@quickback-dev/cli 0.47.15 → 0.48.1

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  1. package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +1 -1
  2. package/dist/commands/compile.js +13 -2
  3. package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
  4. package/dist/commands/migrations.d.ts +10 -0
  5. package/dist/commands/migrations.d.ts.map +1 -1
  6. package/dist/commands/migrations.js +113 -79
  7. package/dist/commands/migrations.js.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/commands/migrations.test.js +96 -1
  9. package/dist/commands/migrations.test.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/docs/content.js +12 -12
  11. package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  13. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  14. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +119 -0
  15. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +23 -2
  16. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +12 -2
  17. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +2 -0
  18. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +2 -0
  19. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +306 -35
  20. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations.md +14 -8
  21. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +151 -10
  22. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/index.md +22 -3
  23. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +6 -4
  24. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +1 -1
  25. package/dist/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/outbound.md +23 -0
  26. package/package.json +1 -1
  27. package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +119 -0
  28. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +23 -2
  29. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +12 -2
  30. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/encryption.md +2 -0
  31. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +2 -0
  32. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +306 -35
  33. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations.md +14 -8
  34. package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +151 -10
  35. package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/index.md +22 -3
  36. package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/live-views.md +6 -4
  37. package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +1 -1
  38. package/src/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/outbound.md +23 -0
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- "content": "## Unreleased\n\n### `acceptScope`: one namespaced handler for the user AND the sessionless principal\n\nA project-level namespace can now **accept an already-minted scope claim as\nproof of entry** — the inverse of `mintScope`. Set\n**`authz.namespaces.<ns>.acceptScope: '<kind>'`** and the hoisted resolver gains\na fast-path: a scope-only principal (`ctx.scopePrincipal`, no `ctx.userId`)\ncarrying a verified `ctx.scope.<kind>` claim proves entry by that claim, without\na DB relationship probe. One `/event/:eventId/*` handler then serves **both** the\nBetter-Auth user and the sessionless invite-principal — retiring the parallel\nPUBLIC `/attendee/*` twin.\n\n- **Named-string only** — the kind is always explicit; a bare `true` is a type\n error. Default absent → the resolver never admits a scope principal (fail-closed).\n- **Two locks, compile-enforced** — `acceptScope` opts the namespace in, **and**\n at least one relationship lane must confer a `<kind>` role declared\n `subject: 'supplied' \\| 'both'`. A `subject: 'user'` role emits no accept arm;\n a kind whose every conferring lane is user-only is a **compile error**, not a\n dead fast-path. The kind must be declared and its `requestField` must equal the\n prefix's first `:param`.\n- **Forging-safe** — the claim is verified (never caller-asserted), the kind is\n read by name (not an any-key loop), the instance is pinned twice\n (`entry.id === :param` in the gate + `eq(loads.pk, :param)` in hydration), and\n each accept arm is one exact `(role, lane)` pair. New proof source, zero new\n enforcement surface — firewall, masking, `access`, and scoped-db read the same\n `ctx.scope` they read for a userId caller.\n- **Composes with `mintScope`** — a userId caller still gets a rolling re-mint;\n a scope principal's verified claim is preserved (not re-stamped) so its\n `subjectId` / sub-keys survive.\n- **Realtime shares the same acceptance** — the `ws-ticket` route now proves a\n scope principal through the *same* emitter as the REST gate\n (`emitScopeAcceptance`), so the two surfaces can't drift. Bringing the ws-ticket\n path onto it tightened it to the named-kind read + supplied-reachable role\n filter, closing an any-kind cross-kind match. `q-events` ships a `vendor` scope\n role (`subject: 'both'`) + logistics-only view demonstrating the sessionless\n supplier end-to-end.\n- **Writes work too** — the scoped-db audit wrapper no longer throws when the\n caller is a verified scope principal (`ctx.scopePrincipal`, no `ctx.userId`).\n Instead of failing on the missing user, it stamps the synthetic, audit-only\n principal id (`scope:<kind>:<subjectId>`, the token's `sub`) into\n `created_by` / `modified_by`. So the SAME `/event/:eventId/*` handler body\n serves both a Better-Auth user and the sessionless principal on **reads AND\n writes** — no parallel raw-`db` write path. Still fail-closed: a genuine\n no-user write (no scope principal) throws exactly as before. `q-events` adds a\n `vendorCheckin` write under the acceptScope namespace exercising it end-to-end.\n\nSee [Scopes → `acceptScope`](/compiler/definitions/scopes#acceptscope--accept-an-incoming-scope-claim-as-proof-of-entry).\n\n### Sessionless scope mint: `ctx.mintScope` + `subject: 'supplied' \\| 'both'`\n\nA scope can now be minted for a principal who has **no Better Auth account** — an\nevent attendee arriving by email + invite code, a kiosk/handout code, a partner\ntoken. The action proves the relationship its own way and asks Quickback to mint\na disciplined scope token from the row it proved.\n\n- **`authz.scopes.<kind>.roles.<role>.subject: 'user' \\| 'supplied' \\| 'both'`** (default `'user'`).\n `'both'` makes the *same* `scope:event:attendee` reachable by a logged-in user\n (via `/scope/v1/enter`) and a sessionless invite-holder (via `ctx.mintScope`) —\n one firewall arm, one masking rule, both principals.\n- **`ctx.mintScope({ via, subject })`** — hydrated on `ctx` in any action (including\n PUBLIC) when a `supplied`/`both` role is declared. The action supplies only the\n conferring row's **primary key**; Quickback reads the role, resource id,\n sub-keys, and subject id **off that row** — never caller-asserted, so the role\n can't be forged. Returns a **scope-only** JWT (no user identity): `ctx.userId`\n stays undefined, so user/org/owner gates and the `AUTHENTICATED`/`USER`\n pseudo-roles all fail closed; only `scope:<kind>:<role>` gates admit it.\n- **`ctx.scope.<kind>.subjectId`** — a reserved claim carrying the proven subject\n row's PK, populated on **both** proof paths. Scope an attendee's self-data\n (travel, dietary, todos) with a single firewall arm\n (`{ field: 'guestId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event.subjectId' }`) that serves both a\n user-attendee and a sessionless one.\n- **Realtime** — the ws-ticket authorizes a scope-only principal directly off its\n proven `ctx.scope` claim, so accountless attendees join the same rooms with the\n same scope role. The `where:` filter runs on the mint probe, so a cancelled row\n confers nothing (revocation within one ≤180s mint cycle).\n\nSee [Scopes → Sessionless scope mint](/compiler/definitions/scopes#sessionless-scope-mint--ctxmintscope).\n\n### MCP OAuth: split authorization-server / resource-server (multi-app SSO)\n\nYou can now run one canonical authorization server with many resource servers (each\nhosting its own `/mcp`) over a shared auth DB:\n\n- A resource server that sets `agents.mcp.requireAuth` now emits the full OAuth\n access-token **verification** path on its own — previously the JWKS-verify block\n only emitted when the separate `auth.config.oauth.enabled` flag was set, so a\n requireAuth-only resource server fell back to HMAC + session and 401'd every valid\n externally-issued bearer.\n- Point a resource server at an external AS with `auth.config.oauth.issuerUrl`; the\n middleware verifies incoming bearers against the shared JWKS (`iss`/`aud`/`exp` +\n live-session binding).\n- `auth.config.oauth.audiences` (an array) registers federated resource-server\n audiences on the AS (RFC 8707). It now **unions** with the AS's own origin instead\n of replacing it, so listing federated servers never drops the AS's own `/mcp`\n audience. Also exposed on the plugin-form `oauthProvider.validAudiences`.\n\nSee [Agents → Split authorization server](/compiler/config/agents#split-authorization-server--resource-server-multi-app-sso).\n\n### MCP tools: callable path params + typed input schemas\n\nAn action mounted under a path that carries a parameter — a namespace prefix like\n`/scope/:scopeId/...`, or any `path:` with `:params` — now produces a fully\ncallable MCP tool:\n\n- The mounted route's path params are extracted into the tool's `inputSchema`\n (and `_pathParams`), so the model has a field to supply each one. Previously\n only record-based actions emitted a param (the hard-coded `id`); a standalone\n or namespace path param was absent from the schema, the URL resolved with an\n empty segment, and the action was uncallable over MCP.\n- Standalone routes are stored in Hono colon form (`:scopeId`); the OpenAPI spec\n key (and therefore the tool's `_path`) is now normalized to brace form\n (`{scopeId}`) so the runtime's brace-only path interpolation can fill it.\n\nAction `input` schemas also lower to richer JSON Schema instead of a phantom\nempty `{}`: `z.coerce.*`, `z.literal`, unions of literals, and **nested\n`z.object`** (child keys stay nested) now emit their real types, so the model —\nand the OpenAPI spec — see the actual field shapes. See\n[Agents → MCP tools](/compiler/config/agents).\n\n### Scaffold surfaces MCP/OAuth + secrets opt-ins\n\n`quickback create` now seeds the generated `quickback.config.ts` with curated,\ncommented-out hints for the authenticated MCP server (`agents.mcp.requireAuth`), the\nsplit-AS `oauth.issuerUrl`/`audiences`, and `bindings.secrets` — so these opt-ins are\ndiscoverable in the config itself, not only in the docs.\n\n### Custom secrets via `bindings.secrets`\n\nDeclare a custom secret your feature/action code reads off `env` — name and\ncontract only, never the value:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n secrets: [\n { name: \"WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET\", description: \"HMAC for webhook callbacks\", required: true },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nIt's emitted into the generated `env.d.ts` `Env` interface so `env.\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
6
+ "content": "## Unreleased\n\n### Neon PostgreSQL reaches deploy parity with D1 (v0.50)\n\nA Neon-backed service now compiles, typechecks, migrates, and deploys with the\nsame capability surface as a D1 service — over HTTP (`@neondatabase/serverless`),\nthe Cloudflare default. There is no Hyperdrive binding and no Neon Authorize /\nJWKS configuration: the Worker verifies each caller, then writes the trusted\nuser/org/team context into transaction-local Postgres settings\n(`set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub' | 'org_id' | 'team_id', …, true)`) as the\nfirst statement of every query batch. RLS reads them through a compiler-defined\n`auth.user_id()` shim and the `get_active_org_id()` helper — **not** a persisted\n`user_sessions` mirror (which never shipped).\n\n- **Background contexts run under a service-role handle.** Queue consumers, cron\n schedules, and cross-tenant `unsafe` actions acquire `createServiceDb(env)`,\n which sets `quickback.service_role = 'true'` (all request claims cleared);\n every feature table carries a `<table>_service_role` RLS policy admitting\n exactly that context. Unsafe-action audit events are unchanged.\n- **Webhooks port to a `webhooks` Postgres schema** in the same database (no\n `WEBHOOKS_DB` binding). `webhooksBinding` is a pure enable flag on Neon; the\n D1-only `webhooksDatabaseId` / `webhooksDatabaseName` keys are rejected. The\n store is service-role-only.\n- **`.encrypted()` / `.sealed()` columns are supported** on Neon over HTTP: the\n key/vault tables fold into the journaled migration set with org-scoped and\n service-role-only RLS.\n- **Batch transactions advertise the truth.** Neon HTTP is fail-fast and\n non-transactional (`meta.transactional: false`, like D1) because\n `drizzle-orm/neon-http` has no interactive transactions; Neon WebSocket\n (Node/Bun) gets real rollback (`meta.transactional: true`).\n- **Deploy glue matches D1:** a generated `deploy` script\n (`npm run db:migrate && wrangler deploy`), a boot check asserting\n `DATABASE_URL`, `.dev.vars.example` (wrangler dev reads `.dev.vars`, not\n `.env`) gitignored, and `drizzle.config.ts` preferring\n `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL ?? DATABASE_URL` for the privileged migration role.\n- **Fail-closed capability gates:** managed file storage (use presign-only R2),\n the Better Auth `subscriptions` plugin, raw `sqliteTable` interop sources on a\n Postgres target, and — under WebSocket mode — webhooks / unsafe actions /\n encrypted columns are all compile-time errors rather than silently-broken\n output. Mixed database providers remain unsupported.\n- **Docs corrected:** the [Neon page](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon)\n no longer describes Neon Authorize, a `user_sessions` table, or Hyperdrive —\n none of which the compiler emits.\n\n### Realtime identity tags — one send reaches a person on either auth door (v0.49)\n\nWebSocket connections now carry **identity tags**, proven at ticket mint and\nsigned into the ws-ticket (never client-supplied): `user:<userId>` for every\nBetter Auth caller, plus `scope:<kind>:<subjectId>` whenever a scope subject is\nproven — on **either** door. A sessionless scope principal's claim and a Better\nAuth caller's matched relationship lane stamp the **identical** subject-keyed\ntag (both derive from the same relationship row), so senders no longer\ndouble-send per recipient to cover `subject: 'both'` roles.\n\n- **`targetTags` on every send** (`realtime.broadcast`, `realtime.insert`, …):\n delivery is the deduplicated union of the runtime's indexed\n `getWebSockets(tag)` lookup — no per-frame attachment scan. Replaces the\n `userId` identity arm when present; the scope/org bind and `targetRoles`\n audience still apply.\n- **Fail-closed:** `targetTags: []` delivers to nobody, consistent with the\n empty-audience rule.\n- Tags are immutable for a socket's lifetime (hibernation-tag semantics);\n limits (10/socket, 256 chars) are validated at mint — rejected, never\n truncated.\n\n### Realtime authorization lease — hibernated sockets no longer outlive revocation (v0.49)\n\nA ws-ticket was verified once at upgrade, and DO hibernation kept the socket\nauthorized forever — bans, member removal, and subject revocation never touched\na live connection. Connections now carry a delivery-time **authorization\nlease** (default **15 minutes**, from ticket `iat`):\n\n- The fan-out skips expired connections (they receive nothing) and closes them\n with code **4401**; inbound messages — even pings — are enforced the same way.\n- **In-place renewal:** `{ type: \"reauth\", ticket: \"<fresh ws-ticket>\" }`\n extends the lease and refreshes roles without socket churn. Renewal is\n strict — same `userId`, same scope/org, exact same tag set (tags are\n immutable); identity drift closes with 4401 → reconnect fresh.\n- Renewal tickets come from `POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket`, which re-runs the\n **full** authorization gate (session, KV revocation, relationship/scope-claim\n probes) — so revocation propagates within one lease period, with no KV reads\n in the Durable Object.\n- Configure via `realtime: { lease: '15m' | seconds | false }` (min 60s;\n `false` disables — discouraged). Clients that never reauth degrade gracefully\n to one forced reconnect per lease.\n\n### Realtime broadcasts are fail-closed — explicit per-resource audience (BREAKING)\n\nRealtime broadcasting is now opt-in **per resource** with a **mandatory audience**,\nmirroring how CRUD is explicit. This closes a fanout footgun where a resource that\nnever mentioned realtime could still broadcast its rows to an entire room.\n\n- **`realtime.access: { roles: [...] }`** is the audience — same `{ roles }` shape\n as `read.access` / `crud.*.access`. A subscriber receives a live row iff that\n role bucket would admit them at REST. Roles may be concrete membership/scope\n roles or UPPERCASE pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `SYSADMIN`).\n- **Fail-closed, at compile time** — a broadcasting resource with no/empty audience\n is a **compile error** naming the resource. There is no implicit fanout. To\n broadcast to everyone in the room, say so deliberately with `access: { roles: ['PUBLIC'] }`.\n- **Fail-closed, at runtime** — the Broadcaster now treats an **empty audience as\n nobody** (previously: everybody) and evaluates the uppercase pseudo-roles exactly\n as the REST access evaluator does (`userRole` is threaded through the ws-ticket\n for `USER`/`SYSADMIN`).\n- **No project-wide auto-broadcast** — `providers.database.config.realtime` now\n only wires the transport (Broadcaster DO + ws-ticket route); it no longer\n enables broadcasts on any resource.\n- **Migration** — a project that relied on the project-wide auto-broadcast must add\n an explicit `realtime: { enabled: true, access: { roles: [...] } }` block to each\n resource that should broadcast. `requiredRoles` is the deprecated spelling of\n `access.roles` (still compiles, normalized internally). `q-events` `guests`\n demonstrates the staff-lane pattern (`access: { roles: ['admin','member'] }`,\n event-scoped, masked).\n\n### Deterministic codegen output\n\nThe compiler now sorts every filesystem-discovered collection (features, and each\n`services.*` group) by a stable key before generating, so recompiles produce\nbyte-identical output regardless of the CLI's directory-scan order. Eliminates the\nchurny, behavior-neutral diffs (queue-consumer case order, auth blocks, schema\nimports) that appeared across machines/CLI versions.\n\n### `acceptScope`: one namespaced handler for the user AND the sessionless principal\n\nA project-level namespace can now **accept an already-minted scope claim as\nproof of entry** — the inverse of `mintScope`. Set\n**`authz.namespaces.<ns>.acceptScope: '<kind>'`** and the hoisted resolver gains\na fast-path: a scope-only principal (`ctx.scopePrincipal`, no `ctx.userId`)\ncarrying a verified `ctx.scope.<kind>` claim proves entry by that claim, without\na DB relationship probe. One `/event/:eventId/*` handler then serves **both** the\nBetter-Auth user and the sessionless invite-principal — retiring the parallel\nPUBLIC `/attendee/*` twin.\n\n- **Named-string only** — the kind is always explicit; a bare `true` is a type\n error. Default absent → the resolver never admits a scope principal (fail-closed).\n- **Two locks, compile-enforced** — `acceptScope` opts the namespace in, **and**\n at least one relationship lane must confer a `<kind>` role declared\n `subject: 'supplied' \\| 'both'`. A `subject: 'user'` role emits no accept arm;\n a kind whose every conferring lane is user-only is a **compile error**, not a\n dead fast-path. The kind must be declared and its `requestField` must equal the\n prefix's first `:param`.\n- **Forging-safe** — the claim is verified (never caller-asserted), the kind is\n read by name (not an any-key loop), the instance is pinned twice\n (`entry.id === :param` in the gate + `eq(loads.pk, :param)` in hydration), and\n each accept arm is one exact `(role, lane)` pair. New proof source, zero new\n enforcement surface — firewall, masking, `access`, and scoped-db read the same\n `ctx.scope` they read for a userId caller.\n- **Composes with `mintScope`** — a userId caller still gets a rolling re-mint;\n a scope principal's verified claim is preserved (not re-stamped) so its\n `subjectId` / sub-keys survive.\n- **Realtime shares the same acceptance** — the `ws-ticket` route now proves a\n scope principal through the *same* emitter as the REST gate\n (`emitScopeAcceptance`), so the two surfaces can't drift. Bringing the ws-ticket\n path onto it tightened it to the named-kind read + supplied-reachable role\n filter, closing an any-kind cross-kind match. `q-events` ships a `vendor` scope\n role (`subject: 'both'`) + logistics-only view demonstrating the sessionless\n supplier end-to-end.\n- **Writes work too** — the scoped-db audit wrapper no longer throws when the\n caller is a verified scope principal (`ctx.scopePrincipal`, no `ctx.userId`).\n Instead of failing on the missing user, it stamps the synthetic, audit-only\n principal id (`scope:<kind>:<subjectId>`, the token's `sub`) into\n `created_by` / `modified_by`. So the SAME `/event/:eventId/*` handler body\n serves both a Better-Auth user and the sessionless principal on **reads AND\n writes** — no parallel raw-`db` write path. Still fail-closed: a genuine\n no-user write (no scope principal) throws exactly as before. `q-events` adds a\n `vendorCheckin` write under the acceptScope namespace exercising it end-to-end.\n\nSee [Scopes → `acceptScope`](/compiler/definitions/scopes#acceptscope--accept-an-incoming-scope-claim-as-proof-of-entry).\n\n### Sessionless scope mint: `ctx.mintScope` + `subject: 'supplied' \\| 'both'`\n\nA scope can now be minted for a principal who has **no Better Auth account** — an\nevent attendee arriving by email + invite code, a kiosk/handout code, a partner\ntoken. The action proves the relationship its own way and asks Quickback to mint\na disciplined scope token from the row it proved.\n\n- **`authz.scopes.<kind>.roles.<role>.subject: 'user' \\| 'supplied' \\| 'both'`** (default `'user'`).\n `'both'` makes the *same* `scope:event:attendee` reachable by a logged-in user\n (via `/scope/v1/enter`) and a sessionless invite-holder (via `ctx.mintScope`) —\n one firewall arm, one masking rule, both principals.\n- **`ctx.mintScope({ via, subject })`** — hydrated on `ctx` in any action (including\n PUBLIC) when a `supplied`/`both` role is declared. The action supplies only the\n conferring row's **primary key**; Quickback reads the role, resource id,\n sub-keys, and subject id **off that row** — never caller-asserted, so the role\n can't be forged. Returns a **scope-only** JWT (no user identity): `ctx.userId`\n stays undefined, so user/org/owner gates and the `AUTHENTICATED`/`USER`\n pseudo-roles all fail closed; only `scope:<kind>:<role>` gates admit it.\n- **`ctx.scope.<kind>.subjectId`** — a reserved claim carrying the proven subject\n row's PK, populated on **both** proof paths. Scope an attendee's self-data\n (travel, dietary, todos) with a single firewall arm\n (`{ field: 'guestId', equals: 'ctx.scope.event.subjectId' }`) that serves both a\n user-attendee and a sessionless one.\n- **Realtime** — the ws-ticket authorizes a scope-only principal directly off its\n proven `ctx.scope` claim, so accountless attendees join the same rooms with the\n same scope role. The `where:` filter runs on the mint probe, so a cancelled row\n confers nothing (revocation within one ≤180s mint cycle).\n\nSee [Scopes → Sessionless scope mint](/compiler/definitions/scopes#sessionless-scope-mint--ctxmintscope).\n\n### MCP OAuth: split authorization-server / resource-server (multi-app SSO)\n\nYou can now run one canonical authorization server with many resource servers (each\nhosting its own `/mcp`) over a shared auth DB:\n\n- A resource server that sets `agents.mcp.requireAuth` now emits the full OAuth\n access-token **verification** path on its own — previously the JWKS-verify block\n only emitted when the separate `auth.config.oauth.enabled` flag was set, so a\n requireAuth-only resource server fell back to HMAC + session and 401'd every valid\n externally-issued bearer.\n- Point a resource server at an external AS with `auth.config.oauth.issuerUrl`; the\n middleware verifies incoming bearers against the shared JWKS (`iss`/`aud`/`exp` +\n live-session binding).\n- `auth.config.oauth.audiences` (an array) registers federated resource-server\n audiences on the AS (RFC 8707). It now **unions** with the AS's own origin instead\n of replacing it, so listing federated servers never drops the AS's own `/mcp`\n audience. Also exposed on the plugin-form `oauthProvider.validAudiences`.\n\nSee [Agents → Split authorization server](/compiler/config/agents#split-authorization-server--resource-server-multi-app-sso).\n\n### MCP tools: callable path params + typed input schemas\n\nAn action mounted under a path that carries a parameter — a namespace prefix like\n`/scope/:scopeId/...`, or any `path:` with `:params` — now produces a fully\ncallable MCP tool:\n\n- The mounted route's path params are extracted into the tool's `inputSchema`\n (and `_pathParams`), so the model has a field to supply each one. Previously\n only record-based actions emitted a param (the hard-coded `id`); a standalone\n or namespace path param was absent from the schema, the URL resolved with an\n empty segment, and the action was uncallable over MCP.\n- Standalone routes are stored in Hono colon form (`:scopeId`); the OpenAPI spec\n key (and therefore the tool's `_path`) is now normalized to brace form\n (`{scopeId}`) so the runtime's brace-only path interpolation can fill it.\n\nAction `input` schemas also lower to richer JSON Schema instead of a phantom\nempty `{}`: `z.coerce.*`, `z.literal`, unions of literals, and **nested\n`z.object`** (child keys stay nested) now emit their real types, so the model —\nand the OpenAPI spec — see the actual field shapes. See\n[Agents → MCP tools](/compiler/config/agents).\n\n### Scaffold surfaces MCP/OAuth + secrets opt-ins\n\n`quickback create` now seeds the generated `quickback.config.ts` with curated,\ncommented-out hints for the authenticated MCP server (`agents.mcp.requireAuth`), the\nsplit-AS `oauth.issuerUrl`/`audiences`, and `bindings.secrets` — so these opt-ins are\ndiscoverable in the config itself, not only in the docs.\n\n### Custom secrets via `bindings.secrets`\n\nDeclare a custom secret your feature/action code reads off `env` — name and\ncontract only, never the value:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n secrets: [\n { name: \"WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET\", description: \"HMAC for webhook callbacks\", required: true },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nIt's emitted into the generated `env.d.ts` `Env` interface so `env.\n</Button>\n```\n\n`ResponsiveModal` survived the migration unchanged — it composes the higher-level Dialog + Drawer wrappers (preserved public API), not the underlying primitives.\n\n#### Caller-side API changes worth noting\n\nBase-ui ships some real behavioural changes the Radix variants didn't:\n\n- `<Select onValueChange>` now receives `(value: string | null, eventDetails) => void` (was `(value: string) => void`). Existing `Dispatch<SetStateAction<string>>` setters reject `null` — wrap callbacks defensively: `onValueChange={(v) => v != null && setX(v)}`.\n- `<DropdownMenuContent forceMount>` removed (base-ui has no `forceMount`). Use base-ui's `keepMounted` on the Popup/Positioner if you need to preserve unmounted state.\n- Component sub-names shifted (`Dialog.Content` → `Dialog.Popup`, `Dialog.Overlay` → `Dialog.Backdrop`). Data attributes are now `data-open` / `data-closed` (no more `data-state=\"open\"`).\n\n#### Adding a new primitive after this release\n\n```bash\ncd packages/ui\npnpm dlx shadcn@latest add <component> --overwrite --yes\n# Sweep generated `@/` imports to relative paths — the SPAs' vite-tsconfig-paths\n# plugin doesn't see packages/ui's @/* mapping at bundle time:\nsed -i.bak \\\n -e 's|\"@/lib/utils\"|\"../lib/utils\"|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/components/|\"./|g' \\\n -e 's|\"@/hooks/|\"../hooks/|g' \\\n components/<component>.tsx && rm components/<component>.tsx.bak\n```\n\nIf the new primitive pulls in fresh deps, mirror them into `apps/compiler/deps-spa-{cms,account}-package.json` per the SPA build pipeline or Docker SPA builds will fail.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.1 — May 18, 2026\n\n### Account SPA — teams, active-team picker, permission-aware UI\n\nThe Account SPA's organization surface is now feature-parity with Better Auth's `organization` plugin for the basic team workflow, and replaces the long-standing hardcoded `role === 'owner' || 'admin'` checks with `checkRolePermission` so projects that ship custom roles get a UI that respects them.\n\n#### Teams (opt-in)\n\nWhen the BA config enables teams — `organization({ teams: { enabled: true } })` — the compiler emits `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true` and the Account SPA exposes a Teams tab on each organization:\n\n- **Teams index** (`/$slug/teams`) — splits into \"Your teams\" (from `listUserTeams`) and \"Other teams\" so non-admins land on what's relevant. Create / rename / delete from the list, gated on `team:create` / `team:update` / `team:delete`.\n- **Team detail** (`/$slug/teams/$teamId`) — member roster with add / remove, joining `listTeamMembers` against the org's full member list for display.\n- **Active-team picker** in the org header — calls `setActiveTeam` and exposes the choice via `OrganizationContext.activeTeamId` so downstream routes (and the BA `session.activeTeamId` server-side) stay in sync.\n- **Team-aware invites** — `InviteMemberDialog` shows an optional team picker when teams are on and forwards `teamId` to `inviteMember`, so accepting the invite drops the new member straight into the right team.\n\nTeams are loaded once by the `$slug` layout (`listTeams` + `listUserTeams`) and exposed via `OrganizationContext.teams` / `userTeamIds` / `refreshTeams`, so individual team routes don't re-fetch the list.\n\n#### Permission-aware UI via `checkRolePermission`\n\n`OrganizationContext.isOwnerOrAdmin` is gone. Routes now read `can(resource, action)` from context, which delegates to `authClient.organization.checkRolePermission` — synchronous, no roundtrip, and aware of any custom roles registered via the BA `ac` option. Multi-role users (BA stores multiple roles comma-separated) are handled by checking each role; the action is allowed if any role grants it.\n\nMigrated sites:\n\n- `$slug.tsx` tab gates → `can('invitation', 'create')`, `can('organization', 'update')`\n- `members.tsx` action menu → `can('member', 'update' | 'delete')`; the owner-hierarchy guard (non-owners can't touch owner-role members) is preserved as a client-side mirror of BA's server enforcement\n- `invitations.tsx` → `can('invitation', 'create' | 'cancel')` gates the Invite button, resend, and cancel separately\n- `settings.tsx` → `can('organization', 'update')` for the form, `can('organization', 'delete')` for the danger zone (was owner-only)\n- `teams.tsx` / `teams.$teamId.tsx` → `can('team', 'create' | 'update' | 'delete')`\n\nProjects on the default three-role hierarchy see no behaviour change; projects that defined `admin`/`member` overrides via BA's access-control API now get a UI that matches what the server will actually authorize.\n\n#### Editable slug + metadata on organization settings\n\nThe `$slug/settings.tsx` form now edits two more `organization.update` fields:\n\n- **URL slug** — full debounced `checkSlug` flow (mirroring the create-org form); on rename, the SPA navigates to `/${newSlug}/settings` and the layout re-fetches with the new slug.\n- **Metadata** — single `Record<string, any> | null` JSON textarea, parsed on submit with inline error messaging. Empty clears the field.\n\nSlug rename is non-breaking for the SPA itself, but every external link / bookmark that references the old slug becomes a 404 — the form warns about this before saving.\n\n#### Auth client wiring\n\nWhen `VITE_ENABLE_ORG_TEAMS=true`, the SPA's `organizationClient(...)` is instantiated with `teams: { enabled: true }` so the team APIs are typed end-to-end. When the flag is off, team methods aren't surfaced — and the Teams tab is hidden — keeping the bundle and UI honest about what the server actually supports.\n\n---\n\n## v0.18.0 — May 17, 2026\n\n### `config.apps` — mount user-authored SPAs on dedicated hostnames\n\nThe compiler now generates per-hostname Worker middleware for arbitrary user SPAs alongside the built-in CMS and Account UIs. Previously the only way to host a product app next to a Quickback API was a second Worker; `config.apps` brings the full stack — API, account, and product UI — onto one deployment with same-origin auth.\n\n```ts\napps: {\n www: {\n domain: \"www.example.com\",\n aliasDomains: [\"example.com\"], // apex serves the same SPA\n },\n}\n```\n\nEach entry binds one or more hostnames to a directory under `src/apps/<name>/` and inherits the Account-domain pass-through behavior — `/api/`, `/auth/`, `/admin/`, `/storage/`, and `/health` route to Hono so the SPA fetches its API without CORS. The compiler:\n\n- emits a `custom_domain = true` route in `wrangler.toml` for the primary hostname and every alias\n- adds each hostname to Better Auth's `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` (when `trustedOrigins` is left unset)\n- widens the CSP `connect-src` to cover the SPA-baked origins\n- folds the new hostnames into shared-parent detection for `crossSubDomainCookies`\n\nDrop the prebuilt SPA bundle at `quickback/apps/<name>/` — the existing source-apps passthrough copies it byte-for-byte into `src/apps/<name>/`. The compiler doesn't build the SPA; it only emits routing for whatever's already there. The names `cms`, `account`, and `public` are reserved; hostname collisions with `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `account.adminDomain` or between two `apps[*]` entries fail at compile time.\n\nWhen `cms` and `account` are both configured, the multi-domain catchall now explicitly skips app hostnames — an API miss on an app host returns the standard 404 JSON via `app.notFound` instead of stray-serving a sibling SPA's HTML shell.\n\n### Cross-subdomain cookie inference handles apex aliases\n\nThe shared-parent detection that drives `advanced.crossSubDomainCookies` previously reduced any hostname by stripping the leftmost label — `'example.com'` collapsed to `'com'`, which broke equality against sibling subdomains. Apex hostnames (exactly two dot-segments) are now treated as already being the parent, so apex aliases (`example.com` listed alongside `www.example.com`) coexist cleanly with `auth.example.com` / `cms.example.com` and the compiler still emits `crossSubDomainCookies: { enabled: true, domain: '.example.com' }`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.2 — May 15, 2026\n\n### `customPlugins` escape hatch on `defineAuth(\"better-auth\", …)`\n\nThe Better Auth provider now accepts `customPlugins` alongside the named-plugin registry — a path to ship third-party plugins (`@better-auth-kit/audit`, …), unregistered built-ins, or one-off project-local plugins without forking the compiler.\n\nEach entry is an explicit import descriptor:\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: { passkey: true, organization: true },\n customPlugins: [\n // (1) Project-local plugin file at quickback/plugins/long-session.ts\n { from: \"./plugins/long-session\", export: \"longSessionPlugin\" },\n // (2) Third-party npm package\n {\n from: \"@better-auth-kit/audit\",\n export: \"auditPlugin\",\n args: { events: [\"sign-in\"] },\n dependencies: { \"@better-auth-kit/audit\": \"^1.0.0\" },\n },\n ],\n}),\n```\n\n`from` is either a relative path under `./plugins/` (the CLI auto-uploads matching files from `quickback/plugins/`; the compiler copies them into `src/plugins/<name>.ts` and rewrites the emitted import) or a bare npm specifier (emitted verbatim; declare `dependencies` so the package lands in the generated `package.json`). Omit `args` to emit the symbol uncalled (plugin instance); provide `args` to emit a JSON-serialized factory call.\n\nThe descriptor is validated with Zod — typos in `from`/`export`, paths that escape `./plugins/`, and references to files the CLI didn't ship all fail at compile time with a targeted message.\n\n---\n\n## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026\n\n### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding\n\n```bash\nmkdir my-app && cd my-app\nnpx @quickback-dev/cli start\n```\n\n`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.\n\nThe same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.\n\n### Named views on the free tier\n\nThe `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.\n\n### `quickback init` removed\n\nFolded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.\n\n### Minor\n\n- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.\n- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.\n- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026\n\n### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations\n\nThe `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026\n\n### Resource-scoped realtime tickets\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:\n\n```ts\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.\n\n### Unified broadcast targeting\n\nThe realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:\n\n```ts\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, { scopeKey: \"events:evt_123\" });\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, { userId: recipientId });\n```\n\nWebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026\n\n### One auth transport per request\n\nGenerated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.\n\n### Cookie-backed CSRF gate\n\nGenerated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.\n\n### First-class Wrangler observability\n\n`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Bearer wins over cookie\n\nA request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.\n\n### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`\n\nBetter Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.\n\nSee [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Flat write DSL\n\nResource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:\n\n```ts\ndefineTable(customers, {\n read: { ... },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] }, mode: \"soft\" },\n upsert: { access: { roles: [\"admin\"] } },\n guards: { ... },\n});\n```\n\n`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.\n\n### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions\n\nStandalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:\n\n- `cms.placement: \"feature\"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature\n- `cms.placement: \"tables\"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables\n- `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only\n\nFeature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.\n\n### `openapi.types` accepts a string array\n\nOne compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:\n\n```ts\nopenapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }\n```\n\n### Stable artifact ordering\n\nGenerated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026\n\n### Drizzle snapshot integrity\n\nDrizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.\n\n### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA\n\nThe Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:\n\n- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)\n- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`\n- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`\n- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions\n\nThe SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.\n\n**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Standalone action mount order\n\nFeature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `\"today-bundle\"` as a record ID.\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization\n\nWorker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.\n\n### `account.customLogin`\n\nSet `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.\n\n### Project-level realtime defaults\n\n`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.\n\n### Compile-time validators\n\nTwo new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:\n\n- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).\n- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.\n\n### Drizzle metadata hardening\n\nDrizzle journal files carry a \"do not edit\" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).\n\n### Minor\n\n- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.\n- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.\n- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026\n\n### Agent Auth Protocol\n\nQuickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.\n\n**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → \"session\"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → \"webauthn\"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.\n\n### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface\n\n`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).\n\n### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries\n\n`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.\n\nAuto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.\n\n### `queue-consumer.ts` gating\n\nThe queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.\n\n---\n\n## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Sysadmin tier for the CMS\n\nA new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.\n\nWhen enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.\n\nThe CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an \"All organizations\" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.\n\n### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved\n\nCloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.\n\n### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough\n\nAnything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.\n\n- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.\n- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.\n- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.\n- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.\n- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features\n\nFour surgical fixes to the generated output:\n\n- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.\n- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.\n- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.\n- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.\n\n### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only\n\n`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP transport correctness\n\nFour fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:\n\n- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.\n- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.\n- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.\n- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026\n\n### MCP environment threading\n\nThe generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026\n\n### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports\n\nThe relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-role table re-exports\n\nGenerated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved\n\nA new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:\n\n```ts\nbindings: {\n durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],\n durableObjectMigrations: [\n { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },\n ],\n}\n```\n\nAll four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`\n\nRecord-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.\n\n### Cross-tenant \"my events\" patterns\n\nThe access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).\n\n---\n\n## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026\n\n### Relationship-based authorization\n\nRoles can now be bound to a domain-table membership (\"user is a confirmed guest of this event\") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:\n\n```ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n roles: {\n guest: { via: 'guestOf' },\n eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },\n],\nread: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },\ncreate: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },\nupdate: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n```\n\nThe compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.\n\nSupported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).\n\nCross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.\n\nSee [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).\n\n### Bulk variants on record-based actions\n\n`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:\n\n```ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: { field: \"status\", via: \"nextStatus\", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n // exact same body — runs once per id\n },\n});\n```\n\nPer-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.\n\n### Aggregations on read views\n\nRead views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:\n\n```ts\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: [\"id\", \"jobId\", \"candidateId\", \"status\", \"appliedAt\"],\n aggregations: {\n totalApplications: { fn: \"count\" },\n byStatus: { fn: \"groupBy\", field: \"status\" },\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nAggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).\n\n---\n\n## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026\n\n### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored\n\nThe documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.\n\n### `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` allowed on writes and actions\n\n`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.\n\nCommon pattern: pair `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.\n\n---\n\n## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### Per-room authorization for PartyServer\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // Single-resource: roomId IS the chat row id.\n { name: 'Chat', className: 'Chat', from: 'lib/Chat',\n access: { resource: 'chats' } },\n\n // Multi-resource: regex dispatches kind → resource.\n { name: 'Notepad', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad',\n access: {\n roomId: { pattern: '^(day-note|interaction|record):([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$', kindGroup: 1, idGroup: 2 },\n resources: {\n 'day-note': { resource: 'day-notes' },\n 'interaction': { resource: 'interactions' },\n 'record': { resource: 'records' },\n },\n } },\n\n // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.\n { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',\n access: 'public' },\n]\n```\n\nThe gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026\n\n### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default\n\nThe `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API keys via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.\n\n**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.\n- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n\n`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects\n\n`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [{\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\",\n}]\n```\n\nDO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nUseful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed.\" Off by default.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate\n\n`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking \"Create one\" no longer loses their return URL.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.\n\nMost projects can write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.\n\nWhen a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` config\n\nThe bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n audience: 'partner-svc',\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',\n },\n}\n```\n\n### Admin MCP endpoints filtered\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.\n\n### Declarative `security` config\n\nEvery security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting.\n\nThe compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.\n\n### HSTS skipped on localhost\n\nGenerated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking defence on every Worker\n\nEvery Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered\n\nEach MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.\n\n- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.\n- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.\n\n`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit logging on Postgres targets\n\n`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.\n\n### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement\n\nProjects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = \"local-audit\"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.\n\n### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP\n\n`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.\n\n### OpenAPI fidelity\n\n- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`.\n- `id` claims `format: \"uuid\"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: \"string\" }`.\n\n### Minor\n\n- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.\n- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n---\n\n## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature\n\n### One file per action\n\nAction authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).\n- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.\n\nSee [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Multi-table actions per feature\n\nOne feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.\n- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.\n\nPlus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.\n\nAction names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.\n\n**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping\n\n`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\n`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.\n\nSee [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate\n\nThe three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted\n },\n}\n```\n\nA view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.\n\n**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### Unified `read:` pipeline\n\nThe read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`\n\n### Pre-record access ordering\n\nHandlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row exists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n### Transactional batch operations\n\nBatch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.\n\nEmbedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.\n\nSee [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Hono CVE bump\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta\n\nQuickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Dependency sweep\n\n`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### `userRole` access primitive\n\nA new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Org owner OR platform admin\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### CMS admin gate enforced server-side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.\n\n### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility\n\nGenerated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### `generateId: \"short\"` strategy\n\nA compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { generateId: \"short\" }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`\n\nA single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:\n\n```bash\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix\n\nDefine a hierarchy and use `+` to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\nauth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }\n\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\nNon-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).\n\n**Action required:**\n- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.\n- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.\n\n### CMS access control\n\n`cms.access: \"admin\"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail\n\nStructured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.\n\nCompile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).\n\n### Security contract report artifacts\n\nGenerated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.\n\n### Headless Drizzle rename hints\n\n`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).\n\n### Minor\n\n- Email OTP magic links work correctly.\n- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.\n- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### Quickback CMS\n\nA schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped database for actions\n\nActions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nDuck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nEvery action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).\n\n### Cascading soft delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.\n\nRules:\n- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).\n\nSee [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).\n\n### Advanced query parameters\n\nNew capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\nSee [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### OpenAPI spec generation\n\nGenerated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.\n\n### Better Auth plugins\n\nPublished `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).\n\n### Security headers\n\nGlobal error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\nPre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.\n\n### Webhook system\n\nInbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.\n\n### Realtime & vector search\n\nDurable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.\n- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.\n- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.\n- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.\n- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.\n- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.\n- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features)."
