@quickback-dev/cli 0.47.5 → 0.47.7
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/create.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/create.js +44 -1
- package/dist/commands/create.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +10 -5
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +24 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +62 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/feature.md +2 -4
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +19 -15
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/index.md +11 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +24 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +62 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/feature.md +2 -4
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +19 -15
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/index.md +11 -1
package/dist/docs/content.js
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export const DOCS = {
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"changelog": {
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"title": "Changelog",
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"content": "## v0.47.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: zero-false-positive analyzer checks are now compile errors\n\nThe authz/authn analyzer (v0.37) shipped warn-only. After a release cycle of\ndata, the checks whose every trip is a definite misconfiguration — never a\nlegitimate config — are **promoted to compile errors**. Warnings nobody is\nforced to read are documentation; the pillar guarantees are now enforced.\n\n**Breaking** — a config that previously compiled with one of these warnings\nnow fails the compile:\n\n- `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` — a permission that is structurally unsatisfiable\n (`allOf(a, not(a))`: a fact AND its exact negation at the same AND-level).\n- `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` — a resource's firewall grants a\n `scope:<kind>:<role>` role access beyond its capability profile (or the\n role has no profile at all). This is the M0.2 pillar guarantee — it was\n authored as an error all along and is now enforced.\n- `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT`,\n `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY`,\n `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` — the structural-authn set (route auth coverage,\n bearer-only `/mcp`/agent surfaces + INTERNAL unreachability, mint↔verify\n key/issuer/audience pairing, anchored credential delivery, verifier-only\n identity claims). These still run against empty route/credential metadata\n on a real compile (no-ops until the generators emit it), but the severity\n contract is locked in now — they fail the build the moment they can fire.\n\nThe heuristic/advisory checks are unchanged: `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM`,\n`AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE`, `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW`, and\n`AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` stay warnings; `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` stays an info\nreport. `QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true` still promotes those warnings too.\n\n**The override escape hatch** — every promoted finding can be explicitly\naccepted, per finding, with a required reason:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n analyzer: {\n allow: [\n {\n check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',\n target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer', // from the rendered finding\n reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nAn override downgrades that exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning\nthat cites the reason — even under strict mode (it's an explicit, reasoned\nacceptance). Every rendered error prints its exact override recipe. Guard\nrails: `check` must be one of the promoted ids (unknown or keep-warn ids are\nrejected at config validation), `reason` is required, and an `allow` entry\nthat matches no current finding is itself a compile error — no dead\noverrides accumulating after the underlying issue is fixed.\n\nAnalyzer-internal defects are still fail-open: a bug in the analyzer itself\ndowngrades to a single warning and the compile continues. Only real findings\nfail builds.\n\n### CLI: live views now compile through the CLI\n\n`defineView` files under `quickback/services/views/` were never loaded by\nthe CLI — the compile payload simply omitted them, so\n[live views](/stack/realtime/live-views) (v0.35) only worked when driving\nthe compiler API directly. The CLI now discovers and ships them like every\nother service definition, and the compile summary counts them\n(`Loaded services: … 1 live view(s)`). If you declared views and wondered\nwhy no surface ever went live: upgrade the CLI and recompile.\n\n### CLI: deterministic compile output across machines\n\nFeature and service discovery used raw `readdir` order, which differs\nbetween macOS and Linux — route registration order, schema re-exports,\nOpenAPI paths, and the Neon RLS document's content hash could all churn when\nthe same project was recompiled on a different machine. All discovery sites\nnow sort by codepoint, so the same input compiles to the same bytes\neverywhere. Expect a one-time diff on the first recompile if your previous\noutput was generated in a different filesystem order.\n\n### Fixes\n\n- Read-only resources (no `crud` block) generated routes importing a\n `CRUD_ACCESS` symbol their resource file never exported — a tsc/bundle\n break. The export is now unconditional.\n- The `blog` starter template gated writes on the removed `ADMIN`\n pseudo-role, which hard-fails current compiles; it now uses the\n org-membership `admin` role.\n- `reports/operations.manifest.json` and `reports/conformance.manifest.json`\n now also cover the realtime (`/broadcast/v1`), storage (`/storage/v1`),\n and FGA (`/fga/v1`) surfaces.\n- The dead free/pro tier plumbing is gone: no Tier row in\n `quickback whoami`, no upsell copy at login. Compiling complete projects\n requires login, exactly as before — there was never a paid gate behind it.\n- The CLI is published to npm via trusted publishing (GitHub OIDC) — signed\n provenance, no long-lived npm token in the pipeline.\n\n## v0.46.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: \"no organization context\" responses unified on HTTP 403\n\nGenerated APIs used to answer the same semantic condition — *the caller has no\nactive organization context* — with two different statuses: `400 ORG_REQUIRED`\nfrom the collection list guard and the create/PUT/batch org validation, but\n`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG` from standalone actions and `403\nACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` from unsafe org-scoped actions. Clients and SDKs\nhad to special-case the split.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required; every \"no org context\" denial is\nnow **403**:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/<resource>` (and views) without an active org or\n `?organizationId=` → `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- `POST /`, `PUT /:id`, `POST /batch`, `PUT /batch` without an active org →\n `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- Standalone actions (`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG`) and unsafe org-scoped actions\n (`403 ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED`) were already 403 and are unchanged.\n\nError **codes are unchanged** — `ORG_REQUIRED`, `ACCESS_NO_ORG`, and\n`ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` keep their identities, so clients that\ndiscriminate on `code` need no changes. Only clients that branch on the raw\n`400` status for these responses must update to `403`.\n\n### Breaking: root-mounted actions lose their nested alias URLs\n\nA standalone action whose declared `path:` lives outside its feature prefix\n(e.g. `path: \"/reports/orders\"` in the `orders` feature) mounts at the root:\n`/api/v1/reports/orders`. That root URL is the one the OpenAPI spec, the MCP\nsurface, and the operations manifest have always advertised — but the\ngenerated per-feature routes file *also* carried an undocumented, fully-gated\ncopy at the nested `/api/v1/<feature><path>` URL (e.g.\n`/api/v1/orders/reports/orders`).\n\n**Breaking** — the nested alias is no longer emitted. One URL per operation:\na root-mounted action exists only at its advertised `/api/v1<path>` mount.\nAnything calling the unadvertised nested URL gets a 404 after recompile +\nredeploy; switch to the documented root URL. Actions declared *under* the\nfeature prefix are untouched, and a feature whose standalone actions are all\nroot-mounted no longer emits an (empty) feature actions routes file.\n\n### Behavior change: `PUBLIC` inside `or:` arms admits anonymous callers\n\n[Access](/compiler/definitions/access) has always documented `PUBLIC` as\nworking on every access node, but the emitted auth gate only honored it in a\nflat `roles: [...]` list. A tree like\n\n```ts\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n { roles: [\"admin\"] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nstill answered anonymous callers with `401`. The auth gate is now tree-aware\nand matches the documented semantics: a `PUBLIC` `or:` arm admits anonymous\ncallers past the authentication gate (an `and:` group admits them only when\n*every* arm does), and the access / org / firewall layers still evaluate the\nfull tree. One shared predicate now drives the emitted gates, the OpenAPI\n`security` blocks, and view routes (which gate per view on the\nview-effective access).\n\n**Worth a loud note:** if you have a nested `PUBLIC` arm that was silently\n401-ing, that endpoint becomes anonymously reachable after recompile —\nexactly what the config declares, but verify it's what you meant. `PUBLIC`\naudit logging applies to the newly-admitted routes as usual.\n\n### Realtime broadcasts now enforce `requiredRoles` and masking\n\nA table's declared realtime gates weren't being applied to the generated\nCRUD broadcasts: `realtime: { requiredRoles: [...] }` and column masking were\nhonored on the HTTP surface but not on the WebSocket fanout. The docs\npromised per-role, masked realtime delivery; the generated broadcasts now\nmatch it. **Recompile and redeploy** any project using realtime on\nrole-gated or masked tables.\n\nGenerated `realtime.insert / update / delete` calls now carry:\n\n- **`targetRoles`** — the table's `realtime.requiredRoles` (post role-\n hierarchy `+` expansion), enforced per subscriber at fanout.\n- **`maskingConfig`** — serialized from the same effective masking\n (declared + auto-detected sensitive columns) the HTTP mask functions are\n generated from. What HTTP masks is what the WebSocket wire masks.\n\nLive-view `view_changes` deltas honor the same table-level `requiredRoles`\nat fanout, so a role-gated table can't leak through a\n[live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) subscription either.\n\nNotes:\n\n- Recompile suffices — no config change needed.\n- If you worked around this with hand-written `realtime.*` calls passing\n `targetRoles` / `maskingConfig`, those workaround broadcasts can be\n removed.\n- `type: 'custom'` mask functions can't ride the wire — the Broadcaster\n fails closed and broadcasts `[REDACTED]` for those columns.\n- Tables without `requiredRoles` or masking are byte-identical: the open\n broadcast default is unchanged.\n\n### Batch operations inherit the base operation's access\n\nWhen a batch operation was declared without its own `access`, it didn't pick\nup the base operation's role requirement:\n\n```ts\ncrud: {\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n batchUpdate: { maxBatchSize: 25 }, // ← no access of its own\n}\n```\n\nA batch config declared without `access` now inherits the base operation's\naccess at compile time — fail closed, so runtime, the OpenAPI spec, and the\ngenerated code all agree. Explicit batch `access` still wins (including\nper-side on upserts); a base op without access still yields an\nauthenticated-only batch op. The flat `update: { batch: true }` shape and\nauto-promoted batch ops were never affected. **Recompile and redeploy** if\nyou use the explicit-batch shape without per-batch access.\n\n### Record actions, PUT upserts, and legacy firewall arms fail closed\n\nThree fail-closed hardening fixes, found and verified against the new\nconformance catalog (route × principal expectations derived from the\ncompiler's own IR — see the\n[conformance manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest)).\nAll apply on recompile + redeploy; no config change needed:\n\n- **Record actions evaluate the role gate before fetching the record**, so\n the denial response no longer varies with record state — a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`. (Bulk actions already had this order; unsafe\n actions write their audit row on the pre-record denial.)\n- **PUT upsert treats an out-of-scope id as a firewall miss** (`403` reveal /\n `404` hide, per your firewall error mode; a standard 207 miss entry on\n `PUT /batch`) instead of routing it into the create path. Genuinely new\n ids keep the create path.\n- **Legacy (array-form) firewall arms deny cleanly when a bound context\n claim is absent at runtime** (e.g. no active org), rather than surfacing a\n database error — the same deny-when-absent behavior the explicit `all:` /\n `any:` group forms already had.\n\n### Root-mounted standalone actions use the standard gate stack\n\nStandalone actions mounted outside their feature prefix\n(`path: \"/reports/orders\"`) were emitted through a separate code path that\ndid not apply the full access / audit / scoped-database treatment that\nin-feature standalone actions receive. They now render through the same\ngenerator, so the same access checks, security-audit writes, and\ntenant-scoped database wrapping apply everywhere. If you use root-mounted\nstandalone actions, recompile and redeploy. (Unifying the two code paths is\nalso what surfaced the two breaking changes above.)\n\n### Namespace routing fixes\n\n- An action whose declared `path` exactly equals its namespace prefix is now\n claimed by the namespace like any nested action (Hono's `/x/*` mount\n already matched the bare `/x`) — it's served through the namespace's gate\n instead of carrying a second inline copy of the resolver.