@quickback-dev/cli 0.17.1 → 0.18.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/docs/content.js +7 -7
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +398 -1214
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +54 -33
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/index.md +9 -9
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare.md +49 -54
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/templates.md +58 -56
- package/dist/skill/docs/index.md +9 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/index.md +8 -4
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +459 -1215
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +54 -33
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/index.md +9 -9
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/domains.md +44 -10
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/output.md +1 -1
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare.md +49 -54
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/templates.md +58 -56
- package/src/skill/docs/index.md +9 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/index.md +74 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/index.md +8 -4
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@@ -4,105 +4,109 @@ Release notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.
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## v0.
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## v0.17.1 — May 14, 2026
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### `quickback start` — interactive onboarding
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```bash
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mkdir my-app && cd my-app
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npx @quickback-dev/cli start
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```
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`start` walks new users through template selection, scaffolds the project on disk, and only prompts for an account when it's ready to compile. Cancelling at the login prompt leaves the scaffold intact — sign in and run `quickback compile` whenever you're ready.
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The same deferred-auth flow applies to `quickback create`. Scaffolding and (optional) Cloudflare D1 setup run before authentication, so you can preview the project on disk before committing to an account.
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### Named views on the free tier
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The `todos` template now ships a `dashboard` named view, exposing a projected response at `GET /api/v1/todos/views/dashboard`. Named views support per-view access rules and per-view field selection while inheriting the table's firewall and masking — the canonical way to ship list-view payloads that are cheaper to fetch and easier to cache than a full collection read.
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- **Drop-only cleanup migrations** are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it.
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- **Every generated D1 migration directory** is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails before `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.
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### `quickback init` removed
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Folded into `start` and `create`. The legacy command name prints a deprecation notice pointing at its replacements.
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### Minor
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- `quickback whoami` reads the stored tier from your credentials.
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- Pro upsell copy in `quickback login` is shown only when the server returns an explicit free-tier subscription.
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- Bare scaffolds (`cloudflare`, `empty`) report accurately when there are no features to generate migrations for.
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---
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## v0.16.
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## v0.16.10 — May 14, 2026
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### D1-specific safety pass on generated migrations
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The `cloudflare-d1` provider now runs a post-generation pass over every Drizzle migration directory (auth, features, webhooks, audit) before the compile finishes. Better Auth cleanup for retired managed tables is stripped from raw `DROP TABLE` statements. Drop-only cleanup migrations are reordered child-first when foreign-key dependencies require it. Every generated D1 migration directory is replayed against SQLite during compile, so a D1-breaking migration fails at compile time rather than at `wrangler d1 migrations apply`.
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---
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## v0.16.9 — May 13, 2026
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### Resource-scoped realtime tickets
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`providers.database.config.realtime` accepts an object form for projects whose WebSocket subscribers aren't org members:
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```ts
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scopeTable: "events",
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realtime: {
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wsTicket: {
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role: "attendee",
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requestField: "eventId",
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scopeTable: "events",
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},
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```
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The generated `/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` route authenticates the caller, evaluates the declared relationship role against the request, and mints a short-lived WebSocket ticket scoped to the resolved resource. `realtime: true` continues to enable the org-scoped broadcaster.
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### Unified broadcast targeting
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await realtime.broadcast("event-page-updated", payload, {
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scopeKey: "events:evt_123",
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});
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The realtime helper and Broadcaster now route by `scopeKey || organizationId || userId`. String targets remain shorthand for `organizationId`; explicit targets can scope a broadcast to a resource or a single user:
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```ts
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await realtime.broadcast("event-page-updated", payload, { scopeKey: "events:evt_123" });
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await realtime.broadcast("dm", payload, { userId: recipientId });
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```
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Pinned by `realtime-ws-ticket-scope.test.ts`, plus the existing realtime routing and relationship-access regression suites.
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WebSocket tickets are Quickback-minted (signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`), not Better Auth tokens — Better Auth remains the front-door auth check; Quickback signs the upgrade ticket after authorization succeeds.
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## v0.16.8 — May 13, 2026
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### One auth transport per request
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Generated middleware treats `Cookie`, `Authorization: Bearer`, and `x-api-key` as distinct auth methods and rejects mixed requests with `400 AUTH_METHOD_CONFLICT`. Query-string API keys (`?api_key=` / `?key=`) are no longer accepted. Machine-to-machine auth is explicit; precedence rules between transports are gone.
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### Cookie-backed CSRF gate
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Generated apps now block cross-site `POST` / `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` requests from cookie-relying callers. The middleware skips explicit `Authorization` clients, requires a trusted `Origin` or `Referer`, and blocks `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. This matters most for cross-subdomain session setups where `SameSite=None` is intentional.
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### First-class Wrangler observability
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`providers.runtime.config.observability` now supports nested `logs` / `traces` blocks for `headSamplingRate`, `destinations`, `persist`, and `logs.invocationLogs`, emitting matching `[observability]`, `[observability.logs]`, and `[observability.traces]` TOML.
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## v0.16.7 — May 12, 2026
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### Bearer wins over cookie
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Two hardenings to the auth middleware closing a mixed-credential ambiguity and a session-token replay path.
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### Bearer wins over cookie
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A request carrying both `Authorization` and a session `Cookie` resolves entirely from the bearer; the cookie is dropped before `getSession()` runs. All three Bearer flavors (API key, JWT, session-token) now behave consistently — no more silent cookie precedence on session-token bearers.
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### Bearer plugin defaults to `requireSignature: true`
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Better Auth's `bearer` plugin defaults to unsigned tokens; Quickback now emits `bearer({ requireSignature: true })`. Tokens emitted in the CORS-exposed `set-auth-token` header are server-signed with `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and verified on every request. Projects that genuinely need unsigned bearers can override via `providers.auth.config.plugins.bearer`.
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See [Authentication Security → Bearer Tokens and Cookie Precedence](/stack/auth/security#bearer-tokens-and-cookie-precedence).
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## v0.16.5 — May 12, 2026
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### Flat write DSL
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Quickback's resource DSL had drifted into an awkward split: reads already lived under `read`, while writes still sat under a nested `crud` block that no longer represented the full CRUD surface. That shape was technically supported, but it was teaching the wrong mental model.
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### Flat write DSL
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Resource write operations are now declared at the table level alongside `read`, replacing the nested `crud` block:
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```ts
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defineTable(customers, {
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```
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`crud` and top-level `put` still compile
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`crud` and top-level `put` still compile as deprecated compatibility aliases. Mixed usage on the same resource is rejected. `schema-registry.json` emits both shapes during the transition.
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### CMS
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### CMS placement for multi-table feature actions
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Standalone actions
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Standalone actions on multi-table features have an explicit placement model:
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- `cms.placement: "feature"` shows the standalone action in the table toolbar for every table in the feature
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- `cms.placement: "feature"` shows the action on every table toolbar in the feature
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- `cms.placement: "tables"` with `cms.tables` scopes it to specific tables
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### `openapi.types` can now keep colocated SPA clients in sync from a single compile
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Feature-root standalone actions are emitted under a new `featureActions` bucket in `schema-registry.json`. Ambiguous multi-table standalone actions without placement compile with a warning.
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### `openapi.types` accepts a string array
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One compile can write the generated types file to multiple locations, keeping colocated SPA clients in sync:
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```ts
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openapi: {
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types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'],
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}
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openapi: { types: ['api-types.gen.ts', 'apps/web/src/lib/api-types.gen.ts'] }
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```
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### Stable artifact ordering
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Generated route files and `schema-registry.json` are emitted in a stable order across runs. Identical logical input produces identical artifacts.
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The compiler now normalizes discovery order before it builds action bundles, route files, and the schema registry. Identical logical input produces stable emitted artifacts, which means fewer no-op diffs after a recompile and cleaner review when something actually changed.
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## v0.16.4 — May 12, 2026
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###
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The v0.16.3 release stamped a `$$__quickback_warning__$$` key onto every drizzle metadata JSON file under `quickback/drizzle/<dialect>/meta/` — both `_journal.json` and each `<n>_snapshot.json`. The original change description noted that drizzle-kit "ignores unknown top-level fields when reading journals/snapshots" — but that's only true for journals. Snapshots are parsed by a strict Zod schema that rejects extras, so on every compile after the upgrade, drizzle-kit logged each `<n>_snapshot.json` as `"data is malformed"`, lost its diff base, and silently emitted no migration on schema changes. Users hand-wrote migrations (e.g. `0033`) to compensate. Reproduced against `examples/recruitment` by adding a column to `candidates` — the recruit tree's 8 snapshots all came back malformed and zero migrations were generated.
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### Drizzle snapshot integrity
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Drizzle metadata files (`<n>_snapshot.json`) are no longer stamped with a Quickback warning key. The warning is now journal-only. Projects whose snapshots were corrupted by an earlier release self-heal on the next compile — the stripped header is removed during staging and the rewritten snapshot is clean.
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### `account.auth.*` drives the server, not just the SPA
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The Account UI's auth flags (`signup`, `password`, `passkey`, `emailOTP`, `emailVerification`) now configure the Better Auth server alongside the SPA bundle. A normalizer maps them into the server config:
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- `signup → emailAndPassword.disableSignUp` (inverted)
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- `password → emailAndPassword.enabled`
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- `emailVerification → emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification`
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- `passkey` / `emailOTP` → plugin additions
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The SPA's `VITE_ENABLE_*` flags are derived from the same canonicalized server config, so the bundle and the server cannot drift. Two new flags ride along: `VITE_ENABLE_API_KEYS` and `VITE_ENABLE_MAGIC_LINK`.
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**Breaking** for anyone who was implicitly relying on the open signup endpoint: projects that set `account.auth.signup: false` but actually wanted server signup to remain open must now explicitly set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` (and accept the risk). Same migration path for `emailVerification` (now actually enforced server-side when set) and the plugin flags. Loop's existing config requires no change — the next recompile + deploy starts returning `403` on `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email`, which is exactly what the config has been claiming since the field was added.
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Pinned by `account-auth-normalize.test.ts` (19 unit tests covering the normalizer + flag resolver + contradiction detection on both array- and object-form plugins) and `loop-pentest-regression.test.ts` (compiles a trimmed Loop config and asserts the generated `auth.ts` carries `disableSignUp: true`).
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**Breaking** for projects that implicitly relied on the SPA-only behaviour: `account.auth.signup: false` now actually disables `POST /auth/v1/sign-up/email` on the server. Set `providers.auth.config.emailAndPassword.disableSignUp: false` explicitly to keep server signup open while hiding the SPA screen.
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### Standalone action mount order
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This is a routing-correctness fix, not a public API redesign. No user code changes are required, and existing standalone action paths do not need to be renamed. Recompile and shared-prefix standalone routes resolve correctly.
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Feature-level standalone action routers now register before sibling CRUD routers when both mount at the exact same prefix. A literal path like `GET /api/v1/records/today-bundle` resolves to the standalone handler instead of falling through to `GET /:id` and treating `"today-bundle"` as a record ID.
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## v0.16.1 — May 9, 2026
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The compiler had the same bug baked into every emit point. `cloudflare.ts` now fetches `/<dir>/` everywhere it previously asked for `/<dir>/index.html`: CMS hostname middleware, `/cms/*` SPA catchall, apex `/` handler, account/admin hostname middleware, `/account/*` SPA catchall, and the multi-domain catchall. Eight regression tests in `cf-assets-canonicalization-spa-fallback.test.ts` pin every emit so a future copy/paste can't sneak the literal back in.
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A new `account: { customLogin: true }` flag emits an explicit `app.get('/account/login', …)` route that serves a project-supplied static page instead of letting the bundled Account SPA's client router handle the path. Drop the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (a *directory*, not a bare `login.html` — see the canonicalization note above) and the existing `quickback/public/` passthrough copies it into the asset binding. The route is registered before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/...` (profile, organizations, devices, …) keeps going through the React SPA. Same surface AttendVIP was hand-patching post-compile — promoting the flag means the next compile no longer wipes their override. Default `false`.
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### Project-level realtime auto-broadcasts every resource by default
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### Cloudflare ASSETS canonicalization
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Worker SPA fallbacks now request `/<dir>/` instead of `/<dir>/index.html`. Cloudflare's static-assets binding rewrites `/index.html` requests as 307 redirects to the trailing-slash path under the default `html_handling=auto-trailing-slash`, which previously caused redirect loops in SPA fallback handlers. Affects CMS, Account, admin, and the multi-domain catchall.
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### `account.customLogin`
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Set `account: { customLogin: true }` to drop a project-branded sign-in page in front of the bundled SPA. Place the page at `quickback/public/account/login/index.html` (as a directory) and the existing public passthrough serves it. The route registers before the `/account/*` SPA catch-all so the static handler wins; everything else under `/account/` continues to route through the bundled SPA.