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- "content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\nThe Quickback Stack is **Cloudflare-only**. `cloudflare` is the single supported runtime.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n### Runtime Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `compatibilityDate` | `string` | Emits Cloudflare `compatibility_date` in `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `placement.mode` | `\"smart\" \\| \"standard\"` | Emits Cloudflare's `[placement]` block. |\n| `observability.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits top-level Workers Logs persistence under `[observability]`. |\n| `observability.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Top-level Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.logs]`. |\n| `observability.logs.invocationLogs` | `boolean` | Enables or suppresses invocation logs. |\n| `observability.logs.destinations` | `string[]` | Named log export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.logs.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported logs in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `observability.traces.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.traces]`. |\n| `observability.traces.destinations` | `string[]` | Named trace export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.traces.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Traces sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.traces.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported traces in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `routes` | `{ pattern, custom_domain? }[]` | Custom domain routes for the generated Worker. |\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\", {\n compatibilityDate: \"2026-05-13\",\n placement: { mode: \"smart\" },\n observability: {\n enabled: true,\n logs: {\n enabled: true,\n invocationLogs: false,\n destinations: [\"logs-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.6,\n },\n traces: {\n enabled: true,\n destinations: [\"otel-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.05,\n persist: false,\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\nTwo databases are supported, both Cloudflare-native:\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite at the edge) |\n| `neon` | Neon (PostgreSQL over Hyperdrive) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `experimentalRemote` | `{ auth?, features?, audit?, webhooks?, files? }` | `{}` | Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag for `wrangler dev` (see [below](#sharing-deployed-d1-in-dev-experimental_remote)) |\n| `realtime` | `boolean \\| { enabled?, wsTicket? }` | `false` | Enables the Broadcaster Durable Object and optional resource-scoped ws-ticket auth (see [below](#realtime-broadcast-config)) |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n#### Sharing deployed D1 in dev (`experimental_remote`)\n\nWrangler can read or write the **deployed** D1 for a specific binding while `wrangler dev` runs locally. A common workflow: share the production auth DB in dev so real sessions and users work against the running local Worker, while feature writes stay sandboxed in the local SQLite shadow.\n\nQuickback regenerates `wrangler.toml` on every compile, so flags like `experimental_remote = true` need to live in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys map to logical bindings, not the runtime binding string:\n\n| Key | Binding affected |\n|-----|------------------|\n| `auth` | `AUTH_DB` (also applied to the files worker's auth binding) |\n| `features` | `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding when `splitDatabases: false`) |\n| `audit` | `AUDIT_DB` |\n| `webhooks` | `WEBHOOKS_DB` |\n| `files` | `FILES_DB` (also applied to the files worker) |\n\nOnly `true` flips the flag on; `false` or omitted leaves the binding local. Off by default — only enable against databases you intend to share.\n\n#### Realtime Broadcast Config\n\nSet `realtime: true` to enable the generated Broadcaster Durable Object with the default organization-scoped routing model:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: true,\n }),\n}\n```\n\nFor relationship-authorized resource scopes, use the object form:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n`wsTicket` tells the compiler how to authorize `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` and what scope to stamp into the short-lived websocket ticket:\n\n- `role`: an authz role declared under `authz.roles` that uses a direct relationship (`{ via: \"...\" }`)\n- `requestField`: the JSON body field the client posts to `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket`\n- `scopeTable`: the parent resource table that defines the broadcast scope key\n\nIn other words: the relationship table proves access, and the `scopeTable` row defines the channel. For an attendee flow, `guests` (or RSVP) would be the relationship evidence and `events` would be the `scopeTable`.\n\nQuickback keeps Better Auth as the front door, then mints its own 60-second websocket ticket after the authz check succeeds. The generated `createRealtime()` helper and Broadcaster share the same targeting model:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nSee [Realtime](/stack/realtime) for the client-side connection flow and helper examples.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins (default) |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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+ "content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\nThe Quickback Stack is **Cloudflare-only**. `cloudflare` is the single supported runtime.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n### Runtime Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `compatibilityDate` | `string` | Emits Cloudflare `compatibility_date` in `wrangler.toml`. |\n| `placement.mode` | `\"smart\" \\| \"standard\"` | Emits Cloudflare's `[placement]` block. |\n| `observability.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits top-level Workers Logs persistence under `[observability]`. |\n| `observability.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Top-level Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.logs]`. |\n| `observability.logs.invocationLogs` | `boolean` | Enables or suppresses invocation logs. |\n| `observability.logs.destinations` | `string[]` | Named log export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.logs.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Logs sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.logs.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported logs in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `observability.traces.enabled` | `boolean` | Emits `[observability.traces]`. |\n| `observability.traces.destinations` | `string[]` | Named trace export destinations configured in Cloudflare. |\n| `observability.traces.headSamplingRate` | `number` | Workers Traces sample rate from `0` to `1`. |\n| `observability.traces.persist` | `boolean` | Keeps exported traces in the Cloudflare dashboard. |\n| `routes` | `{ pattern, custom_domain? }[]` | Custom domain routes for the generated Worker. |\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\", {\n compatibilityDate: \"2026-05-13\",\n placement: { mode: \"smart\" },\n observability: {\n enabled: true,\n logs: {\n enabled: true,\n invocationLogs: false,\n destinations: [\"logs-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.6,\n },\n traces: {\n enabled: true,\n destinations: [\"otel-prod\"],\n headSamplingRate: 0.05,\n persist: false,\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\nTwo databases are supported, both Cloudflare-native:\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite at the edge) |\n| `neon` | Neon serverless PostgreSQL (`@neondatabase/serverless` over HTTP) |\n\nOne database provider per app: auth tables and feature tables always share the\nselected database. On `neon`, Better Auth uses its PostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter\nin the same Postgres database as your features; on `cloudflare-d1`, both use\nD1. A per-service map (`database: { auth: ..., features: ... }`) is rejected at\ncompile time — mixed database providers are not supported.\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\nOptions from `splitDatabases` down apply to `cloudflare-d1` only — Neon uses a\nsingle Postgres database with no bindings or split mode (see\n[Neon options](#neon-options) below).\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases (D1 only) |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `experimentalRemote` | `{ auth?, features?, audit?, webhooks?, files? }` | `{}` | Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag for `wrangler dev` (see [below](#sharing-deployed-d1-in-dev-experimental_remote)) |\n| `realtime` | `boolean \\| { enabled?, wsTicket? }` | `false` | Enables the Broadcaster Durable Object and optional resource-scoped ws-ticket auth (see [below](#realtime-broadcast-config)) |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Neon Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `connectionMode` | `\"auto\" \\| \"http\" \\| \"websocket\"` | `\"auto\"` | How the generated runtime connects (`auto` detects the runtime) |\n| `pooled` | `boolean` | `true` | Use the pooled Neon connection string (recommended for Workers) |\n\nThe Worker connects through a single `DATABASE_URL` secret — auth and feature\nqueries share it. See [Neon](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon) for\nconnection modes, RLS, and the migration workflow.\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n#### Sharing deployed D1 in dev (`experimental_remote`)\n\nWrangler can read or write the **deployed** D1 for a specific binding while `wrangler dev` runs locally. A common workflow: share the production auth DB in dev so real sessions and users work against the running local Worker, while feature writes stay sandboxed in the local SQLite shadow.\n\nQuickback regenerates `wrangler.toml` on every compile, so flags like `experimental_remote = true` need to live in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys map to logical bindings, not the runtime binding string:\n\n| Key | Binding affected |\n|-----|------------------|\n| `auth` | `AUTH_DB` (also applied to the files worker's auth binding) |\n| `features` | `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding when `splitDatabases: false`) |\n| `audit` | `AUDIT_DB` |\n| `webhooks` | `WEBHOOKS_DB` |\n| `files` | `FILES_DB` (also applied to the files worker) |\n\nOnly `true` flips the flag on; `false` or omitted leaves the binding local. Off by default — only enable against databases you intend to share.\n\n#### Realtime Broadcast Config\n\nSet `realtime: true` to enable the generated Broadcaster Durable Object with the default organization-scoped routing model:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: true,\n }),\n}\n```\n\nFor relationship-authorized resource scopes, use the object form:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n`wsTicket` tells the compiler how to authorize `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` and what scope to stamp into the short-lived websocket ticket:\n\n- `role`: an authz role declared under `authz.roles` that uses a direct relationship (`{ via: \"...\" }`)\n- `requestField`: the JSON body field the client posts to `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket`\n- `scopeTable`: the parent resource table that defines the broadcast scope key\n\nIn other words: the relationship table proves access, and the `scopeTable` row defines the channel. For an attendee flow, `guests` (or RSVP) would be the relationship evidence and `events` would be the `scopeTable`.\n\nQuickback keeps Better Auth as the front door, then mints its own 60-second websocket ticket after the authz check succeeds. The generated `createRealtime()` helper and Broadcaster share the same targeting model:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nSee [Realtime](/stack/realtime) for the client-side connection flow and helper examples.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins (default) |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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  "title": "Actions",
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- "content": "Actions are custom API endpoints for business logic beyond CRUD operations. They enable workflows, integrations, and complex operations.\n\n## Overview\n\nQuickback supports two types of actions:\n\n| Aspect | Record-Based | Standalone |\n|--------|--------------|------------|\n| Route | `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}` | Custom `path` (required) |\n| Record fetching | Automatic | None (`record` is `undefined`) |\n| Firewall applied | Yes | No |\n| Preconditions | Supported via `access.record` | Not applicable |\n| Response types | JSON only | JSON, stream, file |\n| Use case | Advance application, reject candidate | AI chat, bulk import from job board, webhooks |\n\nStandalone actions are signalled by the presence of a `path:` field in the action config. Record-based actions omit `path` and bind to the feature's primary table.\n\n## Where do actions live?\n\n**One file per action.** Each action is its own module under the feature's\n`actions/` directory:\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts ← defineTable (primary table)\n├── candidates.ts ← defineTable (sibling table)\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── reject.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── stats.ts ← defineAction, standalone (has `path:`)\n│ └── candidates/\n│ └── disqualify.ts ← defineAction, binds to candidates\n└── lib/\n └── inputs.ts ← shared schemas (optional, copied verbatim)\n```\n\n| Layout | Binds to |\n|--------|----------|\n| `actions/<name>.ts` | The feature's primary table (table file matching the feature name), or standalone if `path:` is set. |\n| `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` | The sibling table file `<table>.ts` at the feature root. Standalone actions inside a subdir ignore the binding. |\n\nThe action's filename (sans `.ts`) is the action name and the URL segment.\nUniqueness is enforced per `(bound table, name)` pair — sibling-bound\nactions on **different** tables may share a verb (`actions/episodes/publish.ts`\nand `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and\n`/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly). The compiler errors only when\ntwo action files would mount at the same URL — for example, a flat\n`actions/foo.ts` (binds to primary) plus `actions/<primary>/foo.ts`, or\ntwo standalones with the same `(method, path)`. Standalone actions are\nunique per `(method, path)`.\n\nTableless features have no top-level `*.ts` files; every action under\n`actions/` must be standalone (have `path:`). Use this for utility endpoints\nlike webhooks, reports, or integrations that don't operate on a specific\nrecord.\n\n### Retired layouts\n\nThese are rejected at load time with migration guidance:\n\n- **`actions.ts`** (bundled multi-action file)\n- **`_feature.ts`** (shared schemas + non-table-bound actions)\n- **`handlers/`** (separate handler-file directory)\n- **`defineActions(table, {...})`** (the multi-action factory)\n- **`defineActions(null, {...})`** (tableless variant)\n- **`*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts`** filename patterns\n\nFor shared Zod schemas or helpers, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import\nfrom each action file. Files under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the\ngenerated output.\n\n## Defining Actions\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n> **`defineAction` import.** Import from `\"../.quickback/define-action\"` —\n> the `.quickback/` directory is generated alongside your feature with a\n> typed helper that infers `record` and `input` types from the rest of the\n> action config. Audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`,\n> `modifiedBy`) are hard-stamped by the audit DB wrapper on every\n> `db.insert().values()` and `db.update().set()` — handlers don't pass\n> them and can't override them.\n\n### Configuration Options\n\n| Option | Required | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `description` | Yes | Human-readable description of the action |\n| `input` | Yes | Zod schema for request validation |\n| `access` | Yes | Access control (roles, record conditions, or function) |\n| `execute` | Yes | Inline async arrow function (`async (ctx) => { … }`) |\n| `path` | Standalone only | Custom route path. Presence of `path` makes the action standalone. |\n| `method` | No | HTTP method: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE (default: POST). GET actions parse `input` from query params; all other methods parse from the JSON body. See [GET vs POST for input](#get-vs-post-for-input). |\n| `responseType` | No | Response format: json, stream, file (default: json) |\n| `sideEffects` | No | Hint for AI tools: `'sync'`, `'async'`, or `'fire-and-forget'` |\n| `allowRawSql` | No | Explicit compile-time opt-in for raw SQL in execute code |\n| `unsafe` | No | Unsafe raw DB mode. Object config (`reason`, `adminOnly`, `crossTenant`, `targetScope`). |\n| `transition` | No | State-machine policy enforcing the from/to pair (record-based actions). See [Transitions](#transition-state-machine-policy) |\n| `bulkVariant` | No | Auto-generate a `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` route alongside the per-record route (record-based actions). See [Bulk Variant](#bulk-variant) |\n| `cms` | No | Pass-through metadata blob for CMS surfaces |\n\n`execute` must be an `async (ctx) => { … }` arrow function. `async function`\ndeclarations and non-async forms are rejected at parse time.\n\n## Record-Based Actions\n\nRecord-based actions operate on an existing record. The record is automatically loaded and validated before your action executes.\n\n**Route pattern:** `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}`\n\n```\nPOST /applications/:id/advance\nPOST /applications/:id/reject\nPOST /applications/:id/schedule-interview\n```\n\n### Runtime Flow\n\n1. **Authentication** - User token is validated\n2. **Input Validation** - Request body validated against Zod schema\n3. **Role Gate** - The access roles are checked *before* the record is\n fetched (v0.46+), so a wrong-role caller gets a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED` whether or not the record exists — the\n response can't be used to probe for record ids\n4. **Record Loading** - The record is fetched by ID **through the firewall**\n (a cross-tenant or missing id is a standard firewall miss)\n5. **Access Check** - Record preconditions (`access.record`) and transition\n policy are validated against the loaded record\n6. **Execution** - Your action handler runs\n7. **Response** - Result is returned to client\n\n### Example: Advance Application Stage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move application to the next pipeline stage\",\n input: z.object({\n stage: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\", \"hired\"]),\n notes: z.string().optional(),\n }),\n access: {\n roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n record: { stage: { notEquals: \"rejected\" } },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n stage: input.stage,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(eq(applications.id, record.id))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Request Example\n\n```\nPOST /applications/app_123/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n}\n```\n\n### Response Example\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Bulk variant\n\nSet `bulkVariant: true` to auto-generate a bulk version of the action at\n`POST /:resource/batch/{action}`. The compiler emits a second route alongside\nthe per-record one, looping the same access + transition + execute pipeline\nover an array of ids. This is the answer to \"I need to advance 50\napplications at once\" — you don't have to hand-roll a parallel standalone\naction that duplicates the per-record logic.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({ status: input.nextStatus })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n if (!updated) throw new TransitionLostError(\"status\", record.status, input.nextStatus);\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Request shape:**\n\n```http\nPOST /applications/batch/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_001\", \"app_002\", \"app_003\"],\n \"input\": { \"nextStatus\": \"interview\" },\n \"failFast\": false\n}\n```\n\nThe `input` is shared across the batch — the action's Zod schema is\nvalidated once, not per id. For per-record input variation, use the\nsingle-record endpoint (`POST /:id/{action}`) or write a standalone action.\n\n**Response (207 Multi-Status when any record fails, 200 when clean):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [{ \"id\": \"app_001\", \"status\": \"interview\" }],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"id\": \"app_002\",\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current state\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": { \"field\": \"status\", \"currentValue\": \"rejected\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Per-record pipeline** mirrors the single-record route exactly — the same\nfirewall fetch, access reason split (403 vs 409), transition pre-check,\n`whereTransition` factory, and `TransitionLostError` handling. Per-record\nfailures land in `errors[]` with their original index; successful records\nland in `success[]` masked the same way the single-record response is.\n\n**Transactional matrix** (same as `PATCH /batch`):\n\n| Provider | failFast | transactional | Behavior |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| neon (Postgres via Hyperdrive) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any throw rolls back all writes |\n| (any) | `false` | `false` | Independent per-record outcomes, partial success |\n| cloudflare-d1 | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — earlier records stay committed (D1 has no `db.transaction`) |\n\n**Constraints:**\n\n- Record-based actions only. Standalone actions reject `bulkVariant: true`\n at compile time (no record context to loop over).\n- `unsafe` actions reject `bulkVariant: true` in v1 — the cross-tenant\n per-record audit story is not yet wired through.\n- Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting. The\n semantic asymmetry (one row → many rows) makes inheriting GET/DELETE\n confusing.\n- Max batch size is 100 ids per request.\n\n## Standalone Actions\n\nStandalone actions are independent endpoints that don't require a record context. Set a `path:` to declare the action standalone.\n\n**Route pattern:** Custom `path`\n\n```\nPOST /chat\nGET /reports/summary\nPOST /webhooks/stripe\n```\n\n### Example: AI Chat with Streaming\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/actions/chat.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Send a message to AI\",\n path: \"/chat\",\n method: \"POST\",\n responseType: \"stream\",\n input: z.object({\n message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n async execute({ input, c }) {\n // Stream response back to client...\n return c.newResponse(/* ReadableStream */);\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Streaming Response Example\n\nFor actions with `responseType: 'stream'`:\n\n```\nContent-Type: text/event-stream\n\ndata: {\"type\": \"start\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"Hello\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"! I'm\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \" here to help.\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"done\"}\n```\n\n### Tableless Features\n\nA feature directory with no top-level `*.ts` files is \"tableless\" — every\naction under `actions/` must be standalone. Use this for utility endpoints\nlike reports, integrations, or webhooks that don't map to a specific\nresource.\n\n```\nquickback/features/\n└── reports/\n └── actions/\n ├── trial-balance.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n └── profit-loss.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/reports/actions/trial-balance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate trial balance report\",\n path: \"/reports/trial-balance\",\n method: \"GET\",\n input: z.object({\n startDate: z.string(),\n endDate: z.string(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"accountant\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... build report\n return { rows: [] };\n },\n});\n```\n\n### GET vs POST for input\n\nGET actions read `input` from URL query parameters; every other method (POST,\nPUT, PATCH, DELETE) reads from the JSON body. The Zod schema is the same in\nboth cases — the compiler picks the right parser based on `method`.\n\n```typescript\n// GET — input populated from ?q=…&limit=…\ndefineAction({\n method: \"GET\",\n path: \"/search\",\n input: z.object({\n q: z.string(),\n limit: z.coerce.number().int().positive().max(100).default(20),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ input }) {\n // input is { q: string, limit: number } — fully typed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nRepeated query keys (`?tag=a&tag=b`) come through as arrays automatically;\nsingle values stay as strings. Use Zod's `.coerce.number()` /\n`.coerce.boolean()` when you want typed primitives from the parsed strings.\n\n**Use POST when input is structured.** GET requests cannot carry a JSON body\nin any of the surfaces Quickback APIs are commonly called from:\n\n- Browsers throw on `fetch(url, { method: 'GET', body })`.\n- CDNs and caches key on URL+method; a GET with a body either gets the body\n stripped at the edge or cache-collides with semantically different requests.\n- OpenAPI client generators (axios, openapi-fetch, openapi-typescript-codegen)\n refuse to emit GET-with-body, so the generated SDKs break.\n- The MCP agent surface treats GET as parameter-only — agents calling a GET\n action will only see what the URL exposes.\n\nIf your action takes nested objects, arrays of objects, or large inputs that\ndon't serialize cleanly to a query string, set `method: \"POST\"`. POST doesn't\nimply \"this writes data\" — it's the right method whenever the request body is\nload-bearing. Use the response shape (`responseType: \"json\"`, or just the data\nyour handler returns) to convey read semantics; HTTP method choice is about\ninput transport, not action intent.\n\n## Access Configuration\n\nAccess controls who can execute an action and under what conditions.\n\n### Role-Based Access\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] // OR logic: user needs any of these roles\n}\n```\n\n### Public Access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for unauthenticated endpoints (contact forms, webhooks, public APIs). Every invocation is **mandatory audit logged** with IP address, input, result, and timing.\n\n```typescript\n// features/contact/actions/submit.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Public contact form submission\",\n path: \"/submit\",\n input: z.object({\n name: z.string().min(1),\n email: z.string().email(),\n message: z.string().min(10),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... persist submission\n return { ok: true };\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe wildcard `\"*\"` is not supported and will throw a compile-time error. Use `\"PUBLIC\"` explicitly.\n\n### Record Conditions\n\nFor record-based actions, you can require the record to be in a specific state:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\"],\n record: {\n stage: { equals: \"screening\" } // Precondition\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Supported operators:**\n\n| Operator | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `equals` | Field must equal value |\n| `notEquals` | Field must not equal value |\n| `in` | Field must be one of the values |\n| `notIn` | Field must not be one of the values |\n\n### Context Substitution\n\nUse `$ctx` to reference the current user's context:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n record: {\n ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" },\n organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### OR/AND Combinations\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\"] },\n {\n roles: [\"recruiter\"],\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Function Access\n\nFor complex logic, use an access function:\n\n```typescript\naccess: async (ctx, record) => {\n return ctx.roles.includes('admin') || record.ownerId === ctx.userId;\n}\n```\n\n### Relationship-roles in actions\n\n**v0.19+** — standalone actions now support relationship-roles in `access.roles` directly. Declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` with optional `loads` / `exposeAs` for ctx hydration, and reference the role by name on the action:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n roles: { attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' } },\n}\n\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] },\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // The resolver already verified attendance and loaded ctx.event.\n // No hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` needed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe action's surface (path params + input fields) must expose the relationship's `resource.column`. At v0.19 a missing key emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission; at v0.20 it becomes a compile error. See [Access — standalone actions](/compiler/definitions/access#standalone-actions-surface-keys-and-loads--exposeas-v019) for the full mechanism.\n\n**Record-based actions** are NOT yet supported — the runtime evaluator fail-closes (403) on relationship arms reached without an inline gate. Until inline emission for record-based actions lands, either:\n\n- Set `firewall: { exception: true }` on the action and gate manually in `execute()`, OR\n- Apply the relationship at the resource's firewall layer (worked example below).\n\n**Resource-layer workaround for record-based actions**: gate the action on BA roles only and apply the relationship at the resource layer via a firewall `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts — firewall scopes rows; action gates on BA role\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row-level relationship check\n],\nactions: {\n comment: defineAction({\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, // ← BA role only on the action\n input: z.object({ text: z.string() }),\n execute: async (input, ctx, db, record) => {\n // record is already filtered by the firewall — guest membership\n // is enforced before this handler runs.\n return db.insert(comments).values({ ... });\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThis pattern composes cleanly: the firewall guarantees the caller has the relationship to the record being acted on; the action's access list keeps the role surface obvious.\n\nSee [Access — relationship authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization) for the full picture, including `loads` / `exposeAs` and the `firewall: { exception: true }` escape hatch.\n\n## Scoped Database\n\nAll actions receive a **scoped `db`** instance that automatically enforces security:\n\n| Operation | Org Scoping | Owner Scoping | Soft Delete Filter | Auto-inject on INSERT |\n|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|\n| `SELECT` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `INSERT` | n/a | n/a | n/a | `organizationId`, `ownerId` from ctx |\n| `UPDATE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `DELETE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n\nScoping is duck-typed at runtime — tables with an `organizationId` column get org scoping, tables with `ownerId` get owner scoping, tables with `deletedAt` get soft delete filtering.\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, ctx, input }) {\n // This query automatically includes WHERE organizationId = ? AND deletedAt IS NULL\n const items = await db.select().from(applications).where(eq(applications.stage, 'interview'));\n\n // Inserts automatically include organizationId\n await db.insert(applications).values({ candidateId: input.candidateId, jobId: input.jobId, stage: 'applied' });\n\n return items;\n}\n```\n\n**Not enforced** in scoped DB (by design):\n- **Guards** — actions ARE the authorized way to modify guarded fields\n- **Masking** — actions are backend code that may need raw data\n- **Access** — already checked before action execution\n\n### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.\n\nUse object form for explicit policy and mandatory audit metadata:\n\n```typescript\n// features/admin/actions/cross-tenant-report.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate cross-org hiring report\",\n path: \"/admin/cross-tenant-report\",\n input: z.object({ startDate: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n unsafe: {\n reason: \"Support investigation for enterprise customer\",\n adminOnly: true, // default true\n crossTenant: true, // default true\n targetScope: \"all\", // \"all\" | \"organization\"\n },\n async execute({ unsafeDb, input }) {\n // unsafeDb bypasses scoped filters\n const allOrgs = await unsafeDb.select().from(applications);\n return allOrgs;\n },\n});\n```\n\nUnsafe cross-tenant actions are generated with:\n\n- Better Auth authentication required (no unauthenticated path)\n- sysadmin gate (`ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`)\n- mandatory audit logging on deny/success/error\n\n`PUBLIC` actions also receive mandatory audit logging (same audit table), since unauthenticated endpoints are high-risk by nature.\n\nWithout unsafe mode, `unsafeDb` is `undefined` in the executor params.\n\n### Raw SQL Policy\n\nBy default, the compiler rejects raw SQL in action code. Use Drizzle query-builder syntax whenever possible.\n\nIf a specific action must use raw SQL, opt in explicitly:\n\n```typescript\n// features/ledgers/actions/reconcile.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Run custom reconciliation query\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n allowRawSql: true,\n async execute({ db }) {\n return db.execute(sql`select 1`);\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `allowRawSql: true`, compilation fails with a loud error pointing to the action and snippet.\n\nThe detector checks for SQL keywords in string arguments, so non-SQL method calls like `headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")` or `map.get(\"key\")` will not trigger false positives.\n\n## Sharing Code Between Actions\n\nFor Zod schemas, helpers, or constants used across multiple actions in a\nfeature, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import from each action file.\nFiles under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the generated output.\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts\n│ └── reject.ts\n└── lib/\n ├── inputs.ts ← shared Zod schemas\n └── transitions.ts ← state-machine helpers\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/lib/inputs.ts\n\nexport const advanceInput = z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move forward\",\n input: advanceInput,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n### Importing Tables\n\nAction files import tables from their own feature or other features. The compiler generates alias files for each table, so you import by the table's file name:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\n// Same feature — import from parent directory using the table's file name\n\n// Cross-feature — go up to the features directory, then into the other feature\n\n```\n\n**Path pattern from `features/{name}/actions/`:**\n- Same feature table: `../{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../applications`)\n- Other feature table: `../../{other-feature}/{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../../candidates/candidates`)\n- Generated lib files: `../../../lib/{module}` (e.g., `../../../lib/realtime`, `../../../lib/webhooks`)\n\n### Executor Parameters\n\n```typescript\n\ninterface ActionExecutorParams {\n db: DrizzleDB; // Scoped database (auto-applies org/owner/soft-delete filters)\n unsafeDb?: DrizzleDB; // Unscoped database (only available when unsafe mode is enabled)\n ctx: AppContext; // User context (userId, roles, activeOrgId, activeTeamId, userRole)\n record?: TRecord; // The record (record-based only, undefined for standalone)\n input: TInput; // Validated input from Zod schema\n services: TServices; // Configured integrations (billing, notifications, etc.)\n c: HonoContext; // Raw Hono context for advanced use\n env: Env; // Runtime bindings (Cloudflare env / process env). Alias for c.env.\n auth: Auth; // Better Auth instance — call auth.api.getSession(...) etc. Lazy on Cloudflare.\n whereRecord?: (table) => SQL; // Pre-built WHERE: firewall + soft-delete + eq(table.id, record.id). Record-based actions only.