\n- A namespace with zero claimed standalone actions (e.g. record-based-only)\n no longer mounts its middleware at all — a dead gate can no longer\n intercept requests under its prefix.\n\n### Custom org roles work with Better Auth member management\n\nCustom roles referenced in access trees (e.g. `roles: [\"support\"]`) are now\nauto-registered with the Better Auth organization plugin. They were already\nenforceable on routes but unprovisionable through Better Auth —\n`invite-member` / `update-member-role` rejected them with\n`400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, so there was no supported way to actually give a\nmember the role. Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent permissions\n(this is about assignability; your access trees remain the authorization\nmodel). If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization plugin\noptions, those win and auto-registration is skipped. Built-in, pseudo, and\n`scope:` roles are excluded; projects with no custom roles emit\nbyte-identical output.\n\n### snake_case tables: dropped record actions and broken helpers fixed\n\nTwo fixes for tables declared with snake_case names (`event_notes`):\n\n- The generated `.quickback/define-action.ts` helpers imported the camelCase\n identifier while the generated alias file exports the verbatim declared\n name (`export { event_notes }`) — a TS2724 compile failure for any\n snake_case table with action files. The helpers now import the real export\n aliased to the camelCase local.\n- Record actions on a snake-declared table living in a kebab-named feature\n file (`event-notes/actions/pin.ts`) were not emitted — missing from both\n the generated routes and OpenAPI. They now emit and document consistently.\n\nIf you have snake_case tables with record actions, recompiling **adds routes\nthat previously didn't exist** — review the new surface.\n\n### First-class MCP OAuth config: `auth.oauth`\n\nThe OAuth 2.1 surface behind `agents.mcp.requireAuth` (v0.42.0) gains a\nfirst-class config block — env-resolvable issuer / login / consent URLs,\nscopes, RFC 8707 audiences, and a dynamic-client-registration toggle:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n oauth: {\n enabled: true,\n issuerUrl: { env: \"OAUTH_ISSUER_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/auth/v1\" },\n loginPage: { env: \"OAUTH_LOGIN_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/login\" },\n consentPage: { env: \"OAUTH_CONSENT_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/consent\" },\n scopes: [\"openid\", \"profile\", \"email\", \"offline_access\"],\n audiences: [{ env: \"OAUTH_MCP_AUDIENCE\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/mcp\" }],\n allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,\n },\n}),\n```\n\nSetting it auto-enables the `oauthProvider`, `jwt`, and `bearer` plugins,\nemits the RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 discovery documents, and accepts the\nprovider's JWKS-signed access tokens in the standard auth middleware. A new\nproject hook, `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`, lets you derive\ntenant fields (`activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` / roles) from the validated\nOAuth identity. On Neon, the auth schema is now owned by the Better Auth CLI\nend to end (the compiler no longer emits its placeholder `src/auth/schema.ts`\nor `src/lib/neon.ts`). See\n[OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)\nand [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks#oauth-context-resolver).\n\n### Neon RLS covers force-enabled plugin tables\n\nOn Neon, row-level-security policies are generated for the Better Auth\ntables. The list of tables receiving policies was derived from your declared\nauth config and didn't account for plugins the compiler force-enables\nautomatically — so some auth-owned tables could be created without RLS\npolicies. The list now derives from the fully resolved plugin set, so every\ngenerated auth table receives appropriate policies (self-scoped where there\nis a clear owner, service-role-only otherwise — fail closed). The RLS\nmigration is content-addressed, so the update arrives as a new journaled\nentry on the next recompile + `db:migrate`. **Neon projects should recompile\nand run `db:migrate`.**\n\n### New compile reports: operations + conformance manifests\n\nEvery compile now writes two machine-readable reports next to\n`openapi.json`:\n\n- **`reports/operations.manifest.json`** — a stable, sorted index of every\n operation: `{ operationId, method, path, auth, feature, kind }`, covering\n the resource, action, view, auth, realtime, storage, and FGA surfaces. An\n extend-only public contract — the recommended integration point for\n scripting against the generated surface.\n- **`reports/conformance.manifest.json`** — for each route × principal\n class, the expected outcome (allow / 401 / 403 / cross-tenant miss …),\n derived from the same IR the emitters consume. This is the artifact the\n conformance fixes above were found and verified against.\n\nThe OpenAPI generator itself now reads the same IR as the route emitters, so\nthe spec follows the emitted surface by construction — including four\naccuracy fixes: `PUT /{id}` is documented only when actually enabled, the\nbatch surface documents the emitter's auto-promotion + access inheritance,\nand views document their effective (view-level, falling back to read-level)\naccess. See\n[Operations manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest).\n\n## v0.45.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'` — sub-TTL JWT revocation\n\nThe JWT fast-path trusts signed claims for their full lifetime — that's what\nmakes it a fast-path. Until now the only revocation bounds were the TTL\n(plain claims) and the carry-forward cap (scope claims, v0.44.0). The\nlong-promised `'kv'` mode is now real on the **Cloudflare runtime**:\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { revocationCheck: 'kv' } }\n```\n\n- **Per-principal revocation timestamps, not per-token denylists.** A\n revocation event writes \"everything for this principal minted before now is\n dead\" to the project's **existing `KV` binding** (keys prefixed `qbrev:`) —\n nothing extra to provision. Entries self-expire after the maximum token\n lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n- **The bearer fast-path checks before trusting.** A verified token whose\n `iat` (or `sct`, for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored\n timestamp is rejected and falls through to session auth, which re-checks\n membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers\n transparently. Costs 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify; the\n explicit trade the opt-in buys.\n- **Written automatically where revocation actually happens:** org-member\n removal and role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`), and\n UPDATE/DELETE of scope-conferring relationship rows — through the same\n audit-wrapper write chokepoint Live Views uses, plus the single DELETE\n route (which has the row in hand but no `.returning()`). Revoke-on-touch:\n a false positive just forces a cheap re-prove.\n- **User bans flip automatically.** The Better Auth admin plugin's ban lands\n as a user-row update, so a generated `databaseHooks.user.update.after` hook\n stamps the user-level revocation the moment `banned` flips — every\n outstanding JWT dies on its next use, and the cookie/session path already\n rejects banned sessions, completing the lockout. When outbound webhooks are\n configured, the same hook emits a `user.banned` event so subscribed\n endpoints are notified.\n- **App-code helpers** for everything else: `src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts`\n exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens`\n (e.g. call `revokeUserTokens` from a custom revoke-all flow).\n- **Fails open.** A KV outage degrades revocation to the TTL /\n carry-forward-cap bound — it never locks every bearer out.\n\nBun/Node + `'kv'` fails at compile time with a clear message (the store rides\nthe Cloudflare KV binding; those runtimes own immediate-revoke via the\ncookie/session path). Default remains `'none'`; without the flag the emitted\nmiddleware is byte-identical to v0.44.0.\n\n### Neon: `npm run db:migrate` now applies the RLS layer\n\nThe RLS SQL (helper functions, policies, triggers) used to be emitted as\norphaned `drizzle/migrations/0099–0102` files that no tool ever applied —\n`db:migrate` ran the schema migrations and silently skipped the security\nlayer. The RLS document now rides the journaled drizzle set in\n`quickback/drizzle/` as a content-addressed migration\n(`<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>`), so one `npm run db:migrate` applies schema\n**and** security, in dependency order. The migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create), so it converges over databases where\nthe old files were applied by hand; an unchanged security config appends\nnothing (the journal stays byte-stable across recompiles), and a changed one\nappends a new content-addressed entry — append-only, like every other\nmigration. Existing Neon projects: recompile + `db:migrate`, nothing breaks.\n\n### Neon: `user_sessions` is real, and the SQL layer speaks TEXT ids\n\n`get_active_org_id()` — the helper every org-scoped RLS policy reads — was\nquerying a `public.user_sessions` table that **no migration created**, and\nthe helper layer was typed `uuid` against Better Auth's TEXT ids\n(`org_abc123`), which would throw on first contact. Now:\n\n- `user_sessions` is compiler-owned migration state\n (`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by the normal journaled flow\n with a FK to the users table — outside `src/auth/schema.ts`, which the\n Better Auth CLI rewrites.\n- Generated Better Auth session hooks mirror the session's active\n organization (and team, in teams mode) into it on create/update.\n Switching to \"no org\" nulls it through — SQL-side access revokes, fail\n closed.\n- The RLS helper layer (`get_active_org_id`, `get_active_team_id`,\n `is_owner`, the audit helpers) is TEXT-typed to match Better Auth ids.\n- Policies for Better Auth's own tables use the plural physical names the\n BA CLI actually generates on Neon, and BA tables no longer get Quickback\n audit triggers for columns they don't have.\n\n### Hard deletes wire into the audit pipeline correctly\n\nTwo codegen bugs around `delete: { mode: 'hard' }`:\n\n- Firewall auto-detection emitted an `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate for\n tables with no soft-delete column — every read on a hard-delete table\n referenced a column that doesn't exist.\n- Hard-delete routes import the `logHardDelete` audit helper, but the helper\n file was only emitted when the project also had unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions\n — a project with hard deletes and neither failed at deploy time. Hard\n deletes are now a first-class trigger of the security-audit pipeline\n (helper file, `AUDIT_DB` binding, env types, audit migration); on D1 that\n means [`auditDatabaseId`](/compiler/config/providers) is required, and the\n compile error says so.\n\n### Generated output is now typechecked — with the first crop of fixes\n\nEvery compiler change now compiles a matrix of fixture projects and runs\n`tsc` + `wrangler deploy --dry-run` against the **generated output** — the\nclass of bug where the compiler emits syntactically valid TypeScript that\nfails downstream. The first runs caught real ones, all fixed here:\n\n- **Neon:** `src/db/org.schema.ts` re-exported tables that don't exist after\n the Better Auth CLI's plural rewrite; a missing `AuthDatabase` type\n export; transaction callbacks typed bare `(tx)` failing `noImplicitAny`;\n the auth middleware's member-table fallback hardcoded the singular name.\n- **Embeddings:** the queue consumer's `Ai.run` result and the optional\n `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` binding both failed strict checks — the route now\n returns a structured `503` when the producer binding is missing instead\n of crashing.\n- **snake_case relationship tables:** relationship/arrow emitters imported\n the camelCase identifier where the generated file exports the verbatim\n table name (`export { event_guests }`) — TS2724 for any snake_case\n relationship table. Imports now alias the real export\n (`event_guests as eventGuests`).\n\n## v0.44.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### Scope carry-forward is now bounded (revocation fix)\n\nThe auth middleware's rolling refresh re-signs a verified `scope` claim on\nevery authed call without re-probing the relationship — that's what lets a\nscoped session ride past the short JWT TTL with zero per-request DB cost. But\nunbounded, it defeated the revocation model the docs promised: a removed\nguest/staff who kept polling got a fresh TTL on every request, so \"removal\ntakes effect within one TTL\" only held for *idle* clients, and the refresh\nalso bypassed the ≤180s scope-token ceiling (it re-signed with the raw\n`auth.jwt.expiresIn`).\n\nScope tokens now carry a proof timestamp (`sct`), stamped exclusively by the\nproven mint sites (`POST /scope/v1/enter` and the namespace resolver, via the\nshared mint helper). The rolling refresh:\n\n- **refuses once the claim's proof is older than the carry-forward cap\n (15 minutes)** — past it, the token expires within one TTL and the client\n re-proves via `enter` or any minting namespace route, which won't re-mint a\n revoked role. Worst-case post-revocation window for an active client:\n **cap + one TTL** from the last real proof, instead of unbounded.\n- **carries `sct` forward verbatim** — the refresh can never restart the\n window without an actual relationship probe. Claims without `sct`\n (pre-0.44 tokens) fail closed and simply stop refreshing.\n- **signs through the same ≤180s ceiling as the mint sites** — an\n `auth.jwt.expiresIn` above the ceiling no longer leaks into scope-bearing\n tokens via the refresh path.\n\nNo client changes needed: tokens renew exactly as before inside the window,\nand re-entering is the existing flow. For tables where even the capped window\nis too wide, gate with a `via` arm (live relationship subquery per request)\ninstead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm; immediate revocation\n(`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`) remains on the roadmap.\n\n## v0.43.