@quickback-dev/cli 0.17.1 → 0.18.0

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@@ -4,105 +4,109 @@ Release notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.
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  ---
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- ## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026
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+ ## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026
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+
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+ ### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ mkdir my-app && cd my-app
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+ npx @quickback-dev/cli start
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+ ```
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+
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+ `start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.
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- ### Cloudflare D1 now gets a compiler-native Drizzle safety layer
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+ The same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.
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- Quickback's `cloudflare-d1` provider no longer treats `drizzle-kit generate` output as deploy-ready SQL by default.
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+ ### Named views on the free tier
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- **A D1-specific post-generation pass now runs inside the compiler.** After Drizzle emits auth, features, webhooks, or audit migrations, the D1 provider inspects the generated SQL before the compile finishes:
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+ The `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.
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- - **Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables** is stripped instead of being shipped as raw `DROP TABLE` statements.
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- - **Drop-only cleanup migrations** are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it.
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- - **Every generated D1 migration directory** is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails before `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.
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+ ### `quickback init` removed
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- This closes the class of failures where a compile succeeded but the later deploy exploded inside Cloudflare D1 because SQLite foreign-key enforcement rejected Drizzle's destructive cleanup ordering.
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+ Folded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.
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- Pinned by `d1-drizzle-helper.test.ts` plus the existing compile-runner and migration-order regressions.
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+ ### Minor
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+
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+ - `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.
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+ - Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.
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+ - Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.
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  ---
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- ## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026
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+ ## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026
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+
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+ ### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations
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+
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+ The `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.
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+
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+ ---
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- ### Resource-scoped realtime tickets and a shared broadcast targeting model
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+ ## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026
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- Quickback's realtime layer no longer assumes every WebSocket subscriber is an org member.
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+ ### Resource-scoped realtime tickets
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- **`providers.database.config.realtime` can now be object-shaped.** `realtime: true` still enables the historical org-scoped broadcaster, but projects can now opt into a declarative ws-ticket policy:
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+ `providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:
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  ```ts
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- providers: {
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- database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", {
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- realtime: {
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- wsTicket: {
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- role: "attendee",
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- requestField: "eventId",
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- scopeTable: "events",
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- },
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- },
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- }),
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+ realtime: {
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+ wsTicket: {
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+ role: "attendee",
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+ requestField: "eventId",
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+ scopeTable: "events",
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+ },
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  }
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  ```
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- That lets the generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticate the caller with Better Auth, evaluate a declared authz relationship role like `attendee` against the request body, and mint a short-lived Quickback websocket ticket for the resolved resource scope. `scopeTable` is the parent resource that defines the broadcast channel; the relationship/junction table remains the proof of access.
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+ The generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.
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- **Realtime and broadcast now share one targeting model.** The generated helper and Broadcaster both route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. Historical string targets still mean "organizationId shorthand", so existing code like `realtime.insert("claims", record, ctx.activeOrgId!)` keeps working. New explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:
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+ ### Unified broadcast targeting
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- ```ts
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- await realtime.broadcast("event-page-updated", payload, {
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- scopeKey: "events:evt_123",
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- });
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+ The realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:
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- await realtime.broadcast("dm", payload, {
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- userId: recipientId,
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- });
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+ ```ts
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+ await realtime.broadcast("event-page-updated", payload, { scopeKey: "events:evt_123" });
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+ await realtime.broadcast("dm", payload, { userId: recipientId });
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  ```
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- **WebSocket tickets are still Quickback-minted, not Better Auth tokens.** The front door remains your normal Better Auth cookie/bearer/JWT auth. After authorization succeeds, Quickback signs its own 60-second ws ticket and the Broadcaster verifies that ticket at upgrade time. Inline and separate broadcast-worker modes now both reuse `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` for ticket signing so there is no extra secret to configure during beta.
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-
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- Pinned by `realtime-ws-ticket-scope.test.ts`, plus the existing realtime routing and relationship-access regression suites.
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+ WebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.
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  ---
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  ## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026
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- ### Auth transport separation, cookie-backed CSRF middleware, and first-class Wrangler observability
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+ ### One auth transport per request
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- Three security/runtime hardenings landed together.
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+ Generated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.
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- **Exactly one auth transport per request.** Generated auth middleware now treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as separate auth methods and rejects any mixed request with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted, which removes ambiguous precedence rules from the hot path and keeps machine-to-machine auth explicit.
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+ ### Cookie-backed CSRF gate
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- **Cookie-backed mutating requests now get a CSRF gate.** Generated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests when the caller is relying on cookies. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional and origin validation has to carry the load.
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+ Generated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.
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- **Wrangler observability is now a first-class compiler surface.** `providers.runtime.config.observability` no longer stops at `enabled: true`. The compiler now understands top-level Workers Logs sampling plus nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, and emits the matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML. The config validator also rejects ambiguous double-mapping of Workers Logs sampling (`observability.headSamplingRate` plus `observability.logs.headSamplingRate`) and requires explicit per-signal `enabled` flags when trace/log export settings are present.
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+ ### First-class Wrangler observability
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- Pinned by `config-wiring.test.ts`, `csrf-middleware.test.ts`, `cookie-security.test.ts`, `auth-api-key-query-param.test.ts`, and the deployed negative-auth regression checks.
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+ `providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.
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  ---
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  ## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026
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- ### Bearer wins over cookie, and bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`
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-
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- Two hardenings to the auth middleware closing a mixed-credential ambiguity and a session-token replay path.
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+ ### Bearer wins over cookie
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- **Bearer-vs-cookie precedence.** A request that carries both an `Authorization` header and a session `Cookie` now resolves entirely from the bearer — the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. Previously the api-key and JWT fast-paths already short-circuited above cookie resolution, but session-token bearers fell through to Better Auth's `getSession()` where cookie auth resolved first and the bearer was silently ignored. That meant a request with `Cookie: alice` + `Authorization: Bearer bob-session-token` would resolve as alice, silently dropping bob's explicit credential. The inconsistency between bearer flavors (api-key/JWT bearer-wins, session-bearer cookie-wins) was the bug; making bearer win universally aligns with Better Auth's own framing of the plugin as "intended only for APIs that don't support cookies, or require Bearer tokens for authentication." Cookie remains the resolution path when no `Authorization` header is present, so browser SPA flows are unchanged.
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+ A request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.
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- **`requireSignature: true` on the bearer plugin.** Better Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults `requireSignature` to `false`, which means the session token emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` response header is a literal session secret — anyone who sees it in a proxy access log, a browser dev-tools panel, or a misrouted `Referer` can replay it. Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })` so Better Auth signs the token server-side with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and rejects unsigned bearers on verify. JWT bearers and agent-auth bearers are independently signed and unaffected. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override by passing `bearer: { requireSignature: false }` in `providers.auth.config.plugins` — user-supplied options merge on top of the secure default.
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+ ### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`
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- See [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence) for the full threat model and the four credential flavors Quickback supports.
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+ Better Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.
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- Pinned by `agent-auth.test.ts` (asserts the `bearer({ requireSignature: true })` emission shape).
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+ See [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).
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  ---
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  ## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026
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- ### Flat write DSL is now the preferred authored shape, with compatibility aliases preserved
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-
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- Quickback's resource DSL had drifted into an awkward split: reads already lived under `read`, while writes still sat under a nested `crud` block that no longer represented the full CRUD surface. That shape was technically supported, but it was teaching the wrong mental model.
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+ ### Flat write DSL
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- The preferred authored surface is now flat at the table level:
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+ Resource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:
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  ```ts
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  defineTable(customers, {
@@ -115,468 +119,295 @@ defineTable(customers, {
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  });
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  ```
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- `crud` and top-level `put` still compile in v0.16.5 as deprecated compatibility aliases. The compiler now normalizes the flat shape into the existing internal write surface, rejects mixed usage on the same resource, and warns when legacy aliases are used. Generated outputs that expose authored table policy — including `schema-registry.json` — now emit flat `create` / `update` / `delete` / `upsert` aliases alongside the legacy normalized `crud` block so older consumers keep working during the transition.
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+ `crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.
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- ### CMS standalone actions now have an explicit placement model for multi-table features
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+ ### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions
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- Standalone actions were unambiguous for single-table features and for clearly table-scoped paths, but multi-table feature-root actions had no clean place to live in the CMS metadata contract. The API knew what the action was; the CMS had to guess where to render it.
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+ Standalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:
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- The contract is now explicit:
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-
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- - `cms.placement: "feature"` shows the standalone action in the table toolbar for every table in the feature
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- - `cms.placement: "tables"` with `cms.tables` shows it only on specific tables
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+ - `cms.placement: "feature"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature
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+ - `cms.placement: "tables"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables
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  - `cms.hidden: true` keeps it API-only
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- The compiler now emits feature-root standalone actions under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json` instead of duplicating them across every table entry. The CMS merges those `featureActions` into table toolbars according to placement, while record action bars remain table-scoped by default. Ambiguous multi-table feature-root standalone actions without placement now compile with a warning instead of silently landing in the wrong UI surface.
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- ### `openapi.types` can now keep colocated SPA clients in sync from a single compile
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+ Feature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.
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- `quickback compile` already emitted `openapi.json` and a generated `api-types.gen.ts`, but projects with a colocated SPA often kept a second copy under something like `apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts`. That second file drifted unless a separate `codegen:api` step was run after every compile.
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+ ### `openapi.types` accepts a string array
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- `openapi.types` now accepts a string array as well as `true`, `false`, or a single custom path. One compile can write the same generated types file to multiple locations, for example:
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+ One compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:
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  ```ts
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- openapi: {
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- types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'],
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- }
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+ openapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }
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  ```
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- This keeps the API root artifact and any colocated SPA copy aligned without a second codegen command. The bundled Quickback CMS and Account SPAs do not use `api-types.gen.ts` themselves — CMS is schema-registry driven, and Account uses Better Auth plus hand-written fetch helpers — so this option is aimed at user-authored client apps that live beside the compiled API.
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+ ### Stable artifact ordering
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- ### Generated route files and `schema-registry.json` are now emitted in a stable order
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+ Generated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.
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- Back-to-back `quickback compile` runs could previously regenerate functionally identical route files or `schema-registry.json` with different ordering. The API behavior did not change, but the diff noise was real.
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- The compiler now normalizes discovery order before it builds action bundles, route files, and the schema registry. Identical logical input produces stable emitted artifacts, which means fewer no-op diffs after a recompile and cleaner review when something actually changed.
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+ ---
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  ## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026
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- ### Compile didn't emit a migration — v0.16.3 corrupted drizzle snapshots, fixed + self-heal
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- The v0.16.3 release stamped a `$$__quickback_warning__$$` key onto every drizzle metadata JSON file under `quickback/drizzle/<dialect>/meta/` — both `_journal.json` and each `<n>_snapshot.json`. The original change description noted that drizzle-kit "ignores unknown top-level fields when reading journals/snapshots" — but that's only true for journals. Snapshots are parsed by a strict Zod schema that rejects extras, so on every compile after the upgrade, drizzle-kit logged each `<n>_snapshot.json` as `"data is malformed"`, lost its diff base, and silently emitted no migration on schema changes. Users hand-wrote migrations (e.g. `0033`) to compensate. Reproduced against `examples/recruitment` by adding a column to `candidates` — the recruit tree's 8 snapshots all came back malformed and zero migrations were generated.
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+ ### Drizzle snapshot integrity
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- The fix narrows `DRIZZLE_META_JSON_RE` to a journal-only matcher (`DRIZZLE_JOURNAL_JSON_RE`) so the warning is stamped only where it's safe. A new `stripJsonHeader()` helper runs over `existingFiles` when the staging step encounters a `<n>_snapshot.json`, so projects whose tree was already corrupted by v0.16.3 self-heal on the next compile: the bad header is stripped on the way into the staging dir, drizzle-kit's diff resolves correctly, and the emitted snapshot writes back without the offending key. No manual snapshot surgery required after upgrading — the next `quickback compile` quietly cleans up the prior corruption.
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+ Drizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.
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- Pinned by `drizzle-meta-header.test.ts`: journals receive the warning key at position 0; snapshots are byte-identical input/output (no warning key); `stripJsonHeader` strips a present warning, no-ops on absent, and tolerates unparseable / array-shaped JSON.
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+ ### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA
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- ### `account.auth.*` now drives the server, not just the UI — closes a signup-disabled bypass
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+ The Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:
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- A 2026-05-11 external pentest of a production Loop deployment confirmed that `account.auth.signup: false` only hid the SPA's signup screen while leaving `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` wide open. A new account could be created against the server, and because `account.auth.emailVerification: false` was the only emit point (it never set the server's `requireEmailVerification`), the freshly issued session was immediately usable. The same shape applied to `password`, `passkey`, and `emailOTP` — every "friendly" `account.auth.*` flag was a SPA build flag with no server counterpart. The Account UI promised "signup is off"; the server cheerfully accepted the registration.
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+ - `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)
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+ - `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`
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+ - `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`
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+ - `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions
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- `apps/compiler/src/providers/auth/providers/better-auth/normalize-from-account.ts` introduces a one-way normalizer that runs in `parseCompilerInput` before any generator reads `providers.auth`. It maps `account.auth.*` into the Better Auth server config — `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted), `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`, `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`, `passkey`/`emailOTP` → plugin additions — only when the user hasn't already set the BA field explicitly. Setting both sides incompatibly (e.g. `account.auth.signup: false` AND `emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false`) throws at compile time with a precise multi-line error rather than picking a silent winner; the silent precedence is what created the bug in the first place.
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+ The SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.
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- The Account SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are now derived from the same canonicalized BA config via a new `resolveAuthFeatureFlags()` helper in `generators/spa-builder.ts`, so the SPA bundle and the server cannot drift. The helper self-normalizes (idempotent) for direct callers and unit tests. Two new SPA flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` (driven by the `apiKey` plugin) and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK` (driven by the `magicLink` plugin), so the existing api-keys route in `packages/account` can self-gate the same way passkey/emailOTP already do.
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- **Breaking** for anyone who was implicitly relying on the open signup endpoint: projects that set `account.auth.signup: false` but actually wanted server signup to remain open must now explicitly set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` (and accept the risk). Same migration path for `emailVerification` (now actually enforced server-side when set) and the plugin flags. Loop's existing config requires no change — the next recompile + deploy starts returning `403` on `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email`, which is exactly what the config has been claiming since the field was added.
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- Pinned by `account-auth-normalize.test.ts` (19 unit tests covering the normalizer + flag resolver + contradiction detection on both array- and object-form plugins) and `loop-pentest-regression.test.ts` (compiles a trimmed Loop config and asserts the generated `auth.ts` carries `disableSignUp: true`).
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+ **Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.
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  ---
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  ## v0.16.3 — May 9, 2026
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- ### Standalone action mount order — literal paths no longer get swallowed by sibling CRUD `/:id` routes
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- When a feature exposed both CRUD routes and a standalone action at the same mount prefix, Hono could register the CRUD router first. A literal standalone path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` would then hit the CRUD router's `GET /:id`, treat `"today-bundle"` as a record id, and fail in the firewall layer as a fake record lookup instead of ever reaching the standalone handler.
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+ ### Standalone action mount order
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- The compiler now attaches an explicit registration priority to generated route mounts. Feature-level standalone action routers register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix, so literal paths win and `/:id` remains the fallback. The regression is pinned in `standalone-route-mount-order.test.ts`, which asserts both emitted routes and the final mount order in `src/index.ts`.
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- This is a routing-correctness fix, not a public API redesign. No user code changes are required, and existing standalone action paths do not need to be renamed. Recompile and shared-prefix standalone routes resolve correctly.
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+ Feature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `"today-bundle"` as a record ID.
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  ---
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  ## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026
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- ### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization — worker SPA emits no longer 307-loop
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- Cloudflare's static-assets binding canonicalizes any request for `/<dir>/index.html` into a 307 redirect to `/<dir>/` (the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`). When a worker subrequest issues `c.env.ASSETS.fetch(new Request(new URL('/<dir>/index.html', …)))`, the binding returns the 307; the worker forwards it; the browser re-requests `/<dir>/`; the same SPA-fallback handler (or hostname middleware) catches the directory request and re-fetches `/<dir>/index.html`. Infinite loop. Caught by AttendVIP writing custom `/admin/` and `/m/` host-routing patches on the deployed worker — the fix in their patches was switching to `/admin/` (trailing slash, no `index.html`), which Cloudflare resolves to the directory's `index.html` content with a 200.
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-
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- The compiler had the same bug baked into every emit point. `cloudflare.ts` now fetches `/<dir>/` everywhere it previously asked for `/<dir>/index.html`: CMS hostname middleware, `/cms/*` SPA catchall, apex `/` handler, account/admin hostname middleware, `/account/*` SPA catchall, and the multi-domain catchall. Eight regression tests in `cf-assets-canonicalization-spa-fallback.test.ts` pin every emit so a future copy/paste can't sneak the literal back in.
195
-
196
- ### `account.customLogin` — drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the SPA
197
-
198
- A new `account: { customLogin: true }` flag emits an explicit `app.get('/account/login', …)` route that serves a project-supplied static page instead of letting the bundled Account SPA's client router handle the path. Drop the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (a *directory*, not a bare `login.html` — see the canonicalization note above) and the existing `quickback/public/` passthrough copies it into the asset binding. The route is registered before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/...` (profile, organizations, devices, …) keeps going through the React SPA. Same surface AttendVIP was hand-patching post-compile — promoting the flag means the next compile no longer wipes their override. Default `false`.
199
-
200
- ### Project-level realtime auto-broadcasts every resource by default
179
+ ### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization
201
180
 
