAPI `operationId`s. The auto-generated list id\n`list\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
7
7
  },
8
8
  "compiler/claude-code-skill": {
9
9
  "title": "AI Developer Tools",
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export const DOCS = {
15
15
  },
16
16
  "compiler/cloud-compiler/cli": {
17
17
  "title": "CLI Reference",
18
- "content": "The Quickback CLI is the fastest way to create, compile, and manage your backend projects.\n\n## Installation\n\n```bash\n# One-shot via npx — recommended for first run\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# Or install globally for repeat use\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\n## Commands\n\n### Start a Project (interactive)\n\n```bash\nquickback start\n```\n\nInteractive onboarding designed for new users. No flags required.\n\n- Prompts for a template (`cloudflare`, `todos`, `blog`, `empty`)\n- Prompts for a project name (defaults to the current directory's name if empty)\n- Auto-detects whether to scaffold in-place or create a `./<name>/` subdirectory\n- Defers login until just before the compile step — cancel at the auth prompt and the scaffold stays on disk, ready for `quickback compile` later\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Create a Project (scriptable)\n\n```bash\nquickback create <template> <name>\n```\n\n**Templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working todos example with masking + actions + a named view\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `empty` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS: orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks, split databases, realtime\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nquickback create todos my-app\n```\n\nThis scaffolds a complete project with:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Example feature with full security configuration (for `todos` / `blog` / `saas`)\n\nSee the [Templates](/compiler/getting-started/templates) page for a deeper guide on choosing between them.\n\n### Compile Definitions\n\n```bash\nquickback compile\n```\n\nReads your definitions and generates:\n- Database migrations (Drizzle)\n- API route handlers (Hono)\n- TypeScript client SDK\n- OpenAPI specification\n\nRun this after making changes to your definitions.\n\n#### Generated `src/` is hermetic\n\nEvery file under `src/` carries a `Generated by quickback.dev` header and is owned by the compiler. Before each compile writes its output, the CLI:\n\n1. Snapshots the existing `src/` tree to `quickback/.archives/src-<ISO-timestamp>/` (a plain recursive copy — `cp -R` semantics, no compression).\n2. Wipes `src/` entirely.\n3. Writes the fresh manifest from the compiler.\n\nThis prevents stale output: removed features stop leaving orphan folders, deleted SPA assets with old content hashes get cleared, and `.DS_Store` files don't keep retired directories alive.\n\nThe most recent **3** archives are retained (older ones are pruned automatically). If a compile produces unexpected output, your last-known-good tree is sitting in `quickback/.archives/` ready to grep or copy back:\n\n```bash\nls quickback/.archives/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-31-02-014/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-29-44-882/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-12-19-301/\n```\n\nAs a safety net, the wipe is **skipped** when the manifest contains zero files for the target directory — that's almost always an upstream compile bug, and we'd rather keep your last working tree than overwrite it with nothing.\n\n### View Documentation\n\n```bash\nquickback docs # List available topics\nquickback docs <topic> # Show documentation for a topic\n```\n\n**Available topics:**\n- `firewall` - Data isolation layer\n- `access` - Role-based permissions\n- `guards` - Field protection\n- `masking` - PII redaction\n- `actions` - Custom business logic\n- `api` - CRUD endpoints reference\n- `config` - Configuration reference\n- `features` - Schema definitions\n\nDocumentation is bundled with the CLI and works offline.\n\n### Manage Claude Code Skill\n\n```bash\nquickback claude install # Interactive install\nquickback claude install --global # Install to ~/.claude/skills/\nquickback claude install --local # Install to ./.claude/\nquickback claude update # Update to latest version\nquickback claude remove # Remove installed skill\nquickback claude status # Check installation status\n```\n\nThe Quickback skill for Claude Code provides AI assistance for:\n- Creating resource definitions with proper security layers\n- Configuring Firewall, Access, Guards, and Masking\n- Debugging configuration issues\n- Understanding security patterns\n\n## Authentication\n\n### Login\n\n```bash\nquickback login\n```\n\nUses the [OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628) (RFC 8628) to authenticate securely without exposing tokens in URLs.\n\n**How it works:**\n\n1. The CLI requests a one-time device code from the Quickback API.\n2. A code is displayed in your terminal (e.g., `AUL8-H93S`).\n3. Your browser opens to the Quickback account page where you approve the code.\n4. The CLI detects approval and exchanges it for a session token.\n5. If you belong to one organization, it's auto-selected. If you have multiple, you choose one.\n6. Credentials are stored locally.\n\n```\n$ quickback login\n\n🔐 Quickback Login\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n Your code: AUL8-H93S\n\n Visit: https://account.quickback.dev/cli/authorize\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n✓ Login successful!\nWelcome, Paul Stenhouse!\n\nUsing organization: Acme\n✓ Active organization: Acme\n```\n\nThis flow works in headless environments (SSH, containers, WSL) since it doesn't require a localhost callback.\n\n### Logout\n\n```bash\nquickback logout\n```\n\nClears stored credentials from `~/.quickback/credentials.json`.\n\n### Check Auth Status\n\n```bash\nquickback whoami\n```\n\nShows the currently authenticated user, organization, and token expiration.\n\n### Credential Storage\n\nCredentials are stored at `~/.quickback/credentials.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"token\": \"...\",\n \"user\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"email\": \"paul@example.com\",\n \"name\": \"Paul Stenhouse\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": \"2026-02-16T01:42:21.519Z\",\n \"organization\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"name\": \"Acme\",\n \"slug\": \"acme\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nSessions expire after 7 days. Run `quickback login` again to re-authenticate.\n\n### Organizations\n\nAfter login, the CLI auto-selects your organization:\n- **One organization** - automatically set as active.\n- **Multiple organizations** - you're prompted to choose one.\n\nThe active organization is stored in your credentials and sent with compile requests, so the compiler knows which org context to use.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a new project (interactive — picks template, scaffolds,\n# prompts for login only when needed)\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# 2. Run locally\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nOr the scriptable form:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create the project (scaffolds + compiles + installs)\nquickback create todos my-app # prompts for login on first compile\ncd my-app\n\n# 2. Run\nnpm run dev\n\n# 3. Recompile after editing definitions\nquickback compile\n```\n\n## Options\n\n| Flag | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `-v, --version` | Show version number |\n| `-h, --help` | Show help message |\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for authentication (alternative to `quickback login`) |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Override compiler API URL |\n\n### API Key Authentication\n\nUse an API key instead of interactive login. Useful for CI/CD pipelines and automated workflows:\n\n```bash\n# Pass API key for a single command\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key\nquickback compile\n```\n\nThe API key takes precedence over stored credentials from `quickback login`.\n\nYou can create API keys from your [Quickback account](https://account.quickback.dev/profile). Each key is scoped to your organization.\n\n### Custom Compiler URL\n\nPoint the CLI to a different compiler (local or custom):\n\n```bash\n# Use a local compiler\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020 quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020\nquickback compile\n```\n\nSee [Local Compiler](/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler) for running the compiler locally with Docker.\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### \"Command not found: quickback\"\n\nMake sure the CLI is installed globally:\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\nOr use npx (no global install needed):\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Compile errors\n\n1. Check your `quickback.config.ts` exists and is valid\n2. Ensure all tables in `quickback/features/` have valid exports\n3. Run `quickback compile` with `--verbose` for detailed output\n4. For rename-related Drizzle failures in CI/headless runs, configure `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`\n\n### Authentication issues\n\nClear credentials and re-authenticate:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```\n\n### \"Could not load organizations\"\n\nThis can happen if your session token expired or if the API is temporarily unavailable. Re-login:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```"
18
+ "content": "The Quickback CLI is the fastest way to create, compile, and manage your backend projects.\n\n## Installation\n\n```bash\n# One-shot via npx — recommended for first run\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# Or install globally for repeat use\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\n## Commands\n\n### Start a Project (interactive)\n\n```bash\nquickback start\n```\n\nInteractive onboarding designed for new users. No flags required.\n\n- Prompts for a template (`cloudflare`, `todos`, `blog`, `empty`)\n- Prompts for a project name (defaults to the current directory's name if empty)\n- Auto-detects whether to scaffold in-place or create a `./<name>/` subdirectory\n- Defers login until just before the compile step — cancel at the auth prompt and the scaffold stays on disk, ready for `quickback compile` later\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Create a Project (scriptable)\n\n```bash\nquickback create <template> <name>\n```\n\n**Templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working todos example with masking + actions + a named view\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `empty` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS: orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks, split databases, realtime\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\nquickback create todos my-app\n```\n\nThis scaffolds a complete project with:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Example feature with full security configuration (for `todos` / `blog` / `saas`)\n\nSee the [Templates](/compiler/getting-started/templates) page for a deeper guide on choosing between them.\n\n### Compile Definitions\n\n```bash\nquickback compile\n```\n\nUse `quickback compile --verbose` when a remote compile fails and you need the\nunderlying command, exit code, stderr/stdout tail, and compiler-suggested fixes.\n\nReads your definitions and generates:\n- Database migrations (Drizzle)\n- API route handlers (Hono)\n- TypeScript client SDK\n- OpenAPI specification\n\nRun this after making changes to your definitions.\n\n#### Generated `src/` is hermetic\n\nEvery file under `src/` carries a `Generated by quickback.dev` header and is owned by the compiler. Before each compile writes its output, the CLI:\n\n1. Snapshots the existing `src/` tree to `quickback/.archives/src-<ISO-timestamp>/` (a plain recursive copy — `cp -R` semantics, no compression).\n2. Wipes `src/` entirely.\n3. Writes the fresh manifest from the compiler.\n\nThis prevents stale output: removed features stop leaving orphan folders, deleted SPA assets with old content hashes get cleared, and `.DS_Store` files don't keep retired directories alive.\n\nThe most recent **3** archives are retained (older ones are pruned automatically). If a compile produces unexpected output, your last-known-good tree is sitting in `quickback/.archives/` ready to grep or copy back:\n\n```bash\nls quickback/.archives/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-31-02-014/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-29-44-882/\n# src-2026-04-27T16-12-19-301/\n```\n\nAs a safety net, the wipe is **skipped** when the manifest contains zero files for the target directory — that's almost always an upstream compile bug, and we'd rather keep your last working tree than overwrite it with nothing.\n\n### View Documentation\n\n```bash\nquickback docs # List available topics\nquickback docs <topic> # Show documentation for a topic\n```\n\n**Available topics:**\n- `firewall` - Data isolation layer\n- `access` - Role-based permissions\n- `guards` - Field protection\n- `masking` - PII redaction\n- `actions` - Custom business logic\n- `api` - CRUD endpoints reference\n- `config` - Configuration reference\n- `features` - Schema definitions\n\nDocumentation is bundled with the CLI and works offline.\n\n### Manage Claude Code Skill\n\n```bash\nquickback claude install # Interactive install\nquickback claude install --global # Install to ~/.claude/skills/\nquickback claude install --local # Install to ./.claude/\nquickback claude update # Update to latest version\nquickback claude remove # Remove installed skill\nquickback claude status # Check installation status\n```\n\nThe Quickback skill for Claude Code provides AI assistance for:\n- Creating resource definitions with proper security layers\n- Configuring Firewall, Access, Guards, and Masking\n- Debugging configuration issues\n- Understanding security patterns\n\n## Authentication\n\n### Login\n\n```bash\nquickback login\n```\n\nUses the [OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628) (RFC 8628) to authenticate securely without exposing tokens in URLs.\n\n**How it works:**\n\n1. The CLI requests a one-time device code from the Quickback API.\n2. A code is displayed in your terminal (e.g., `AUL8-H93S`).\n3. Your browser opens to the Quickback account page where you approve the code.\n4. The CLI detects approval and exchanges it for a session token.\n5. If you belong to one organization, it's auto-selected. If you have multiple, you choose one.\n6. Credentials are stored locally.\n\n```\n$ quickback login\n\n🔐 Quickback Login\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n Your code: AUL8-H93S\n\n Visit: https://account.quickback.dev/cli/authorize\n\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\n\n✓ Login successful!\nWelcome, Paul Stenhouse!\n\nUsing organization: Acme\n✓ Active organization: Acme\n```\n\nThis flow works in headless environments (SSH, containers, WSL) since it doesn't require a localhost callback.\n\n### Logout\n\n```bash\nquickback logout\n```\n\nClears stored credentials from `~/.quickback/credentials.json`.\n\n### Check Auth Status\n\n```bash\nquickback whoami\n```\n\nShows the currently authenticated user, organization, and token expiration.\n\n### Credential Storage\n\nCredentials are stored at `~/.quickback/credentials.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"token\": \"...\",\n \"user\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"email\": \"paul@example.com\",\n \"name\": \"Paul Stenhouse\"\n },\n \"expiresAt\": \"2026-02-16T01:42:21.519Z\",\n \"organization\": {\n \"id\": \"...\",\n \"name\": \"Acme\",\n \"slug\": \"acme\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nSessions expire after 7 days. Run `quickback login` again to re-authenticate.\n\n### Organizations\n\nAfter login, the CLI auto-selects your organization:\n- **One organization** - automatically set as active.\n- **Multiple organizations** - you're prompted to choose one.\n\nThe active organization is stored in your credentials and sent with compile requests, so the compiler knows which org context to use.\n\n## Quick Start\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a new project (interactive — picks template, scaffolds,\n# prompts for login only when needed)\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n\n# 2. Run locally\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nOr the scriptable form:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create the project (scaffolds + compiles + installs)\nquickback create todos my-app # prompts for login on first compile\ncd my-app\n\n# 2. Run\nnpm run dev\n\n# 3. Recompile after editing definitions\nquickback compile\n```\n\n## Options\n\n| Flag | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `-v, --version` | Show version number |\n| `-h, --help` | Show help message |\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `QUICKBACK_API_KEY` | API key for authentication (alternative to `quickback login`) |\n| `QUICKBACK_API_URL` | Override compiler API URL |\n\n### API Key Authentication\n\nUse an API key instead of interactive login. Useful for CI/CD pipelines and automated workflows:\n\n```bash\n# Pass API key for a single command\nQUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_KEY=your_api_key\nquickback compile\n```\n\nThe API key takes precedence over stored credentials from `quickback login`.\n\nYou can create API keys from your [Quickback account](https://account.quickback.dev/profile). Each key is scoped to your organization.\n\n### Custom Compiler URL\n\nPoint the CLI to a different compiler (local or custom):\n\n```bash\n# Use a local compiler\nQUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020 quickback compile\n\n# Or export for the session\nexport QUICKBACK_API_URL=http://localhost:3020\nquickback compile\n```\n\nSee [Local Compiler](/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler) for running the compiler locally with Docker.\n\n## Troubleshooting\n\n### \"Command not found: quickback\"\n\nMake sure the CLI is installed globally:\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\n```\n\nOr use npx (no global install needed):\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n### Compile errors\n\n1. Check your `quickback.config.ts` exists and is valid\n2. Ensure all tables in `quickback/features/` have valid exports\n3. Run `quickback compile` with `--verbose` for detailed output\n4. For rename-related Drizzle failures in CI/headless runs, configure `compiler.migrations.renames` in `quickback.config.ts`\n\n### Authentication issues\n\nClear credentials and re-authenticate:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```\n\n### \"Could not load organizations\"\n\nThis can happen if your session token expired or if the API is temporarily unavailable. Re-login:\n```bash\nquickback logout\nquickback login\n```"
19
19
  },
20
20
  "compiler/cloud-compiler/endpoints": {
21
21
  "title": "Endpoints",
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export const DOCS = {
95
95
  },
96
96
  "compiler/definitions/encryption": {
97
97
  "title": "Encryption",
98
- "content": "Mark a text column `.encrypted()` and Quickback envelope-encrypts it at rest with a **per-organization key**:\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-org\n name: q.text().required(),\n emergencyContact: q.text().encrypted(),\n dietaryNotes: q.text().encrypted(),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nThat one modifier changes what a database breach means: a leaked D1 backup, export, or stolen database token yields only ciphertext for those columns. The keys live separately, wrapped under a worker secret the database never sees.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\n- **`org_data_keys`** — one row per organization holding a random 256-bit data key (DEK), stored **wrapped** under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret. Created lazily on the org's first encrypted write.\n- **Write path** — every write (CRUD routes, batch routes, and `db.insert`/`db.update` inside your actions) flows through the same chokepoint, which AES-256-GCM-encrypts the column before anything else sees it. Audit snapshots, webhook payloads, and realtime deltas therefore carry ciphertext by construction.\n- **Read path** — generated routes decrypt behind the firewall and then apply masking, so authorized callers see plaintext and everyone else sees the redaction — never ciphertext.\n- **`ctx.crypto`** — explicit `await ctx.crypto.decrypt(value)` / `ctx.crypto.encrypt(value)` for action code that processes the field server-side (building a manifest, sending an email). Scoped to the caller's active organization.\n- **Boot guard** — a project with encrypted columns refuses to serve without `ENCRYPTION_KEK` (503 `MISSING_ENV`), instead of silently storing plaintext.\n\nValues at rest look like `qbenc:1:<keyVersion>:<iv>:<ciphertext>` — the prefix makes accidental plaintext detectable, and the embedded key version supports rotation with lazy re-encryption on write.\n\n## Setup\n\nScaffolded projects already have a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK` in `.dev.vars`, so local dev works with zero setup. For production:\n\n```bash\nopenssl rand -hex 32 | wrangler secret put ENCRYPTION_KEK\n```\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nCiphertext cannot be queried, so encrypted columns are **excluded from every query surface at compile time** — these are errors, not warnings:\n\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()`, and never listed in a view's `query.{searchable,filterable,sortable}`\n- No `.unique()` (AES-GCM randomizes ciphertext per write), no primary keys, no `.references()`, no `q.scope()` columns, no defaults (a SQL default would bypass the encrypting chokepoint)\n- Never an `embeddings.fields` source (embedding a value ships its plaintext to the model)\n- The table must carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-organization\n- Text-shaped columns only (v1)\n\nEncrypted columns **may** appear in view projections and responses — they decrypt through the generated prepare path. Masking composes on top as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Per-organization keys: blast radius and crypto-shredding\n\nEach organization's data is encrypted under its own DEK, so one compromised key never exposes another tenant. Deleting an org's `org_data_keys` row makes every encrypted value it ever wrote **permanently unreadable** — the cleanest possible GDPR-erasure and offboarding story.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe envelope tier protects against **storage compromise**: backups, exports, dashboard access, leaked database tokens, SQL injection, and insiders with database read access all get ciphertext. The server *can* decrypt — that's the point; your actions still process the field. It does not protect against full Worker compromise (the sealed/E2EE tier in the encryption roadmap addresses that — see `apps/compiler/research/encryption-vault-spec.md`).\n\nTwo practical notes:\n\n- **Action responses**: rows returned from `db.insert(...).returning()` inside your own actions contain ciphertext — decrypt explicitly with `ctx.crypto.decrypt()` if your action returns the field. Generated CRUD routes handle this automatically.\n- **No server-side equality lookups** on encrypted values (blind indexes are a roadmap item). If you need to filter by it, it probably shouldn't be encrypted — or it needs a separate non-sensitive derived column."