\n whereTransition?: (table) => SQL; // whereRecord plus the transition's \"from\" precondition. Transition actions only.\n}\n```\n\n#### `auth` — Better Auth instance\n\n`auth` is the Better Auth instance, ready to call from inside an action\nhandler. Use it for things like minting an OAuth access token, fetching the\ncurrent session in a custom way, or invoking a Better Auth plugin method\nthat isn't already exposed by the generated middleware.\n\n```typescript\n// features/integrations/actions/connect-google-drive.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Get a fresh Google Drive access token for the signed-in user\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ auth, ctx, c }) {\n // genericOAuth plugin method — needs a cast since the default-generic\n // `Auth` type doesn't carry plugin-specific API surface.\n const token = await (auth.api as any).getAccessToken({\n headers: c.req.raw.headers,\n body: { providerId: \"google\", userId: ctx.userId },\n });\n return { accessToken: token.accessToken };\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Lazy on Cloudflare**: the generated handler emits a `Proxy` so\n`createAuth(c.env, c.req.raw.cf)` only runs the first time you read a\nproperty on `auth`. Actions that never touch `auth` pay zero construction\ncost. On Bun/Node `auth` is the imported singleton (an IIFE that lazy-loads\nthe database adapter) wrapped in the same proxy shape — call sites are\nidentical across runtimes.\n\n**Typing**: `auth` is typed as `Auth` from `better-auth`. The base API\n(`getSession`, `signOut`, `signInEmail`, etc.) is fully typed. Plugin-only\nmethods (`getAccessToken` from `genericOAuth`, admin-plugin methods, etc.)\nneed a cast at the call site — the default-generic `Auth` doesn't infer\nthe project's specific plugin set.\n\n#### `whereRecord` — explicit, scope-safe WHERE\n\nFor protected-field writes inside record-based actions, prefer\n`whereRecord(table)` over `eq(table.id, record.id)`. It returns a Drizzle\nexpression that AND-merges the resource's firewall and soft-delete predicates\nwith the record id, so the WHERE is explicit even if a future refactor swaps\n`db` back to an unscoped client:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Advance\",\n input: /* … */,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereRecord }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereRecord!(applications)) // firewall + soft-delete + id, all in one\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe audit DB wrapper hard-stamps `modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every\n`.set()` call, so handlers don't write them. The same wrapper hard-stamps\n`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every `.values()`.\nCaller-supplied audit fields are dropped on the floor — the audit log\nalways reflects the real actor and the real moment.\n\n`whereRecord` is undefined for standalone actions (they have no record), so\nthe parameter is typed as optional. `whereTransition` extends `whereRecord`\nwith the transition's \"from\" precondition for transition actions.\n\n#### Reaching Better Auth tables (`authDb`)\n\nThe scoped `db` only sees your feature tables. To read Better Auth tables —\nusers, organizations, members — use the auth database connection from the\nHono context plus the generated `lib/org-access.ts` helper:\n\n```typescript\n// features/projects/actions/assign.ts — validate a userId is an org member\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Assign a project to an org member\",\n input: z.object({ assigneeId: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"member\", \"admin\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, ctx, c, whereRecord }) {\n // getOrgMemberRole(authDb, userId, organizationId) → role string | null\n const role = await getOrgMemberRole(c.get(\"authDb\"), input.assigneeId, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n if (!role) {\n throw new ActionError(\"Assignee is not a member of this organization\", \"NOT_A_MEMBER\", 400);\n }\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(projects)\n .set({ assigneeId: input.assigneeId })\n .where(whereRecord!(projects))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n`c.get(\"authDb\")` is the Drizzle connection to the auth database (in dual-DB\nmode it's a separate D1 from your features). For richer queries, import the\nauth schema tables from `../../../auth/schema` and query `authDb` directly.\n\n## HTTP API Reference\n\n### Request Format\n\n| Method | Input Source | Use Case |\n|--------|--------------|----------|\n| `GET` | Query parameters | Read-only operations, fetching data |\n| `POST` | JSON body | Default, state-changing operations |\n| `PUT` | JSON body | Full replacement operations |\n| `PATCH` | JSON body | Partial updates |\n| `DELETE` | JSON body | Deletion with optional payload |\n\n### Response Formats\n\n| Type | Content-Type | Use Case |\n|------|--------------|----------|\n| `json` | `application/json` | Standard API responses (default) |\n| `stream` | `text/event-stream` | Real-time streaming (AI chat, live updates) |\n| `file` | Varies | File downloads (reports, exports) |\n\n### Error Codes\n\n| Status | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `400` | Invalid input / validation error (also `GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED` for direct protected-field writes) |\n| `401` | Not authenticated |\n| `403` | Access role check failed (`ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`) |\n| `404` | Record not found (record-based actions) |\n| `409` | Record is in the wrong state for this action — `access.record` predicate or `transition` policy failed (`ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`) |\n| `500` | Handler execution error |\n\n### Validation Error Response\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Invalid request data\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"VALIDATION_FAILED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"fields\": {\n \"amount\": \"Expected positive number\"\n }\n },\n \"hint\": \"Check the input schema for this action\"\n}\n```\n\n### Error Handling\n\n**Option 1: Return a JSON error response** (recommended for most cases)\n\nSince action handlers receive the Hono context (`c`), you can return error responses directly:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input, c }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n return c.json({\n error: 'Cannot modify a hired application',\n code: 'ALREADY_HIRED',\n details: { currentStage: record.stage },\n }, 400);\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Throw an ActionError**\n\n```typescript\n\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n throw new ActionError('Cannot modify a hired application', 'ALREADY_HIRED', 400, {\n currentStage: record.stage,\n });\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\nThe `ActionError` constructor signature is `(message, code, statusCode = 400, details?)`. The compile step rewrites the `@quickback/compiler` import to the generated runtime class (`src/lib/types.ts`), and the route handler catches it by name and returns `{ error, code, details }` with your `statusCode`.\n\n## Protected Fields\n\nActions can modify fields that are protected from regular CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\n// In the table file (defineTable config)\nguards: {\n protected: {\n status: [\"advance\", \"reject\", \"hire\", \"withdraw\"], // Only these actions can modify status\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis allows the `advance` action to set `status = \"interview\"` even though the field is protected from regular PATCH requests. Direct `PATCH /:id` attempts to set `status` are rejected by the guards layer with **400 GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED**, and the field is omitted from the generated POST/PATCH body Zod schemas — clients cannot even send it past validation.\n\n## Transition (state-machine policy)\n\nFor protected fields that follow a state machine — application status, invoice\nlifecycle, order fulfilment — use `transition` on the action so the compiler\ngenerates a runtime guard that enforces the *from/to pair*, not just the\ncurrent state. Without it, an `advance` action whose input enum allows\n`[\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]` and whose `access.record` allows\n`status in [\"applied\", \"screening\", \"interview\"]` will happily run\n`applied → offer` (a skip) or `interview → screening` (a regression).\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\", // read target from input.nextStatus\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/hire.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Finalize an offer.\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n to: \"hired\", // fixed target — same value every call\n fromTo: { offer: [\"hired\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n| Field | Required | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| `field` | Yes | Record column to validate (e.g. `\"status\"`) |\n| `fromTo` | Yes | Map of current value → permitted next values. Keys also enumerate the legal source states. |\n| `via` | Yes (or `to`) | Input key that carries the target value. Use for variable-target actions like `advance`. |\n| `to` | Yes (or `via`) | Literal target value the action always writes. Use for fixed-target actions like `hire`/`reject`. |\n\nExactly one of `via` or `to` must be provided. The compiler rejects both at\nvalidate time. When `to` is set, it must appear in some `fromTo[*]` array —\notherwise the action would be unreachable, which is almost certainly a bug.\n\n### Wire-level errors\n\nThe compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`** with\nthe field, the current value, the requested target, and the allowed set:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current record state\",\n \"layer\": \"access\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": {\n \"field\": \"status\",\n \"current\": \"interview\",\n \"target\": \"screening\",\n \"allowedTargets\": [\"offer\"]\n },\n \"hint\": \"From \\\"interview\\\", status can transition to: offer\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is distinct from a role failure: if the caller has the wrong role they\nget **403 `ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`** as before. Splitting the two lets clients\ntell *\"you can't do this\"* from *\"you can't do this *yet*\"* — the latter is\nrecoverable by the user, the former isn't.\n\nThe same 409 code is used when an `access.record` predicate (without\n`transition`) fails — for example `record: { status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`\ncalled against a paid invoice now returns 409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`,\nnot a misleading 403.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Bulk Import (Standalone, No Record)\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/actions/bulk-import.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Import candidates from job board CSV\",\n path: \"/candidates/import\",\n input: z.object({\n data: z.array(z.object({\n email: z.string().email(),\n name: z.string(),\n })),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n const inserted = await db\n .insert(candidates)\n .values(input.data)\n .returning();\n return { imported: inserted.length };\n },\n});\n```"
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+ "content": "Actions are custom API endpoints for business logic beyond CRUD operations. They enable workflows, integrations, and complex operations.\n\n## Overview\n\nQuickback supports two types of actions:\n\n| Aspect | Record-Based | Standalone |\n|--------|--------------|------------|\n| Route | `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}` | Custom `path` (required) |\n| Record fetching | Automatic | None (`record` is `undefined`) |\n| Firewall applied | Yes | No |\n| Preconditions | Supported via `access.record` | Not applicable |\n| Response types | JSON only | JSON, stream, file |\n| Use case | Advance application, reject candidate | AI chat, bulk import from job board, webhooks |\n\nStandalone actions are signalled by the presence of a `path:` field in the action config. Record-based actions omit `path` and bind to the feature's primary table.\n\n## Where do actions live?\n\n**One file per action.** Each action is its own module under the feature's\n`actions/` directory:\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts ← defineTable (primary table)\n├── candidates.ts ← defineTable (sibling table)\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── reject.ts ← defineAction, binds to applications\n│ ├── stats.ts ← defineAction, standalone (has `path:`)\n│ └── candidates/\n│ └── disqualify.ts ← defineAction, binds to candidates\n└── lib/\n └── inputs.ts ← shared schemas (optional, copied verbatim)\n```\n\n| Layout | Binds to |\n|--------|----------|\n| `actions/<name>.ts` | The feature's primary table (table file matching the feature name), or standalone if `path:` is set. |\n| `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` | The sibling table file `<table>.ts` at the feature root. Standalone actions inside a subdir ignore the binding. |\n\nThe action's filename (sans `.ts`) is the action name and the URL segment.\nUniqueness is enforced per `(bound table, name)` pair — sibling-bound\nactions on **different** tables may share a verb (`actions/episodes/publish.ts`\nand `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and\n`/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly). The compiler errors only when\ntwo action files would mount at the same URL — for example, a flat\n`actions/foo.ts` (binds to primary) plus `actions/<primary>/foo.ts`, or\ntwo standalones with the same `(method, path)`. Standalone actions are\nunique per `(method, path)`.\n\nTableless features have no top-level `*.ts` files; every action under\n`actions/` must be standalone (have `path:`). Use this for utility endpoints\nlike webhooks, reports, or integrations that don't operate on a specific\nrecord.\n\n### Retired layouts\n\nThese are rejected at load time with migration guidance:\n\n- **`actions.ts`** (bundled multi-action file)\n- **`_feature.ts`** (shared schemas + non-table-bound actions)\n- **`handlers/`** (separate handler-file directory)\n- **`defineActions(table, {...})`** (the multi-action factory)\n- **`defineActions(null, {...})`** (tableless variant)\n- **`*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts`** filename patterns\n\nFor shared Zod schemas or helpers, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import\nfrom each action file. Files under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the\ngenerated output.\n\n## Defining Actions\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n> **`defineAction` import.** Import from `\"../.quickback/define-action\"` —\n> the `.quickback/` directory is generated alongside your feature with a\n> typed helper that infers `record` and `input` types from the rest of the\n> action config. Audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`,\n> `modifiedBy`) are hard-stamped by the audit DB wrapper on every\n> `db.insert().values()` and `db.update().set()` — handlers don't pass\n> them and can't override them.\n\n### Configuration Options\n\n| Option | Required | Description |\n|--------|----------|-------------|\n| `description` | Yes | Human-readable description of the action |\n| `input` | Yes | Zod schema for request validation |\n| `access` | Yes | Access control (roles, record conditions, or function) |\n| `execute` | Yes | Inline async arrow function (`async (ctx) => { … }`) |\n| `path` | Standalone only | Custom route path. Presence of `path` makes the action standalone. |\n| `method` | No | HTTP method: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE (default: POST). GET actions parse `input` from query params; all other methods parse from the JSON body. See [GET vs POST for input](#get-vs-post-for-input). |\n| `responseType` | No | Response format: json, stream, file (default: json) |\n| `sideEffects` | No | Hint for AI tools: `'sync'`, `'async'`, or `'fire-and-forget'` |\n| `allowRawSql` | No | Explicit compile-time opt-in for raw SQL in execute code |\n| `unsafe` | No | Unsafe raw DB mode. Object config (`reason`, `adminOnly`, `crossTenant`, `targetScope`). |\n| `transition` | No | State-machine policy enforcing the from/to pair (record-based actions). See [Transitions](#transition-state-machine-policy) |\n| `bulkVariant` | No | Auto-generate a `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` route alongside the per-record route (record-based actions). See [Bulk Variant](#bulk-variant) |\n| `cms` | No | Pass-through metadata blob for CMS surfaces |\n\n`execute` must be an `async (ctx) => { … }` arrow function. `async function`\ndeclarations and non-async forms are rejected at parse time.\n\n## Record-Based Actions\n\nRecord-based actions operate on an existing record. The record is automatically loaded and validated before your action executes.\n\n**Route pattern:** `{METHOD} /:id/{actionName}`\n\n```\nPOST /applications/:id/advance\nPOST /applications/:id/reject\nPOST /applications/:id/schedule-interview\n```\n\n### Runtime Flow\n\n1. **Authentication** - User token is validated\n2. **Input Validation** - Request body validated against Zod schema\n3. **Role Gate** - The access roles are checked *before* the record is\n fetched (v0.46+), so a wrong-role caller gets a uniform\n `403 ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED` whether or not the record exists — the\n response can't be used to probe for record ids\n4. **Record Loading** - The record is fetched by ID **through the firewall**\n (a cross-tenant or missing id is a standard firewall miss)\n5. **Access Check** - Record preconditions (`access.record`) and transition\n policy are validated against the loaded record\n6. **Execution** - Your action handler runs\n7. **Response** - Result is returned to client\n\n### Example: Advance Application Stage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move application to the next pipeline stage\",\n input: z.object({\n stage: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\", \"hired\"]),\n notes: z.string().optional(),\n }),\n access: {\n roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n record: { stage: { notEquals: \"rejected\" } },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n stage: input.stage,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(eq(applications.id, record.id))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Request Example\n\n```\nPOST /applications/app_123/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n}\n```\n\n### Response Example\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\",\n \"notes\": \"Strong technical background, moving to interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Bulk variant\n\nSet `bulkVariant: true` to auto-generate a bulk version of the action at\n`POST /:resource/batch/{action}`. The compiler emits a second route alongside\nthe per-record one, looping the same access + transition + execute pipeline\nover an array of ids. This is the answer to \"I need to advance 50\napplications at once\" — you don't have to hand-roll a parallel standalone\naction that duplicates the per-record logic.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n bulkVariant: true,\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({ status: input.nextStatus })\n .where(whereTransition!(applications))\n .returning();\n if (!updated) throw new TransitionLostError(\"status\", record.status, input.nextStatus);\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Request shape:**\n\n```http\nPOST /applications/batch/advance\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_001\", \"app_002\", \"app_003\"],\n \"input\": { \"nextStatus\": \"interview\" },\n \"failFast\": false\n}\n```\n\nThe `input` is shared across the batch — the action's Zod schema is\nvalidated once, not per id. For per-record input variation, use the\nsingle-record endpoint (`POST /:id/{action}`) or write a standalone action.\n\n**Response (207 Multi-Status when any record fails, 200 when clean):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [{ \"id\": \"app_001\", \"status\": \"interview\" }],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"id\": \"app_002\",\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current state\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": { \"field\": \"status\", \"currentValue\": \"rejected\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Per-record pipeline** mirrors the single-record route exactly — the same\nfirewall fetch, access reason split (403 vs 409), transition pre-check,\n`whereTransition` factory, and `TransitionLostError` handling. Per-record\nfailures land in `errors[]` with their original index; successful records\nland in `success[]` masked the same way the single-record response is.\n\n**Transactional matrix** (same as `PATCH /batch`):\n\n| Provider | failFast | transactional | Behavior |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| tx-supporting (postgres, neon over websocket) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any throw rolls back all writes |\n| (any) | `false` | `false` | Independent per-record outcomes, partial success |\n| cloudflare-d1, neon over http (Cloudflare default) | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — earlier records stay committed (the driver has no `db.transaction`; `drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws at runtime) |\n\n**Constraints:**\n\n- Record-based actions only. Standalone actions reject `bulkVariant: true`\n at compile time (no record context to loop over).\n- `unsafe` actions reject `bulkVariant: true` in v1 — the cross-tenant\n per-record audit story is not yet wired through.\n- Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting. The\n semantic asymmetry (one row → many rows) makes inheriting GET/DELETE\n confusing.\n- Max batch size is 100 ids per request.\n\n## Standalone Actions\n\nStandalone actions are independent endpoints that don't require a record context. Set a `path:` to declare the action standalone.\n\n**Route pattern:** Custom `path`\n\n```\nPOST /chat\nGET /reports/summary\nPOST /webhooks/stripe\n```\n\n### Example: AI Chat with Streaming\n\n```typescript\n// features/sessions/actions/chat.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Send a message to AI\",\n path: \"/chat\",\n method: \"POST\",\n responseType: \"stream\",\n input: z.object({\n message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n async execute({ input, c }) {\n // Stream response back to client...\n return c.newResponse(/* ReadableStream */);\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Streaming Response Example\n\nFor actions with `responseType: 'stream'`:\n\n```\nContent-Type: text/event-stream\n\ndata: {\"type\": \"start\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"Hello\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \"! I'm\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"chunk\", \"content\": \" here to help.\"}\ndata: {\"type\": \"done\"}\n```\n\n### Tableless Features\n\nA feature directory with no top-level `*.ts` files is \"tableless\" — every\naction under `actions/` must be standalone. Use this for utility endpoints\nlike reports, integrations, or webhooks that don't map to a specific\nresource.\n\n```\nquickback/features/\n└── reports/\n └── actions/\n ├── trial-balance.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n └── profit-loss.ts ← standalone (has path:)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/reports/actions/trial-balance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate trial balance report\",\n path: \"/reports/trial-balance\",\n method: \"GET\",\n input: z.object({\n startDate: z.string(),\n endDate: z.string(),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"accountant\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... build report\n return { rows: [] };\n },\n});\n```\n\n### GET vs POST for input\n\nGET actions read `input` from URL query parameters; every other method (POST,\nPUT, PATCH, DELETE) reads from the JSON body. The Zod schema is the same in\nboth cases — the compiler picks the right parser based on `method`.\n\n```typescript\n// GET — input populated from ?q=…&limit=…\ndefineAction({\n method: \"GET\",\n path: \"/search\",\n input: z.object({\n q: z.string(),\n limit: z.coerce.number().int().positive().max(100).default(20),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ input }) {\n // input is { q: string, limit: number } — fully typed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nRepeated query keys (`?tag=a&tag=b`) come through as arrays automatically;\nsingle values stay as strings. Use Zod's `.coerce.number()` /\n`.coerce.boolean()` when you want typed primitives from the parsed strings.\n\n**Use POST when input is structured.** GET requests cannot carry a JSON body\nin any of the surfaces Quickback APIs are commonly called from:\n\n- Browsers throw on `fetch(url, { method: 'GET', body })`.\n- CDNs and caches key on URL+method; a GET with a body either gets the body\n stripped at the edge or cache-collides with semantically different requests.\n- OpenAPI client generators (axios, openapi-fetch, openapi-typescript-codegen)\n refuse to emit GET-with-body, so the generated SDKs break.\n- The MCP agent surface treats GET as parameter-only — agents calling a GET\n action will only see what the URL exposes.\n\nIf your action takes nested objects, arrays of objects, or large inputs that\ndon't serialize cleanly to a query string, set `method: \"POST\"`. POST doesn't\nimply \"this writes data\" — it's the right method whenever the request body is\nload-bearing. Use the response shape (`responseType: \"json\"`, or just the data\nyour handler returns) to convey read semantics; HTTP method choice is about\ninput transport, not action intent.\n\n## Access Configuration\n\nAccess controls who can execute an action and under what conditions.\n\n### Role-Based Access\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] // OR logic: user needs any of these roles\n}\n```\n\n### Public Access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for unauthenticated endpoints (contact forms, webhooks, public APIs). Every invocation is **mandatory audit logged** with IP address, input, result, and timing.\n\n```typescript\n// features/contact/actions/submit.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Public contact form submission\",\n path: \"/submit\",\n input: z.object({\n name: z.string().min(1),\n email: z.string().email(),\n message: z.string().min(10),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n // ... persist submission\n return { ok: true };\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe wildcard `\"*\"` is not supported and will throw a compile-time error. Use `\"PUBLIC\"` explicitly.\n\n### Record Conditions\n\nFor record-based actions, you can require the record to be in a specific state:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n roles: [\"hiring-manager\"],\n record: {\n stage: { equals: \"screening\" } // Precondition\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Supported operators:**\n\n| Operator | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `equals` | Field must equal value |\n| `notEquals` | Field must not equal value |\n| `in` | Field must be one of the values |\n| `notIn` | Field must not be one of the values |\n\n### Context Substitution\n\nUse `$ctx` to reference the current user's context:\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n record: {\n ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" },\n organizationId: { equals: \"$ctx.activeOrgId\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### OR/AND Combinations\n\n```typescript\naccess: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\"] },\n {\n roles: [\"recruiter\"],\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Function Access\n\nFor complex logic, use an access function:\n\n```typescript\naccess: async (ctx, record) => {\n return ctx.roles.includes('admin') || record.ownerId === ctx.userId;\n}\n```\n\n### Relationship-roles in actions\n\n**v0.19+** — standalone actions now support relationship-roles in `access.roles` directly. Declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` with optional `loads` / `exposeAs` for ctx hydration, and reference the role by name on the action:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n attendeeOf: {\n from: 'guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n loads: 'events',\n exposeAs: 'event',\n },\n },\n roles: { attendee: { via: 'attendeeOf' } },\n}\n\n// features/chat/actions/getInbox.ts\nexport default defineAction({\n path: '/chat/get-inbox',\n input: z.object({ eventId: z.number().int().positive() }),\n access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'attendee'] },\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n // The resolver already verified attendance and loaded ctx.event.\n // No hand-rolled `SELECT … FROM guests WHERE …` needed.\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe action's surface (path params + input fields) must expose the relationship's `resource.column`. At v0.19 a missing key emits a `[quickback:authz]` warning and skips resolver emission; at v0.20 it becomes a compile error. See [Access — standalone actions](/compiler/definitions/access#standalone-actions-surface-keys-and-loads--exposeas-v019) for the full mechanism.\n\n**Record-based actions** are NOT yet supported — the runtime evaluator fail-closes (403) on relationship arms reached without an inline gate. Until inline emission for record-based actions lands, either:\n\n- Set `firewall: { exception: true }` on the action and gate manually in `execute()`, OR\n- Apply the relationship at the resource's firewall layer (worked example below).\n\n**Resource-layer workaround for record-based actions**: gate the action on BA roles only and apply the relationship at the resource layer via a firewall `via:` predicate:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauthz: {\n relationships: {\n guestOf: {\n from: 'event_guests',\n subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },\n resource: { column: 'eventId' },\n where: { status: 'confirmed' },\n },\n },\n}\n\n// features/sessions/sessions.ts — firewall scopes rows; action gates on BA role\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row-level relationship check\n],\nactions: {\n comment: defineAction({\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] }, // ← BA role only on the action\n input: z.object({ text: z.string() }),\n execute: async (input, ctx, db, record) => {\n // record is already filtered by the firewall — guest membership\n // is enforced before this handler runs.\n return db.insert(comments).values({ ... });\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThis pattern composes cleanly: the firewall guarantees the caller has the relationship to the record being acted on; the action's access list keeps the role surface obvious.\n\nSee [Access — relationship authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization) for the full picture, including `loads` / `exposeAs` and the `firewall: { exception: true }` escape hatch.\n\n## Scoped Database\n\nAll actions receive a **scoped `db`** instance that automatically enforces security:\n\n| Operation | Org Scoping | Owner Scoping | Soft Delete Filter | Auto-inject on INSERT |\n|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|\n| `SELECT` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `INSERT` | n/a | n/a | n/a | `organizationId`, `ownerId` from ctx |\n| `UPDATE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n| `DELETE` | `WHERE organizationId = ?` | `WHERE ownerId = ?` | `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | n/a |\n\nScoping is duck-typed at runtime — tables with an `organizationId` column get org scoping, tables with `ownerId` get owner scoping, tables with `deletedAt` get soft delete filtering.\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ db, ctx, input }) {\n // This query automatically includes WHERE organizationId = ? AND deletedAt IS NULL\n const items = await db.select().from(applications).where(eq(applications.stage, 'interview'));\n\n // Inserts automatically include organizationId\n await db.insert(applications).values({ candidateId: input.candidateId, jobId: input.jobId, stage: 'applied' });\n\n return items;\n}\n```\n\n**Not enforced** in scoped DB (by design):\n- **Guards** — actions ARE the authorized way to modify guarded fields\n- **Masking** — actions are backend code that may need raw data\n- **Access** — already checked before action execution\n\n### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that need to bypass scoped DB filters (for example, platform-level support operations) can enable unsafe mode.\n\nUse object form for explicit policy and mandatory audit metadata:\n\n```typescript\n// features/admin/actions/cross-tenant-report.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Generate cross-org hiring report\",\n path: \"/admin/cross-tenant-report\",\n input: z.object({ startDate: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n unsafe: {\n reason: \"Support investigation for enterprise customer\",\n adminOnly: true, // default true\n crossTenant: true, // default true\n targetScope: \"all\", // \"all\" | \"organization\"\n },\n async execute({ unsafeDb, input }) {\n // unsafeDb bypasses scoped filters\n const allOrgs = await unsafeDb.select().from(applications);\n return allOrgs;\n },\n});\n```\n\nUnsafe cross-tenant actions are generated with:\n\n- Better Auth authentication required (no unauthenticated path)\n- sysadmin gate (`ctx.userRole === \"sysadmin\"`)\n- mandatory audit logging on deny/success/error\n\n**Provider note (Neon):** on Neon the request-scoped db enforces Row Level\nSecurity with the *caller's* org claims, which would filter out exactly the\ncross-tenant rows unsafe actions exist to reach. Unsafe handlers therefore\nacquire a dedicated service-role handle (`createServiceDb`) that sets the\n`quickback.service_role` transaction marker instead of caller claims; the\ngenerated RLS grants that context an explicit per-table bypass policy. The\naudit-logging contract is identical to D1. Neon with\n`connectionMode: 'websocket'` does not support unsafe actions yet and fails\nthe compile with a descriptive error.\n\n`PUBLIC` actions also receive mandatory audit logging (same audit table), since unauthenticated endpoints are high-risk by nature.\n\nWithout unsafe mode, `unsafeDb` is `undefined` in the executor params.\n\n### Raw SQL Policy\n\nBy default, the compiler rejects raw SQL in action code. Use Drizzle query-builder syntax whenever possible.\n\nIf a specific action must use raw SQL, opt in explicitly:\n\n```typescript\n// features/ledgers/actions/reconcile.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Run custom reconciliation query\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n allowRawSql: true,\n async execute({ db }) {\n return db.execute(sql`select 1`);\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `allowRawSql: true`, compilation fails with a loud error pointing to the action and snippet.\n\nThe detector checks for SQL keywords in string arguments, so non-SQL method calls like `headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")` or `map.get(\"key\")` will not trigger false positives.\n\n## Sharing Code Between Actions\n\nFor Zod schemas, helpers, or constants used across multiple actions in a\nfeature, put them under `<feature>/lib/` and import from each action file.\nFiles under `lib/` are copied verbatim into the generated output.\n\n```\nfeatures/applications/\n├── applications.ts\n├── actions/\n│ ├── advance.ts\n│ └── reject.ts\n└── lib/\n ├── inputs.ts ← shared Zod schemas\n └── transitions.ts ← state-machine helpers\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/lib/inputs.ts\n\nexport const advanceInput = z.object({\n nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]),\n notes: z.string().max(2000).optional(),\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move forward\",\n input: advanceInput,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n### Importing Tables\n\nAction files import tables from their own feature or other features. The compiler generates alias files for each table, so you import by the table's file name:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\n// Same feature — import from parent directory using the table's file name\n\n// Cross-feature — go up to the features directory, then into the other feature\n\n```\n\n**Path pattern from `features/{name}/actions/`:**\n- Same feature table: `../{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../applications`)\n- Other feature table: `../../{other-feature}/{table-file-name}` (e.g., `../../candidates/candidates`)\n- Generated lib files: `../../../lib/{module}` (e.g., `../../../lib/realtime`, `../../../lib/webhooks`)\n\n### Executor Parameters\n\n```typescript\n\ninterface ActionExecutorParams {\n db: DrizzleDB; // Scoped database (auto-applies org/owner/soft-delete filters)\n unsafeDb?: DrizzleDB; // Unscoped database (only available when unsafe mode is enabled)\n ctx: AppContext; // User context (userId, roles, activeOrgId, activeTeamId, userRole)\n record?: TRecord; // The record (record-based only, undefined for standalone)\n input: TInput; // Validated input from Zod schema\n services: TServices; // Configured integrations (billing, notifications, etc.)