202
- `dbConfig.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled unless its `realtime` block explicitly opts out. The previous behavior set `effectiveResourceRealtime` to `undefined` when a resource didn't declare its own block — so a project that flipped the project-level flag still had to add per-table `realtime: { enabled: true }` everywhere to actually get auto-broadcasts. Caught against AttendVIP after the v0.15.x auto-broadcast wiring landed but didn't fire. New default: project-level on with no per-resource override = `{ enabled: true }`. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.
181
+ Worker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.
203
182
 
204
- ### Drizzle metadata gets a DO NOT EDIT header + journal drift warning
183
+ ### `account.customLogin`
205
184
 
206
- Two changes that protect the drizzle plumbing from quiet corruption.
185
+ Set `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.
207
186
 
208
- `compile-runner.ts:addJsonHeader` now stamps drizzle's generated JSON (`_journal.json`, `<n>_snapshot.json`) with a `$__quickback_warning__$` key explaining the file is regenerated by the compiler and should not be edited by hand. The disclaimer matches the one already on `.ts` outputs — the journal had been the one drizzle file users felt entitled to "tidy up" because nothing in it said otherwise.
187
+ ### Project-level realtime defaults
209
188
 
210
- A new check in the same module compares the journal entry count against the snapshot file count. drizzle-kit only produces one snapshot per `generate` run, so `journal.entries.length > snapshots + 1` means the journal claims migrations the snapshot side has lost (typical cause: a manual delete of an `<n>_snapshot.json` that left the journal entry behind). The compiler logs a warning and lists the orphan entries. Detected directly out of AttendVIP's `Travel 500` triage — drizzle-kit was diffing against a stale `0002_snapshot.json` and emitting bogus full `CREATE TABLE` migrations for tables that had been added in subsequent (now-orphaned) journal entries.
189
+ `providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.
211
190
 
212
- ### Two new compile-time validators (LOUD failures over silent traps)
191
+ ### Compile-time validators
213
192
 
214
- **`AUTHENTICATED` + tenant-scoped firewall now refuses to compile.** `pseudo-role-validator.ts` rejects any access tree that admits `AUTHENTICATED` on a resource whose firewall scopes by `organizationId`. The combination is the silent-empty trap: a sign-in-only caller with no active org passes the role gate, the firewall WHERE clause filters every row out, and the API returns `[]` with a 200. The error message names three valid resolutions — drop the org scope (`firewall: { exception: true }`), tighten the role to `USER` or a role with implied org membership, or split the route into a token-auth branch and an org-membership branch.
193
+ Two new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:
215
194
 
216
- **`createRealtime` imports without `dbConfig.realtime: true` now throw.** Project lib + action + feature-lib files are scanned at compile time for `import { createRealtime }` (and the equivalent named binding). When the project hasn't enabled realtime, the compile fails with the offending file paths and remediation: either enable `dbConfig.realtime: true` so the runtime helper exists, or remove the import. Caught against AttendVIP — three handler files (`broadcastAnnouncement.ts`, `declineActivityForGuest.ts`, `applyRsvp.ts`) imported `createRealtime` after the v0.15 auto-broadcast wiring landed, but their config never set `realtime: true`. The Worker compiled, deployed, and 500'd at first call. The user's framing was "config should be the source of truth" — this validator enforces that. Five regression tests in `realtime-import-without-config-rejected.test.ts`.
195
+ - `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).
196
+ - `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.
217
197
 
218
- ### Fixes
198
+ ### Drizzle metadata hardening
219
199
 
220
- **1. `SYSADMIN` was missing from the per-feature standalone gate's `allowsWithoutOrg` set.** The standalone-action wrapper skips its `if (!ctx.activeOrgId)` gate for any access tree referencing a pseudo-role (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `ADMIN`) — but `SYSADMIN`, the v0.15.0 fifth marker, was missing from the matcher. Sysadmin actions on `cms.sysadmin: true` projects were 403'ing on cross-tenant calls (sysadmins have no member rows, so `ctx.activeOrgId` is unset by design). The matcher now includes `SYSADMIN`.
200
+ Drizzle journal files carry a "do not edit" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).
221
201
 
222
- **2. Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects when neither CMS nor Account SPA is bundled.** Projects that opt out of both bundled SPAs still receive traffic at `/` (no apex handler, 404) and `/account/login` (no Account fallback, 404). Setting `auth.loginUrl` to an external sign-in host now activates two compiler-emitted redirects so those natural inbound URLs land somewhere useful: `/account/login → loginUrl?redirect=…` (preserves the bounce param) and `/ → loginUrl` (or `/account` when the Account SPA is bundled). Both opt in via `auth.loginUrl !== '/account/login'` so projects using the built-in `/account/login` keep the existing SPA-fallback behavior unchanged.
202
+ ### Minor
223
203
 
224
- **3. Record-based action URLs are now kebab-case to match OpenAPI.** `record-based.ts` was emitting URL paths from the camelCase action name (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/sendInvite`) while OpenAPI emit produced `/widgets/:id/send-invite`. Admin tooling and SDK consumers reading the OpenAPI spec hit 404s on every multi-word action. URL paths and OpenAPI emit now share a `urlPath = toKebabCase(urlSegment)` helper. Identifiers in audit `actionName`, error messages, and console logs stay camel — those are programmatic surfaces and breaking them would churn audit logs. Same fix shape as the v0.15.0 standalone-action URL casing.
225
-
226
- ### Notes
227
-
228
- Test coverage: 1175 → 1183 (+8 across the canonicalization, customLogin, and createRealtime regression files). Verified end-to-end against AttendVIP — `quickback compile` produces a worker whose `/account/login`, hostname-routed account/admin SPAs, and apex / handler all return 200 with the right SPA shell on the deployed Cloudflare worker, no 307 loops.
229
-
230
- The bundled docs (`packages/claude-skill/docs/changelog.md`, `packages/cli/src/skill/docs/changelog.md`) and the CLI's `packages/cli/src/docs/content.ts` are regenerated by `scripts/bundle-docs.ts` — run that before publishing the CLI bump.
204
+ - `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.
205
+ - Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.
206
+ - Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).
231
207
 
232
208
  ---
233
209
 
234
210
  ## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026
235
211
 
236
- ### Agent Auth Protocol — first-class agent identity for AI callers
237
-
238
- Quickback now ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) by way of `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Opt in with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` (or the array form `plugins: ["agentAuth"]`). When enabled, the compiler emits a complete agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables (`agent`, `agentHost`, `agentCapabilityGrant`, `approvalRequest`) added to the auth schema automatically by `auth generate`.
239
-
240
- **OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** The compiler emits `src/lib/openapi-spec.ts` (the project's full OpenAPI spec inlined as a const) and wires `createFromOpenAPI(openapiSpec, { ... })` into the `agentAuth(...)` call. Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → "session"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → "webauthn"`. Default `defaultHostCapabilities`: `["GET", "HEAD"]`.
212
+ ### Agent Auth Protocol
241
213
 
242
- The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch to the worker's own URL with a Better Auth JWT minted for `agentSession.user.id`, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path, populates `ctx`, and the full firewall + access + masking pipeline runs on the proxied call. No new middleware code, no parallel security path — agent capability calls go through the same gates as regular REST traffic. The cost is one Cloudflare subrequest per capability call (~50ms); fine for typical agent traffic. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.
214
+ Quickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.
243
215
 
244
- The Account SPA gains `/agents/approve` (`packages/account/app/routes/agents.approve.tsx`) — modeled on the existing `/cli/authorize` device-code page. Pastes the user code, fetches the pending request, lists the requested capabilities with a "Step-up" badge on any capability whose `approvalStrength` is `"webauthn"`, then approves or denies. WebAuthn step-up itself is a placeholder for v0.16.0 — the upstream agent-auth API for the escalation call is still settling, so capabilities tagged `"webauthn"` will fail server-side until that lands. The badge tells the user what's coming.
216
+ **OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → "session"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → "webauthn"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.
245
217
 
246
218
  ### Bearer-only on `/mcp` and the agent-auth surface
247
219
 
248
- `/mcp` now forwards **only** `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner `app.request()` re-entry. Cookie + `x-api-key` forwarding has been removed. The MCP surface is server-to-server by nature — there are no browser callers, no CSRF surface to defend, and no benefit to fragmenting the auth model across three header conventions. Three Bearer flavors all land on the same header, resolved by the inner Hono middleware chain:
220
+ `/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).
249
221
 
250
- - Better Auth session token via the official `bearer` plugin
251
- - OAuth access token via the OAuth Provider plugin
252
- - Agent JWT via `@better-auth/agent-auth`
222
+ ### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries
253
223
 
254
- If a project still wants API-key auth here, configure the `apiKey` plugin to accept its key via `Authorization: Bearer` so everything stays one channel. The existing `mcp-server.test.ts` regression seal flips from "forwards Cookie + x-api-key" to "forwards only Authorization (bearer-only surface)".
224
+ `bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.
255
225
 
256
- ### Auth DSL: `bearer`, `oauthProvider`, `agentAuth` are now first-class plugin entries
226
+ Auto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.
257
227
 
258
- Both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface in `apps/compiler/src/define/auth.ts` gain `"bearer"`, `"oauthProvider"`, and `"agentAuth"`. `bearer` was previously in the runtime registry but missing from the TS type, so callsites had to use `as any` or `// @ts-expect-error` to set it. Both are gone now. New typed options interfaces — `OAuthProviderOptions` (audience, login/consent paths, dynamic registration) and `AgentAuthOptions` (providerName, providerDescription, modes, fromOpenAPI, approvalStrength, defaultHostCapabilities) — let users override defaults through the object form.
228
+ ### `queue-consumer.ts` gating
259
229
 
260
- Auto-enable rule lives in the canonical `computeAutoAddedPlugins` (`generators/auth.ts`): turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. There is no useful agent-auth deployment without those two — surfacing it as auto-add rather than a confusing "missing dependency" runtime error matches the existing pattern (`oauthProvider` already auto-adds `jwt`).
261
-
262
- ### `queue-consumer.ts` now emitted for `additionalQueues` too
263
-
264
- Prior to this release, the queue consumer emit gated on `embeddingFeatures.length > 0 || queueHandlers.length > 0`. Projects that declared queue infrastructure via `dbConfig.additionalQueues` but had no embeddings + no `services/queues/*` handlers shipped a `wrangler.toml` with `[[queues.consumers]]` entries pointing at a missing worker `queue` export. The CLI's archive-restore step kept a stale `queue-consumer.ts` around, so the file appeared "stuck" across compiles — same class of bug as the v0.15.0 services/queues/* regression caught against AttendVIP, just one source removed.
265
-
266
- The gate is now a three-way OR: `hasEmbeddings || hasQueueHandlers || hasAdditionalQueues`. When only `additionalQueues` is set, the compiler emits a stub `queue-consumer.ts` whose `queue` export acks every message with a warning — Cloudflare needs an export for every consumer binding, and a noisy-but-correct stub beats a silent deploy break. `MainAppOptions` and `CloudflareMainAppOptions` gain `hasAdditionalQueues`; `generateQueueImport` and `generateCloudflareExport` mirror the new gate. Regression test: `src/__tests__/queue-additional-queues-gate.test.ts`.
267
-
268
- ### Fixes
269
-
270
- **1. `bearer` was missing from the `BetterAuthPlugins` TypeScript interface.** The runtime plugin registry has had `bearer` since the pre-1.0 cuts, but `apps/compiler/src/define/auth.ts` never declared it on the typed shape — so any `quickback.config.ts` using `plugins: { bearer: true }` had to `as any`-cast or sit behind a `@ts-expect-error`. Both `bearer` and `oauthProvider` (same gap, same workaround) are now first-class typed entries; `agentAuth` joins them. The array-form union also gains all three. No behavior change at runtime; existing casts can come out.
271
-
272
- **2. MCP `buildInternalRequest` no longer forwards Cookie or `x-api-key`.** The MCP surface is server-to-server — there are no browser callers, no CSRF surface to defend, and no benefit to fragmenting the auth model across three header conventions. The inner `app.request()` re-entry now forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …`. Three Bearer flavors all land on the same header (BA session token via the `bearer` plugin, OAuth access token via OAuth Provider, agent JWT via `@better-auth/agent-auth`). Existing `mcp-server.test.ts` regression flipped from "forwards Cookie + x-api-key" to "forwards only Authorization (bearer-only surface)".
273
-
274
- **3. `agentAuth` now auto-enables `bearer` + `oauthProvider`.** There is no useful agent-auth deployment without those two — the agent surface is bearer-only and MCP clients need OAuth to register. Auto-enable lives in the canonical `computeAutoAddedPlugins` (`generators/auth.ts`), so it propagates to every consumer (better-auth generator, schema generation, package-deps emission). Same pattern as the existing `oauthProvider` → `jwt` rule. Surfaced in `agent-auth.test.ts` with a regression seal that asserts both plugins land in the merged plugin list whether the user wrote the array form or the object form.
275
-
276
- **4. `OpenAPISpec` literal type rejected by tsc on inlined spec.** Quickback's OpenAPI emit produces `$ref`-style parameter entries (`{ "$ref": "#/components/parameters/X" }`) that the agent-auth plugin's stricter `OpenAPIParameter` type doesn't model — `tsc` fails the generated project with "Type … is not assignable to OpenAPIParameter". The plugin handles refs correctly at runtime; only the structural narrowing on the TS literal needed help. The generated `agentAuth({ ...createFromOpenAPI(openapiSpec as any, { ... }) })` call now carries an `as any` cast on the spec with an inline comment explaining why. Drop when upstream models `$ref` parameters.
277
-
278
- ### Notes
279
-
280
- `@better-auth/agent-auth` 0.4.5 ships ESM-only exports without a `require` condition, so the Better Auth CLI's `auth generate` step (jiti / CJS resolver) bails with `ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED`. The compiler image patches the package's `package.json` at install time to add a matching `require` condition pointing at the same dist file (Node 22+ supports `require(esm)`). Remove the patch in `apps/compiler/Dockerfile` when upstream ships proper exports.
281
-
282
- Test coverage: 1136 → 1152 (+11 `agent-auth.test.ts`, +5 `queue-additional-queues-gate.test.ts`). Verified end-to-end against `examples/recruitment` with `agentAuth` enabled — `quickback compile` produces a project whose `npm run build` typechecks clean and whose generated schema includes all four agent-auth tables (`agent`, `agentHost`, `agentCapabilityGrant`, `approvalRequest`).
230
+ The queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.
283
231
 