98
+ "content": "Mark a text column `.encrypted()` and Quickback envelope-encrypts it at rest with a **per-organization key**:\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-org\n name: q.text().required(),\n emergencyContact: q.text().encrypted(),\n dietaryNotes: q.text().encrypted(),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nThat one modifier changes what a database breach means: a leaked D1 backup, export, or stolen database token yields only ciphertext for those columns. The keys live separately, wrapped under a worker secret the database never sees.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\n- **`org_data_keys`** — one row per organization holding a random 256-bit data key (DEK), stored **wrapped** under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret. Created lazily on the org's first encrypted write.\n- **Write path** — every write (CRUD routes, batch routes, and `db.insert`/`db.update` inside your actions) flows through the same chokepoint, which AES-256-GCM-encrypts the column before anything else sees it. Audit snapshots, webhook payloads, and realtime deltas therefore carry ciphertext by construction.\n- **Read path** — generated routes decrypt behind the firewall and then apply masking, so authorized callers see plaintext and everyone else sees the redaction — never ciphertext.\n- **`ctx.crypto`** — explicit `await ctx.crypto.decrypt(value)` / `ctx.crypto.encrypt(value)` for action code that processes the field server-side (building a manifest, sending an email). Scoped to the caller's active organization.\n- **Boot guard** — a project with encrypted columns refuses to serve without `ENCRYPTION_KEK` (503 `MISSING_ENV`), instead of silently storing plaintext.\n\nValues at rest look like `qbenc:1:<keyVersion>:<iv>:<ciphertext>` — the prefix makes accidental plaintext detectable, and the embedded key version supports rotation with lazy re-encryption on write.\n\n## Setup\n\nScaffolded projects already have a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK` in `.dev.vars`, so local dev works with zero setup. For production:\n\n```bash\nopenssl rand -hex 32 | wrangler secret put ENCRYPTION_KEK\n```\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nCiphertext cannot be queried, so encrypted columns are **excluded from every query surface at compile time** — these are errors, not warnings:\n\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()`, and never listed in a view's `query.{searchable,filterable,sortable}`\n- No `.unique()` (AES-GCM randomizes ciphertext per write), no primary keys, no `.references()`, no `q.scope()` columns, no defaults (a SQL default would bypass the encrypting chokepoint)\n- Never an `embeddings.fields` source (embedding a value ships its plaintext to the model)\n- The table must carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-organization\n- Text-shaped columns only (v1)\n\nEncrypted columns **may** appear in view projections and responses — they decrypt through the generated prepare path. Masking composes on top as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Per-organization keys: blast radius and crypto-shredding\n\nEach organization's data is encrypted under its own DEK, so one compromised key never exposes another tenant. Deleting an org's `org_data_keys` row makes every encrypted value it ever wrote **permanently unreadable** — the cleanest possible GDPR-erasure and offboarding story.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe envelope tier protects against **storage compromise**: backups, exports, dashboard access, leaked database tokens, SQL injection, and insiders with database read access all get ciphertext. The server *can* decrypt — that's the point; your actions still process the field. It does not protect against full Worker compromise — for that, use the **sealed tier** below, where the server structurally cannot read the value at all.\n\nTwo practical notes:\n\n- **Action responses**: rows returned from `db.insert(...).returning()` inside your own actions contain ciphertext — decrypt explicitly with `ctx.crypto.decrypt()` if your action returns the field. Generated CRUD routes handle this automatically.\n- **No server-side equality lookups** on encrypted values (blind indexes are a roadmap item). If you need to filter by it, it probably shouldn't be encrypted — or it needs a separate non-sensitive derived column.\n\n---\n\n# Sealed tier — end-to-end encryption\n\nMark a text column `.sealed()` instead of `.encrypted()` and you cross a line the envelope tier never claims: **the server cannot read the value.** It holds only ciphertext plus a content key *wrapped to a public key it has no private half for*. A full Worker compromise — leaked secrets, malicious code, a coerced admin — still yields nothing but ciphertext. Decryption happens only on the client, after a fresh step-up.\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-scope\n name: q.text().required(),\n governmentId: q.text().encrypted(), // envelope tier: server CAN read (to mask)\n backgroundCheck: q.text({ maxLength: 8000 }).sealed(), // sealed tier: server CANNOT read\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nUse it for data that is legally sensitive and need-to-know, where you want a database breach **and the server itself** to yield only ciphertext: background checks, health findings, raw identity documents, anything you'd rather not be able to read by accident.\n\nThe page below is the *usage* view. For the on-the-wire contract — the versioned `qbseal:1` envelope format, the full `/seal/v1` lifecycle, the Argon2id floor, passkey expectations, canonical conformance vectors, and the first-party **Swift / Kotlin / TypeScript SDKs** (with install + usage) — see [Sealed protocol](/compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol).\n\n## The key model\n\nThree nested keys. A breach of any layer above plaintext yields only more wrapped keys:\n\n```\nUSER key ──unwrap──▶ SCOPE private key ──unwrap──▶ content key ──decrypt──▶ plaintext\n```\n\n- **USER key** — derived on the client from a **vault passphrase** (Argon2id → an Ed25519 signing key + an X25519 wrap key). This is **never** the Better Auth login password — reusing the login password would collapse the zero-knowledge property back to server-trust. The server stores only the Ed25519 *public* key (to verify step-ups) and the Argon2id params.\n- **SCOPE keypair** — one per scope (per organization). The content key is wrapped to the scope's public key, so any authorized reader can be granted access without re-encrypting the data.\n- **Content key** — a random AES-256-GCM key, one per sealed value, wrapped to the scope.\n\nA **writer** needs only the scope's *public* key — no key of their own. Only **readers** (staff doing a reveal) need a grant of the scope private key, wrapped to their USER key.\n\n## The client ships with your backend\n\nFor any project with a `.sealed()` column the compiler emits the E2EE client **into your project** — there's nothing to `npm install`:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├─ lib/\n│ ├─ seal-routes.ts # server: the /seal/v1/* reveal rails (verify-only)\n│ └─ seal-client/ # client: the browser SDK you import — emitted for you\n│ └─ index.ts sdk.ts flow.ts wrap.ts kdf.ts envelope.ts ...\n```\n\n`@noble/curves` and `@noble/hashes` are added to your `package.json` automatically. The client is emitted from the *same compiler version* as the server routes, so the wire format (`qbseal:` envelopes, the step-up message, the key-wrap method) can never drift between the two — a class of silent decrypt-time bug that a separately-versioned package would reintroduce.\n\n## Writing a sealed value\n\nThe writer seals the plaintext to the scope's public key, then writes the result like any other field. The server stores ciphertext and is none the wiser.\n\n```typescript\n\nconst seal = new SealClient(transport); // transport = POST to /seal/v1/*\n\n// Fetches the scope's PUBLIC key and seals to it — the writer needs no key.\nconst sealed = await seal.sealField(\n 'scope:organization:org_123',\n new TextEncoder().encode('Background check: clear'),\n);\n\n// Write it like any field. At rest this is a `qbseal:` sealed-cell envelope.\nawait api.post('/api/v1/candidates', { name: 'Ada', backgroundCheck: sealed });\n```\n\n## Revealing a sealed value\n\nA reveal is a deliberate, audited, **step-up-gated** action — not an ambient read. The SDK runs the whole handshake; you provide the reader's passphrase-derived session:\n\n```typescript\n// Derive the reader's keys once from their vault passphrase (NOT their login password).\nconst session = seal.session(passphrase, enrollment);\n\nconst plaintext = await seal.reveal({\n session,\n scopeRef: 'scope:organization:org_123',\n vaultItemId: candidate.id,\n});\nnew TextDecoder().decode(plaintext); // \"Background check: clear\"\n```\n\nBehind that one call:\n\n1. **`/seal/v1/my-grant`** → the reader's wrapped scope private key.\n2. **`/seal/v1/challenge`** → a fresh, single-use nonce bound to this reader + item.\n3. The client signs a **step-up proof** over the nonce (Ed25519 from the passphrase, or a passkey assertion whose WebAuthn challenge *is* the nonce).\n4. **`/seal/v1/reveal`** verifies the proof, writes an append-only reveal-log entry, and mints a short-lived (≤180s) `scope:seal:reveal` capability.\n5. **`/seal/v1/key`** (bearer that capability) passes three fail-closed gates — tenant, capability, live-grant — and returns the still-wrapped content key.\n6. The client unwraps the scope key, unwraps the content key, and decrypts. **None of this touches the server with a readable key.**\n\nPasskey reveal is the same call as `revealWithPasskey({ ..., getAssertion })`, where `getAssertion(nonce)` runs the WebAuthn ceremony.\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nSealed values are opaque references at rest, so they're fenced off from every surface that would need to read them — these are compile errors:\n\n- **Never** in a view projection, `?search`, or a `masking` rule (there's no plaintext to project, search, or redact — it leaves the system *only* through the reveal rails).\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()` / `.unique()` / defaults / `embeddings.fields` (same reasons as the envelope tier).\n- The table **must** carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-scope.\n- Reading a sealed column server-side is a **type error**: the column is branded `$type<SealedValue>()`, an opaque non-string, so `db.select()` on it won't typecheck. The server's structural inability to read it is enforced by `tsc`, not convention.\n- Sealed projects **force-enable** KV-backed JWT revocation (so a revoked reader's in-flight reveal token dies); a project with sealed columns and no KV binding **fails to compile**.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe sealed tier protects against **full Worker compromise** — leaked secrets, malicious or buggy server code, a coerced operator. All of them get ciphertext; the keys to read it never exist server-side. What it asks in return:\n\n- **A reveal needs a real second factor.** The vault passphrase (or passkey) is separate from login and never leaves the client. Lose it with no recovery grant and the data is unrecoverable *by design* — that's the guarantee, not a bug. Recovery/escrow and rotation re-granting are roadmap.\n- **No server-side processing.** Your actions can't read, mask, search, or index a sealed value — it's plaintext only in a client that just revealed it. If the server needs to process the field, you want the envelope tier instead.\n- **Passkey reveal** verify logic is in place but should be exercised with a real browser/authenticator before production; the passphrase lane is fully round-trip tested."