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### Project-level realtime defaults
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`providers.database.config.realtime: true` now treats every resource as realtime-enabled by default. Per-resource `realtime: { enabled: false }` still wins.
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###
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### Compile-time validators
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Two new compile-time errors over silent runtime failures:
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- `AUTHENTICATED` + org-scoped firewall is rejected. The combination silently returned empty lists to sign-in-only callers who lacked an active org; the validator names three valid resolutions (drop the org scope, use `USER`, or split the route).
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- `createRealtime` imports without `realtime: true` enabled in the config are rejected at compile.
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###
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### Drizzle metadata hardening
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Drizzle journal files carry a "do not edit" header. The compiler warns when the journal entry count exceeds the snapshot file count (typically the trace of a hand-deleted snapshot).
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### Minor
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Test coverage: 1175 → 1183 (+8 across the canonicalization, customLogin, and createRealtime regression files). Verified end-to-end against AttendVIP — `quickback compile` produces a worker whose `/account/login`, hostname-routed account/admin SPAs, and apex / handler all return 200 with the right SPA shell on the deployed Cloudflare worker, no 307 loops.
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The bundled docs (`packages/claude-skill/docs/changelog.md`, `packages/cli/src/skill/docs/changelog.md`) and the CLI's `packages/cli/src/docs/content.ts` are regenerated by `scripts/bundle-docs.ts` — run that before publishing the CLI bump.
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- `SYSADMIN` is now recognised by the standalone-action org gate's pseudo-role matcher.
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- Apex `/` and `/account/login` get fallback redirects to `auth.loginUrl` when neither bundled SPA is enabled.
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- Record-based action URLs are kebab-case to match the OpenAPI spec (e.g. `/api/v1/widgets/:id/send-invite`).
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---
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## v0.16.0 — May 9, 2026
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### Agent Auth Protocol
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Quickback now ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) by way of `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Opt in with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` (or the array form `plugins: ["agentAuth"]`). When enabled, the compiler emits a complete agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables (`agent`, `agentHost`, `agentCapabilityGrant`, `approvalRequest`) added to the auth schema automatically by `auth generate`.
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**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** The compiler emits `src/lib/openapi-spec.ts` (the project's full OpenAPI spec inlined as a const) and wires `createFromOpenAPI(openapiSpec, { ... })` into the `agentAuth(...)` call. Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → "session"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → "webauthn"`. Default `defaultHostCapabilities`: `["GET", "HEAD"]`.
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### Agent Auth Protocol
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Quickback ships a server implementation of the [Agent Auth Protocol](https://agentauthprotocol.com) via `@better-auth/agent-auth`. Enable with `auth.plugins.agentAuth: true` and the compiler emits the full agent-auth surface: discovery at `/.well-known/agent-configuration`, capability projection from the project's OpenAPI spec, a device-authorization approval page in the Account SPA at `/agents/approve`, and the four agent-auth tables added to the auth schema automatically.
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**OpenAPI capability projection runs by default.** Every operation with an `operationId` becomes an agent capability. Default `approvalStrength` map: `GET → "session"`, `POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → "webauthn"`. The proxy `onExecute` makes a self-fetch with a Better Auth JWT minted for the agent session, so the inner request hits the existing JWT fast-path and runs the full firewall + access + masking pipeline. Opt out of OpenAPI projection with `agentAuth: { fromOpenAPI: false }` and wire `capabilities` + `onExecute` by hand.
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`/mcp`
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`/mcp` forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …` into the inner request. Cookie and `x-api-key` forwarding are removed. Three Bearer flavors land on the same header — Better Auth session token (via the `bearer` plugin), OAuth access token (via OAuth Provider), and agent JWT (via `@better-auth/agent-auth`).
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- Agent JWT via `@better-auth/agent-auth`
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### Auth DSL gains first-class plugin entries
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`bearer`, `oauthProvider`, and `agentAuth` are now typed entries in both the array-form union and the `BetterAuthPlugins` interface, with their own options shapes (`OAuthProviderOptions`, `AgentAuthOptions`). Existing `as any` casts can come out.
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Auto-enable rule: turning on `agentAuth` force-adds `bearer` + `oauthProvider`. No useful agent-auth deployment ships without those two.
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### `queue-consumer.ts` gating
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### `queue-consumer.ts` now emitted for `additionalQueues` too
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Prior to this release, the queue consumer emit gated on `embeddingFeatures.length > 0 || queueHandlers.length > 0`. Projects that declared queue infrastructure via `dbConfig.additionalQueues` but had no embeddings + no `services/queues/*` handlers shipped a `wrangler.toml` with `[[queues.consumers]]` entries pointing at a missing worker `queue` export. The CLI's archive-restore step kept a stale `queue-consumer.ts` around, so the file appeared "stuck" across compiles — same class of bug as the v0.15.0 services/queues/* regression caught against AttendVIP, just one source removed.
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The gate is now a three-way OR: `hasEmbeddings || hasQueueHandlers || hasAdditionalQueues`. When only `additionalQueues` is set, the compiler emits a stub `queue-consumer.ts` whose `queue` export acks every message with a warning — Cloudflare needs an export for every consumer binding, and a noisy-but-correct stub beats a silent deploy break. `MainAppOptions` and `CloudflareMainAppOptions` gain `hasAdditionalQueues`; `generateQueueImport` and `generateCloudflareExport` mirror the new gate. Regression test: `src/__tests__/queue-additional-queues-gate.test.ts`.
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### Fixes
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**1. `bearer` was missing from the `BetterAuthPlugins` TypeScript interface.** The runtime plugin registry has had `bearer` since the pre-1.0 cuts, but `apps/compiler/src/define/auth.ts` never declared it on the typed shape — so any `quickback.config.ts` using `plugins: { bearer: true }` had to `as any`-cast or sit behind a `@ts-expect-error`. Both `bearer` and `oauthProvider` (same gap, same workaround) are now first-class typed entries; `agentAuth` joins them. The array-form union also gains all three. No behavior change at runtime; existing casts can come out.
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**2. MCP `buildInternalRequest` no longer forwards Cookie or `x-api-key`.** The MCP surface is server-to-server — there are no browser callers, no CSRF surface to defend, and no benefit to fragmenting the auth model across three header conventions. The inner `app.request()` re-entry now forwards only `Authorization: Bearer …`. Three Bearer flavors all land on the same header (BA session token via the `bearer` plugin, OAuth access token via OAuth Provider, agent JWT via `@better-auth/agent-auth`). Existing `mcp-server.test.ts` regression flipped from "forwards Cookie + x-api-key" to "forwards only Authorization (bearer-only surface)".
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**3. `agentAuth` now auto-enables `bearer` + `oauthProvider`.** There is no useful agent-auth deployment without those two — the agent surface is bearer-only and MCP clients need OAuth to register. Auto-enable lives in the canonical `computeAutoAddedPlugins` (`generators/auth.ts`), so it propagates to every consumer (better-auth generator, schema generation, package-deps emission). Same pattern as the existing `oauthProvider` → `jwt` rule. Surfaced in `agent-auth.test.ts` with a regression seal that asserts both plugins land in the merged plugin list whether the user wrote the array form or the object form.
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**4. `OpenAPISpec` literal type rejected by tsc on inlined spec.** Quickback's OpenAPI emit produces `$ref`-style parameter entries (`{ "$ref": "#/components/parameters/X" }`) that the agent-auth plugin's stricter `OpenAPIParameter` type doesn't model — `tsc` fails the generated project with "Type … is not assignable to OpenAPIParameter". The plugin handles refs correctly at runtime; only the structural narrowing on the TS literal needed help. The generated `agentAuth({ ...createFromOpenAPI(openapiSpec as any, { ... }) })` call now carries an `as any` cast on the spec with an inline comment explaining why. Drop when upstream models `$ref` parameters.
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### Notes
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`@better-auth/agent-auth` 0.4.5 ships ESM-only exports without a `require` condition, so the Better Auth CLI's `auth generate` step (jiti / CJS resolver) bails with `ERR_PACKAGE_PATH_NOT_EXPORTED`. The compiler image patches the package's `package.json` at install time to add a matching `require` condition pointing at the same dist file (Node 22+ supports `require(esm)`). Remove the patch in `apps/compiler/Dockerfile` when upstream ships proper exports.
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Test coverage: 1136 → 1152 (+11 `agent-auth.test.ts`, +5 `queue-additional-queues-gate.test.ts`). Verified end-to-end against `examples/recruitment` with `agentAuth` enabled — `quickback compile` produces a project whose `npm run build` typechecks clean and whose generated schema includes all four agent-auth tables (`agent`, `agentHost`, `agentCapabilityGrant`, `approvalRequest`).
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+
The queue consumer is emitted when any of the following are true: embeddings are configured, queue handlers exist under `services/queues/*`, or `additionalQueues` is declared. Previously the third case left projects with a wrangler binding pointing at a missing handler.
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---
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## v0.15.0 — May 7, 2026
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### Sysadmin tier
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A new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a Supabase-style cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from `'admin'` so Better Auth admin-plugin powers (user management, impersonation) and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default — projects without the feature get zero behavior change.
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### Sysadmin tier for the CMS
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A new opt-in `cms: { sysadmin: true }` flag turns the CMS into a cross-tenant DB-admin tool gated by `user.role === 'sysadmin'`. Distinct from the Better Auth `'admin'` plugin role, so user-management powers and DB-admin powers stay decoupled. Off by default.
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When enabled, the compiler emits a `SYSADMIN` pseudo-role (a fifth marker alongside `PUBLIC` / `AUTHENTICATED` / `USER` / `ADMIN`), a firewall escape hatch that drops tenant scopes for sysadmins while preserving soft-delete, a true cross-tenant `/admin/v1/sysadmin/organizations` endpoint, and a relaxed cross-tenant guard for list routes.
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The CMS SPA gains a two-mode design: org admins keep the existing membership-based switcher, sysadmins get an "All organizations" selector that pins tenants via `?organizationId=` on every API call.
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### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is
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### Durable Object `[[migrations]]` order is preserved
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Cloudflare's migration
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Cloudflare's migration list is append-only. The compiler now reads your existing `wrangler.toml` (when present) and emits auto-generated DO `[[migrations]]` blocks in two phases: deployed entries first (preserving order), net-new entries appended last. Reordering DOs in the config array no longer reshuffles deployed migrations.
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### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough
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Anything dropped under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile and served by the wrangler `[assets]` binding. Use for favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, `.well-known/` files, marketing PDFs — anything that needs to ride past the compiler as bytes.
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- Optional. Missing folder is a no-op.
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- Stale-cleaned. Files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear on the next compile.
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- Hidden entries (`.DS_Store`, dotfiles) are skipped.
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- Collisions with compiler-emitted manifest paths fail the compile loudly.
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###
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### Minor
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### `quickback/public/` — static-asset passthrough into `src/apps/`
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A new opt-in folder. Anything you drop under `quickback/public/` is copied verbatim into `src/apps/` on every compile, where the wrangler `[assets]` binding (`directory = "src/apps"`) already serves it. So `quickback/public/robots.txt` becomes reachable at `https://your-domain/robots.txt`, `quickback/public/og/og-image.png` at `/og/og-image.png`, and so on. Favicons, `robots.txt`, OG images, marketing PDFs, sitemap fragments, `.well-known/` files — anything you'd previously have had to post-process into `src/apps/` after each compile.
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The compiler does **not** parse, template, or otherwise touch these files. They ride past it as bytes — the CLI does the copy after `writeFilesWithMerge`, using `fs.copyFile` so binaries (PNGs, fonts, PDFs) stay byte-perfect rather than being corrupted by the utf-8 string channel the compiler manifest uses for source files. The compiler API contract is unchanged; nothing round-trips through `compile.quickback.dev`.
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Rules:
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- **Optional.** If the folder doesn't exist, the step is a no-op.
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- **Stale-cleaned.** `src/` is wiped and rewritten each compile, so files removed from `quickback/public/` disappear from `src/apps/` automatically on the next run.
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- **Hidden entries skipped.** `.DS_Store`, `.git/`, dotfiles — none of these were intentional drops; including them would break worker asset bindings.
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- **Collisions fail loud.** A file in `quickback/public/` whose path would shadow a compiler-emitted manifest entry — e.g. `quickback/public/cms/index.html` against the SPA shell — fails the compile with the offending paths listed, rather than silently overwriting and producing a confused-looking SPA build. Move or rename the offending file.
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The change is contained to the CLI: `packages/cli/src/lib/copy-public-assets.ts` (helper + `PublicAssetCollisionError`) and one block in `packages/cli/src/commands/compile.ts`. Test coverage in `copy-public-assets.test.ts` walks the missing-folder, single-file, nested-tree, binary-preservation, hidden-entry, single-collision, multi-collision, empty-folder, and split-output cases — nine tests, byte-level assertions on the binary path.