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Better Auth 1.6\n\nGenerated projects are now pinned to Better Auth **1.6**. The `agents.mcp.requireAuth` work in 0.42.0 surfaced a long-standing version drift: the compiler emitted `better-auth: ^1.5.0`, but `@better-auth/oauth-provider` resolves a tree that requires `@better-auth/core ^1.6.14` and imports `@better-auth/core/utils/host` + `/redirect-uri` — subpaths that only exist in 1.6.x. The result was a `wrangler deploy` that failed at bundle time with `Could not resolve …` and never uploaded.\n\nThis release aligns the **entire** Better Auth dependency set to a coherent 1.6.9 floor so npm resolves one consistent tree:\n\n- `better-auth`, `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter`, `@better-auth/api-key`, `@better-auth/passkey`, `@better-auth/oauth-provider` → `^1.6.9` (generated projects, the baked Docker deps, and the bundled CMS/Account SPAs).\n- Added an explicit `kysely ^0.28.16` pin: Better Auth 1.6's migrator imports `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_TABLE` / `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_LOCK_TABLE` from kysely but doesn't *declare* kysely, so the Worker bundle needs it pinned directly.\n\nNo code migration was required — Quickback already uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (not the now-deprecated OIDC Provider plugin), and emits no `freshAge`/SAML usage affected by 1.6's behavioral changes. Verified end to end: a `requireAuth` project and a normal project both `npm install` a clean 1.6.14 tree and bundle with `wrangler deploy --dry-run` with zero resolution errors.\n\n### Larger migration histories no longer hit the upload ceiling\n\nLong-lived projects accumulate one full-schema drizzle snapshot per migration, and the whole cumulative meta payload (snapshots + journals + `.sql`, across both the auth and features dirs) is re-sent on **every** compile — even a no-schema-change one. Projects with deep migration histories were hitting the compiler's `existingFiles` size limit and failing to compile, with no schema drift and nothing to fix on their end.\n\nThe server-side ceilings are raised so this is no longer the binding constraint:\n\n- `existingFiles` payload: **4 MiB → 16 MiB**\n- total request body: **8 MiB → 32 MiB** (kept above the per-category limits so it doesn't trip first)\n\nThis is enforced entirely on the compiler, so no CLI upgrade is needed — the new headroom applies as soon as `compiler.quickback.dev` is on this release.\n\n### Custom response headers (`security.headers`)\n\nThe generated Worker emitted a fixed set of security headers (CSP, HSTS,\n`X-Content-Type-Options`, …) with no supported way to add your own — teams that\nwanted, say, an `X-Server-Version` build stamp on every response had to\npost-patch the generated middleware after each compile.\n\nNew `security.headers` sets arbitrary response headers natively. Values are\nstatic strings or templates interpolating per-deploy Worker env vars via the\n`{{env.VAR_NAME}}` token:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n headers: {\n // Both vars must be set, or the header is omitted entirely.\n 'X-Server-Version': '{{env.SERVER_VERSION}}+{{env.SERVER_BUILD}}',\n 'X-Powered-By': 'Quickback',\n },\n}\n```\n\n- **Omit-if-unset** — a header that references env vars is emitted only when\n *every* referenced var is set (non-empty) at runtime. A Worker that forgot to\n inject the var emits no header, never `X-Server-Version: undefined`. Static\n headers are always emitted.\n- The value is read from `c.env` per request, so it picks up whatever Worker\n var is injected at deploy time — nothing is baked at compile time.\n- **Managed headers are rejected** — names owned by a dedicated `security` field\n (CSP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, …) error at compile so the\n two emitters can't race. Malformed `{{env…}}` tokens error too, rather than\n leaking literal braces into the wire header.\n\nSurvives a clean `quickback compile` with no post-processing. See\n[Security Headers → Custom response headers](/compiler/config/security#custom-response-headers).\n\n## v0.42.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Interactive OAuth for the generated MCP server\n\nMCP connectors (Claude, Cursor, …) could only connect to a generated `/mcp`\nendpoint **anonymously** — they never launched a sign-in flow, so auth-gated\ntools stayed invisible. The OAuth machinery was already present (Better Auth's\n`oauth-provider` ships `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`, `/register` + PKCE under\n`/auth/v1`); the compiler just never let a connector discover or trigger it.\n\nNew `agents.mcp.requireAuth` makes the MCP surface authenticated-only:\n\n```ts\nagents: { mcp: { requireAuth: true } },\n```\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler:\n\n- **Challenges unauthenticated `/mcp`** with `401` + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer\n resource_metadata=\"…\"` ([RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728) §5.1) — the signal connectors use to start OAuth.\n- **Force-enables `oauthProvider` + `bearer`**, so `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`,\n and `/register` ([RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) dynamic client registration) exist with PKCE.\n- **Delegates `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`** to Better Auth's real\n metadata instead of a hand-rolled stub that advertised a non-existent\n authorization endpoint.\n- Adds the `<origin>/mcp` resource to `validAudiences`\n ([RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707)) so the connector's access token isn't rejected.\n\nLogin and consent are served by your Account SPA, so users authenticate with\nwhatever methods you already enabled. Default is unchanged (anonymous public\ntools); set `requireAuth: true` for servers meant for authenticated users.\n\n## v0.40.2 — June 3, 2026\n\n### Passwordless plugins can no longer bypass the signup gate\n\nBetter Auth's `emailOtp` and `magicLink` plugins auto-create an account when a\ncode/link is verified for an unknown email — and that path is independent of\n`emailAndPassword.disableSignUp`. As a result, `account.auth.signup: false`\nclosed `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` but left OTP / magic-link verification as an\nopen back-door for account creation.\n\nThe compiler now emits each plugin's own `disableSignUp` flag, and new\nper-plugin options expose it directly:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: {\n emailOtp: { disableSignUp: true }, // OTP sign-in only; unknown emails rejected\n magicLink: { disableSignUp: true }, // same for magic links\n },\n}),\n```\n\nBoth default to following the global gate: setting `account.auth.signup: false`\n(→ `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`) now also gates the OTP and magic-link\npaths automatically. Set `{ disableSignUp: false }` on a plugin explicitly to\nkeep its sign-up open while password sign-up stays closed.\n\n## v0.40.1 — June 2, 2026\n\n- The generated `wrangler.toml` and `Env` type now emit the `ASSETS` binding\n type for projects that mount SPAs (CMS / Account), so handler code that\n references `c.env.ASSETS` typechecks.\n- Compiler Docker builds preserve their layer cache across rebuilds, cutting\n local recompile time.\n\n## v0.40.0 — June 2, 2026\n\nR2 file storage is now **presign-only by default**. Adding\n`defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` emits just the `ctx.storage` signer — no\nFILES_DB database, no `/storage/v1/*` endpoints, no files worker. You sign\npresigned URLs against a bucket and store references in your own table. The\nturnkey managed subsystem is still available, now behind `managed: true`.\n\nThis decouples the lightweight primitive from the heavyweight subsystem so you\ncan add uploads without standing up a metadata database you don't use.\n\n### Presign-only by default; managed is opt-in\n\n```ts\n// Presign-only (default) — ctx.storage against a bucket, nothing else\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { bucketName: \"my-app-media\" })\n\n// Managed subsystem — FILES_DB + /storage/v1/* + files worker\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { managed: true })\n```\n\n- New projects can omit `bucketName` — it defaults to `<project>-media`, so\n setup is one `wrangler r2 bucket create` plus the R2 API-token secrets.\n- Existing projects set `bucketName` to a bucket they already have. Presign-only\n emits **no** R2 bucket binding and **no** FILES_DB binding — nothing to\n provision, nothing to migrate.\n\n### Per-call bucket + custom secret names\n\n```ts\n// Sign against a different bucket than the configured default\nawait storage.signPutUrl(key, { bucket: \"my-app-public\", contentType });\n```\n\nIf your project already stores R2 credentials under different env-var names,\nmap them so the signer reads yours:\n\n```ts\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", {\n bucketName: \"my-app-media\",\n presign: { accountIdEnv: \"CF_ACCOUNT_ID\", accessKeyIdEnv: \"S3_KEY\", secretAccessKeyEnv: \"S3_SECRET\" },\n})\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n- `maxFileSize` now accepts a human string (`\"100mb\"`, `\"5gb\"`) as well as a\n number of bytes — previously a string emitted invalid TypeScript.\n- Presign-only no longer emits a stray `FILES_DB` `[[d1_databases]]` block (with\n an invalid `database_id = \"local-files\"`) into `wrangler.toml`, which would\n have made `wrangler deploy` reject the worker.\n\n## v0.39.1 — June 2, 2026\n\nDeduplicate colliding OpenAPI `operationId`s. The auto-generated list id\n`list\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
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"content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Envelope encryption — `q.text().encrypted()` (encryption pillar, Phase 1)\n\nMark a text column `.encrypted()` and it is AES-256-GCM-encrypted at rest\nunder a **per-organization key**: a database breach (backup, export, leaked\ntoken, SQL injection, insider read) yields only ciphertext for that column.\nSee [Encryption](/compiler/definitions/encryption).\n\n- Per-org DEKs live wrapped under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret in a\n compiler-owned `org_data_keys` table (lazily created, versioned for\n rotation). Deleting an org's row **crypto-shreds** every value it wrote.\n- One write chokepoint: CRUD, batch, and action-layer `db.insert/update`\n all encrypt through the audit wrapper — audit snapshots, webhook\n payloads, and realtime deltas carry ciphertext by construction.\n- Reads decrypt behind the firewall then apply masking; encrypted columns\n are compile-time excluded from `?search`/`?filter`/`?sort`, view query\n allowlists, and embedding sources.\n- `ctx.crypto.encrypt/decrypt` for explicit server-side processing in\n actions; boot guard refuses to serve without the KEK (503 `MISSING_ENV`);\n scaffolded `.dev.vars` now includes a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK`.\n- The sealed (E2EE) and vault tiers remain compile-gated until built —\n roadmap in `apps/compiler/research/encryption-vault-spec.md`.\n\n## v0.47.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: zero-false-positive analyzer checks are now compile errors\n\nThe authz/authn analyzer (v0.37) shipped warn-only. After a release cycle of\ndata, the checks whose every trip is a definite misconfiguration — never a\nlegitimate config — are **promoted to compile errors**. Warnings nobody is\nforced to read are documentation; the pillar guarantees are now enforced.\n\n**Breaking** — a config that previously compiled with one of these warnings\nnow fails the compile:\n\n- `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` — a permission that is structurally unsatisfiable\n (`allOf(a, not(a))`: a fact AND its exact negation at the same AND-level).\n- `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` — a resource's firewall grants a\n `scope:<kind>:<role>` role access beyond its capability profile (or the\n role has no profile at all). This is the M0.2 pillar guarantee — it was\n authored as an error all along and is now enforced.\n- `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT`,\n `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY`,\n `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` — the structural-authn set (route auth coverage,\n bearer-only `/mcp`/agent surfaces + INTERNAL unreachability, mint↔verify\n key/issuer/audience pairing, anchored credential delivery, verifier-only\n identity claims). These still run against empty route/credential metadata\n on a real compile (no-ops until the generators emit it), but the severity\n contract is locked in now — they fail the build the moment they can fire.\n\nThe heuristic/advisory checks are unchanged: `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM`,\n`AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE`, `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW`, and\n`AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` stay warnings; `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` stays an info\nreport. `QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true` still promotes those warnings too.\n\n**The override escape hatch** — every promoted finding can be explicitly\naccepted, per finding, with a required reason:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n analyzer: {\n allow: [\n {\n check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',\n target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer', // from the rendered finding\n reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nAn override downgrades that exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning\nthat cites the reason — even under strict mode (it's an explicit, reasoned\nacceptance). Every rendered error prints its exact override recipe. Guard\nrails: `check` must be one of the promoted ids (unknown or keep-warn ids are\nrejected at config validation), `reason` is required, and an `allow` entry\nthat matches no current finding is itself a compile error — no dead\noverrides accumulating after the underlying issue is fixed.\n\nAnalyzer-internal defects are still fail-open: a bug in the analyzer itself\ndowngrades to a single warning and the compile continues. Only real findings\nfail builds.