99
99
  },
100
100
  "compiler/definitions/feature": {
101
101
  "title": "feature() — the canonical form",
@@ -119,12 +119,16 @@ export const DOCS = {
119
119
  },
120
120
  "compiler/definitions/masking": {
121
121
  "title": "Masking - Field Redaction",
122
- "content": "Hide sensitive data from unauthorized users while showing it to those with permission.\n\n## Automatic Masking (Secure by Default)\n\nQuickback automatically applies masking to columns that match sensitive naming patterns. This ensures a high security posture even if you don't explicitly configure masking.\n\n### Sensitive Keywords & Default Masks\n\n| Pattern | Default Mask | Description |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| `email` | `email` | p***@e******.com |\n| `phone`, `mobile`, `fax` | `phone` | ******4567 |\n| `ssn`, `socialsecurity`, `nationalid` | `ssn` | *****6789 |\n| `creditcard`, `cc`, `cardnumber`, `cvv` | `creditCard` | ************1234 |\n| `iban` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `password`, `secret`, `token`, `apikey`, `privatekey` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `accesstoken`, `refreshtoken`, `clientsecret`, `signingsecret`, `bearer` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `stripe`, `webhook` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n\n### Build-Time Alerts\n\nIf the compiler auto-detects a sensitive column that you haven't explicitly configured, it will emit a warning:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking enabled for sensitive column \"users.email\". Explicitly configure masking to silence this warning.\n```\n\nTo silence this warning or change the behavior, simply define the field explicitly in your `masking` configuration. Explicit configurations always take precedence over auto-detected defaults.\n\n#### Tables without an owner column\n\nThe default auto-mask predicate is `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — admins always see the value, the row's owner sees their own. If the table has no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`), the compiler drops the `owner` clause and emits a second warning so the rule is still safe but transparent:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking on \"people.email\" requested owner OR-show, but \"people\"\n has no \"ownerId\" column. Falling back to roles-only (roles: [\"admin\"]).\n Declare `masking: { email: { show: { roles: [...] } } }` explicitly to\n silence this and pick a real predicate.\n```\n\nThis is a real behavioral signal, not boilerplate — the auto-detector can't tell whether the table is \"ownerless on purpose\" (e.g. a shared lookup table) or \"should have an owner column but was authored without one.\" Declare the predicate explicitly to silence the warning and lock in the intent.\n\n### Overriding Defaults\n\nIf you want to show a sensitive field to everyone (disable masking) or use a different rule, define it explicitly in the `resource.masking` block:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(candidates, {\n masking: {\n // Show email to everyone (overrides auto-masking)\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['everyone'] } },\n\n // Silence warning but keep secure (recruiter and above only)\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required(),\n email: q.text().required(),\n phone: q.text().optional(),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: { createable: [\"name\", \"email\", \"phone\", \"resumeUrl\"], updatable: [\"name\", \"phone\"] },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter', 'interviewer'] } },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\n## Built-in Mask Types\n\n| Type | Example Input | Masked Output |\n|------|---------------|---------------|\n| `'email'` | `john@yourdomain.com` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `'phone'` | `555-123-4567` | `******4567` |\n| `'ssn'` | `123-45-6789` | `*****6789` |\n| `'creditCard'` | `4111111111111111` | `************1111` |\n| `'name'` | `John Smith` | `J*** S****` |\n| `'redact'` | `anything` | `[REDACTED]` |\n| `'custom'` | (your logic) | (your output) |\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n // Basic masking - everyone sees masked value\n phone: { type: 'phone' },\n\n // Show unmasked to specific roles\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] }\n },\n\n // Show unmasked to owner (createdBy === ctx.userId)\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'redact',\n show: { or: 'owner' }\n },\n\n // Custom mask function\n externalProfileUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: (value) => value.slice(0, 4) + '...' + value.slice(-4),\n show: { roles: ['recruiter'] }\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Show Conditions\n\n```typescript\nshow: {\n roles?: string[]; // Unmasked if user has any of these roles\n or?: 'owner'; // Unmasked if user is the record owner\n}\n```\n\nThe `'owner'` condition compares against the owner column declared via `q.scope('owner')` (or auto-detected from a `userId` / `ownerId` column). If no owner scope is present, it falls back to `createdBy`.\n\n### Relationship-roles in masking (v1 limitation)\n\nRelationship-roles declared under `authz.roles` (e.g. `guest: { via: 'guestOf' }`) are **not yet supported in `show:` clauses**. The compiler refuses to build with a clear error message because async, db-aware mask functions plus a batched relationship matcher (to avoid N+1 on list responses) are required to ship safely — that pipeline has not yet landed. The runtime evaluator fails closed on unrecognized arms, so silent grants are impossible.\n\n**Workarounds**, depending on intent:\n\n- **Gate on BA roles only**: keep masking simple and put the relationship check at the access layer instead — `read.views.<v>.access: { roles: ['guest'] }` returns a curated field projection that excludes the sensitive column entirely for non-staff callers, without involving masking.\n- **Move the field into a view that's gated by the relationship-role at access**: same pattern — column-level security via field projection rather than per-row masking.\n\nA future async-mask pipeline with batched lookups will lift this limitation; the schema slot is reserved so the v2 add will be non-breaking.\n\n## Query Gate (filter / sort / search)\n\nMasking has a second concern beyond hiding values in the response: a non-admin caller could enumerate masked PII via the query string — e.g. `?filter=email:like:%@target.com` — and infer presence even when the response payload is redacted. The `query` allowlist closes this:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n // Optional — defaults to show.roles when omitted\n query: { roles: ['admin'] },\n },\n}\n```\n\n`query` is a single role gate that covers `?filter`, `?sort`, and `?search` uniformly. When omitted, it inherits from `show.roles` — \"if you can see it, you can query it\" — which is the right shape for almost all PII.\n\nA view can opt back in for a higher-privileged role pair by listing the column in its own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist. The compiler validates at build time that the view's access roles intersect the masking `query.roles` (or `show.roles` when `query` is omitted), so the opt-in can never reach a caller who'd see the value masked.\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n // query: defaults to show.roles → ['admin']\n},\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n query: {\n searchable: ['name'], // email NOT listed → not searchable on this view\n },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email'],\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email'], // ✓ admin satisfies email's query gate\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n},\n```\n\n`query` replaces the legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`). Setting any of those is rejected at compile time with a migration hint.\n\n## Complete Example\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required().filterable('like').searchable(),\n email: q.text().required().filterable('eq').searchable(),\n phone: q.text().optional().filterable('eq'),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: {\n createable: ['name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n updatable: ['name', 'phone'],\n },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: () => '[RESUME LINK HIDDEN]',\n show: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n },\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n query: { searchable: ['name'] },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n access: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email', 'phone'],\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['owner'] }, mode: 'soft' },\n});\n```"
122
+ "content": "Hide sensitive data from unauthorized users while showing it to those with permission.\n\n## Automatic Masking (Secure by Default)\n\nQuickback automatically applies masking to columns that match sensitive naming patterns. This ensures a high security posture even if you don't explicitly configure masking.\n\n### Sensitive Keywords & Default Masks\n\n| Pattern | Default Mask | Description |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| `email` | `email` | p***@e******.com |\n| `phone`, `mobile`, `fax` | `phone` | ******4567 |\n| `ssn`, `socialsecurity`, `nationalid` | `ssn` | *****6789 |\n| `creditcard`, `cc`, `cardnumber`, `cvv` | `creditCard` | ************1234 |\n| `iban` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `password`, `secret`, `token`, `apikey`, `privatekey` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `accesstoken`, `refreshtoken`, `clientsecret`, `signingsecret`, `bearer` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `stripe`, `webhook` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n\n### Build-Time Alerts\n\nIf the compiler auto-detects a sensitive column that you haven't explicitly configured, it will emit a warning:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking enabled for sensitive column \"users.email\". Explicitly configure masking to silence this warning.\n```\n\nTo silence this warning or change the behavior, simply define the field explicitly in your `masking` configuration. Explicit configurations always take precedence over auto-detected defaults.\n\n#### Tables without an owner column\n\nThe default auto-mask predicate is `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — admins always see the value, the row's owner sees their own. If the table has no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`), the compiler drops the `owner` clause and emits a second warning so the rule is still safe but transparent:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking on \"people.email\" requested owner OR-show, but \"people\"\n has no \"ownerId\" column. Falling back to roles-only (roles: [\"admin\"]).\n Declare `masking: { email: { show: { roles: [...] } } }` explicitly to\n silence this and pick a real predicate.\n```\n\nThis is a real behavioral signal, not boilerplate — the auto-detector can't tell whether the table is \"ownerless on purpose\" (e.g. a shared lookup table) or \"should have an owner column but was authored without one.\" Declare the predicate explicitly to silence the warning and lock in the intent.\n\n### Overriding Defaults\n\nIf you want to show a sensitive field to everyone (disable masking) or use a different rule, define it explicitly in the `resource.masking` block:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(candidates, {\n masking: {\n // Show email to everyone (overrides auto-masking)\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['everyone'] } },\n\n // Silence warning but keep secure (recruiter and above only)\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required(),\n email: q.text().required(),\n phone: q.text().optional(),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: { createable: [\"name\", \"email\", \"phone\", \"resumeUrl\"], updatable: [\"name\", \"phone\"] },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter', 'interviewer'] } },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\n## Built-in Mask Types\n\n| Type | Example Input | Masked Output |\n|------|---------------|---------------|\n| `'email'` | `john@yourdomain.com` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `'phone'` | `555-123-4567` | `******4567` |\n| `'ssn'` | `123-45-6789` | `*****6789` |\n| `'creditCard'` | `4111111111111111` | `************1111` |\n| `'name'` | `John Smith` | `J*** S****` |\n| `'redact'` | `anything` | `[REDACTED]` |\n| `'custom'` | (your logic) | (your output) |\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n // Basic masking - everyone sees masked value\n phone: { type: 'phone' },\n\n // Show unmasked to specific roles\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] }\n },\n\n // Show unmasked to owner (createdBy === ctx.userId)\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'redact',\n show: { or: 'owner' }\n },\n\n // Custom mask function\n externalProfileUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: (value) => value.slice(0, 4) + '...' + value.slice(-4),\n show: { roles: ['recruiter'] }\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Show Conditions\n\n```typescript\nshow: {\n roles?: string[]; // Unmasked if user has any of these roles\n or?: 'owner'; // Unmasked if user is the record owner\n}\n```\n\nThe `'owner'` condition compares against the owner column declared via `q.scope('owner')` (or auto-detected from a `userId` / `ownerId` column). If no owner scope is present, it falls back to `createdBy`.\n\n### Relationship-roles in masking (v1 limitation)\n\nRelationship-roles declared under `authz.roles` (e.g. `guest: { via: 'guestOf' }`) are **not yet supported in `show:` clauses**. The compiler refuses to build with a clear error message because async, db-aware mask functions plus a batched relationship matcher (to avoid N+1 on list responses) are required to ship safely — that pipeline has not yet landed. The runtime evaluator fails closed on unrecognized arms, so silent grants are impossible.\n\n**Workarounds**, depending on intent:\n\n- **Gate on BA roles only**: keep masking simple and put the relationship check at the access layer instead — `read.views.<v>.access: { roles: ['guest'] }` returns a curated field projection that excludes the sensitive column entirely for non-staff callers, without involving masking.\n- **Move the field into a view that's gated by the relationship-role at access**: same pattern — column-level security via field projection rather than per-row masking.\n\nA future async-mask pipeline with batched lookups will lift this limitation; the schema slot is reserved so the v2 add will be non-breaking.\n\n## Query Gate (filter / sort / search)\n\nMasking has a second concern beyond hiding values in the response: a non-admin caller could enumerate masked PII via the query string — e.g. `?filter=email:like:%@target.com` — and infer presence even when the response payload is redacted. The `query` allowlist closes this:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n // Optional — defaults to show.roles when omitted\n query: { roles: ['admin'] },\n },\n}\n```\n\n`query` is a single role gate that covers `?filter`, `?sort`, and `?search` uniformly. When omitted, it inherits from `show.roles` — \"if you can see it, you can query it\" — which is the right shape for almost all PII.\n\nA view can opt back in for a higher-privileged role pair by listing the column in its own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist. The compiler validates at build time that the view's access roles intersect the masking `query.roles` (or `show.roles` when `query` is omitted), so the opt-in can never reach a caller who'd see the value masked.\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n // query: defaults to show.roles → ['admin']\n},\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n query: {\n searchable: ['name'], // email NOT listed → not searchable on this view\n },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email'],\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email'], // ✓ admin satisfies email's query gate\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n},\n```\n\n`query` replaces the legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`). Setting any of those is rejected at compile time with a migration hint.\n\n## Egress protection\n\nMasking redacts a column on the **read paths** (`GET /:id`, list, views, realtime) per role. It does **not** automatically follow the value if you copy it into a *derived* artifact that bypasses those read paths — a different record, an html/text string, or an outbound payload. Quickback guards those egress points so a masked token/PII can't quietly ship in the clear:\n\n- **Compile-time block (declarative).** A masked column is rejected at build time if it appears in `embeddings.fields` / `embeddings.metadata` (the value would be embedded and stored beside the vector, and returned in search hits) or is used as the table's `displayColumn` (it would render as the FK label inside every referencing record).\n- **Compile-time scan (actions).** A record-based action that copies `record.<maskedColumn>` into another record's column, an html/text template that gets stored, or a payload object fails compilation. Plain reads, comparisons, logging, and tagged templates (`sql\\`…\\${record.col}\\``) are fine — only the storage/payload sinks are flagged.\n- **Realtime → webhook.** Rows pushed to a realtime webhook sink are masked (an external sink carries no role, so masked columns are redacted), matching what WebSocket subscribers see.\n\n### Revealing a value on purpose: `unmask()`\n\nWhen an action legitimately needs the raw value (e.g. calling an external API with a token), route it through `unmask()` — the sanctioned, audited reveal. It returns the raw value and records a best-effort `masked_reveal` entry in the audit database when one is configured.\n\n```typescript\n\n// in an action's execute():\nconst token = await unmask(c, record.apiToken, 'apiToken');\nawait fetch(externalUrl, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });\n```\n\n### Opting a column out: `egress: 'allow'`\n\nIf a column is masked for display tidiness rather than secrecy, opt it out of both the compile-time block and the action scan:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n shortCode: { type: 'redact', show: { roles: ['admin'] }, egress: 'allow' },\n}\n```\n\n`egress` defaults to `'block'` (fail-closed). Note the action scan is a heuristic — it catches the obvious accidental copy (`record.col` straight into a sink) but not values first aliased into another variable, the whole row returned/spread, or a re-fetch via `db.select()`. Treat it as a guardrail against accidents, not a cryptographic boundary; for true secrecy use the [encryption pillar](/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption).\n\n## Complete Example\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required().filterable('like').searchable(),\n email: q.text().required().filterable('eq').searchable(),\n phone: q.text().optional().filterable('eq'),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: {\n createable: ['name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n updatable: ['name', 'phone'],\n },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: () => '[RESUME LINK HIDDEN]',\n show: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n },\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n query: { searchable: ['name'] },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n access: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email', 'phone'],\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['owner'] }, mode: 'soft' },\n});\n```"
123
123
  },
124
124
  "compiler/definitions/permissions": {
125
125
  "title": "Permissions",
126
126
  "content": "A `via:` arm references **one** relationship. A `roles: [...]` array ORs a\nflat list of role names. When the *same* grant rule recurs across several\nresources — \"organizer **or** confirmed attendee\", \"admin **and not**\nsuspended\" — name it once under `authz.permissions` and reference it\neverywhere by name. A permission is a **named boolean expression** over the\nauthorization primitives you've already declared.\n\n## Declaring permissions\n\nPermissions live in `quickback.config.ts` alongside `authz.relationships`:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...providers...\n authz: {\n relationships: {\n organizerOf: { from: 'event_staff', subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, resource: { column: 'eventId' }, where: { role: 'organizer' } },\n attendeeOf: { from: 'event_guests', subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, resource: { column: 'eventId' }, where: { status: 'confirmed' } },\n },\n permissions: {\n 'event:view': { anyOf: ['organizerOf', 'attendeeOf'] },\n 'event:manage': { allOf: ['organizerOf', { not: 'suspendedFromEvent' }] },\n 'org:admin': { anyOf: [{ role: 'admin' }, { role: 'owner' }] },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## The expression DSL\n\nA permission is a tree of three combinators over **leaves**:\n\n| Combinator | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| `{ anyOf: [...] }` | union — satisfied if **any** arm holds |\n| `{ allOf: [...] }` | intersection — satisfied only if **all** arms hold |\n| `{ not: <expr> }` | exclusion — satisfied if the operand does **not** hold |\n\nA bare leaf (no combinator) is a one-arm permission — the replacement for a\nsingle `via:`.\n\n### Leaves\n\nA leaf names one authorization primitive. The common case is a bare string;\nobject forms are the unambiguous escape hatch.\n\n| Leaf | Resolves to |\n|---|---|\n| `'organizerOf'` (bare string, no prefix) | a declared **relationship** |\n| `{ relationRef: 'organizerOf' }` | a declared relationship (explicit) |\n| `{ permissionRef: 'event:view' }` | **another permission** (composition) |\n| `{ role: 'admin' }` | an org-membership role (`ctx.roles`) |\n| `{ scopeRole: { kind: 'event', role: 'organizer' } }` | a [scoped role](/compiler/definitions/scopes) |\n| `{ pseudoRole: 'AUTHENTICATED' }` | `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `INTERNAL` / … |\n| `{ arrowRef: 'eventOrg', permission: 'org:admin' }` | an [FK-traversal arrow](/compiler/definitions/arrows) — resolve the row's FK to its target object and require a permission there |\n\nString sugar for the prefixed forms is also accepted inside an expression:\n`'permission:event:view'`, `'scope:event:organizer'`, `'role:admin'`. A bare\nstring with no recognized prefix is always a relationship reference.\n\n## Referencing a permission\n\nA resource references a permission from its `firewall` with a\n`{ permission }` arm. `field` is the resource-side column the lowered\nsubqueries constrain — the same column a `via:` arm would carry:\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', permission: 'event:view' },\n]\n```\n\nThe compiler **lowers** the permission to the equivalent firewall arms:\n`anyOf` becomes an OR of relationship subqueries (`any`), `allOf` becomes an\nAND (`all`), and `{ permissionRef }` inlines the referenced permission's\narms. The result is byte-identical to writing those `via:` arms by hand — the\npermission is just the named, reusable spelling.\n\nSee [Firewall — named permissions](/compiler/definitions/firewall#named-permissions-permission)\nfor how the arm sits inside a firewall.\n\n## M1 limits\n\nPermissions are richer than what a firewall can enforce today. The DSL\naccepts the full shape so configs are forward-compatible, but a firewall\nruns as a SQL `WHERE` clause, so a permission referenced from a firewall\nmust be **SQL-pushable**. Two cases are rejected at compile time when\nreferenced from a firewall:\n\n- **Claim-site leaves.** `{ role }`, `{ scopeRole }`, and `{ pseudoRole }`\n are decided from the request's verified claims, not from a row subquery.\n A permission containing one of these can't lower to a `WHERE` clause, so\n referencing it from a firewall is a compile error. Gate membership on\n `read.access` / `crud.*.access` instead, where role checks belong.\n- **`not`.** A `not` whose operand resolves to a SQL (relationship) site is\n rejected — `NOT IN (subquery)` over a nullable set is the classic\n null-trap (a `NULL` row silently passes). It's representable in the DSL for\n future claim/runtime sites but errors in a firewall in M1.\n\nThese shapes (`{ role }`, `not`, typed caveats) remain in the DSL because\nthey're the enforcement surfaces of later milestones (claim-site and runtime\nchecks). M1 ships the SQL-pushable subset: relationship and `{ permissionRef }`\nleaves under `anyOf` / `allOf`. FK-traversal arrows (`{ arrowRef, permission }`)\nare now shipped and **are** firewall-pushable — see\n[Arrows](/compiler/definitions/arrows).\n\nThe compile-time analyzer flags permissions that can never be satisfied,\narms shadowed by a broader arm, a `not` over a SQL site (the null-trap), and\nthe subquery / CTE cost of each rule — see\n[Diagnostics](/compiler/definitions/diagnostics).\n\n## Reference\n\n```typescript\n// authz.permissions.<name>\ntype PermissionExpr =\n | PermissionLeaf\n | { anyOf: PermissionExpr[] }\n | { allOf: PermissionExpr[] }\n | { not: PermissionExpr };\n\ntype PermissionLeaf =\n | string // relationship name (bare) or prefixed sugar\n | { relationRef: string }\n | { permissionRef: string }\n | { role: string } // claim-site — not firewall-pushable (M1)\n | { scopeRole: { kind: string; role: string } } // claim-site — not firewall-pushable (M1)\n | { pseudoRole: string } // claim-site — not firewall-pushable (M1)\n | { arrowRef: string; permission: string }; // FK-traversal arrow — see Arrows\n```\n\n- Referenced from a firewall as `{ field, permission: '<name>' }`.\n- Relationship leaves carry every property of the underlying relationship —\n the `from` table's own firewall (tenant scope + soft-delete) is AND'd into\n each subquery, exactly as with a `via:` arm.\n- See [Scopes & capability grants](/compiler/definitions/scopes) for scoped\n roles and [Access — relationships](/compiler/definitions/access#authz-relationships)\n for the relationship shape."