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- Standalone-action wrapper skips the org gate when the access tree references any pseudo-role.
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- Queue handler emit no longer drops the `queue` export when there are no embeddings.
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---
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## v0.14.7 — May 7, 2026
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###
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-
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Filed after AttendVIP's `tsc` reported 230 errors against the generated `src/`. Triage split them into six patterns; four are surgical and ship here. The other two (TS2769 ×156 + TS2339 ×~50) trace to a deeper assumption — every queryable table has a string-typed `id` column — and are deferred to v0.14.8 along with the agreed `id` auto-inject design (see *Coming next* below).
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**1. Duplicate `guests` import in routes that use relationship-roles (`TS2300`).** The relationship-import injector (`generators/feature-generator.ts`) added `import { <table>, buildFirewallConditions as build<Table>FirewallConditions } from './<table>.resource'` whenever it detected a relationship-table reference in the routes file — without checking that the table binding was already imported from `./schema` upstream. So `guests.routes.ts` ended up with `guests` declared twice. Fix: scan the existing import block, only add identifiers that aren't already in scope (drop the binding from the new import line, or skip the line entirely if both binding and alias are imported).
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**2. `db` referenced before declaration in single-record + bulk action handlers (`TS2448` / `TS2304`).** `record-based.ts:195,541` baked `firewallClause = ...buildFirewallConditions(ctx, db)...` and used the same string in two places: (a) the outer pre-fetch `await unsafeDb.select().from(table).where(firewallClause)` — where `db` doesn't exist yet (`db = createScopedDb(unsafeDb, ctx)` is declared later for handler scope), and (b) inside `processBatch` where `db` is created from the tx/handle param. The outer use threw at typecheck (`'db' is used before its declaration`); at runtime it would have been a `ReferenceError`. Fix: pass `unsafeDb` (the in-scope handle) to `buildFirewallConditions` in both `firewallClause` definitions. The helper only uses its `db` arg for relationship-role subqueries (when `via:` is in play); either handle is a valid Drizzle client for that lookup.
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**3. PartyServer realtime gates passed 1 arg to a 2-arg `buildFirewall_X` (`TS2554`).** `optional-routes.ts` emitted `buildFirewall_<feature>(ctx as any)` in the WebSocket-upgrade gate for every Durable Object that declared `access: { resource }`. After v0.14.4 made `buildFirewallConditions(ctx, db)` 2-arg whenever the resource has any `via:` predicate, this gate stopped compiling for any DO whose target feature uses relationship-roles. AttendVIP's `event-pages` DO sits on `event_pages` (admin via `guestOf`), which is exactly that case. Fix: the gate already constructs `db = drizzle(c.env.<binding>)` for its own `db.select(...).limit(1)` — pass that same `db` into the firewall call. Mirrored in both the single-resource and multi-resource gate branches.
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**4. Durable-object-only features dropped their `lib/` files from output (`TS2307`).** `compiler.ts:546` only ran the feature-walker (and copied `featureLibFiles` to output) when the feature had at least one action file. AttendVIP's `user-profiles/` declares a single DO source under `lib/UserGateway.ts` and zero `actions/` — perfectly valid (per-user realtime gateway, the Slack/Linear pattern), but the walker skipped the feature entirely. The compile finished without error, then `index.ts` tried to import `./features/user-profiles/lib/UserGateway` and `tsc` 404'd the module. `event-pages/PageRoom.ts` worked only because that feature happens to also have `actions/`. Fix: run the discovery + lib-copy path whenever the feature has either actions OR lib files. Copying `lib/` files when the feature has at least one of either is the safe reading of the original intent.
|
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266
|
+
### Codegen fixes for projects with non-`id` primary keys and DO-only features
|
|
342
267
|
|
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343
|
-
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|
268
|
+
Four surgical fixes to the generated output:
|
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344
269
|
|
|
345
|
-
|
|
270
|
+
- Duplicate table imports in relationship-role routes are deduplicated.
|
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271
|
+
- `db` references in single-record and bulk action handlers now resolve correctly during pre-fetch.
|
|
272
|
+
- PartyServer auth gates pass the in-scope `db` handle into firewall calls.
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273
|
+
- Durable-object-only features keep their `lib/` files in the output.
|
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346
274
|
|
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347
|
-
|
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275
|
+
### `emailOtp` + AWS SES is OTP-only
|
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348
276
|
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349
|
-
|
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350
|
-
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351
|
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1. **Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the OTP before the human sees the email.** Outlook Safe Links, Gmail mobile, corporate proxies, and security scanners all eagerly fetch URLs in incoming mail; the magic link's `?data=...` payload includes the OTP server-side, so the first GET completes the sign-in (consuming the one-time code) and the user clicking through 30 seconds later gets a "code already used" failure.
|
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352
|
-
2. **Two sign-in surfaces are harder to support.** The account SPA's `/welcome` and `/email-otp` routes only render the OTP form; the magic-link arm bypasses that UI entirely. One canonical entry point (enter the code) keeps the account flow legible.
|
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353
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-
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354
|
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The compiler now emits a plain `sendVerificationOTP` callback that calls `sendEmailWithSES` with `emailTemplates.emailOTP` directly — no combo wrapper, no magic-link URL. `useComboAuthEmail` is hardcoded to `false`. The `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` package and the `magicLink` plugin are still available for users who explicitly opt in via a custom `sendVerificationOTP` in their config; the change here is just the auto-wired default.
|
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355
|
-
|
|
356
|
-
Test coverage: `auth-email-wiring.test.ts` was updated to assert the new shape — generated auth files for `emailOtp + aws-ses` now contain `emailTemplates.emailOTP` and `useComboAuthEmail: false`, and explicitly do not contain `createComboAuthSendVerificationOTP` or `better-auth-combo-auth`.
|
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357
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-
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358
|
-
### Coming next — `id` field auto-injection (v0.14.8)
|
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359
|
-
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360
|
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The compiler treats `id` as load-bearing across CRUD/action route generators, FK probing, access checks, OpenAPI emission, and CMS — but doesn't add it for you the way it adds `createdAt`/`modifiedAt`/`createdBy`/`modifiedBy` (or `organizationId` in org-scoped features, or `deletedAt`/`deletedBy` for soft-delete tables). At the time of v0.14.7, tables that omitted `id` (or used a non-`id` single PK like `userId.primaryKey()`, or a compound `primaryKey({ columns: [...] })` constraint) were not yet supported by the generated route and OpenAPI pipeline.
|
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361
|
-
|
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362
|
-
**Agreed direction:** mirror `injectAuditFields` with a new `injectIdField` that runs unconditionally — including on junction tables. Tables with no PK or a non-`id` PK get an `id` column auto-injected; existing column-level `.primaryKey()` on a non-`id` column gets demoted to `.notNull()`; `primaryKey({ columns: [...] })` constraints get rewritten to `uniqueIndex().on(...)`. The cost (one extra column per junction row) is minimal and closes the asymmetry — every table participating in routes gets a single string-typed `id`, just like every table gets `createdAt`. Migration tail (existing D1 databases need an ADD COLUMN + index rewrite per affected table) is generated alongside.
|
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363
|
-
|
|
364
|
-
No user code changes required for the four fixes shipping in v0.14.7. Recompile and the affected features typecheck.
|
|
277
|
+
`auth.emailOtp` with the AWS SES email provider no longer auto-wires the magic-link companion. Mail-client URL prefetching can burn the one-time code before the human sees it; the Account SPA's `/email-otp` route is the single canonical entry point. Projects that explicitly want the magic-link arm can wire `sendVerificationOTP` directly.
|
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365
278
|
|
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366
279
|
---
|
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367
280
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|
## v0.14.6 — May 7, 2026
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282
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370
|
-
###
|
|
371
|
-
|
|
372
|
-
Filed in `research/attendvip-v014-mcp-and-firewall-gaps.md` after AttendVIP patched these locally and asked us to upstream them. All four ride a single MCP `tools/call` against a team-scoped resource over a Bearer api-key — fix any one and the next bug surfaces. We're shipping them as one patch release with end-to-end coverage of the chain.
|
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373
|
-
|
|
374
|
-
**1. MCP `tools/call` URL is double-prefixed for action tools.** The OpenAPI spec emits action paths as `/api/v1/<action>` already-absolute, but the MCP request builder did `'/api/v1' + tool._path` unconditionally — so action tool calls hit `/api/v1/api/v1/<action>` and 404'd. CRUD tools (bare `_path: '/customers'`) were unaffected. Fix: prefix only when `_path` doesn't already start with `/api/v1/`.
|
|
283
|
+
### MCP transport correctness
|
|
375
284
|
|
|
376
|
-
|
|
285
|
+
Four fixes to the MCP-over-HTTP path:
|
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377
286
|
|
|
378
|
-
|
|
379
|
-
|
|
380
|
-
|
|
381
|
-
|
|
382
|
-
After upstreaming, the AttendVIP one-shot verification passes:
|
|
383
|
-
|
|
384
|
-
```bash
|
|
385
|
-
curl -fs -X POST https://attend.vip/mcp \
|
|
386
|
-
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
|
387
|
-
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"listEvents","arguments":{}}}' \
|
|
388
|
-
| jq '.result.content[0].text | fromjson | .data | length' # > 0
|
|
389
|
-
```
|
|
390
|
-
|
|
391
|
-
No user code changes required for any of the four. Recompile and the MCP path works end-to-end against team-scoped, role-gated resources via Bearer api-key.
|
|
287
|
+
- `tools/call` URLs are no longer double-prefixed for action tools.
|
|
288
|
+
- Auth middleware accepts API keys via `Authorization: Bearer` in addition to `x-api-key` and query parameters — the channel MCP clients use exclusively.
|
|
289
|
+
- `auth.roleHierarchy` is expanded for runtime role checks across api-key, JWT, and session auth paths. A higher role inherits the privileges of every lower role.
|
|
290
|
+
- Team-scoped firewall predicates degrade gracefully when no team is active (org scoping continues to apply; team scoping is optional).
|
|
392
291
|
|
|
393
292
|
---
|
|
394
293
|
|
|
395
294
|
## v0.14.5 — May 7, 2026
|
|
396
295
|
|
|
397
|
-
### MCP
|
|
296
|
+
### MCP environment threading
|
|
398
297
|
|
|
399
|
-
The generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch
|
|
400
|
-
|
|
401
|
-
**Fix:** `mountMcp` now threads `c.env` and `c.executionCtx` through to `handle → handleRpc → callTool → app.request(internalReq, undefined, env, executionCtx)`. Hono's `request()` 3rd/4th args set the bindings + execution context for the sub-request, so the action handler sees the same env the outer worker received. Tools/list was unaffected — it reads ctx in-process and never re-enters the app.
|
|
402
|
-
|
|
403
|
-
No user code changes required. Recompile against v0.14.5 and the MCP endpoint dispatches actions correctly against all bindings.
|
|
298
|
+
The generated MCP server's `tools/call` dispatch threads `env` and `executionCtx` into the inner request, so action tools that touch Cloudflare bindings (D1, KV, R2, Queues) no longer crash with `undefined` env access.
|
|
404
299
|
|
|
405
300
|
---
|
|
406
301
|
|
|
407
302
|
## v0.14.4 — May 7, 2026
|
|
408
303
|
|
|
409
|
-
### `via:` firewall predicates
|
|
410
|
-
|
|
411
|
-
The relationship-role generator (v0.14.0) emits a `buildFirewallConditions` body that references `db`, `inArray`, and `sql` at function scope when any predicate has `via:` — but the resource-file imports it generated only pulled in `eq, and, isNull, type SQL`. So every endpoint guarded by `firewall: [{ field, via }]` threw `ReferenceError: db is not defined` at the very first request, and the catch-all returned 500 before the firewall query ever ran. Found by AttendVIP on `/api/v1/event-pages` against v0.14.3 — none of the v0.14.0 → v0.14.3 unit tests exercised emitted-import resolution, so the bug rode through three patch releases.
|
|
304
|
+
### `via:` firewall predicates pull required imports
|
|
412
305
|
|
|
413
|
-
|
|
414
|
-
|
|
415
|
-
1. **Imports in the generated resource file now include `inArray, sql`** when the firewall has any `via:` predicate. Hidden behind a flag so a no-via resource still gets the minimal import surface.
|
|
416
|
-
2. **`buildFirewallConditions` now takes `(ctx, db)`** and the wrapper template (`WITH_FIREWALL_HELPER`) pulls `const db = c.get('db' as never) as any;` from the Hono context before invoking it. Every CRUD/action call site (single-record + batch + record-based-action) was updated to pass `db` through.