\n\n### CLI: live views now compile through the CLI\n\n`defineView` files under `quickback/services/views/` were never loaded by\nthe CLI — the compile payload simply omitted them, so\n[live views](/stack/realtime/live-views) (v0.35) only worked when driving\nthe compiler API directly. The CLI now discovers and ships them like every\nother service definition, and the compile summary counts them\n(`Loaded services: … 1 live view(s)`). If you declared views and wondered\nwhy no surface ever went live: upgrade the CLI and recompile.\n\n### CLI: deterministic compile output across machines\n\nFeature and service discovery used raw `readdir` order, which differs\nbetween macOS and Linux — route registration order, schema re-exports,\nOpenAPI paths, and the Neon RLS document's content hash could all churn when\nthe same project was recompiled on a different machine. All discovery sites\nnow sort by codepoint, so the same input compiles to the same bytes\neverywhere. Expect a one-time diff on the first recompile if your previous\noutput was generated in a different filesystem order.\n\n### Fixes\n\n- Read-only resources (no `crud` block) generated routes importing a\n `CRUD_ACCESS` symbol their resource file never exported — a tsc/bundle\n break. The export is now unconditional.\n- The `blog` starter template gated writes on the removed `ADMIN`\n pseudo-role, which hard-fails current compiles; it now uses the\n org-membership `admin` role.\n- `reports/operations.manifest.json` and `reports/conformance.manifest.json`\n now also cover the realtime (`/broadcast/v1`), storage (`/storage/v1`),\n and FGA (`/fga/v1`) surfaces.\n- The dead free/pro tier plumbing is gone: no Tier row in\n `quickback whoami`, no upsell copy at login. Compiling complete projects\n requires login, exactly as before — there was never a paid gate behind it.\n- The CLI is published to npm via trusted publishing (GitHub OIDC) — signed\n provenance, no long-lived npm token in the pipeline.\n\n## v0.46.0 — June 11, 2026\n\n### Breaking: \"no organization context\" responses unified on HTTP 403\n\nGenerated APIs used to answer the same semantic condition — *the caller has no\nactive organization context* — with two different statuses: `400 ORG_REQUIRED`\nfrom the collection list guard and the create/PUT/batch org validation, but\n`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG` from standalone actions and `403\nACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` from unsafe org-scoped actions. Clients and SDKs\nhad to special-case the split.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required; every \"no org context\" denial is\nnow **403**:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/<resource>` (and views) without an active org or\n `?organizationId=` → `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- `POST /`, `PUT /:id`, `POST /batch`, `PUT /batch` without an active org →\n `403 ORG_REQUIRED` (was 400).\n- Standalone actions (`403 ACCESS_NO_ORG`) and unsafe org-scoped actions\n (`403 ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED`) were already 403 and are unchanged.\n\nError **codes are unchanged** — `ORG_REQUIRED`, `ACCESS_NO_ORG`, and\n`ACCESS_TENANT_SCOPE_REQUIRED` keep their identities, so clients that\ndiscriminate on `code` need no changes. Only clients that branch on the raw\n`400` status for these responses must update to `403`.\n\n### Breaking: root-mounted actions lose their nested alias URLs\n\nA standalone action whose declared `path:` lives outside its feature prefix\n(e.g. `path: \"/reports/orders\"` in the `orders` feature) mounts at the root:\n`/api/v1/reports/orders`. That root URL is the one the OpenAPI spec, the MCP\nsurface, and the operations manifest have always advertised — but the\ngenerated per-feature routes file *also* carried an undocumented, fully-gated\ncopy at the nested `/api/v1/<feature><path>` URL (e.g.\n`/api/v1/orders/reports/orders`).\n\n**Breaking** — the nested alias is no longer emitted. One URL per operation:\na root-mounted action exists only at its advertised `/api/v1<path>` mount.\nAnything calling the unadvertised nested URL gets a 404 after recompile +\nredeploy; switch to the documented root URL. Actions declared *under* the\nfeature prefix are untouched, and a feature whose standalone actions are all\nroot-mounted no longer emits an (empty) feature actions routes file.\n\n### Behavior change: `PUBLIC` inside `or:` arms admits anonymous callers\n\n[Access](/compiler/definitions/access) has always documented `PUBLIC` as\nworking on every access node, but the emitted auth gate only honored it in a\nflat `roles: [...]` list. A tree like\n\n```ts\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n { roles: [\"admin\"] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nstill answered anonymous callers with `401`. The auth gate is now tree-aware\nand matches the documented semantics: a `PUBLIC` `or:` arm admits anonymous\ncallers past the authentication gate (an `and:` group admits them only when\n*every* arm does), and the access / org / firewall layers still evaluate the\nfull tree. One shared predicate now drives the emitted gates, the OpenAPI\n`security` blocks, and view routes (which gate per view on the\nview-effective access).\n\n**Worth a loud note:** if you have a nested `PUBLIC` arm that was silently\n401-ing, that endpoint becomes anonymously reachable after recompile —\nexactly what the config declares, but verify it's what you meant. `PUBLIC`\naudit logging applies to the newly-admitted routes as usual.\n\n### Realtime broadcasts now enforce `requiredRoles` and masking\n\nA table's declared realtime gates weren't being applied to the generated\nCRUD broadcasts: `realtime: { requiredRoles: [...] }` and column masking were\nhonored on the HTTP surface but not on the WebSocket fanout. The docs\npromised per-role, masked realtime delivery; the generated broadcasts now\nmatch it. **Recompile and redeploy** any project using realtime on\nrole-gated or masked tables.\n\nGenerated `realtime.insert / update / delete` calls now carry:\n\n- **`targetRoles`** — the table's `realtime.requiredRoles` (post role-\n hierarchy `+` expansion), enforced per subscriber at fanout.\n- **`maskingConfig`** — serialized from the same effective masking\n (declared + auto-detected sensitive columns) the HTTP mask functions are\n generated from. What HTTP masks is what the WebSocket wire masks.\n\nLive-view `view_changes` deltas honor the same table-level `requiredRoles`\nat fanout, so a role-gated table can't leak through a\n[live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) subscription either.\n\nNotes:\n\n- Recompile suffices — no config change needed.\n- If you worked around this with hand-written `realtime.*` calls passing\n `targetRoles` / `maskingConfig`, those workaround broadcasts can be\n removed.\n- `type: 'custom'` mask functions can't ride the wire — the Broadcaster\n fails closed and broadcasts `[REDACTED]` for those columns.\n- Tables without `requiredRoles` or masking are byte-identical: the open\n broadcast default is unchanged.\n\n### Batch operations inherit the base operation's access\n\nWhen a batch operation was declared without its own `access`, it didn't pick\nup the base operation's role requirement:\n\n```ts\ncrud: {\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n batchUpdate: { maxBatchSize: 25 }, // ← no access of its own\n}\n```\n\nA batch config declared without `access` now inherits the base operation's\naccess at compile time — fail closed, so runtime, the OpenAPI spec, and the\ngenerated code all agree. Explicit batch `access` still wins (including\nper-side on upserts); a base op without access still yields an\nauthenticated-only batch op. The flat `update: { batch: true }` shape and\nauto-promoted batch ops were never affected. **Recompile and redeploy** if\nyou use the explicit-batch shape without per-batch access.\n\n### Record actions, PUT upserts, and legacy firewall arms fail closed\n\nThree fail-closed hardening fixes, found and verified against the new\nconformance catalog (route × principal expectations derived from the\ncompiler's own IR — see the\n[conformance manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest)).\nAll apply on recompile + redeploy; no config change needed:\n\n- **Record actions evaluate the role gate before fetching the record**, so\n the denial response no longer varies with record state — a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`. (Bulk actions already had this order; unsafe\n actions write their audit row on the pre-record denial.)\n- **PUT upsert treats an out-of-scope id as a firewall miss** (`403` reveal /\n `404` hide, per your firewall error mode; a standard 207 miss entry on\n `PUT /batch`) instead of routing it into the create path. Genuinely new\n ids keep the create path.\n- **Legacy (array-form) firewall arms deny cleanly when a bound context\n claim is absent at runtime** (e.g. no active org), rather than surfacing a\n database error — the same deny-when-absent behavior the explicit `all:` /\n `any:` group forms already had.\n\n### Root-mounted standalone actions use the standard gate stack\n\nStandalone actions mounted outside their feature prefix\n(`path: \"/reports/orders\"`) were emitted through a separate code path that\ndid not apply the full access / audit / scoped-database treatment that\nin-feature standalone actions receive. They now render through the same\ngenerator, so the same access checks, security-audit writes, and\ntenant-scoped database wrapping apply everywhere. If you use root-mounted\nstandalone actions, recompile and redeploy. (Unifying the two code paths is\nalso what surfaced the two breaking changes above.)\n\n### Namespace routing fixes\n\n- An action whose declared `path` exactly equals its namespace prefix is now\n claimed by the namespace like any nested action (Hono's `/x/*` mount\n already matched the bare `/x`) — it's served through the namespace's gate\n instead of carrying a second inline copy of the resolver.\n- A namespace with zero claimed standalone actions (e.g. record-based-only)\n no longer mounts its middleware at all — a dead gate can no longer\n intercept requests under its prefix.\n\n### Custom org roles work with Better Auth member management\n\nCustom roles referenced in access trees (e.g. `roles: [\"support\"]`) are now\nauto-registered with the Better Auth organization plugin. They were already\nenforceable on routes but unprovisionable through Better Auth —\n`invite-member` / `update-member-role` rejected them with\n`400 ROLE_NOT_FOUND`, so there was no supported way to actually give a\nmember the role. Auto-registered roles carry member-equivalent permissions\n(this is about assignability; your access trees remain the authorization\nmodel). If you pass your own `roles` / `ac` to the organization plugin\noptions, those win and auto-registration is skipped. Built-in, pseudo, and\n`scope:` roles are excluded; projects with no custom roles emit\nbyte-identical output.\n\n### snake_case tables: dropped record actions and broken helpers fixed\n\nTwo fixes for tables declared with snake_case names (`event_notes`):\n\n- The generated `.quickback/define-action.ts` helpers imported the camelCase\n identifier while the generated alias file exports the verbatim declared\n name (`export { event_notes }`) — a TS2724 compile failure for any\n snake_case table with action files. The helpers now import the real export\n aliased to the camelCase local.\n- Record actions on a snake-declared table living in a kebab-named feature\n file (`event-notes/actions/pin.ts`) were not emitted — missing from both\n the generated routes and OpenAPI. They now emit and document consistently.\n\nIf you have snake_case tables with record actions, recompiling **adds routes\nthat previously didn't exist** — review the new surface.\n\n### First-class MCP OAuth config: `auth.oauth`\n\nThe OAuth 2.1 surface behind `agents.mcp.requireAuth` (v0.42.0) gains a\nfirst-class config block — env-resolvable issuer / login / consent URLs,\nscopes, RFC 8707 audiences, and a dynamic-client-registration toggle:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n oauth: {\n enabled: true,\n issuerUrl: { env: \"OAUTH_ISSUER_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/auth/v1\" },\n loginPage: { env: \"OAUTH_LOGIN_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/login\" },\n consentPage: { env: \"OAUTH_CONSENT_URL\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/account/consent\" },\n scopes: [\"openid\", \"profile\", \"email\", \"offline_access\"],\n audiences: [{ env: \"OAUTH_MCP_AUDIENCE\", fallback: \"http://localhost:8787/mcp\" }],\n allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,\n },\n}),\n```\n\nSetting it auto-enables the `oauthProvider`, `jwt`, and `bearer` plugins,\nemits the RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 discovery documents, and accepts the\nprovider's JWKS-signed access tokens in the standard auth middleware. A new\nproject hook, `quickback/hooks/resolve-oauth-context.ts`, lets you derive\ntenant fields (`activeOrgId` / `activeTeamId` / roles) from the validated\nOAuth identity. On Neon, the auth schema is now owned by the Better Auth CLI\nend to end (the compiler no longer emits its placeholder `src/auth/schema.ts`\nor `src/lib/neon.ts`). See\n[OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)\nand [Auth Hooks](/stack/account-ui/hooks#oauth-context-resolver).\n\n### Neon RLS covers force-enabled plugin tables\n\nOn Neon, row-level-security policies are generated for the Better Auth\ntables. The list of tables receiving policies was derived from your declared\nauth config and didn't account for plugins the compiler force-enables\nautomatically — so some auth-owned tables could be created without RLS\npolicies. The list now derives from the fully resolved plugin set, so every\ngenerated auth table receives appropriate policies (self-scoped where there\nis a clear owner, service-role-only otherwise — fail closed). The RLS\nmigration is content-addressed, so the update arrives as a new journaled\nentry on the next recompile + `db:migrate`. **Neon projects should recompile\nand run `db:migrate`.**\n\n### New compile reports: operations + conformance manifests\n\nEvery compile now writes two machine-readable reports next to\n`openapi.json`:\n\n- **`reports/operations.manifest.json`** — a stable, sorted index of every\n operation: `{ operationId, method, path, auth, feature, kind }`, covering\n the resource, action, view, auth, realtime, storage, and FGA surfaces. An\n extend-only public contract — the recommended integration point for\n scripting against the generated surface.