284
232
  ---
285
233
 
286
234
  ## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026
287
235
 
288
- ### Sysadmin tier — cross-tenant DB-admin role for the CMS
289
-
290
- A new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a Supabase-style cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from `'admin'` so Better Auth admin-plugin powers (user management, impersonation) and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default — projects without the feature get zero behavior change.
236
+ ### Sysadmin tier for the CMS
291
237
 
292
- When enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`); a firewall escape hatch in every `buildFirewallConditions` that drops tenant scopes for `ctx.userRole === 'sysadmin'` while preserving soft-delete; a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint that selects directly from the auth-schema `organization` table; and a relaxed cross-tenant guard that skips the `ORG_REQUIRED` 400 for sysadmins on list routes — that's how the SPA's "All organizations" sentinel reaches the firewall escape end-to-end.
238
+ A new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.
293
239
 
294
- The CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher (Better Auth's `setActiveOrganization`); sysadmins get a `SysadminOrgSelector` that loads from the cross-tenant endpoint, defaults to "All organizations" (omits the org filter on reads), and pins selected tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call (sysadmins have no member rows, so `setActive` would 403). A new `OrgGate` component handles no-active-org cases for org users — auto-pick when there's exactly one membership, full-frame picker for multiple, empty state for zero — so sessions that lost their active org don't dead-end.
240
+ When enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.
295
241
 
296
- Refusing to compile `roles: ["SYSADMIN"]` without `cms.sysadmin: true` keeps the role from sitting as dead code. RLS providers (Neon, Supabase) emit `false` for `SYSADMIN` today; per-table RLS policy emit is a follow-up.
242
+ The CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an "All organizations" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.
297
243
 
298
- ### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is now preserved across recompiles
244
+ ### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved
299
245
 
300
- Cloudflare's migration system is append-only — every deploy must include previously-deployed migration tags in their original order, with new ones appended last. CF rejects deploys with `code: 10061` when the order shifts. The compiler used to iterate `bindings.durableObjects` in config order at emit time, so a user inserting a new DO into the middle of the array bumped every later auto-migration into the wrong slot, breaking deploys for projects with multiple DOs (caught by AttendVIP).
246
+ Cloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.
301
247
 
302
- The CLI now sends the project's existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) in `existingFiles` alongside the drizzle meta. The compiler parses migration tags from it via `parseExistingMigrationTags`, then emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving the existing wrangler.toml order), net-new entries appended last in `bindings.durableObjects` config order. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations; inserting a new DO anywhere in the array always appends its migration block last. First compiles (no existing wrangler.toml) keep the current config-order behavior — no behavior change for new projects. User-declared `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` (historical entries) are unaffected; they continue to emit first.
248
+ ### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough
303
249
 
304
- ### Standalone-action wrapper no longer 403s `AUTHENTICATED`-only routes on org-scoped projects
250
+ Anything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.
305
251
 
306
- Standalone actions (`standalone: true`) on org-scoped projects emitted an unconditional `if (!ctx.activeOrgId) return 403 ACCESS_NO_ORG` gate before role checking. For an action declared `access: { roles: ["AUTHENTICATED"] }`, this contradicted the access rule itself: a signed-in user with no active org (e.g. just signed up but not yet joined an organization, or a token-auth caller) was the exact caller `AUTHENTICATED` was supposed to admit. Found by AttendVIP — every recompile re-introduced the bug because the fix lived in handler-side patches, not the generator. The standalone wrapper now skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role anywhere, including under `or:`/`and:` arms.
252
+ - Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.
253
+ - Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.
254
+ - Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.
255
+ - Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.
307
256
 
308
- ### Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings
257
+ ### Minor
309
258
 
310
- `compiler.ts` emits `src/queue-consumer.ts` whenever `embeddingFeatures.length > 0 || queueHandlers.length > 0`, but the worker entry only checked `hasEmbeddings`. Projects with custom queue handlers under `services/queues/*` and no embeddings got the consumer file generated and then no entry-point wiring — wrangler bound the queue to a missing handler at deploy time. Caught against AttendVIP's `sendCancelEmail` queue handler. `MainAppOptions` and `CloudflareMainAppOptions` gain a `hasQueueHandlers` flag; `generateQueueImport` and `generateCloudflareExport` now gate on `hasEmbeddings || hasQueueHandlers`.
311
-
312
- ### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough into `src/apps/`
313
-
314
- A new opt-in folder. Anything you drop under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile, where the wrangler `[assets]` binding (`directory = "src/apps"`) already serves it. So `quickback/public/robots.txt` becomes reachable at `https://your-domain/robots.txt`, `quickback/public/og/og-image.png` at `/og/og-image.png`, and so on. Favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, marketing PDFs, sitemap fragments, `.well-known/` files — anything you'd previously have had to post-process into `src/apps/` after each compile.
315
-
316
- The compiler does **not** parse, template, or otherwise touch these files. They ride past it as bytes — the CLI does the copy after `writeFilesWithMerge`, using `fs.copyFile` so binaries (PNGs, fonts, PDFs) stay byte-perfect rather than being corrupted by the utf-8 string channel the compiler manifest uses for source files. The compiler API contract is unchanged; nothing round-trips through `compile.quickback.dev`.
317
-
318
- Rules:
319
-
320
- - **Optional.** If the folder doesn't exist, the step is a no-op.
321
- - **Stale-cleaned.** `src/` is wiped and rewritten each compile, so files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear from `src/apps/` automatically on the next run.
322
- - **Hidden entries skipped.** `.DS_Store`, `.git/`, dotfiles — none of these were intentional drops; including them would break worker asset bindings.
323
- - **Collisions fail loud.** A file in `quickback/public/` whose path would shadow a compiler-emitted manifest entry — e.g. `quickback/public/cms/index.html` against the SPA shell — fails the compile with the offending paths listed, rather than silently overwriting and producing a confused-looking SPA build. Move or rename the offending file.
324
-
325
- The change is contained to the CLI: `packages/cli/src/lib/copy-public-assets.ts` (helper + `PublicAssetCollisionError`) and one block in `packages/cli/src/commands/compile.ts`. Test coverage in `copy-public-assets.test.ts` walks the missing-folder, single-file, nested-tree, binary-preservation, hidden-entry, single-collision, multi-collision, empty-folder, and split-output cases — nine tests, byte-level assertions on the binary path.
259
+ - Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.
260
+ - Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.
326
261
 
327
262
  ---
328
263
 
329
264
  ## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026
330
265
 
331
- ### Four more codegen bugs caught by AttendVIP — generated output now typechecks for projects with non-`id` PKs and DO-only features
332
-
333
- Filed after AttendVIP's `tsc` reported 230 errors against the generated `src/`. Triage split them into six patterns; four are surgical and ship here. The other two (TS2769 ×156 + TS2339 ×~50) trace to a deeper assumption — every queryable table has a string-typed `id` column — and are deferred to v0.14.8 along with the agreed `id` auto-inject design (see *Coming next* below).
334
-
335
- **1. Duplicate `guests` import in routes that use relationship-roles (`TS2300`).** The relationship-import injector (`generators/feature-generator.ts`) added `import { <table>, buildFirewallConditions as build<Table>FirewallConditions } from './<table>.resource'` whenever it detected a relationship-table reference in the routes file — without checking that the table binding was already imported from `./schema` upstream. So `guests.routes.ts` ended up with `guests` declared twice. Fix: scan the existing import block, only add identifiers that aren't already in scope (drop the binding from the new import line, or skip the line entirely if both binding and alias are imported).
336
-
337
- **2. `db` referenced before declaration in single-record + bulk action handlers (`TS2448` / `TS2304`).** `record-based.ts:195,541` baked `firewallClause = ...buildFirewallConditions(ctx, db)...` and used the same string in two places: (a) the outer pre-fetch `await unsafeDb.select().from(table).where(firewallClause)` — where `db` doesn't exist yet (`db = createScopedDb(unsafeDb, ctx)` is declared later for handler scope), and (b) inside `processBatch` where `db` is created from the tx/handle param. The outer use threw at typecheck (`'db' is used before its declaration`); at runtime it would have been a `ReferenceError`. Fix: pass `unsafeDb` (the in-scope handle) to `buildFirewallConditions` in both `firewallClause` definitions. The helper only uses its `db` arg for relationship-role subqueries (when `via:` is in play); either handle is a valid Drizzle client for that lookup.
338
-
339
- **3. PartyServer realtime gates passed 1 arg to a 2-arg `buildFirewall_X` (`TS2554`).** `optional-routes.ts` emitted `buildFirewall_<feature>(ctx as any)` in the WebSocket-upgrade gate for every Durable Object that declared `access: { resource }`. After v0.14.4 made `buildFirewallConditions(ctx, db)` 2-arg whenever the resource has any `via:` predicate, this gate stopped compiling for any DO whose target feature uses relationship-roles. AttendVIP's `event-pages` DO sits on `event_pages` (admin via `guestOf`), which is exactly that case. Fix: the gate already constructs `db = drizzle(c.env.<binding>)` for its own `db.select(...).limit(1)` — pass that same `db` into the firewall call. Mirrored in both the single-resource and multi-resource gate branches.
340
-
341
- **4. Durable-object-only features dropped their `lib/` files from output (`TS2307`).** `compiler.ts:546` only ran the feature-walker (and copied `featureLibFiles` to output) when the feature had at least one action file. AttendVIP's `user-profiles/` declares a single DO source under `lib/UserGateway.ts` and zero `actions/` — perfectly valid (per-user realtime gateway, the Slack/Linear pattern), but the walker skipped the feature entirely. The compile finished without error, then `index.ts` tried to import `./features/user-profiles/lib/UserGateway` and `tsc` 404'd the module. `event-pages/PageRoom.ts` worked only because that feature happens to also have `actions/`. Fix: run the discovery + lib-copy path whenever the feature has either actions OR lib files. Copying `lib/` files when the feature has at least one of either is the safe reading of the original intent.
266
+ ### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features
342
267
 
343
- **Drops ~20 of the 230 attendvip errors** (TS2300 ×2, TS2448 ×11, TS2304 ×6, TS2554 ×2 from the realtime gate, TS2307 ×1 — depending on cache state). The remaining 210 are TS2769 (numeric-ID arrays where the column is `integer`, not `text`) and TS2339 (`.id` referenced on tables that have a non-`id` PK or a compound PK) — both downstream of the same root: `id` is currently *not* auto-injected, only audit columns are.
268
+ Four surgical fixes to the generated output:
344
269
 
345
- ### Account auth: emailOtp on AWS SES drops the magic-link companion (OTP-only)
270
+ - Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.
271
+ - `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.
272
+ - PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.
273
+ - Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.
346
274
 
347
- The compiler used to auto-wire `createComboAuthSendVerificationOTP` from `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` whenever a project used `emailOtp` with the `aws-ses` email provider — sign-in / sign-up / verify emails carried *both* a 6-digit OTP and a clickable magic link, with `useComboAuthEmail: true` in the SES config. This was on by default for every account-app project that picked AWS SES.
275
+ ### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only
348
276
 
349
- Two reasons to drop the magic-link half:
350
-
351
- 1. **Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the OTP before the human sees the email.** Outlook Safe Links, Gmail mobile, corporate proxies, and security scanners all eagerly fetch URLs in incoming mail; the magic link's `?data=...` payload includes the OTP server-side, so the first GET completes the sign-in (consuming the one-time code) and the user clicking through 30 seconds later gets a "code already used" failure.
352
- 2. **Two sign-in surfaces are harder to support.** The account SPA's `/welcome` and `/email-otp` routes only render the OTP form; the magic-link arm bypasses that UI entirely. One canonical entry point (enter the code) keeps the account flow legible.
353
-
354
- The compiler now emits a plain `sendVerificationOTP` callback that calls `sendEmailWithSES` with `emailTemplates.emailOTP` directly — no combo wrapper, no magic-link URL. `useComboAuthEmail` is hardcoded to `false`. The `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` package and the `magicLink` plugin are still available for users who explicitly opt in via a custom `sendVerificationOTP` in their config; the change here is just the auto-wired default.
355
-
356
- Test coverage: `auth-email-wiring.test.ts` was updated to assert the new shape — generated auth files for `emailOtp + aws-ses` now contain `emailTemplates.emailOTP` and `useComboAuthEmail: false`, and explicitly do not contain `createComboAuthSendVerificationOTP` or `better-auth-combo-auth`.
357
-
358
- ### Coming next — `id` field auto-injection (v0.14.8)
359
-
360
- The compiler treats `id` as load-bearing across CRUD/action route generators, FK probing, access checks, OpenAPI emission, and CMS — but doesn't add it for you the way it adds `createdAt`/`modifiedAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedBy` (or `organizationId` in org-scoped features, or `deletedAt`/`deletedBy` for soft-delete tables). At the time of v0.14.7, tables that omitted `id` (or used a non-`id` single PK like `userId.primaryKey()`, or a compound `primaryKey({ columns: [...] })` constraint) were not yet supported by the generated route and OpenAPI pipeline.
361
-
362
- **Agreed direction:** mirror `injectAuditFields` with a new `injectIdField` that runs unconditionally — including on junction tables. Tables with no PK or a non-`id` PK get an `id` column auto-injected; existing column-level `.primaryKey()` on a non-`id` column gets demoted to `.notNull()`; `primaryKey({ columns: [...] })` constraints get rewritten to `uniqueIndex().on(...)`. The cost (one extra column per junction row) is minimal and closes the asymmetry — every table participating in routes gets a single string-typed `id`, just like every table gets `createdAt`. Migration tail (existing D1 databases need an ADD COLUMN + index rewrite per affected table) is generated alongside.
363
-
364
- No user code changes required for the four fixes shipping in v0.14.7. Recompile and the affected features typecheck.
277
+ `auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.
365
278
 
366
279
  ---
367
280
 
368
281
  ## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026
369
282
 
370
- ### Four more v0.14 compiler bugs caught by AttendVIP's MCP rollout
371
-
372
- Filed in `research/attendvip-v014-mcp-and-firewall-gaps.md` after AttendVIP patched these locally and asked us to upstream them. All four ride a single MCP `tools/call` against a team-scoped resource over a Bearer api-key — fix any one and the next bug surfaces. We're shipping them as one patch release with end-to-end coverage of the chain.
373
-
374
- **1. MCP `tools/call` URL is double-prefixed for action tools.** The OpenAPI spec emits action paths as `/api/v1/<action>` already-absolute, but the MCP request builder did `'/api/v1' + tool._path` unconditionally — so action tool calls hit `/api/v1/api/v1/<action>` and 404'd. CRUD tools (bare `_path: '/customers'`) were unaffected. Fix: prefix only when `_path` doesn't already start with `/api/v1/`.
283
+ ### MCP transport correctness
375
284
 
376
- **2. Auth middleware ignored `Authorization: Bearer <api-key>`.** MCP clients (claude.ai, etc.) only set `Authorization: Bearer ...`. The api-key block read from `x-api-key` header / `?api_key=` / `?key=` query but not from `Authorization`; the JWT fast-path narrowly gated on `bearerToken.startsWith('eyJ')`. Non-JWT bearers fell through to BA session auth, which doesn't recognise api-keys, so the request authenticated as anonymous and `tools/list` returned only PUBLIC tools. Fix: api-key extraction now also accepts a non-JWT `Authorization: Bearer <token>` as the key candidate. Three transports for one credential — header / query / Bearer.
285
+ Four fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:
377
286
 