|
|
417
|
-
|
|
418
|
-
Regression test added (`firewall-via-imports.test.ts`) that parses the generated resource file's top-level imports and asserts every free identifier referenced in `buildFirewallConditions` resolves to either an import or a function parameter — so a future generator change that introduces a new free identifier (`exists`, `not`, etc.) without importing it fails the unit suite instead of leaking to a real project.
|
|
419
|
-
|
|
420
|
-
No user code changes required — recompile and `via:` predicates work end-to-end.
|
|
306
|
+
The relationship-role generator emits `inArray` and `sql` imports when the firewall has any `via:` predicate, and `buildFirewallConditions` accepts `(ctx, db)` so the relationship subquery has a Drizzle client to evaluate against. Every CRUD and action call site passes `db` through automatically.
|
|
421
307
|
|
|
422
308
|
---
|
|
423
309
|
|
|
424
310
|
## v0.14.3 — May 7, 2026
|
|
425
311
|
|
|
426
|
-
### Relationship-role
|
|
427
|
-
|
|
428
|
-
Pre-fix, the v0.14.0 relationship-role generator emitted imports like `import { eventGuests, buildFirewallConditions as buildEventGuestsFirewallConditions } from '../event-guests/event-guests.resource'` on every consuming resource — but the relationship-table's own `.resource.ts` file imported `event_guests` from `./schema` for its own use without re-exporting it. So the consuming file got `undefined` at runtime, every relationship subquery failed with `Cannot read properties of undefined`, and the whole authz layer was unreachable on real projects.
|
|
429
|
-
|
|
430
|
-
Found by AttendVIP within minutes of recompiling against v0.14.2: the moment they hit any endpoint guarded by `firewall: [{ field, via }]` or `crud.<op>.access roles: ['guest']`, the request errored before the firewall query ran.
|
|
312
|
+
### Relationship-role table re-exports
|
|
431
313
|
|
|
432
|
-
|
|
433
|
-
|
|
434
|
-
```ts
|
|
435
|
-
// generated <table>.resource.ts (after fix)
|
|
436
|
-
import { event_guests } from './schema';
|
|
437
|
-
export { event_guests }; // ← was missing
|
|
438
|
-
```
|
|
439
|
-
|
|
440
|
-
Regression test added (`authz-end-to-end.test.ts`) that asserts every `.resource` file re-exports its Drizzle binding, so this can't drift again. No user code changes required — recompile and the cross-feature relationship subqueries resolve correctly.
|
|
314
|
+
Generated `<table>.resource.ts` files now re-export their Drizzle table binding. Cross-feature relationship subqueries that import the binding from the resource file (rather than the schema) resolve correctly.
|
|
441
315
|
|
|
442
316
|
---
|
|
443
317
|
|
|
444
318
|
## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026
|
|
445
319
|
|
|
446
|
-
###
|
|
447
|
-
|
|
448
|
-
Cloudflare requires the `[[migrations]]` list in `wrangler.toml` to be **append-only**: once a tag has been deployed, removing it on a subsequent compile causes the next deploy to fail with `Cannot apply <new|deleted|renamed|transferred>-class migration to class <X>` — CF replays the full migrations log on every push and notices the tag is gone.
|
|
449
|
-
|
|
450
|
-
Pre-fix, the compiler regenerated the `[[migrations]]` blocks from scratch on every compile, emitting only entries for the *current* `durableObjects` bindings. Any historical lifecycle events the user had hand-maintained — `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, `transferred_classes` — were silently dropped and the deploy then broke. AttendVIP hit this first: a `qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05` deletion entry got dropped, and the next deploy tried to re-apply `qb-do-Notepad`'s `new_sqlite_classes` against the existing class.
|
|
320
|
+
### Historical DO `[[migrations]]` are preserved
|
|
451
321
|
|
|
452
|
-
|
|
322
|
+
A new `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` config slot carries forward `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, and `transferred_classes` lifecycle entries across recompiles. Cloudflare's migration list is append-only; entries declared here are emitted first in `wrangler.toml`, then auto-generated current-class entries follow:
|
|
453
323
|
|
|
454
324
|
```ts
|
|
455
|
-
// quickback.config.ts
|
|
456
325
|
bindings: {
|
|
457
|
-
durableObjects: [
|
|
458
|
-
{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' },
|
|
459
|
-
],
|
|
326
|
+
durableObjects: [{ name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' }],
|
|
460
327
|
durableObjectMigrations: [
|
|
461
|
-
|
|
462
|
-
{
|
|
463
|
-
tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05',
|
|
464
|
-
deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'],
|
|
465
|
-
},
|
|
328
|
+
{ tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05', deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'] },
|
|
466
329
|
],
|
|
467
330
|
}
|
|
468
331
|
```
|
|
469
332
|
|
|
470
|
-
All four lifecycle shapes are supported
|
|
471
|
-
|
|
472
|
-
This is a config-side fix, not a wrangler.toml-merging one — Quickback doesn't read your existing `wrangler.toml`. The discipline is the same as for any append-only log: declare lifecycle events as you make them. Auto-detection of removed classes from the schema diff is on the roadmap; for now the compiler trusts your declaration.
|
|
473
|
-
|
|
474
|
-
7 new tests covering deletion, rename, transfer, multi-entry ordering, override-via-same-tag, no-history bit-identical output, and the historical-only-no-current-DOs edge case.
|
|
333
|
+
All four lifecycle shapes are supported. User-declared entries can override auto-emit by reusing the same tag.
|
|
475
334
|
|
|
476
335
|
---
|
|
477
336
|
|
|
478
337
|
## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026
|
|
479
338
|
|
|
480
|
-
### Bulk action variants
|
|
481
|
-
|
|
482
|
-
Record-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` (introduced in v0.14.0) generate a working `POST /<base>/batch/<actionName>` route at runtime, but the OpenAPI generator wasn't aware of them — so the bulk endpoints were invisible to typed-client codegen (`api-types.gen.ts`) and to MCP-driven agents discovering operations from the spec. AttendVIP's v0.14.0 rollout (seven actions with `bulkVariant: true`: `approve`, `checkIn`, `checkOut`, `setVisibility`, `cancelInvite`, `sendInvite`, `sessionApprove`) found this within hours of shipping.
|
|
483
|
-
|
|
484
|
-
The OpenAPI generator now emits each bulk variant as a sibling operation to its per-record action, with the documented request shape (`{ ids: string[], input, failFast? }`), correct 200 / 207 / 400 responses, an `x-bulk-variant: true` marker, and a separate `<resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so client codegen can distinguish single from bulk. The fix also threads `bulkVariant` through `getAllActions` so any other downstream consumer of the action registry sees the flag — previously the parser captured it but the spec-emit path silently dropped it.
|
|
339
|
+
### Bulk action variants in `openapi.json`
|
|
485
340
|
|
|
486
|
-
|
|
341
|
+
Record-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` are now emitted as sibling operations in the OpenAPI spec, with the documented `{ ids, input, failFast? }` request shape, 200/207/400 responses, and a separate `<Resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so typed-client codegen distinguishes single from bulk.
|
|
487
342
|
|
|
488
|
-
### Cross-tenant "my events"
|
|
343
|
+
### Cross-tenant "my events" patterns
|
|
489
344
|
|
|
490
|
-
The
|
|
491
|
-
|
|
492
|
-
See [Access → Cross-tenant "my events" dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).
|
|
345
|
+
The access docs now include a worked example for the cross-tenant aggregation pattern (e.g. `GET /my-events` returning resources across all tenants a caller is invited to). See [Access → Cross-tenant dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).
|
|
493
346
|
|
|
494
347
|
---
|
|
495
348
|
|
|
496
349
|
## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026
|
|
497
350
|
|
|
498
|
-
### Relationship-based authorization
|
|
499
|
-
|
|
500
|
-
Quickback's role system now supports a third kind of role beyond Better Auth org membership and the four pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`/`AUTHENTICATED`/`USER`/`ADMIN`): **relationship-roles** that bind to a domain-table membership ("user is a confirmed guest of this event") rather than an org/admin gate. The original ask was a B2B event-management app where logged-in users who aren't team members but ARE confirmed guests of an event need to see that event's sessions, pages, and tracks — same data, different access lane. The old workarounds (function-form access, hand-written actions, `firewall: { exception: true }`) all gave up some combination of OpenAPI/MCP visibility, CRUD code generation, or tenant safety.
|
|
351
|
+
### Relationship-based authorization
|
|
501
352
|
|
|
502
|
-
Declare the relationship once
|
|
353
|
+
Roles can now be bound to a domain-table membership ("user is a confirmed guest of this event") rather than an org membership or a pseudo-role. Declare the relationship once and reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:
|
|
503
354
|
|
|
504
355
|
```ts
|
|
505
|
-
// quickback.config.ts
|
|
506
356
|
authz: {
|
|
507
357
|
relationships: {
|
|
508
358
|
guestOf: {
|
|
509
|
-
from: 'event_guests',
|
|
510
|
-
subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },
|
|
511
|
-
resource: { column: 'eventId' },
|
|
512
|
-
where: { status: 'confirmed' },
|
|
359
|
+
from: 'event_guests',
|
|
360
|
+
subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' },
|
|
361
|
+
resource: { column: 'eventId' },
|
|
362
|
+
where: { status: 'confirmed' },
|
|
513
363
|
},
|
|
514
364
|
},
|
|
515
365
|
roles: {
|
|
516
366
|
guest: { via: 'guestOf' },
|
|
517
|
-
eventStaff: {
|
|
518
|
-
or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }],
|
|
519
|
-
},
|
|
367
|
+
eventStaff: { or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }] },
|
|
520
368
|
},
|
|
521
369
|
}
|
|
522
370
|
|
|
523
371
|
// features/sessions/sessions.ts
|
|
524
372
|
firewall: [
|
|
525
373
|
{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },
|
|
526
|
-
{ field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },
|
|
374
|
+
{ field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },
|
|
527
375
|
],
|
|
528
|
-
read: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },
|
|
529
|
-
|
|
530
|
-
|
|
531
|
-
update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },
|
|
532
|
-
}
|
|
376
|
+
read: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } },
|
|
377
|
+
create: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } },
|
|
378
|
+
update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },
|
|
533
379
|
```
|
|
534
380
|
|
|
535
|
-
The compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own
|
|
536
|
-
|
|
537
|
-
What works in v0.14.0:
|
|
381
|
+
The compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own firewall (tenant scope, soft-delete) is honored inside the subquery; cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits outermost.
|
|
538
382
|
|
|
539
|
-
|
|
540
|
-
|---|---|
|
|
541
|
-
| `firewall: [{ field, via }]` row-level scoping | Full |
|
|
542
|
-
| `crud.<op>.access` `roles: ['guest']` (inline emission) | Full |
|
|
543
|
-
| `read.access` and `read.views.*.access` | Full |
|
|
544
|
-
| `masking.<f>.show` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
|
|
545
|
-
| `actions.<n>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
|
|
546
|
-
|
|
547
|
-
The runtime evaluator fails closed on relationship arms regardless of which surface you hit, so silent grants are impossible everywhere. The two refused surfaces have clear compile-time errors pointing to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer with `via:`, gate the role at the access layer with BA roles).
|
|
548
|
-
|
|
549
|
-
Compile-time refusals also catch: unknown `via:` reference, cycles in role composition (`a → b → a`), reserved role-name shadowing (auth-provider-derived only — `guest`/`speaker`/`attendee` are free; `admin`/`owner`/`member` are reserved when the BA org plugin is on), unknown relationship `from` table, resource missing the `resource.column`, relationship table with `firewall: { exception: true }` (would let cross-tenant grants slip through), `lowering: 'session'` (reserved for v2 — staleness/invalidation ergonomics not yet shipped), and `+` hierarchy on relationship-roles (terminal, like pseudo-roles).
|
|
383
|
+
Supported surfaces: row-level scoping via `firewall: [{ field, via }]`, role gates on writes and reads, view access. Masking and action access reject relationship-roles at compile time with pointers to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer, gate the role at the access layer).
|
|
550
384
|
|
|
551
|
-
Cross-tenant
|
|
385
|
+
Cross-tenant aggregation dashboards aren't solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall remains the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall or function-form access on a dedicated route.
|
|
552
386
|
|
|
553
|
-
|
|
387
|
+
See [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).