\n c: HonoContext; // Raw Hono context for advanced use\n env: Env; // Runtime bindings (Cloudflare env / process env). Alias for c.env.\n auth: Auth; // Better Auth instance — call auth.api.getSession(...) etc. Lazy on Cloudflare.\n whereRecord?: (table) => SQL; // Pre-built WHERE: firewall + soft-delete + eq(table.id, record.id). Record-based actions only.\n whereTransition?: (table) => SQL; // whereRecord plus the transition's \"from\" precondition. Transition actions only.\n}\n```\n\n#### `auth` — Better Auth instance\n\n`auth` is the Better Auth instance, ready to call from inside an action\nhandler. Use it for things like minting an OAuth access token, fetching the\ncurrent session in a custom way, or invoking a Better Auth plugin method\nthat isn't already exposed by the generated middleware.\n\n```typescript\n// features/integrations/actions/connect-google-drive.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Get a fresh Google Drive access token for the signed-in user\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] },\n async execute({ auth, ctx, c }) {\n // genericOAuth plugin method — needs a cast since the default-generic\n // `Auth` type doesn't carry plugin-specific API surface.\n const token = await (auth.api as any).getAccessToken({\n headers: c.req.raw.headers,\n body: { providerId: \"google\", userId: ctx.userId },\n });\n return { accessToken: token.accessToken };\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Lazy on Cloudflare**: the generated handler emits a `Proxy` so\n`createAuth(c.env, c.req.raw.cf)` only runs the first time you read a\nproperty on `auth`. Actions that never touch `auth` pay zero construction\ncost. On Bun/Node `auth` is the imported singleton (an IIFE that lazy-loads\nthe database adapter) wrapped in the same proxy shape — call sites are\nidentical across runtimes.\n\n**Typing**: `auth` is typed as `Auth` from `better-auth`. The base API\n(`getSession`, `signOut`, `signInEmail`, etc.) is fully typed. Plugin-only\nmethods (`getAccessToken` from `genericOAuth`, admin-plugin methods, etc.)\nneed a cast at the call site — the default-generic `Auth` doesn't infer\nthe project's specific plugin set.\n\n#### `whereRecord` — explicit, scope-safe WHERE\n\nFor protected-field writes inside record-based actions, prefer\n`whereRecord(table)` over `eq(table.id, record.id)`. It returns a Drizzle\nexpression that AND-merges the resource's firewall and soft-delete predicates\nwith the record id, so the WHERE is explicit even if a future refactor swaps\n`db` back to an unscoped client:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Advance\",\n input: /* … */,\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereRecord }) {\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(applications)\n .set({\n status: input.nextStatus,\n notes: input.notes ?? record.notes,\n })\n .where(whereRecord!(applications)) // firewall + soft-delete + id, all in one\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe audit DB wrapper hard-stamps `modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every\n`.set()` call, so handlers don't write them. The same wrapper hard-stamps\n`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` on every `.values()`.\nCaller-supplied audit fields are dropped on the floor — the audit log\nalways reflects the real actor and the real moment.\n\n`whereRecord` is undefined for standalone actions (they have no record), so\nthe parameter is typed as optional. `whereTransition` extends `whereRecord`\nwith the transition's \"from\" precondition for transition actions.\n\n#### Reaching Better Auth tables (`authDb`)\n\nThe scoped `db` only sees your feature tables. To read Better Auth tables —\nusers, organizations, members — use the auth database connection from the\nHono context plus the generated `lib/org-access.ts` helper:\n\n```typescript\n// features/projects/actions/assign.ts — validate a userId is an org member\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Assign a project to an org member\",\n input: z.object({ assigneeId: z.string() }),\n access: { roles: [\"member\", \"admin\"] },\n async execute({ db, record, input, ctx, c, whereRecord }) {\n // getOrgMemberRole(authDb, userId, organizationId) → role string | null\n const role = await getOrgMemberRole(c.get(\"authDb\"), input.assigneeId, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n if (!role) {\n throw new ActionError(\"Assignee is not a member of this organization\", \"NOT_A_MEMBER\", 400);\n }\n const [updated] = await db\n .update(projects)\n .set({ assigneeId: input.assigneeId })\n .where(whereRecord!(projects))\n .returning();\n return updated;\n },\n});\n```\n\n`c.get(\"authDb\")` is the Drizzle connection to the auth database (in dual-DB\nmode it's a separate D1 from your features). For richer queries, import the\nauth schema tables from `../../../auth/schema` and query `authDb` directly.\n\n## HTTP API Reference\n\n### Request Format\n\n| Method | Input Source | Use Case |\n|--------|--------------|----------|\n| `GET` | Query parameters | Read-only operations, fetching data |\n| `POST` | JSON body | Default, state-changing operations |\n| `PUT` | JSON body | Full replacement operations |\n| `PATCH` | JSON body | Partial updates |\n| `DELETE` | JSON body | Deletion with optional payload |\n\n### Response Formats\n\n| Type | Content-Type | Use Case |\n|------|--------------|----------|\n| `json` | `application/json` | Standard API responses (default) |\n| `stream` | `text/event-stream` | Real-time streaming (AI chat, live updates) |\n| `file` | Varies | File downloads (reports, exports) |\n\n### Error Codes\n\n| Status | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `400` | Invalid input / validation error (also `GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED` for direct protected-field writes) |\n| `401` | Not authenticated |\n| `403` | Access role check failed (`ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`) |\n| `404` | Record not found (record-based actions) |\n| `409` | Record is in the wrong state for this action — `access.record` predicate or `transition` policy failed (`ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`) |\n| `500` | Handler execution error |\n\n### Validation Error Response\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Invalid request data\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"VALIDATION_FAILED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"fields\": {\n \"amount\": \"Expected positive number\"\n }\n },\n \"hint\": \"Check the input schema for this action\"\n}\n```\n\n### Error Handling\n\n**Option 1: Return a JSON error response** (recommended for most cases)\n\nSince action handlers receive the Hono context (`c`), you can return error responses directly:\n\n```typescript\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input, c }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n return c.json({\n error: 'Cannot modify a hired application',\n code: 'ALREADY_HIRED',\n details: { currentStage: record.stage },\n }, 400);\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Throw an ActionError**\n\n```typescript\n\nasync execute({ ctx, record, input }) {\n if (record.stage === 'hired') {\n throw new ActionError('Cannot modify a hired application', 'ALREADY_HIRED', 400, {\n currentStage: record.stage,\n });\n }\n // ... continue\n}\n```\n\nThe `ActionError` constructor signature is `(message, code, statusCode = 400, details?)`. The compile step rewrites the `@quickback/compiler` import to the generated runtime class (`src/lib/types.ts`), and the route handler catches it by name and returns `{ error, code, details }` with your `statusCode`.\n\n## Protected Fields\n\nActions can modify fields that are protected from regular CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\n// In the table file (defineTable config)\nguards: {\n protected: {\n status: [\"advance\", \"reject\", \"hire\", \"withdraw\"], // Only these actions can modify status\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis allows the `advance` action to set `status = \"interview\"` even though the field is protected from regular PATCH requests. Direct `PATCH /:id` attempts to set `status` are rejected by the guards layer with **400 GUARD_FIELD_PROTECTED**, and the field is omitted from the generated POST/PATCH body Zod schemas — clients cannot even send it past validation.\n\n## Transition (state-machine policy)\n\nFor protected fields that follow a state machine — application status, invoice\nlifecycle, order fulfilment — use `transition` on the action so the compiler\ngenerates a runtime guard that enforces the *from/to pair*, not just the\ncurrent state. Without it, an `advance` action whose input enum allows\n`[\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]` and whose `access.record` allows\n`status in [\"applied\", \"screening\", \"interview\"]` will happily run\n`applied → offer` (a skip) or `interview → screening` (a regression).\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline.\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\", // read target from input.nextStatus\n fromTo: {\n applied: [\"screening\"],\n screening: [\"interview\"],\n interview: [\"offer\"],\n },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/hire.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Finalize an offer.\",\n input: z.object({}),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n to: \"hired\", // fixed target — same value every call\n fromTo: { offer: [\"hired\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n| Field | Required | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| `field` | Yes | Record column to validate (e.g. `\"status\"`) |\n| `fromTo` | Yes | Map of current value → permitted next values. Keys also enumerate the legal source states. |\n| `via` | Yes (or `to`) | Input key that carries the target value. Use for variable-target actions like `advance`. |\n| `to` | Yes (or `via`) | Literal target value the action always writes. Use for fixed-target actions like `hire`/`reject`. |\n\nExactly one of `via` or `to` must be provided. The compiler rejects both at\nvalidate time. When `to` is set, it must appear in some `fromTo[*]` array —\notherwise the action would be unreachable, which is almost certainly a bug.\n\n### Wire-level errors\n\nThe compiled guard returns **409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`** with\nthe field, the current value, the requested target, and the allowed set:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Action not allowed for current record state\",\n \"layer\": \"access\",\n \"code\": \"ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE\",\n \"details\": {\n \"field\": \"status\",\n \"current\": \"interview\",\n \"target\": \"screening\",\n \"allowedTargets\": [\"offer\"]\n },\n \"hint\": \"From \\\"interview\\\", status can transition to: offer\"\n}\n```\n\nThis is distinct from a role failure: if the caller has the wrong role they\nget **403 `ACCESS_ROLE_REQUIRED`** as before. Splitting the two lets clients\ntell *\"you can't do this\"* from *\"you can't do this *yet*\"* — the latter is\nrecoverable by the user, the former isn't.\n\nThe same 409 code is used when an `access.record` predicate (without\n`transition`) fails — for example `record: { status: { equals: \"pending\" } }`\ncalled against a paid invoice now returns 409 `ACCESS_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED_FOR_STATE`,\nnot a misleading 403.\n\n## Examples\n\n### Bulk Import (Standalone, No Record)\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/actions/bulk-import.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Import candidates from job board CSV\",\n path: \"/candidates/import\",\n input: z.object({\n data: z.array(z.object({\n email: z.string().email(),\n name: z.string(),\n })),\n }),\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n async execute({ db, input }) {\n const inserted = await db\n .insert(candidates)\n .values(input.data)\n .returning();\n return { imported: inserted.length };\n },\n});\n```"
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  "title": "Encryption",
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- "content": "Mark a text column `.encrypted()` and Quickback envelope-encrypts it at rest with a **per-organization key**:\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-org\n name: q.text().required(),\n emergencyContact: q.text().encrypted(),\n dietaryNotes: q.text().encrypted(),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nThat one modifier changes what a database breach means: a leaked D1 backup, export, or stolen database token yields only ciphertext for those columns. The keys live separately, wrapped under a worker secret the database never sees.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\n- **`org_data_keys`** — one row per organization holding a random 256-bit data key (DEK), stored **wrapped** under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret. Created lazily on the org's first encrypted write.\n- **Write path** — every write (CRUD routes, batch routes, and `db.insert`/`db.update` inside your actions) flows through the same chokepoint, which AES-256-GCM-encrypts the column before anything else sees it. Audit snapshots, webhook payloads, and realtime deltas therefore carry ciphertext by construction.\n- **Read path** — generated routes decrypt behind the firewall and then apply masking, so authorized callers see plaintext and everyone else sees the redaction — never ciphertext.\n- **`ctx.crypto`** — explicit `await ctx.crypto.decrypt(value)` / `ctx.crypto.encrypt(value)` for action code that processes the field server-side (building a manifest, sending an email). Scoped to the caller's active organization.\n- **Boot guard** — a project with encrypted columns refuses to serve without `ENCRYPTION_KEK` (503 `MISSING_ENV`), instead of silently storing plaintext.\n\nValues at rest look like `qbenc:1:<keyVersion>:<iv>:<ciphertext>` — the prefix makes accidental plaintext detectable, and the embedded key version supports rotation with lazy re-encryption on write.\n\n## Setup\n\nScaffolded projects already have a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK` in `.dev.vars`, so local dev works with zero setup. For production:\n\n```bash\nopenssl rand -hex 32 | wrangler secret put ENCRYPTION_KEK\n```\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nCiphertext cannot be queried, so encrypted columns are **excluded from every query surface at compile time** — these are errors, not warnings:\n\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()`, and never listed in a view's `query.{searchable,filterable,sortable}`\n- No `.unique()` (AES-GCM randomizes ciphertext per write), no primary keys, no `.references()`, no `q.scope()` columns, no defaults (a SQL default would bypass the encrypting chokepoint)\n- Never an `embeddings.fields` source (embedding a value ships its plaintext to the model)\n- The table must carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-organization\n- Text-shaped columns only (v1)\n\nEncrypted columns **may** appear in view projections and responses — they decrypt through the generated prepare path. Masking composes on top as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Per-organization keys: blast radius and crypto-shredding\n\nEach organization's data is encrypted under its own DEK, so one compromised key never exposes another tenant. Deleting an org's `org_data_keys` row makes every encrypted value it ever wrote **permanently unreadable** — the cleanest possible GDPR-erasure and offboarding story.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe envelope tier protects against **storage compromise**: backups, exports, dashboard access, leaked database tokens, SQL injection, and insiders with database read access all get ciphertext. The server *can* decrypt — that's the point; your actions still process the field. It does not protect against full Worker compromise — for that, use the **sealed tier** below, where the server structurally cannot read the value at all.\n\nTwo practical notes:\n\n- **Action responses**: rows returned from `db.insert(...).returning()` inside your own actions contain ciphertext — decrypt explicitly with `ctx.crypto.decrypt()` if your action returns the field. Generated CRUD routes handle this automatically.\n- **No server-side equality lookups** on encrypted values (blind indexes are a roadmap item). If you need to filter by it, it probably shouldn't be encrypted — or it needs a separate non-sensitive derived column.\n\n---\n\n# Sealed tier — end-to-end encryption\n\nMark a text column `.sealed()` instead of `.encrypted()` and you cross a line the envelope tier never claims: **the server cannot read the value.** It holds only ciphertext plus a content key *wrapped to a public key it has no private half for*. A full Worker compromise — leaked secrets, malicious code, a coerced admin — still yields nothing but ciphertext. Decryption happens only on the client, after a fresh step-up.\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-scope\n name: q.text().required(),\n governmentId: q.text().encrypted(), // envelope tier: server CAN read (to mask)\n backgroundCheck: q.text({ maxLength: 8000 }).sealed(), // sealed tier: server CANNOT read\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nUse it for data that is legally sensitive and need-to-know, where you want a database breach **and the server itself** to yield only ciphertext: background checks, health findings, raw identity documents, anything you'd rather not be able to read by accident.\n\nThe page below is the *usage* view. For the on-the-wire contract — the versioned `qbseal:1` envelope format, the full `/seal/v1` lifecycle, the Argon2id floor, passkey expectations, canonical conformance vectors, and the first-party **Swift / Kotlin / TypeScript SDKs** (with install + usage) — see [Sealed protocol](/compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol).\n\n## The key model\n\nThree nested keys. A breach of any layer above plaintext yields only more wrapped keys:\n\n```\nUSER key ──unwrap──▶ SCOPE private key ──unwrap──▶ content key ──decrypt──▶ plaintext\n```\n\n- **USER key** — derived on the client from a **vault passphrase** (Argon2id → an Ed25519 signing key + an X25519 wrap key). This is **never** the Better Auth login password — reusing the login password would collapse the zero-knowledge property back to server-trust. The server stores only the Ed25519 *public* key (to verify step-ups) and the Argon2id params.\n- **SCOPE keypair** — one per scope (per organization). The content key is wrapped to the scope's public key, so any authorized reader can be granted access without re-encrypting the data.\n- **Content key** — a random AES-256-GCM key, one per sealed value, wrapped to the scope.\n\nA **writer** needs only the scope's *public* key — no key of their own. Only **readers** (staff doing a reveal) need a grant of the scope private key, wrapped to their USER key.\n\n## The client ships with your backend\n\nFor any project with a `.sealed()` column the compiler emits the E2EE client **into your project** — there's nothing to `npm install`:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├─ lib/\n│ ├─ seal-routes.ts # server: the /seal/v1/* reveal rails (verify-only)\n│ └─ seal-client/ # client: the browser SDK you import — emitted for you\n│ └─ index.ts sdk.ts flow.ts wrap.ts kdf.ts envelope.ts ...\n```\n\n`@noble/curves` and `@noble/hashes` are added to your `package.json` automatically. The client is emitted from the *same compiler version* as the server routes, so the wire format (`qbseal:` envelopes, the step-up message, the key-wrap method) can never drift between the two — a class of silent decrypt-time bug that a separately-versioned package would reintroduce.\n\n## Writing a sealed value\n\nThe writer seals the plaintext to the scope's public key, then writes the result like any other field. The server stores ciphertext and is none the wiser.\n\n```typescript\n\nconst seal = new SealClient(transport); // transport = POST to /seal/v1/*\n\n// Fetches the scope's PUBLIC key and seals to it — the writer needs no key.\nconst sealed = await seal.sealField(\n 'scope:organization:org_123',\n new TextEncoder().encode('Background check: clear'),\n);\n\n// Write it like any field. At rest this is a `qbseal:` sealed-cell envelope.\nawait api.post('/api/v1/candidates', { name: 'Ada', backgroundCheck: sealed });\n```\n\n## Revealing a sealed value\n\nA reveal is a deliberate, audited, **step-up-gated** action — not an ambient read. The SDK runs the whole handshake; you provide the reader's passphrase-derived session:\n\n```typescript\n// Derive the reader's keys once from their vault passphrase (NOT their login password).\nconst session = seal.session(passphrase, enrollment);\n\nconst plaintext = await seal.reveal({\n session,\n scopeRef: 'scope:organization:org_123',\n vaultItemId: candidate.id,\n});\nnew TextDecoder().decode(plaintext); // \"Background check: clear\"\n```\n\nBehind that one call:\n\n1. **`/seal/v1/my-grant`** → the reader's wrapped scope private key.\n2. **`/seal/v1/challenge`** → a fresh, single-use nonce bound to this reader + item.\n3. The client signs a **step-up proof** over the nonce (Ed25519 from the passphrase, or a passkey assertion whose WebAuthn challenge *is* the nonce).\n4. **`/seal/v1/reveal`** verifies the proof, writes an append-only reveal-log entry, and mints a short-lived (≤180s) `scope:seal:reveal` capability.\n5. **`/seal/v1/key`** (bearer that capability) passes three fail-closed gates — tenant, capability, live-grant — and returns the still-wrapped content key.\n6. The client unwraps the scope key, unwraps the content key, and decrypts. **None of this touches the server with a readable key.**\n\nPasskey reveal is the same call as `revealWithPasskey({ ..., getAssertion })`, where `getAssertion(nonce)` runs the WebAuthn ceremony.\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nSealed values are opaque references at rest, so they're fenced off from every surface that would need to read them — these are compile errors:\n\n- **Never** in a view projection, `?search`, or a `masking` rule (there's no plaintext to project, search, or redact — it leaves the system *only* through the reveal rails).\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()` / `.unique()` / defaults / `embeddings.fields` (same reasons as the envelope tier).\n- The table **must** carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-scope.\n- Reading a sealed column server-side is a **type error**: the column is branded `$type<SealedValue>()`, an opaque non-string, so `db.select()` on it won't typecheck. The server's structural inability to read it is enforced by `tsc`, not convention.\n- Sealed projects **force-enable** KV-backed JWT revocation (so a revoked reader's in-flight reveal token dies); a project with sealed columns and no KV binding **fails to compile**.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe sealed tier protects against **full Worker compromise** — leaked secrets, malicious or buggy server code, a coerced operator. All of them get ciphertext; the keys to read it never exist server-side. What it asks in return:\n\n- **A reveal needs a real second factor.** The vault passphrase (or passkey) is separate from login and never leaves the client. Lose it with no recovery grant and the data is unrecoverable *by design* — that's the guarantee, not a bug. Recovery/escrow and rotation re-granting are roadmap.\n- **No server-side processing.** Your actions can't read, mask, search, or index a sealed value — it's plaintext only in a client that just revealed it. If the server needs to process the field, you want the envelope tier instead.\n- **Passkey reveal** verify logic is in place but should be exercised with a real browser/authenticator before production; the passphrase lane is fully round-trip tested."
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+ "content": "Mark a text column `.encrypted()` and Quickback envelope-encrypts it at rest with a **per-organization key**:\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('guests', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-org\n name: q.text().required(),\n emergencyContact: q.text().encrypted(),\n dietaryNotes: q.text().encrypted(),\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nThat one modifier changes what a database breach means: a leaked D1 backup, export, or stolen database token yields only ciphertext for those columns. The keys live separately, wrapped under a worker secret the database never sees.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\n- **`org_data_keys`** — one row per organization holding a random 256-bit data key (DEK), stored **wrapped** under the `ENCRYPTION_KEK` worker secret. Created lazily on the org's first encrypted write.\n- **Write path** — every write (CRUD routes, batch routes, and `db.insert`/`db.update` inside your actions) flows through the same chokepoint, which AES-256-GCM-encrypts the column before anything else sees it. Audit snapshots, webhook payloads, and realtime deltas therefore carry ciphertext by construction.\n- **Read path** — generated routes decrypt behind the firewall and then apply masking, so authorized callers see plaintext and everyone else sees the redaction — never ciphertext.\n- **`ctx.crypto`** — explicit `await ctx.crypto.decrypt(value)` / `ctx.crypto.encrypt(value)` for action code that processes the field server-side (building a manifest, sending an email). Scoped to the caller's active organization.\n- **Boot guard** — a project with encrypted columns refuses to serve without `ENCRYPTION_KEK` (503 `MISSING_ENV`), instead of silently storing plaintext.\n\nValues at rest look like `qbenc:1:<keyVersion>:<iv>:<ciphertext>` — the prefix makes accidental plaintext detectable, and the embedded key version supports rotation with lazy re-encryption on write.\n\n## Setup\n\nScaffolded projects already have a generated `ENCRYPTION_KEK` in `.dev.vars`, so local dev works with zero setup. For production:\n\n```bash\nopenssl rand -hex 32 | wrangler secret put ENCRYPTION_KEK\n```\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nCiphertext cannot be queried, so encrypted columns are **excluded from every query surface at compile time** — these are errors, not warnings:\n\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()`, and never listed in a view's `query.{searchable,filterable,sortable}`\n- No `.unique()` (AES-GCM randomizes ciphertext per write), no primary keys, no `.references()`, no `q.scope()` columns, no defaults (a SQL default would bypass the encrypting chokepoint)\n- Never an `embeddings.fields` source (embedding a value ships its plaintext to the model)\n- The table must carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-organization\n- Text-shaped columns only (v1)\n- Database provider must be **Cloudflare D1** or **Neon over HTTP** (the Cloudflare default). Anything else — including Neon's websocket mode — is a compile error, never silently-plaintext output. On Neon, `org_data_keys` lives in the `app` Postgres schema with org-scoped row-level security: a request-scoped connection can read and lazily create exactly its own organization's wrapped-key row; rotation and crypto-shredding are service-role operations.\n\nEncrypted columns **may** appear in view projections and responses — they decrypt through the generated prepare path. Masking composes on top as defense-in-depth.\n\n## Per-organization keys: blast radius and crypto-shredding\n\nEach organization's data is encrypted under its own DEK, so one compromised key never exposes another tenant. Deleting an org's `org_data_keys` row makes every encrypted value it ever wrote **permanently unreadable** — the cleanest possible GDPR-erasure and offboarding story.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe envelope tier protects against **storage compromise**: backups, exports, dashboard access, leaked database tokens, SQL injection, and insiders with database read access all get ciphertext. The server *can* decrypt — that's the point; your actions still process the field. It does not protect against full Worker compromise — for that, use the **sealed tier** below, where the server structurally cannot read the value at all.\n\nTwo practical notes:\n\n- **Action responses**: rows returned from `db.insert(...).returning()` inside your own actions contain ciphertext — decrypt explicitly with `ctx.crypto.decrypt()` if your action returns the field. Generated CRUD routes handle this automatically.\n- **No server-side equality lookups** on encrypted values (blind indexes are a roadmap item). If you need to filter by it, it probably shouldn't be encrypted — or it needs a separate non-sensitive derived column.\n\n---\n\n# Sealed tier — end-to-end encryption\n\nMark a text column `.sealed()` instead of `.encrypted()` and you cross a line the envelope tier never claims: **the server cannot read the value.** It holds only ciphertext plus a content key *wrapped to a public key it has no private half for*. A full Worker compromise — leaked secrets, malicious code, a coerced admin — still yields nothing but ciphertext. Decryption happens only on the client, after a fresh step-up.\n\n```typescript\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // required — keys are per-scope\n name: q.text().required(),\n governmentId: q.text().encrypted(), // envelope tier: server CAN read (to mask)\n backgroundCheck: q.text({ maxLength: 8000 }).sealed(), // sealed tier: server CANNOT read\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['member+'] } },\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n});\n```\n\nUse it for data that is legally sensitive and need-to-know, where you want a database breach **and the server itself** to yield only ciphertext: background checks, health findings, raw identity documents, anything you'd rather not be able to read by accident.\n\nThe page below is the *usage* view. For the on-the-wire contract — the versioned `qbseal:1` envelope format, the full `/seal/v1` lifecycle, the Argon2id floor, passkey expectations, canonical conformance vectors, and the first-party **Swift / Kotlin / TypeScript SDKs** (with install + usage) — see [Sealed protocol](/compiler/definitions/sealed-protocol).\n\n## The key model\n\nThree nested keys. A breach of any layer above plaintext yields only more wrapped keys:\n\n```\nUSER key ──unwrap──▶ SCOPE private key ──unwrap──▶ content key ──decrypt──▶ plaintext\n```\n\n- **USER key** — derived on the client from a **vault passphrase** (Argon2id → an Ed25519 signing key + an X25519 wrap key). This is **never** the Better Auth login password — reusing the login password would collapse the zero-knowledge property back to server-trust. The server stores only the Ed25519 *public* key (to verify step-ups) and the Argon2id params.\n- **SCOPE keypair** — one per scope (per organization). The content key is wrapped to the scope's public key, so any authorized reader can be granted access without re-encrypting the data.\n- **Content key** — a random AES-256-GCM key, one per sealed value, wrapped to the scope.\n\nA **writer** needs only the scope's *public* key — no key of their own. Only **readers** (staff doing a reveal) need a grant of the scope private key, wrapped to their USER key.\n\n## The client ships with your backend\n\nFor any project with a `.sealed()` column the compiler emits the E2EE client **into your project** — there's nothing to `npm install`:\n\n```\nsrc/\n├─ lib/\n│ ├─ seal-routes.ts # server: the /seal/v1/* reveal rails (verify-only)\n│ └─ seal-client/ # client: the browser SDK you import — emitted for you\n│ └─ index.ts sdk.ts flow.ts wrap.ts kdf.ts envelope.ts ...\n```\n\n`@noble/curves` and `@noble/hashes` are added to your `package.json` automatically. The client is emitted from the *same compiler version* as the server routes, so the wire format (`qbseal:` envelopes, the step-up message, the key-wrap method) can never drift between the two — a class of silent decrypt-time bug that a separately-versioned package would reintroduce.\n\n## Writing a sealed value\n\nThe writer seals the plaintext to the scope's public key, then writes the result like any other field. The server stores ciphertext and is none the wiser.\n\n```typescript\n\nconst seal = new SealClient(transport); // transport = POST to /seal/v1/*\n\n// Fetches the scope's PUBLIC key and seals to it — the writer needs no key.\nconst sealed = await seal.sealField(\n 'scope:organization:org_123',\n new TextEncoder().encode('Background check: clear'),\n);\n\n// Write it like any field. At rest this is a `qbseal:` sealed-cell envelope.\nawait api.post('/api/v1/candidates', { name: 'Ada', backgroundCheck: sealed });\n```\n\n## Revealing a sealed value\n\nA reveal is a deliberate, audited, **step-up-gated** action — not an ambient read. The SDK runs the whole handshake; you provide the reader's passphrase-derived session:\n\n```typescript\n// Derive the reader's keys once from their vault passphrase (NOT their login password).\nconst session = seal.session(passphrase, enrollment);\n\nconst plaintext = await seal.reveal({\n session,\n scopeRef: 'scope:organization:org_123',\n vaultItemId: candidate.id,\n});\nnew TextDecoder().decode(plaintext); // \"Background check: clear\"\n```\n\nBehind that one call:\n\n1. **`/seal/v1/my-grant`** → the reader's wrapped scope private key.\n2. **`/seal/v1/challenge`** → a fresh, single-use nonce bound to this reader + item.\n3. The client signs a **step-up proof** over the nonce (Ed25519 from the passphrase, or a passkey assertion whose WebAuthn challenge *is* the nonce).\n4. **`/seal/v1/reveal`** verifies the proof, writes an append-only reveal-log entry, and mints a short-lived (≤180s) `scope:seal:reveal` capability.\n5. **`/seal/v1/key`** (bearer that capability) passes three fail-closed gates — tenant, capability, live-grant — and returns the still-wrapped content key.\n6. The client unwraps the scope key, unwraps the content key, and decrypts. **None of this touches the server with a readable key.**\n\nPasskey reveal is the same call as `revealWithPasskey({ ..., getAssertion })`, where `getAssertion(nonce)` runs the WebAuthn ceremony.\n\n## Rules the compiler enforces\n\nSealed values are opaque references at rest, so they're fenced off from every surface that would need to read them — these are compile errors:\n\n- **Never** in a view projection, `?search`, or a `masking` rule (there's no plaintext to project, search, or redact — it leaves the system *only* through the reveal rails).\n- No `.filterable()` / `.searchable()` / `.unique()` / defaults / `embeddings.fields` (same reasons as the envelope tier).\n- The table **must** carry a `q.scope('organization')` column — keys are per-scope.\n- Reading a sealed column server-side is a **type error**: the column is branded `$type<SealedValue>()`, an opaque non-string, so `db.select()` on it won't typecheck. The server's structural inability to read it is enforced by `tsc`, not convention.\n- Sealed projects **force-enable** KV-backed JWT revocation (so a revoked reader's in-flight reveal token dies); a project with sealed columns and no KV binding **fails to compile**.\n- Database provider must be **Cloudflare D1** or **Neon over HTTP** (the Cloudflare default) — anything else fails to compile. On Neon, the seal/vault tables carry **deny-all row-level security for request connections**: only the worker-internal service-role lane (the generated `/seal/v1` routes, `ctx.seal`, and the sealed write chokepoint) can touch them, and every one of those queries is still explicitly organization-scoped.\n\n## What this tier does and doesn't claim\n\nThe sealed tier protects against **full Worker compromise** — leaked secrets, malicious or buggy server code, a coerced operator. All of them get ciphertext; the keys to read it never exist server-side. What it asks in return:\n\n- **A reveal needs a real second factor.** The vault passphrase (or passkey) is separate from login and never leaves the client. Lose it with no recovery grant and the data is unrecoverable *by design* — that's the guarantee, not a bug. Recovery/escrow and rotation re-granting are roadmap.\n- **No server-side processing.** Your actions can't read, mask, search, or index a sealed value — it's plaintext only in a client that just revealed it. If the server needs to process the field, you want the envelope tier instead.\n- **Passkey reveal** verify logic is in place but should be exercised with a real browser/authenticator before production; the passphrase lane is fully round-trip tested."