\n- **`reports/conformance.manifest.json`** — for each route × principal\n class, the expected outcome (allow / 401 / 403 / cross-tenant miss …),\n derived from the same IR the emitters consume. This is the artifact the\n conformance fixes above were found and verified against.\n\nThe OpenAPI generator itself now reads the same IR as the route emitters, so\nthe spec follows the emitted surface by construction — including four\naccuracy fixes: `PUT /{id}` is documented only when actually enabled, the\nbatch surface documents the emitter's auto-promotion + access inheritance,\nand views document their effective (view-level, falling back to read-level)\naccess. See\n[Operations manifest](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi#operations-manifest).\n\n## v0.45.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'` — sub-TTL JWT revocation\n\nThe JWT fast-path trusts signed claims for their full lifetime — that's what\nmakes it a fast-path. Until now the only revocation bounds were the TTL\n(plain claims) and the carry-forward cap (scope claims, v0.44.0). The\nlong-promised `'kv'` mode is now real on the **Cloudflare runtime**:\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { revocationCheck: 'kv' } }\n```\n\n- **Per-principal revocation timestamps, not per-token denylists.** A\n revocation event writes \"everything for this principal minted before now is\n dead\" to the project's **existing `KV` binding** (keys prefixed `qbrev:`) —\n nothing extra to provision. Entries self-expire after the maximum token\n lifetime, so the store never accumulates.\n- **The bearer fast-path checks before trusting.** A verified token whose\n `iat` (or `sct`, for the relationship-scope claim) predates the stored\n timestamp is rejected and falls through to session auth, which re-checks\n membership and re-mints — an active legitimate session recovers\n transparently. Costs 2+ edge-cached KV reads per bearer verify; the\n explicit trade the opt-in buys.\n- **Written automatically where revocation actually happens:** org-member\n removal and role change (Better Auth `organizationHooks`), and\n UPDATE/DELETE of scope-conferring relationship rows — through the same\n audit-wrapper write chokepoint Live Views uses, plus the single DELETE\n route (which has the row in hand but no `.returning()`). Revoke-on-touch:\n a false positive just forces a cheap re-prove.\n- **User bans flip automatically.** The Better Auth admin plugin's ban lands\n as a user-row update, so a generated `databaseHooks.user.update.after` hook\n stamps the user-level revocation the moment `banned` flips — every\n outstanding JWT dies on its next use, and the cookie/session path already\n rejects banned sessions, completing the lockout. When outbound webhooks are\n configured, the same hook emits a `user.banned` event so subscribed\n endpoints are notified.\n- **App-code helpers** for everything else: `src/lib/jwt-revocation.ts`\n exports `revokeUserTokens` / `revokeMemberTokens` / `revokeScopeTokens`\n (e.g. call `revokeUserTokens` from a custom revoke-all flow).\n- **Fails open.** A KV outage degrades revocation to the TTL /\n carry-forward-cap bound — it never locks every bearer out.\n\nBun/Node + `'kv'` fails at compile time with a clear message (the store rides\nthe Cloudflare KV binding; those runtimes own immediate-revoke via the\ncookie/session path). Default remains `'none'`; without the flag the emitted\nmiddleware is byte-identical to v0.44.0.\n\n### Neon: `npm run db:migrate` now applies the RLS layer\n\nThe RLS SQL (helper functions, policies, triggers) used to be emitted as\norphaned `drizzle/migrations/0099–0102` files that no tool ever applied —\n`db:migrate` ran the schema migrations and silently skipped the security\nlayer. The RLS document now rides the journaled drizzle set in\n`quickback/drizzle/` as a content-addressed migration\n(`<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>`), so one `npm run db:migrate` applies schema\n**and** security, in dependency order. The migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create), so it converges over databases where\nthe old files were applied by hand; an unchanged security config appends\nnothing (the journal stays byte-stable across recompiles), and a changed one\nappends a new content-addressed entry — append-only, like every other\nmigration. Existing Neon projects: recompile + `db:migrate`, nothing breaks.\n\n### Neon: `user_sessions` is real, and the SQL layer speaks TEXT ids\n\n`get_active_org_id()` — the helper every org-scoped RLS policy reads — was\nquerying a `public.user_sessions` table that **no migration created**, and\nthe helper layer was typed `uuid` against Better Auth's TEXT ids\n(`org_abc123`), which would throw on first contact. Now:\n\n- `user_sessions` is compiler-owned migration state\n (`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by the normal journaled flow\n with a FK to the users table — outside `src/auth/schema.ts`, which the\n Better Auth CLI rewrites.\n- Generated Better Auth session hooks mirror the session's active\n organization (and team, in teams mode) into it on create/update.\n Switching to \"no org\" nulls it through — SQL-side access revokes, fail\n closed.\n- The RLS helper layer (`get_active_org_id`, `get_active_team_id`,\n `is_owner`, the audit helpers) is TEXT-typed to match Better Auth ids.\n- Policies for Better Auth's own tables use the plural physical names the\n BA CLI actually generates on Neon, and BA tables no longer get Quickback\n audit triggers for columns they don't have.\n\n### Hard deletes wire into the audit pipeline correctly\n\nTwo codegen bugs around `delete: { mode: 'hard' }`:\n\n- Firewall auto-detection emitted an `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate for\n tables with no soft-delete column — every read on a hard-delete table\n referenced a column that doesn't exist.\n- Hard-delete routes import the `logHardDelete` audit helper, but the helper\n file was only emitted when the project also had unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions\n — a project with hard deletes and neither failed at deploy time. Hard\n deletes are now a first-class trigger of the security-audit pipeline\n (helper file, `AUDIT_DB` binding, env types, audit migration); on D1 that\n means [`auditDatabaseId`](/compiler/config/providers) is required, and the\n compile error says so.\n\n### Generated output is now typechecked — with the first crop of fixes\n\nEvery compiler change now compiles a matrix of fixture projects and runs\n`tsc` + `wrangler deploy --dry-run` against the **generated output** — the\nclass of bug where the compiler emits syntactically valid TypeScript that\nfails downstream. The first runs caught real ones, all fixed here:\n\n- **Neon:** `src/db/org.schema.ts` re-exported tables that don't exist after\n the Better Auth CLI's plural rewrite; a missing `AuthDatabase` type\n export; transaction callbacks typed bare `(tx)` failing `noImplicitAny`;\n the auth middleware's member-table fallback hardcoded the singular name.\n- **Embeddings:** the queue consumer's `Ai.run` result and the optional\n `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` binding both failed strict checks — the route now\n returns a structured `503` when the producer binding is missing instead\n of crashing.\n- **snake_case relationship tables:** relationship/arrow emitters imported\n the camelCase identifier where the generated file exports the verbatim\n table name (`export { event_guests }`) — TS2724 for any snake_case\n relationship table. Imports now alias the real export\n (`event_guests as eventGuests`).\n\n## v0.44.0 — June 9, 2026\n\n### Scope carry-forward is now bounded (revocation fix)\n\nThe auth middleware's rolling refresh re-signs a verified `scope` claim on\nevery authed call without re-probing the relationship — that's what lets a\nscoped session ride past the short JWT TTL with zero per-request DB cost. But\nunbounded, it defeated the revocation model the docs promised: a removed\nguest/staff who kept polling got a fresh TTL on every request, so \"removal\ntakes effect within one TTL\" only held for *idle* clients, and the refresh\nalso bypassed the ≤180s scope-token ceiling (it re-signed with the raw\n`auth.jwt.expiresIn`).\n\nScope tokens now carry a proof timestamp (`sct`), stamped exclusively by the\nproven mint sites (`POST /scope/v1/enter` and the namespace resolver, via the\nshared mint helper). The rolling refresh:\n\n- **refuses once the claim's proof is older than the carry-forward cap\n (15 minutes)** — past it, the token expires within one TTL and the client\n re-proves via `enter` or any minting namespace route, which won't re-mint a\n revoked role. Worst-case post-revocation window for an active client:\n **cap + one TTL** from the last real proof, instead of unbounded.\n- **carries `sct` forward verbatim** — the refresh can never restart the\n window without an actual relationship probe. Claims without `sct`\n (pre-0.44 tokens) fail closed and simply stop refreshing.\n- **signs through the same ≤180s ceiling as the mint sites** — an\n `auth.jwt.expiresIn` above the ceiling no longer leaks into scope-bearing\n tokens via the refresh path.\n\nNo client changes needed: tokens renew exactly as before inside the window,\nand re-entering is the existing flow. For tables where even the capped window\nis too wide, gate with a `via` arm (live relationship subquery per request)\ninstead of a bare `ctx.scope.<kind>` arm; immediate revocation\n(`auth.jwt.revocationCheck: 'kv'`) remains on the roadmap.\n\n## v0.43.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Better Auth 1.6\n\nGenerated projects are now pinned to Better Auth **1.6**. The `agents.mcp.requireAuth` work in 0.42.0 surfaced a long-standing version drift: the compiler emitted `better-auth: ^1.5.0`, but `@better-auth/oauth-provider` resolves a tree that requires `@better-auth/core ^1.6.14` and imports `@better-auth/core/utils/host` + `/redirect-uri` — subpaths that only exist in 1.6.x. The result was a `wrangler deploy` that failed at bundle time with `Could not resolve …` and never uploaded.\n\nThis release aligns the **entire** Better Auth dependency set to a coherent 1.6.9 floor so npm resolves one consistent tree:\n\n- `better-auth`, `@better-auth/drizzle-adapter`, `@better-auth/api-key`, `@better-auth/passkey`, `@better-auth/oauth-provider` → `^1.6.9` (generated projects, the baked Docker deps, and the bundled CMS/Account SPAs).\n- Added an explicit `kysely ^0.28.16` pin: Better Auth 1.6's migrator imports `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_TABLE` / `DEFAULT_MIGRATION_LOCK_TABLE` from kysely but doesn't *declare* kysely, so the Worker bundle needs it pinned directly.\n\nNo code migration was required — Quickback already uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (not the now-deprecated OIDC Provider plugin), and emits no `freshAge`/SAML usage affected by 1.6's behavioral changes. Verified end to end: a `requireAuth` project and a normal project both `npm install` a clean 1.6.14 tree and bundle with `wrangler deploy --dry-run` with zero resolution errors.\n\n### Larger migration histories no longer hit the upload ceiling\n\nLong-lived projects accumulate one full-schema drizzle snapshot per migration, and the whole cumulative meta payload (snapshots + journals + `.sql`, across both the auth and features dirs) is re-sent on **every** compile — even a no-schema-change one. Projects with deep migration histories were hitting the compiler's `existingFiles` size limit and failing to compile, with no schema drift and nothing to fix on their end.\n\nThe server-side ceilings are raised so this is no longer the binding constraint:\n\n- `existingFiles` payload: **4 MiB → 16 MiB**\n- total request body: **8 MiB → 32 MiB** (kept above the per-category limits so it doesn't trip first)\n\nThis is enforced entirely on the compiler, so no CLI upgrade is needed — the new headroom applies as soon as `compiler.quickback.dev` is on this release.\n\n### Custom response headers (`security.headers`)\n\nThe generated Worker emitted a fixed set of security headers (CSP, HSTS,\n`X-Content-Type-Options`, …) with no supported way to add your own — teams that\nwanted, say, an `X-Server-Version` build stamp on every response had to\npost-patch the generated middleware after each compile.\n\nNew `security.headers` sets arbitrary response headers natively. Values are\nstatic strings or templates interpolating per-deploy Worker env vars via the\n`{{env.VAR_NAME}}` token:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n headers: {\n // Both vars must be set, or the header is omitted entirely.\n 'X-Server-Version': '{{env.SERVER_VERSION}}+{{env.SERVER_BUILD}}',\n 'X-Powered-By': 'Quickback',\n },\n}\n```\n\n- **Omit-if-unset** — a header that references env vars is emitted only when\n *every* referenced var is set (non-empty) at runtime. A Worker that forgot to\n inject the var emits no header, never `X-Server-Version: undefined`. Static\n headers are always emitted.\n- The value is read from `c.env` per request, so it picks up whatever Worker\n var is injected at deploy time — nothing is baked at compile time.\n- **Managed headers are rejected** — names owned by a dedicated `security` field\n (CSP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, …) error at compile so the\n two emitters can't race. Malformed `{{env…}}` tokens error too, rather than\n leaking literal braces into the wire header.\n\nSurvives a clean `quickback compile` with no post-processing. See\n[Security Headers → Custom response headers](/compiler/config/security#custom-response-headers).\n\n## v0.42.0 — June 4, 2026\n\n### Interactive OAuth for the generated MCP server\n\nMCP connectors (Claude, Cursor, …) could only connect to a generated `/mcp`\nendpoint **anonymously** — they never launched a sign-in flow, so auth-gated\ntools stayed invisible. The OAuth machinery was already present (Better Auth's\n`oauth-provider` ships `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`, `/register` + PKCE under\n`/auth/v1`); the compiler just never let a connector discover or trigger it.\n\nNew `agents.mcp.requireAuth` makes the MCP surface authenticated-only:\n\n```ts\nagents: { mcp: { requireAuth: true } },\n```\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler:\n\n- **Challenges unauthenticated `/mcp`** with `401` + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer\n resource_metadata=\"…\"` ([RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728) §5.1) — the signal connectors use to start OAuth.