|
|
554
388
|
|
|
555
|
-
### Bulk variants
|
|
389
|
+
### Bulk variants on record-based actions
|
|
556
390
|
|
|
557
|
-
|
|
391
|
+
`defineAction({ bulkVariant: true })` emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` alongside the per-record route. The bulk handler loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids, input, failFast? }` body:
|
|
558
392
|
|
|
559
393
|
```ts
|
|
560
|
-
// features/applications/actions/advance.ts
|
|
561
394
|
export default defineAction({
|
|
562
395
|
description: "Move an application forward in the pipeline.",
|
|
563
396
|
input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum(["screening", "interview", "offer"]) }),
|
|
564
397
|
access: { roles: ["owner", "admin"] },
|
|
565
|
-
bulkVariant: true,
|
|
398
|
+
bulkVariant: true,
|
|
566
399
|
transition: { field: "status", via: "nextStatus", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },
|
|
567
400
|
async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {
|
|
568
|
-
// exact same body
|
|
401
|
+
// exact same body — runs once per id
|
|
569
402
|
},
|
|
570
403
|
});
|
|
571
404
|
```
|
|
572
405
|
|
|
573
|
-
Per-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status
|
|
574
|
-
|
|
575
|
-
Compile-time refusals: `bulkVariant: true` is rejected on standalone actions (no record context to loop over) and on actions that declare `unsafe` (cross-tenant per-record audit not yet wired). Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting — the one-row-to-many-rows asymmetry makes inheriting GET/DELETE confusing. Max batch size is 100 ids per request, mirroring the CRUD batch endpoints. See [Actions → Bulk variant](/compiler/definitions/actions#bulk-variant).
|
|
406
|
+
Per-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` on tx-supporting providers; D1 fails fast without rollback. Max 100 IDs per request. Rejected on standalone actions and `unsafe` actions.
|
|
576
407
|
|
|
577
408
|
### Aggregations on read views
|
|
578
409
|
|
|
579
|
-
Read views can
|
|
410
|
+
Read views can declare pre-computed metrics that surface alongside the row payload:
|
|
580
411
|
|
|
581
412
|
```ts
|
|
582
413
|
read: {
|
|
@@ -592,51 +423,29 @@ read: {
|
|
|
592
423
|
}
|
|
593
424
|
```
|
|
594
425
|
|
|
595
|
-
|
|
596
|
-
|
|
597
|
-
```json
|
|
598
|
-
{
|
|
599
|
-
"data": [/* paginated rows */],
|
|
600
|
-
"view": "pipeline",
|
|
601
|
-
"pagination": { "count": 50, "page": 1, "pageSize": 50, "hasMore": true },
|
|
602
|
-
"aggregations": {
|
|
603
|
-
"totalApplications": 173,
|
|
604
|
-
"byStatus": { "applied": 102, "screening": 41, "interview": 18, "offer": 7, "rejected": 5 }
|
|
605
|
-
}
|
|
606
|
-
}
|
|
607
|
-
```
|
|
608
|
-
|
|
609
|
-
Aggregations always run over the **same firewalled, filtered set** as the row query — pagination is intentionally ignored, so `?status=applied&limit=10` returns the 10 paged rows AND the count over every applied row. Supported `fn`s: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count` (with or without `field` — `COUNT(*)` vs `COUNT(field)`), `count_distinct`, and `groupBy` (returns `{ value: count }`, NULLs bucket as `"(none)"`).
|
|
610
|
-
|
|
611
|
-
Compile-time validation: `field` must reference a real column; `sum`/`avg` require numeric column types; the same masking opt-out gate that governs `query.{filterable, sortable, searchable}` applies to aggregations (a `sum(salary)` leaks structure even when the row payload is redacted); aggregation names cannot collide with the reserved response fields `data`, `pagination`, `view`. No raw SQL `expr:` form in v1 — column references only. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).
|
|
426
|
+
Aggregations run over the same firewalled, filtered set as the row query; pagination is intentionally ignored. Supported functions: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count`, `count_distinct`, `groupBy`. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).
|
|
612
427
|
|
|
613
428
|
---
|
|
614
429
|
|
|
615
430
|
## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026
|
|
616
431
|
|
|
617
|
-
### Object-form `auth.plugins`
|
|
618
|
-
|
|
619
|
-
The documented object form for per-plugin config — `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }`, etc. (see [Better Auth Plugins → Custom configuration](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)) — was rejected by the compiler with `plugins.includes is not a function`. `hasCliAuthRoutes` called `.includes()` directly on `auth.config.plugins` to detect `deviceAuthorization`, and `generateAuthFiles` flattened plugins to a string array before handing them to the better-auth generator, silently dropping every per-plugin user option on the way through.
|
|
620
|
-
|
|
621
|
-
Both paths now run through a shared resolver that preserves the user's input format (object in → object out, array in → array out) and only adds the compiler's auto-included plugins (`organization`, `admin`, `apiKey`, plus `bearer` when `deviceAuthorization` is present) as `true` entries that don't clobber user config. Per-plugin options like `oauthProvider: { scopes: [...] }`, `organization: { teams: { enabled: true } }`, and `deviceAuthorization: { verificationUri: '...' }` now reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.
|
|
622
|
-
|
|
623
|
-
Better Auth's `ac` / `roles` access-control objects (the result of `createAccessControl(...)`) still require a custom `auth.ts` override — they're live runtime values that can't survive the JSON config trip from CLI → compiler. A declarative escape hatch for that is on the roadmap.
|
|
432
|
+
### Object-form `auth.plugins` config is honored
|
|
624
433
|
|
|
625
|
-
|
|
434
|
+
The documented `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }` shapes now flow through the compiler unchanged. Per-plugin options reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.
|
|
626
435
|
|
|
627
|
-
|
|
436
|
+
### `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` allowed on writes and actions
|
|
628
437
|
|
|
629
|
-
|
|
438
|
+
`PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, writes, views, and actions. The runtime trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive mandatory audit logging.
|
|
630
439
|
|
|
631
|
-
`
|
|
440
|
+
Common pattern: pair `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.
|
|
632
441
|
|
|
633
442
|
---
|
|
634
443
|
|
|
635
444
|
## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026
|
|
636
445
|
|
|
637
|
-
### Per-room authorization for PartyServer
|
|
446
|
+
### Per-room authorization for PartyServer
|
|
638
447
|
|
|
639
|
-
`bindings.durableObjects[].access`
|
|
448
|
+
`bindings.durableObjects[].access` declares a path-scoped gate that runs the declared resource's firewall and `read.access` pipeline before the WebSocket upgrade:
|
|
640
449
|
|
|
641
450
|
```ts
|
|
642
451
|
durableObjects: [
|
|
@@ -655,119 +464,70 @@ durableObjects: [
|
|
|
655
464
|
},
|
|
656
465
|
} },
|
|
657
466
|
|
|
658
|
-
// Anonymous
|
|
467
|
+
// Anonymous lobbies / public pads: explicit opt-out.
|
|
659
468
|
{ name: 'PublicLobby', className: 'PublicLobby', from: 'lib/PublicLobby',
|
|
660
469
|
access: 'public' },
|
|
661
|
-
]
|
|
470
|
+
]
|
|
662
471
|
```
|
|
663
472
|
|
|
664
|
-
The gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing
|
|
473
|
+
The gate 401s unauthenticated callers, 403s when the firewall hides the row, 404s when the row is missing. Resource references are validated against feature names at compile time. See [PartyServer Rooms → Per-room authorization](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms#per-room-authorization-via-access-v012).
|
|
665
474
|
|
|
666
475
|
---
|
|
667
476
|
|
|
668
477
|
## v0.11.1 — May 5, 2026
|
|
669
478
|
|
|
670
|
-
### PartyServer auto-mount is
|
|
671
|
-
|
|
672
|
-
The `/realtime/*` auto-mount shipped in v0.11.0 didn't gate WebSocket upgrades — anyone who knew a room ID (CUID2, hard to guess but not a security boundary) could open a connection. `authMiddleware` populated the request context but `partyserverMiddleware` doesn't 401 anonymous upgrades on its own.
|
|
479
|
+
### PartyServer auto-mount is secure by default
|
|
673
480
|
|
|
674
|
-
The auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check
|
|
675
|
-
|
|
676
|
-
Per-room access (e.g., "is this user a member of the org that owns this room?") is still your `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect` — the auto-mount only enforces "are you authenticated at all." Hand-written mounts with custom `onBeforeConnect` continue to work unchanged; declare them at `/realtime/*` before the auto-mount runs to opt out of the default gate.
|
|
677
|
-
|
|
678
|
-
No code changes required — `quickback compile` regenerates the gated mount automatically. Single-tenant alphas weren't exploitable in practice (room IDs aren't logged or surfaced); multi-tenant projects should redeploy to pick this up.
|
|
481
|
+
The `/realtime/*` auto-mount now wraps `partyserverMiddleware` in an auth check. Unauthenticated upgrades return 401; the four auth mechanisms (session cookie, JWT bearer, `x-api-key` header, query parameter) all unlock connections. Per-room access remains the `Server` class's responsibility in `onConnect`.
|
|
679
482
|
|
|
680
483
|
---
|
|
681
484
|
|
|
682
485
|
## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026
|
|
683
486
|
|
|
684
|
-
### OAuth Provider
|
|
685
|
-
|
|
686
|
-
Quickback can now act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable it with `plugins: ["oauthProvider"]` in your auth config — the compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin (the OAuth provider delegates access-token signing to it) and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.
|
|
487
|
+
### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)
|
|
687
488
|
|
|
688
|
-
|
|
489
|
+
Quickback can act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable with `plugins: ["oauthProvider"]`. The compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.
|
|
689
490
|
|
|
690
|
-
|
|
491
|
+
This replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the discovery documents they need to bootstrap. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).
|
|
691
492
|
|
|
692
|
-
|
|
493
|
+
### API keys via query parameter
|
|
693
494
|
|
|
694
|
-
The
|
|
495
|
+
The auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=…` or `?key=…` query parameters. The `x-api-key` header takes precedence when both are sent. Prefer the header whenever the client supports it — query parameters land in access logs and `Referer` headers.
|
|
695
496
|
|
|
696
|
-
### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split
|
|
497
|
+
### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split
|
|
697
498
|
|
|
698
|
-
The realtime URL space is reorganized so
|
|
499
|
+
The realtime URL space is reorganized so names match what each primitive does:
|
|
699
500
|
|
|
700
|
-
- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the
|
|
701
|
-
- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id
|
|
501
|
+
- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the org-wide Broadcaster moves to its semantically accurate prefix.
|
|
502
|
+
- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`** — new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms. Per-room Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted whenever a project declares any in-worker DO.
|
|
702
503
|
|
|
703
|
-
**Breaking
|
|
504
|
+
**Breaking** — recompile + redeploy required:
|
|
704
505
|
|
|
705
|
-
-
|
|
706
|
-
-
|
|
707
|
-
-
|
|
506
|
+
- `REALTIME_URL` env var renamed to `BROADCAST_URL`.
|
|
507
|
+
- SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`.
|
|
508
|
+
- `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.
|
|
708
509
|
|
|
709
|
-
|
|
710
|
-
|
|
711
|
-
**Recipe:** see the new [PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) doc page and the `examples/recruitment` interview-room demo for an end-to-end example with presence and live notes.
|
|
510
|
+
`partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are pre-installed in the compiler image; collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step.
|
|
712
511
|
|
|
713
512
|
---
|
|
714
513
|
|
|
715
514
|
## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026
|
|
716
515
|
|
|
717
|
-
### In-worker Durable Objects
|
|
718
|
-
|
|
719
|
-
`bindings.durableObjects` previously only emitted the binding declaration — useful for cross-worker DOs (`scriptName: "other-worker"`), but not enough for app-owned classes that live in this worker's source. Authors had to hand-edit `src/index.ts` (to add `export { ItemStream } from './...'`) and `wrangler.toml` (to add the `[[migrations]]` block) on every compile.
|
|
516
|
+
### In-worker Durable Objects
|
|
720
517
|
|
|
721
|
-
|
|
518
|
+
`bindings.durableObjects[].from` flips a DO binding into in-worker mode and emits the export, the `[[migrations]]` block, and the `CloudflareBindings` type all together:
|
|
722
519
|
|
|
723
520
|
```ts
|
|
724
|
-
durableObjects: [
|
|
725
|
-
|
|
726
|
-
|
|
727
|
-
|
|
728
|
-
|
|
729
|
-
},
|
|
730
|
-
]
|
|
521
|
+
durableObjects: [{
|
|
522
|
+
name: "ITEM_STREAM",
|
|
523
|
+
className: "ItemStream",
|
|
524
|
+
from: "features/loops/lib/ItemStream",
|
|
525
|
+
}]
|
|
731
526
|
```
|
|
732
527
|
|
|
733
|
-
|
|
734
|
-
- `src/index.ts`: `export { ItemStream } from './features/loops/lib/ItemStream';` — wrangler resolves the binding by class export.
|
|
735
|
-
- `wrangler.toml`: a `[[migrations]]` block with `tag = "qb-do-ItemStream"` and `new_sqlite_classes = ["ItemStream"]`.