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  "title": "feature() — the canonical form",
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ export const DOCS = {
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- "content": "There is **one way to write a feature**: `feature()` — one file, one export, the table and its security contract in a single call. See [feature()](/compiler/definitions/feature) for the full reference.\n\nTwo lower-level forms exist for specific situations, not as alternatives to choose between — both compile to exactly the same runtime, and `feature()` itself is sugar over the first:\n\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form `feature()` expands into. Reach for it only when another file needs to import the table identifier directly (e.g. an action file referencing the table before the default export).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop for bringing an existing Drizzle schema forward, or for dialect-specific column options.\n\nIf you're starting fresh — or you're an agent defining a user's features — use `feature()` for every table.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the expanded form\n\nThis is what `feature()` compiles into. Write it by hand only when another file needs the table identifier as a named export.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Drizzle interop\n\nIf you have an existing Drizzle schema you're bringing forward — or need a dialect-specific column option `q` doesn't expose — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### When Drizzle interop is the right call\n\nDefault to `feature()`. Drop to Drizzle only when:\n\n- You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward\n- You need a Drizzle-specific column option not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types)\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature — so one interop table doesn't force the rest of the project off `feature()`.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated and scheduled for removal. Still compiles with a warning; do not write new code with it — migrate to `feature()` (or `defineTable`).\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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+ "content": "There is **one way to write a feature**: `feature()` — one file, one export, the table and its security contract in a single call. See [feature()](/compiler/definitions/feature) for the full reference.\n\nTwo lower-level forms exist for specific situations, not as alternatives to choose between — both compile to exactly the same runtime, and `feature()` itself is sugar over the first:\n\n- **`q.table()` + `defineTable()`** — the two-export form `feature()` expands into. Reach for it only when another file needs to import the table identifier directly (e.g. an action file referencing the table before the default export).\n- **Drizzle `sqliteTable()` / `pgTable()` + `defineTable()`** — interop for bringing an existing Drizzle schema forward, or for dialect-specific column options.\n\nIf you're starting fresh — or you're an agent defining a user's features — use `feature()` for every table.\n\n## feature() — the one-call form (default)\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport default feature('jobs', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(), // \"draft\" | \"open\" | \"closed\"\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n // firewall block omitted — q.scope('organization') triggers auto-derivation\n // of [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }, { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }].\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nType inference still works — `typeof import('./jobs').default.$infer` gives you the row type. In action files, `import jobs from './jobs'` gives you the same typed handle you'd get from `q.table()`, so `defineActions(jobs, { … })` accepts it unchanged.\n\n## q.table() + defineTable() — the expanded form\n\nThis is what `feature()` compiles into. Write it by hand only when another file needs the table identifier as a named export.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = q.table('jobs', {\n id: q.id(),\n title: q.text().required(),\n department: q.text().required(),\n status: q.text().default('draft').required(),\n salaryMin: q.int().optional(),\n salaryMax: q.int().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n guards: { /* ... */ },\n read: { /* ... */ },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$infer;\n```\n\nProduces byte-identical output to the `feature()` form above — the compiler expands `feature()` to exactly this shape internally. Use whichever reads better for the file you're writing.\n\nA few mechanics to know:\n\n- **Column names** default to snake_case of the JS key — `organizationId` ↔ `organization_id`, `salaryMin` ↔ `salary_min`. Pass a positional argument to override: `q.text('custom_name')`.\n- **`q.id()`** emits `text('id').primaryKey()` with a provider-driven app-layer default.\n- **`.required()` / `.optional()`** control NOT NULL. Chain before or after `.default(x)`.\n- **References:** `q.text().required().references(() => other.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' })`.\n- **Indexes:** column-level `.index()` or table-level `indexes` / `unique` as a third arg to `q.table(name, cols, { indexes, unique })`. With `feature()`, pass `indexes` and `unique` as top-level keys alongside `columns` — the sugar forwards them into the same `q.table` opts.\n\n### Column Types\n\n| Builder | Drizzle equivalent | Zod type |\n|---------|---------------------|----------|\n| `q.text()` | `text(...)` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.url()` | `text(...)` | `z.string().url()` |\n| `q.int()` | `integer(...)` | `z.number().int()` |\n| `q.bool()` | `boolean(...)` | `z.boolean()` |\n| `q.uuid()` | `uuid(...)` | `z.string().uuid()` |\n| `q.timestamp()` | `timestamp(...)` (converted to SQLite `text` on sqlite targets) | `z.coerce.date()` |\n| `q.json()` | `jsonb(...)` | `z.unknown()` (or the type you pass in) |\n| `q.enum(['a','b'])` | `text(..., { enum: [...] })` | `z.enum([...])` |\n| `q.id()` | `text('id').primaryKey()` | `z.string()` |\n| `q.scope(kind)` | `text(...).notNull()` | `z.string()` |\n\n`q.text()` and `q.url()` accept either a SQL-name string or an options object — `q.text({ sqlName: 'org_id', maxLength: 80 })`. `maxLength` adds `z.string().max(n)` at the validation edge; the SQL column stays `text` (D1 ignores `VARCHAR(n)` length anyway).\n\n`q.url()` is `q.text()` plus `z.string().url()` at the validation edge, so `javascript:` / `data:` URIs and free-form strings are rejected before they ever land in storage or get rendered in the CMS.\n\n`q.id()` emits a plain text primary key. Actual ID assignment at insert time is driven by the provider's `generateId` setting. This keeps q's output decoupled from any specific ID library.\n\nFor `generateId: \"cuid\"`, there is one important nuance: import-capable runtime\npaths can emit real `createId()` usage, but compiler-managed schema\nauto-injection may keep the same `createId()` call site and back it with a\nfile-local `crypto.randomUUID()` polyfill so schema-generation sandboxes do not\ndepend on project `node_modules`.\n\n### q.scope() — tenant scope columns\n\n`q.scope(kind)` is the canonical way to declare a column that holds a tenant-scope value (org / owner / team). It compiles to `text(...).notNull()` like a regular required text column, plus metadata that the compiler reads to:\n\n1. **Auto-derive the firewall predicate** — `q.scope('organization')` produces `[{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` so you can omit the explicit `firewall:` block. (If `deletedAt` is present — and it is whenever the resource uses soft delete, which is the default — the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate is appended automatically.)\n2. **Reject the column from client input** — scope fields land in `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` alongside the audit fields, so `POST { organizationId: 'org_other' }` returns 400 even if guards aren't otherwise configured.\n3. **Auto-populate on create / upsert** — the value is taken from the request context, not the request body.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nOverride the context source for non-default sources:\n\n```typescript\nownerId: q.scope('owner', { source: 'ctx.userId' }),\n```\n\n`q.scope()` is preferred over `q.text().required()` for tenant columns. Auto-detection on column names (`organizationId`, `userId`, etc.) still works as a fallback for projects bringing forward Drizzle schemas, but the explicit `q.scope()` form locks in the semantics in the source.\n\n### Naming Convention\n\nBy default, `q` picks the SQL column name from the JS key using the target database's conventional casing. Both `cloudflare-d1` and `neon` default to **`snake_case`** (`organizationId` → `organization_id`).\n\nYou can override for any project by setting `namingConvention` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default {\n providers: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n namingConvention: 'camelCase', // keep JS-style names in the SQL\n },\n },\n },\n};\n```\n\nFor one-off overrides on a specific column, pass an explicit name as the positional argument:\n\n```ts\norganizationId: q.scope('organization', { sqlName: 'org_id' }), // SQL name: 'org_id'\n```\n\n## Drizzle interop\n\nIf you have an existing Drizzle schema you're bringing forward — or need a dialect-specific column option `q` doesn't expose — use `pgTable` / `sqliteTable` / `mysqlTable` directly:\n\n| Target Database | Import From | Table Function |\n|-----------------|-------------|----------------|\n| Cloudflare D1, Turso, SQLite | `drizzle-orm/sqlite-core` | `sqliteTable` |\n| Supabase, Neon, PostgreSQL | `drizzle-orm/pg-core` | `pgTable` |\n| PlanetScale, MySQL | `drizzle-orm/mysql-core` | `mysqlTable` |\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/jobs.ts\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n department: text('department').notNull(),\n status: text('status').notNull(),\n salaryMin: integer('salary_min'),\n salaryMax: integer('salary_max'),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: {\n createable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\", \"salaryMin\", \"salaryMax\"],\n updatable: [\"title\", \"department\", \"status\"],\n },\n create: { /* ... */ },\n update: { /* ... */ },\n delete: { /* ... */ },\n});\n\nexport type Job = typeof jobs.$inferSelect;\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle (rather than `q.scope()`), declare the firewall as a predicate array. Auto-detection still works on column names (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `teamId`) so you can omit `firewall:` entirely if exactly one isolation column is present.\n\n### When Drizzle interop is the right call\n\nDefault to `feature()`. Drop to Drizzle only when:\n\n- You already have Drizzle schemas to bring forward\n- You need a Drizzle-specific column option not yet in `q` (e.g., `decimal`, `varchar` with length, dialect-specific types)\n\nFeatures in the same project may mix freely — Quickback dispatches per feature — so one interop table doesn't force the rest of the project off `feature()`.\n\nOne dialect rule: interop files **without** a `defineTable(...)` default export (internal child tables) are not dialect-translated — author them in the target database's dialect. On Postgres providers (Neon, Supabase), a `sqliteTable` interop source without `defineTable` is a compile-time error; write it with `pgTable` from `drizzle-orm/pg-core` instead. Sources **with** `defineTable(...)` keep compiling across dialects automatically.\n\n### Drizzle Column Types\n\nDrizzle supports all standard SQL column types:\n\n| Type | Drizzle Function | Example |\n|------|------------------|---------|\n| String | `text()`, `varchar()` | `text('name')` |\n| Integer | `integer()`, `bigint()` | `integer('count')` |\n| Boolean | `boolean()` | `boolean('is_active')` |\n| Timestamp | `timestamp()` | `timestamp('created_at')` |\n| JSON | `json()`, `jsonb()` | `jsonb('metadata')` |\n| UUID | `uuid()` | `uuid('id')` |\n| Decimal | `decimal()`, `numeric()` | `decimal('price', { precision: 10, scale: 2 })` |\n\n### Drizzle Column Modifiers\n\n```typescript\n// Required field\nname: text('name').notNull()\n\n// Default value\nisActive: boolean('is_active').default(true)\n\n// Primary key\nid: text('id').primaryKey()\n\n// Unique constraint\nemail: text('email').unique()\n\n// Default to current timestamp\ncreatedAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow()\n```\n\n## File Organization\n\nOrganize your tables by feature. Each feature directory contains table files:\n\n```\nquickback/\n├── quickback.config.ts\n└── features/\n ├── jobs/\n │ ├── jobs.ts # Main table + config\n │ ├── applications.ts # Related table + config\n │ └── actions.ts # Custom actions\n ├── candidates/\n │ ├── candidates.ts # Table + config\n │ └── candidate-notes.ts # Related table\n └── organizations/\n └── organizations.ts\n```\n\n**Key points:**\n- Tables with `export default defineTable(...)` get resource routes generated\n- Tables without a default export are internal (no routes, used for joins/relations)\n- Route paths are derived from filenames: `applications.ts` → `/api/v1/applications`\n\n### defineTable vs defineResource\n\n- **`defineTable`** — The standard function for defining tables with generated API routes\n- **`defineResource`** — Deprecated and scheduled for removal. Still compiles with a warning; do not write new code with it — migrate to `feature()` (or `defineTable`).\n\n```typescript\n// Preferred:\nexport default defineTable(jobs, { /* config */ });\n```\n\n## 1 Resource = 1 Security Boundary\n\nEach `defineTable()` call defines a complete, self-contained security boundary. The security config you write — firewall, access, guards, and masking — is compiled into a single resource file that wraps all generated routes for that table.\n\nThis is a deliberate design choice. Mixing two resources with different security rules in one configuration would create ambiguity about which firewall, access, or masking rules apply to which table. By keeping it 1:1, there's never any question.\n\n| Scenario | What to do |\n|----------|------------|\n| Table needs its own API routes + security | Own file with `defineTable()` |\n| Table is internal/supporting (no direct API) | Extra `.ts` file in the parent feature directory, no `defineTable()` |\n\nA supporting table without `defineTable()` is useful when it's accessed internally — by action handlers, joins, or background jobs — but should never be directly exposed as its own API endpoint.\n\n## Internal Tables (No Routes)\n\nFor junction tables or internal data structures that shouldn't have API routes, simply omit the `defineTable` export. Add a `// @quickback-internal` marker so the compiler skips the \"no defineTable found\" warning:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/jobs/interview-scores.ts\n\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no routes intentionally.\n\nexport const interviewScores = sqliteTable('interview_scores', {\n applicationId: text('application_id').notNull(),\n interviewerId: text('interviewer_id').notNull(),\n score: integer('score'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(), // Scope junction tables for cascade soft-deletes\n});\n\n// No default export = no routes generated\n```\n\nThese internal tables still participate in the database schema and migrations — they just don't get API routes or security configuration. Without the `@quickback-internal` marker the compiler emits a warning per table, since the missing `defineTable` is more often a bug than a deliberate choice.\n\nThe compiler automatically injects the four **[audit fields](#audit-fields)** (`createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy`), the soft-delete pair (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`, when soft delete is enabled), and **`organizationId`** into child/junction tables when the parent feature is org-scoped. This ensures cascade soft deletes and scoped queries work correctly without manual column definitions.\n\n## Audit Fields\n\nQuickback adds four audit columns to **every table** (including child/junction tables without `defineTable`) — never declare them in your schemas:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `createdAt` | timestamp | Set on insert |\n| `createdBy` | text | Actor that performed the insert (`ctx.userId`) |\n| `modifiedAt` | timestamp | Set on every insert and update |\n| `modifiedBy` | text | Actor that performed the latest insert/update (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nAudit fields are a separate concept from soft-delete (`deletedAt`/`deletedBy`) — they're always present, regardless of delete mode. See [Soft-Delete Fields](#soft-delete-fields) below.\n\nOpt out of audit injection entirely with `compiler.features.auditFields: false` in `quickback.config.ts`. (You almost never want to.)\n\n### How auto-injection works (two layers)\n\n\"Auto-injection\" covers two distinct steps. Conflating them is the most common source of confusion:\n\n1. **Schema injection (compile-time)** — the compiler adds the four columns to every Drizzle table. Idempotent: if you've authored a column with the same name yourself, the compiler leaves yours alone.\n2. **Runtime injection (per-write)** — a Proxy around the request-context `db` (`createAuditDb`, generated to `src/lib/audit-wrapper.ts`) intercepts `.insert(...).values(...)` and `.update(...).set(...)` and writes the audit columns from `ctx.userId` and the actual write moment.\n\nThe runtime layer **hard-stamps** every audit field on every write. Caller-supplied values for `createdAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedAt`/`modifiedBy` are silently overwritten. This is intentional: the audit log can never be forged by a crafted request body or by a client echoing a row back into a PATCH.\n\n```ts\n// In a custom action handler — caller cannot fake audit attribution\nawait db.insert(records).values({\n id: createId(),\n status: 'active',\n createdBy: 'admin', // ← ignored; wrapper writes ctx.userId\n modifiedAt: '1999-01-01', // ← ignored; wrapper writes \"now\"\n});\n```\n\nWhat the caller is responsible for: `id` (the framework doesn't mint ids for you) and the domain fields.\n\nWhat the caller does *not* need to set: any of the four audit fields, ever.\n\n### Actors: who shows up in `createdBy` / `modifiedBy`\n\nThe wrapper writes whatever string is in `ctx.userId`. For user-driven requests this is the authenticated user's id — set by auth middleware before the handler runs. For non-user-driven entry points (inbound webhooks, cron, queue workers), you mint a synthetic actor id at the boundary so the audit log preserves provenance.\n\n**Inherit before you mint.** If a real user's request triggers cascades, hooks, or enqueues background jobs, every downstream write should carry that user's id — not a synthetic one. The cascade is part of the user's action. Only mint when there is genuinely no upstream user.\n\nWhen you do mint, use a single namespace and a stable convention:\n\n| Boundary | Actor id |\n|----------|----------|\n| Inbound webhook | `system:webhook-<provider>` (e.g. `system:webhook-stripe`) |\n| Scheduled / cron | `system:cron-<job>` (e.g. `system:cron-cleanup-stale`) |\n| Queue worker | `system:queue-<queue>` (e.g. `system:queue-embeddings-retry`) |\n| Quickback platform-internal write with no user upstream | `system:quickback` |\n| Out-of-band operator script | `system:script-<name>` |\n\nThe `system:` prefix marks \"not a real user\" — readable by anyone joining the audit columns to `users`, and cheap to filter on. Don't use `tenant:admin` or `quickback:admin`: those imply a human role nobody is actually playing. The tenant context is already on the row (in `organizationId`); the actor id is purely about *source*.\n\n### Failure mode: missing `ctx.userId`\n\nIf a write reaches the wrapper without a `ctx.userId`, the wrapper throws:\n\n```\naudit-wrapper: insert reached without ctx.userId.\nIf this is an intentional system-side write, use the unwrapped db directly.\n```\n\nTwo paths to fix it, depending on intent:\n\n- **Mint a synthetic actor** (preferred — preserves attribution) — populate `ctx.userId` with one of the conventions above before calling into your handler.\n- **Bypass the wrapper entirely** — use the unwrapped `createDb` instead of the request-context `db`. Use this only for migrations, schema repair, or backfill scripts where you genuinely don't want any audit attribution. The audit columns will fall back to DB defaults (`createdAt`/`modifiedAt` populate from `defaultNow()`; `createdBy`/`modifiedBy` end up `NULL`).\n\n### Disabling Audit Fields\n\nTo disable automatic audit fields for your project:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: false, // Disable for entire project\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\nThis turns off both layers — schema injection and the runtime wrapper.\n\n## Soft-Delete Fields\n\n`deletedAt` and `deletedBy` are **not** audit fields. They're a separate, per-table mechanism for soft delete:\n\n| Field | Type | Description |\n|-------|------|-------------|\n| `deletedAt` | timestamp | Set when the record is soft-deleted |\n| `deletedBy` | text | Actor that performed the soft delete (`ctx.userId`) |\n\nThe compiler injects them only when the resource uses soft delete — i.e. when neither `delete.mode` nor `delete.batch.mode` is explicitly `'hard'`. Soft is the default, so most tables get the columns. Tables with both delete paths set to `'hard'` skip them entirely, which also drops the `isNull(deletedAt)` predicate from the firewall WHERE clause.\n\n```typescript\n// soft delete (default) — table gets deletedAt + deletedBy\ndelete: {}\n\n// hard delete — no deletedAt/deletedBy columns, no soft-delete predicate\ndelete: { mode: 'hard', batch: { mode: 'hard' } }\n```\n\n### Caller contract\n\nIn custom-action handlers, **passing `deletedAt` in `.set({})` is the signal** that this update is a soft delete. Any value works — the wrapper detects the field and overwrites both `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` with `now` and `ctx.userId`:\n\n```ts\nawait db.update(records)\n .set({ deletedAt: new Date() }) // signal — value is overwritten\n .where(eq(records.id, id));\n```\n\nYou don't set `deletedBy` yourself; the wrapper pairs it with the `deletedAt` signal.\n\n### Protected system fields\n\nThe audit and soft-delete columns are always protected from client input, even with `guards: false`:\n\n- `id` (when `generateId` is not `false`)\n- `createdAt`, `createdBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy` *(audit — always present)*\n- `deletedAt`, `deletedBy` *(soft-delete — present when delete mode allows soft)*\n\nProtection is enforced by the runtime wrapper — even if a request body passes one of these, it gets overwritten before the SQL is built.\n\n## Auto-Indexes\n\nThe compiler injects performance-critical indexes you'd otherwise have to author by hand. The pass runs after audit-field injection (so `deletedAt` is present) and is idempotent — if you already declared a matching index it's left alone.\n\n| Trigger | Index | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Tenant column (`organizationId` / `organisationId` / `userId`) + `deletedAt` | Composite `(<isolation_col>, deletedAt)` | Every list query filters by isolation AND `deletedAt IS NULL` — a composite index lets D1/SQLite prune both predicates in one btree walk. |\n| Any FK column (`.references(() => other.id)`) | Single-column `(<fk_col>)` | SQLite/D1 don't auto-index FK columns, and the generated FK existence checks read by id on the parent. |\n| Any column that appears in a view's `read.query.sortable` allowlist (or `defaultSort`) | Single-column `(<col>)` | Sort scans go through an index instead of a full-table scan. |\n\nIndexes are emitted into the table's Drizzle extras callback (`(t) => ({ ... })`) and named `<table>_<col>_idx` (or `<table>_<col1>_<col2>_idx` for the composite). The `index` import is added to your schema's `drizzle-orm/<dialect>-core` import line if it isn't already there.\n\nYou can opt out of any auto-injected index by declaring your own with the same name or column set — the injector treats both as already-present and skips.\n\n## Ownership Fields\n\nFor the firewall to work, declare a tenant-scope column. With `q.scope()` (recommended), the compiler auto-derives the firewall predicate, marks the column as system-managed, and auto-populates it on create:\n\n```typescript\n// q DSL (recommended)\norganizationId: q.scope('organization') // → ctx.activeOrgId\nownerId: q.scope('owner') // → ctx.userId\nteamId: q.scope('team') // → ctx.activeTeamId\n```\n\nWhen using Drizzle directly, declare a regular column. Auto-detection picks it up by name; `q.scope()` semantics (systemManaged, auto-populate) still apply because they're keyed off the firewall predicate, not the column DSL:\n\n```typescript\n// Drizzle interop\norganizationId: text('organization_id').notNull()\nownerId: text('owner_id').notNull()\nteamId: text('team_id').notNull()\n```\n\n## Display Column\n\nWhen a table has foreign key columns (e.g., `departmentId` referencing `departments`), Quickback can automatically resolve the human-readable label in GET and LIST responses. This eliminates the need for frontend lookup calls.\n\n### Auto-Detection\n\nQuickback auto-detects the display column by checking for common column names in this order:\n\n`name` → `title` → `label` → `headline` → `subject` → `code` → `displayName` → `fullName` → `description`\n\nIf your `departments` table has a `name` column, it's automatically used as the display column. No config needed.\n\n### Explicit Override\n\nOverride the auto-detected column with `displayColumn`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(interviewStages, {\n displayColumn: 'label', // Use 'label' instead of auto-detected 'name'\n read: { access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n});\n```\n\n### Default Sort\n\nSet a default sort order for the CMS table list view with `defaultSort`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n defaultSort: { field: \"createdAt\", order: \"desc\" },\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } },\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS applies this sort when the table first loads. Users can still click column headers to change the sort order.\n\n### How Labels Appear in Responses\n\nFor any FK column ending in `Id`, the API adds a `_label` field with the resolved display value:\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"job_abc\",\n \"title\": \"Senior Engineer\",\n \"departmentId\": \"dept_xyz\",\n \"department_label\": \"Engineering\",\n \"locationId\": \"loc_123\",\n \"location_label\": \"San Francisco\"\n}\n```\n\nThe pattern is `{columnWithoutId}_label`. The frontend can find all labels with:\n\n```typescript\nObject.keys(record).filter(k => k.endsWith('_label'))\n```\n\nLabel resolution works within the same feature (tables in the same feature directory). System columns (`organizationId`, `createdBy`, `modifiedBy`) are never resolved.\n\nFor LIST endpoints, labels are batch-resolved efficiently — one query per FK column, not per record.\n\n## References\n\nWhen your FK columns don't match the target table name by convention (e.g., `vendorId` actually points to the `contact` table), declare explicit references so the CMS and schema registry know the correct target:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n references: {\n candidateId: \"candidate\",\n jobId: \"job\",\n referredById: \"candidate\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nEach key is a column name ending in `Id`, and the value is the camelCase table name it references. These mappings flow into the schema registry as `fkTarget` on each column, enabling the CMS to render typeahead/lookup inputs that search the correct table.\n\nConvention-based matching (strip `Id` suffix, look for a matching table) still works for simple cases like `projectId` → `project`. Use `references` only for columns where the convention doesn't match.\n\n## Input Hints\n\nControl how the CMS renders form inputs for specific columns. By default the CMS infers input types from the column's SQL type — `inputHints` lets you override that:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(jobs, {\n inputHints: {\n status: \"select\",\n department: \"select\",\n salaryMin: \"currency\",\n salaryMax: \"currency\",\n description: \"richtext\",\n },\n // ... firewall, guards, crud\n});\n```\n\n### Available Hint Values\n\n| Hint | Renders As |\n|------|-----------|\n| `richtext` | Rich text editor (tiptap) — bold, italic, headings, lists, links. Stores HTML. Lazy-loaded in edit mode, rendered as formatted HTML in view mode. |\n| `select` | Dropdown select (single value) |\n| `multi-select` | Multi-value select |\n| `radio` | Radio button group |\n| `checkbox` | Checkbox toggle |\n| `textarea` | Multi-line text input |\n| `lookup` | FK typeahead search |\n| `hidden` | Hidden from forms |\n| `color` | Color picker |\n| `date` | Date picker |\n| `datetime` | Date + time picker |\n| `time` | Time picker |\n| `currency` | Currency input with formatting |\n\nInput hints are emitted in the schema registry as `inputHints` on the table metadata, and the CMS reads them to render the appropriate form controls.\n\n### Rich Text Example\n\nFor fields that contain HTML content (e.g., blog posts, descriptions from RSS feeds), use `\"richtext\"`:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(podcastEpisodes, {\n inputHints: { description: \"richtext\" },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThe CMS will:\n- **View mode**: Render the HTML with proper formatting (headings, lists, links, etc.)\n- **Edit mode**: Load a tiptap rich text editor with a toolbar (bold, italic, H2, H3, bullet/ordered lists, links, code, undo/redo)\n- **Storage**: HTML strings — no format conversion needed, compatible with external HTML content\n\n## Relations (Optional)\n\nDrizzle supports defining relations for type-safe joins:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobsRelations = relations(jobs, ({ one, many }) => ({\n organization: one(organizations, {\n fields: [jobs.organizationId],\n references: [organizations.id],\n }),\n applications: many(applications),\n}));\n```\n\n## Database Configuration\n\nConfigure database options in your Quickback config:\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-app',\n providers: {\n database: defineDatabase('cloudflare-d1', {\n generateId: 'prefixed', // 'uuid' | 'cuid' | 'nanoid' | 'short' | 'prefixed' | 'serial' | false\n namingConvention: 'snake_case', // 'camelCase' | 'snake_case'\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: 'users' vs 'user'\n }),\n },\n compiler: {\n features: {\n auditFields: true, // Auto-manage audit timestamps\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Choosing Your Dialect\n\nUse the Drizzle dialect that matches your database provider:\n\n### SQLite (Cloudflare D1)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = sqliteTable('jobs', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: text('metadata', { mode: 'json' }), // JSON stored as text\n isOpen: integer('is_open', { mode: 'boolean' }).default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### PostgreSQL (Neon)\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const jobs = pgTable('jobs', {\n id: serial('id').primaryKey(),\n title: text('title').notNull(),\n metadata: jsonb('metadata'), // Native JSONB\n isOpen: boolean('is_open').default(false),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\n### Key Differences\n\n| Feature | SQLite | PostgreSQL |\n|---------|--------|------------|\n| Boolean | `integer({ mode: 'boolean' })` | `boolean()` |\n| JSON | `text({ mode: 'json' })` | `jsonb()` or `json()` |\n| Auto-increment | `integer().primaryKey()` | `serial()` |\n| UUID | `text()` | `uuid()` |\n\n## Next Steps\n\n- [Configure the firewall](/compiler/definitions/firewall) for data isolation\n- [Set up access control](/compiler/definitions/access) for read and write operations\n- [Define guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) for field modification rules\n- [Add custom actions](/compiler/definitions/actions) for business logic"
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- "content": "Neon provides serverless PostgreSQL that works with Cloudflare Workers via HTTP connections. Choose Neon when you need PostgreSQL features (JSON operators, full-text search, advanced indexing) or want database-level Row Level Security alongside the generated Hono API.\n\n## Why Neon\n\n- **Full PostgreSQL** — Advanced queries, joins, PostGIS, full-text search\n- **Database-level security** — RLS policies enforce access even if the API is bypassed\n- **Serverless** — HTTP connection mode for Cloudflare Workers\n- **Neon Authorize** — JWT-based RLS via the `auth.user_id()` function\n- **Better Auth integration** — Works seamlessly with the Quickback auth provider\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"auto\", // detects runtime\n pooled: true,\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Connection modes\n\n| Mode | Best for | How it works |\n|------|----------|--------------|\n| **HTTP** | Cloudflare Workers, edge functions | Stateless HTTP queries via `@neondatabase/serverless` |\n| **WebSocket** | Node.js, Bun | Persistent WebSocket connection for lower latency |\n| **Auto** (default) | Mixed environments | Detects runtime and picks the best mode |\n\n## Environment variables\n\n```bash\n# For Cloudflare Workers\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL\n# Paste: postgresql://user:pwd@ep-xxx.region.neon.tech/db?sslmode=require\n\n# For local development (.env)\nDATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:pwd@ep-xxx.region.neon.tech/db?sslmode=require\n```\n\n## Migrations\n\nNeon uses PostgreSQL migrations, distinct from D1's SQLite migrations:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile # generates migrations under quickback/drizzle/\nnpm run db:migrate # applies them — schema AND the RLS layer\n```\n\nThe RLS layer (helper functions, policies, triggers) rides the same\njournaled migration set as your schema (v0.45+): the compiler appends a\ncontent-addressed `<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>` migration, so one\n`db:migrate` applies everything in order. The RLS migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create) and only a *changed* security config\nappends a new entry — recompiles with unchanged security append nothing. No\nmanual SQL application step exists anymore.\n\n## Row Level Security\n\nQuickback emits RLS policies from your `firewall` and `access` config. The Neon target uses Neon Authorize's `auth.user_id()` JWT claim function (the Supabase target uses `auth.uid()` instead — same pattern, different function).\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n]\n```\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"documents_select\" ON documents FOR SELECT\nUSING (\n organization_id = get_active_org_id()\n AND (has_any_role(ARRAY['admin']) OR user_id = auth.user_id())\n);\n```\n\n### Firewall patterns\n\n**Organization-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"projects_select\" ON projects FOR SELECT\nUSING (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id());\n```\n\n**User-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"preferences_select\" ON preferences FOR SELECT\nUSING (user_id = auth.user_id());\n```\n\n**Public tables:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_deny_anon\" ON categories FOR ALL TO anon USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_all\" ON categories FOR ALL TO authenticated USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);\n```\n\n### Helper functions\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n|----------|---------|\n| `get_active_org_id()` | Returns the user's active organization from `user_sessions` |\n| `has_any_role(roles[])` | Checks if the user has any specified role |\n| `has_org_role(role)` | Checks for a single specific role |\n| `is_org_member()` | Checks org membership |\n| `is_owner(owner_id)` | Checks record ownership |\n\nAll helpers are TEXT-typed to match Better Auth's prefixed ids\n(`org_abc123`). The `user_sessions` table the org helpers read is\ncompiler-owned migration state (`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`), created by\nthe journaled migrations and kept in sync automatically: generated Better\nAuth session hooks mirror the session's active organization (and team) into\nit on every session create/update. Switching to \"no org\" revokes SQL-side\naccess — fail closed.\n\nRLS coverage includes Better Auth's own tables — including those the\ncompiler force-enables (organization, admin, `apikeys`; plus the OAuth/agent\ntable families when those surfaces are on, locked to service-role only).\n\n## Setting up Neon Authorize\n\n1. Open **Project Settings → Authorize** in the Neon console\n2. Add your JWKS URL: `https://your-api.example.com/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json`\n3. The `auth.user_id()` function will return the authenticated user's ID from the JWT\n\n## Generated files\n\n```\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── 0000_<name>.sql # schema migrations (drizzle-kit)\n├── 0001_quickback_rls_<hash>.sql # journaled RLS layer (content-addressed)\n└── meta/_journal.json # one journal covers both\nsrc/\n├── db/schema.ts # Drizzle schema barrel\n├── db/rls-support.schema.ts # user_sessions + RLS support tables\n└── auth/schema.ts # Better Auth schema (owned by the BA CLI)\n```\n\n## When to choose Neon vs D1\n\n| Factor | Neon | D1 |\n|--------|------|-----|\n| SQL dialect | PostgreSQL | SQLite |\n| Security model | RLS + application-layer | Application-layer only |\n| Multi-region | Built-in replication | Single region per database |\n| Pricing | Free tier, then usage-based | Free tier, then usage-based |\n| Best for | Complex queries, existing Postgres apps | Edge-first, simple schemas |\n\n## See also\n\n- [D1](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1) — SQLite at the edge\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — All database provider options"
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+ "content": "Neon provides serverless PostgreSQL that works with Cloudflare Workers via HTTP connections. Choose Neon when you need PostgreSQL features (JSON operators, full-text search, advanced indexing) or want database-level Row Level Security alongside the generated Hono API.\n\n## Why Neon\n\n- **Full PostgreSQL** — Advanced queries, joins, PostGIS, full-text search\n- **Database-level security** — RLS policies enforce access even if the API is bypassed\n- **Serverless** — HTTP connection mode (`@neondatabase/serverless`) for Cloudflare Workers\n- **Worker-scoped RLS** — the Worker verifies each caller, then writes the trusted user/org/team context into transaction-local Postgres settings that RLS policies read (see [How Worker-scoped RLS works](#how-worker-scoped-rls-works))\n- **Better Auth integration** — Works seamlessly with the Quickback auth provider\n\n## One database for auth and features\n\nQuickback uses a single database provider per app. On Neon, Better Auth tables\nand feature tables live in the same Postgres database: Better Auth runs on its\nPostgreSQL/Drizzle adapter, and everything connects through one `DATABASE_URL`.\nThere is no `AUTH_DATABASE_URL`, and split-database mode is a D1-only option.\n\nMixing providers — for example D1 for auth with Neon for features — is not\nsupported. The per-service config form is rejected at compile time:\n\n```\nproviders.database service-map form is not supported in v2.\nConfigure one database provider; auth and feature data use the same database.\n```\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript title=\"quickback/quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"auto\", // detects runtime\n pooled: true,\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Connection modes\n\n| Mode | Best for | How it works |\n|------|----------|--------------|\n| **HTTP** | Cloudflare Workers, edge functions | Stateless HTTP queries via `@neondatabase/serverless` |\n| **WebSocket** | Node.js, Bun | Persistent WebSocket connection (`drizzle-orm/neon-serverless`) |\n| **Auto** (default) | Mixed environments | Detects runtime: `http` on `cloudflare`, `websocket` on Node/Bun |\n\nOn the Cloudflare runtime, `auto` resolves to **HTTP** — this is the mode the\nrest of this page assumes. The generated Worker uses `@neondatabase/serverless`\nover HTTP; there is no Hyperdrive binding.\n\n## Environment variables\n\nThree connection points, each read by a different tool:\n\n| Where | File / store | Read by |\n|-------|--------------|---------|\n| Migrations (local/CI) | `.env` | `drizzle-kit` |\n| `wrangler dev` (local Worker) | `.dev.vars` | Wrangler |\n| Production Worker | `wrangler secret put` | The deployed Worker |\n\nThe compiler emits `.env.neon.example` and `.dev.vars.example` as templates,\nand gitignores `.dev.vars` so local secrets are never committed.\n\n```bash\n# Migrations read .env — copy the template and fill it in:\ncp .env.neon.example .env\n# .env holds:\n# DATABASE_URL — pooled quickback (runtime) role URL\n# DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL — unpooled quickback_admin role URL (optional)\n\n# wrangler dev reads .dev.vars (NOT .env) — copy the template:\ncp .dev.vars.example .dev.vars # gitignored; holds DATABASE_URL + BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n\n# Production: secrets live in Worker secrets, never in files:\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL # pooled quickback role URL\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n```\n\n`DATABASE_URL` is the only connection string the Worker needs at runtime — auth\nand feature queries share it. `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` is used **only** by\n`drizzle-kit`: the generated `drizzle.config.ts` reads\n`process.env.DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL ?? process.env.DATABASE_URL`, so migrations\nrun as the privileged `quickback_admin` role when it is set and fall back to\n`DATABASE_URL` when it is not. Never deploy `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` to the\nWorker.\n\n## Better Auth schema generation\n\n`src/auth/schema.ts` is owned by the Better Auth CLI. The generated `build`\nscript regenerates it before typechecking:\n\n```bash\nnpm run build # runs auth:schema, then tsc\n```\n\n`auth:schema` expands to:\n\n```bash\nnpx better-auth generate --config ./src/lib/auth.ts --output ./src/auth/schema.ts --yes \\\n && node scripts/quickback-qualify-auth-schema.mjs\n```\n\nThe qualifier script adjusts the CLI output for Postgres schema placement.\nDon't hand-edit `src/auth/schema.ts` — regenerate it instead.\n\n## Migrations\n\nNeon uses PostgreSQL migrations, distinct from D1's SQLite migrations. One\nDrizzle journal covers auth tables, feature tables, indexes, FK/cascade\nsemantics, and the RLS layer:\n\n```bash\nquickback compile # generates migrations under quickback/drizzle/\nnpm run db:migrate # applies schema AND the RLS layer, in order\n```\n\nThe RLS layer (helper functions, policies, triggers) rides the same\njournaled migration set as your schema: the compiler appends a\ncontent-addressed `<idx>_quickback_rls_<hash>` migration, so one\n`db:migrate` applies everything in order. The RLS migration is idempotent\n(`DROP POLICY IF EXISTS` + re-create) and only a *changed* security config\nappends a new entry — recompiles with unchanged security append nothing. No\nmanual SQL application step exists.\n\n## How Worker-scoped RLS works\n\nQuickback does **not** send browser or mobile clients directly to Neon, and it\ndoes **not** use Neon Authorize / a JWKS endpoint. Clients authenticate with the\nCloudflare Worker; the Worker verifies the Better Auth session or API key, runs\nthe access checks, and then performs the database call as a trusted proxy.\n\nFor every feature-table query, the generated database client opens a Neon HTTP\nbatch (an implicit transaction) whose **first** statement writes the verified\ncaller context into transaction-local Postgres settings:\n\n```sql\n-- Injected by the Worker as the batch's first statement (is_local = true):\nSELECT\n set_config('quickback.service_role', '', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', 'usr_123', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.org_id', 'org_abc', true),\n set_config('request.jwt.claim.team_id', '', true);\n```\n\nRLS policies read those settings through Quickback-defined helper functions —\nthere is no external JWT verification and no persisted session state in the\ndatabase. `auth.user_id()` is a compiler-generated shim, not a Neon Authorize\nfunction:\n\n```sql\n-- Generated by Quickback (granted to the quickback runtime role):\nCREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth.user_id()\nRETURNS TEXT AS $$\n SELECT NULLIF(current_setting('request.jwt.claim.sub', true), '')\n$$ LANGUAGE SQL STABLE SET search_path = public;\n```\n\nBecause the settings are transaction-local (`set_config(..., true)`), they\napply only to the current batch and never leak between requests. If the Worker\nnever stamps a user id, `auth.user_id()` returns `NULL` and the restrictive\n`deny_anon` policy blocks the query — fail closed.\n\n## Row Level Security\n\nQuickback emits RLS policies from your `firewall` and `access` config. Neon's\npolicies read the transaction-local claims described above via `auth.user_id()`\nand the `get_active_org_id()` / `has_any_role()` helpers (the Supabase target\nuses `auth.uid()` instead — same pattern, different function).