378
- **3. `auth.roleHierarchy` was silently inert for runtime role checks.** A user configured `auth.roleHierarchy: ['owner', 'admin', 'member']` and expected an `owner` to satisfy any check requiring `admin` or `member`. But the api-key + JWT fast-paths populated `ctx.roles` with the single org-member role, and the access checker did strict intersection — `owner ∩ {admin, member} = ∅` → 403. Fix: at the api-key, JWT fast-path, AND BA session paths, expand the user's role via `auth.roleHierarchy` so a higher role inherits all lower-role privileges. The hierarchy is auto-normalized — users who write the array reversed (`['owner', 'admin', 'member']` instead of the documented `['member', 'admin', 'owner']`) now get the same correct expansion.
379
-
380
- **4. Team-firewall predicate hardcoded `eq(table.teamId, ctx.activeTeamId!)` even when no team was active.** The `!` non-null assertion lied at runtime — api-keys, JWTs, and sessions without an active team carry `undefined`. The resulting SQL was `team_id = NULL` which matches nothing, so api-key callers saw zero rows on team-scoped resources. Fix: emit the team predicate as `(ctx.activeTeamId ? eq(...) : undefined)` — drizzle's `and(...)` drops `undefined`, so the WHERE collapses to the org scope only. Org and owner predicates are deliberately NOT softened the same way (those are security boundaries, not optional scopes).
381
-
382
- After upstreaming, the AttendVIP one-shot verification passes:
383
-
384
- ```bash
385
- curl -fs -X POST https://attend.vip/mcp \
386
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
387
- -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"listEvents","arguments":{}}}' \
388
- | jq '.result.content[0].text | fromjson | .data | length' # > 0
389
- ```
390
-
391
- No user code changes required for any of the four. Recompile and the MCP path works end-to-end against team-scoped, role-gated resources via Bearer api-key.
287
+ - `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.
288
+ - Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.
289
+ - `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.
290
+ - Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).
392
291
 
393
292
  ---
394
293
 
395
294
  ## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026
396
295
 
397
- ### MCP `tools/call` no longer crashes with `undefined (reading 'AUTH_DB')`
296
+ ### MCP environment threading
398
297
 
399
- The generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch re-enters the same Hono app via `app.request(internalReq)` so every tool invocation runs through the full middleware chain (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking). But the call passed only the request — not `env` or `executionCtx` — so the sub-request handler ran with `c.env === undefined`. Any tool whose route touched a Cloudflare binding (e.g. the `AUTH_DB` D1, KV, R2, Queues) crashed with `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'AUTH_DB')`. Found by AttendVIP — every action that hit auth-side data (acceptInvite, etc.) failed.
400
-
401
- **Fix:** `mountMcp` now threads `c.env` and `c.executionCtx` through to `handle → handleRpc → callTool → app.request(internalReq, undefined, env, executionCtx)`. Hono's `request()` 3rd/4th args set the bindings + execution context for the sub-request, so the action handler sees the same env the outer worker received. Tools/list was unaffected — it reads ctx in-process and never re-enters the app.
402
-
403
- No user code changes required. Recompile against v0.14.5 and the MCP endpoint dispatches actions correctly against all bindings.
298
+ The generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.
404
299
 
405
300
  ---
406
301
 
407
302
  ## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026
408
303
 
409
- ### `via:` firewall predicates no longer crash with `ReferenceError: db is not defined`
410
-
411
- The relationship-role generator (v0.14.0) emits a `buildFirewallConditions` body that references `db`, `inArray`, and `sql` at function scope when any predicate has `via:` — but the resource-file imports it generated only pulled in `eq, and, isNull, type SQL`. So every endpoint guarded by `firewall: [{ field, via }]` threw `ReferenceError: db is not defined` at the very first request, and the catch-all returned 500 before the firewall query ever ran. Found by AttendVIP on `/api/v1/event-pages` against v0.14.3 — none of the v0.14.0 → v0.14.3 unit tests exercised emitted-import resolution, so the bug rode through three patch releases.
304
+ ### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports
412
305
 
413
- Two fixes:
414
-
415
- 1. **Imports in the generated resource file now include `inArray, sql`** when the firewall has any `via:` predicate. Hidden behind a flag so a no-via resource still gets the minimal import surface.
416
- 2. **`buildFirewallConditions` now takes `(ctx, db)`** and the wrapper template (`WITH_FIREWALL_HELPER`) pulls `const db = c.get('db' as never) as any;` from the Hono context before invoking it. Every CRUD/action call site (single-record + batch + record-based-action) was updated to pass `db` through.
417
-
418
- Regression test added (`firewall-via-imports.test.ts`) that parses the generated resource file's top-level imports and asserts every free identifier referenced in `buildFirewallConditions` resolves to either an import or a function parameter — so a future generator change that introduces a new free identifier (`exists`, `not`, etc.) without importing it fails the unit suite instead of leaking to a real project.
419
-
420
- No user code changes required — recompile and `via:` predicates work end-to-end.
306
+ The relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.
421
307
 
422
308
  ---
423
309
 
424
310
  ## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026
425
311
 
426
- ### Relationship-role consumers now resolve the relationship-table binding at runtime
427
-
428
- Pre-fix, the v0.14.0 relationship-role generator emitted imports like `import { eventGuests, buildFirewallConditions as buildEventGuestsFirewallConditions } from '../event-guests/event-guests.resource'` on every consuming resource — but the relationship-table's own `.resource.ts` file imported `event_guests` from `./schema` for its own use without re-exporting it. So the consuming file got `undefined` at runtime, every relationship subquery failed with `Cannot read properties of undefined`, and the whole authz layer was unreachable on real projects.
429
-
430
- Found by AttendVIP within minutes of recompiling against v0.14.2: the moment they hit any endpoint guarded by `firewall: [{ field, via }]` or `crud.<op>.access roles: ['guest']`, the request errored before the firewall query ran.
312
+ ### Relationship-role table re-exports
431
313
 
432
- The fix is one line in `generateTableResourceHelpers` — re-export the Drizzle table binding from the `.resource` file alongside the existing import. The `.resource` file is the public surface of the table; the schema is an implementation detail. This decision was implicit in the relationship-import resolver's path choice but not enforced on the producer side.
433
-
434
- ```ts
435
- // generated <table>.resource.ts (after fix)
436
- import { event_guests } from './schema';
437
- export { event_guests }; // ← was missing
438
- ```
439
-
440
- Regression test added (`authz-end-to-end.test.ts`) that asserts every `.resource` file re-exports its Drizzle binding, so this can't drift again. No user code changes required — recompile and the cross-feature relationship subqueries resolve correctly.
314
+ Generated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.
441
315
 
442
316
  ---
443
317
 
444
318
  ## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026
445
319
 
446
- ### Wrangler `[[migrations]]` no longer drops historical Durable Object lifecycle entries
447
-
448
- Cloudflare requires the `[[migrations]]` list in `wrangler.toml` to be **append-only**: once a tag has been deployed, removing it on a subsequent compile causes the next deploy to fail with `Cannot apply <new|deleted|renamed|transferred>-class migration to class <X>` — CF replays the full migrations log on every push and notices the tag is gone.
449
-
450
- Pre-fix, the compiler regenerated the `[[migrations]]` blocks from scratch on every compile, emitting only entries for the *current* `durableObjects` bindings. Any historical lifecycle events the user had hand-maintained — `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, `transferred_classes` — were silently dropped and the deploy then broke. AttendVIP hit this first: a `qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05` deletion entry got dropped, and the next deploy tried to re-apply `qb-do-Notepad`'s `new_sqlite_classes` against the existing class.
320
+ ### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved
451
321
 
452
- The fix adds a new config slot — `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` — for historical entries that survive recompiles. Declared entries are emitted FIRST in the generated `wrangler.toml`'s migrations list (preserving chronological order), then the auto-generated current-class creation entries follow, deduplicated by tag so an explicit user entry wins over the auto-emit.
322
+ A new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:
453
323
 
454
324
  ```ts
455
- // quickback.config.ts
456
325
  bindings: {
457
- durableObjects: [
458
- { name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' },
459
- ],
326
+ durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],
460
327
  durableObjectMigrations: [
461
- // Carry forward across recompiles — Cloudflare's migration list is append-only.
462
- {
463
- tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05',
464
- deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'],
465
- },
328
+ { tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },
466
329
  ],
467
330
  }
468
331
  ```
469
332
 
470
- All four lifecycle shapes are supported: `newClasses` / `newSqliteClasses` (creations), `deletedClasses` (removals), `renamedClasses` (`{ from, to }` inline-table-array), `transferredClasses` (`{ from, from_script, to }` for moves between workers). The user-declared entry can also override the auto-emit by reusing the same tag — useful when a DO started life as KV-backed before SQLite-DOs existed.
471
-
472
- This is a config-side fix, not a wrangler.toml-merging one — Quickback doesn't read your existing `wrangler.toml`. The discipline is the same as for any append-only log: declare lifecycle events as you make them. Auto-detection of removed classes from the schema diff is on the roadmap; for now the compiler trusts your declaration.
473
-
474
- 7 new tests covering deletion, rename, transfer, multi-entry ordering, override-via-same-tag, no-history bit-identical output, and the historical-only-no-current-DOs edge case.
333
+ All four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.
475
334
 
476
335
  ---
477
336
 
478
337
  ## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026
479
338
 
480
- ### Bulk action variants now appear in `openapi.json`
481
-
482
- Record-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` (introduced in v0.14.0) generate a working `POST /<base>/batch/<actionName>` route at runtime, but the OpenAPI generator wasn't aware of them — so the bulk endpoints were invisible to typed-client codegen (`api-types.gen.ts`) and to MCP-driven agents discovering operations from the spec. AttendVIP's v0.14.0 rollout (seven actions with `bulkVariant: true`: `approve`, `checkIn`, `checkOut`, `setVisibility`, `cancelInvite`, `sendInvite`, `sessionApprove`) found this within hours of shipping.
483
-
484
- The OpenAPI generator now emits each bulk variant as a sibling operation to its per-record action, with the documented request shape (`{ ids: string[], input, failFast? }`), correct 200 / 207 / 400 responses, an `x-bulk-variant: true` marker, and a separate `<resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so client codegen can distinguish single from bulk. The fix also threads `bulkVariant` through `getAllActions` so any other downstream consumer of the action registry sees the flag — previously the parser captured it but the spec-emit path silently dropped it.
339
+ ### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`
485
340
 
486
- No changes required in user code. Re-running `quickback compile` regenerates `openapi.json` with both routes per `bulkVariant: true` action; downstream `api-types.gen.ts` builds pick up the new operations on the next codegen run.
341
+ Record-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.
487
342
 
488
- ### Cross-tenant "my events" pattern documented with a worked example
343
+ ### Cross-tenant "my events" patterns
489
344
 
490
- The v0.14.0 docs noted that relationship-roles do **not** solve cross-tenant aggregation ("a guest's view of events across all tenants they were invited to") and pointed at function-form access as the workaround, but didn't show what that looked like in practice. The access docs now carry a full standalone-action example for `GET /my-events` — the canonical attendee-dashboard pattern — including the two security guardrails (always filter by `ctx.userId`; the action takes responsibility for soft-delete and other invariants the firewall would otherwise apply). Standalone actions are already mandatorily audit-logged in the runtime, so the cross-tenant traversal is recorded automatically.
491
-
492
- See [Access → Cross-tenant "my events" dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).
345
+ The access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).
493
346
 
494
347
  ---
495
348
 
496
349
  ## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026
497
350
 
498
- ### Relationship-based authorization roles
499
-
500
- Quickback's role system now supports a third kind of role beyond Better Auth org membership and the four pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`/`AUTHENTICATED`/`USER`/`ADMIN`): **relationship-roles** that bind to a domain-table membership ("user is a confirmed guest of this event") rather than an org/admin gate. The original ask was a B2B event-management app where logged-in users who aren't team members but ARE confirmed guests of an event need to see that event's sessions, pages, and tracks — same data, different access lane. The old workarounds (function-form access, hand-written actions, `firewall: { exception: true }`) all gave up some combination of OpenAPI/MCP visibility, CRUD code generation, or tenant safety.
351
+ ### Relationship-based authorization
501
352
 
502
- Declare the relationship once in `quickback.config.ts`, then reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:
353
+ Roles can now be bound to a domain-table membership ("user is a confirmed guest of this event") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:
503
354
 
504
355
  ```ts
505
- // quickback.config.ts
506
356
  authz: {
507
357
  relationships: {
508
358
  guestOf: {
509
- from: 'event_guests', // relationship table
510
- subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side
511
- resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side
512
- where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional row filter
359
+ from: 'event_guests',
360
+ subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },
361
+ resource: { column: 'eventId' },
362
+ where: { status: 'confirmed' },
513
363
  },
514
364
  },
515
365
  roles: {
516
366
  guest: { via: 'guestOf' },
517
- eventStaff: {
518
- or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }],
519
- },
367
+ eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },
520
368
  },
521
369
  }
522
370
 
523
371
  // features/sessions/sessions.ts
524
372
  firewall: [
525
373
  { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },
526
- { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row scoping
374
+ { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },
527
375
  ],
528
- read: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } }, // ← OR-composed
529
- crud: {
530
- create: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } }, // inline async lookup
531
- update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },
532
- }
376
+ read: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },
377
+ create: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },
378
+ update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },
533
379
  ```
534
380
 
535
- The compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own `buildFirewallConditions(ctx)` is called inside the subquery so soft-delete and tenant scope on the relationship row are always honored — soft-deleting an `event_guests` row revokes access immediately. Anonymous callers fail closed (the subquery short-circuits to `WHERE 1 = 0` when `ctx.userId` is null). Cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits as the outermost AND, never folded into a role OR. See [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).
536
-
537
- What works in v0.14.0:
381
+ The compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.
538
382
 
539
- | Surface | Status |
540
- |---|---|
541
- | `firewall: [{ field, via }]` row-level scoping | Full |
542
- | `crud.<op>.access` `roles: ['guest']` (inline emission) | Full |
543
- | `read.access` and `read.views.*.access` | Full |
544
- | `masking.<f>.show` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
545
- | `actions.<n>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
546
-
547
- The runtime evaluator fails closed on relationship arms regardless of which surface you hit, so silent grants are impossible everywhere. The two refused surfaces have clear compile-time errors pointing to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer with `via:`, gate the role at the access layer with BA roles).
548
-
549
- Compile-time refusals also catch: unknown `via:` reference, cycles in role composition (`a → b → a`), reserved role-name shadowing (auth-provider-derived only — `guest`/`speaker`/`attendee` are free; `admin`/`owner`/`member` are reserved when the BA org plugin is on), unknown relationship `from` table, resource missing the `resource.column`, relationship table with `firewall: { exception: true }` (would let cross-tenant grants slip through), `lowering: 'session'` (reserved for v2 — staleness/invalidation ergonomics not yet shipped), and `+` hierarchy on relationship-roles (terminal, like pseudo-roles).
383
+ Supported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).
550
384
 
551
- Cross-tenant "my events" dashboards (a logged-in user wants `GET /my-events` returning events they're a guest of *across all tenants*) are **not** solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall stays the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall (`firewall: { owner: { column: 'userId' } }`) or function-form access on a dedicated route. Documented prominently in [access.mdx](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this) so users don't reach for relationship-roles first and get confused.
385
+ Cross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.
552
386
 
553
- Roadmap: `lowering: 'session'` ergonomics, inline relationship emission for `actions.access` (needs `relationshipBindings` design), async/batched mask functions for `masking.show`. The schema slots are reserved so v2 lands non-breaking.
387
+ See [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).
554
388
 
555
- ### Bulk variants of record-based actions
389
+ ### Bulk variants on record-based actions
556
390
 
557
- Record-based actions can now opt into an auto-generated bulk route alongside the per-record route. Set `bulkVariant: true` on a `defineAction({...})` and the compiler emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` that loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids: [...], input, failFast? }` body. The original ask was an event-management UX where every domain bulk operation (approve N guests, rescind N invites, advance N applications) became a hand-written standalone action that re-implemented a per-record action's transition + execute logic in a `for` loop — `PATCH /:resource/batch` couldn't do it because state lives on a protected field, which is the right call for safety.
391
+ `defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:
558
392
 