|
|
736
|
-
- `CloudflareBindings`: `ITEM_STREAM: DurableObjectNamespace` so `c.env.ITEM_STREAM.idFromName(...)` typechecks.
|
|
737
|
-
|
|
738
|
-
Where the class file lives: in-worker DO classes go under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile (the rest of `src/` is wiped). The `from` value is the resulting `src/`-relative path with no `./` prefix and no `.ts` suffix.
|
|
528
|
+
DO class files live under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile. `from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive; cross-worker DOs (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and migration block.
|
|
739
529
|
|
|
740
|
-
`
|
|
741
|
-
|
|
742
|
-
`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and **must never be removed or renamed once deployed** — wrangler tracks applied tags and will reject deploys that try to walk them back. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`; set to `false` for legacy KV-backed DOs.
|
|
743
|
-
|
|
744
|
-
See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects) for the full reference.
|
|
745
|
-
|
|
746
|
-
---
|
|
747
|
-
|
|
748
|
-
## v0.10.19 — May 4, 2026
|
|
749
|
-
|
|
750
|
-
### Fix: bundled-SPA auth survives `wrangler dev` on custom_domain projects
|
|
751
|
-
|
|
752
|
-
`wrangler dev` rewrites the configured `custom_domain` host in **every** response header value (Location, Content-Security-Policy, X-…) to the local hostname, with a case-sensitive substring matcher. That mangles the CSP `connect-src` for projects with `domain: "api.example.com"` + bundled CMS / Account SPAs:
|
|
753
|
-
|
|
754
|
-
```
|
|
755
|
-
# Compiled (correct)
|
|
756
|
-
connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com …
|
|
757
|
-
|
|
758
|
-
# Served by wrangler dev (mangled)
|
|
759
|
-
connect-src 'self' https://localhost:8787 …
|
|
760
|
-
```
|
|
761
|
-
|
|
762
|
-
Result: the bundled SPA's hardcoded `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` fetches get blocked in dev because the CSP only allows localhost. Reported by Loop on the 0.10.18 thread; verified end-to-end with a minimal `wrangler@4.85.0 dev --local` repro.
|
|
763
|
-
|
|
764
|
-
The compiler now emits the SPA-baked-origin literal in `connect-src` with the host's first letter capitalised (`https://Api.example.com`). CSP host-source matching is ASCII case-insensitive per CSP3, so browsers accept it for connections to `https://api.example.com`; wrangler's case-sensitive matcher misses it. The case-shift is applied at compile time and only to URLs whose host matches the configured `custom_domain` — other origins (localhost, third-party hosts) are unchanged.
|
|
765
|
-
|
|
766
|
-
`TRUSTED_ORIGINS` keeps its lowercase prod entries: it's consumed by the CORS `isTrustedOrigin` check via `Array.includes()` against the browser-supplied Origin header (always lowercase). The CSP fix only needs to land on the SPA-baked literal — that's the entry the SPA's hardcoded fetch needs covered.
|
|
767
|
-
|
|
768
|
-
If wrangler ships a fix for the response-header rewrite, the case-shifted source remains a valid CSP entry that browsers match identically — no follow-up needed in user code.
|
|
769
|
-
|
|
770
|
-
**Action required:** none. Recompile (`quickback compile`) to pick up the fix.
|
|
530
|
+
`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and must never be removed or renamed once deployed. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`. See [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects).
|
|
771
531
|
|
|
772
532
|
---
|
|
773
533
|
|
|
@@ -775,93 +535,45 @@ If wrangler ships a fix for the response-header rewrite, the case-shifted source
|
|
|
775
535
|
|
|
776
536
|
### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`
|
|
777
537
|
|
|
778
|
-
Per-binding `experimental_remote = true`
|
|
538
|
+
Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` lets `wrangler dev` read/write deployed D1 for selected bindings:
|
|
779
539
|
|
|
780
540
|
```ts
|
|
781
541
|
providers: {
|
|
782
542
|
database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", {
|
|
783
543
|
splitDatabases: true,
|
|
784
|
-
experimentalRemote: {
|
|
785
|
-
auth: true, // wrangler dev reads/writes deployed AUTH_DB
|
|
786
|
-
features: false, // (default) features stays local
|
|
787
|
-
audit: false,
|
|
788
|
-
webhooks: false,
|
|
789
|
-
files: false,
|
|
790
|
-
},
|
|
544
|
+
experimentalRemote: { auth: true, features: false },
|
|
791
545
|
}),
|
|
792
546
|
}
|
|
793
547
|
```
|
|
794
548
|
|
|
795
|
-
|
|
549
|
+
Useful for "share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed." Off by default.
|
|
796
550
|
|
|
797
551
|
### Google OAuth + signup ToS
|
|
798
552
|
|
|
799
|
-
The Account SPA
|
|
800
|
-
|
|
801
|
-
Signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA's branding config).
|
|
802
|
-
|
|
803
|
-
### CLI compile auth gate + device-auth redirect fix
|
|
804
|
-
|
|
805
|
-
- `quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs (closes the unauth public-compile path).
|
|
806
|
-
- The device-flow `/cli/authorize` page was sending `?returnTo=` to login, but `signup.tsx` and the `_authenticated` middleware only read `?redirect=` — so a user who clicked "Create one" from `/login` lost the return URL. Standardized on `?redirect=` everywhere.
|
|
807
|
-
|
|
808
|
-
### Skill restructure (Claude Code skill)
|
|
809
|
-
|
|
810
|
-
The bundled Claude Code skill was reorganized for clarity:
|
|
811
|
-
|
|
812
|
-
- `SKILL.md` is now a thin orientation pointer, not a 600-line dump
|
|
813
|
-
- Reference docs split into `Compiler` and `Stack` sections
|
|
814
|
-
- Docs bundled as **files** the model navigates with `Read` / `Glob` rather than via `quickback docs <topic>` shell calls — same content, fewer tool calls per lookup
|
|
815
|
-
- Tightened against audit gaps surfaced by red-team review
|
|
816
|
-
|
|
817
|
-
Run `quickback claude install` to pick up the new skill layout.
|
|
818
|
-
|
|
819
|
-
---
|
|
820
|
-
|
|
821
|
-
## v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026
|
|
822
|
-
|
|
823
|
-
### Security fix: CSP auto-config no longer widens `default-src`
|
|
553
|
+
The Account SPA wires Google OAuth end-to-end when configured under `auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled`. The signup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA branding).
|
|
824
554
|
|
|
825
|
-
|
|
555
|
+
### CLI compile auth gate
|
|
826
556
|
|
|
827
|
-
|
|
828
|
-
|
|
829
|
-
Before (0.10.16):
|
|
830
|
-
```
|
|
831
|
-
default-src 'self' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://fonts.gstatic.com @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com
|
|
832
|
-
```
|
|
833
|
-
|
|
834
|
-
After (0.10.17):
|
|
835
|
-
```
|
|
836
|
-
default-src 'self'
|
|
837
|
-
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com
|
|
838
|
-
font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com
|
|
839
|
-
connect-src 'self' @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com
|
|
840
|
-
```
|
|
841
|
-
|
|
842
|
-
**Action required:** recompile (`quickback compile`) to regenerate the security middleware with the corrected scaffolding. Configs that already declared each `*-src` directive explicitly were unaffected by the bug — the regression only surfaced when users wrote `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and let auto-config fill in the rest.
|
|
843
|
-
|
|
844
|
-
The user-side workaround from 0.10.16 (declaring each directive with `['@self']` to force scaffold) is no longer needed in 0.10.17 — the compiler does the right thing automatically.
|
|
557
|
+
`quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs. Device-flow `?redirect=` parameters are standardized across the login + signup pages so a user clicking "Create one" no longer loses their return URL.
|
|
845
558
|
|
|
846
559
|
---
|
|
847
560
|
|
|
848
|
-
## v0.10.
|
|
849
|
-
|
|
850
|
-
### CSP auto-config now covers SPA-baked-in API origins
|
|
561
|
+
## v0.10.15–v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026
|
|
851
562
|
|
|
852
|
-
|
|
563
|
+
### CSP auto-config
|
|
853
564
|
|
|
854
|
-
|
|
565
|
+
When `security.csp` is set, the compiler widens directives additively based on the project's enabled features:
|
|
855
566
|
|
|
856
|
-
|
|
857
|
-
|
|
858
|
-
|
|
859
|
-
|
|
860
|
-
|
|
567
|
+
| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |
|
|
568
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
569
|
+
| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |
|
|
570
|
+
| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |
|
|
571
|
+
| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |
|
|
572
|
+
| Bundled SPA enabled | SPA-baked API origin (`config.domain`, `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`) | `connectSrc` |
|
|
861
573
|
|
|
862
|
-
|
|
574
|
+
Anything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Each applied addition is logged to stderr. Opt out with `security: { cspAutoConfig: false }`.
|
|
863
575
|
|
|
864
|
-
|
|
576
|
+
Most projects can write the minimal:
|
|
865
577
|
|
|
866
578
|
```ts
|
|
867
579
|
security: {
|
|
@@ -874,286 +586,107 @@ security: {
|
|
|
874
586
|
}
|
|
875
587
|
```
|
|
876
588
|
|
|
877
|
-
…and the compiler fills in
|
|
878
|
-
|
|
879
|
-
---
|
|
880
|
-
|
|
881
|
-
## v0.10.15 — May 2, 2026
|
|
882
|
-
|
|
883
|
-
### CSP auto-config — bundled-SPA origins added automatically
|
|
884
|
-
|
|
885
|
-
When `security.csp` is set, the compiler now widens directives **additively** based on the project's enabled features. The four rules:
|
|
886
|
-
|
|
887
|
-
| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |
|
|
888
|
-
|---|---|---|
|
|
889
|
-
| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |
|
|
890
|
-
| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |
|
|
891
|
-
| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |
|
|
892
|
-
|
|
893
|
-
Anything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Every applied addition prints to stderr at compile so the magic is visible:
|
|
894
|
-
|
|
895
|
-
```
|
|
896
|
-
[security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router
|
|
897
|
-
[security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)
|
|
898
|
-
```
|
|
899
|
-
|
|
900
|
-
The recipe in [the security docs](/compiler/config/security#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes ~5 lines shorter — most projects no longer need to list `fonts.googleapis.com` / `fonts.gstatic.com` / `@trustedOrigins` themselves. **Loop's CSP shrinks dramatically** after recompiling against this version.
|
|
901
|
-
|
|
902
|
-
**Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control.
|
|
903
|
-
|
|
904
|
-
**Smart fallback:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), the addition lands in `defaultSrc` rather than creating a sibling directive — CSP fall-back semantics mean a sibling would *narrow* your intent, so we preserve the broader fallback.
|
|
589
|
+
…and the compiler fills in font hosts, trusted origins, and SPA-baked URLs.
|
|
905
590
|
|
|
906
|
-
|
|
907
|
-
|
|
908
|
-
The security docs page now includes a [Troubleshooting CSP violations](/compiler/config/security#troubleshooting-csp-violations) table mapping browser console errors back to the directive that needs widening. Useful when auto-config is disabled or the project has a non-bundled SPA hitting third-party origins.
|
|
909
|
-
|
|
910
|
-
### Out of scope (deferred)
|
|
911
|
-
|
|
912
|
-
- **Per-request CSP nonces** (`@nonce` sentinel implementation) — Phase 2 / 0.10.16. Sentinel still errors at compile in 0.10.15.
|
|
913
|
-
- **`revocationCheck: 'kv'` for `auth.jwt`** — schema accepts it, runtime still errors at compile. Slipped from 0.10.15 to 0.10.16.
|
|
914
|
-
- **Public R2 host auto-add to `imgSrc`** — most R2 access today goes through the worker so the SPA fetches from `'@self'`. Will revisit once we have a clean way to discover public-bucket hosts at compile.
|
|
591
|
+
When a target directive is missing, auto-config scaffolds it from `default-src` baseline rather than widening `default-src` itself — CSP3 fall-back semantics would otherwise leak the addition to every directive that falls back to `default-src`.
|
|
915
592
|
|
|
916
593
|
---
|
|
917
594
|
|
|
918
595
|
## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026
|
|
919
596
|
|
|
920
|
-
### `auth.jwt`
|
|
597
|
+
### `auth.jwt` config
|
|
921
598
|
|
|
922
|
-
|
|
599
|
+
The bearer-token JWT used by the auth fast-path is configurable. Tune `expiresIn` to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs (which auto-refresh on every authed call):
|
|
923
600
|
|
|
924
601
|
```ts
|
|
925
602
|
auth: {
|
|
926
603
|
jwt: {
|
|
927
|
-
expiresIn: 30,
|
|
928
|
-
issuer: 'my-api',
|
|
929
|
-
audience: 'partner-svc',
|
|
930
|
-
secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',
|
|
604
|
+
expiresIn: 30,
|
|
605
|
+
issuer: 'my-api',
|
|
606
|
+
audience: 'partner-svc',
|
|
607
|
+
secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET',
|
|
931
608
|
},
|
|
932
609
|
}
|
|
933
610
|
```
|
|
934
611
|
|
|
935
|
-
|
|
612
|
+
### Admin MCP endpoints filtered
|
|
936
613
|
|
|
937
|
-
|
|
614
|
+
Better Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, etc.) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec. The MCP `tools/list` access-filter drops them for non-admin callers.