\n- **Force-enables `oauthProvider` + `bearer`**, so `/oauth2/authorize`, `/token`,\n and `/register` ([RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591) dynamic client registration) exist with PKCE.\n- **Delegates `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`** to Better Auth's real\n metadata instead of a hand-rolled stub that advertised a non-existent\n authorization endpoint.\n- Adds the `<origin>/mcp` resource to `validAudiences`\n ([RFC 8707](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707)) so the connector's access token isn't rejected.\n\nLogin and consent are served by your Account SPA, so users authenticate with\nwhatever methods you already enabled. Default is unchanged (anonymous public\ntools); set `requireAuth: true` for servers meant for authenticated users.\n\n## v0.40.2 — June 3, 2026\n\n### Passwordless plugins can no longer bypass the signup gate\n\nBetter Auth's `emailOtp` and `magicLink` plugins auto-create an account when a\ncode/link is verified for an unknown email — and that path is independent of\n`emailAndPassword.disableSignUp`. As a result, `account.auth.signup: false`\nclosed `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` but left OTP / magic-link verification as an\nopen back-door for account creation.\n\nThe compiler now emits each plugin's own `disableSignUp` flag, and new\nper-plugin options expose it directly:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: {\n emailOtp: { disableSignUp: true }, // OTP sign-in only; unknown emails rejected\n magicLink: { disableSignUp: true }, // same for magic links\n },\n}),\n```\n\nBoth default to following the global gate: setting `account.auth.signup: false`\n(→ `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: true`) now also gates the OTP and magic-link\npaths automatically. Set `{ disableSignUp: false }` on a plugin explicitly to\nkeep its sign-up open while password sign-up stays closed.\n\n## v0.40.1 — June 2, 2026\n\n- The generated `wrangler.toml` and `Env` type now emit the `ASSETS` binding\n type for projects that mount SPAs (CMS / Account), so handler code that\n references `c.env.ASSETS` typechecks.\n- Compiler Docker builds preserve their layer cache across rebuilds, cutting\n local recompile time.\n\n## v0.40.0 — June 2, 2026\n\nR2 file storage is now **presign-only by default**. Adding\n`defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` emits just the `ctx.storage` signer — no\nFILES_DB database, no `/storage/v1/*` endpoints, no files worker. You sign\npresigned URLs against a bucket and store references in your own table. The\nturnkey managed subsystem is still available, now behind `managed: true`.\n\nThis decouples the lightweight primitive from the heavyweight subsystem so you\ncan add uploads without standing up a metadata database you don't use.\n\n### Presign-only by default; managed is opt-in\n\n```ts\n// Presign-only (default) — ctx.storage against a bucket, nothing else\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { bucketName: \"my-app-media\" })\n\n// Managed subsystem — FILES_DB + /storage/v1/* + files worker\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", { managed: true })\n```\n\n- New projects can omit `bucketName` — it defaults to `<project>-media`, so\n setup is one `wrangler r2 bucket create` plus the R2 API-token secrets.\n- Existing projects set `bucketName` to a bucket they already have. Presign-only\n emits **no** R2 bucket binding and **no** FILES_DB binding — nothing to\n provision, nothing to migrate.\n\n### Per-call bucket + custom secret names\n\n```ts\n// Sign against a different bucket than the configured default\nawait storage.signPutUrl(key, { bucket: \"my-app-public\", contentType });\n```\n\nIf your project already stores R2 credentials under different env-var names,\nmap them so the signer reads yours:\n\n```ts\ndefineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\", {\n bucketName: \"my-app-media\",\n presign: { accountIdEnv: \"CF_ACCOUNT_ID\", accessKeyIdEnv: \"S3_KEY\", secretAccessKeyEnv: \"S3_SECRET\" },\n})\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n- `maxFileSize` now accepts a human string (`\"100mb\"`, `\"5gb\"`) as well as a\n number of bytes — previously a string emitted invalid TypeScript.\n- Presign-only no longer emits a stray `FILES_DB` `[[d1_databases]]` block (with\n an invalid `database_id = \"local-files\"`) into `wrangler.toml`, which would\n have made `wrangler deploy` reject the worker.\n\n## v0.39.1 — June 2, 2026\n\nDeduplicate colliding OpenAPI `operationId`s. The auto-generated list id\n`list\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
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"content": "Quickback compiles your authorization model into a single normalized **policy\nIR** — relations, permissions, arrows, scopes, grants, and per-resource\nfirewalls — and then runs a set of static checks over it. The analyzer never\nchanges what's emitted; it reports problems it can prove from the policy\ngraph: a permission that can never be satisfied, a scoped role no grant\nreaches, a resource that hands a scope role more than its profile allows, a\nnegation that can silently pass.\n\n## The console channel\n\nDiagnostics render to the existing `[quickback:authz]` / `[quickback:authn]`\nconsole channel — the same prefix the compiler has always used for security\nwarnings, so any CI grep you already key on keeps working. Each line carries\na stable, greppable **code**:\n\n```\n[quickback:authz] AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION: permission \"event:locked\" can never be satisfied — it requires organizerOf AND its negation simultaneously.\n at resource=sessions authz.permissions[\"event:locked\"]\n hint: Remove the contradictory arm, or split into separate permissions.\n override: authz: { analyzer: { allow: [{ check: 'AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION', target: 'event:locked', reason: '<why this is acceptable>' }] } }\n```\n\nThe first line stays greppable (`[quickback:<channel>] CODE: message`); the\nsource location, fix hint, and — for promoted errors — the exact override\nrecipe render on continuation lines.\n\n## Errors vs warnings (v0.47+)\n\nThe checks split into two tiers:\n\n- **Promoted (compile errors).** A trip is a *definite misconfiguration* —\n never a legitimate config. These fail the build by default. Each one can be\n explicitly accepted per finding via\n [`authz.analyzer.allow`](#the-override-surface).\n- **Heuristic (warnings) and reports (info).** Advisory findings where a\n legitimate config could trip the detector. These print and the compile\n continues. Set **`QUICKBACK_AUTHZ_STRICT=true`** to promote these warnings\n to errors as well (overridden findings stay warnings even under strict —\n an override is an explicit, reasoned acceptance).\n\nThe analyzer remains compile-time only — zero runtime blast radius. A defect\nin the analyzer *itself* is caught and downgraded to a single warning, so an\nanalyzer bug can never take down an otherwise-valid compile. Only real\nfindings fail builds.\n\n## Authz codes\n\nThese read the permission graph projected from the policy IR and run on every\ncompile.\n\n| Code | Tier | What it catches |\n|---|---|---|\n| `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` | **error** | A permission that can never be satisfied — `allOf(a, not(a))`, a fact and its exact negation at the same AND-level. The detector is conservative (exact-leaf contradictions only), so a trip is structurally unsatisfiable. |\n| `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` | **error** | A resource's firewall grants a `scope:<kind>:<role>` role read access **beyond its capability profile** — either the role has no profile at all, or the profile doesn't list this resource. The M0.2 pillar guarantee. |\n| `AUTHZ_SHADOWED_ARM` | warn | An `anyOf` arm subsumed by a broader arm: a leaf `X` and an `allOf(X, …)` in the same union — the narrower arm can never widen the result. |\n| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_ROLE` | warn | A scoped role declared under `authz.scopes` with **no grant profile** — it can authorize no read, action, or channel. Dead config, deny-safe. |\n| `AUTHZ_UNREACHABLE_VIEW` | warn | A grant's `read` names a `resource:view` whose resource has no firewall — no role can reach that view. (A reachability proxy — heuristic by design.) |\n| `AUTHZ_NOT_OVER_RESOURCE` | warn | A `not` whose operand resolves to a **resource (SQL) site** — `NOT EXISTS` over a nullable join can silently pass (the null-trap). The site resolution is conservative, so this stays advisory. |\n| `AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` | info | Per-permission report: how many SQL subqueries the permission lowers to, plus the max recursive-CTE depth. Advisory, never fails a build. |\n\nA few codes are reserved in the diagnostic enum for the milestones that emit\nthem and don't fire on a shipped config today: `AUTHZ_UNBOUNDED_RECURSION`\n(an unbounded recursive arrow with no claim path — currently a hard compile\nerror raised at config validation, before the analyzer runs),\n`AUTHZ_UNENFORCEABLE_FACT`, and `AUTHZ_CAVEAT_SITE_MISMATCH` (M3 caveats).\n\n### The capability ceiling\n\nThe check that backs [scope grant profiles](/compiler/definitions/scopes): a\nscoped role is deny-by-default and may touch only what its `grants` profile\nlists. The analyzer walks every resource firewall, follows each\n`{ permission }` arm into the permission graph to find the scope roles it\nreferences, and **fails the build** if a resource grants a scope role access\nthe profile doesn't cover. This is what makes the grant profile the single\nauditable manifest of what an external principal can see.\n\n## Authn codes\n\nFive **structural authentication** checks — proving properties over the\ngenerated route + credential surface rather than the authz policy. All are\npromoted (compile errors):\n\n| Code | Tier | What it catches |\n|---|---|---|\n| `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE` | **error** | A route that reaches data with an **unclassifiable** auth gate and isn't declared `PUBLIC` — the signup / flag-gap bug class (data delivered to an unauthenticated ctx). Fires only on a gate the compiler cannot classify; zero-FP by construction. |\n| `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT` | **error** | A surface contract breach: an `/mcp` or agent route not gated bearer-only, or an `INTERNAL`-gated route mounted on an HTTP-reachable surface. |\n| `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY` | **error** | A credential's mint site and verify site don't share key / issuer / audience — every minted token would fail verification (the ws-ticket \"401 on every upgrade\" trap). |\n| `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY` | **error** | A fire-and-forget credential send (the OTP-email shape) not anchored to `waitUntil` / `await` — the Worker may drop the promise and never deliver (the OTP-500 bug class). |\n| `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` | **error** | An identity `ctx` field written from **request input** rather than a credential verifier — client-asserted identity, which is forbidden. Unprovable provenance also fails (fail closed). |\n\nThese check definitions are **wired and fully unit-tested**, but their inputs\n— the per-route and per-credential metadata (`RouteNode` / `MintSite` /\n`VerifySite` / `ClaimWrite`) — are not yet emitted by the route, middleware,\nand credential generators. Until those generators emit that metadata the\nanalyzer runs the authn checks against **empty** route/credential graphs, so\nthey are effectively no-ops on a real compile. The severity contract is\nlocked in now: they fail builds the moment they can fire. (The emitted route\nsurface is separately guarded today by the IR's unbound-route invariant — a\nhard error that predates this promotion and owns that surface; one subject,\none error.)\n\n## The override surface\n\nEvery promoted finding can be explicitly accepted — per finding, with a\nrequired reason:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n analyzer: {\n allow: [\n {\n check: 'AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING',\n target: 'sessions/scope:event:organizer',\n reason: 'organizer grant profile lands with the v2 rollout (TICKET-123)',\n },\n ],\n },\n}\n```\n\nAn entry downgrades the exact `(check, target)` finding back to a warning\nthat cites the reason. The rendered error prints the exact recipe — copy the\n`check` and `target` from it. Target formats:\n\n| Check | `target` format |\n|---|---|\n| `AUTHZ_EMPTY_PERMISSION` | the permission name — `event:locked` |\n| `AUTHZ_CAPABILITY_CEILING` | `<resource>/scope:<kind>:<role>` — `sessions/scope:event:organizer` |\n| `AUTHN_ROUTE_COVERAGE`, `AUTHN_SURFACE_INVARIANT` | `<METHOD> <path>` — `GET /mcp` |\n| `AUTHN_SECRET_CONSISTENCY`, `AUTHN_CREDENTIAL_DELIVERY` | the credential kind — `ws-ticket` |\n| `AUTHN_CLAIM_PROVENANCE` | the ctx field — `ctx.userId` |\n\nGuard rails, all compile errors:\n\n- `check` must be a **promoted** id — unknown ids and keep-warn ids (there is\n nothing to override) are rejected at config validation.\n- `reason` is required and non-empty: overrides are self-documenting.\n- An `allow` entry that matches **no current finding** is a *dead override*\n and fails the compile — fix or remove the stale entry. Override lists can\n never silently outlive the problems they suppressed.\n\n## Reading the pushdown-cost report\n\n`AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST` is an `info` line per permission that pushes down to\nSQL — it never fails a build, but it surfaces the query cost of an\nauthorization rule before you ship it:\n\n```\n[quickback:authz] AUTHZ_PUSHDOWN_COST: permission \"section:inTree\" lowers to 1 SQL subquery, recursive CTE depth 6 (sites: resource).\n```\n\nA high subquery count or a deep recursive CTE (from a recursive\n[arrow](/compiler/definitions/arrows)) is a signal to reconsider the rule —\nnot an error, but worth a look.\n\n## See also\n\n- [Permissions](/compiler/definitions/permissions) — the `anyOf` / `allOf` /\n `not` DSL the empty / shadowed / not-over-resource checks analyze.\n- [Arrows](/compiler/definitions/arrows) — recursive-CTE depth feeds the\n pushdown-cost report; the unbounded-recursion guard is a hard error.\n- [Scopes & capability grants](/compiler/definitions/scopes) — the grant\n profiles the capability-ceiling check enforces.\n- [Firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) — the `{ permission }` arms the\n ceiling check follows into the permission graph."