559
393
  ```ts
560
- // features/applications/actions/advance.ts
561
394
  export default defineAction({
562
395
  description: "Move an application forward in the pipeline.",
563
396
  input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum(["screening", "interview", "offer"]) }),
564
397
  access: { roles: ["owner", "admin"] },
565
- bulkVariant: true, // ← opt-in
398
+ bulkVariant: true,
566
399
  transition: { field: "status", via: "nextStatus", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },
567
400
  async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {
568
- // exact same body as before — runs once per id
401
+ // exact same body — runs once per id
569
402
  },
570
403
  });
571
404
  ```
572
405
 
573
- Per-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status with the same `{ success, errors, meta }` shape as `PATCH /batch`. Each id flows through the firewall fetch, the per-record `evaluateAccessReason` split (403 role / 409 record-precondition), the transition pre-check, and the same `whereTransition` factory the single-record route uses — so a stale-state record fails for that id alone, not the whole batch. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and (on Postgres / Supabase / Neon / libsql / sqlite drivers) wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` so prior writes roll back; D1 is documented as fail-fast-without-rollback because it has no `db.transaction`.
574
-
575
- Compile-time refusals: `bulkVariant: true` is rejected on standalone actions (no record context to loop over) and on actions that declare `unsafe` (cross-tenant per-record audit not yet wired). Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting — the one-row-to-many-rows asymmetry makes inheriting GET/DELETE confusing. Max batch size is 100 ids per request, mirroring the CRUD batch endpoints. See [Actions → Bulk variant](/compiler/definitions/actions#bulk-variant).
406
+ Per-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.
576
407
 
577
408
  ### Aggregations on read views
578
409
 
579
- Read views can now declare pre-computed metrics that surface on the response next to the row payload, without a custom standalone action. Every dashboard tile that previously turned into a standalone action just for "count of X grouped by Y" now lives in the same view config that drives the rows.
410
+ Read views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:
580
411
 
581
412
  ```ts
582
413
  read: {
@@ -592,51 +423,29 @@ read: {
592
423
  }
593
424
  ```
594
425
 
595
- Response carries `aggregations: { ... }` alongside `data`:
596
-
597
- ```json
598
- {
599
- "data": [/* paginated rows */],
600
- "view": "pipeline",
601
- "pagination": { "count": 50, "page": 1, "pageSize": 50, "hasMore": true },
602
- "aggregations": {
603
- "totalApplications": 173,
604
- "byStatus": { "applied": 102, "screening": 41, "interview": 18, "offer": 7, "rejected": 5 }
605
- }
606
- }
607
- ```
608
-
609
- Aggregations always run over the **same firewalled, filtered set** as the row query — pagination is intentionally ignored, so `?status=applied&limit=10` returns the 10 paged rows AND the count over every applied row. Supported `fn`s: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count` (with or without `field` — `COUNT(*)` vs `COUNT(field)`), `count_distinct`, and `groupBy` (returns `{ value: count }`, NULLs bucket as `"(none)"`).
610
-
611
- Compile-time validation: `field` must reference a real column; `sum`/`avg` require numeric column types; the same masking opt-out gate that governs `query.{filterable, sortable, searchable}` applies to aggregations (a `sum(salary)` leaks structure even when the row payload is redacted); aggregation names cannot collide with the reserved response fields `data`, `pagination`, `view`. No raw SQL `expr:` form in v1 — column references only. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).
426
+ Aggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).
612
427
 
613
428
  ---
614
429
 
615
430
  ## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026
616
431
 
617
- ### Object-form `auth.plugins` no longer crashes the compiler
618
-
619
- The documented object form for per-plugin config — `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }`, etc. (see [Better Auth Plugins → Custom configuration](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)) — was rejected by the compiler with `plugins.includes is not a function`. `hasCliAuthRoutes` called `.includes()` directly on `auth.config.plugins` to detect `deviceAuthorization`, and `generateAuthFiles` flattened plugins to a string array before handing them to the better-auth generator, silently dropping every per-plugin user option on the way through.
620
-
621
- Both paths now run through a shared resolver that preserves the user's input format (object in → object out, array in → array out) and only adds the compiler's auto-included plugins (`organization`, `admin`, `apiKey`, plus `bearer` when `deviceAuthorization` is present) as `true` entries that don't clobber user config. Per-plugin options like `oauthProvider: { scopes: [...] }`, `organization: { teams: { enabled: true } }`, and `deviceAuthorization: { verificationUri: '...' }` now reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.
622
-
623
- Better Auth's `ac` / `roles` access-control objects (the result of `createAccessControl(...)`) still require a custom `auth.ts` override — they're live runtime values that can't survive the JSON config trip from CLI → compiler. A declarative escape hatch for that is on the roadmap.
432
+ ### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored
624
433
 
625
- ### `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` is allowed on writes and actions again
434
+ The documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.
626
435
 
627
- v0.10.17 added a compile-time block that rejected `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` on `crud.create` / `crud.update` / `crud.delete` and on every action. The intent — "anonymous mutations are usually a misconfiguration" — collided with the legitimate use cases the rest of Quickback was built around: Gmail one-click RSVP confirms, public RSVP forms, magic-link redemption, List-Unsubscribe-Post handlers, webhook ingest, captcha-gated contact forms. None of those carry a session, so `AUTHENTICATED` 401s the caller before the handler can validate its own token, and the suggested escape hatch ("custom action that does its own auth + `firewall: { exception: true }`") was itself blocked by the same validator.
436
+ ### `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` allowed on writes and actions
628
437
 
629
- The block is removed. `PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, CRUD writes, views, and actions. The compiler trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own token validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive **mandatory audit logging** (IP, input, result, timing) in the runtime regardless. `crud.create`/`update`/`delete` typically pair `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.
438
+ `PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.
630
439
 
631
- `USER` and `ADMIN` keep their compile-time prerequisites (firewall must scope by `userId` / admin plugin must be enabled).
440
+ Common pattern: pair `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.
632
441
 
633
442
  ---
634
443
 
635
444
  ## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026
636
445
 
637
- ### Per-room authorization for PartyServer rooms
446
+ ### Per-room authorization for PartyServer
638
447
 
639
- `bindings.durableObjects[].access` lets the compiler emit a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's existing firewall + `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade — same pillars `GET /api/v1/<resource>/:id` enforces, zero hand-written auth code.
448
+ `bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:
640
449
 
641
450
  ```ts
642
451
  durableObjects: [
@@ -655,119 +464,70 @@ durableObjects: [
655
464
  },
656
465
  } },
657
466
 
658
- // Anonymous game lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.
467
+ // Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.
659
468
  { name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',
660
469
  access: 'public' },
661
- ],
470
+ ]
662
471
  ```
663
472
 
664
- The gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing, and lets the upgrade proceed otherwise. DOs without an `access` declaration keep the v0.11.1 catchall (just `ctx.authenticated`). Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time so typos break the build, not the first WebSocket upgrade. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization via access](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).
473
+ The gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).
665
474
 
666
475
  ---
667
476
 
668
477
  ## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026
669
478
 
670
- ### PartyServer auto-mount is now secure by default
671
-
672
- The `/realtime/*` auto-mount shipped in v0.11.0 didn't gate WebSocket upgrades — anyone who knew a room ID (CUID2, hard to guess but not a security boundary) could open a connection. `authMiddleware` populated the request context but `partyserverMiddleware` doesn't 401 anonymous upgrades on its own.
479
+ ### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default
673
480
 
674
- The auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check: `401 Unauthorized` if the caller has no resolved auth context, otherwise the upgrade proceeds. The four auth mechanisms the rest of the worker honors (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, `?api_key=` / `?key=` query) all unlock connections automatically.
675
-
676
- Per-room access (e.g., "is this user a member of the org that owns this room?") is still your `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect` — the auto-mount only enforces "are you authenticated at all." Hand-written mounts with custom `onBeforeConnect` continue to work unchanged; declare them at `/realtime/*` before the auto-mount runs to opt out of the default gate.
677
-
678
- No code changes required — `quickback compile` regenerates the gated mount automatically. Single-tenant alphas weren't exploitable in practice (room IDs aren't logged or surfaced); multi-tenant projects should redeploy to pick this up.
481
+ The `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.
679
482
 
680
483
  ---
681
484
 
682
485
  ## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026
683
486
 
684
- ### OAuth Provider plugin (MCP-ready)
685
-
686
- Quickback can now act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable it with `plugins: ["oauthProvider"]` in your auth config — the compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin (the OAuth provider delegates access-token signing to it) and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.
487
+ ### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)
687
488
 
688
- This replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every future MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration + the well-known discovery documents they need to bootstrap themselves. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).
489
+ Quickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: ["oauthProvider"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.
689
490
 
690
- ### API key auth via query parameter
491
+ This replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).
691
492
 
692
- The auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=...` or `?key=...` query parameters in addition to the `x-api-key` header. The header takes precedence when both are sent. This unblocks clients that can't inject custom headers — most notably claude.ai's MCP connector, which previously returned zero tools because every list/call attempt was unauthenticated.
493
+ ### API keys via query parameter
693
494
 
694
- The query-param form lands in access logs and `Referer` headers; prefer the header whenever the client supports it. See [Auth Plugins → API Keys](/stack/auth/plugins#api-keys).
495
+ The auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.
695
496
 
696
- ### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split (breaking)
497
+ ### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split
697
498
 
698
- The realtime URL space is reorganized so the names match what each primitive does:
499
+ The realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:
699
500
 
700
- - **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the existing org-wide Broadcaster (Postgres-changes fan-out, ws-ticket auth) moves to its semantically accurate prefix. Same code, same behavior, just a different mount point.
701
- - **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` is the new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms** — bidirectional, per-room (per-document) Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted via `hono-party` whenever a project declares any in-worker DO via `bindings.durableObjects[].from`. Use these for collaborative editing, live cursors, and per-room state.
501
+ - **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.
502
+ - **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.
702
503
 
703
- **Breaking changes** — recompile + redeploy required:
504
+ **Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:
704
505
 
705
- - The `REALTIME_URL` runtime env var is renamed to `BROADCAST_URL` (used by the org member-update broadcast hook in separate-mode realtime). If you set this via `wrangler secret put REALTIME_URL`, re-set it as `BROADCAST_URL`.
706
- - The auth-ui SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` are renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`. The `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` field is renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.
707
- - WebSocket subscribers that hardcoded `/realtime/v1/websocket` or `/realtime/v1/ws-ticket` need to be updated to `/broadcast/v1/...`. The bundled CMS and Account SPAs handle this automatically; custom clients need a one-line change.
506
+ - `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.
507
+ - SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.
508
+ - `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.
708
509
 
709
- **Pre-installed deps in the compiler image:** `partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are now cached in `/deps/node_modules` so opt-in collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step. `Y-PartyServer` (Yjs CRDT support) stays opt-in.
710
-
711
- **Recipe:** see the new [PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) doc page and the `examples/recruitment` interview-room demo for an end-to-end example with presence and live notes.
510
+ `partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.
712
511
 
713
512
  ---
714
513
 
715
514
  ## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026
716
515
 
717
- ### In-worker Durable Objects via `bindings.durableObjects[].from`
718
-
719
- `bindings.durableObjects` previously only emitted the binding declaration — useful for cross-worker DOs (`scriptName: "other-worker"`), but not enough for app-owned classes that live in this worker's source. Authors had to hand-edit `src/index.ts` (to add `export { ItemStream } from './...'`) and `wrangler.toml` (to add the `[[migrations]]` block) on every compile.
516
+ ### In-worker Durable Objects
720
517
 
721
- Adding `from` flips the entry into in-worker mode and the compiler does both:
518
+ `bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:
722
519
 
723
520
  ```ts
724
- durableObjects: [
725
- {
726
- name: "ITEM_STREAM",
727
- className: "ItemStream",
728
- from: "features/loops/lib/ItemStream", // module path under src/
729
- },
730
- ]
521
+ durableObjects: [{
522
+ name: "ITEM_STREAM",
523
+ className: "ItemStream",
524
+ from: "features/loops/lib/ItemStream",
525
+ }]
731
526
  ```
732
527
 
733
- Generates:
734
- - `src/index.ts`: `export { ItemStream } from './features/loops/lib/ItemStream';` — wrangler resolves the binding by class export.
735
- - `wrangler.toml`: a `[[migrations]]` block with `tag = "qb-do-ItemStream"` and `new_sqlite_classes = ["ItemStream"]`.
736
- - `CloudflareBindings`: `ITEM_STREAM: DurableObjectNamespace` so `c.env.ITEM_STREAM.idFromName(...)` typechecks.
737
-
738
- Where the class file lives: in-worker DO classes go under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile (the rest of `src/` is wiped). The `from` value is the resulting `src/`-relative path with no `./` prefix and no `.ts` suffix.
528
+ DO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.
739
529
 
740
- `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive — the compiler rejects entries that set both. Cross-worker entries (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and the migration block; the exporting worker owns its own migration table.
741
-
742
- `migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and **must never be removed or renamed once deployed** — wrangler tracks applied tags and will reject deploys that try to walk them back. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`; set to `false` for legacy KV-backed DOs.
743
-
744
- See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects) for the full reference.
745
-
746
- ---
747
-
748
- ## v0.10.19 — May 4, 2026
749
-
750
- ### Fix: bundled-SPA auth survives `wrangler dev` on custom_domain projects
751
-
752
- `wrangler dev` rewrites the configured `custom_domain` host in **every** response header value (Location, Content-Security-Policy, X-…) to the local hostname, with a case-sensitive substring matcher. That mangles the CSP `connect-src` for projects with `domain: "api.example.com"` + bundled CMS / Account SPAs:
753
-
754
- ```
755
- # Compiled (correct)
756
- connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com …
757
-
758
- # Served by wrangler dev (mangled)
759
- connect-src 'self' https://localhost:8787 …
760
- ```
761
-
762
- Result: the bundled SPA's hardcoded `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` fetches get blocked in dev because the CSP only allows localhost. Reported by Loop on the 0.10.18 thread; verified end-to-end with a minimal `wrangler@4.85.0 dev --local` repro.
763
-
764
- The compiler now emits the SPA-baked-origin literal in `connect-src` with the host's first letter capitalised (`https://Api.example.com`). CSP host-source matching is ASCII case-insensitive per CSP3, so browsers accept it for connections to `https://api.example.com`; wrangler's case-sensitive matcher misses it. The case-shift is applied at compile time and only to URLs whose host matches the configured `custom_domain` — other origins (localhost, third-party hosts) are unchanged.
765
-
766
- `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` keeps its lowercase prod entries: it's consumed by the CORS `isTrustedOrigin` check via `Array.includes()` against the browser-supplied Origin header (always lowercase). The CSP fix only needs to land on the SPA-baked literal — that's the entry the SPA's hardcoded fetch needs covered.
767
-
768
- If wrangler ships a fix for the response-header rewrite, the case-shifted source remains a valid CSP entry that browsers match identically — no follow-up needed in user code.
769
-
770
- **Action required:** none. Recompile (`quickback compile`) to pick up the fix.
530
+ `migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).
771
531
 
772
532
  ---
773
533
 
@@ -775,93 +535,45 @@ If wrangler ships a fix for the response-header rewrite, the case-shifted source
775
535
 
776
536
  ### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`
777
537
 
778
- Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag emitted into the generated `wrangler.toml`. Useful for "share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed":
538
+ Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:
779
539
 
780
540
  ```ts
781
541
  providers: {
782
542
  database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", {
783
543
  splitDatabases: true,
784
- experimentalRemote: {
785
- auth: true, // wrangler dev reads/writes deployed AUTH_DB
786
- features: false, // (default) features stays local
787
- audit: false,
788
- webhooks: false,
789
- files: false,
790
- },
544
+ experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },
791
545
  }),
792
546
  }
793
547
  ```
794
548
 