127
127
  },
128
+ "compiler/definitions/rate-limit": {
129
+ "title": "Rate Limit - Per-Operation Request Caps",
130
+ "content": "Per-operation request caps for every CRUD endpoint. Backed by Cloudflare's native [Rate Limiting binding](https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/bindings/rate-limit/) — no extra storage, no third-party libraries.\n\n## Defaults\n\nEvery resource gets these limits automatically (per authenticated user, per minute):\n\n| Operation | Default |\n|-----------|---------|\n| `read` | 1000 / 60s |\n| `create` | 200 / 60s |\n| `update` | 200 / 60s |\n| `delete` | 200 / 60s |\n\nNumbers are loose enough that no legitimate user-driven traffic hits them, but tight enough to catch a runaway script before it burns the day's D1 budget. Override per-op or opt out wherever the defaults don't fit.\n\n## Override one operation\n\n```typescript\n// features/claims/claims.ts\nexport default defineTable(claims, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n rateLimit: {\n delete: { limit: 5, period: 60 }, // tighter than the 200/60s default\n },\n // read / create / update keep shipped defaults\n});\n```\n\n## Disable rate-limiting on a resource\n\n```typescript\n// features/telemetry/events.ts\nexport default defineTable(telemetryEvents, {\n rateLimit: false, // high-volume sink, skip enforcement\n});\n```\n\n## Project-wide overrides\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n rateLimit: {\n read: { limit: 500, period: 60 }, // tighter project-wide read default\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Disable globally\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n rateLimit: false, // e.g. when behind a WAF that handles request shaping\n});\n```\n\n## Configuration shape\n\n```typescript\nrateLimit?: {\n read?: { limit: number, period: 10 | 60 };\n create?: { limit: number, period: 10 | 60 };\n update?: { limit: number, period: 10 | 60 };\n delete?: { limit: number, period: 10 | 60 };\n} | false\n```\n\n- `period` must be `10` or `60` (Cloudflare binding constraint — anything else is a compile-time error).\n- `limit` is a positive integer.\n- Omit an op to inherit the project default (or shipped default).\n- Set `false` at resource or project level to opt out.\n\n## Resolution order\n\n1. Project `rateLimit: false` → no enforcement anywhere\n2. Resource `rateLimit: false` → no enforcement on this resource\n3. Resource per-op override\n4. Project per-op default\n5. Quickback shipped defaults (1000 / 200 above)\n\nDefault-using resources collapse onto two shared bindings (`RL_1000_60`, `RL_200_60`), so a project that never declares `rateLimit` still ships exactly two rate-limit bindings — not one per resource.\n\n## How requests are keyed\n\nEach handler composes a key as `<resource>:<op>:<userId>`. For routes that opt into PUBLIC access (no `userId`), the key falls back to the client's `cf-connecting-ip` header, then to the literal `'anon'` if that header is absent too.\n\nThis means:\n\n- A single user is rate-limited per resource per op — heavy `read` traffic on `claims` doesn't slow their `update` traffic on `applications`.\n- One noisy user can't starve another — keys are scoped by `userId`.\n- Anonymous traffic hitting PUBLIC routes is keyed by IP, which works behind a CDN but is trivially bypassed by a botnet — pair PUBLIC routes with auth-required mutations or a Cloudflare WAF rule for hostile traffic.\n\n## How limits compile\n\nThe compiler walks every resource, collects unique `(limit, period)` tuples, and emits one Cloudflare binding per tuple to `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```toml\n[[unsafe.bindings]]\nname = \"RL_1000_60\"\ntype = \"ratelimit\"\nnamespace_id = \"60001000\"\nsimple = { limit = 1000, period = 60 }\n\n[[unsafe.bindings]]\nname = \"RL_200_60\"\ntype = \"ratelimit\"\nnamespace_id = \"60000200\"\nsimple = { limit = 200, period = 60 }\n```\n\nEach generated CRUD handler invokes `c.env.RL_<L>_<P>.limit({ key })` between the auth gate and the access check. Hitting the limit returns:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests\nRetry-After: 60\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{ \"error\": \"Rate limit exceeded\", \"code\": \"RATE_LIMITED\", \"retryAfter\": 60 }\n```\n\n## Batch endpoints\n\nBatch routes (`POST /batch`, `PATCH /batch`, `DELETE /batch`, `PUT /batch`) count as **a single request** against their op's limit, not N. A batch of 100 records consumes one token, not one hundred. This matches how most rate-limit configurations are actually written (caps on request volume, not row volume).\n\n## Actions\n\nCustom actions (record-based and standalone) inherit rate limits without configuration:\n\n- **Record-based actions** (e.g. `POST /api/v1/claims/:id/approve`) inherit the resource's `update` (write) bucket. A user who hits the write limit on `claims` is also blocked from `approve`.\n- **Standalone actions** (e.g. `POST /api/v1/twilioIncoming`) inherit the project-default `update` bucket — they don't belong to a resource.\n\nOverride either with the action's `rateLimit` field:\n\n```typescript\n// features/claims/actions/approve.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: 'Approve a claim',\n input: z.object({ claimId: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n rateLimit: { limit: 5, period: 60 }, // tighter than resource update bucket\n execute: async ({ db, input }) => { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/integrations/actions/twilioIncoming.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: 'Webhook from Twilio',\n path: '/twilioIncoming',\n method: 'POST',\n input: z.object({ /* ... */ }),\n access: { roles: ['PUBLIC'] },\n rateLimit: { limit: 1000, period: 10 }, // tolerate burst from Twilio\n execute: async ({ input }) => { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\nSet `rateLimit: false` to opt the action out of enforcement entirely.\n\n**Key composition** — actions get their own keyspace so a generic resource bucket and an action's bucket never share counters:\n\n| Action kind | Key shape |\n|-------------|-----------|\n| Record-based | `<resource>:action:<actionName>:<userId\\|cf-connecting-ip\\|anon>` |\n| Standalone | `standalone:<path>:<userId\\|cf-connecting-ip\\|anon>` |\n\nThe `:action:` infix is what keeps `update` (resource bucket) and `approve` (action bucket) from sharing counters when they happen to land on the same binding name.\n\n## Cardinality — how many bindings ship\n\nCloudflare bindings are sized at compile time (limit + period are baked in), so the compiler emits one binding per **unique `(limit, period)` tuple**, not one per resource. A project of 50 resources that all use the defaults still ships exactly two rate-limit bindings.\n\n| Configuration | Bindings emitted |\n|---------------|------------------|\n| All defaults | 2 (`RL_1000_60` for reads, `RL_200_60` for writes) |\n| One project-wide read override (`read: { limit: 500, period: 60 }`) | 3 (`RL_500_60`, `RL_1000_60` ← only if some resource opts back into the default, `RL_200_60`) |\n| Five resources tightening `delete` to `{ limit: 5, period: 60 }` | 3 (defaults + `RL_5_60` shared) |\n| Ten distinct per-action overrides at unique tuples | 12 (defaults + ten action buckets) |\n\n**Practical caps.** Cloudflare workers have generous binding limits (hundreds), so this is unlikely to be a real ceiling — but it's the reason every distinct `(limit, period)` you write on a `rateLimit` config widens the binding set, even when the same resource declares the same tuple multiple times. Resource-level configs that share a tuple share a binding and simply produce different runtime keys.\n\n**Key cardinality is separate.** Each binding holds an independent counter per key. A binding called via `claims:read:user_123` and `applications:read:user_123` consumes two separate counters in the same binding — fan-out cost lives in Cloudflare's distributed counter store, not in your binding count. The user-perceivable limit is \"per (resource, op, user)\", regardless of how many resources share the binding.\n\n## Runtime support\n\n| Runtime | Rate limiting |\n|---------|---------------|\n| `cloudflare` | Backed by Cloudflare's native [Rate Limiting binding](https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/bindings/rate-limit/) |\n| `bun` | In-process fixed-window counter (`src/lib/rate-limit-memory.ts`). Same generated check code, same 429 response — single-instance only |\n\nOn Bun, the compiler emits `src/lib/rate-limit-memory.ts` and wires up a per-binding shim in the server's fetch handler. Each `RL_<limit>_<period>` shim delegates to a process-memory token bucket, so the same `c.env.RL_*.limit({ key })` call site that targets the Cloudflare binding works unchanged.\n\n**Multi-instance Bun deployments** need either a load balancer with sticky sessions (so the same user keeps hitting the same instance and its bucket) or the Cloudflare runtime (which has cross-instance counters out of the box). The in-memory shim does not coordinate across processes.\n\n## Compile-time validation\n\nThe compiler errors on:\n\n1. `period` other than `10` or `60`\n2. Non-integer or non-positive `limit`\n3. Unknown ops (e.g. `list` instead of `read`)\n\n## Disabling vs. tightening — when to use which\n\n| Goal | Configuration |\n|------|---------------|\n| One op needs a tighter cap (e.g. `delete`) | Resource override on that op only |\n| One op needs a looser cap (high-volume reads) | Resource override raising the limit |\n| One resource is a high-volume sink | `rateLimit: false` on the resource |\n| Whole project is behind a WAF | `rateLimit: false` at project level |\n| App-wide tighter default (e.g. expensive reads) | Project-level override of that op |"
131
+ },
128
132
  "compiler/definitions/read": {
129
133
  "title": "Read - Unified Read Pipeline",
130
134
  "content": "The `read` block owns the read side of every resource: the collection-level\n`GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections. It\nreplaces the legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes — those are rejected\nat compile time in DSL v2.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/customers/customers.ts\n\nexport const customers = sqliteTable('customers', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n name: text('name').notNull(),\n email: text('email').notNull(),\n ssn: text('ssn'),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(customers, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n masking: {\n ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n views: {\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'status'],\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email', 'ssn', 'status'],\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n },\n },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['admin'] }, mode: 'soft' },\n});\n```\n\n## What `read` Owns\n\n| Endpoint | Gate |\n|----------|------|\n| `GET /api/v1/{resource}` | `read.access` |\n| `GET /api/v1/{resource}/:id` | `read.access` |\n| `GET /api/v1/{resource}/views/{name}` | `read.views[name].access` (falls back to `read.access`) |\n\nSingle-record `GET /:id` inherits `read.access` automatically — there's no\nseparate `read.get` block. If you need different access for single records,\nuse record-level conditions on `read.access`:\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n access: {\n or: [\n { roles: ['admin'] },\n { roles: ['member'], record: { ownerId: { equals: '$ctx.userId' } } },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Configuration Options\n\n```typescript\ninterface ReadConfig {\n // Role/condition gate for collection reads, single-record reads, and the\n // default view fallback.\n access?: Access;\n\n // Optional read-side firewall override. If omitted, the resource-level\n // `firewall` block is used (the common case).\n firewall?: FirewallConfig;\n\n // Pagination defaults for collection reads.\n pageSize?: number; // Default page size (default: 50)\n maxPageSize?: number; // Hard cap (default: 100)\n\n // Named field projections. Each view has its own access and field list.\n views?: {\n [viewName: string]: ViewConfig;\n };\n}\n\ninterface ViewConfig {\n fields: string[]; // Columns returned by this view\n access?: Access; // Per-view access (falls back to read.access)\n pageSize?: number;\n maxPageSize?: number;\n}\n```\n\n## Access Ordering on `/:id`\n\nSingle-record `GET /:id` evaluates checks in this order to close the\n404-vs-403 ID-probe channel:\n\n1. **Auth gate** — 401 if unauthenticated\n2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)\n3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership\n4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates\n5. **Masking** — applied to the response\n\nAn unauthorized caller without a matching role gets 403 from step 2 before\nthe database is touched, so they can't distinguish \"row exists in another\ntenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" A caller with the right role but the wrong\ntenant gets the firewall's configured response (403 by default; see\n[`firewallErrorMode: 'hide'`](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for an opaque\n404 instead).\n\nFunction-form access is opaque to the pre-check (it always passes there) and\nis fully evaluated post-record, so `access: async (ctx, record) => ...`\nstill works as before.\n\n## Views Under `read.views`\n\nViews are named field projections — Column Level Security. They live under\n`read.views` (not at the resource top level). See\n[Views](/compiler/definitions/views) for the full feature reference.\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n views: {\n public: {\n fields: ['id', 'title', 'status'],\n access: { roles: ['PUBLIC'] },\n },\n internal: {\n fields: ['id', 'title', 'status', 'salaryMin', 'salaryMax'],\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nNamed views are emitted at dedicated path routes:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/jobs/views/internal`\n- If `read.defaultView` is set, bare `GET /api/v1/jobs` resolves to that view.\n\n## Migrating from `crud.list` / `crud.get`\n\nDSL v2 rejects both at compile time. The migration is mechanical:\n\n| Before (DSL v1) | After (DSL v2) |\n|---|---|\n| `crud.list.access` | `read.access` |\n| `crud.list.pageSize` | `read.pageSize` |\n| `crud.list.maxPageSize` | `read.maxPageSize` |\n| `crud.list.fields: [...]` | Move to a named view under `read.views` |\n| `crud.get.access` | `read.access` (or record-level conditions) |\n| `crud.get.fields: [...]` | Move to a named view; clients call `/views/{name}` |\n| Top-level `views: {...}` | `read.views: {...}` |\n\nExample before/after:\n\n```typescript\n// Before — DSL v1\ncrud: {\n list: {\n access: { roles: ['member'] },\n pageSize: 25,\n },\n get: {\n access: { roles: ['member'] },\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'status'], // per-field projection\n },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n}\n\n// After — DSL v2\nread: {\n access: { roles: ['member'] },\n pageSize: 25,\n views: {\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'status'],\n access: { roles: ['member'] },\n },\n },\n}\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } }\n```\n\nClients that previously hit `GET /:id` to retrieve only summary fields now\nmove that projection to a named collection view such as\n`GET /api/v1/jobs/views/summary`. Single-record `GET /:id` always returns the\nfull masked record.\n\n## Read-Only Resources\n\nA resource that exposes only reads is valid with no write-operation blocks at all:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(balanceSnapshots, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] } },\n // no create/update/delete/upsert — no writes\n});\n```\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Views](/compiler/definitions/views) — Full reference for named projections\n- [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) — Roles, record conditions, and combinators\n- [Firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) — Tenant scoping and `firewallErrorMode`\n- [Views API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api) — Calling views from clients"
@@ -137,6 +141,10 @@ export const DOCS = {
137
141
  "title": "Scopes & Capability Grants",
138
142