\n\n```typescript\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n]\n```\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"documents_select\" ON documents FOR SELECT\nUSING (\n organization_id = public.get_active_org_id()\n AND (public.is_admin() OR user_id = auth.user_id())\n);\n```\n\nEvery feature table also gets a restrictive `deny_anon` policy (blocks queries\nwith no stamped user id) and a `service_role` policy (admits Worker-internal\ncontexts — see [Background jobs and cross-tenant actions](#background-jobs-and-cross-tenant-actions)).\n\n### Firewall patterns\n\n**Organization-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"projects_select\" ON projects FOR SELECT\nUSING (organization_id = public.get_active_org_id());\n```\n\n**User-scoped:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"preferences_select\" ON preferences FOR SELECT\nUSING (user_id = auth.user_id());\n```\n\n**Public tables:**\n\n```sql\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_deny_anon\" ON categories FOR ALL TO anon USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"categories_all\" ON categories FOR ALL TO authenticated USING (true) WITH CHECK (true);\n```\n\n### Helper functions\n\n| Function | Purpose |\n|----------|---------|\n| `auth.user_id()` | Reads the verified user id from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.sub` setting |\n| `get_active_org_id()` | Reads the request-scoped org from the transaction-local `request.jwt.claim.org_id` setting |\n| `get_active_team_id()` | Reads the request-scoped team from `request.jwt.claim.team_id` (teams mode) |\n| `has_any_role(roles[])` | Checks if the user has any specified role in the request org |\n| `has_org_role(role)` | Checks for a single specific role |\n| `is_org_member()` | Checks org membership in the request org |\n| `is_owner(owner_id)` | Checks record ownership against `auth.user_id()` |\n| `is_admin()` | Checks the `auth.admins` table (admin mode) |\n\nAll helpers are TEXT-typed to match Better Auth's prefixed ids (`org_abc123`).\nThe request org/team scope is passed by the Worker **per transaction**, not read\nfrom a persisted mirror. There is no compiler-owned `user_sessions` table and no\nsession hook that syncs the active organization into the database — switching to\n\"no org\" simply means the Worker stamps an empty `request.jwt.claim.org_id`, and\nSQL-side access is revoked immediately. Fail closed.\n\nThe only compiler-owned support tables the RLS layer reads live in\n`src/db/rls-support.schema.ts`: a `profiles` table (populated by the\n`sync_profile_display_name()` trigger and protected by the `profiles_*`\npolicies) and, when admin/sysadmin helpers are emitted, an `admins` table (read\nby `is_admin()` / `is_sysadmin()`). Better Auth's own `sessions` table may still\ncarry an `active_organization_id`, but Quickback RLS never reads it.\n\nRLS coverage includes Better Auth's own tables — including those the compiler\nforce-enables (organization, admin, `apikeys`; plus the OAuth/agent table\nfamilies when those surfaces are on, locked to service-role only).\n\n## Background jobs and cross-tenant actions\n\nSome code runs with no HTTP request and therefore no caller claims: queue\nconsumers, cron schedules, and cross-tenant `unsafe` actions. These acquire the\n**service-role handle** `createServiceDb(env)` from the generated `src/db`\nindex. Instead of caller claims, it sets `quickback.service_role = 'true'` (with\nall request claims cleared) — the same marker the Better Auth adapter's\ntransactions use. Every feature table carries a `<table>_service_role` RLS\npolicy that admits exactly that context, so background work can reach rows\nacross tenants while the request-scoped `createDb()` client stays caller-scoped.\n\nThe service-role marker is only ever set by Worker-internal chokepoints\n(`createServiceDb`, the Better Auth adapter) — it is never derived from request\ninput. Unsafe actions keep their mandatory audit contract: cross-tenant writes\nstill land audit events (the `audit` Postgres schema), unchanged from D1.\n\n## Webhooks on Neon\n\nWebhooks are supported on Neon over HTTP. The store (`webhook_events`,\n`webhook_endpoints`, `webhook_deliveries`) lives in a dedicated `webhooks`\nPostgres schema of the **same** database — following the `audit` schema\nprecedent — so there is no separate `WEBHOOKS_DB` binding.\n\n- Set `webhooksBinding` to enable webhooks. On Neon its value is a pure enable\n flag (no D1 binding is emitted); the queue names stay provider-neutral.\n- The D1-only keys `webhooksDatabaseId` and `webhooksDatabaseName` are rejected\n at compile time — they name a D1 database that cannot exist on Neon.\n- The webhook store is Worker-internal (endpoint signing secrets live there):\n every table in the `webhooks` schema has RLS enabled with a single\n service-role-only policy, so only `createWebhooksDb()` (which wraps\n `createServiceDb`) can touch it. Route handlers gate access at the app layer\n (`requireOrgMember` / endpoint-ownership checks) before querying.\n- Webhooks require `connectionMode: 'http'`.\n\n## Encryption on Neon\n\nThe encryption pillar — `.encrypted()` (envelope) and `.sealed()` /\n`q.vaultRef()` (sealed) columns — is supported on Neon over HTTP. The\n`org_data_keys` and seal-vault tables fold into the single journaled migration\nset, and the encryption RLS section rides the journaled RLS migration:\n`org_data_keys` gets org-scoped RLS (the envelope DEK path needs caller claims),\nand the vault spine is locked to service-role-only. The seal chokepoints\nacquire `createServiceDb`.\n\nBoth tiers require `connectionMode: 'http'`; under WebSocket mode they are a\nfail-closed compile error.\n\n## Batch transactions\n\nWhether a batch handler (`PATCH /batch`, `DELETE /batch`, …) is truly atomic\ndepends on the connection mode, and the response advertises the guarantee via\n`meta.transactional`:\n\n| Mode | `meta.transactional` | Behavior |\n|------|----------------------|----------|\n| Neon HTTP (Cloudflare default) | `false` | Fail-fast per-record loop, no rollback — `drizzle-orm/neon-http` has no interactive transactions, so this matches D1's semantics honestly |\n| Neon WebSocket (Node/Bun) | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the loop; any failure rolls back every write in the batch |\n\n`drizzle-orm/neon-http` throws \"No transactions support in neon-http driver\" at\nruntime, so the HTTP path deliberately treats batches like D1 (fail-fast,\nnon-transactional) rather than emitting code that would 500 on every failed\nbatch. Honest advertisement over runtime surprises.\n\n## Capability limits (fail closed)\n\nAnything not yet ported to Postgres is a compile-time error on Neon, never\nsilently-broken output:\n\n- **Managed file storage** (`fileStorage` with `managed: true`) is rejected — its\n metadata store is a D1 database. Use presign-only R2 (the default, without\n `managed`), which is provider-neutral and works on Neon today.\n- **The Better Auth `subscriptions` plugin** is rejected until it gets\n provider-aware db acquisition and a Postgres dialect schema.\n- **Raw `sqliteTable` interop sources** on a Postgres target are rejected — write\n child tables with `pgTable` (see [below](#raw-drizzle-interop-tables-must-use-pg-core)).\n- **WebSocket mode** rejects webhooks, cross-tenant `unsafe` actions, and\n encrypted/sealed columns (see the [connection modes](#connection-modes)\n callout).\n\nMixed database providers (e.g. D1 auth + Neon features) remain unsupported.\n\n## Deploying\n\nThe generated `deploy` script runs migrations, then ships the Worker:\n\n```bash\nnpm run deploy # runs db:migrate (drizzle-kit) then wrangler deploy\n```\n\nBefore the first deploy, put the runtime secrets in Worker secrets and make sure\nthe Worker's KV namespace (used by Better Auth for sessions and JWT revocation)\nis provisioned:\n\n```bash\nnpx wrangler secret put DATABASE_URL # pooled quickback role URL\nnpx wrangler secret put BETTER_AUTH_SECRET\n```\n\nThe generated Neon client fails fast at boot if `DATABASE_URL` is missing, so a\nmisconfigured deploy surfaces immediately rather than on the first query.\n\n## Generated files\n\n```\nquickback/drizzle/\n├── 0000_<name>.sql # schema migrations (drizzle-kit)\n├── 0001_quickback_rls_<hash>.sql # journaled RLS layer (content-addressed)\n└── meta/_journal.json # one journal covers both\nsrc/\n├── db/index.ts # createDb / createServiceDb (claim-scoped clients)\n├── db/schema.ts # Drizzle schema barrel\n├── db/rls-support.schema.ts # profiles (+ admins) — RLS support tables\n└── auth/schema.ts # Better Auth schema (owned by the BA CLI)\n.env.neon.example # migration connection strings (copy to .env)\n.dev.vars.example # wrangler dev secrets (copy to .dev.vars)\ndocs/neon-setup.md # role bootstrap + deploy walkthrough\n```\n\n## Raw Drizzle interop tables must use `pg-core`\n\nInternal child tables authored as raw Drizzle (a table file with **no**\n`export default defineTable(...)`) are not dialect-translated by the\ncompiler — on Neon they must be written with `pgTable` from\n`drizzle-orm/pg-core`. A `sqliteTable` interop source on a Postgres target\nis a **compile-time error**: the mechanical sqlite→pg rewrite would leave\nSQLite-shaped audit columns (`text` ISO strings instead of `timestamptz`,\nwhich the RLS audit triggers stamp) and SQLite-only column options in the\nPostgres schema.\n\n```typescript\n// quickback/features/interviews/interview_scores.ts\n// @quickback-internal — child table, no CRUD routes\n\nexport const interviewScores = pgTable('interview_scores', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n interviewId: text('interview_id').notNull(),\n rating: integer('rating').notNull(),\n});\n```\n\nTables **with** `defineTable(...)` are unaffected — existing `sqliteTable`\nsources with a resource config still compile to the Postgres dialect\nautomatically.\n\n## When to choose Neon vs D1\n\n| Factor | Neon | D1 |\n|--------|------|-----|\n| SQL dialect | PostgreSQL | SQLite |\n| Security model | RLS + application-layer | Application-layer only |\n| Multi-region | Built-in replication | Single region per database |\n| Pricing | Free tier, then usage-based | Free tier, then usage-based |\n| Best for | Complex queries, existing Postgres apps | Edge-first, simple schemas |\n\n## See also\n\n- [D1](/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1) — SQLite at the edge\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — All database provider options"
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- "content": "Batch operations let you create, update, upsert, or delete multiple records in a single request. They are **auto-enabled** when the corresponding write operation exists in your definition.\n\n## Available Endpoints\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Auto-enabled When |\n|----------|--------|-------------------|\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `POST` | `create` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `PATCH` | `update` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `DELETE` | `delete` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `PUT` | `upsert` exists |\n\nTo disable a batch operation, set it to `false` in your definition:\n\n```typescript\ncreate: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n batch: false, // Disable batch create\n}\n```\n\n## Batch Create\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Strong frontend background\" },\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_202\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Also interested in backend role\" },\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_102\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Referred by employee\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (201 or 207)\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc3\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_102\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"record\": { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_202\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Also interested in backend role\" },\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Database insert failed\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"INSERT_FAILED\",\n \"details\": { \"reason\": \"UNIQUE constraint failed: applications.candidateId, applications.jobId\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n- **201** — All records created successfully\n- **207** — Partial success (some errors, some successes)\n\n`POST /batch` uses a single bulk `INSERT`, so `meta.transactional` is `true` on every provider — the database guarantees the insert is atomic regardless of the `failFast` flag.\n\nFields applied automatically to each record:\n- ID generation (UUID, prefixed, etc.)\n- Ownership fields (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `createdBy`)\n- Audit fields (`createdAt`, `modifiedAt`)\n- Default values and computed fields\n\n## Batch Update\n\n```\nPATCH /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\nEvery record **must include an `id` field**.\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"notes\": \"Passed phone screen, schedule onsite\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"notes\": \"Moved to technical interview round\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\", \"notes\": \"Hiring manager approved offer\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (200 or 207)\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"notes\": \"Passed phone screen, schedule onsite\", \"modifiedAt\": \"2025-01-15T11:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"notes\": \"Moved to technical interview round\", \"modifiedAt\": \"2025-01-15T11:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 2,\n \"record\": { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\", \"notes\": \"Hiring manager approved offer\" },\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Not found\",\n \"layer\": \"firewall\",\n \"code\": \"NOT_FOUND\",\n \"details\": { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\nRecords that don't exist or aren't accessible through the firewall return a `NOT_FOUND` error. Guard rules (immutable, protected, not-updatable fields) are checked per record.\n\n### Missing IDs\n\nIf any records are missing the `id` field, the entire request is rejected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Records missing required ID field\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_MISSING_IDS\",\n \"details\": { \"indices\": [0, 2] },\n \"hint\": \"All records must include an ID field for batch update.\"\n}\n```\n\n## Batch Delete\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_abc1\", \"app_abc2\", \"app_abc3\"],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\nNote: Batch delete uses an `ids` array (not `records`).\n\n### Response (200 or 207)\n\n**Soft delete** (default):\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"deletedAt\": \"2025-01-15T12:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_103\", \"deletedAt\": \"2025-01-15T12:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 2,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 0,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n`DELETE /batch` issues a single bulk `UPDATE … WHERE id IN (...)` (soft delete) or `DELETE … WHERE id IN (...)` (hard delete), so `meta.transactional` is `true` on every provider regardless of `failFast`.\n\n**Hard delete**: Returns objects with only the `id` field (record data is deleted).\n\n## Batch Upsert\n\n```\nPUT /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\nInserts new records or updates existing ones. Every record must include an `id` field.\n\n**Note:** Batch upsert is only available when `generateId` is set to `false` (user-provided IDs) in your configuration.\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_001\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"screening\", \"notes\": \"Updated after phone screen\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_002\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_104\", \"jobId\": \"job_203\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"New application from referral\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (201 or 207)\n\nThe compiler checks which IDs already exist and splits the batch into creates and updates. Create records get ownership and default fields; update records get only `modifiedAt`. Under `failFast: true`, both the bulk insert and the per-record updates run inside the same transaction — a failed update rolls back the inserts too on tx-supporting providers.\n\n## Fail-Fast Mode\n\nBy default, batch operations use **partial success** mode — each record is processed independently, and failures don't affect other records.\n\nSet `\"failFast\": true` to stop on the first error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [...],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Fail-Fast Failure Response (400)\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Batch failed at index 1\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_FAILFAST_STOPPED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"failedAt\": 1,\n \"reason\": \"Database insert failed\",\n \"errorDetails\": { \"reason\": \"UNIQUE constraint failed\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Transactional Semantics\n\nThe behavior of `failFast: true` depends on whether your database provider\nsupports transactions. The response's `meta.transactional` flag tells you\nwhich guarantee you actually got — inspect it in clients that care about\nrollback.\n\n### Per-Provider Matrix\n\n| Endpoint | Provider | `failFast` | `meta.transactional` | Behavior |\n|----------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | neon (Postgres via Hyperdrive) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the per-record loop. Any failure rolls back ALL writes in the batch. |\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | (any) | `false` | `false` | Per-record loop, partial success. Each record commits independently. |\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | cloudflare-d1 | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — D1 has no `db.transaction`. Records before the failure stay committed. |\n| `PUT /batch` (upsert) | tx-supporting | `true` | `true` | Bulk insert + per-record update share one transaction. Any failure rolls back both. |\n| `PUT /batch` (upsert) | cloudflare-d1 | `true` | `false` | Bulk insert commits; per-record update loop is fail-fast without rollback. |\n| `POST /batch` (create) | (any) | (any) | `true` | Single bulk `INSERT` — atomic at the DB level. |\n| `DELETE /batch` | (any) | (any) | `true` | Single bulk `UPDATE` (soft) or `DELETE` (hard) — atomic at the DB level. |\n\n### Reading `meta.transactional` in clients\n\n```typescript\nconst res = await fetch('/api/v1/jobs/batch', {\n method: 'PATCH',\n body: JSON.stringify({ records, options: { failFast: true } }),\n});\nconst body = await res.json();\n\nif (!body.meta.transactional && body.errors.length > 0) {\n // Some records succeeded before the failure and remain committed.\n // Compensate via the success array if needed.\n}\n```\n\n### Embeddings and Realtime\n\nWhen a resource has `embeddings` or `realtime` configured, queue messages\nand broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction commits. A\nrolled-back batch produces no orphan embedding jobs.\n\n## Batch Size Limit\n\nThe default maximum batch size is **100 records**. Requests exceeding the limit are rejected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Batch size limit exceeded\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_SIZE_EXCEEDED\",\n \"details\": { \"max\": 100, \"actual\": 250 },\n \"hint\": \"Maximum 100 records allowed per batch. Split into multiple requests.\"\n}\n```\n\n## Configuration\n\nBatch operations inherit access control from their corresponding write operation. You can override per-batch settings:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n create: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] },\n batch: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] }, // More restrictive than single create\n maxBatchSize: 50, // Default: 100\n allowFailFast: true, // Default: true\n },\n },\n update: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] },\n batch: {\n maxBatchSize: 100,\n allowFailFast: true,\n },\n },\n delete: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n mode: 'soft',\n batch: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n maxBatchSize: 100,\n allowFailFast: true,\n },\n },\n\n // Disable only batch upsert\n upsert: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n batch: false,\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Security\n\nAll security pillars apply to batch operations:\n\n1. **Authentication** — Required for all batch endpoints (401 if missing)\n2. **Firewall** — Applied per-record for update/delete/upsert (not applicable to create)\n3. **Access** — Role-based check using the batch operation's access config\n4. **Guards** — Per-record validation (createable/updatable/immutable fields)\n5. **Masking** — Applied to all records in the success array before response\n\n## See Also\n\n- [CRUD Endpoints](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud) — Single-record operations\n- [Error Responses](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors) — Error format reference\n- [Guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) — Field-level write protection"
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+ "content": "Batch operations let you create, update, upsert, or delete multiple records in a single request. They are **auto-enabled** when the corresponding write operation exists in your definition.\n\n## Available Endpoints\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Auto-enabled When |\n|----------|--------|-------------------|\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `POST` | `create` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `PATCH` | `update` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `DELETE` | `delete` exists |\n| `/{resource}/batch` | `PUT` | `upsert` exists |\n\nTo disable a batch operation, set it to `false` in your definition:\n\n```typescript\ncreate: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n batch: false, // Disable batch create\n}\n```\n\n## Batch Create\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Strong frontend background\" },\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_202\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Also interested in backend role\" },\n { \"candidateId\": \"cand_102\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Referred by employee\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (201 or 207)\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc3\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_102\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 1,\n \"record\": { \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_202\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"Also interested in backend role\" },\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Database insert failed\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"INSERT_FAILED\",\n \"details\": { \"reason\": \"UNIQUE constraint failed: applications.candidateId, applications.jobId\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n- **201** — All records created successfully\n- **207** — Partial success (some errors, some successes)\n\n`POST /batch` uses a single bulk `INSERT`, so `meta.transactional` is `true` on every provider — the database guarantees the insert is atomic regardless of the `failFast` flag.\n\nFields applied automatically to each record:\n- ID generation (UUID, prefixed, etc.)\n- Ownership fields (`organizationId`, `ownerId`, `createdBy`)\n- Audit fields (`createdAt`, `modifiedAt`)\n- Default values and computed fields\n\n## Batch Update\n\n```\nPATCH /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\nEvery record **must include an `id` field**.\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"notes\": \"Passed phone screen, schedule onsite\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"notes\": \"Moved to technical interview round\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\", \"notes\": \"Hiring manager approved offer\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (200 or 207)\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"notes\": \"Passed phone screen, schedule onsite\", \"modifiedAt\": \"2025-01-15T11:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"notes\": \"Moved to technical interview round\", \"modifiedAt\": \"2025-01-15T11:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [\n {\n \"index\": 2,\n \"record\": { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\", \"notes\": \"Hiring manager approved offer\" },\n \"error\": {\n \"error\": \"Not found\",\n \"layer\": \"firewall\",\n \"code\": \"NOT_FOUND\",\n \"details\": { \"id\": \"app_xyz9\" }\n }\n }\n ],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 3,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 1,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\nRecords that don't exist or aren't accessible through the firewall return a `NOT_FOUND` error. Guard rules (immutable, protected, not-updatable fields) are checked per record.\n\n### Missing IDs\n\nIf any records are missing the `id` field, the entire request is rejected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Records missing required ID field\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_MISSING_IDS\",\n \"details\": { \"indices\": [0, 2] },\n \"hint\": \"All records must include an ID field for batch update.\"\n}\n```\n\n## Batch Delete\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"ids\": [\"app_abc1\", \"app_abc2\", \"app_abc3\"],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\nNote: Batch delete uses an `ids` array (not `records`).\n\n### Response (200 or 207)\n\n**Soft delete** (default):\n\n```json\n{\n \"success\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_abc1\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"deletedAt\": \"2025-01-15T12:00:00Z\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_abc2\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_103\", \"deletedAt\": \"2025-01-15T12:00:00Z\" }\n ],\n \"errors\": [],\n \"meta\": {\n \"total\": 2,\n \"succeeded\": 2,\n \"failed\": 0,\n \"failFast\": false,\n \"transactional\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n`DELETE /batch` issues a single bulk `UPDATE … WHERE id IN (...)` (soft delete) or `DELETE … WHERE id IN (...)` (hard delete), so `meta.transactional` is `true` on every provider regardless of `failFast`.\n\n**Hard delete**: Returns objects with only the `id` field (record data is deleted).\n\n## Batch Upsert\n\n```\nPUT /api/v1/{resource}/batch\n```\n\nInserts new records or updates existing ones. Every record must include an `id` field.\n\n**Note:** Batch upsert is only available when `generateId` is set to `false` (user-provided IDs) in your configuration.\n\n### Request\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [\n { \"id\": \"app_001\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_101\", \"jobId\": \"job_201\", \"stage\": \"screening\", \"notes\": \"Updated after phone screen\" },\n { \"id\": \"app_002\", \"candidateId\": \"cand_104\", \"jobId\": \"job_203\", \"stage\": \"applied\", \"notes\": \"New application from referral\" }\n ],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": false\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Response (201 or 207)\n\nThe compiler checks which IDs already exist and splits the batch into creates and updates. Create records get ownership and default fields; update records get only `modifiedAt`. Under `failFast: true`, both the bulk insert and the per-record updates run inside the same transaction — a failed update rolls back the inserts too on tx-supporting providers.\n\n## Fail-Fast Mode\n\nBy default, batch operations use **partial success** mode — each record is processed independently, and failures don't affect other records.\n\nSet `\"failFast\": true` to stop on the first error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"records\": [...],\n \"options\": {\n \"failFast\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Fail-Fast Failure Response (400)\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Batch failed at index 1\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_FAILFAST_STOPPED\",\n \"details\": {\n \"failedAt\": 1,\n \"reason\": \"Database insert failed\",\n \"errorDetails\": { \"reason\": \"UNIQUE constraint failed\" }\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Transactional Semantics\n\nThe behavior of `failFast: true` depends on whether your database provider —\nand, for Neon, its **connection mode** — supports interactive transactions.\nThe response's `meta.transactional` flag tells you which guarantee you\nactually got — inspect it in clients that care about rollback.\n\nNeon is transactional **only over websocket** (`connectionMode: 'websocket'`,\nthe default on Node/Bun runtimes). Over HTTP — the default on Cloudflare\nWorkers — the `drizzle-orm/neon-http` driver has no `db.transaction()` (it\nthrows at runtime), so Neon-over-HTTP batches behave exactly like D1:\nfail-fast per-record loop, `meta.transactional: false`.\n\n### Per-Provider Matrix\n\n| Endpoint | Provider | `failFast` | `meta.transactional` | Behavior |\n|----------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | tx-supporting (postgres, neon over websocket) | `true` | `true` | `db.transaction()` wraps the per-record loop. Any failure rolls back ALL writes in the batch. |\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | (any) | `false` | `false` | Per-record loop, partial success. Each record commits independently. |\n| `PATCH /batch` (update) | cloudflare-d1, neon over http (Cloudflare default) | `true` | `false` | Fail-fast loop without rollback — the driver has no `db.transaction`. Records before the failure stay committed. |\n| `PUT /batch` (upsert) | tx-supporting (postgres, neon over websocket) | `true` | `true` | Bulk insert + per-record update share one transaction. Any failure rolls back both. |\n| `PUT /batch` (upsert) | cloudflare-d1, neon over http (Cloudflare default) | `true` | `false` | Bulk insert commits; per-record update loop is fail-fast without rollback. |\n| `POST /batch` (create) | (any) | (any) | `true` | Single bulk `INSERT` — atomic at the DB level. |\n| `DELETE /batch` | (any) | (any) | `true` | Single bulk `UPDATE` (soft) or `DELETE` (hard) — atomic at the DB level. |\n\n### Reading `meta.transactional` in clients\n\n```typescript\nconst res = await fetch('/api/v1/jobs/batch', {\n method: 'PATCH',\n body: JSON.stringify({ records, options: { failFast: true } }),\n});\nconst body = await res.json();\n\nif (!body.meta.transactional && body.errors.length > 0) {\n // Some records succeeded before the failure and remain committed.\n // Compensate via the success array if needed.\n}\n```\n\n### Embeddings and Realtime\n\nWhen a resource has `embeddings` or `realtime` configured, queue messages\nand broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction commits. A\nrolled-back batch produces no orphan embedding jobs.\n\n## Batch Size Limit\n\nThe default maximum batch size is **100 records**. Requests exceeding the limit are rejected:\n\n```json\n{\n \"error\": \"Batch size limit exceeded\",\n \"layer\": \"validation\",\n \"code\": \"BATCH_SIZE_EXCEEDED\",\n \"details\": { \"max\": 100, \"actual\": 250 },\n \"hint\": \"Maximum 100 records allowed per batch. Split into multiple requests.\"\n}\n```\n\n## Configuration\n\nBatch operations inherit access control from their corresponding write operation. You can override per-batch settings:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n create: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] },\n batch: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] }, // More restrictive than single create\n maxBatchSize: 50, // Default: 100\n allowFailFast: true, // Default: true\n },\n },\n update: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] },\n batch: {\n maxBatchSize: 100,\n allowFailFast: true,\n },\n },\n delete: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n mode: 'soft',\n batch: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n maxBatchSize: 100,\n allowFailFast: true,\n },\n },\n\n // Disable only batch upsert\n upsert: {\n access: { roles: ['hiring-manager'] },\n batch: false,\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Security\n\nAll security pillars apply to batch operations:\n\n1. **Authentication** — Required for all batch endpoints (401 if missing)\n2. **Firewall** — Applied per-record for update/delete/upsert (not applicable to create)\n3. **Access** — Role-based check using the batch operation's access config\n4. **Guards** — Per-record validation (createable/updatable/immutable fields)\n5. **Masking** — Applied to all records in the success array before response\n\n## See Also\n\n- [CRUD Endpoints](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud) — Single-record operations\n- [Error Responses](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors) — Error format reference\n- [Guards](/compiler/definitions/guards) — Field-level write protection"
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- "content": "Quickback can generate realtime notification helpers for broadcasting changes to connected clients. This enables live updates via WebSocket using Cloudflare Durable Objects.\n\nThe targeting model is shared across ws tickets, websocket attachment, and server-side broadcasts:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nThat means the same mental model drives both `createRealtime()` and the generated Broadcaster filter path.\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` configuration to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable(\"applications\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text(\"candidate_id\").notNull(),\n jobId: text(\"job_id\").notNull(),\n stage: text(\"stage\").notNull(),\n organizationId: text(\"organization_id\").notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true, // Enable realtime for this table\n onInsert: true, // Broadcast on INSERT (default: true)\n onUpdate: true, // Broadcast on UPDATE (default: true)\n onDelete: true, // Broadcast on DELETE (default: true)\n requiredRoles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"], // Who receives broadcasts\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"], // Fields to include (optional)\n },\n // ... guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nWhen any table has realtime enabled, the compiler generates `src/lib/realtime.ts` with helper functions for sending notifications.\n\nAt the project level, `providers.database.config.realtime` can stay boolean or become object-shaped when you need relationship-authorized resource tickets:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThat tells `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` to authenticate with Better Auth, verify the `attendee` relationship role against `body.eventId`, and mint a short-lived ticket scoped to the resolved `events:<id>` lane.\n\n### Namespace-backed tickets (per-matched-lane)\n\nThe single-`role` form above authorizes the ticket through **one** relationship.\nWhen the room is gated by an [authz namespace](/compiler/definitions/scopes#mintscope-mint-the-scope-token-from-the-namespace-resolver)\nwith a **multi-lane `via:`** — e.g. an event reachable by attendees, organizers,\ncontractors, *and* org admins — point the ticket at the namespace instead, and it\nauthorizes through the namespace's full `via` (per-matched-lane):\n\n```typescript\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n namespace: \"eventScope\", // authorize via this namespace's full multi-lane `via`\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n},\n```\n\n`/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` now runs the **same first-match-wins gate** the\nnamespace uses, and issues the ticket for whichever lane matched:\n\n| Caller matched via | Ticket role |\n|---|---|\n| `attendeeOf` (relationship lane) | `attendee` |\n| `organizerOf` | `organizer` |\n| `contractorOf` | `contractor` |\n| `{ roles: [\"admin\",\"owner\"] }` (bulk lane) | the caller's **org/membership roles** — no scope role |\n\nThis closes the gap where the single-`role` form denied (`403`) an org admin who\ncould legitimately reach the room through the bulk lane but isn't a confirmed\nattendee — their realtime socket now opens.\n\n## When auto-broadcast fires (and when you call it manually)\n\nQuickback emits auto-broadcasts in **only one place**: the generated CRUD route handlers (`POST /` create, `PATCH /:id` update, `DELETE /:id` delete) for resources with `realtime.enabled` (or covered by `dbConfig.realtime: true`'s project-level default). Those handlers wrap each successful write with a `realtime.insert / update / delete` call before responding.\n\nAuto-broadcasts carry the table's declared gates (v0.46+): the\n`realtime.requiredRoles` list becomes the broadcast's `targetRoles` (with\nrole-hierarchy `+` expanded), and the table's effective masking config —\ndeclared plus auto-detected sensitive columns — is applied per subscriber\nrole at fanout, matching what the HTTP routes mask. A `type: 'custom'` mask\nfunction can't be replicated by the Broadcaster, so those columns broadcast\nas `[REDACTED]` (fail closed). Tables that declare neither broadcast openly,\nas before.\n\nEverywhere else — action handlers, queue consumers, scheduled jobs, custom Hono routes — you broadcast manually. In action handlers on realtime-enabled projects, Quickback now injects a typed `realtime` helper directly into `execute(...)`; outside actions you still call `createRealtime(env)` yourself.\n\n| Mutation site | Auto-broadcast? | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| Generated CRUD route (`POST /`, `PATCH /:id`, `DELETE /:id`) | Yes | The compiler emits the call after the write returns. |\n| Generated batch route (`/batch/...`) | Yes | Same pattern, emitted per record. |\n| `scoped.insert/update/delete` inside an action handler | No — manual | Scoped-db is a query-shape wrapper (firewall + soft-delete WHERE injection). It deliberately has no side-effects so explicit handlers can write multiple records, conditionally roll back, etc. without surprise broadcasts. |\n| `unsafeDb` writes in actions (or any custom route) | No — manual | Same reasoning — `unsafeDb` is the un-wrapped escape hatch. |\n| Queue consumers, cron jobs, webhook handlers | No — manual | These run outside the CRUD path entirely. |\n\nThe rule of thumb: if your code calls `db.insert(...)` / `scoped.insert(...)` directly, you also call `realtime.insert(...)` directly on the next line. Otherwise the cross-tab live-update you wired up in the SPA won't fire.\n\n## Generated Helper\n\nAction handlers on realtime-enabled projects receive a typed `realtime` param. The underlying `createRealtime()` factory still powers it and remains the API to use from queues, cron jobs, and other non-action code:\n\n```typescript\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ db, ctx, input, realtime }) => {\n // After creating a record\n await realtime.insert('applications', newApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After updating a record\n await realtime.update('applications', newApplication, oldApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After deleting a record\n await realtime.delete('applications', { id: applicationId }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n`env` is also typed in action handlers, so custom bindings like R2, D1, Queues, Durable Objects, and auth env vars no longer need `(env as any)` casts.\n\nFor explicit targeting, pass an object instead of the historical org string:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, {\n scopeKey: `events:${input.eventId}`,\n});\n\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, {\n userId: recipientId,\n});\n```\n\n## Event Format\n\nQuickback broadcasts events in a structured JSON format for easy client-side handling.\n\n### Insert Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('applications', {\n id: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'applied'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"applied\"\n },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\n### Update Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'interview' }, // new\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'screening' }, // old\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"UPDATE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"screening\" }\n}\n```\n\n### Delete Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.delete('applications',\n { id: 'app_123' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"DELETE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": null,\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\" }\n}\n```\n\n## Custom Broadcasts\n\nFor arbitrary events that don't map to CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast('screening-complete', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'interview'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## User-Specific Broadcasts\n\nTarget a specific user instead of the entire organization:\n\n```typescript\n// Only this user receives the notification\nawait realtime.insert('notifications', newNotification, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: ctx.userId\n});\n\n// Notify a hiring manager of a new application\nawait realtime.broadcast('application-received', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n jobId: 'job_789'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: hiringManagerId\n});\n```\n\n## Role-Based Filtering\n\nLimit which roles receive a broadcast using `targetRoles`:\n\n```typescript\n// Only hiring managers and recruiters receive this broadcast\nawait realtime.insert('applications', application, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter']\n});\n\n// Interviewers only see applications assigned to them\nawait realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager']\n});\n```\n\nIf `targetRoles` is not specified, all authenticated subscribers in the chosen scope receive the broadcast.\n\n## Per-Role Field Masking\n\nApply different field masking based on the subscriber's role using `maskingConfig`:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('candidates', newCandidate, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n maskingConfig: {\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n resumeUrl: { type: 'redact', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n**How masking works:**\n- Each subscriber receives a payload masked according to their role\n- Roles in the `show.roles` array see unmasked values\n- All other roles see the masked version\n- Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles) not O(subscribers))\n\n**Available mask types:**\n| Type | Example Output |\n|------|----------------|\n| `email` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `phone` | `******4567` |\n| `ssn` | `*****6789` |\n| `creditCard` | `**** **** **** 1111` |\n| `name` | `J***` |\n| `redact` | `[REDACTED]` |\n\n### Owner-Based Masking\n\nShow unmasked data to the record owner:\n\n```typescript\nmaskingConfig: {\n phone: {\n type: 'phone',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager'], or: 'owner' } // Hiring manager OR owner sees unmasked\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Client-Side Subscription\n\n### WebSocket Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. The client first obtains a short-lived ticket from the main API, then connects with it as a URL parameter. The Broadcaster verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade time — no HTTP round-trip needed.\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Get a ws-ticket from your API (requires session auth)\nconst response = await fetch('/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: {\n Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}`,\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: 'evt_123' }),\n});\nconst { wsTicket } = await response.json();\n\n// 2. Connect with ticket as URL param\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log('Connected and authenticated!');\n // No auth message needed — pre-authenticated at upgrade\n};\n```\n\nTickets expire after 60 seconds, so fetch a fresh one before each connection or reconnection.\n\n### Handling Messages\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n // Handle CRUD events\n if (msg.type === 'postgres_changes') {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n if (eventType === 'INSERT') {\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'UPDATE') {\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'DELETE') {\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n }\n }\n\n // Handle custom broadcasts\n if (msg.type === 'broadcast') {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === 'screening-complete') {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === 'interview-scheduled') {\n showInterviewNotification(payload.applicationId);\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster DO runs inline in your main worker and uses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` (already required for auth) to sign and verify WebSocket tickets.\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Signs/verifies WebSocket tickets (already set for auth) |\n\nThe `BROADCASTER` binding is a `DurableObjectNamespace` — the compiler generates this in your `wrangler.toml` automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n 1. POST /ws-ticket\n┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │ ◄──│ Browser Client │\n│ │ ──►│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────┐ │ └───────┬─────────┘\n│ │ Hono API │ ───────────► │ Broadcaster DO │ │ │\n│ └──────────┘ (in-process)└───────┬────────┘ │ 2. WS ?ws_ticket=...\n│ │ │ │\n└────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┘ │\n │◄──────────────────────┘\n WebSocket (verified at upgrade)\n```\n\n1. **Client gets a ticket** — `POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` on the main API (session-authenticated). Returns a 60-second HMAC-signed ticket.\n2. **Client connects** — Opens WebSocket with `?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. The Durable Object verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade and attaches the socket to the ticket's `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId`.\n3. **API broadcasts** — After CRUD ops, or from custom handlers, the API calls the Broadcaster DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop) using the same target model.\n\n## Best Practices\n\n### Broadcast After Commit\n\nAlways broadcast after the database operation succeeds:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - broadcast after successful insert\nconst [newApp] = await db.insert(applications).values(data).returning();\nawait realtime.insert('applications', newApp, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Bad - don't broadcast before confirming success\nawait realtime.insert('applications', data, ctx.activeOrgId!);\nawait db.insert(applications).values(data); // Could fail!\n```\n\n### Minimal Payloads\n\nOnly include necessary data in broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - minimal payload\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: record.id, stage: 'interview' },\n { id: record.id, stage: 'screening' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n\n// Avoid - sending entire record with large content\nawait realtime.update('applications', fullRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Use Broadcasts for Complex Events\n\nFor events that don't map cleanly to CRUD:\n\n```typescript\n// Hiring pipeline stage completed\nawait realtime.broadcast('pipeline-stage-complete', {\n applicationId: application.id,\n stages: ['applied', 'screening', 'interview'],\n currentStage: 'offer',\n candidateId: application.candidateId\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n## Custom Event Namespaces\n\nFor complex applications with many custom events, you can define typed event namespaces using `defineRealtime`. This generates strongly-typed helper methods for your custom events.\n\n### Defining Event Namespaces\n\nCreate a file in `services/realtime/`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/screening.ts\n\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'screening',\n events: ['started', 'progress', 'completed', 'failed'],\n description: 'Candidate screening pipeline events',\n});\n```\n\n### Generated Helper Methods\n\nAfter compilation, the `createRealtime()` helper includes your custom namespace:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // Type-safe custom event methods\n await realtime.screening.started({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Progress updates\n await realtime.screening.progress({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n percent: 50,\n step: 'background-check',\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Completion\n await realtime.screening.completed({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n result: 'passed',\n duration: 1234,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n### Event Format\n\nCustom namespace events use the `broadcast` type with namespaced event names:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening:started\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Multiple Namespaces\n\nDefine multiple namespaces for different parts of your application:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/notifications.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'notifications',\n events: ['interview-reminder', 'offer-update', 'application-received'],\n description: 'Recruitment notification events',\n});\n\n// services/realtime/presence.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'presence',\n events: ['joined', 'left', 'reviewing', 'idle'],\n description: 'Who is reviewing which candidate',\n});\n```\n\nUsage:\n```typescript\nconst realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n// Notification events\nawait realtime.notifications['interview-reminder']({ ... }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Presence events — who's reviewing which candidate\nawait realtime.presence.reviewing({ userId: ctx.userId, candidateId: 'cnd_456' }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Namespace vs Generic Broadcast\n\n| Use Case | Approach |\n|----------|----------|\n| One-off custom event | `realtime.broadcast('event-name', payload, orgId)` |\n| Repeated event patterns | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Type-safe events | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Event discovery | `defineRealtime` (appears in generated types) |"