795
- Keys are logical binding names — `auth` flips the flag on the `AUTH_DB` binding, `features` flips it on `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding), `audit` / `webhooks` / `files` follow the same pattern. Off by default; only enable for databases you intend to share.
549
+ Useful for "share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed." Off by default.
796
550
 
797
551
  ### Google OAuth + signup ToS
798
552
 
799
- The Account SPA now wires Google OAuth end-to-end when `auth.providers.auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled: true`. The compiler bakes the right `VITE_ENABLE_GOOGLE_OAUTH` flag into the SPA's `.env` so the social-login button renders only when the provider is enabled — no more dead buttons.
800
-
801
- Signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA's branding config).
802
-
803
- ### CLI compile auth gate + device-auth redirect fix
804
-
805
- - `quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs (closes the unauth public-compile path).
806
- - The device-flow `/cli/authorize` page was sending `?returnTo=` to login, but `signup.tsx` and the `_authenticated` middleware only read `?redirect=` — so a user who clicked "Create one" from `/login` lost the return URL. Standardized on `?redirect=` everywhere.
807
-
808
- ### Skill restructure (Claude Code skill)
809
-
810
- The bundled Claude Code skill was reorganized for clarity:
811
-
812
- - `SKILL.md` is now a thin orientation pointer, not a 600-line dump
813
- - Reference docs split into `Compiler` and `Stack` sections
814
- - Docs bundled as **files** the model navigates with `Read` / `Glob` rather than via `quickback docs <topic>` shell calls — same content, fewer tool calls per lookup
815
- - Tightened against audit gaps surfaced by red-team review
816
-
817
- Run `quickback claude install` to pick up the new skill layout.
818
-
819
- ---
820
-
821
- ## v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026
822
-
823
- ### Security fix: CSP auto-config no longer widens `default-src`
553
+ The Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).
824
554
 
825
- When 0.10.15's auto-config was asked to add a value to a directive the user hadn't declared (e.g. `https://fonts.googleapis.com` → `style-src` when only `default-src` was set), it incorrectly pushed the value into `default-src` itself. Because CSP3 fall-back semantics make `default-src` the fallback for `script-src`, `img-src`, `media-src`, and others, this widened the attack surface to every directive that fell back to it — a `style-src`-only host became reachable from `script-src`.
555
+ ### CLI compile auth gate
826
556
 
827
- 0.10.17 fixes the logic: missing target directives are now **scaffolded** with the user's `default-src` values as baseline, then extended with the auto-config addition. `default-src` stays clean. The new directive (e.g. `style-src`) covers exactly the styles the SPA needs and nothing else.
828
-
829
- Before (0.10.16):
830
- ```
831
- default-src 'self' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://fonts.gstatic.com @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com
832
- ```
833
-
834
- After (0.10.17):
835
- ```
836
- default-src 'self'
837
- style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com
838
- font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com
839
- connect-src 'self' @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com
840
- ```
841
-
842
- **Action required:** recompile (`quickback compile`) to regenerate the security middleware with the corrected scaffolding. Configs that already declared each `*-src` directive explicitly were unaffected by the bug — the regression only surfaced when users wrote `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and let auto-config fill in the rest.
843
-
844
- The user-side workaround from 0.10.16 (declaring each directive with `['@self']` to force scaffold) is no longer needed in 0.10.17 — the compiler does the right thing automatically.
557
+ `quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking "Create one" no longer loses their return URL.
845
558
 
846
559
  ---
847
560
 
848
- ## v0.10.16 — May 2, 2026
849
-
850
- ### CSP auto-config now covers SPA-baked-in API origins
561
+ ## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026
851
562
 
852
- When the bundled CMS or Account SPA is enabled, the compiler already inlines the API URL into the SPA bundle as a string literal at build time (`VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL=https://${unifiedDomain}`). That hardcoded URL is what the SPA actually fetches — regardless of which origin is currently serving the page. CSP `connect-src` must allow it explicitly.
563
+ ### CSP auto-config
853
564
 
854
- 0.10.16's auto-config picks up every domain the compiler already knows about — `config.domain`, the inferred `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`, the admin domain — and adds `https://${each}` to `connectSrc` whenever a bundled SPA is enabled.
565
+ When `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:
855
566
 
856
- The motivating case: running the SPA on `localhost:5173` while it's still baked against `https://quickback.your-app.com`. Pre-0.10.16 the localhost CSP's `'self'` blocked the prod URL; users were patching it manually. Now it just works.
857
-
858
- ```
859
- [security] auto-added https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com to csp.connectSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → SPA bundle hardcodes https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com as VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL / etc.
860
- ```
567
+ | Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |
568
+ |---|---|---|
569
+ | `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |
570
+ | `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |
571
+ | `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |
572
+ | Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |
861
573
 
862
- `@trustedOrigins` (the CORS allowlist) is unchanged — it still gets added independently. The two cover different things: `@trustedOrigins` permits CORS-allowed sibling subdomains; the new SPA-baked addition permits the exact URL the SPA's compiled bundle hardcodes.
574
+ Anything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.
863
575
 
864
- Combined with 0.10.15's bundled-SPA defaults, most projects can now write the minimal:
576
+ Most projects can write the minimal:
865
577
 
866
578
  ```ts
867
579
  security: {
@@ -874,286 +586,107 @@ security: {
874
586
  }
875
587
  ```
876
588
 
877
- …and the compiler fills in styleSrc font hosts, fontSrc gstatic, connectSrc trusted origins, and connectSrc SPA-baked URLs.
878
-
879
- ---
880
-
881
- ## v0.10.15 — May 2, 2026
882
-
883
- ### CSP auto-config — bundled-SPA origins added automatically
884
-
885
- When `security.csp` is set, the compiler now widens directives **additively** based on the project's enabled features. The four rules:
886
-
887
- | Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |
888
- |---|---|---|
889
- | `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |
890
- | `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |
891
- | `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |
892
-
893
- Anything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Every applied addition prints to stderr at compile so the magic is visible:
894
-
895
- ```
896
- [security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router
897
- [security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)
898
- ```
899
-
900
- The recipe in [the security docs](/compiler/config/security#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes ~5 lines shorter — most projects no longer need to list `fonts.googleapis.com` / `fonts.gstatic.com` / `@trustedOrigins` themselves. **Loop's CSP shrinks dramatically** after recompiling against this version.
901
-
902
- **Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control.
903
-
904
- **Smart fallback:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), the addition lands in `defaultSrc` rather than creating a sibling directive — CSP fall-back semantics mean a sibling would *narrow* your intent, so we preserve the broader fallback.
589
+ …and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.
905
590
 
906
- ### Troubleshooting table for CSP violations
907
-
908
- The security docs page now includes a [Troubleshooting CSP violations](/compiler/config/security#troubleshooting-csp-violations) table mapping browser console errors back to the directive that needs widening. Useful when auto-config is disabled or the project has a non-bundled SPA hitting third-party origins.
909
-
910
- ### Out of scope (deferred)
911
-
912
- - **Per-request CSP nonces** (`@nonce` sentinel implementation) — Phase 2 / 0.10.16. Sentinel still errors at compile in 0.10.15.
913
- - **`revocationCheck: 'kv'` for `auth.jwt`** — schema accepts it, runtime still errors at compile. Slipped from 0.10.15 to 0.10.16.
914
- - **Public R2 host auto-add to `imgSrc`** — most R2 access today goes through the worker so the SPA fetches from `'@self'`. Will revisit once we have a clean way to discover public-bucket hosts at compile.
591
+ When a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.
915
592
 
916
593
  ---
917
594
 
918
595
  ## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026
919
596
 
920
- ### `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path config
597
+ ### `auth.jwt` config
921
598
 
922
- Quickback's bearer-token JWT (the one minted by the auth middleware and consumed by the fast-path on every subsequent request) is now configurable. The most-tuned knob is `expiresIn` — drop it to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs, which auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call:
599
+ The bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):
923
600
 
924
601
  ```ts
925
602
  auth: {
926
603
  jwt: {
927
- expiresIn: 30, // 30s post-revocation replay window
928
- issuer: 'my-api', // iss claim (verified on the way back in)
929
- audience: 'partner-svc', // aud claim
930
- secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET', // override BETTER_AUTH_SECRET if you need the JWT secret rotated independently
604
+ expiresIn: 30,
605
+ issuer: 'my-api',
606
+ audience: 'partner-svc',
607
+ secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',
931
608
  },
932
609
  }
933
610
  ```
934
611
 
935
- `revocationCheck: 'kv'` (KV-denylist consult on every fast-path verify, ~5-15ms edge-cached, no D1 hit) is reserved in the schema today but **deferred to 0.10.15** — setting it errors at compile so the migration path is explicit. `'none'` (today's behaviour, 0 cost, replay bound by TTL) stays the default.
612
+ ### Admin MCP endpoints filtered
936
613
 
937
- See [the docs page](/compiler/config/auth) for the full knob list and tuning recommendations.
614
+ Better Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.
938
615
 
939
- ### MCP admin endpoints hidden from non-admin `tools/list`
616
+ ### Declarative `security` config
940
617
 
941
- Better Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, `/admin/impersonate-user`, etc. — 9 in total) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec, which means the MCP server's existing access-filter automatically drops them from `tools/list` for callers without an admin token. Anonymous and member-role callers no longer see admin tooling enumerated through MCP; admin endpoints still exist on the HTTP surface (Better Auth gates them server-side regardless).
618
+ Every security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `"'self'"` quoting.
942
619
 
943
- ### Declarative `security` config block
620
+ The compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.
944
621
 
945
- Every security response-header (`Content-Security-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is now configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. Loop's `postcompile-patch.mjs` (which re-injected a fuller CSP and COOP after every `quickback compile`) can now be deleted in favour of:
622
+ ### HSTS skipped on localhost
946
623
 
947
- ```ts
948
- security: {
949
- csp: {
950
- defaultSrc: ['@self'],
951
- scriptSrc: ['@self'],
952
- styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline'],
953
- frameAncestors: ['@none'],
954
- objectSrc: ['@none'],
955
- upgradeInsecureRequests: true,
956
- },
957
- coop: 'same-origin',
958
- }
959
- ```
960
-
961
- `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@unsafe-eval`, `@trustedOrigins`, `@nonce`) save users from awkward `"'self'"` quoting and let `@trustedOrigins` resolve to the same allowlist `cors()` uses. Unknown sentinels throw at compile rather than silently stringify into the wire CSP.
962
-
963
- The compiler runs lint rules over the resolved config — errors for `@nonce` (deferred to 0.10.15), `@unsafe-inline + @nonce` (silently broken), and sentinel-only directives that would resolve to nothing at runtime; warnings for `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration, etc.
964
-
965
- Defaults preserve 0.10.13 behaviour byte-for-byte — adding the block without setting any field is a no-op.
966
-
967
- See [the docs page](/compiler/config/security) for the full reference.
968
-
969
- ### HSTS no longer pins `localhost` to HTTPS
970
-
971
- The generated middleware now skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `max-age` seconds — observable across every project on that machine since HSTS keys on hostname, not port. Affects every project running locally.
972
-
973
- ### Out of scope (deferred)
974
-
975
- - **Per-request CSP nonces** — Phase 2 / 0.10.15. Sentinel exists at config-validation level so users can author their final CSP today knowing it'll start working when nonces ship.
976
- - **Asset-hash CSP** for inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks emitted by the bundled SPAs — Phase 3.
977
- - **Per-route CSP overrides** (e.g. one looser policy for `/admin`) — single global CSP for now.
624
+ Generated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.
978
625
 
979
626
  ---
980
627
 
981
628
  ## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026
982
629
 
983
- ### Clickjacking protection on every generated Worker
984
-
985
- Every Worker now emits two clickjacking-defence headers on every
986
- response:
987
-
988
- - `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>`
989
- - `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`
990
-
991
- The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant
992
- that gates CORS, so users configure their domains in one place
993
- (`auth.trustedOrigins` / `auth.trustedOriginDefaults` in
994
- `quickback.config.ts`) and both CORS and frame-ancestors stay in
995
- lockstep. `'self'` is always allowed so an app's own SPAs can frame
996
- their own routes (e.g. an account login popover hosted on the same
997
- origin).
630
+ ### Clickjacking defence on every Worker
998
631
 
999
- Modern browsers obey `frame-ancestors` and ignore `X-Frame-Options`
1000
- when both are set; the legacy header is included for clients that
1001
- don't speak CSP3. The CSP intentionally only sets `frame-ancestors` —
1002
- adding `script-src` / `default-src` would need a much wider audit
1003
- across SPA assets, inline scripts, and third-party embeds, so that's
1004
- left as a follow-up.
1005
-
1006
- Recompile (`quickback compile`) and redeploy to pick this up — no
1007
- config change needed unless you want to allow extra cross-origin
1008
- iframe embeds, in which case add them to `auth.trustedOrigins`.
1009
-
1010
- ---
1011
-
1012
- ## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026
1013
-
1014
- ### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix
1015
-
1016
- Patch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the
1017
- Claude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they
1018
- reflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS
1019
- posture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page
1020
- itself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the
1021
- 0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside
1022
- `@quickback-dev/cli`.
1023
-
1024
- No runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`
1025
- against this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.
632
+ Every Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.
1026
633
 
1027
634
  ---
1028
635
 
1029
636
  ## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026
1030
637
 
1031
- ### MCP `tools/list` is now access-filtered + recon-tightened
1032
-
1033
- The generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes
1034
- that turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:
1035
-
1036
- 1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including
1037
- admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool
1038
- descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant
1039
- scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.
1040
- 2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could
1041
- pull the catalogue from a browser.
1042
- 3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its
1043
- discovery payload.
1044
-
1045
- Fix:
1046
-
1047
- - Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering
1048
- `roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`
1049
- pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the
1050
- caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed
1051
- callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and
1052
- function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.
1053
- - Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware
1054
- (origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now
1055
- applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.
1056
- - `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.
1057
- `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the
1058
- spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.
1059
- - Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is
1060
- only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.
1061
-
1062
- This filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`
1063
- still re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,
1064
- access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the
1065
- underlying gate.
1066
-
1067
- Known follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,
1068
- `impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,
1069
- so any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call
1070
- is still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.
1071
-
1072
- ---
1073
-
1074
- ## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026
1075
-
1076
- ### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time
1077
-
1078
- `access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between
1079
- entries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /
1080
- `roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the
1081
- runtime treated the literal string `"and"` as a column lookup, the
1082
- predicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /
1083
- empty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type
1084
- couldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index
1085
- signature, so any key parses.
638
+ ### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered
1086
639
 
1087
- The compiler now walks every access node attached to a resource (CRUD
1088
- ops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action
1089
- access) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a
1090
- reserved key:
640
+ Each MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.
1091
641
 
1092
- - `and` / `or` inside `record` → use the top-level `and` / `or`
1093
- sibling: `{ and: [{ record: { ... } }, { record: { ... } }] }`
1094
- - `roles` / `userRole` inside `record` → put them at the access node
1095
- alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`
642
+ - Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.
643
+ - Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.
644
+ - Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.
1096
645
 
1097
- The error names the exact origin (`crud.update.access`,
1098
- `actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.
646
+ `tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.
1099
647
 
1100
648
  ---
1101
649
 
1102
- ## v0.10.9 — April 29, 2026
1103
-
1104
- ### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access
1105
-
1106
- `auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus
1107
- `access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to
1108
- silently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator
1109
- inlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the
1110
- record-based generator read the access config back through the
1111
- runtime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where
1112
- the unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did
1113
- literal string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling
1114
- the action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.
650
+ ## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026
1115
651
 
1116
- Fixed: record-based action routes now inline the expanded list the
1117
- same way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow
1118
- through the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the
1119
- access config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time
1120
- expansion actually reaches the matcher.
652
+ ### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected
1121
653
 
1122
- A regression test (`role-hierarchy-action-routes.test.ts`) locks the
1123
- behavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route
1124
- output and that the access config is no longer read from
1125
- `actions[name].access` at runtime.
654
+ `access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).
1126
655
 