  "content": "Org membership answers *\"which tenant is this caller in?\"* Scopes answer a different question: *\"this caller isn't an org member, but they're a **confirmed attendee of event E** — let them see exactly E's rows, as exactly the role they hold, and nothing else.\"*\n\nA **scope** is a tenant axis whose value is established by a **relationship you prove once** (at `POST /scope/v1/enter`) and then carry in a signed JWT claim — verified cryptographically on every later request with **no database round-trip**. It's the REST/JWT twin of the realtime ws-ticket.\n\n## When to use it\n\nReach for a scope when a principal must touch a bounded slice of an instance **without being an org member**:\n\n- **Event attendee** — reads their event's announcements / sessions, not the org.\n- **Shuttle driver** — sees only the passengers on *their* bus (a row slice), can DM them.\n- **F&B vendor** — reads dietary *counts*, zero attendee rows.\n- **Visiting nurse / carrier / contractor** — one patient's meds, one carrier's shipments.\n\nEach is *event-scoped* but a **distinct least-privilege role**. Org members are unaffected — they keep their normal tenant access.\n\n## The model\n\n### 1. Declare relationships + scopes\n\nA scope **kind** (`event`) declares named **roles**, each conferred by a relationship whose `from` row carries the role (and optionally a **sub-key** for row slicing):\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: { from: 'guests', subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, resource: { column: 'eventId' }, where: { status: 'confirmed' } },\n organizerOf: { from: 'staff', subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, resource: { column: 'eventId' }, where: { role: 'organizer' } },\n shuttleDriverOf: { from: 'staff', subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, resource: { column: 'eventId' }, where: { role: 'shuttleDriver' } },\n },\n scopes: {\n event: {\n requestField: 'eventId', // the body field the client sends to /enter\n roles: {\n attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' },\n organizer: { via: 'organizerOf' },\n shuttleDriver: { via: 'shuttleDriverOf', subKeys: ['shuttleId'] }, // row-slice sub-key\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Enter the scope\n\n```http\nPOST /scope/v1/enter (session OR existing JWT auth)\n{ \"eventId\": \"evt_123\" }\n```\n\nThe server probes **every declared role** for the proposed instance (one DB touch), and mints the proven roles + sub-keys into a signed JWT `scope` claim, returned via the `set-auth-token` header and the body:\n\n```jsonc\n// a shuttle driver who is also a confirmed guest\n\"scope\": { \"event\": { \"id\": \"evt_123\", \"roles\": [\"attendee\", \"shuttleDriver\"], \"shuttleId\": \"shA\" } }\n```\n\nThe client sends that JWT as `Authorization: Bearer …` on subsequent requests. The auth middleware verifies the signature and sets `ctx.scope` — **no DB**. The claim is carried forward on every authed call (rolling refresh) for up to **15 minutes from the last actual relationship proof** — the mint stamps a proof timestamp (`sct`) that the refresh carries forward verbatim and checks against the carry-forward cap. Past the cap the refresh stops, the token expires within one TTL, and the client re-proves via `enter` (or any namespace route that mints) to restart the window.\n\n> **Invariant:** the client only *proposes* the instance id (from the URL). The server proves membership before signing. No client-asserted scope is ever trusted.\n\n### 3. Gate the pillars\n\nScoped roles are referenced everywhere a pillar takes a role as the namespaced identifier **`scope:<kind>:<role>`**:\n\n```typescript\n// features/guests/guests.ts — the manifest, row-sliced + PII-masked\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: { /* … eventId, shuttleId, email, … */ },\n // org staff see the whole event; a shuttle driver sees only their bus\n firewall: {\n any: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { all: [\n { field: 'eventId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event' },\n { field: 'shuttleId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event.shuttleId' }, // sub-key row slice\n ] },\n ],\n },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin', 'scope:event:organizer'] } }, // hidden from the driver\n },\n read: {\n views: {\n manifest: {\n fields: ['id', 'nameAtInvite', 'shuttleId', 'pickupLocation'],\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'scope:event:organizer', 'scope:event:shuttleDriver'] },\n },\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n| Pillar | How it reads the scoped role |\n|--------|------------------------------|\n| **Firewall** (rows) | `all`/`any` arms keyed on `ctx.scope.<kind>` (+ sub-keys) — see [Firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) |\n| **Access** (verbs/views) | `access.roles: ['scope:event:shuttleDriver']` on CRUD, actions, and views |\n| **Masking** (fields) | `masking.<col>.show.roles` includes / excludes `scope:event:<role>` |\n\n## The org / scope split (security)\n\n**Scoped roles never merge into `ctx.roles`.** A `scope:*` identifier matches **only** the verified scope claim (`ctx.scope.<kind>.roles`); a bare org role (`admin`, `member`) matches **only** `ctx.roles`. The compiler enforces the split so an externally-provisioned `shuttleDriver` can **never** satisfy an `admin` gate by string coincidence, and a tampered scope claim can't impersonate an org role. This is the precondition for admitting limited outside users at all.\n\n## Sub-keys (row slicing)\n\nA role's `subKeys` name columns on the relationship's `from` row that are projected into the claim. A firewall arm then slices on them:\n\n```typescript\n{ field: 'shuttleId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event.shuttleId' }\n```\n\nBecause sub-key arms compose with `all`, an **absent** sub-key denies (`sql\\`1 = 0\\``) rather than widening — a driver can never see *all* shuttles by simply lacking the claim. The scope accessor is always emitted null-safe (`ctx.scope?.event?.shuttleId`), so an org caller who never entered the scope hits a clean deny, not a 500.\n\n### Set-valued sub-keys\n\nA driver may cover **more than one** bus. Append a `[]` marker to the\nsub-key name to project **every** matched `from` row's value into the claim\nas a `string[]`:\n\n```typescript\nroles: {\n shuttleDriver: { via: 'shuttleDriverOf', subKeys: ['shuttleId[]'] }, // set-valued\n}\n```\n\nThe `[]` is a marker only — it's stripped from the column name (the\nrelationship's `from` row still reads `shuttleId`). At `/scope/v1/enter` the\nproven rows union their values, so the claim carries an array:\n\n```jsonc\n\"scope\": { \"event\": { \"id\": \"evt_123\", \"roles\": [\"shuttleDriver\"], \"shuttleId\": [\"shA\", \"shC\"] } }\n```\n\nThe matching firewall arm — written exactly as for the scalar case\n(`{ field: 'shuttleId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event.shuttleId' }`) — is\n**rewritten by the compiler** to an `inArray` row-slice:\n\n```sql\nWHERE shuttle_id IN (ctx.scope?.event?.shuttleId ?? [])\n```\n\nThe `?? []` default makes an absent claim lower to `inArray(col, [])` — a\nclean DENY, never a malformed SQL fragment or a 500. A scalar sub-key (no\n`[]` marker) is untouched and keeps lowering to `eq`. You write the same\n`equals` arm either way; declaring `shuttleId[]` vs `shuttleId` in the scope\nrole is the only switch.\n\n## Auto-stamping the scope column on insert (`q.scope`)\n\n`q.scope('organization')` auto-stamps the tenant column on write, the same\nway `q.scope('owner')` stamps `ownerId`. A relationship-derived kind works\nidentically: `q.scope('event')` auto-stamps the column from the **verified\nscope claim** (`ctx.scope.event.id`) on insert — no need to pass `eventId`\nin the request body:\n\n```typescript\nexport const eventNotes = q.table('event_notes', {\n id: q.id(),\n eventId: q.scope('event'), // INSERT autofill from ctx.scope.event.id\n body: q.text().required(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // INSERT autofill from ctx.activeOrgId\n});\n```\n\nThe stamp is **insert-only** and null-safe — the generated CREATE handler\nwrites `eventId: ctx.scope?.event?.id`, so it never binds `undefined`. It\ndoes **not** add a read-time `WHERE` filter (that's the firewall's job; a\nread scoped to `eventId = ctx.scope.event.id` would be wrong here). Infra\nkinds map to their session fields (`organization` → `ctx.activeOrgId`,\n`owner` → `ctx.userId`, `team` → `ctx.activeTeamId`); any other kind maps to\n`ctx.scope.<kind>.id`.\n\n## Namespace scope-claim refresh\n\nA scope is normally minted at `POST /scope/v1/enter`. When you also mount a\n[namespace](/compiler/definitions/access#namespace-mounts-hoisted-relationship-middleware)\nthat gates `/event/:eventId/*` on the **same** relationship, the namespace\nresolver can refresh `ctx.scope.<kind>` in memory for the duration of that\nrequest — so an attendee hitting `/event/evt_123/announce` gets\n`ctx.scope.event = { id: 'evt_123', roles: ['attendee'] }` without a separate\n`enter` round-trip. The refresh runs **after** the gate (the gate proves the\nrelationship; the refresh stamps the proven role from the path param).\n\nThis is a strictly-guarded convenience, and it stamps **per matched lane**. The\nresolver records which `via:` lane opened the gate (first-match-wins) and stamps\n**only that lane's** scope role — an attendee who matched `attendeeOf` gets\n`roles: ['attendee']`; an organizer who matched `organizerOf` gets\n`roles: ['organizer']`. A caller can never receive a role they didn't prove this\nrequest.\n\n- **Relationship lanes** each confer their own scope role, stamped only when that exact lane matched — so a **multi-lane `via:`** (e.g. `via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf']`) refreshes the matched lane's role, not an ambiguous union.\n- A **bulk-grant lane** (`{ roles: [...] }` or `{ team: true }`) confers **no** scope role — it opens the gate via the caller's org role *without* proving any relationship, so there is nothing to stamp (stamping one would forge it). The gate still passes; the caller is simply authorized by their org role.\n\nThe refresh described so far is in-memory and single-request. To also hand the\ncaller a **persisted** scope token, opt the namespace into `mintScope` — see\nbelow.\n\n### Gotcha: a namespace only emits its resolver when it claims a standalone action\n\nThis is the single most common surprise (it has tripped up a customer): **a\nnamespace emits its resolver — and therefore the scope refresh and the\n[`mintScope`](#mintscope-mint-the-scope-token-from-the-namespace-resolver)\nmint — only when at least one STANDALONE action's `path:` falls under the\nnamespace prefix.**\n\nA standalone action declares its own `path:` (e.g.\n`path: '/event/:eventId/home'`), so the compiler can match it against the\nnamespace prefix and hoist it into the synthetic namespace routes file.\n**Record-based actions are different** — they mount under their resource's CRUD\nroutes (`/api/v1/guests/:id/checkin`), which live *outside* the\n`/event/:eventId` prefix. They never match the prefix, so they never get\nclaimed.\n\nA namespace that contains **only** record-based actions is therefore **inert**:\nnothing matches the prefix, no synthetic routes file is emitted, and so there\nis **no resolver, no scope refresh, and no mint** — even though the namespace\nis declared and validates cleanly. The middleware you expected to gate\n`/event/:eventId/*` simply isn't there.\n\nThe fix is to give the namespace at least one standalone action under the\nprefix. In `q-events`, `eventHome` exists precisely for this — a standalone\n`GET /event/:eventId/home` that pulls the resolver (and the §5.3 mint) into\nexistence:\n\n```typescript\n// features/events/actions/eventHome.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/event/:eventId/home', // ← standalone path UNDER the namespace prefix\n method: 'GET',\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: ['scope:event:attendee', 'scope:event:organizer', 'manager+'] },\n async execute({ db, ctx, c }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\nWith that action present, the `eventScope` resolver is emitted, runs the\n`attendeeOf` probe once per `/event/:eventId/*` request, stamps\n`ctx.scope.event`, and (because the namespace sets `mintScope: true`) mints the\nscope token. Without a standalone action under the prefix, none of that fires.\n\n## `mintScope` — mint the scope token from the namespace resolver\n\nA scope is normally minted by an explicit `POST /scope/v1/enter` round-trip.\nSetting **`mintScope: true`** on a namespace folds that mint into the\nnamespace resolver: on a successful relationship probe the resolver MINTS a\npersisted scope JWT and returns it via the `set-auth-token` header — so a\nnative client hitting `/event/:eventId/*` gets a scope token **without ever\ncalling `/scope/v1/enter`**.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'linkedUserId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'guests',\n exposeAs: 'guest',\n },\n },\n namespaces: {\n eventScope: {\n prefix: '/event/:eventId',\n via: ['attendeeOf'], // one or more lanes — mints the matched lane's role\n mintScope: true, // ← fold the scope-token mint into the resolver\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nA confirmed attendee then hits the standalone action under the prefix:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/event/evt_123/home\nAuthorization: Bearer <existing-jwt>\n\n200 OK\nset-auth-token: <new-scoped-jwt> ← carries scope.event.roles = [\"attendee\"]\n```\n\nThe client stores the `set-auth-token` value and sends it as the bearer on\nevery subsequent `/event/:eventId/*` request. The JWT carries\n`scope.event = { id: 'evt_123', roles: ['attendee'] }`, so the scoped-role\naccess checks (`scope:event:attendee`) pass with no DB touch and no second\n`enter` call.\n\n`mintScope` is **opt-in per namespace** and defaults to `false`. With it off,\nthe resolver does the in-memory `ctx.scope.<kind>` refresh only (the section\nabove); subsequent requests must still call `/scope/v1/enter` for a persisted\ntoken.\n\n### Per-matched-lane minting (forging safety)\n\nThe mint stamps the scope role of **whichever lane matched**, gated on the\nfirst-match-wins probe — the *same* per-lane discipline as the in-memory stamp,\napplied here with higher stakes: a minted token **persists for its whole TTL**,\nso it can only ever carry the role the caller actually proved this request.\n\n- A **multi-lane `via:`** (e.g. `via: ['attendeeOf', 'organizerOf']`) mints the matched lane's role — `attendeeOf` → `scope.event.roles = ['attendee']`, `organizerOf` → `['organizer']`. The resolver records which lane opened the gate, so there is no ambiguity.\n- A **bulk-grant lane** (`{ roles: [...] }` or `{ team: true }`) mints **no** scope role — it opens the gate via the caller's org role without proving a relationship. The gate passes; the caller carries their org role, not a minted scope role.\n\n> The realtime [ws-ticket](/stack/realtime/durable-objects#namespace-backed-tickets-per-matched-lane) can authorize through this same namespace `via:`, issuing a per-matched-lane WebSocket ticket — so the socket gate and the REST gate stay identical.\n\nIn every suppressed case the gate still authorizes the request; only the mint\n(and the in-memory refresh) are skipped, and those callers obtain a scope\ntoken through `/scope/v1/enter` as usual. Flipping `mintScope: true` can never\nforge a scope role — the guard, not the flag, is the gate.\n\n### TTL and best-effort semantics\n\n- **TTL is the scope-token TTL** — `auth.jwt.expiresIn` (default 180s), **clamped to a hard ≤180s ceiling** at every signing site that emits a scope claim: both proven mints (`/scope/v1/enter`, the namespace resolver) *and* the middleware's rolling refresh. A longer-lived scope token would widen the post-revocation replay window past the spec bound, so the clamp is non-negotiable — an `auth.jwt.expiresIn` above the ceiling applies to plain tokens but never survives into a scope-bearing one.\n- **The mint is gated by the same proven-relationship guard as the in-memory stamp.** It runs *after* the gate has granted access, reading the instance id from the proven path param (`:eventId`) — never from request input — so the minted `scope:<kind>:<role>` is backed by exactly the proof `/scope/v1/enter` requires. The token is **byte-identical** to one `/scope/v1/enter` would produce: same shared mint helper, same carry-forward of any *other* verified scope kinds already on the incoming token (the freshly-proven kind takes precedence; siblings survive the re-mint).\n- **The mint is best-effort.** A mint failure (e.g. a missing signing secret) **never fails the request** — the in-memory stamp already authorized it; the caller simply doesn't receive a refreshed token on that response and can fall back to `/scope/v1/enter`.\n\n## Revocation & TTL\n\nThe scope claim is trusted between proofs — it is never re-checked against the database while it rides. Two bounds keep that window finite:\n\n- **The TTL** (default 180s, `auth.jwt.expiresIn`, clamped ≤180s on scope-bearing tokens) bounds an *idle* client: a token that stops being used dies within one TTL.\n- **The carry-forward cap** (15 minutes) bounds an *active* client: the rolling refresh re-signs the claim on every authed call, but only while the claim's proof timestamp (`sct`, stamped exclusively by the proven mint sites) is younger than the cap. Past it the refresh refuses, the token expires, and the next `enter` (or namespace-route mint) re-probes the relationship — which won't re-mint a revoked role.\n\nSo removing a guest/staff row takes effect within **cap + one TTL** for a client that keeps polling, and within one TTL once it goes idle. Two ways to tighten that:\n\n- **`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`** (v0.45+, Cloudflare runtime) — sub-TTL revocation: updating or deleting a conferring relationship row stamps a revocation timestamp in KV, and the bearer fast-path rejects a carried scope claim whose proof (`sct`) predates it. See [auth config](/compiler/config/auth).\n- **`via` arms** — for tables where any caching is too wide, gate with a `via` arm instead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm: `via` emits a live subquery against the relationship table on every request, immune to a stale claim entirely.\n\n## Reference\n\n```typescript\n// AppContext (generated lib/types.ts)\nctx.scope?: Record<string, { id: string; roles?: string[]; [subKey: string]: string | string[] | undefined }>;\n\n// authz.scopes.<kind>\n{\n requestField: string; // body field carrying the instance id\n roles: Record<string, { via: string; subKeys?: string[] }>; // 'col' → eq, 'col[]' → inArray\n}\n```\n\n- `requestField` must equal every role-relationship's `resource.column`.\n- Each relationship's `from` table must exist and ship a generated firewall (it can't be `exception`).\n- A `subKeys` entry ending in `[]` is **set-valued** (lowers to `inArray`, minted as `string[]`); without the marker it's scalar (`eq`, minted as `string`).\n- `q.scope('<kind>')` auto-stamps the column from `ctx.scope.<kind>.id` on insert.\n- Generated route: `POST /scope/v1/enter` (mounted only when `authz.scopes` is declared)."