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+ "content": "Quickback can generate realtime notification helpers for broadcasting changes to connected clients. This enables live updates via WebSocket using Cloudflare Durable Objects.\n\nThe targeting model is shared across ws tickets, websocket attachment, and server-side broadcasts:\n\n- string target: historical `organizationId` shorthand\n- object target: `{ scopeKey?, organizationId?, userId? }`\n\nThat means the same mental model drives both `createRealtime()` and the generated Broadcaster filter path.\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` configuration to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable(\"applications\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text(\"candidate_id\").notNull(),\n jobId: text(\"job_id\").notNull(),\n stage: text(\"stage\").notNull(),\n organizationId: text(\"organization_id\").notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true, // Enable realtime broadcasts for this table\n onInsert: true, // Broadcast on INSERT (default: true)\n onUpdate: true, // Broadcast on UPDATE (default: true)\n onDelete: true, // Broadcast on DELETE (default: true)\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] }, // Audience — MANDATORY, fail-closed\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"], // Fields to include (optional)\n },\n // ... guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nWhen any table has realtime enabled, the compiler generates `src/lib/realtime.ts` with helper functions for sending notifications.\n\nAt the project level, `providers.database.config.realtime` can stay boolean or become object-shaped when you need relationship-authorized resource tickets:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThat tells `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` to authenticate with Better Auth, verify the `attendee` relationship role against `body.eventId`, and mint a short-lived ticket scoped to the resolved `events:<id>` lane.\n\n### Namespace-backed tickets (per-matched-lane)\n\nThe single-`role` form above authorizes the ticket through **one** relationship.\nWhen the room is gated by an [authz namespace](/compiler/definitions/scopes#mintscope-mint-the-scope-token-from-the-namespace-resolver)\nwith a **multi-lane `via:`** — e.g. an event reachable by attendees, organizers,\ncontractors, *and* org admins — point the ticket at the namespace instead, and it\nauthorizes through the namespace's full `via` (per-matched-lane):\n\n```typescript\nrealtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n namespace: \"eventScope\", // authorize via this namespace's full multi-lane `via`\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n},\n```\n\n`/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` now runs the **same first-match-wins gate** the\nnamespace uses, and issues the ticket for whichever lane matched:\n\n| Caller matched via | Ticket role |\n|---|---|\n| `attendeeOf` (relationship lane) | `attendee` |\n| `organizerOf` | `organizer` |\n| `contractorOf` | `contractor` |\n| `{ roles: [\"admin\",\"owner\"] }` (bulk lane) | the caller's **org/membership roles** — no scope role |\n\nThis closes the gap where the single-`role` form denied (`403`) an org admin who\ncould legitimately reach the room through the bulk lane but isn't a confirmed\nattendee — their realtime socket now opens.\n\n## When auto-broadcast fires (and when you call it manually)\n\nQuickback emits auto-broadcasts in **only one place**: the generated CRUD route handlers (`POST /` create, `PATCH /:id` update, `DELETE /:id` delete) for resources that **explicitly declare** a `realtime.enabled` block. The project-level `dbConfig.realtime` switch wires the *transport* (Broadcaster DO + ws-ticket route) but does **not** auto-enable broadcasting on any resource — broadcasting is opt-in per resource, like CRUD. Those handlers wrap each successful write with a `realtime.insert / update / delete` call before responding.\n\nAuto-broadcasts carry the table's declared gates: the `realtime.access.roles`\naudience (or the deprecated `requiredRoles` alias) becomes the broadcast's\n`targetRoles` (with role-hierarchy `+` expanded and UPPERCASE pseudo-roles like\n`PUBLIC`/`USER` evaluated at fanout exactly as REST evaluates them), and the\ntable's effective masking config —\ndeclared plus auto-detected sensitive columns — is applied per subscriber\nrole at fanout, matching what the HTTP routes mask. A `type: 'custom'` mask\nfunction can't be replicated by the Broadcaster, so those columns broadcast\nas `[REDACTED]` (fail closed). Tables that declare neither broadcast openly,\nas before.\n\nEverywhere else — action handlers, queue consumers, scheduled jobs, custom Hono routes — you broadcast manually. In action handlers on realtime-enabled projects, Quickback now injects a typed `realtime` helper directly into `execute(...)`; outside actions you still call `createRealtime(env)` yourself.\n\n| Mutation site | Auto-broadcast? | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| Generated CRUD route (`POST /`, `PATCH /:id`, `DELETE /:id`) | Yes | The compiler emits the call after the write returns. |\n| Generated batch route (`/batch/...`) | Yes | Same pattern, emitted per record. |\n| `scoped.insert/update/delete` inside an action handler | No — manual | Scoped-db is a query-shape wrapper (firewall + soft-delete WHERE injection). It deliberately has no side-effects so explicit handlers can write multiple records, conditionally roll back, etc. without surprise broadcasts. |\n| `unsafeDb` writes in actions (or any custom route) | No — manual | Same reasoning — `unsafeDb` is the un-wrapped escape hatch. |\n| Queue consumers, cron jobs, webhook handlers | No — manual | These run outside the CRUD path entirely. |\n\nThe rule of thumb: if your code calls `db.insert(...)` / `scoped.insert(...)` directly, you also call `realtime.insert(...)` directly on the next line. Otherwise the cross-tab live-update you wired up in the SPA won't fire.\n\n## Generated Helper\n\nAction handlers on realtime-enabled projects receive a typed `realtime` param. The underlying `createRealtime()` factory still powers it and remains the API to use from queues, cron jobs, and other non-action code:\n\n```typescript\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ db, ctx, input, realtime }) => {\n // After creating a record\n await realtime.insert('applications', newApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After updating a record\n await realtime.update('applications', newApplication, oldApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After deleting a record\n await realtime.delete('applications', { id: applicationId }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n`env` is also typed in action handlers, so custom bindings like R2, D1, Queues, Durable Objects, and auth env vars no longer need `(env as any)` casts.\n\nFor explicit targeting, pass an object instead of the historical org string:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"event-page-updated\", payload, {\n scopeKey: `events:${input.eventId}`,\n});\n\nawait realtime.broadcast(\"dm\", payload, {\n userId: recipientId,\n});\n```\n\n## Event Format\n\nQuickback broadcasts events in a structured JSON format for easy client-side handling.\n\n### Insert Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('applications', {\n id: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'applied'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"applied\"\n },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\n### Update Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'interview' }, // new\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'screening' }, // old\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"UPDATE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"screening\" }\n}\n```\n\n### Delete Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.delete('applications',\n { id: 'app_123' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"DELETE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": null,\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\" }\n}\n```\n\n## Custom Broadcasts\n\nFor arbitrary events that don't map to CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast('screening-complete', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'interview'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED'],\n});\n```\n\n**Every send needs an audience.** Delivery is fail-closed: a broadcast whose\n`targetRoles` is omitted or empty reaches **nobody**. \"Everyone in the room\" is\nspelled explicitly — `targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED']` (any authenticated\nsubscriber) or `['PUBLIC']`.\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## User-Specific Broadcasts\n\nTarget a specific user instead of the entire organization:\n\n```typescript\n// Only this user receives the notification\nawait realtime.insert('notifications', newNotification, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: ctx.userId,\n targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED'],\n});\n\n// Notify a hiring manager of a new application\nawait realtime.broadcast('application-received', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n jobId: 'job_789'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: hiringManagerId,\n targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED'],\n});\n```\n\n`userId` targeting matches the **socket identity** — the Better Auth user id, or\nthe synthetic `scope:<subjectId>` principal for sessionless scope connections. If\nthe same person can connect through either door, prefer\n[identity-tag targeting](#identity-tag-targeting) — one send reaches both.\n\n## Role-Based Filtering\n\nLimit which roles receive a broadcast using `targetRoles`:\n\n```typescript\n// Only hiring managers and recruiters receive this broadcast\nawait realtime.insert('applications', application, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter']\n});\n\n// Interviewers only see applications assigned to them\nawait realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager']\n});\n```\n\n**Fail-closed (v0.48+):** an omitted or empty `targetRoles` delivers to\n**nobody** — there is no implicit \"everyone\" fallback. To reach every\nauthenticated subscriber in the scope, say so explicitly with\n`targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED']`. UPPERCASE pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`,\n`AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `SYSADMIN`) are evaluated exactly as the REST access\nevaluator does.\n\n> **Migrating from pre-0.48:** custom `realtime.broadcast(...)` /\n> `realtime.insert(...)` calls that omitted `targetRoles` used to fan out to\n> everyone; they now silently deliver to nobody. Audit every manual send and add\n> an explicit audience.\n\n## Identity-Tag Targeting\n\nEvery connection carries **identity tags**, proven at ticket mint and signed\ninto the ticket (never client-supplied):\n\n- `user:<userId>` — every Better Auth caller\n- `scope:<kind>:<subjectId>` — when a scope subject is proven, on **either**\n door: a sessionless scope principal's verified claim, or a Better Auth caller\n whose matched relationship lane maps to a scope kind with\n `subject: 'supplied' | 'both'`. Both doors stamp the **identical** tag (the\n subject row's id), which is the point.\n\nTarget them with `targetTags`:\n\n```typescript\n// ONE send reaches this guest whether they're connected via their Better Auth\n// session or a sessionless scope link — no per-identity double-send.\nawait realtime.broadcast('chat.frame', payload, { scopeKey }, {\n targetTags: [`scope:guest:${guestId}`],\n targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED'],\n});\n\n// Reach a person under either identity explicitly (deduped per socket):\nawait realtime.broadcast('rsvp.updated', payload, { scopeKey }, {\n targetTags: [`scope:guest:${guestId}`, `user:${linkedUserId}`],\n targetRoles: ['AUTHENTICATED'],\n});\n```\n\nSemantics:\n\n- Delivery is the **deduplicated union** of the runtime's indexed tag lookup\n (`getWebSockets(tag)`) — no attachment scan, and a dual-identity socket\n matches once.\n- `targetTags` **replaces the `userId` identity arm** when present; the\n scope/org bind and the `targetRoles` audience still apply on top.\n- **Fail-closed:** `targetTags: []` delivers to nobody.\n- Tags are **immutable** for a socket's lifetime (a Workers hibernation-tag\n constraint) — an identity change requires a reconnect.\n- Limits: at most 10 tags per connection, 256 characters per tag. The mint\n rejects violations; it never truncates.\n\n## Authorization Lease\n\nThe 60-second ws-ticket is verified once, at upgrade — but Durable Object\nhibernation keeps sockets alive indefinitely. Without a lease, a ban, member\nremoval, or subject revocation (say, an organizer cancelling a guest) would\nnever affect an already-connected socket. The lease closes that gap:\n\n- At upgrade, the connection stores `authExpiresAt = ticket.iat + lease`\n (default **15 minutes**).\n- The fan-out **skips expired connections** — they receive nothing — and closes\n them with code **4401** so the client knows to re-ticket rather than blindly\n reconnect. Inbound messages (even pings) are enforced the same way.\n- Renewal happens at mint: `POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` re-runs the full\n authorization gate (session validity, revocation checks, relationship /\n scope-claim probes), so a revoked principal simply can't obtain a renewal\n ticket. Revocation propagates within one lease period with no polling.\n\nConfigure it on the realtime transport:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: {\n config: {\n realtime: {\n enabled: true,\n lease: '15m', // default; also '900s', '1h', or a number of seconds\n // lease: false // disable (discouraged — reopens the revocation gap)\n },\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe lease must be at least 60 seconds (the handshake-ticket TTL).\n\n### In-place renewal (`reauth`)\n\nInstead of reconnecting every lease period, a client can renew in place: mint a\nfresh ticket and send it over the open socket.\n\n```typescript\n// On a timer comfortably inside the lease (e.g. every 10 min for a 15m lease):\nconst { wsTicket } = await mintTicket(); // POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\nws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'reauth', ticket: wsTicket }));\n\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n if (msg.type === 'reauth_ok') {\n scheduleNextRenewal(msg.authExpiresAt); // lease extended, roles refreshed\n }\n if (msg.type === 'error' && msg.code === 'REAUTH_FAILED') {\n // Ticket invalid/expired — mint a fresh one and retry before the lease lapses.\n }\n};\n\nws.onclose = (event) => {\n if (event.code === 4401) {\n // Lease expired or identity drift: mint a fresh ticket and reconnect.\n reconnectWithFreshTicket();\n }\n};\n```\n\nRenewal is **strict**: the fresh ticket must carry the same `userId`,\n`scopeKey`/`organizationId`, and the **exact same tag set** as the live socket\n(tags are immutable). A renewal that matches extends the lease and refreshes\n`role`/`roles` in place — live permission changes without socket churn. One\nthat doesn't closes the socket with 4401: reconnect fresh.\n\nClients that never send `reauth` still work — their socket is closed with 4401\nonce per lease and normal reconnect logic (with a fresh ticket) re-runs the\nfull gate. The lease is the server-side invariant either way.\n\n## Per-Role Field Masking\n\nApply different field masking based on the subscriber's role using `maskingConfig`:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('candidates', newCandidate, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n maskingConfig: {\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n resumeUrl: { type: 'redact', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n**How masking works:**\n- Each subscriber receives a payload masked according to their role\n- Roles in the `show.roles` array see unmasked values\n- All other roles see the masked version\n- Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles) not O(subscribers))\n\n**Available mask types:**\n| Type | Example Output |\n|------|----------------|\n| `email` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `phone` | `******4567` |\n| `ssn` | `*****6789` |\n| `creditCard` | `**** **** **** 1111` |\n| `name` | `J***` |\n| `redact` | `[REDACTED]` |\n\n### Owner-Based Masking\n\nShow unmasked data to the record owner:\n\n```typescript\nmaskingConfig: {\n phone: {\n type: 'phone',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager'], or: 'owner' } // Hiring manager OR owner sees unmasked\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Client-Side Subscription\n\n### WebSocket Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. The client first obtains a short-lived ticket from the main API, then connects with it as a URL parameter. The Broadcaster verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade time — no HTTP round-trip needed.\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Get a ws-ticket from your API (requires session auth)\nconst response = await fetch('/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: {\n Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}`,\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: 'evt_123' }),\n});\nconst { wsTicket } = await response.json();\n\n// 2. Connect with ticket as URL param\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log('Connected and authenticated!');\n // No auth message needed — pre-authenticated at upgrade\n};\n```\n\nTickets expire after 60 seconds, so fetch a fresh one before each connection or reconnection.\n\n### Handling Messages\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n // Handle CRUD events\n if (msg.type === 'postgres_changes') {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n if (eventType === 'INSERT') {\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'UPDATE') {\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'DELETE') {\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n }\n }\n\n // Handle custom broadcasts\n if (msg.type === 'broadcast') {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === 'screening-complete') {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === 'interview-scheduled') {\n showInterviewNotification(payload.applicationId);\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster DO runs inline in your main worker and uses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` (already required for auth) to sign and verify WebSocket tickets.\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Signs/verifies WebSocket tickets (already set for auth) |\n\nThe `BROADCASTER` binding is a `DurableObjectNamespace` — the compiler generates this in your `wrangler.toml` automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n 1. POST /ws-ticket\n┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │ ◄──│ Browser Client │\n│ │ ──►│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────┐ │ └───────┬─────────┘\n│ │ Hono API │ ───────────► │ Broadcaster DO │ │ │\n│ └──────────┘ (in-process)└───────┬────────┘ │ 2. WS ?ws_ticket=...\n│ │ │ │\n└────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┘ │\n │◄──────────────────────┘\n WebSocket (verified at upgrade)\n```\n\n1. **Client gets a ticket** — `POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` on the main API (session-authenticated). Returns a 60-second HMAC-signed ticket.\n2. **Client connects** — Opens WebSocket with `?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. The Durable Object verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade and attaches the socket to the ticket's `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId`.\n3. **API broadcasts** — After CRUD ops, or from custom handlers, the API calls the Broadcaster DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop) using the same target model.\n\n## Best Practices\n\n### Broadcast After Commit\n\nAlways broadcast after the database operation succeeds:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - broadcast after successful insert\nconst [newApp] = await db.insert(applications).values(data).returning();\nawait realtime.insert('applications', newApp, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Bad - don't broadcast before confirming success\nawait realtime.insert('applications', data, ctx.activeOrgId!);\nawait db.insert(applications).values(data); // Could fail!\n```\n\n### Minimal Payloads\n\nOnly include necessary data in broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - minimal payload\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: record.id, stage: 'interview' },\n { id: record.id, stage: 'screening' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n\n// Avoid - sending entire record with large content\nawait realtime.update('applications', fullRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Use Broadcasts for Complex Events\n\nFor events that don't map cleanly to CRUD:\n\n```typescript\n// Hiring pipeline stage completed\nawait realtime.broadcast('pipeline-stage-complete', {\n applicationId: application.id,\n stages: ['applied', 'screening', 'interview'],\n currentStage: 'offer',\n candidateId: application.candidateId\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n## Custom Event Namespaces\n\nFor complex applications with many custom events, you can define typed event namespaces using `defineRealtime`. This generates strongly-typed helper methods for your custom events.\n\n### Defining Event Namespaces\n\nCreate a file in `services/realtime/`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/screening.ts\n\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'screening',\n events: ['started', 'progress', 'completed', 'failed'],\n description: 'Candidate screening pipeline events',\n});\n```\n\n### Generated Helper Methods\n\nAfter compilation, the `createRealtime()` helper includes your custom namespace:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // Type-safe custom event methods\n await realtime.screening.started({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Progress updates\n await realtime.screening.progress({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n percent: 50,\n step: 'background-check',\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Completion\n await realtime.screening.completed({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n result: 'passed',\n duration: 1234,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n### Event Format\n\nCustom namespace events use the `broadcast` type with namespaced event names:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening:started\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Multiple Namespaces\n\nDefine multiple namespaces for different parts of your application:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/notifications.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'notifications',\n events: ['interview-reminder', 'offer-update', 'application-received'],\n description: 'Recruitment notification events',\n});\n\n// services/realtime/presence.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'presence',\n events: ['joined', 'left', 'reviewing', 'idle'],\n description: 'Who is reviewing which candidate',\n});\n```\n\nUsage:\n```typescript\nconst realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n// Notification events\nawait realtime.notifications['interview-reminder']({ ... }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Presence events — who's reviewing which candidate\nawait realtime.presence.reviewing({ userId: ctx.userId, candidateId: 'cnd_456' }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Namespace vs Generic Broadcast\n\n| Use Case | Approach |\n|----------|----------|\n| One-off custom event | `realtime.broadcast('event-name', payload, orgId)` |\n| Repeated event patterns | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Type-safe events | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Event discovery | `defineRealtime` (appears in generated types) |"
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  "title": "Realtime",
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- "content": "Quickback ships **two parallel realtime primitives**, both backed by Cloudflare Durable Objects:\n\n- **`/broadcast/v1/*` — server fan-out.** One DO instance per subscription scope. Postgres-changes events from CRUD routes plus custom broadcast events flow out to every subscriber, with role filtering and per-role field masking applied. Best for \"tell every client in this shared scope that something changed.\" The scope can be an organization, a specific user, or a compiler-resolved resource key like `events:evt_123`. Documented on this page.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` — bidirectional rooms.** One DO instance per room (per document, per interview, per game). Client↔client messages, presence, and CRDT-friendly state. Use these for collaborative editing. See [PartyServer rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms).\n\nBoth share the same auth model and ride on the same compiled worker; they solve different problems.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │\n│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────────┐\n│ │ Hono API │ ──────────────► │ Broadcaster (DO) │\n│ │ │ │ WebSocket manager │\n│ └──────────┘ └─────────┬──────────┘\n│ │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────┼┘\n │ WebSocket\n │\n ┌────────▼─────────┐\n │ Browser Clients │\n │ (CMS, Account, │\n │ Admin, Custom) │\n └──────────────────┘\n```\n\nThe Broadcaster Durable Object runs **inline** in your main Quickback worker — no separate worker deployment needed. The API calls the DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop).\n\n1. **Quickback Worker** — Your compiled API with the Broadcaster DO class exported from the same worker.\n2. **Broadcaster (Durable Object)** — Manages WebSocket connections per subscription scope. One instance per `scopeKey`, organization, or user lane.\n3. **Browser Clients** — CMS, Account, Admin, and custom frontends connect via WebSocket on the same origin.\n\n## Key Features\n\n| Feature | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Scope-aware fan-out | Routes by `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId` |\n| Role-based filtering | Only send events to users with matching roles |\n| Per-role masking | Different users see different field values based on their role |\n| User-specific targeting | Send events to a specific user within an org |\n| Resource-scoped tickets | Reuse authz relationship roles to mint scope-bound ws tickets |\n| Custom broadcasts | Arbitrary events beyond CRUD |\n| Custom namespaces | `defineRealtime()` for type-safe event helpers |\n| Ticket-based auth | HMAC-signed tickets verified at WebSocket upgrade — no HTTP round-trip |\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true,\n onInsert: true,\n onUpdate: true,\n onDelete: true,\n requiredRoles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"],\n },\n});\n```\n\nAnd enable the realtime binding in your database config. The compiler generates the Durable Object class, helper functions, and wrangler bindings — all within your main worker.\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nWith that config, `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` can authenticate the caller, verify the declared authz relationship role against `body.eventId`, and mint a short-lived ticket scoped to the resolved `events:<id>` channel.\n\n## Pages\n\n- **[Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects)** — Broadcaster configuration, wrangler bindings, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- **[Using Realtime](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)** — Subscribing to `/broadcast/v1/*`: WebSocket connection, ticket auth, client-side handling\n- **[PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms)** — Per-room collab via `/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`: presence, live notes, room IDs"
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+ "content": "Quickback ships **two parallel realtime primitives**, both backed by Cloudflare Durable Objects:\n\n- **`/broadcast/v1/*` — server fan-out.** One DO instance per subscription scope. Postgres-changes events from CRUD routes plus custom broadcast events flow out to every subscriber, with role filtering and per-role field masking applied. Best for \"tell every client in this shared scope that something changed.\" The scope can be an organization, a specific user, or a compiler-resolved resource key like `events:evt_123`. Documented on this page.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` — bidirectional rooms.** One DO instance per room (per document, per interview, per game). Client↔client messages, presence, and CRDT-friendly state. Use these for collaborative editing. See [PartyServer rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms).\n\nBoth share the same auth model and ride on the same compiled worker; they solve different problems.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │\n│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────────┐\n│ │ Hono API │ ──────────────► │ Broadcaster (DO) │\n│ │ │ │ WebSocket manager │\n│ └──────────┘ └─────────┬──────────┘\n│ │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────┼┘\n │ WebSocket\n │\n ┌────────▼─────────┐\n │ Browser Clients │\n │ (CMS, Account, │\n │ Admin, Custom) │\n └──────────────────┘\n```\n\nThe Broadcaster Durable Object runs **inline** in your main Quickback worker — no separate worker deployment needed. The API calls the DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop).\n\n1. **Quickback Worker** — Your compiled API with the Broadcaster DO class exported from the same worker.\n2. **Broadcaster (Durable Object)** — Manages WebSocket connections per subscription scope. One instance per `scopeKey`, organization, or user lane.\n3. **Browser Clients** — CMS, Account, Admin, and custom frontends connect via WebSocket on the same origin.\n\n## Key Features\n\n| Feature | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Scope-aware fan-out | Routes by `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId` |\n| Role-based filtering | Only send events to users with matching roles |\n| Per-role masking | Different users see different field values based on their role |\n| User-specific targeting | Send events to a specific user within an org |\n| Resource-scoped tickets | Reuse authz relationship roles to mint scope-bound ws tickets |\n| Custom broadcasts | Arbitrary events beyond CRUD |\n| Custom namespaces | `defineRealtime()` for type-safe event helpers |\n| Ticket-based auth | HMAC-signed tickets verified at WebSocket upgrade — no HTTP round-trip |\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nBroadcasting is **opt-in per resource**, exactly like CRUD — a table broadcasts\nonly if it declares its own `realtime` block. Add `realtime` to individual table\ndefinitions:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true,\n onInsert: true,\n onUpdate: true,\n onDelete: true,\n // Audience — WHO may receive these live rows. Same { roles } shape as\n // read.access / crud.*.access. MANDATORY and fail-closed: a broadcast\n // reaches every subscriber in the room, so the audience is not optional.\n // Omit it (or leave it empty) and compilation fails. Roles may be concrete\n // membership/scope roles or UPPERCASE pseudo-roles.\n access: { roles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"],\n },\n});\n```\n\nAnd enable the realtime **transport** in your database config. This is a\nproject-level switch that stands up the Broadcaster Durable Object + the\nws-ticket connection route; it does **not** by itself make any resource\nbroadcast (that's the per-resource `realtime` block above). The compiler\ngenerates the Durable Object class, helper functions, and wrangler bindings —\nall within your main worker.\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n realtime: {\n wsTicket: {\n role: \"attendee\",\n requestField: \"eventId\",\n scopeTable: \"events\",\n },\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nWith that config, `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` can authenticate the caller, verify the declared authz relationship role against `body.eventId`, and mint a short-lived ticket scoped to the resolved `events:<id>` channel.\n\n## Pages\n\n- **[Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects)** — Broadcaster configuration, wrangler bindings, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- **[Using Realtime](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)** — Subscribing to `/broadcast/v1/*`: WebSocket connection, ticket auth, client-side handling\n- **[PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms)** — Per-room collab via `/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`: presence, live notes, room IDs"
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  "stack/realtime/live-views": {
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  "title": "Live Views",
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- "content": "A **live view** is a named *surface*: a root row plus the related data a screen\nshows around it — forward foreign-key display values and reverse-FK child\ncollections. When a client subscribes to a live view, the open surface stays\nwhole in realtime: any write to the root row **or** a related row that shares a\nforeign key is pushed as a `view_changes` delta the client splices in place.\n\nThis is the difference from table-level [`postgres_changes`](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)\nbroadcasts, which are single-row, single-table. A person-detail screen that\nshows a `people` row plus rows from a normalized `phone_numbers` table would\notherwise have to stitch together separate per-table events and figure out that\na `phone_numbers` insert with `personId = X` belongs to the person it has open.\nLive views do that mapping for you.\n\n> Live views ride the realtime Broadcaster. You must have realtime enabled\n> (`providers.database.config.realtime: true`). Declaring a view without\n> realtime is a compile-time error.\n\n## Defining a view\n\nViews live in `services/views/<name>.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/views/person-detail.ts\n\nexport default defineView({\n name: 'person-detail',\n root: 'people',\n include: [\n { relation: 'companyId' }, // forward FK → company display value\n { relation: 'phone_numbers' }, // reverse FK → phoneNumbers[] collection\n ],\n});\n```\n\n- **`root`** — the table the surface is keyed by. Must be a `defineTable`\n resource (its firewall + read access gate the surface).\n- **`include[].relation`** — a forward-FK column on the root (`companyId`), or\n the name of a child table that references the root (`phone_numbers`). The\n compiler auto-detects the direction from the foreign-key graph; pass\n `kind: 'forward' | 'reverse'` to disambiguate.\n- **`as`** — the response key the related data is spliced under. Defaults to a\n derived name: forward strips a trailing `Id` (`companyId` → `company`),\n reverse uses the child table name (`phone_numbers` → `phoneNumbers`).\n- **`fields`** — optional column projection on the included table.\n\nThe materialized surface looks like:\n\n```jsonc\n{\n \"id\": \"person_123\",\n \"name\": \"Ada Lovelace\",\n \"email\": \"ad***@example.com\", // masked per the people table's masking config\n \"company\": \"Analytical Engines\", // forward display value\n \"phoneNumbers\": [ // reverse-FK child collection\n { \"id\": \"ph_1\", \"number\": \"+1...\" }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nEvery included table is read through **its own** `firewall` and `masking` — a\nsubscriber only ever sees related rows they're already allowed to read, masked\nexactly as they would be on a normal read.\n\n## Reading a surface\n\nThe compiler generates a read endpoint per view:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/views/person-detail/person_123\n→ { \"data\": { ...surface }, \"seq\": 7 }\n```\n\n`seq` is the surface's current monotonic sequence — the client uses it to detect\ndropped deltas. A `404` is returned when the caller can't read the root row\n(indistinguishable from \"doesn't exist\", closing the id-probe channel).\n\n## Subscribing (client)\n\nThe built-in CMS and Account SPAs ship a `useView` hook:\n\n```tsx\n\nfunction PersonDetail({ personId }: { personId: string }) {\n const { data, connected, loading } = useView('person-detail', personId);\n // `data` stays live: editing the person merges into the root; adding a phone\n // appends to data.phoneNumbers; deleting one removes it — no refetch.\n}\n```\n\nUnder the hood `useView` uses a **subscribe-then-snapshot** flow so no change\nslips through the gap between reading the surface and the socket going live:\n\n1. Requests a **view-scoped ws-ticket** (`POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` with\n `{ view, rootId }`) — gated by the same root firewall as the read endpoint —\n and opens a WebSocket scoped to `view:<view>:<rootId>`.\n2. Once the socket is open, fetches the full surface via\n `GET /api/v1/views/<view>/:rootId`. Deltas arriving during that fetch are\n **buffered**, then replayed after the snapshot applies (the route reads the\n `seq` baseline *before* materializing, so the snapshot is at least as fresh\n as `seq`, and replay is idempotent — collections key by row `id`).\n3. Applies `view_changes` deltas in place (the **hybrid-delta** model):\n - `target: 'root'` + `UPDATE` → shallow-merge into the surface root\n - `target: 'root'` + `DELETE` → surface cleared\n - `target: 'collection'` → append / replace-by-key / remove-by-key on `data[as]`\n - `delta.resync` → refetch the surface (the stricter-child path above)\n4. Tracks `seq`. A gap (`seq !== last + 1`) or a WebSocket reconnect triggers a\n full **resync** — the safety net that heals any dropped delta (Cloudflare D1\n has no transactions, so emit is best-effort by design). If the server can't\n read the baseline it returns `seq: null`; the client then adopts the first\n delta's `seq` instead of treating it as `0`, so a transient read error never\n spirals into a resync loop. Overlapping resyncs are token-guarded so a slow\n earlier fetch can't clobber a newer surface.\n\nTo subscribe from a custom client, request a ticket with `{ view, rootId }` and\nconnect to `…/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. Messages are:\n\n```jsonc\n{\n \"type\": \"view_changes\",\n \"view\": \"person-detail\",\n \"rootId\": \"person_123\",\n \"seq\": 8,\n \"delta\": { \"target\": \"collection\", \"op\": \"INSERT\", \"as\": \"phoneNumbers\",\n \"key\": \"ph_2\", \"row\": { \"id\": \"ph_2\", \"number\": \"+1...\" } }\n}\n```\n\n## How changes are captured\n\nDeltas are emitted from the **write chokepoint** — the same wrapper that injects\naudit fields wraps every `db.insert/update/delete`. Because CRUD routes *and*\naction handlers write through that db, both emit deltas; there's no separate\nhook to wire. A write taps its result and, when it used `.returning()`, fans a\ndelta to each affected surface. Soft deletes (an `UPDATE` that sets `deletedAt`)\nare emitted as `DELETE` so the row leaves the surface.\n\n## Security\n\n- The **subscribe gate** reuses the view materializer: a ticket is only minted\n when the caller can read the root row.\n- Each included table's `firewall` + `masking` apply on both the initial\n materialize and the live deltas (masking is applied per subscriber role at\n fanout), so the two are consistent.\n- A table-level `realtime.requiredRoles` declaration is honored on view\n deltas too (v0.46+): `view_changes` for that table fan out only to\n subscribers holding one of the required roles, exactly like its row-stream\n broadcasts. Tables without `requiredRoles` are unaffected.\n- **Stricter-child guard.** When a reverse-FK child's firewall is *stricter*\n than the root's (e.g. an owner-scoped note under an org-scoped person), the\n raw child row is **never broadcast**. Instead the server emits a *resync\n signal* and the client refetches the surface through the materializer, which\n applies the child's own firewall per subscriber. Row-bearing deltas are sent\n only when the child is no stricter than the root.\n- **Masking fails closed.** A mask type the Broadcaster can't replicate —\n notably `type: 'custom'`, whose function is stripped during codegen — is\n fully redacted (`[REDACTED]`) in deltas rather than passed through.\n- **Projection parity.** An include's `fields` projection is applied to deltas\n too, so a delta never carries a column the surface deliberately omits.\n\n## v1 limitations\n\n- **Depth-1 includes only.** Nested includes are a compile-time error — flatten\n the surface or split into multiple views.\n- **Forward includes** (e.g. a company name on a person) are materialized into\n the surface and refreshed on resync, but a change to the *referenced parent*\n does not push a live delta — it surfaces on the next resync/reconnect.\n- **Writes without `.returning()`** (and raw action writes that don't return\n rows) don't push a live delta; resync-on-reconnect heals the surface."