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"content": "Mark a text column `.encrypted()` and Quickback envelope-encrypts it at rest with a **per-organization key**:\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-org\n name: q.text().required(),\n emergencyContact: q.text().encrypted(),\n dietaryNotes: q.text().encrypted(),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nThat one modifier changes what a database breach means: a leaked D1 backup, export, or stolen database token yields only ciphertext for those columns. The keys live separately, wrapped under a worker secret the database never sees.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\n- **`org_data_keys`** — one row per organization holding a random 256-bit data key (DEK), stored **wrapped** under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret. Created lazily on the org's first encrypted write.\n- **Write path** — every write (CRUD routes, batch routes, and `db.insert`/`db.update` inside your actions) flows through the same chokepoint, which AES-256-GCM-encrypts the column before anything else sees it. Audit snapshots, webhook payloads, and realtime deltas therefore carry ciphertext by construction.\n- **Read path** — generated routes decrypt behind the firewall and then apply masking, so authorized callers see plaintext and everyone else sees the redaction — never ciphertext.\n- **`ctx.crypto`** — explicit `await ctx.crypto.decrypt(value)` / `ctx.crypto.encrypt(value)` for action code that processes the field server-side (building a manifest, sending an email). Scoped to the caller's active organization.\n- **Boot guard** — a project with encrypted columns refuses to serve without `ENCRYPTION_KEK` (503 `MISSING_ENV`), instead of silently storing plaintext.\n\nValues at rest look like `qbenc:1:<keyVersion>:<iv>:<ciphertext>` — the prefix makes accidental plaintext detectable, and the embedded key version supports rotation with lazy re-encryption on write.\n\n## Setup\n\nScaffolded projects already have a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK` in `.dev.vars`, so local dev works with zero setup. For production:\n\n```bash\nopenssl rand -hex 32 | wrangler secret put ENCRYPTION_KEK\n```\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nCiphertext cannot be queried, so encrypted columns are **excluded from every query surface at compile time** — these are errors, not warnings:\n\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()`, and never listed in a view's `query.{searchable,filterable,sortable}`\n- No `.unique()` (AES-GCM randomizes ciphertext per write), no primary keys, no `.references()`, no `q.scope()` columns, no defaults (a SQL default would bypass the encrypting chokepoint)\n- Never an `embeddings.fields` source (embedding a value ships its plaintext to the model)\n- The table must carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-organization\n- Text-shaped columns only (v1)\n\nEncrypted columns **may** appear in view projections and responses — they decrypt through the generated prepare path. Masking composes on top as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Per-organization keys: blast radius and crypto-shredding\n\nEach organization's data is encrypted under its own DEK, so one compromised key never exposes another tenant. Deleting an org's `org_data_keys` row makes every encrypted value it ever wrote **permanently unreadable** — the cleanest possible GDPR-erasure and offboarding story.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe envelope tier protects against **storage compromise**: backups, exports, dashboard access, leaked database tokens, SQL injection, and insiders with database read access all get ciphertext. The server *can* decrypt — that's the point; your actions still process the field. It does not protect against full Worker compromise (the sealed/E2EE tier in the encryption roadmap addresses that — see `apps/compiler/research/encryption-vault-spec.md`).\n\nTwo practical notes:\n\n- **Action responses**: rows returned from `db.insert(...).returning()` inside your own actions contain ciphertext — decrypt explicitly with `ctx.crypto.decrypt()` if your action returns the field. Generated CRUD routes handle this automatically.\n- **No server-side equality lookups** on encrypted values (blind indexes are a roadmap item). If you need to filter by it, it probably shouldn't be encrypted — or it needs a separate non-sensitive derived column."
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"content": "`feature()` is **the** way to write a Quickback feature: one file, one default export, the table and its security contract together. The older `q.table()` + `defineTable()` pair still exists underneath (it's what `feature()` expands into), but it means two exports and two concepts for something a feature file treats as one unit.\n\n## Before\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/features/contacts.ts\"\n\nexport const contacts = q.table(\"contacts\", {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.text().required().index(),\n address: q.text().required().index(),\n name: q.text().optional(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(contacts, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n guards: { createable: [\"address\", \"name\"] },\n});\n\nexport type Contact = typeof contacts.$infer;\n```\n\n## After\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/features/contacts.ts\"\n\nexport default feature(\"contacts\", {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.text().required().index(),\n address: q.text().required().index(),\n name: q.text().optional(),\n },\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n guards: { createable: [\"address\", \"name\"] },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import(\"./contacts\").default.$infer` gives you the `Contact` row type.\n\n## How it works\n\n`feature(name, config)` is a **compile-time sugar**, not a runtime abstraction. When the compiler sees `export default feature(...)`, it rewrites the source to the canonical two-export form before any parsing runs. Every downstream layer — dialect pass, audit injection, security contracts, generated routes, OpenAPI, MCP tools, RLS emission — runs on the same Drizzle source it always did. Zero runtime cost; zero semantic difference from `q.table()` + `defineTable()`.\n\nThat means:\n\n- **Both forms remain supported indefinitely.** Mix them freely — some files `feature(...)`, some files `q.table() + defineTable()`, some files Drizzle `sqliteTable() + defineTable()`. The compiler dispatches per file.\n- **Action files reference the table by default import.** `import contacts from \"./contacts\"` gives you the same typed handle `q.table(\"contacts\", ...)` would have returned, so `defineActions(contacts, { … })` still works.\n- **Diagnostics are identical.** Missing firewall → same warning. Protected-field wiring → same check. Nothing about `feature()` weakens the secure-by-default posture.\n\n## Aliases\n\n`q` is canonical (matches Zod's `z.`, Superstruct's `s.`). `qb` is exported as an alias if you'd rather self-document the namespace:\n\n```ts\n\nexport default feature(\"contacts\", {\n columns: { id: qb.id(), name: qb.text().required() },\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n // …\n});\n```\n\nSame object, two names — pick one.\n\n## When to use which\n\n| Pattern | When |\n|---|---|\n| `feature(name, {...})` | Default. One table, one security contract, one file. |\n| `q.table()` + `defineTable()` | Multiple tables per file (rare), or you want to reference the table identifier before the default export. |\n| `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()` | Interop with existing Drizzle code / migrations. |\n| `q.table(...)` alone (no `defineTable`) | Internal join/lookup/pivot tables with no public API. Compiler warns so you confirm the opt-out is intentional. |\n\n## Feature directory layout\n\nA feature directory holds tables, optional shared schemas, and the handler files that back any actions:\n\n```\nfeatures/podcast/\n├── episodes.ts ← defineTable + (optional) defineActions(episodes, {…})\n├── shows.ts ← defineTable + (optional) defineActions(shows, {…})\n├── episode-tags.ts ← defineTable only (junction)\n├── _feature.ts ← non-table-bound actions + shared zod schemas\n├── handlers/\n│ ├── episodes/{publish,revertToDraft}.ts\n│ └── shows/…\n└── lib/\n └── shared.ts ← feature-local helpers, copied verbatim\n```\n\nThree things to know:\n\n- **`handlers/` walks recursively**, keyed by relative path (`handlers/episodes/publish.ts`). The canonical layout is per-table subdirectories so action handlers stay grouped with the table they act on.\n- **`lib/` rides along** — feature-local helper modules get copied verbatim into the generated output. Use this for shared utilities that both handlers and inline `execute:` bodies reference.\n- **`_feature.ts` is the universal slot** for non-table-bound actions and shared schemas. Top-level decls in `_feature.ts` get prepended once to the merged actions module, so a `const sharedSchema = z.object({…})` in `_feature.ts` is referenceable from any sibling action's `input:` without re-declaring it.\n\nFor everything action-related — three modes, conflict rules, the `_feature.ts` shape — see [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n## Handlers — one `q` namespace for everything\n\nCustom action handlers need to run queries against the database. Quickback's compiled projects expose the Drizzle query-builder helpers on the same `q` namespace you use for schema authoring, so handler code stays inside one DSL:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback/features/mail/handlers/inbound.ts\"\n\nexport const execute = async ({ unsafeDb, input }) => {\n // Find the mailbox this email was addressed to\n const mailbox = await unsafeDb.query.mailboxes.findFirst({\n where: q.eq(mailboxes.address, input.mailboxAddress),\n });\n if (!mailbox) return { error: \"unknown mailbox\" };\n\n // Look up the thread by in-reply-to + organization scope\n const thread = input.parsed.inReplyTo\n ? await unsafeDb.query.threads.findFirst({\n where: q.and(\n q.eq(threads.organizationId, mailbox.organizationId),\n q.eq(threads.lastMessageId, input.parsed.inReplyTo),\n ),\n })\n : null;\n\n // Insert the new message\n await unsafeDb.insert(messages).values({\n id: crypto.randomUUID(),\n threadId: thread?.id,\n organizationId: mailbox.organizationId,\n subject: input.parsed.subject,\n createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n });\n\n return { ok: true };\n};\n```\n\nThe `q` in handlers is a runtime re-export of Drizzle's query builder — `q.eq`, `q.and`, `q.or`, `q.not`, `q.ne`, `q.gt`, `q.gte`, `q.lt`, `q.lte`, `q.like`, `q.ilike`, `q.inArray`, `q.notInArray`, `q.isNull`, `q.isNotNull`, `q.between`, `q.desc`, `q.asc`, `q.sql`. Pure re-export, zero wrapper cost.\n\n**The compiler generates `src/lib/q.ts`** in every project so the runtime `q` is always available. You never need to `import { eq } from \"drizzle-orm\"` in a handler — though you can if you want (Quickback doesn't hide drizzle, it just offers a consistent surface that matches the schema DSL).\n\n## Why one namespace\n\nQuickback is an opinionated wrapper with opinionated security. One DSL for schema (`q.table`, `q.text`, `q.id`), one DSL for queries (`q.eq`, `q.and`, `q.gte`), one opt-in for routes (`feature()` / `defineTable`). You never need to learn the names of the underlying tools to write a feature — the same way Next.js users don't need to know they're using webpack, or Astro users don't need to know they're using Vite."