|
|
938
615
|
|
|
939
|
-
###
|
|
616
|
+
### Declarative `security` config
|
|
940
617
|
|
|
941
|
-
|
|
618
|
+
Every security response header (`Content-Security-Policy`, COOP, COEP, CORP, HSTS, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. `@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@trustedOrigins`, etc.) replace awkward `"'self'"` quoting.
|
|
942
619
|
|
|
943
|
-
|
|
620
|
+
The compiler lints the resolved config for known footguns: `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration.
|
|
944
621
|
|
|
945
|
-
|
|
622
|
+
### HSTS skipped on localhost
|
|
946
623
|
|
|
947
|
-
|
|
948
|
-
security: {
|
|
949
|
-
csp: {
|
|
950
|
-
defaultSrc: ['@self'],
|
|
951
|
-
scriptSrc: ['@self'],
|
|
952
|
-
styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline'],
|
|
953
|
-
frameAncestors: ['@none'],
|
|
954
|
-
objectSrc: ['@none'],
|
|
955
|
-
upgradeInsecureRequests: true,
|
|
956
|
-
},
|
|
957
|
-
coop: 'same-origin',
|
|
958
|
-
}
|
|
959
|
-
```
|
|
960
|
-
|
|
961
|
-
`@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@unsafe-eval`, `@trustedOrigins`, `@nonce`) save users from awkward `"'self'"` quoting and let `@trustedOrigins` resolve to the same allowlist `cors()` uses. Unknown sentinels throw at compile rather than silently stringify into the wire CSP.
|
|
962
|
-
|
|
963
|
-
The compiler runs lint rules over the resolved config — errors for `@nonce` (deferred to 0.10.15), `@unsafe-inline + @nonce` (silently broken), and sentinel-only directives that would resolve to nothing at runtime; warnings for `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration, etc.
|
|
964
|
-
|
|
965
|
-
Defaults preserve 0.10.13 behaviour byte-for-byte — adding the block without setting any field is a no-op.
|
|
966
|
-
|
|
967
|
-
See [the docs page](/compiler/config/security) for the full reference.
|
|
968
|
-
|
|
969
|
-
### HSTS no longer pins `localhost` to HTTPS
|
|
970
|
-
|
|
971
|
-
The generated middleware now skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `max-age` seconds — observable across every project on that machine since HSTS keys on hostname, not port. Affects every project running locally.
|
|
972
|
-
|
|
973
|
-
### Out of scope (deferred)
|
|
974
|
-
|
|
975
|
-
- **Per-request CSP nonces** — Phase 2 / 0.10.15. Sentinel exists at config-validation level so users can author their final CSP today knowing it'll start working when nonces ship.
|
|
976
|
-
- **Asset-hash CSP** for inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks emitted by the bundled SPAs — Phase 3.
|
|
977
|
-
- **Per-route CSP overrides** (e.g. one looser policy for `/admin`) — single global CSP for now.
|
|
624
|
+
Generated middleware skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin a developer's browser to HTTPS across every project on that machine.
|
|
978
625
|
|
|
979
626
|
---
|
|
980
627
|
|
|
981
628
|
## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026
|
|
982
629
|
|
|
983
|
-
### Clickjacking
|
|
984
|
-
|
|
985
|
-
Every Worker now emits two clickjacking-defence headers on every
|
|
986
|
-
response:
|
|
987
|
-
|
|
988
|
-
- `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>`
|
|
989
|
-
- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`
|
|
990
|
-
|
|
991
|
-
The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant
|
|
992
|
-
that gates CORS, so users configure their domains in one place
|
|
993
|
-
(`auth.trustedOrigins` / `auth.trustedOriginDefaults` in
|
|
994
|
-
`quickback.config.ts`) and both CORS and frame-ancestors stay in
|
|
995
|
-
lockstep. `'self'` is always allowed so an app's own SPAs can frame
|
|
996
|
-
their own routes (e.g. an account login popover hosted on the same
|
|
997
|
-
origin).
|
|
630
|
+
### Clickjacking defence on every Worker
|
|
998
631
|
|
|
999
|
-
|
|
1000
|
-
when both are set; the legacy header is included for clients that
|
|
1001
|
-
don't speak CSP3. The CSP intentionally only sets `frame-ancestors` —
|
|
1002
|
-
adding `script-src` / `default-src` would need a much wider audit
|
|
1003
|
-
across SPA assets, inline scripts, and third-party embeds, so that's
|
|
1004
|
-
left as a follow-up.
|
|
1005
|
-
|
|
1006
|
-
Recompile (`quickback compile`) and redeploy to pick this up — no
|
|
1007
|
-
config change needed unless you want to allow extra cross-origin
|
|
1008
|
-
iframe embeds, in which case add them to `auth.trustedOrigins`.
|
|
1009
|
-
|
|
1010
|
-
---
|
|
1011
|
-
|
|
1012
|
-
## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026
|
|
1013
|
-
|
|
1014
|
-
### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix
|
|
1015
|
-
|
|
1016
|
-
Patch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the
|
|
1017
|
-
Claude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they
|
|
1018
|
-
reflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS
|
|
1019
|
-
posture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page
|
|
1020
|
-
itself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the
|
|
1021
|
-
0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside
|
|
1022
|
-
`@quickback-dev/cli`.
|
|
1023
|
-
|
|
1024
|
-
No runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`
|
|
1025
|
-
against this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.
|
|
632
|
+
Every Worker emits `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>` and `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on every response. The CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant that gates CORS.
|
|
1026
633
|
|
|
1027
634
|
---
|
|
1028
635
|
|
|
1029
636
|
## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026
|
|
1030
637
|
|
|
1031
|
-
### MCP `tools/list` is
|
|
1032
|
-
|
|
1033
|
-
The generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes
|
|
1034
|
-
that turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:
|
|
1035
|
-
|
|
1036
|
-
1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including
|
|
1037
|
-
admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool
|
|
1038
|
-
descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant
|
|
1039
|
-
scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.
|
|
1040
|
-
2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could
|
|
1041
|
-
pull the catalogue from a browser.
|
|
1042
|
-
3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its
|
|
1043
|
-
discovery payload.
|
|
1044
|
-
|
|
1045
|
-
Fix:
|
|
1046
|
-
|
|
1047
|
-
- Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering
|
|
1048
|
-
`roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`
|
|
1049
|
-
pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the
|
|
1050
|
-
caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed
|
|
1051
|
-
callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and
|
|
1052
|
-
function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.
|
|
1053
|
-
- Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware
|
|
1054
|
-
(origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now
|
|
1055
|
-
applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.
|
|
1056
|
-
- `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.
|
|
1057
|
-
`annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the
|
|
1058
|
-
spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.
|
|
1059
|
-
- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is
|
|
1060
|
-
only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.
|
|
1061
|
-
|
|
1062
|
-
This filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`
|
|
1063
|
-
still re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,
|
|
1064
|
-
access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the
|
|
1065
|
-
underlying gate.
|
|
1066
|
-
|
|
1067
|
-
Known follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,
|
|
1068
|
-
`impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,
|
|
1069
|
-
so any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call
|
|
1070
|
-
is still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.
|
|
1071
|
-
|
|
1072
|
-
---
|
|
1073
|
-
|
|
1074
|
-
## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026
|
|
1075
|
-
|
|
1076
|
-
### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time
|
|
1077
|
-
|
|
1078
|
-
`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between
|
|
1079
|
-
entries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /
|
|
1080
|
-
`roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the
|
|
1081
|
-
runtime treated the literal string `"and"` as a column lookup, the
|
|
1082
|
-
predicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /
|
|
1083
|
-
empty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type
|
|
1084
|
-
couldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index
|
|
1085
|
-
signature, so any key parses.
|
|
638
|
+
### MCP `tools/list` is access-filtered
|
|
1086
639
|
|
|
1087
|
-
|
|
1088
|
-
ops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action
|
|
1089
|
-
access) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a
|
|
1090
|
-
reserved key:
|
|
640
|
+
Each MCP tool now carries sanitised access metadata. `tools/list` filters against the caller's `ctx`: unauthenticated callers see only `PUBLIC` tools, authenticated callers see only role-gated tools they pass.
|
|
1091
641
|
|
|
1092
|
-
-
|
|
1093
|
-
|
|
1094
|
-
-
|
|
1095
|
-
alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`
|
|
642
|
+
- Wildcard CORS removed from the MCP endpoint.
|
|
643
|
+
- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer enumerates tool names.
|
|
644
|
+
- Internal flavor text is removed; `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the spec-correct signals for clients.
|
|
1096
645
|
|
|
1097
|
-
|
|
1098
|
-
`actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.
|
|
646
|
+
`tools/call` continues to re-enter the Hono app and run every middleware (auth, firewall, access, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the underlying gate.
|
|
1099
647
|
|
|
1100
648
|
---
|
|
1101
649
|
|
|
1102
|
-
## v0.10.
|
|
1103
|
-
|
|
1104
|
-
### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access
|
|
1105
|
-
|
|
1106
|
-
`auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus
|
|
1107
|
-
`access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to
|
|
1108
|
-
silently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator
|
|
1109
|
-
inlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the
|
|
1110
|
-
record-based generator read the access config back through the
|
|
1111
|
-
runtime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where
|
|
1112
|
-
the unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did
|
|
1113
|
-
literal string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling
|
|
1114
|
-
the action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.
|
|
650
|
+
## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026
|
|
1115
651
|
|
|
1116
|
-
|
|
1117
|
-
same way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow
|
|
1118
|
-
through the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the
|
|
1119
|
-
access config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time
|
|
1120
|
-
expansion actually reaches the matcher.
|
|
652
|
+
### Reserved keys in `access.record` are rejected
|
|
1121
653
|
|
|
1122
|
-
|
|
1123
|
-
behavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route
|
|
1124
|
-
output and that the access config is no longer read from
|
|
1125
|
-
`actions[name].access` at runtime.
|
|
654
|
+
`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between entries — keys must be column names. The compiler now rejects reserved keys (`and`, `or`, `roles`, `userRole`) inside `record` with migration guidance pointing at the working pattern (top-level siblings with their own `record:` blocks).
|
|
1126
655
|
|
|
1127
656
|
---
|
|
1128
657
|
|
|
1129
658
|
## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026
|
|
1130
659
|
|
|
1131
|
-
### Audit
|
|
660
|
+
### Audit logging on Postgres targets
|
|
661
|
+
|
|
662
|
+
`audit_events` previously only existed on `cloudflare-d1`. The audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`) on Postgres targets. The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 or any PG dialect; `auditDatabaseId` remains a D1-only requirement.
|
|
1132
663
|
|
|
1133
|
-
|
|
664
|
+
### `auditDatabaseId` is a compile-time requirement
|
|
1134
665
|
|
|
1135
|
-
|
|
666
|
+
Projects with unsafe or `PUBLIC` actions that previously produced a placeholder `database_id = "local-audit"` in production now fail at compile time with the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the config key where the returned ID goes.
|
|
1136
667
|
|
|
1137
|
-
###
|
|
668
|
+
### Action input → OpenAPI / MCP
|
|
1138
669
|
|
|
1139
|
-
|
|
670
|
+
`defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas flow into the OpenAPI `requestBody` and the MCP tool's `inputSchema.properties`. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references run through Zod's native `z.toJSONSchema()` for full-fidelity output.
|
|
1140
671
|
|
|
1141
|
-
|
|
1142
|
-
- Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.
|
|
1143
|
-
- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: "string", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.
|
|
1144
|
-
- `id` only claims `format: "uuid"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: "string" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.
|
|
672
|
+
### OpenAPI fidelity
|
|
1145
673
|
|
|
1146
|
-
|
|
674
|
+
- Response schemas emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column.
|
|
675
|
+
- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: "string", enum: [...] }`.
|
|
676
|
+
- `id` claims `format: "uuid"` only when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators emit plain `{ type: "string" }`.
|
|
1147
677
|
|
|
1148
|
-
|
|
678
|
+
### Minor
|
|
1149
679
|
|
|
1150
|
-
|
|
680
|
+
- Auto-mask predicate verifies the resolved owner column exists before emitting an `or: 'owner'` clause; falls back to roles-only with a warning otherwise.