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+ "content": "A **live view** is a named *surface*: a root row plus the related data a screen\nshows around it — forward foreign-key display values and reverse-FK child\ncollections. When a client subscribes to a live view, the open surface stays\nwhole in realtime: any write to the root row **or** a related row that shares a\nforeign key is pushed as a `view_changes` delta the client splices in place.\n\nThis is the difference from table-level [`postgres_changes`](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)\nbroadcasts, which are single-row, single-table. A person-detail screen that\nshows a `people` row plus rows from a normalized `phone_numbers` table would\notherwise have to stitch together separate per-table events and figure out that\na `phone_numbers` insert with `personId = X` belongs to the person it has open.\nLive views do that mapping for you.\n\n> Live views ride the realtime Broadcaster. You must have realtime enabled\n> (`providers.database.config.realtime: true`). Declaring a view without\n> realtime is a compile-time error.\n\n## Defining a view\n\nViews live in `services/views/<name>.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/views/person-detail.ts\n\nexport default defineView({\n name: 'person-detail',\n root: 'people',\n include: [\n { relation: 'companyId' }, // forward FK → company display value\n { relation: 'phone_numbers' }, // reverse FK → phoneNumbers[] collection\n ],\n});\n```\n\n- **`root`** — the table the surface is keyed by. Must be a `defineTable`\n resource (its firewall + read access gate the surface).\n- **`include[].relation`** — a forward-FK column on the root (`companyId`), or\n the name of a child table that references the root (`phone_numbers`). The\n compiler auto-detects the direction from the foreign-key graph; pass\n `kind: 'forward' | 'reverse'` to disambiguate.\n- **`as`** — the response key the related data is spliced under. Defaults to a\n derived name: forward strips a trailing `Id` (`companyId` → `company`),\n reverse uses the child table name (`phone_numbers` → `phoneNumbers`).\n- **`fields`** — optional column projection on the included table.\n\nThe materialized surface looks like:\n\n```jsonc\n{\n \"id\": \"person_123\",\n \"name\": \"Ada Lovelace\",\n \"email\": \"ad***@example.com\", // masked per the people table's masking config\n \"company\": \"Analytical Engines\", // forward display value\n \"phoneNumbers\": [ // reverse-FK child collection\n { \"id\": \"ph_1\", \"number\": \"+1...\" }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nEvery included table is read through **its own** `firewall` and `masking` — a\nsubscriber only ever sees related rows they're already allowed to read, masked\nexactly as they would be on a normal read.\n\n## Reading a surface\n\nThe compiler generates a read endpoint per view:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/views/person-detail/person_123\n→ { \"data\": { ...surface }, \"seq\": 7 }\n```\n\n`seq` is the surface's current monotonic sequence — the client uses it to detect\ndropped deltas. A `404` is returned when the caller can't read the root row\n(indistinguishable from \"doesn't exist\", closing the id-probe channel).\n\n## Subscribing (client)\n\nThe built-in CMS and Account SPAs ship a `useView` hook:\n\n```tsx\n\nfunction PersonDetail({ personId }: { personId: string }) {\n const { data, connected, loading } = useView('person-detail', personId);\n // `data` stays live: editing the person merges into the root; adding a phone\n // appends to data.phoneNumbers; deleting one removes it — no refetch.\n}\n```\n\nUnder the hood `useView` uses a **subscribe-then-snapshot** flow so no change\nslips through the gap between reading the surface and the socket going live:\n\n1. Requests a **view-scoped ws-ticket** (`POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` with\n `{ view, rootId }`) — gated by the same root firewall as the read endpoint —\n and opens a WebSocket scoped to `view:<view>:<rootId>`.\n2. Once the socket is open, fetches the full surface via\n `GET /api/v1/views/<view>/:rootId`. Deltas arriving during that fetch are\n **buffered**, then replayed after the snapshot applies (the route reads the\n `seq` baseline *before* materializing, so the snapshot is at least as fresh\n as `seq`, and replay is idempotent — collections key by row `id`).\n3. Applies `view_changes` deltas in place (the **hybrid-delta** model):\n - `target: 'root'` + `UPDATE` → shallow-merge into the surface root\n - `target: 'root'` + `DELETE` → surface cleared\n - `target: 'collection'` → append / replace-by-key / remove-by-key on `data[as]`\n - `delta.resync` → refetch the surface (the stricter-child path above)\n4. Tracks `seq`. A gap (`seq !== last + 1`) or a WebSocket reconnect triggers a\n full **resync** — the safety net that heals any dropped delta (Cloudflare D1\n has no transactions, so emit is best-effort by design). If the server can't\n read the baseline it returns `seq: null`; the client then adopts the first\n delta's `seq` instead of treating it as `0`, so a transient read error never\n spirals into a resync loop. Overlapping resyncs are token-guarded so a slow\n earlier fetch can't clobber a newer surface.\n\nTo subscribe from a custom client, request a ticket with `{ view, rootId }` and\nconnect to `…/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. Messages are:\n\n```jsonc\n{\n \"type\": \"view_changes\",\n \"view\": \"person-detail\",\n \"rootId\": \"person_123\",\n \"seq\": 8,\n \"delta\": { \"target\": \"collection\", \"op\": \"INSERT\", \"as\": \"phoneNumbers\",\n \"key\": \"ph_2\", \"row\": { \"id\": \"ph_2\", \"number\": \"+1...\" } }\n}\n```\n\n## How changes are captured\n\nDeltas are emitted from the **write chokepoint** — the same wrapper that injects\naudit fields wraps every `db.insert/update/delete`. Because CRUD routes *and*\naction handlers write through that db, both emit deltas; there's no separate\nhook to wire. A write taps its result and, when it used `.returning()`, fans a\ndelta to each affected surface. Soft deletes (an `UPDATE` that sets `deletedAt`)\nare emitted as `DELETE` so the row leaves the surface.\n\n## Security\n\n- The **subscribe gate** reuses the view materializer: a ticket is only minted\n when the caller can read the root row.\n- Each included table's `firewall` + `masking` apply on both the initial\n materialize and the live deltas (masking is applied per subscriber role at\n fanout), so the two are consistent.\n- A table-level `realtime.access.roles` audience is honored on view deltas\n too: `view_changes` for that table fan out only to subscribers within the\n declared audience (evaluated with the same pseudo-role semantics as REST),\n exactly like its row-stream broadcasts. Tables that don't declare a\n broadcasting `realtime` block don't emit row-stream broadcasts, but their\n rows can still surface through a live view they participate in.\n- **Stricter-child guard.** When a reverse-FK child's firewall is *stricter*\n than the root's (e.g. an owner-scoped note under an org-scoped person), the\n raw child row is **never broadcast**. Instead the server emits a *resync\n signal* and the client refetches the surface through the materializer, which\n applies the child's own firewall per subscriber. Row-bearing deltas are sent\n only when the child is no stricter than the root.\n- **Masking fails closed.** A mask type the Broadcaster can't replicate —\n notably `type: 'custom'`, whose function is stripped during codegen — is\n fully redacted (`[REDACTED]`) in deltas rather than passed through.\n- **Projection parity.** An include's `fields` projection is applied to deltas\n too, so a delta never carries a column the surface deliberately omits.\n\n## v1 limitations\n\n- **Depth-1 includes only.** Nested includes are a compile-time error — flatten\n the surface or split into multiple views.\n- **Forward includes** (e.g. a company name on a person) are materialized into\n the surface and refreshed on resync, but a change to the *referenced parent*\n does not push a live delta — it surfaces on the next resync/reconnect.\n- **Writes without `.returning()`** (and raw action writes that don't return\n rows) don't push a live delta; resync-on-reconnect heals the surface."
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  "title": "Using Realtime",
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- "content": "This page covers connecting to the Quickback realtime system from client applications — authentication, subscribing to events, and handling messages.\n\n## Connecting\n\nOpen a WebSocket connection to the realtime worker:\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\"wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket\");\n```\n\n## Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. This is a two-step process:\n\n1. **Get a ticket** — Call the ws-ticket endpoint with your session auth\n2. **Connect with ticket** — Pass the ticket as a URL parameter when opening the WebSocket\n\nThis approach is faster and more secure than in-band auth messages — the connection is authenticated at upgrade time with no HTTP round-trip from the Durable Object.\n\n### Step 1: Get a WebSocket Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\n Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}`,\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: \"evt_123\" }), // optional; used by resource-scoped wsTicket config\n});\nconst { wsTicket, expiresIn } = await response.json();\n// expiresIn = 60 (seconds)\n```\n\nThe ticket is a short-lived (60-second) HMAC-signed token containing your userId, roles, and the resolved subscription scope.\n\n### Step 2: Connect with Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log(\"Connected and authenticated!\");\n // No auth message needed — connection is pre-authenticated\n};\n```\n\nIf the ticket is invalid or expired, the WebSocket upgrade is rejected with a 401 status.\n\n## Handling Messages\n\n### CRUD Events\n\nCRUD events use the `postgres_changes` type:\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n if (msg.type === \"postgres_changes\") {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n switch (eventType) {\n case \"INSERT\":\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"UPDATE\":\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"DELETE\":\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n break;\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\nFor UPDATE events, both `new` and `old` are populated. For DELETE events, only `old` is populated.\n\n### Custom Broadcasts\n\nCustom events use the `broadcast` type:\n\n```typescript\nif (msg.type === \"broadcast\") {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === \"screening-complete\") {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === \"screening:progress\") {\n updateProgressBar(payload.percent);\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nCustom namespaces (from `defineRealtime()`) use the format `namespace:event` — e.g., `screening:started`, `screening:progress`.\n\n## Security\n\n### Role-Based Filtering\n\nEvents are only delivered to users whose role matches the broadcast's `targetRoles`. If a table's realtime config specifies `requiredRoles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"]`, only users with those roles receive the events. This applies to generated CRUD broadcasts and to [live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) `view_changes` deltas alike, enforced at fanout (v0.46+ — recompile and redeploy to pick up the enforcement).\n\n### Per-Role Masking\n\nField values are masked according to the subscriber's role. For example, with this masking config:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: \"ssn\", show: { roles: [\"owner\"] } },\n}\n```\n\n- **Owner sees:** `{ ssn: \"123-45-6789\" }`\n- **Recruiter sees:** `{ ssn: \"*****6789\" }`\n\nMasking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles), not O(subscribers)) for efficiency. A `type: 'custom'` mask function can't run inside the Broadcaster — those columns broadcast as `[REDACTED]` (fail closed).\n\n### User-Specific Events\n\nEvents can target a specific user lane. Only that user receives the broadcast — all other connections on the same scope are skipped.\n\n### Scope Isolation\n\nEach WebSocket connection is attached to exactly one resolved scope: `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId`. Users can only subscribe to the scope stamped into their ws ticket, enforced during authentication and ticket minting.\n\n## Reconnection\n\nWebSocket connections can drop due to network issues. Implement reconnection logic in your client — note that you need to fetch a fresh ticket on each reconnect since tickets expire after 60 seconds:\n\n```typescript\nasync function connect() {\n // Get a fresh ticket each time\n const res = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}` },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: \"evt_123\" }),\n });\n const { wsTicket } = await res.json();\n\n const ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n );\n\n ws.onclose = () => {\n // Reconnect after delay\n setTimeout(connect, 2000);\n };\n\n ws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n handleMessage(msg);\n };\n\n return ws;\n}\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster Durable Object runs inline in your main worker and reuses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` for WebSocket ticket signing.\n\nThe compiler generates the required `wrangler.toml` bindings automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Cloudflare Only\n\nRealtime requires Cloudflare Durable Objects and is only available with the Cloudflare runtime.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects) — Configuration, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Field masking configuration"
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+ "content": "This page covers connecting to the Quickback realtime system from client applications — authentication, subscribing to events, and handling messages.\n\n## Connecting\n\nOpen a WebSocket connection to the realtime worker:\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\"wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket\");\n```\n\n## Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. This is a two-step process:\n\n1. **Get a ticket** — Call the ws-ticket endpoint with your session auth\n2. **Connect with ticket** — Pass the ticket as a URL parameter when opening the WebSocket\n\nThis approach is faster and more secure than in-band auth messages — the connection is authenticated at upgrade time with no HTTP round-trip from the Durable Object.\n\n### Step 1: Get a WebSocket Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\n Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}`,\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: \"evt_123\" }), // optional; used by resource-scoped wsTicket config\n});\nconst { wsTicket, expiresIn } = await response.json();\n// expiresIn = 60 (seconds)\n```\n\nThe ticket is a short-lived (60-second) HMAC-signed token containing your userId, roles, and the resolved subscription scope.\n\n### Step 2: Connect with Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log(\"Connected and authenticated!\");\n // No auth message needed — connection is pre-authenticated\n};\n```\n\nIf the ticket is invalid or expired, the WebSocket upgrade is rejected with a 401 status.\n\n## Handling Messages\n\n### CRUD Events\n\nCRUD events use the `postgres_changes` type:\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n if (msg.type === \"postgres_changes\") {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n switch (eventType) {\n case \"INSERT\":\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"UPDATE\":\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"DELETE\":\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n break;\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\nFor UPDATE events, both `new` and `old` are populated. For DELETE events, only `old` is populated.\n\n### Custom Broadcasts\n\nCustom events use the `broadcast` type:\n\n```typescript\nif (msg.type === \"broadcast\") {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === \"screening-complete\") {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === \"screening:progress\") {\n updateProgressBar(payload.percent);\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nCustom namespaces (from `defineRealtime()`) use the format `namespace:event` — e.g., `screening:started`, `screening:progress`.\n\n## Security\n\n### Role-Based Filtering\n\nEvents are only delivered to subscribers who fall within the broadcast's audience. A broadcasting table's realtime config **must** declare `access: { roles: [...] }` — e.g. `access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] }` delivers only to those roles. The audience is evaluated at fanout with the same uppercase pseudo-role semantics as REST (`PUBLIC` = everyone in the room, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `SYSADMIN`), plus concrete membership/scope roles. This is **fail-closed**: an empty or omitted audience delivers to no one (and is a compile error for a broadcasting resource). Applies to generated CRUD broadcasts and to [live view](/stack/realtime/live-views) `view_changes` deltas alike.\n\n### Per-Role Masking\n\nField values are masked according to the subscriber's role. For example, with this masking config:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: \"ssn\", show: { roles: [\"owner\"] } },\n}\n```\n\n- **Owner sees:** `{ ssn: \"123-45-6789\" }`\n- **Recruiter sees:** `{ ssn: \"*****6789\" }`\n\nMasking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles), not O(subscribers)) for efficiency. A `type: 'custom'` mask function can't run inside the Broadcaster — those columns broadcast as `[REDACTED]` (fail closed).\n\n### User-Specific Events\n\nEvents can target a specific user lane. Only that user receives the broadcast — all other connections on the same scope are skipped.\n\n### Scope Isolation\n\nEach WebSocket connection is attached to exactly one resolved scope: `scopeKey`, `organizationId`, or `userId`. Users can only subscribe to the scope stamped into their ws ticket, enforced during authentication and ticket minting.\n\n## Reconnection\n\nWebSocket connections can drop due to network issues. Implement reconnection logic in your client — note that you need to fetch a fresh ticket on each reconnect since tickets expire after 60 seconds:\n\n```typescript\nasync function connect() {\n // Get a fresh ticket each time\n const res = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}` },\n body: JSON.stringify({ eventId: \"evt_123\" }),\n });\n const { wsTicket } = await res.json();\n\n const ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}`\n );\n\n ws.onclose = () => {\n // Reconnect after delay\n setTimeout(connect, 2000);\n };\n\n ws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n handleMessage(msg);\n };\n\n return ws;\n}\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster Durable Object runs inline in your main worker and reuses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` for WebSocket ticket signing.\n\nThe compiler generates the required `wrangler.toml` bindings automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Cloudflare Only\n\nRealtime requires Cloudflare Durable Objects and is only available with the Cloudflare runtime.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects) — Configuration, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Field masking configuration"
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  "title": "Outbound Webhooks",
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- "content": "Outbound webhooks notify external services when events happen in your API. Users register webhook endpoints, subscribe to event types, and receive signed HTTP POST requests when events are emitted.\n\n## Overview\n\nOutbound webhooks are a multi-step system:\n\n1. **Users register endpoints** via the REST API\n2. **Your code emits events** using `emitWebhookEvent()`\n3. **Quickback queues deliveries** for each matching endpoint\n4. **The queue consumer delivers** with retry and exponential backoff\n5. **Payloads are signed** with HMAC-SHA256 (Stripe-compatible format)\n\n## Emitting Events\n\nCall `emitWebhookEvent()` in your actions or custom routes:\n\n```typescript\n\n// After creating a user\nconst newUser = await db.insert(users).values(data).returning();\n\nawait emitWebhookEvent(\n \"user.created\",\n newUser[0],\n { organizationId: ctx.activeOrgId },\n env\n);\n```\n\n**Parameters:**\n\n| Parameter | Type | Description |\n|-----------|------|-------------|\n| `eventType` | `string` | Event name (e.g., `user.created`) |\n| `payload` | `unknown` | Event data (auto-wrapped with metadata) |\n| `options` | `object` | `{ organizationId?, userId? }` — scope for endpoint matching |\n| `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | Cloudflare environment bindings |\n\n**Note:** The compiler does NOT auto-emit events after CRUD operations. You must call `emitWebhookEvent()` explicitly where you want webhooks triggered.\n\n## Event Types\n\nQuickback provides recommended event naming conventions:\n\n| Category | Events |\n|----------|--------|\n| User | `user.created`, `user.updated`, `user.deleted` |\n| Subscription | `subscription.created`, `subscription.updated`, `subscription.cancelled`, `subscription.renewed` |\n| Organization | `organization.created`, `organization.updated`, `organization.deleted`, `organization.member_added`, `organization.member_removed` |\n| File | `file.uploaded`, `file.deleted` |\n\nYou can emit any custom event type — these are conventions, not restrictions.\n\n## Payload Format\n\nThe emitted payload is wrapped automatically:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"user.created\",\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"usr_abc123\",\n \"name\": \"Jane Doe\",\n \"email\": \"jane@example.com\"\n },\n \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\n## Payload Signing\n\nEvery delivery is signed with HMAC-SHA256 using the endpoint's secret. The signature format is Stripe-compatible:\n\n```\nX-Webhook-Signature: t=1705312800,v1=5257a869e7ecebeda32affa62cdca3fa51cad7e77a0e56ff536d0ce8e108d8bd\n```\n\n**Signed payload:** `<timestamp>.<json_body>`\n\n**Additional headers:**\n\n| Header | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `X-Webhook-Signature` | `t=<timestamp>,v1=<hmac>` |\n| `X-Webhook-Event` | Event type (e.g., `user.created`) |\n| `X-Webhook-Delivery` | Delivery ID for tracking |\n| `Content-Type` | `application/json` |\n\n### Verifying Signatures (Consumer Side)\n\n```typescript\n\nfunction verifyWebhook(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {\n const [tPart, v1Part] = signature.split(',');\n const timestamp = tPart.replace('t=', '');\n const expectedSig = v1Part.replace('v1=', '');\n\n // Check timestamp (5 minute tolerance)\n const age = Date.now() / 1000 - parseInt(timestamp);\n if (age > 300) return false;\n\n const signed = `${timestamp}.${payload}`;\n const computed = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(signed).digest('hex');\n return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(computed), Buffer.from(expectedSig));\n}\n```\n\n## Endpoint Management API\n\n### Register an Endpoint\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/endpoints\n```\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"My Integration\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/webhook\",\n \"events\": [\"user.created\", \"subscription.*\"]\n}\n```\n\n**Response (201):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"wep_abc123\",\n \"name\": \"My Integration\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/webhook\",\n \"secret\": \"whsec_a1b2c3d4...\",\n \"events\": [\"user.created\", \"subscription.*\"],\n \"enabled\": true,\n \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nThe `secret` is only returned on creation. Store it securely.\n\n### Event Pattern Matching\n\nEndpoints subscribe to events using patterns:\n\n| Pattern | Matches |\n|---------|---------|\n| `user.created` | Exact match only |\n| `user.*` | All user events |\n| `*` | All events |\n\n### Other Endpoints\n\n| Method | Path | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints` | List your endpoints |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Get endpoint details (secret masked) |\n| `PATCH` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Update endpoint (name, url, events, enabled) |\n| `DELETE` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Delete endpoint |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/deliveries` | List delivery attempts |\n| `POST` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/test` | Send a test event |\n| `POST` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/rotate-secret` | Generate a new signing secret |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/events` | List available event types |\n\n### Access Control\n\nEndpoints are scoped by `userId` or `organizationId`. Users can only manage their own endpoints. When emitting events, only endpoints matching the event's scope receive deliveries.\n\n### URL Validation (anti-SSRF)\n\nRegistered URLs are validated at registration and again before each delivery attempt. The default policy rejects:\n\n- Any scheme other than `https:` (matches Stripe, GitHub, and Slack webhook conventions)\n- Loopback hosts (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`)\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`)\n- RFC 1918 private ranges (`10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`), `169.254/16`, and `0.0.0.0/8`\n- Hosts ending in `.internal` or `.local`\n\nPlaintext `http:` is rejected by default. To allow `http:` (e.g. for a self-hosted dev environment without TLS), set `webhookAllowInsecure: true` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nproviders: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n webhooksBinding: 'WEBHOOKS_DB',\n webhookAllowInsecure: true, // dev/self-host only\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe other validation rules (private/loopback/metadata blocking) still apply when this flag is on.\n\n### Redirect Handling\n\nOutbound delivery uses `redirect: \"manual\"` — the runtime refuses to follow 3xx responses. A redirect is treated as a **terminal** delivery failure (no retry), and the redirect target is recorded in the `responseBody`. This protects signed payloads from being bounced to a different host than the one the user registered.\n\nIf your endpoint legitimately needs to relocate, update the `url` on the endpoint record instead of relying on a 301/302.\n\n## Delivery and Retry\n\nDeliveries are processed asynchronously via a Cloudflare Queue.\n\n**Success:** HTTP 2xx response marks the delivery as `delivered`.\n\n**Failure:** HTTP 4xx/5xx or network errors trigger retries with exponential backoff:\n\n| Attempt | Delay |\n|---------|-------|\n| 1st retry | ~2 seconds |\n| 2nd retry | ~4 seconds |\n| 3rd retry (final) | ~8 seconds |\n\nMaximum backoff is capped at 1 hour. After 3 failed attempts, the delivery is marked as `failed`.\n\n**Disabled endpoints:** If an endpoint is disabled or deleted between emission and delivery, the delivery is marked as failed immediately.\n\n### Delivery Record\n\nEach delivery attempt is tracked in the `webhook_deliveries` table:\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `status` | `pending`, `delivered`, or `failed` |\n| `attempts` | Number of delivery attempts |\n| `responseStatus` | HTTP status from last attempt |\n| `responseBody` | Response body (truncated to 1000 chars) |\n| `lastAttemptAt` | Timestamp of last attempt |\n| `nextRetryAt` | When the next retry will occur |\n\n## Infrastructure\n\n### Queue Configuration\n\nOutbound webhooks use a dedicated Cloudflare Queue:\n\n```toml\n# Auto-generated in wrangler.toml\n[[queues.producers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-queue\"\nbinding = \"WEBHOOKS_QUEUE\"\n\n[[queues.consumers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-queue\"\nmax_batch_size = 10\nmax_batch_timeout = 30\nmax_retries = 3\ndead_letter_queue = \"my-app-webhooks-dlq\"\n```\n\n### Dead Letter Queue\n\nFailed webhook deliveries (after all retries) are sent to a dead letter queue for investigation:\n\n```toml\n[[queues.consumers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-dlq\"\nmax_batch_size = 1\n```\n\n## Enabling Webhooks\n\nSet `webhooksBinding` in your database provider config:\n\n```typescript\ndatabase: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n binding: \"DB\",\n webhooksBinding: \"WEBHOOKS_DB\",\n})\n```\n\nThis generates the webhook database schema, routes, queue consumer, and all supporting code.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Inbound Webhooks](/stack/webhooks/inbound) — Receive webhooks from external services\n- [Queues](/stack/queues) — Background processing infrastructure"
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+ "content": "Outbound webhooks notify external services when events happen in your API. Users register webhook endpoints, subscribe to event types, and receive signed HTTP POST requests when events are emitted.\n\n## Overview\n\nOutbound webhooks are a multi-step system:\n\n1. **Users register endpoints** via the REST API\n2. **Your code emits events** using `emitWebhookEvent()`\n3. **Quickback queues deliveries** for each matching endpoint\n4. **The queue consumer delivers** with retry and exponential backoff\n5. **Payloads are signed** with HMAC-SHA256 (Stripe-compatible format)\n\n## Emitting Events\n\nCall `emitWebhookEvent()` in your actions or custom routes:\n\n```typescript\n\n// After creating a user\nconst newUser = await db.insert(users).values(data).returning();\n\nawait emitWebhookEvent(\n \"user.created\",\n newUser[0],\n { organizationId: ctx.activeOrgId },\n env\n);\n```\n\n**Parameters:**\n\n| Parameter | Type | Description |\n|-----------|------|-------------|\n| `eventType` | `string` | Event name (e.g., `user.created`) |\n| `payload` | `unknown` | Event data (auto-wrapped with metadata) |\n| `options` | `object` | `{ organizationId?, userId? }` — scope for endpoint matching |\n| `env` | `CloudflareBindings` | Cloudflare environment bindings |\n\n**Note:** The compiler does NOT auto-emit events after CRUD operations. You must call `emitWebhookEvent()` explicitly where you want webhooks triggered.\n\n## Event Types\n\nQuickback provides recommended event naming conventions:\n\n| Category | Events |\n|----------|--------|\n| User | `user.created`, `user.updated`, `user.deleted` |\n| Subscription | `subscription.created`, `subscription.updated`, `subscription.cancelled`, `subscription.renewed` |\n| Organization | `organization.created`, `organization.updated`, `organization.deleted`, `organization.member_added`, `organization.member_removed` |\n| File | `file.uploaded`, `file.deleted` |\n\nYou can emit any custom event type — these are conventions, not restrictions.\n\n## Payload Format\n\nThe emitted payload is wrapped automatically:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"user.created\",\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"usr_abc123\",\n \"name\": \"Jane Doe\",\n \"email\": \"jane@example.com\"\n },\n \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\n## Payload Signing\n\nEvery delivery is signed with HMAC-SHA256 using the endpoint's secret. The signature format is Stripe-compatible:\n\n```\nX-Webhook-Signature: t=1705312800,v1=5257a869e7ecebeda32affa62cdca3fa51cad7e77a0e56ff536d0ce8e108d8bd\n```\n\n**Signed payload:** `<timestamp>.<json_body>`\n\n**Additional headers:**\n\n| Header | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `X-Webhook-Signature` | `t=<timestamp>,v1=<hmac>` |\n| `X-Webhook-Event` | Event type (e.g., `user.created`) |\n| `X-Webhook-Delivery` | Delivery ID for tracking |\n| `Content-Type` | `application/json` |\n\n### Verifying Signatures (Consumer Side)\n\n```typescript\n\nfunction verifyWebhook(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {\n const [tPart, v1Part] = signature.split(',');\n const timestamp = tPart.replace('t=', '');\n const expectedSig = v1Part.replace('v1=', '');\n\n // Check timestamp (5 minute tolerance)\n const age = Date.now() / 1000 - parseInt(timestamp);\n if (age > 300) return false;\n\n const signed = `${timestamp}.${payload}`;\n const computed = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(signed).digest('hex');\n return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(computed), Buffer.from(expectedSig));\n}\n```\n\n## Endpoint Management API\n\n### Register an Endpoint\n\n```\nPOST /webhooks/v1/endpoints\n```\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"My Integration\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/webhook\",\n \"events\": [\"user.created\", \"subscription.*\"]\n}\n```\n\n**Response (201):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"wep_abc123\",\n \"name\": \"My Integration\",\n \"url\": \"https://example.com/webhook\",\n \"secret\": \"whsec_a1b2c3d4...\",\n \"events\": [\"user.created\", \"subscription.*\"],\n \"enabled\": true,\n \"createdAt\": \"2025-01-15T10:00:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nThe `secret` is only returned on creation. Store it securely.\n\n### Event Pattern Matching\n\nEndpoints subscribe to events using patterns:\n\n| Pattern | Matches |\n|---------|---------|\n| `user.created` | Exact match only |\n| `user.*` | All user events |\n| `*` | All events |\n\n### Other Endpoints\n\n| Method | Path | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints` | List your endpoints |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Get endpoint details (secret masked) |\n| `PATCH` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Update endpoint (name, url, events, enabled) |\n| `DELETE` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id` | Delete endpoint |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/deliveries` | List delivery attempts |\n| `POST` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/test` | Send a test event |\n| `POST` | `/webhooks/v1/endpoints/:id/rotate-secret` | Generate a new signing secret |\n| `GET` | `/webhooks/v1/events` | List available event types |\n\n### Access Control\n\nEndpoints are scoped by `userId` or `organizationId`. Users can only manage their own endpoints. When emitting events, only endpoints matching the event's scope receive deliveries.\n\n### URL Validation (anti-SSRF)\n\nRegistered URLs are validated at registration and again before each delivery attempt. The default policy rejects:\n\n- Any scheme other than `https:` (matches Stripe, GitHub, and Slack webhook conventions)\n- Loopback hosts (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`)\n- Cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`)\n- RFC 1918 private ranges (`10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`), `169.254/16`, and `0.0.0.0/8`\n- Hosts ending in `.internal` or `.local`\n\nPlaintext `http:` is rejected by default. To allow `http:` (e.g. for a self-hosted dev environment without TLS), set `webhookAllowInsecure: true` on the database provider config:\n\n```ts\n// quickback.config.ts\nproviders: {\n database: {\n name: 'cloudflare-d1',\n config: {\n webhooksBinding: 'WEBHOOKS_DB',\n webhookAllowInsecure: true, // dev/self-host only\n },\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe other validation rules (private/loopback/metadata blocking) still apply when this flag is on.\n\n### Redirect Handling\n\nOutbound delivery uses `redirect: \"manual\"` — the runtime refuses to follow 3xx responses. A redirect is treated as a **terminal** delivery failure (no retry), and the redirect target is recorded in the `responseBody`. This protects signed payloads from being bounced to a different host than the one the user registered.\n\nIf your endpoint legitimately needs to relocate, update the `url` on the endpoint record instead of relying on a 301/302.\n\n## Delivery and Retry\n\nDeliveries are processed asynchronously via a Cloudflare Queue.\n\n**Success:** HTTP 2xx response marks the delivery as `delivered`.\n\n**Failure:** HTTP 4xx/5xx or network errors trigger retries with exponential backoff:\n\n| Attempt | Delay |\n|---------|-------|\n| 1st retry | ~2 seconds |\n| 2nd retry | ~4 seconds |\n| 3rd retry (final) | ~8 seconds |\n\nMaximum backoff is capped at 1 hour. After 3 failed attempts, the delivery is marked as `failed`.\n\n**Disabled endpoints:** If an endpoint is disabled or deleted between emission and delivery, the delivery is marked as failed immediately.\n\n### Delivery Record\n\nEach delivery attempt is tracked in the `webhook_deliveries` table:\n\n| Field | Description |\n|-------|-------------|\n| `status` | `pending`, `delivered`, or `failed` |\n| `attempts` | Number of delivery attempts |\n| `responseStatus` | HTTP status from last attempt |\n| `responseBody` | Response body (truncated to 1000 chars) |\n| `lastAttemptAt` | Timestamp of last attempt |\n| `nextRetryAt` | When the next retry will occur |\n\n## Infrastructure\n\n### Queue Configuration\n\nOutbound webhooks use a dedicated Cloudflare Queue:\n\n```toml\n# Auto-generated in wrangler.toml\n[[queues.producers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-queue\"\nbinding = \"WEBHOOKS_QUEUE\"\n\n[[queues.consumers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-queue\"\nmax_batch_size = 10\nmax_batch_timeout = 30\nmax_retries = 3\ndead_letter_queue = \"my-app-webhooks-dlq\"\n```\n\n### Dead Letter Queue\n\nFailed webhook deliveries (after all retries) are sent to a dead letter queue for investigation:\n\n```toml\n[[queues.consumers]]\nqueue = \"my-app-webhooks-dlq\"\nmax_batch_size = 1\n```\n\n## Enabling Webhooks\n\nSet `webhooksBinding` in your database provider config:\n\n```typescript\ndatabase: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n binding: \"DB\",\n webhooksBinding: \"WEBHOOKS_DB\",\n})\n```\n\nThis generates the webhook database schema, routes, queue consumer, and all supporting code.\n\n### On Neon (Postgres)\n\nWebhooks are supported on the `neon` provider too. `webhooksBinding` acts as a\npure enable flag — there is no separate webhooks database. The webhook tables\nlive in a dedicated `webhooks` Postgres schema of your single Neon database,\ncreated by the standard drizzle migration set, and are locked down by an RLS\npolicy so only the Worker's internal service-role handle can touch them:\n\n```typescript\ndatabase: defineDatabase(\"neon\", {\n connectionMode: \"http\", // required for webhooks\n webhooksBinding: \"WEBHOOKS_DB\", // enable flag; no D1 binding is emitted\n // queue names stay configurable on any provider:\n webhooksQueueName: \"my-app-webhooks-queue\",\n webhooksDlqName: \"my-app-webhooks-dlq\",\n})\n```\n\nThe D1-only keys `webhooksDatabaseId` / `webhooksDatabaseName` are rejected at\ncompile time on Neon, and webhooks require `connectionMode: 'http'` (the\nCloudflare default). Queue wiring (`WEBHOOKS_QUEUE`, the consumer, and the\ndead letter queue) is identical across providers.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Inbound Webhooks](/stack/webhooks/inbound) — Receive webhooks from external services\n- [Queues](/stack/queues) — Background processing infrastructure"
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  export const TOPIC_LIST = [