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"content": "Quickback supports three co-equal authoring patterns. All compile to the same generated runtime — the compiler dispatches per file, so every feature in a project may choose independently.\n\n- **`feature()`** — single-export sugar for the `q` DSL. One import, one export, everything about the table and its security contract in one call. **Recommended default.** See [feature() — single-export sugar](/compiler/definitions/feature).\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form. Same DSL, more explicit. Use when you want to reference the table identifier before the default export (e.g. from an action file).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop with existing Drizzle code. Use when you're bringing an existing schema forward or want dialect-specific column options.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the two-export form\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Defining Tables with Drizzle\n\nIf you prefer Drizzle — or have an existing schema you're bringing forward — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### Choosing Between `q` and Drizzle\n\n| Pick `q` when | Pick Drizzle when |\n|---|---|\n| Starting a new feature from scratch | You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward |\n| You want the same Zod across actions, forms, and routes | You need Drizzle-specific column options not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types) |\n| You prefer concise, Zod-native syntax | You prefer the explicit Drizzle dialect import per target |\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated. Still works but emits a warning during compilation. Use `defineTable` instead.\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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"content": "There is **one way to write a feature**: `feature()` — one file, one export, the table and its security contract in a single call. See [feature()](/compiler/definitions/feature) for the full reference.\n\nTwo lower-level forms exist for specific situations, not as alternatives to choose between — both compile to exactly the same runtime, and `feature()` itself is sugar over the first:\n\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form `feature()` expands into. Reach for it only when another file needs to import the table identifier directly (e.g. an action file referencing the table before the default export).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop for bringing an existing Drizzle schema forward, or for dialect-specific column options.\n\nIf you're starting fresh — or you're an agent defining a user's features — use `feature()` for every table.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the expanded form\n\nThis is what `feature()` compiles into. Write it by hand only when another file needs the table identifier as a named export.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Drizzle interop\n\nIf you have an existing Drizzle schema you're bringing forward — or need a dialect-specific column option `q` doesn't expose — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### When Drizzle interop is the right call\n\nDefault to `feature()`. Drop to Drizzle only when:\n\n- You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward\n- You need a Drizzle-specific column option not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types)\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature — so one interop table doesn't force the rest of the project off `feature()`.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated and scheduled for removal. Still compiles with a warning; do not write new code with it — migrate to `feature()` (or `defineTable`).\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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"content": "Get started with Quickback in minutes. This guide shows you how to define a complete table with security configuration.\n\n## Start a Project\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`quickback start` is interactive — it asks for a template and project name, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account just before compiling. If you cancel at the login prompt the scaffold stays put; finish later with `quickback login && quickback compile`.\n\nAlready know what you want? Pass the template (and optionally a name) to skip the prompts:\n\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start blank # config only, no features\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start todos # working CRUD example\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start blog my-site # blog starter, named my-site\n```\n\nPrefer a scriptable form?\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\nquickback create cloudflare my-app\ncd my-app\n```\n\nBoth paths scaffold the same project:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Working example feature with full security configuration (when you pick `todos`/`blog`/`saas`)\n\n**Available templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working CRUD example with masking + actions\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `blank` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features (alias: `empty`)\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS with orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks\n\n## File Structure\n\nEach table gets its own file with schema and security config together:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n └── jobs/\n ├── jobs.ts # Table + security config\n ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n ├── actions.ts # Custom actions (optional)\n └── handlers/ # Action handlers (optional)\n └── close-job.ts\n```\n\n## Complete Example\n\nHere's a complete `jobs` table with all security layers in a single `feature()` call:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // draft | open | closed\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n // Ownership — required for firewall data isolation\n organizationId: q.scope(\"organization\"),\n },\n\n // 1. FIREWALL — Data isolation\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n\n // 2. GUARDS — Field modification rules\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n\n // 3. READ — Collection + per-id GET (gates GET / and GET /:id)\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25,\n },\n\n // 4. WRITE OPERATIONS\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n});\n```\n\nOne import, one export, every security layer declared in one place. Secure by default — no write routes ship until you opt in with top-level `create`, `update`, `delete`, or `upsert`.\n\n### Alternatives — same result, different shape\n\nIf you'd rather split the table declaration from the security config (e.g. to reference the table in an action file), use the two-export form. Identical output:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n // … same columns\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n // … same config\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nOr if you're interop'ing with existing Drizzle schemas, you can author with `sqliteTable` / `pgTable` directly — the compiler dispatches per file, and all forms can coexist in the same project.\n\nSee [feature() —
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"content": "Get started with Quickback in minutes. This guide shows you how to define a complete table with security configuration.\n\n## Start a Project\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`quickback start` is interactive — it asks for a template and project name, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account just before compiling. If you cancel at the login prompt the scaffold stays put; finish later with `quickback login && quickback compile`.\n\nAlready know what you want? Pass the template (and optionally a name) to skip the prompts:\n\n```bash\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start blank # config only, no features\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start todos # working CRUD example\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start blog my-site # blog starter, named my-site\n```\n\nPrefer a scriptable form?\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g @quickback-dev/cli\nquickback create cloudflare my-app\ncd my-app\n```\n\nBoth paths scaffold the same project:\n- `quickback.config.ts` — Project configuration\n- `quickback/features/` — Your table definitions\n- Working example feature with full security configuration (when you pick `todos`/`blog`/`saas`)\n\n**Available templates:**\n- `cloudflare` — Cloudflare Workers + D1 + Better Auth, bare scaffold\n- `todos` — Working CRUD example with masking + actions\n- `blog` — Single-tenant blog, PUBLIC reads, admin writes\n- `blank` — Cloudflare scaffold, no example features (alias: `empty`)\n- `saas` — Full B2B SaaS with orgs, R2 file storage, webhooks\n\n## File Structure\n\nEach table gets its own file with schema and security config together:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n └── jobs/\n ├── jobs.ts # Table + security config\n ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n ├── actions.ts # Custom actions (optional)\n └── handlers/ # Action handlers (optional)\n └── close-job.ts\n```\n\n## Complete Example\n\nHere's a complete `jobs` table with all security layers in a single `feature()` call:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // draft | open | closed\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n // Ownership — required for firewall data isolation\n organizationId: q.scope(\"organization\"),\n },\n\n // 1. FIREWALL — Data isolation\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n\n // 2. GUARDS — Field modification rules\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n\n // 3. READ — Collection + per-id GET (gates GET / and GET /:id)\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25,\n },\n\n // 4. WRITE OPERATIONS\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n});\n```\n\nOne import, one export, every security layer declared in one place. Secure by default — no write routes ship until you opt in with top-level `create`, `update`, `delete`, or `upsert`.\n\n### Alternatives — same result, different shape\n\nIf you'd rather split the table declaration from the security config (e.g. to reference the table in an action file), use the two-export form. Identical output:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n // … same columns\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n // … same config\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nOr if you're interop'ing with existing Drizzle schemas, you can author with `sqliteTable` / `pgTable` directly — the compiler dispatches per file, and all forms can coexist in the same project.\n\nSee [feature() — the canonical form](/compiler/definitions/feature) and [Schema: Drizzle interop](/compiler/definitions/schema#drizzle-interop) for the full picture.\n\n## What Each Layer Does\n\n1. **Firewall**: Automatically adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` to every query. Users in Org A can never see Org B's data.\n2. **Guards**: Controls which fields can be modified — `createable` for POST, `updatable` for PATCH, `protected` for action-only fields.\n3. **Write Access**: Role-based access control for each operation. All roles can read, only hiring managers can write.\n\n## Compile and Run\n\n```bash\n# Compile your definitions — prompts you to sign in or sign up\n# if you haven't already (no separate `quickback login` step needed)\nquickback compile\n\n# Run locally\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nThe first compile prompts for an account; subsequent compiles re-use the stored session.\n\n### Local development requirements\n\nTwo things the local `wrangler dev` server needs that production gets from Cloudflare config:\n\n- **`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`** — read from a `.dev.vars` file in the project root. Projects scaffolded with `quickback start`/`create` get one generated automatically (git-ignored). If yours is missing, every auth call returns `503 MISSING_ENV`; create it with:\n ```bash\n echo \"BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)\" > .dev.vars\n ```\n- **An `Origin` header on cookie-backed writes** — CSRF protection rejects mutations (`403 CSRF_ORIGIN_REJECTED`) unless the request carries a trusted origin. Browsers send it automatically; when testing with curl or an agent, add `-H \"Origin: http://localhost:8787\"` to POST/PATCH/DELETE requests (reads don't need it). Bearer-token requests are exempt.\n\n## Generated Endpoints\n\nQuickback generates these endpoints from the example above:\n\n| Method | Endpoint | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `GET` | `/api/v1/jobs` | List jobs (all roles) |\n| `GET` | `/api/v1/jobs/:id` | Get single job |\n| `POST` | `/api/v1/jobs` | Create job (hiring managers only) |\n| `PATCH` | `/api/v1/jobs/:id` | Update job (hiring managers only) |\n| `DELETE` | `/api/v1/jobs/:id` | Soft delete job (hiring managers only) |\n\n## Test Your API\n\nAfter `quickback compile` and `npm run dev`, your API is running locally. Open a second terminal and try these requests:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create a user account\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8787/auth/v1/sign-up/email \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"email\": \"admin@example.com\", \"password\": \"securepassword123\", \"name\": \"Admin\"}'\n\n# 2. Sign in and get a session token\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8787/auth/v1/sign-in/email \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"email\": \"admin@example.com\", \"password\": \"securepassword123\"}'\n# → Response includes a session token in Set-Cookie header\n\n# 3. Create a record (use the session cookie from step 2)\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8787/api/v1/jobs \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Cookie: better-auth.session_token=<token>\" \\\n -d '{\"title\": \"Senior Engineer\", \"department\": \"Engineering\", \"status\": \"open\"}'\n\n# 4. List records\ncurl http://localhost:8787/api/v1/jobs \\\n -H \"Cookie: better-auth.session_token=<token>\"\n```\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Template Walkthroughs](/compiler/getting-started/templates) — Detailed setup guides\n- [Full Example](/compiler/getting-started/full-example) — Complete resource walkthrough\n- [Database Schema](/compiler/definitions/schema) — Column types, relations, audit fields\n- [Firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) — Data isolation patterns\n- [Access](/compiler/definitions/access) — Role & condition-based control\n- [Guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) — Field modification rules\n- [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Field redaction for sensitive data\n- [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) — Custom business logic endpoints\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Quickback Stack](/stack) — The runtime environment where your compiled API runs (D1, KV, R2, auth)\n- [Account UI](/stack/account-ui) — Pre-built authentication and account management UI\n- [Using the API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api) — CRUD endpoints, filtering, and batch operations"
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