1127
656
  ---
1128
657
 
1129
658
  ## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026
1130
659
 
1131
- ### Audit support on postgres targets, plus a generated-API quality pass
660
+ ### Audit logging on Postgres targets
661
+
662
+ `audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.
1132
663
 
1133
- **Audit on PG.** Until this release, `audit_events` only existed on cloudflare-d1 — projects on Neon (or any postgres target) silently skipped audit logging on `unsafe:` and `PUBLIC`-role actions, and hard delete was hard-blocked. Postgres has no equivalent of D1's separate-database binding model, but it has native schemas — so the audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema in the same database as features (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`). The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 OR any PG dialect; the `auditDatabaseId` requirement only fires for D1 (which still uses the separate-binding model). The recruitment example wires `auditDatabaseId` so the recompile path stays green.
664
+ ### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement
1134
665
 
1135
- **`auditDatabaseId` is now a compile-time requirement** (D1 only). Previously, projects with unsafe/PUBLIC actions but no audit id silently produced a `database_id = "local-audit"` placeholder in production `wrangler.toml`; Cloudflare's worker upload step then rejected it with code 10021 *after* assets and migrations had already run. The compile-time error names the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the `auditDatabaseId` config key where the returned id goes.
666
+ Projects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = "local-audit"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.
1136
667
 
1137
- ### Five fixes from a Loop integration ticket pass
668
+ ### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP
1138
669
 
1139
- **Action input → OpenAPI / MCP.** `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas now flow into `requestBody` on the OpenAPI operation and `inputSchema.properties` / `_bodyFields` on the MCP tool list. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; for discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references (`input: createPersonInput`), the compiler runs your action file through Zod 4's native `z.toJSONSchema()` during compilation — full-fidelity output with no static translator to maintain. Pre-fix, every action came out as a no-arg endpoint, which gutted typed SDK generation and made MCP useless for actions that take parameters.
670
+ `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.
1140
671
 
1141
- **OpenAPI fidelity.** Three surgical fixes that strict validators (zod, openapi-typescript, openapi-fetch) had been complaining about:
1142
- - Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.
1143
- - `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: "string", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.
1144
- - `id` only claims `format: "uuid"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: "string" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.
672
+ ### OpenAPI fidelity
1145
673
 
1146
- **Mask auto-detector now checks the column exists.** The auto-mask predicate used to be unconditionally `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — including for tables with no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`). The generated mask function would reference a non-existent column and fail under TypeScript checks. The auto-detector now verifies the resolved owner column exists in the parsed schema before emitting the `or` clause; when it doesn't, the rule falls back to roles-only and the compiler emits a warning so the behavior is transparent.
674
+ - Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.
675
+ - `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: "string", enum: [...] }`.
676
+ - `id` claims `format: "uuid"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: "string" }`.
1147
677
 
1148
- **Error code consistency.** The generated CRUD layer was emitting raw codes (`'UNAUTHORIZED'`, `'NOT_NULL_VIOLATION'`, `'UNIQUE_VIOLATION'`, `'INSERT_FAILED'`, `'UPDATE_FAILED'`) that were never in the `QuickbackErrorCode` enum, so consumers couldn't switch exhaustively on `code`. New `database` layer + `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` / `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` / `DB_INSERT_FAILED` / `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` / `NOT_FOUND` codes are now in the enum, the routes use `AuthErrors.missing()` / `DatabaseErrors.*()` helpers throughout, and the OpenAPI `Error` component emits `code` as a closed enum sourced from the canonical `QUICKBACK_ERROR_CODES` list. Generated SDKs can now `switch` on `code` without a default branch swallowing unknown values. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).
678
+ ### Minor
1149
679
 
1150
- **Dropped dead `auditFields` preamble from action route generators.** The audit wrapper's `Proxy` already hard-stamps `createdAt` / `createdBy` / `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every INSERT and `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every UPDATE — the `auditFields` const the route preamble built was never read. Dropped from `standalone.ts` / `record-based.ts` and from the `ActionExecutorParams` JSDoc. Migrated 7 example handlers (drop `modifiedAt: auditFields!.modifiedAt` from `.set` payloads — the wrapper handles it). Note: `.onConflictDoUpdate({ set })` is *not* intercepted by the wrapper, so `upsertBatch`-style handlers keep an explicit `modifiedAt: now`.
680
+ - Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.
681
+ - Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).
1151
682
 
1152
683
  ---
1153
684
 
1154
- ## One file per action: greenfield action authoring
685
+ ## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature
1155
686
 
1156
- Action authoring collapses to a single shape. Each action is its own file under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts` using `defineAction({...})`. The filename is the action name AND the URL segment.
687
+ ### One file per action
688
+
689
+ Action authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:
1157
690
 
1158
691
  ```typescript
1159
692
  // features/applications/actions/advance.ts
@@ -1174,65 +707,37 @@ export default defineAction({
1174
707
  });
1175
708
  ```
1176
709
 
1177
- `defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — types `record`, `input`, and audit fields without manual annotations. The directory says what `:id` mounts to; the imports say what the body reads or writes.
710
+ `defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.
1178
711
 
1179
712
  **Discovery rules:**
1180
- - `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table (the `<feature>.ts` file at the feature root).
1181
- - `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file `<table>.ts` — for multi-table features.
1182
- - Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch, no firewall preload).
1183
- - Tableless features (no top-level `*.ts` files) require every action to be standalone.
1184
- - Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.
1185
- - Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).
1186
-
1187
- **Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):
1188
-
1189
- - `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)
1190
- - `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)
1191
- - `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref
1192
- - `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`
1193
- - `export default { actions: {…} }`
1194
- - Colocated `defineActions` inside table files
1195
- - `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)
1196
- - `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns
1197
-
1198
- The phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.
1199
-
1200
- The CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.
1201
-
1202
- See the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.
713
+ - `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.
714
+ - `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.
715
+ - Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).
716
+ - Tableless features require every action to be standalone.
1203
717
 
1204
- ---
1205
-
1206
- ## Multi-table actions per feature
1207
-
1208
- Features used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:
718
+ **Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.
1209
719
 
1210
- - **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity. Default for new features.
1211
- - **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.
1212
- - **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.
720
+ See [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).
1213
721
 
1214
- Plus the universal `_feature.ts` slot (at feature root) for **non-table-bound feature-level actions** (`export default { actions: { … } }` shape) and **shared Zod schemas** that get prepended once to the merged actions module so every sibling action sees them. Allowed in any of the three modes — orthogonal to table binding.
722
+ ### Multi-table actions per feature
1215
723
 
1216
- The decision flowchart: *one table with actions → colocate. Multiple tables with actions → colocate each. Hit a cycle or want strict separation → `actions/<table>.ts`. Want schema/actions split for a single-table feature → `actions.ts`. Non-table actions → always `_feature.ts`.*
724
+ One feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:
1217
725
 
1218
- Conflicts are batched and printed once before the compiler aborts — no "fix one, recompile, fix the next" loop. The CLI hard-errors when a feature mixes `actions.ts` with table-bound mode, when the same table has its `defineActions` declared in two places, when an `actions/<x>.ts` first-arg doesn't match the basename, or when `_feature.ts` contains `defineActions(table, …)`. Legacy `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filenames in a feature dir trigger a soft warning naming the offending paths.
726
+ - **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.
727
+ - **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.
728
+ - **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.
1219
729
 
1220
- Within the legacy bundled `actions.ts` DSL, action names had to be unique within a feature — the runtime module merged every source into one keyspace, so colliding `publish` actions on `episodes` and `shows` would have silently overwritten each other. The retired `actions.ts` shape is no longer accepted, so this constraint is gone: the current one-file-per-action layout keys uniqueness per `(bindTable, name)` pair, and the codegen aggregator mangles the JS map key per bind-table while keeping the URL segment bare. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.
730
+ Plus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.
1221
731
 
1222
- Inline `execute:` bodies must be arrow functions (`execute: async (ctx) => { … }`). `async function` and plain `function` shapes were silently misparsed by the route emitter — they now hard-error at parse time pointing at the canonical arrow form, with a suggestion to use `handler:` for callers who genuinely need a named function declaration.
1223
-
1224
- `handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.
1225
-
1226
- Migration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.
732
+ Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.
1227
733
 
1228
734
  ---
1229
735
 
1230
- ## Firewall: named-scope shape restored, auto-detection synonyms widened
736
+ ## Firewall: named-scope shape
1231
737
 
1232
- The named-scope firewall shape (`firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }`) is back as a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array. DSL v2 step 8 had walled it off, but the internal architecture still kept named-scope around for the route + scoped-db generators — so re-accepting it at the input boundary is a thin coercion layer, not an architectural change.
738
+ The named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:
1233
739
 
1234
740
  ```typescript
1235
- // All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.
1236
741
  firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)
1237
742
  firewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }
1238
743
  firewall: { exception: true }
@@ -1244,27 +749,17 @@ firewall: [
1244
749
 
1245
750
  Pick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.
1246
751
 
1247
- **Auto-detection synonyms expanded.** When `firewall:` is omitted entirely, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list now accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope still accepts `userId` only.
1248
-
1249
- **`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\`ownerId\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \`userId\` if this column controls access, add a separate \`userId\` / \`organizationId\` column, or specify \`firewall:\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic "missing isolation column" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).
752
+ **Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.
1250
753
 
1251
- Migration: nothing breaks. Projects on the predicate-array shape compile bit-identically. Projects on the named-scope shape — including any test fixtures or example projects that were left on the legacy form — now compile cleanly again.
754
+ **`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.
1252
755
 
1253
756
  ---
1254
757
 
1255
758
  ## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026
1256
759
 
1257
- ### `q.scope()` column DSL + unified `masking.query` gate
760
+ ### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping
1258
761
 
1259
- Two related DSL consolidations land. The `q.scope()` half is purely additive; the `masking.query` half rejects three legacy per-capability flags at compile time (migration is mechanical — see below).
1260
-
1261
- **`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:
1262
-
1263
- 1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.
1264
- 2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.
1265
- 3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.
1266
-
1267
- The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.
762
+ `q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:
1268
763
 
1269
764
  ```typescript
1270
765
  columns: {
@@ -1274,304 +769,148 @@ columns: {
1274
769
  }
1275
770
  ```
1276
771
 
1277
- The auto-derived firewall also includes the soft-delete predicate (`{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }`) when audit-field injection is on (the default). See [`q.scope()` in the schema docs](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).
772
+ `q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.
1278
773
 
1279
- **`masking[col].query.roles` — unified role gate for filter / sort / search.** The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single allowlist that says "these roles can query the column."
774
+ See [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).
775
+
776
+ ### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate
777
+
778
+ The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:
1280
779
 
1281
780
  ```typescript
1282
781
  masking: {
1283
782
  email: {
1284
783
  type: 'email',
1285
784
  show: { roles: ['admin'] },
1286
- query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // optional — defaults to show.roles
785
+ query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted
1287
786
  },
1288
787
  }
1289
788
  ```
1290
789
 
1291
- When omitted, `query` inherits from `show.roles` ("if you can see it, you can query it") which is the right shape for almost all PII. A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time. See [Masking query gate](/compiler/definitions/masking#query-gate-filter--sort--search).
790
+ A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.
1292
791
 
1293
- **Breaking:** Setting `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or just delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).
792
+ **Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).
1294
793
 
1295
794
  ---
1296
795
 
1297
796
  ## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026
1298
797
 
1299
- ### DSL v2: unified `read:` pipeline, transactional batches, ID-probe defense
798
+ ### Unified `read:` pipeline
1300
799
 
1301
- Step 8 of the DSL v2 refactor lands. The headline shift is that the read
1302
- side of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the
1303
- collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view
1304
- projections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at
1305
- compile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page
1306
- for the full reference and migration table.
800
+ The read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.
1307
801
 
1308
802
  **Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):
1309
803
 
1310
- - `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)
1311
- - `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)
1312
- - Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)
804
+ - `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)
805
+ - `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)
806
+ - Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`
1313
807
  - `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`
1314
808
 
1315
- **Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only
1316
- access check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching
1317
- role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403
1318
- ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish "row
1319
- exists in another tenant" from "row doesn't exist." See
1320
- [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).
1321
-
1322
- **Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a
1323
- `failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a
1324
- `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers
1325
- (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`
1326
- wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls
1327
- back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`
1328
- still stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect
1329
- `meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue
1330
- messages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction
1331
- commits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See
1332
- [Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).
1333
-
1334
- **`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that
1335
- controls 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level
1336
- (sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate
1337
- array and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`
1338
- values should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.
1339
-
1340
- **Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`
1341
- entirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to
1342
- expose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.
1343
-
1344
- **Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so
1345
- `defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.
809
+ ### Pre-record access ordering
1346
810
 
1347
- ---
811
+ Handlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish "row exists in another tenant" from "row doesn't exist." See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).
1348
812
 
1349
- ## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026
1350
-
1351
- ### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix
1352
-
1353
- Hono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.
813
+ ### Transactional batch operations
1354
814
 
1355
- ### Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta
815
+ Batch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.
1356
816
 
1357
- Quickback already defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys, and Cloudflare Email Sending has now graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config, no API keys, no third-party accounts. No action needed; recompiling any existing project continues to wire the default Cloudflare transport. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).
817
+ Embedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.
1358
818
 
1359
- ### Minor/patch dep sweep
1360
-
1361
- Aligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:
1362
-
1363
- - `wrangler@^4.83.0`
1364
- - `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`
1365
- - `zod@^4.3.6`
1366
- - `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)
1367
- - `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)
819
+ See [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).
1368
820
 
1369
821
  ---
1370
822
 
1371
- ## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026
1372
-
1373
- ### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility
823
+ ## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026
1374
824
 
1375
- Generated API code failed to typecheck after Better Auth bumped to 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` tightened `BufferSource` to `ArrayBufferView<ArrayBuffer>`. Four unrelated surfaces broke:
825
+ ### Hono CVE bump
1376
826
 
1377
- - **`databaseHooks.member.update.after` was removed** in Better Auth 1.5. The compiler now emits the member role-change broadcast hook as `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` inside the `organization()` plugin call, which is the current supported shape.
1378
- - **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `"inline"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).
1379
- - **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.
1380
- - **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.
827
+ Hono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.
1381
828
 
1382
- No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fixes.
829
+ ### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta
1383
830
 
1384
- ### CMS Admin Gate Now Enforced Server-Side
831
+ Quickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).
1385
832
 
1386
- `cms: { access: "admin" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an "Access Denied" screen inside the SPA — the static assets, `/api/v1/schema`, and `/api/v1/custom_view` CRUD were reachable by any authenticated user. A non-admin with an API token or cookie could bypass the UI and read schema metadata or saved CMS views directly.
833
+ ### Dependency sweep
1387
834
 
1388
- This release adds server-side enforcement at every CMS-facing surface:
835
+ `wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.
1389
836
 
1390
- - **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === "admin"` before serving `index.html`. Unauthenticated requests redirect to login; authenticated non-admins get `403 Admin access required`. Static bundles (JS/CSS) remain reachable so browser caches aren't invalidated.
1391
- - **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.
1392
- - **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: ["admin"]` primitive rather than org membership.
1393
- - **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.
837
+ ---
1394
838
 
1395
- Your resource CRUD endpoints are unaffected — they keep their per-resource `crud.access.roles`.
839
+ ## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026
1396
840
 
1397
- ### New `userRole` Access Primitive
841
+ ### `userRole` access primitive
1398
842
 
1399
- Added `userRole?: string[]` to the declarative `Access` config, evaluated against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). This is distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).
843
+ A new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).
1400
844
 
1401
845
  ```typescript
1402
- // Old: in multi-tenant this meant org-admin, not platform-admin
1403
- access: { roles: ['admin'] }
1404
-
1405
- // New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership
1406
- access: { userRole: ['admin'] }
1407
-
1408
- // "Org owner OR platform admin"
846
+ // Org owner OR platform admin
1409
847
  access: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }
1410
848
 