139
143
  },
144
+ "compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol": {
145
+ "title": "Sealed protocol (qbseal:1)",
146
+ "content": "This is the **protocol reference** for the [SEALED tier](/compiler/definitions/encryption#sealed-tier--end-to-end-encryption) — the on-the-wire contract a client speaks to the generated `/seal/v1` surface. Quickback ships first-party clients — TypeScript (emitted into your project), **Swift, and Kotlin** — so you usually don't implement this yourself; jump to [Client SDKs](#client-sdks). The format is also **language-agnostic and versioned**, so you can build a Go or server-side client against this spec and the [conformance vectors](#conformance-vectors) instead of reading emitted source.\n\n## Key model\n\nThree nested keys; a breach of any layer above plaintext yields only more wrapped keys.\n\n```\nUSER key ──unwrap──▶ SCOPE private key ──unwrap──▶ content key ──decrypt──▶ plaintext\n```\n\n| Key | Lives | Derivation |\n|---|---|---|\n| **USER** | client only | `Argon2id(vault passphrase, salt)` → HKDF-split into an Ed25519 signing key + an X25519 wrap key. **Never** the login password. |\n| **SCOPE** | private half wrapped per-user; public half on the server | random X25519 keypair, one per scope (per org). |\n| **Content (CK)** | wrapped to the scope | random AES-256-GCM key, one per sealed value. |\n\nA **writer** needs only the scope *public* key. A **reader** needs a grant of the scope private key, wrapped to their USER key.\n\n## Crypto primitives\n\nAll standard; no hand-rolled constructions. A conforming port maps each to its platform library (CryptoKit, BouncyCastle, WebCrypto, …).\n\n| Purpose | Primitive | Parameters |\n|---|---|---|\n| USER-key KDF | **Argon2id** | floor below; output 32 bytes |\n| KDF domain split | **HKDF-SHA256** | `info = \"qbseal-ed25519-v1\"` and `\"qbseal-x25519-v1\"`, no salt, L=32 |\n| Signing key | **Ed25519** | seed = HKDF ed25519 output |\n| Wrap key | **X25519** | seed = HKDF x25519 output |\n| Step-up proof | **Ed25519** sign/verify | over the [step-up message](#step-up-message) |\n| Sealed box (wrap a key to a pubkey) | **X25519 ECDH → HKDF-SHA256 → AES-256-GCM** | see below |\n| Content / key encryption | **AES-256-GCM** | 12-byte IV, 16-byte tag appended to ciphertext |\n\n### Argon2id floor\n\nThe server **rejects** enrollment params below this floor (a weak-KDF verifier is offline-brute-forceable, and the public key is stored). These are the OWASP Argon2id minimums:\n\n```json\n{ \"memoryKiB\": 19456, \"iterations\": 2, \"parallelism\": 1 }\n```\n\nA client MAY choose stronger params; it MUST send the params it used (the server re-derives nothing — it only verifies the Ed25519 proof and stores the params for the client to re-derive at reveal time).\n\n### Sealed box\n\nWrapping a key (a content key, or a scope private key) to an X25519 public key — the analogue of libsodium's `crypto_box_seal`:\n\n1. Generate an ephemeral X25519 keypair `eph`.\n2. `shared = X25519(eph.secret, recipientPub)`.\n3. `wrapKey = HKDF-SHA256(ikm = shared, salt = eph.pub ‖ recipientPub, info = \"qbseal-box-v1\", L = 32)`.\n4. `ct = AES-256-GCM(wrapKey, iv, plaintext)`.\n5. Envelope: `{ alg: \"x25519-aesgcm\", eph, iv, ct }` (all base64url).\n\nTo open: recompute `shared = X25519(recipientSecret, eph.pub)`, re-derive `wrapKey` (salt uses the same `eph.pub ‖ recipientPub`), AES-GCM-decrypt.\n\n### Step-up message\n\nThe message an Ed25519 step-up proof signs. Each field is **independently SHA-256-hashed then joined** — fixed-width, delimiter-free, so the `scope:<kind>:<id>` colons in `scopeRef` can't be re-segmented to forge a proof for a different target:\n\n```\nmessage = utf8(\n \"qbseal-stepup:v1:\" +\n b64url(sha256(utf8(scopeRef))) + \":\" +\n b64url(sha256(utf8(vaultItemId))) + \":\" +\n b64url(sha256(utf8(nonce)))\n)\n```\n\nThe `nonce` is the server-issued [challenge](#3-challenge). The proof is `Ed25519.sign(message, userEd25519Secret)`, sent base64url.\n\n## Envelope wire format\n\nEvery sealed blob is `qbseal:<version>:<base64url(json)>`. Three payload shapes:\n\n```jsonc\n// a key wrapped to an X25519 public key\n{ \"alg\": \"x25519-aesgcm\", \"eph\": \"<b64url>\", \"iv\": \"<b64url>\", \"ct\": \"<b64url>\" }\n\n// content encrypted under a content key\n{ \"alg\": \"aes-256-gcm\", \"iv\": \"<b64url>\", \"ct\": \"<b64url>\" }\n\n// a SEALED CELL — the compound value written into a .sealed() column.\n// The server STRUCTURALLY SPLITS this (decode only, never decrypts) into\n// vault_items.ct (content) + wrapped_ck_owner (wrappedCk).\n{ \"alg\": \"sealed-cell\",\n \"content\": { \"alg\": \"aes-256-gcm\", ... },\n \"wrappedCk\": { \"alg\": \"x25519-aesgcm\", ... } }\n```\n\nThe decoder rejects a non-`qbseal:` string, an unknown version, an envelope over 64 KiB, or a malformed body — all fail-closed.\n\n## The `/seal/v1` lifecycle\n\nAll routes are `POST`, JSON in/out, mounted at `/seal/v1`, and require an authenticated session with an **active organization** (`requireOrg` → 401/403). Errors use the standard Quickback error envelope. Most write routes accept `\"dryRun\": true` to validate + preview without persisting.\n\n`scopeRef` grammar is `scope:<kind>:<id>` (org/event/relationship) or `user:<id>`; the server validates it (`assertRefGrammar`).\n\n### Key-admin authorization (who may enroll / grant / rotate / revoke)\n\n`enroll`, `grant`, `rotate`, and `revoke` are gated by **`hasKeyAdminForScope`**:\n\n- `userRole === \"sysadmin\"` always passes; **or**\n- a verified `ctx.scope.seal` claim **for the exact `scopeRef`** carrying a key-admin-tier scoped role (configurable via `encryption.seal.keyAdminRoles`; the literal `\"key-admin\"` scoped role always qualifies).\n\nScoped roles live **only** on `ctx.scope.seal`, never `ctx.roles` — a forged `ctx.roles` entry can't satisfy the gate. There is **no automatic** role→grant: the server holds no key material, so it cannot wrap the scope key to a new reader itself. Instead a reader self-publishes their public key via [`/grant-request`](#10-grant-request) and a key-admin fulfils it via [`/grant`](#5-grant) — see [role→grant](#rolegrant-readers-request-key-admins-fulfil). Minting the key-admin scope claim is done through the normal [scopes](/compiler/definitions/scopes) machinery — that policy (which role becomes key-admin for which scope) is yours to declare.\n\n---\n\n### 1. `/scope-key` — get a scope's public key (writers)\n\nAny tenant member who can write the scope needs it. Returns the **current** (highest `keyVersion`) public key.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef }\n// ← { scopeRef, publicKey: \"<b64url X25519>\", keyVersion: 1 }\n```\n404 (existence-oracle parity) if the scope is unknown *or* has no key yet.\n\n### 2. `/enroll` — create a scope's seal key (key-admin)\n\nTrust-on-first-use: **first write wins**, never overwrites. Persists `seal_keys` (the scope public key). `organizationId` is stamped server-side.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef, publicKey: \"<b64url X25519>\" } // client generated the keypair\n// ← { enrolled: true, scopeRef, keyVersion: 1 }\n```\n409 if a key already exists for the scope (use `/rotate`).\n\n### 3. `/challenge` — issue a step-up nonce (any member)\n\nA single-use, **(issuing-user, scopeRef, vaultItemId)-bound** nonce, stored in KV (`expirationTtl` **120 s**). Bound to the item's owning scopeRef so it can only answer a reveal for *that* item; bound to the issuing user so another user can't burn it.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { vaultItemId }\n// ← { nonce: \"<b64url 32B>\", scopeRef, vaultItemId, expiresIn: 120 }\n```\n503 fail-closed if no KV binding (sealed deployments require it).\n\n### 4. `/reveal` — prove step-up, mint a reveal token (reader)\n\nVerifies the step-up proof, writes a **committed** append-only reveal-log row, then mints a short-lived capability. The proof is consumed (single-use); the token is **not** the key.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { vaultItemId, fieldRef?, stepUp: <StepUpProof> }\n// ← { revealToken: \"<JWT ≤180s>\", scope, vaultItemId, expiresIn: 180 }\n```\n`StepUpProof` is one of:\n```jsonc\n{ \"kind\": \"passphrase\", \"nonce\": \"<from /challenge>\",\n \"argon2\": { \"proof\": \"<b64url Ed25519 sig over the step-up message>\",\n \"memoryKiB\": 19456, \"iterations\": 2, \"parallelism\": 1 } }\n\n{ \"kind\": \"passkey\", \"nonce\": \"<from /challenge>\",\n \"assertion\": <WebAuthn AuthenticationResponseJSON> } // see Passkey step-up\n```\nGates, all fail-closed and in order: **(a)** tenant load, **(b)** any presented `ctx.scope.seal` claim must match the item's scopeRef, **(c)** structural step-up (single-use nonce, bound message), **(d)** `assertGrantLive` (D1 read — owner reveal needs no grant; otherwise a live `seal_key_grant` for the scope, or an audience `vault_grant`).\n\n### 5. `/key` — fetch the wrapped key (bearer the reveal token)\n\nThe **separate** post-mint route (never folded into `/reveal`). Re-runs three independent gates — tenant, capability (`ctx.scope.seal` only), `assertGrantLive` (D1, **prior to and independent of** any KV revocation check, which fails *open*) — writes a committed `delivered` reveal-log row, and returns the still-wrapped material.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { vaultItemId } (Authorization: Bearer <revealToken>)\n// ← { wrappedKey: \"<qbseal envelope>\", ct: \"<qbseal content envelope>\",\n// wrapMethod: \"owner\" | \"scope\" | \"audience\" }\n```\nThe client unwraps per `wrapMethod` (see [`/my-grant`](#6-my-grant)) and decrypts `ct`. **No readable key ever touches the server.**\n\n### 6. `/my-grant` — the caller's own wrapped scope private key (reader)\n\nFor `wrapMethod: \"scope\"`, the client first unwraps the scope private key with its USER key, then the CK. User-scoped; 404 if not granted.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef }\n// ← { wrappedPrivateKey: \"<qbseal envelope>\", wrapMethod: \"scope\" }\n```\n\n### 7. `/grant` — enroll a reader + store their wrapped scope key (key-admin)\n\nThe combined **enrollment + grant** endpoint. The server **never wraps** — it persists the client-supplied opaque blob. Exactly one live grant per `(scopeRef, userId)` (it revokes any prior live grant first).\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef, userId, wrappedPrivateKey: \"<qbseal envelope>\", wrapMethod: \"scope\",\n// wrapMeta?,\n// // OPTIONAL passphrase-reveal enrollment (the step-up verifier):\n// stepUp?: { kind: \"passphrase\", publicKey: \"<b64url Ed25519>\",\n// salt: \"<b64url>\", argon2: { memoryKiB, iterations, parallelism } } }\n// ← { granted: true, scopeRef, userId, stepUpEnrolled: boolean }\n```\n`stepUp.argon2` is floor-checked **at enrollment** (a weak verifier is rejected here, not just at reveal). The `stepUpPublicKey` + params are stored zero-knowledge; the passphrase never leaves the client.\n\n### 8. `/revoke` — sever future access (key-admin)\n\nTwo forms: `{ scopeRef, userId }` (revoke a scope-key grant) or `{ vaultItemId, audienceRef }` (revoke an audience grant). Severs the future D1 key-fetch **and** kills in-flight tokens via KV revocation. It does **not** recall an already-unwrapped key — the response surfaces `rotationRecommended` when that matters.\n\n### 9. `/rotate` — add a new key version + re-grant worklist (key-admin)\n\nAppend-only `INSERT` of a new `seal_keys` version, and returns the **re-grant worklist** — the live readers and their X25519 public keys.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef, publicKey: \"<new b64url X25519>\" } // client generated the new keypair\n// ← { rotated: true, scopeRef, keyVersion: 2,\n// regrant: [{ userId, userPublicKey }, …], // re-wrap the NEW scope key to each\n// missingPublicKey: [userId, …] } // readers granted before key capture\n```\nThe key-admin's client wraps the **new** scope private key to each `regrant[].userPublicKey` and calls [`/grant`](#5-grant) per reader (which revokes the stale grant and inserts the fresh one). The server holds no key material, so it can only hand back the wrap targets — it never re-wraps. Older `seal_keys` versions remain readable, so existing sealed values keep decrypting until re-sealed. Readers in `missingPublicKey` re-request via [`/grant-request`](#10-grant-request).\n\n### 10. `/grant-request` — request access to a scope (any member)\n\nA reader who has a role for a scope but no grant publishes their X25519 USER public key. Requesting only publishes public material + intent; **fulfilling is the key-admin-gated action**. One pending request per `(scope, user)`; a fresh request replaces the pending key.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef, userPublicKey: \"<b64url X25519>\" }\n// ← { requested: true, scopeRef }\n```\n\n### 11. `/grant-requests` — list pending requests (key-admin)\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef }\n// ← { scopeRef, requests: [{ userId, userPublicKey, requestedAt }, …] }\n```\nThe key-admin wraps the scope key to each `userPublicKey` and calls [`/grant`](#5-grant), which **auto-resolves** the matching pending request.\n\n### 12. `/recovery/enroll` — escrow the scope key under a recovery code (key-admin)\n\nA key-admin (holding the scope private key) wraps it to a key derived from a **recovery code** and escrows the blob. The server stores only the opaque recovery-wrapped material — the recovery code, held by the client, is what makes it usable; the server can never unwrap it. One live recovery per scope key version.