1411
849
  // Platform admins see SSNs across every org
1412
850
  masking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }
1413
851
  ```
1414
852
 
1415
- `userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or`/`and` combinators. See [Access - userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).
853
+ `userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).
1416
854
 
1417
- ### Fix: `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` in generated POST handlers
855
+ ### CMS admin gate enforced server-side
1418
856
 
1419
- Projects with `providers.database.config.generateId: "short"` (or `"nanoid"` / `"cuid"`) compiled routes that called the ID helper but never imported it. Every generated `src/features/**/*.routes.ts` had `customAlphabet('0123...', 6)()` in its POST body but no matching `import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';` at the top of the file. Every `POST /api/v1/<resource>` and batch-create returned `500` with `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` on the first write.
857
+ `cms: { access: "admin" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an "Access Denied" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.
1420
858
 
1421
- The compiler now emits the correct import alongside the ID expression for all three modes: `nanoid`, `customAlphabet`, and `createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`.
859
+ ### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility
1422
860
 
1423
- No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.
1424
-
1425
- ### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`
1426
-
1427
- When a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.
1428
-
1429
- The preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.
1430
-
1431
- ### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `"local-files"` on every compile
1432
-
1433
- Projects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = "local-files"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.
1434
-
1435
- The files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.
1436
-
1437
- No config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.
1438
-
1439
- ---
1440
-
1441
- ## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026
1442
-
1443
- ### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback
1444
-
1445
- Tables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —
1446
-
1447
- ```ts
1448
- export const episodeTags = sqliteTable("episode_tags", {
1449
- id: text("id").primaryKey(),
1450
- episodeId: text("episode_id").notNull(),
1451
- tagId: text("tag_id").notNull(),
1452
- }, (t) => [ // <-- "}, (t) =>" on one line
1453
- uniqueIndex("episode_tag_unique").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),
1454
- ]);
1455
- ```
1456
-
1457
- never received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.
1458
-
1459
- The regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.
1460
-
1461
- **Recovery path:**
1462
-
1463
- - Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.
1464
- - Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with "duplicate column name" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.
1465
-
1466
- ### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column
1467
-
1468
- Resources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.
1469
-
1470
- The three concerns are now fully independent:
1471
-
1472
- - **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.
1473
- - **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.
1474
- - **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.
1475
-
1476
- In the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.
1477
-
1478
- No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.
861
+ Generated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.
1479
862
 
1480
863
  ---
1481
864
 
1482
865
  ## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026
1483
866
 
1484
- ### New `generateId: "short"` Strategy
867
+ ### `generateId: "short"` strategy
1485
868
 
1486
- Added a compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:
869
+ A compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:
1487
870
 
1488
871
  ```typescript
1489
872
  providers: {
1490
- database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", {
1491
- generateId: "short",
1492
- }),
873
+ database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", { generateId: "short" }),
1493
874
  }
1494
875
  ```
1495
876
 
1496
- Generates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package in your project (same as the existing `"nanoid"` strategy).
1497
-
1498
- **When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.
877
+ Generates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.
1499
878
 
1500
- **When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability (birthday bound). For large tables stick with `"uuid"`, `"cuid"`, or `"prefixed"`.
879
+ **When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.
1501
880
 
1502
- See [Providers - ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options) for the full list of strategies.
1503
-
1504
- ---
1505
-
1506
- ## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026
1507
-
1508
- ### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs
1509
-
1510
- Two bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:
1511
-
1512
- **Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: "routes"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.
1513
-
1514
- **D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `"local-features"`, `"local-files"`, and `"local"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:
1515
-
1516
- | Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |
1517
- |---------|-----------------------------------|
1518
- | `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |
1519
- | `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |
1520
- | `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |
1521
- | `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |
1522
-
1523
- See [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.
1524
-
1525
- ### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain
1526
-
1527
- When the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.
1528
-
1529
- The SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.
1530
-
1531
- No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.
881
+ **When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `"uuid"`, `"cuid"`, or `"prefixed"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).
1532
882
 
1533
883
  ---
1534
884
 
1535
885
  ## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026
1536
886
 
1537
- ### Catch-All `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` Environment Variable
887
+ ### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`
1538
888
 
1539
- Instead of setting four separate URL env vars, you can now point at a single Quickback origin:
889
+ A single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:
1540
890
 
1541
891
  ```bash
1542
- # One variable — done.
1543
892
  VITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com
1544
893
  ```
1545
894
 
1546
- When set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:
1547
-
1548
895
  | Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |
1549
896
  |---|---|
1550
897
  | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |
1551
898
  | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |
1552
899
  | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |
1553
900
 
1554
- `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend, not the Quickback server.
1555
-
1556
- **Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.
1557
-
1558
- See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.
901
+ `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).
1559
902
 
1560
903
  ---
1561
904
 
1562
905
  ## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026
1563
906
 
1564
- ### Role Hierarchy with `+` Suffix
907
+ ### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix
1565
908
 
1566
- You can now define a role hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix in access rules to mean "this role and above":
909
+ Define a hierarchy and use `+` to mean "this role and above":
1567
910
 
1568
911
  ```typescript
1569
- // quickback.config.ts
1570
- auth: {
1571
- roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],
1572
- }
912
+ auth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }
1573
913
 
1574
- // In resource definitions
1575
914
  crud: {
1576
915
  list: { access: { roles: ["member+"] } }, // member, admin, owner
1577
916
  create: { access: { roles: ["admin+"] } }, // admin, owner
@@ -1579,15 +918,15 @@ crud: {
1579
918
  }
1580
919
  ```
1581
920
 
1582
- Roles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access - Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) for details.
921
+ Roles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).
1583
922
 
1584
923
  ---
1585
924
 
1586
925
  ## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026
1587
926
 
1588
- ### Breaking: VITE URL Environment Variables Renamed
927
+ ### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced
1589
928
 
1590
- All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.
929
+ All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.
1591
930
 
1592
931
  | Old | New |
1593
932
  |-----|-----|
@@ -1596,129 +935,58 @@ All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE
1596
935
  | `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |
1597
936
  | `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |
1598
937
 
1599
- **Non-URL variables are unchanged:** `VITE_ENABLE_*` feature flags, branding vars (`VITE_APP_NAME`, etc.), and `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` stay as-is.
938
+ Non-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).
1600
939
 
1601
940
  **Action required:**
1602
- - **Compiled projects** — re-run `quickback compile`. The compiler generates the new names automatically.
1603
- - **Standalone deploys** — update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.
1604
- - **Library users** — the `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globalThis names are unchanged, but if you pipe Vite env vars into them, update the var names.
1605
-
1606
- See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.
941
+ - Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.
942
+ - Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.
943
+ - Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.
1607
944
 
1608
- ### CMS Access Control
945
+ ### CMS access control
1609
946
 
1610
- The `cms.access` config option now enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility in Account UI.
1611
-
1612
- ```typescript
1613
- cms: { access: "admin" }
1614
- ```
1615
-
1616
- When set to `"admin"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== "admin"`) see an "Access Denied" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `"user"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.
1617
-
1618
- See [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.
1619
-
1620
- ### SPA Sub-Route Fix
1621
-
1622
- Fixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.
947
+ `cms.access: "admin"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== "admin"`) see an "Access Denied" screen with a sign-out button.
1623
948
 
1624
949
  ---
1625
950
 
1626
951
  ## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026
1627
952
 
1628
- ### Email OTP & Auth Fixes
1629
-
1630
- - Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly
1631
- - Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead
1632
- - Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)
953
+ ### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail
1633
954
 
1634
- ### Multiple Table Exports Fix
955
+ Structured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === "admin"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.
1635
956
 
1636
- - Fixed a compiler error when a single file exports multiple Drizzle tables alongside a `defineTable()` default export
1637
- - The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix
957
+ Compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).
1638
958
 
1639
- ### Headless Drizzle Rename Hints
959
+ ### Security contract report artifacts
1640
960
 
1641
- - Added `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts would block compilation
1642
- - Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys
1643
- - See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details
961
+ Generated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.
1644
962
 
1645
- ### Security Contract Report Artifacts
963
+ ### Headless Drizzle rename hints
1646
964
 
1647
- - Added generated security contract artifacts to compiler output:
1648
- - `reports/security-contracts.report.json`
1649
- - `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`
1650
- - Added config-driven signing controls:
1651
- - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`
1652
- - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`
1653
- - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`
1654
- - Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance
1655
- - Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options
965
+ `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).
1656
966
 
1657
- ### Mandatory Unsafe Action Audit Trail
967
+ ### Minor
1658
968
 
1659
- - Added structured unsafe action config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`)
1660
- - Cross-tenant unsafe actions now require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === "admin"`)
1661
- - Added mandatory audit logging for unsafe cross-tenant actions (success, denial, and error paths)
1662
- - Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present
1663
- - Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)
1664
-
1665
- ---
1666
-
1667
- ## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026
1668
-
1669
- ### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output
1670
-
1671
- - Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions
1672
- - Better CLI output formatting during compilation
1673
- - Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration
1674
-
1675
- ### Bug Fixes
1676
-
1677
- - Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)
1678
- - API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)
1679
-
1680
- ---
1681
-
1682
- ## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026
1683
-
1684
- ### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support
1685
-
1686
- - Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages
1687
- - Auth middleware improvements for page routes
1688
- - CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions
969
+ - Email OTP magic links work correctly.
970
+ - Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.
971
+ - Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.
1689
972
 
1690
973
  ---
1691
974
 
1692
975
  ## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026
1693
976
 
1694
- ### CMS App
1695
-
1696
- - Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API
1697
- - CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations
1698
- - Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions
1699
-
1700
- ### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements
1701
-
1702
- - Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS
1703
- - Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments
977
+ ### Quickback CMS
1704
978
 
1705
- ### Bug Fixes
1706
-
1707
- - Fixed anonymous user email format generation
1708
- - Organization selector improvements in Account UI
1709
- - Config validation now catches more errors at compile time
1710
- - Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses
1711
- - Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting
979
+ A schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.
1712
980
 
1713
981
  ---
1714
982
 
1715
983
  ## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026
1716
984
 
1717
- ### Scoped Database for Actions
985
+ ### Scoped database for actions
1718
986
 
1719
- Actions now receive a **security-scoped database** instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.
987
+ Actions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.
1720
988
 
1721
- The scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:
989
+ Duck-typed column detection at runtime:
1722
990
 
1723
991
  | Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |
1724
992
  |---|---|---|
@@ -1726,24 +994,9 @@ The scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:
1726
994
  | `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |
1727
995
  | `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |
1728
996
 
1729
- This means **every action is secure by default** — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.
997
+ Every action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.
1730
998
 
1731
- ```typescript
1732
- defineActions(todos, {
1733
- complete: {
1734
- type: "record",
1735
- execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {
1736
- // db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted
1737
- const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);
1738
- // ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL
1739
- },
1740
- },
1741
- });
1742
- ```
1743
-
1744
- #### Unsafe Mode
1745
-
1746
- Actions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:
999
+ Actions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:
1747
1000
 
1748
1001
  ```typescript
1749
1002
  defineActions(analytics, {
@@ -1758,108 +1011,45 @@ defineActions(analytics, {
1758
1011
  });
1759
1012
  ```
1760
1013
 
1761
- Without `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.
1762
-
1763
- **Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)
1764
-
1765
- ---
1766
-
1767
- ### Cascading Soft Delete
1768
-
1769
- Soft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.
1014
+ Without `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).
1770
1015
 
1771
- ```
1772
- DELETE /api/v1/projects/:id
1773
- ```
1016
+ ### Cascading soft delete
1774
1017
 
1775
- Generated behavior:
1776
- ```typescript
1777
- // 1. Soft delete the parent
1778
- await db.update(projects)
1779
- .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
1780
- .where(eq(projects.id, id));
1781
-
1782
- // 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)
1783
- await db.update(projectMembers)
1784
- .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
1785
- .where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));
1786
-
1787
- await db.update(projectTasks)
1788
- .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
1789
- .where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));
1790
- ```
1018
+ Soft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.
1791
1019
 
1792
1020
  Rules:
1793
- - Only applies to **soft delete** (the default). Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.
1794
- - Only cascades within the **same feature** — cross-feature references are not affected.
1795
- - Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler's audit fields).
1021
+ - Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.
1022
+ - Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.
1023
+ - Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).
1796
1024
 
1797
- **Related docs:** [Actions API — Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete)
1025
+ See [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).
1798
1026
 
1799
- ---
1800
-
1801
- ### Advanced Query Parameters
1027
+ ### Advanced query parameters
1802
1028
 
1803
- New query parameter capabilities for all list endpoints:
1029
+ New capabilities for all list endpoints:
1804
1030
 
1805
- - **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status` returns only the columns you need
1806
- - **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc` sorts by multiple fields
1807
- - **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in response headers (`X-Total-Count`)
1031
+ - **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`
1032
+ - **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`
1033
+ - **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`
1808
1034
  - **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns
1809
1035
 
1810
- ```bash
1811
- # Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count
1812
- GET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true
1813
-
1814
- # Search across all text fields
1815
- GET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent
1816
- ```
1817
-
1818
- **Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)
1819
-
1820
- ---
1821
-
1822
- ### Audit Field Improvements
1823
-
1824
- - `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema
1825
- - All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed
1826
-
1827
- ---
1828
-
1829
- ## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026
1830
-
1831
- ### Database Naming Conventions
1832
-
1833
- - Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`
1834
- - Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency
1835
- - Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard
1836
-
1837
- ### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix
1838
-
1839
- - Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import
1840
- - Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes
1036
+ See [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).
1841
1037
 
1842
1038
  ---
1843
1039
 
1844
1040
  ## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026
1845
1041
 
1846
- ### Better Auth Plugins
1042
+ ### OpenAPI spec generation
1847
1043
 
1848
- - Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` v1.1.0 — post-passkey email collection flow
1849
- - Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication
1850
- - Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth
1044
+ Generated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.
1851
1045
 
1852
- ### OpenAPI Spec Generation
1046
+ ### Better Auth plugins
1853
1047
 
1854
- - Generated APIs now include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`
1855
- - Better Auth endpoints included in the spec
1856
- - Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`
1048
+ Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).
1857
1049
 
1858
- ### Security Hardening
1050
+ ### Security headers
1859
1051
 
1860
- - Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details
1861
- - Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
1862
- - `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config
1052
+ Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.
1863
1053
 
1864
1054
  ---
1865
1055
 
@@ -1867,34 +1057,28 @@ GET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent
1867
1057
 
1868
1058
  ### Account UI
1869
1059
 
1870
- - Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers
1871
- - Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys
1872
- - Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects
1060
+ Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.
1873
1061
 
1874
- ### Webhook System
1062
+ ### Webhook system
1875
1063
 
1876
- - Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification
1877
- - Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries
1878
- - Configurable per-feature webhook events
1064
+ Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.
1879
1065
 
1880
- ### Realtime & Vector Search
1066
+ ### Realtime & vector search
1881
1067
 
1882
- - Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions
1883
- - Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize
1884
- - KV and R2 storage integrations
1068
+ Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.
1885
1069
 
1886
1070
  ---
1887
1071
 
1888
1072
  ## v0.5.0 — January 2026
1889
1073
 
1890
- ### Initial Release
1891
-
1892
- - **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler
1893
- - **Four Security Pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking
1894
- - **`defineTable()`** — Schema + security configuration in a single file
1895
- - **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, Bun standalone, B2B SaaS
1896
- - **Cloud Compiler** — Remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`
1897
- - **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`, `quickback init`
1898
- - **Better Auth Integration** — Organizations, roles, sessions
1899
- - **Drizzle ORM** — Schema-first with automatic migrations
1900
- - **Cloudflare D1** — Split database support (auth + features)
1074
+ ### Initial release
1075
+
1076
+ - **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.
1077
+ - **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.
1078
+ - **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.
1079
+ - **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.
1080
+ - **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.
1081
+ - **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.
1082
+ - **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.
1083
+ - **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.
1084
+ - **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features).