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef, wrappedPrivateKey: \"<qbseal envelope, scope key wrapped to the recovery key>\" }\n// ← { enrolled: true, scopeRef, keyVersion: 1 }\n```\n\n### 13. `/recovery/use` — retrieve the recovery blob (key-admin)\n\nReturns the live recovery-wrapped scope key (and appends a `recovery` entry to the reveal log). The client unwraps it with the recovery-code key to recover the scope private key, then re-grants readers. The returned blob is **useless without the recovery code** — the server gates *who* may fetch it, the code gates whether it can be unwrapped.\n\n```jsonc\n// → { scopeRef }\n// ← { scopeRef, keyVersion, wrappedPrivateKey: \"<qbseal envelope>\" } // 404 parity if none\n```\n\n#### role→grant: readers request, key-admins fulfil\n\nBecause the server holds no key material, it cannot mint a grant when a user gains a role. The supported pattern: the reader calls `/grant-request` (publishing their public key); a key-admin lists pending requests with `/grant-requests`, wraps the scope key to each, and `/grant`s them — which auto-resolves the request. Who is allowed to *request* (the \"role\" half) is your access policy; the cryptographic *fulfilment* is always key-admin-gated.\n\n## Passkey step-up\n\nWhen the passkey plugin is enabled, `/reveal` verifies a WebAuthn assertion whose **challenge is the server nonce** (not Better Auth's login challenge). The native ceremony must produce an `AuthenticationResponseJSON` (the `@simplewebauthn/browser` `startAuthentication` shape) for these expectations:\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| `challenge` | the `/challenge` `nonce` **as the base64url string** (the client signs the b64url text, the server passes `expectedChallenge = nonce`) |\n| `rpID` | the passkey plugin's `rpID` — i.e. `crossSubDomainCookies.domain` (leading dot stripped) when configured, else the host of `env.ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `userVerification` | **required** (`requireUserVerification: true` — a reveal is a deliberate re-auth) |\n| origin | the resolved account origin (mirrors the `passkey({ rpID, origin })` plugin) |\n\nThe credential is looked up in the **auth** database (`passkey` table) and the signature counter is clone-checked. Conformance for passkey is **verify-based** at the server; the client's job is to bind `challenge = nonce` exactly.\n\n## Conformance vectors\n\nCanonical vectors live at **`packages/seal-client/vectors/qbseal-v1.json`**, generated from the reference TS SDK (`bun packages/seal-client/scripts/generate-vectors.ts`) and self-validated against it (`src/vectors.test.ts`). Every input (passphrase, salt, key seeds, IVs, ephemerals) is fixed, so the file is byte-stable and each vector reproduces from its inputs alone.\n\n| Group | Pins | Determinism |\n|---|---|---|\n| `kdf` | passphrase + salt + params → Ed25519/X25519 public keys | full |\n| `stepUpMessage` | `(scopeRef, vaultItemId, nonce)` → signed message | full |\n| `stepUpSign` | a signature that **verifies** against the message + pubkey | verify-based (signing may be randomized) |\n| `aesGcm` | key + IV + plaintext → ciphertext (+tag) | full |\n| `sealedBoxOpen` | recipient secret + box → plaintext | open-direction (canonical) |\n| `reveal` | passphrase → keys; owner + scope unwrap paths → plaintext | open-direction (canonical) |\n| `envelope` | `qbseal:1:` sealed-cell decodes structurally | full |\n\nA port verifies the open-direction vectors exactly, and proves its *seal* direction by round-tripping through its own open. Vectors are the **cross-language byte-for-byte guarantee** — CI runs every client (TypeScript, Swift, and Kotlin) against this one file and fails on drift.\n\n## Client SDKs\n\nYou don't have to implement the crypto. Quickback ships first-party clients, each gated in CI against the conformance vectors above — so they agree byte-for-byte with the server and with each other.\n\n| Platform | Package | Distribution | Crypto |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Web / Worker / Node | `@quickback-dev/seal-client` | **emitted** into your project at `src/lib/seal-client/` (for any project with a `.sealed()` column) | `@noble` + WebCrypto |\n| iOS / macOS | **`QuickbackSeal`** | SwiftPM — `apps/seal-sdk/swift` | CryptoKit + vendored Argon2 |\n| JVM / Android | **`dev.quickback.seal`** | Gradle — `apps/seal-sdk/kotlin` | BouncyCastle |\n\nAll three expose the same shape: a `SealClient` over a transport you implement on your HTTP client (URLSession / OkHttp / Ktor / fetch). The transport just POSTs to `/seal/v1/*`; the SDK does the crypto and the reveal handshake.\n\n### Swift (iOS / macOS)\n\n```swift\n// Package.swift\n.package(url: \"https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler.git\", branch: \"main\")\n// target dependency: .product(name: \"QuickbackSeal\", package: \"quickback-compiler\")\n```\n```swift\n\nlet seal = SealClient(transport: myTransport) // POSTs to /seal/v1/*\nlet sealed = try await seal.sealField(scopeRef: scope, // WRITE — no key needed\n plaintext: Data(\"Background check: clear\".utf8))\n\nlet session = try seal.session(passphrase: vaultPass, saltB64url: salt, argon2: .defaults)\nlet plaintext = try await seal.reveal(session: session, scopeRef: scope, vaultItemId: id)\n```\n\n### Kotlin (JVM / Android)\n\n```kotlin\n// build.gradle.kts — composite build or a published artifact from apps/seal-sdk/kotlin\n\nval seal = SealClient(myTransport)\nval sealed = seal.sealField(scope, \"Background check: clear\".toByteArray()) // WRITE\n\nval session = seal.session(vaultPass, saltB64url, Argon2Params.DEFAULTS)\nval plaintext = seal.reveal(session, scope, vaultItemId) // REVEAL\n```\n\nPasskey reveal is the same call as `revealWithPasskey(…, getAssertion)`, where `getAssertion(nonce)` runs the platform WebAuthn ceremony with `challenge = nonce`. Full details, the transport contract, and the conformance harness live in [`apps/seal-sdk/README`](https://github.com/paulstenhouse/quickback-compiler/tree/main/apps/seal-sdk). The SDKs are versioned **with** the compiler in the same repo, so the wire format never drifts from the server you're talking to.\n\n## Not yet wired\n\nHonest gaps, fail-closed until built — a client should not assume these exist:\n\n- **Content-key re-encryption on rotation** — `/rotate` versions the scope key and re-grants *readers*, and older key versions stay readable, so nothing breaks. But existing sealed *values* keep their content keys wrapped to the old scope key until a client re-seals them; there's no bulk re-encrypt-and-crypto-shred-the-old-version flow yet.\n- **Audience grants beyond reveal** — `vault_grant` audience reveals are honored at `/reveal`/`/key`, but there's no first-class management surface yet.\n\nThese will arrive as additive `:1` routes (no wire-format break) with their own vectors."
147
+ },
140
148
  "compiler/definitions/triggers": {
141
149
  "title": "Triggers - Postgres-Style Table Triggers",
142
150
  "content": "Run logic when rows change — Postgres-style `before`/`after` triggers on `insert`/`update`/`delete`, declared per table.\n\nEach trigger lowers one of two ways, and the compiler reports which:\n\n| You write | Lowers to | Fires on |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sql:` | A real SQLite `CREATE TRIGGER` in your migrations | **Every** write path — REST, actions, queue handlers, cron, raw SQL. Atomic with the write. |\n| `handler:` | An application hook at the audit-wrapper write chokepoint | Writes through the wrapped `db` — REST CRUD and actions. **Not** queue handlers, cron, or raw SQL. |\n\nThere is no auto-translation between the lanes: SQL bodies stay SQL, functions stay functions. Pick the lane by what the trigger must guarantee.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/invoices/invoices.ts\n\nexport default feature('invoices', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text({ maxLength: 200 }).required(),\n notes: q.text({ maxLength: 2000 }).optional(),\n total: q.int().default(0).required(),\n status: q.enum(['draft', 'sent', 'paid']).default('draft').required(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['member'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['member'] }, mode: 'soft' },\n\n triggers: {\n beforeInsert: [\n {\n name: 'guardTotals',\n handler: ({ values }) => {\n if (values.total < 0) throw new Error('total must be >= 0');\n return { notes: values.notes ?? 'created' }; // merge into the write\n },\n },\n ],\n afterInsert: [\n {\n // SQL lane — fires for raw SQL too, atomic with the insert\n name: 'stampNotes',\n sql: `UPDATE invoices SET notes = NEW.title WHERE id = NEW.id;`,\n },\n ],\n beforeUpdate: [\n {\n // The universal-enforcement shape: WHEN guard + RAISE(ABORT)\n name: 'lockPaid',\n when: `OLD.status = 'paid' AND NEW.status != 'paid'`,\n sql: `SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'paid invoices cannot be reopened');`,\n },\n ],\n },\n});\n```\n\nEvents: `beforeInsert`, `afterInsert`, `beforeUpdate`, `afterUpdate`, `beforeDelete`, `afterDelete`. Each event takes an array of named triggers; names must be unique per event.\n\n## SQL triggers (`sql:`)\n\nThe compiler wraps your statements in a `CREATE TRIGGER` named\n`qb_trg_<table>_<event>_<name>` and ships it in the journaled features\nmigration — content-addressed, so an unchanged trigger set produces no new\nmigration, and removing a trigger from config drops it from the database on\nthe next migrate.\n\n- Write **bare, `;`-terminated statements** — the compiler owns the\n `BEGIN`/`END` frame. (It emits the frame uppercase; lowercase `begin`\n breaks remote D1's statement splitter even though local D1 accepts it.)\n- `OLD.column` / `NEW.column` references use **SQL column names**\n (`deleted_at`, not `deletedAt`) and are validated against the table at\n compile time.\n- Optional `when:` is a SQL expression guard (`WHEN` clause).\n- To reject a write, `SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'message');` — this is the only\n trigger form that blocks *every* write path, including raw SQL.\n- SQL triggers run inside the triggering statement — the only\n transactional option on D1, which has no `db.transaction()`.\n\nCurrently supported on `cloudflare-d1` only; declaring `sql:` triggers on\nanother database provider is a compile error.\n\n### Soft-delete mapping\n\nOn soft-delete tables (the default), `*Delete` events map to the\nsoft-delete *transition* — the compiler emits an\n`AFTER UPDATE OF \"deleted_at\" ... WHEN NEW.\"deleted_at\" IS NOT NULL AND\nOLD.\"deleted_at\" IS NULL` trigger, plus a plain `AFTER DELETE` variant so\nraw-SQL hard deletes are still covered. `*Update` events get the inverse\nguard, so a soft delete fires delete triggers exactly once and never\ndouble-fires as an update.\n\n## Handler triggers (`handler:`)\n\nHandlers run at the same write chokepoint that powers audit stamping and\nLive Views, with full application context:\n\n```typescript\nhandler: ({ table, op, values /* before */, row /* after */, ctx, db, env }) => { ... }\n```\n\n- **`before*` hooks are synchronous.** Return a partial object to merge\n into the write payload, or throw to reject — the write never executes and\n the request gets a structured `TRIGGER_REJECTED` (422) error. Audit\n fields (`createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, …) are re-stamped after hooks run and\n cannot be forged.\n- **`after*` hooks run once per affected row and are awaited** before the\n write's promise resolves. They may be `async`. A throw surfaces as\n `TRIGGER_AFTER_FAILED` (500) with `details.committed: true` — the row was\n already persisted (no transactions on D1), so clients must not blind-retry.\n- Handlers must be **inline arrow/function expressions**. Imports they\n reference are hoisted into the generated registry, and each table's\n drizzle object is auto-imported under its authored name — so this works\n as written:\n\n```typescript\n\n// ...\nafterUpdate: [\n {\n name: 'syncNotes',\n handler: async ({ row, db }) => {\n await db.update(invoices)\n .set({ notes: `updated: ${row.title}` })\n .where(eq(invoices.id, row.id));\n },\n },\n],\n```\n\n`after*` hooks only receive rows when the write chain used `.returning()`\n— generated CRUD routes and actions do.\n\n### Recursion\n\nTrigger cascades are bounded in every lane:\n\n- **Handler hooks**: the `db` a hook receives is re-wrapped at depth + 1.\n A cascade deeper than 5 levels (a hook's write firing hooks that write\n again, …) throws with the table/op that exceeded the cap.\n- **SQL triggers**: SQLite's `recursive_triggers` pragma defaults off — a\n trigger cannot re-enter itself, directly or through a cycle.\n\n### Coverage — read the compile report\n\nHandler hooks do **not** fire for queue handlers, cron jobs, or raw SQL.\nThe compiler emits a per-trigger lowering report and warns at compile time\nwhen a `before*` handler is used as a guard — if a rule must hold for every\nwrite path, use the `sql:` lane with `RAISE(ABORT)`.\n\n## Choosing a lane\n\n| Need | Use |\n|---|---|\n| Invariant that must hold universally (raw SQL included) | `sql:` with `RAISE(ABORT)` |\n| Denormalized columns, counters, tombstones | `sql:` |\n| Validation/derivation with application logic | `before*` `handler:` |\n| Side-effects after a write (notify, write related rows) | `after*` `handler:` |\n| Atomic with the write (D1 has no transactions) | `sql:` only |\n\nPlanned (not yet available — declaring them is a compile error rather than\na silent no-op): `async: true` queue-dispatched after-hooks with retries,\nand `withOld: true` previous-row access on update/delete hooks."
@@ -475,7 +483,7 @@ export const DOCS = {
475
483
  },
476
484
  "stack/webhooks/inbound": {
477
485
  "title": "Inbound Webhooks",
478
- "content": "Inbound webhooks allow external services (Stripe, Paddle, GitHub, etc.) to notify your API of events. Quickback generates endpoints that verify signatures, deduplicate events, and dispatch to your handler functions via a Cloudflare Queue.\n\n## Endpoint\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/inbound/:provider\n```\n\nThe `:provider` parameter identifies which service sent the webhook (e.g., `stripe`, `paddle`, `github`). Each provider has its own signature verification logic.\n\n## How It Works\n\n```\nExternal Service → POST /webhooks/v1/inbound/stripe\n │\n ├─ 1. Verify signature (HMAC-SHA256)\n ├─ 2. Parse event (provider-specific)\n ├─ 3. Deduplicate via externalId\n ├─ 4. Store in webhook_events table\n ├─ 5. Enqueue for async processing\n └─ 6. Return 200 OK immediately\n\n Queue Consumer\n │\n ├─ 1. Update status → 'processing'\n ├─ 2. Call registered handlers\n └─ 3. Update status → 'processed' or 'failed'\n```\n\nThe API returns `200 OK` immediately after enqueuing. Your handler logic runs asynchronously via the queue consumer, so external services don't time out waiting for your processing to complete.\n\n## Registering Handlers\n\nUse `onWebhookEvent()` in your action code to register handlers for specific events:\n\n```typescript\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:checkout.session.completed\", async (ctx) => {\n const { type, data, provider, env } = ctx;\n await createSubscription(data, env);\n});\n\n// Wildcard — handle all events from a provider\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:*\", async (ctx) => {\n console.log(`Received ${ctx.type} from ${ctx.provider}`);\n});\n```\n\n**Handler context:**\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `type` | `string` | Full event type (e.g., `stripe:checkout.session.completed`) |\n| `data` | `unknown` | Parsed event payload |\n| `provider` | `string` | Provider name (e.g., `stripe`) |\n| `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | Cloudflare environment bindings |\n\n**Execution order:**\n1. Specific handlers run first (exact match on event type)\n2. Wildcard handlers run after\n3. All matching handlers run in parallel\n4. If any handler throws, the message is retried\n\n## Signature Verification\n\nEach provider verifies signatures differently. The secret is read from an environment variable.\n\n### Stripe\n\n**Environment variable:** `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`\n\nStripe uses HMAC-SHA256 with a timestamp-based signature:\n\n```\nStripe-Signature: t=1614556800,v1=abc123...\n```\n\nThe signed payload is `<timestamp>.<raw_body>`. Verification checks:\n- HMAC matches\n- Timestamp is within 5 minutes (prevents replay attacks)\n\n### Custom Providers\n\nProviders implement this interface:\n\n```typescript\ninterface InboundProvider {\n name: string;\n verifySignature(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): Promise<boolean>;\n parseEvent(payload: string): {\n type: string;\n data: unknown;\n externalId?: string;\n };\n}\n```\n\n## Idempotency\n\nEvents are deduplicated on the tuple `(provider, externalId)` (e.g., Stripe's `event.id`). The `webhook_events` table carries a **unique index** on this pair, and inbound delivery uses `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` so concurrent deliveries collapse deterministically:\n\n- The first delivery to win the race inserts the row, enqueues processing, and returns `{ received: true, eventId }`.\n- Any concurrent delivery with the same `(provider, externalId)` short-circuits and returns `{ received: true, duplicate: true }` — the queue is **never** sent the duplicate, so handlers run exactly once.\n\nEvents without an `externalId` (NULL) are not deduplicated. SQLite treats NULLs as distinct in unique indexes, so providers that don't supply a stable event ID continue to insert one row per delivery.\n\n### Migrating an existing deployment\n\nThe unique index was added in v0.10.x. Existing deployments may have duplicate rows from before the constraint existed; drizzle-kit's migration will fail until they are cleaned up. Run this once before applying the migration:\n\n```sql\nDELETE FROM webhook_events\nWHERE rowid NOT IN (\n SELECT MIN(rowid) FROM webhook_events\n WHERE external_id IS NOT NULL\n GROUP BY provider, external_id\n);\n```\n\nThis keeps the earliest row for each `(provider, external_id)` pair and discards the duplicates.\n\n## Database Schema\n\nInbound events are stored in the `webhook_events` table:\n\n| Column | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `id` | text | Primary key (`whe_<uuid>`) |\n| `provider` | text | Provider name |\n| `eventType` | text | Event type from provider |\n| `externalId` | text | Provider's event ID (for deduplication) |\n| `payload` | text | Raw JSON payload |\n| `status` | text | `received`, `processing`, `processed`, `failed` |\n| `attempts` | integer | Processing attempt count |\n| `processedAt` | timestamp | When successfully processed |\n| `error` | text | Error message if failed |\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | When received |\n\n## Admin Routes\n\nTwo admin-only routes are generated for monitoring inbound webhooks:\n\n### List Events\n\n```\nGET /webhooks/v1/inbound/events\n```\n\nReturns recent inbound events with their status. Requires admin role.\n\n### Retry Failed Event\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/inbound/events/:id/retry\n```\n\nRe-queues a failed event for processing. Requires admin role.\n\n## Error Handling\n\n- **Invalid signature** — Returns `401 Unauthorized`, event not stored\n- **Handler failure** — Event marked as `failed`, message retried (up to 3 times via queue)\n- **All retries exhausted** — Event remains in `failed` status; use the admin retry endpoint to re-process manually\n\n## Configuration\n\nWebhooks are enabled by setting `webhooksBinding` in your database config:\n\n```typescript\ndatabase: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n binding: \"DB\",\n webhooksBinding: \"WEBHOOKS_DB\",\n})\n```\n\nSet the provider secret as a Wrangler secret:\n\n```bash\nwrangler secret put STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET\n```\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Outbound Webhooks](/stack/webhooks/outbound) — Send webhooks when data changes\n- [Queues](/stack/queues) — Background processing infrastructure"
486
+ "content": "Inbound webhooks allow external services (Stripe, Paddle, GitHub, etc.) to notify your API of events. Quickback generates endpoints that verify signatures, deduplicate events, and dispatch to your handler functions via a Cloudflare Queue.\n\n## Endpoint\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/inbound/:provider\n```\n\nThe `:provider` parameter identifies which service sent the webhook (e.g., `stripe`, `paddle`, `github`). Each provider has its own signature verification logic.\n\n## How It Works\n\n```\nExternal Service → POST /webhooks/v1/inbound/stripe\n │\n ├─ 1. Verify signature (HMAC-SHA256)\n ├─ 2. Parse event (provider-specific)\n ├─ 3. Deduplicate via externalId\n ├─ 4. Store in webhook_events table\n ├─ 5. Enqueue for async processing\n └─ 6. Return 200 OK immediately\n\n Queue Consumer\n │\n ├─ 1. Update status → 'processing'\n ├─ 2. Call registered handlers\n └─ 3. Update status → 'processed' or 'failed'\n```\n\nThe API returns `200 OK` immediately after enqueuing. Your handler logic runs asynchronously via the queue consumer, so external services don't time out waiting for your processing to complete.\n\n## Registering Handlers\n\nUse `onWebhookEvent()` in your action code to register handlers for specific events:\n\n```typescript\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:checkout.session.completed\", async (ctx) => {\n const { type, data, event, provider, env } = ctx;\n // ctx.event is the full Stripe envelope; ctx.data is event.data.object\n await createSubscription(data, env);\n});\n\n// Wildcard — handle all events from a provider\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:*\", async (ctx) => {\n console.log(`Received ${ctx.type} from ${ctx.provider}`);\n});\n```\n\n**Handler context:**\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `type` | `string` | Event type (e.g., `checkout.session.completed`) |\n| `data` | `unknown` | The convenience slice of the payload. For Stripe this is `event.data.object`. |\n| `event` | `unknown` | The **full event envelope**, exactly as the provider sent it — nothing dropped. For Stripe this carries `account` (Connect connected-account id), `id`, `livemode`, `api_version`, `request`, etc. |\n| `provider` | `string` | Provider name (e.g., `stripe`) |\n| `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | Cloudflare environment bindings |\n\nFor `stripe:` patterns the context is typed automatically: `ctx.event` is a\n`StripeWebhookEvent` and `ctx.data` is its `data.object`, so `ctx.event.account`,\n`ctx.event.id`, and `ctx.event.livemode` are all typed with no cast.\n\n```typescript\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:invoice.paid\", async (ctx) => {\n ctx.event.account; // string | undefined — the acct_… (Connect)\n ctx.event.id; // string — evt_…\n ctx.event.livemode; // boolean\n ctx.data; // event.data.object (Record<string, unknown>)\n});\n```\n\n`data.object` is an open record. Cast it when you need inner-field typing:\n\n```typescript\nconst session = ctx.data as import(\"stripe\").Stripe.Checkout.Session;\n```\n\n**Execution order:**\n1. Specific handlers run first (exact match on event type)\n2. Wildcard handlers run after\n3. All matching handlers run in parallel\n4. If any handler throws, the message is retried\n\n## Signature Verification\n\nEach provider verifies signatures differently. The secret is read from an environment variable.\n\n### Stripe\n\n**Environment variable:** `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`\n\nStripe uses HMAC-SHA256 with a timestamp-based signature:\n\n```\nStripe-Signature: t=1614556800,v1=abc123...\n```\n\nThe signed payload is `<timestamp>.<raw_body>`. Verification checks:\n- HMAC matches\n- Timestamp is within 5 minutes (prevents replay attacks)\n\n#### Stripe Connect\n\nThe single-secret model is exactly what a Connect platform needs. With Standard\nconnected accounts and direct charges, each of your customers connects their own\nStripe account, and **one** webhook endpoint on your platform receives events\nfrom **all** connected accounts — every delivery signed with your **one**\nplatform signing secret.\n\n1. In the Stripe Dashboard, add a webhook endpoint pointing at\n `https://<your-api>/webhooks/v1/inbound/stripe` and enable **\"Listen to\n events on Connected accounts.\"**\n2. Set that endpoint's signing secret as `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` (one secret\n covers every connected account — no per-account configuration).\n\nTo know **which connected account** an event belongs to, read the top-level\n`event.account` (an `acct_…` id) off the envelope via `ctx.event.account`. It is\n**not** inside `event.data.object`.\n\n```typescript\nonWebhookEvent(\"stripe:checkout.session.completed\", async (ctx) => {\n const connectedAccount = ctx.event.account; // acct_… — which organizer\n if (!connectedAccount) return; // platform-account event, ignore\n\n // Route to the org that owns this connected account, and validate the match.\n const org = await findOrgByStripeAccount(connectedAccount, ctx.env);\n if (!org) throw new Error(`Unknown connected account ${connectedAccount}`);\n\n await fulfillOrder(ctx.data, org, ctx.env);\n});\n```\n\n`ctx.data` remains `event.data.object` (the Checkout Session) for convenience;\n`ctx.event` gives you the rest of the envelope — `account`, `id`, `livemode`,\n`api_version`, `request` — so nothing about the delivery is lost.\n\n### Custom Providers\n\nProviders implement this interface:\n\n```typescript\ninterface InboundProvider {\n name: string;\n verifySignature(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): Promise<boolean>;\n parseEvent(payload: string): {\n type: string;\n data: unknown; // convenience slice (e.g. Stripe's data.object)\n externalId?: string; // provider event id, for idempotency\n envelope?: unknown; // full event envelope, when available\n };\n}\n```\n\n## Idempotency\n\nEvents are deduplicated on the tuple `(provider, externalId)` (e.g., Stripe's `event.id`). The `webhook_events` table carries a **unique index** on this pair, and inbound delivery uses `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` so concurrent deliveries collapse deterministically:\n\n- The first delivery to win the race inserts the row, enqueues processing, and returns `{ received: true, eventId }`.\n- Any concurrent delivery with the same `(provider, externalId)` short-circuits and returns `{ received: true, duplicate: true }` — the queue is **never** sent the duplicate, so handlers run exactly once.\n\nEvents without an `externalId` (NULL) are not deduplicated. SQLite treats NULLs as distinct in unique indexes, so providers that don't supply a stable event ID continue to insert one row per delivery.\n\n### Migrating an existing deployment\n\nThe unique index was added in v0.10.x. Existing deployments may have duplicate rows from before the constraint existed; drizzle-kit's migration will fail until they are cleaned up. Run this once before applying the migration:\n\n```sql\nDELETE FROM webhook_events\nWHERE rowid NOT IN (\n SELECT MIN(rowid) FROM webhook_events\n WHERE external_id IS NOT NULL\n GROUP BY provider, external_id\n);\n```\n\nThis keeps the earliest row for each `(provider, external_id)` pair and discards the duplicates.\n\n## Database Schema\n\nInbound events are stored in the `webhook_events` table:\n\n| Column | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `id` | text | Primary key (`whe_<uuid>`) |\n| `provider` | text | Provider name |\n| `eventType` | text | Event type from provider |\n| `externalId` | text | Provider's event ID (for deduplication) |\n| `payload` | text | Raw JSON payload |\n| `status` | text | `received`, `processing`, `processed`, `failed` |\n| `attempts` | integer | Processing attempt count |\n| `processedAt` | timestamp | When successfully processed |\n| `error` | text | Error message if failed |\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | When received |\n\n## Admin Routes\n\nTwo admin-only routes are generated for monitoring inbound webhooks:\n\n### List Events\n\n```\nGET /webhooks/v1/inbound/events\n```\n\nReturns recent inbound events with their status. Requires admin role.\n\n### Retry Failed Event\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/inbound/events/:id/retry\n```\n\nRe-queues a failed event for processing. Requires admin role.\n\n## Error Handling\n\n- **Invalid signature** — Returns `401 Unauthorized`, event not stored\n- **Handler failure** — Event marked as `failed`, message retried (up to 3 times via queue)\n- **All retries exhausted** — Event remains in `failed` status; use the admin retry endpoint to re-process manually\n\n## Configuration\n\nWebhooks are enabled by setting `webhooksBinding` in your database config:\n\n```typescript\ndatabase: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n binding: \"DB\",\n webhooksBinding: \"WEBHOOKS_DB\",\n})\n```\n\nSet the provider secret as a Wrangler secret:\n\n```bash\nwrangler secret put STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET\n```\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Outbound Webhooks](/stack/webhooks/outbound) — Send webhooks when data changes\n- [Queues](/stack/queues) — Background processing infrastructure"
479
487
  },
480
488
  "stack/webhooks": {
481
489
  "title": "Webhooks",
@@ -518,9 +526,11 @@ export const TOPIC_LIST = [
518
526
  "compiler/definitions",
519
527
  "compiler/definitions/masking",
520
528
  "compiler/definitions/permissions",
529
+ "compiler/definitions/rate-limit",
521
530
  "compiler/definitions/read",
522
531
  "compiler/definitions/schema",
523
532
  "compiler/definitions/scopes",
533
+ "compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol",
524
534
  "compiler/definitions/triggers",
525
535
  "compiler/definitions/validation",
526
536
  "compiler/definitions/views",