|
|
681
|
+
- Generated CRUD errors emit canonical `QuickbackErrorCode` enum values (`DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION`, `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION`, etc.) so generated SDKs can exhaustively switch on `code`. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).
|
|
1151
682
|
|
|
1152
683
|
---
|
|
1153
684
|
|
|
1154
|
-
##
|
|
685
|
+
## DSL: one file per action, multi-table per feature
|
|
1155
686
|
|
|
1156
|
-
|
|
687
|
+
### One file per action
|
|
688
|
+
|
|
689
|
+
Action authoring is one file per action under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts`. The filename is the action name and the URL segment:
|
|
1157
690
|
|
|
1158
691
|
```typescript
|
|
1159
692
|
// features/applications/actions/advance.ts
|
|
@@ -1174,65 +707,37 @@ export default defineAction({
|
|
|
1174
707
|
});
|
|
1175
708
|
```
|
|
1176
709
|
|
|
1177
|
-
`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` —
|
|
710
|
+
`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — `record`, `input`, and audit fields are typed without manual annotations.
|
|
1178
711
|
|
|
1179
712
|
**Discovery rules:**
|
|
1180
|
-
- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table
|
|
1181
|
-
- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file
|
|
1182
|
-
- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch
|
|
1183
|
-
- Tableless features
|
|
1184
|
-
- Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.
|
|
1185
|
-
- Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).
|
|
1186
|
-
|
|
1187
|
-
**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):
|
|
1188
|
-
|
|
1189
|
-
- `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)
|
|
1190
|
-
- `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)
|
|
1191
|
-
- `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref
|
|
1192
|
-
- `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`
|
|
1193
|
-
- `export default { actions: {…} }`
|
|
1194
|
-
- Colocated `defineActions` inside table files
|
|
1195
|
-
- `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)
|
|
1196
|
-
- `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns
|
|
1197
|
-
|
|
1198
|
-
The phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.
|
|
1199
|
-
|
|
1200
|
-
The CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.
|
|
1201
|
-
|
|
1202
|
-
See the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.
|
|
713
|
+
- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table.
|
|
714
|
+
- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file.
|
|
715
|
+
- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch).
|
|
716
|
+
- Tableless features require every action to be standalone.
|
|
1203
717
|
|
|
1204
|
-
|
|
1205
|
-
|
|
1206
|
-
## Multi-table actions per feature
|
|
1207
|
-
|
|
1208
|
-
Features used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:
|
|
718
|
+
**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance): `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file), `_feature.ts`, `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref, `defineActions(table, {…})`, colocated `defineActions` inside table files, `standalone: true` flag, `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns.
|
|
1209
719
|
|
|
1210
|
-
|
|
1211
|
-
- **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.
|
|
1212
|
-
- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.
|
|
720
|
+
See [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions).
|
|
1213
721
|
|
|
1214
|
-
|
|
722
|
+
### Multi-table actions per feature
|
|
1215
723
|
|
|
1216
|
-
|
|
724
|
+
One feature directory can own actions on multiple tables. Three discovery modes:
|
|
1217
725
|
|
|
1218
|
-
|
|
726
|
+
- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity.
|
|
727
|
+
- **`actions.ts`** — single primary-table actions file at feature root.
|
|
728
|
+
- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for strict schema/behavior separation.
|
|
1219
729
|
|
|
1220
|
-
|
|
730
|
+
Plus a universal `_feature.ts` slot for non-table-bound feature-level actions and shared Zod schemas.
|
|
1221
731
|
|
|
1222
|
-
|
|
1223
|
-
|
|
1224
|
-
`handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.
|
|
1225
|
-
|
|
1226
|
-
Migration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.
|
|
732
|
+
Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.
|
|
1227
733
|
|
|
1228
734
|
---
|
|
1229
735
|
|
|
1230
|
-
## Firewall: named-scope shape
|
|
736
|
+
## Firewall: named-scope shape
|
|
1231
737
|
|
|
1232
|
-
The named-scope firewall shape
|
|
738
|
+
The named-scope firewall shape is a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array:
|
|
1233
739
|
|
|
1234
740
|
```typescript
|
|
1235
|
-
// All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.
|
|
1236
741
|
firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)
|
|
1237
742
|
firewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }
|
|
1238
743
|
firewall: { exception: true }
|
|
@@ -1244,27 +749,17 @@ firewall: [
|
|
|
1244
749
|
|
|
1245
750
|
Pick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.
|
|
1246
751
|
|
|
1247
|
-
**Auto-detection synonyms
|
|
1248
|
-
|
|
1249
|
-
**`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\`ownerId\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \`userId\` if this column controls access, add a separate \`userId\` / \`organizationId\` column, or specify \`firewall:\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic "missing isolation column" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).
|
|
752
|
+
**Auto-detection synonyms.** When `firewall:` is omitted, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope accepts `userId`.
|
|
1250
753
|
|
|
1251
|
-
|
|
754
|
+
**`ownerId` is a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column and no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error — `ownerId` is business-logic ownership, not access control. Use `userId` for access control, declare an explicit `firewall:`, or add a separate isolation column.
|
|
1252
755
|
|
|
1253
756
|
---
|
|
1254
757
|
|
|
1255
758
|
## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026
|
|
1256
759
|
|
|
1257
|
-
### `q.scope()`
|
|
760
|
+
### `q.scope()` — single-declaration tenant scoping
|
|
1258
761
|
|
|
1259
|
-
|
|
1260
|
-
|
|
1261
|
-
**`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:
|
|
1262
|
-
|
|
1263
|
-
1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.
|
|
1264
|
-
2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.
|
|
1265
|
-
3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.
|
|
1266
|
-
|
|
1267
|
-
The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.
|
|
762
|
+
`q.scope(kind)` replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + ownership-guard) with one column:
|
|
1268
763
|
|
|
1269
764
|
```typescript
|
|
1270
765
|
columns: {
|
|
@@ -1274,304 +769,148 @@ columns: {
|
|
|
1274
769
|
}
|
|
1275
770
|
```
|
|
1276
771
|
|
|
1277
|
-
|
|
772
|
+
`q.scope()` columns auto-derive the firewall predicate, register with the guards layer as `systemManaged` (client input rejected), and auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert. The systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` registers its `field` automatically.
|
|
1278
773
|
|
|
1279
|
-
|
|
774
|
+
See [`q.scope()`](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).
|
|
775
|
+
|
|
776
|
+
### `masking[col].query.roles` — unified filter / sort / search gate
|
|
777
|
+
|
|
778
|
+
The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single `query.roles` allowlist:
|
|
1280
779
|
|
|
1281
780
|
```typescript
|
|
1282
781
|
masking: {
|
|
1283
782
|
email: {
|
|
1284
783
|
type: 'email',
|
|
1285
784
|
show: { roles: ['admin'] },
|
|
1286
|
-
query: { roles: ['admin'] }, //
|
|
785
|
+
query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // defaults to show.roles when omitted
|
|
1287
786
|
},
|
|
1288
787
|
}
|
|
1289
788
|
```
|
|
1290
789
|
|
|
1291
|
-
|
|
790
|
+
A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time.
|
|
1292
791
|
|
|
1293
|
-
**Breaking:**
|
|
792
|
+
**Breaking:** `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).
|
|
1294
793
|
|
|
1295
794
|
---
|
|
1296
795
|
|
|
1297
796
|
## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026
|
|
1298
797
|
|
|
1299
|
-
###
|
|
798
|
+
### Unified `read:` pipeline
|
|
1300
799
|
|
|
1301
|
-
|
|
1302
|
-
side of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the
|
|
1303
|
-
collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view
|
|
1304
|
-
projections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at
|
|
1305
|
-
compile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page
|
|
1306
|
-
for the full reference and migration table.
|
|
800
|
+
The read side of every resource has its own block — `read:` — that owns the collection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view projections.
|
|
1307
801
|
|
|
1308
802
|
**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):
|
|
1309
803
|
|
|
1310
|
-
- `crud.list` →
|
|
1311
|
-
- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically
|
|
1312
|
-
- Top-level `views: {...}` →
|
|
804
|
+
- `crud.list` → `read.access` (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)
|
|
805
|
+
- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically)
|
|
806
|
+
- Top-level `views: {...}` → `read.views: {...}`
|
|
1313
807
|
- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`
|
|
1314
808
|
|
|
1315
|
-
|
|
1316
|
-
access check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching
|
|
1317
|
-
role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403
|
|
1318
|
-
ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish "row
|
|
1319
|
-
exists in another tenant" from "row doesn't exist." See
|
|
1320
|
-
[Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).
|
|
1321
|
-
|
|
1322
|
-
**Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a
|
|
1323
|
-
`failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a
|
|
1324
|
-
`meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers
|
|
1325
|
-
(postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`
|
|
1326
|
-
wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls
|
|
1327
|
-
back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`
|
|
1328
|
-
still stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect
|
|
1329
|
-
`meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue
|
|
1330
|
-
messages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction
|
|
1331
|
-
commits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See
|
|
1332
|
-
[Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).
|
|
1333
|
-
|
|
1334
|
-
**`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that
|
|
1335
|
-
controls 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level
|
|
1336
|
-
(sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate
|
|
1337
|
-
array and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`
|
|
1338
|
-
values should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.
|
|
1339
|
-
|
|
1340
|
-
**Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`
|
|
1341
|
-
entirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to
|
|
1342
|
-
expose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.
|
|
1343
|
-
|
|
1344
|
-
**Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so
|
|
1345
|
-
`defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.
|
|
809
|
+
### Pre-record access ordering
|
|
1346
810
|
|
|
1347
|
-
|
|
811
|
+
Handlers on `/:id` run a role-only access check before the firewall query. A caller without a matching role gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish "row exists in another tenant" from "row doesn't exist." See [Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).
|
|
1348
812
|
|
|
1349
|
-
|
|
1350
|
-
|
|
1351
|
-
### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix
|
|
1352
|
-
|
|
1353
|
-
Hono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.
|
|
813
|
+
### Transactional batch operations
|
|
1354
814
|
|
|
1355
|
-
|
|
815
|
+
Batch endpoints expose `failFast` and a `meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers (postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true` wraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls back the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true` stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed.
|
|
1356
816
|
|
|
1357
|
-
|
|
817
|
+
Embedding queue messages and realtime broadcasts emit after the transaction commits — rolled-back batches produce no orphan jobs.
|
|
1358
818
|
|
|
1359
|
-
|
|
1360
|
-
|
|
1361
|
-
Aligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:
|
|
1362
|
-
|
|
1363
|
-
- `wrangler@^4.83.0`
|
|
1364
|
-
- `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`
|
|
1365
|
-
- `zod@^4.3.6`
|
|
1366
|
-
- `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)
|
|
1367
|
-
- `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)
|
|
819
|
+
See [Batch Operations → Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).
|
|
1368
820
|
|
|
1369
821
|
---
|
|
1370
822
|
|
|
1371
|
-
## v0.8.
|
|
1372
|
-
|
|
1373
|
-
### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility
|
|
823
|
+
## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026
|
|
1374
824
|
|
|
1375
|
-
|
|
825
|
+
### Hono CVE bump
|
|
1376
826
|
|
|
1377
|
-
|
|
1378
|
-
- **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `"inline"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).
|
|
1379
|
-
- **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.
|
|
1380
|
-
- **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.
|
|
827
|
+
Hono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.
|
|
1381
828
|
|
|
1382
|
-
|
|
829
|
+
### Cloudflare Email Sending in public beta
|
|
1383
830
|
|
|
1384
|
-
|
|
831
|
+
Quickback defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys. Cloudflare Email Sending has graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).
|
|
1385
832
|
|
|
1386
|
-
|
|
833
|
+
### Dependency sweep
|
|
1387
834
|
|
|
1388
|
-
|
|
835
|
+
`wrangler@^4.83.0`, `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`, `zod@^4.3.6`, `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1`.
|
|
1389
836
|
|
|
1390
|
-
|
|
1391
|
-
- **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.
|
|
1392
|
-
- **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: ["admin"]` primitive rather than org membership.
|
|
1393
|
-
- **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.
|
|
837
|
+
---
|
|
1394
838
|
|
|
1395
|
-
|
|
839
|
+
## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026
|
|
1396
840
|
|
|
1397
|
-
###
|
|
841
|
+
### `userRole` access primitive
|
|
1398
842
|
|
|
1399
|
-
|
|
843
|
+
A new `userRole?: string[]` field in the declarative `Access` config evaluates against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). Distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).
|
|
1400
844
|
|
|
1401
845
|
```typescript
|
|
1402
|
-
//
|
|
1403
|
-
access: { roles: ['admin'] }
|
|
1404
|
-
|
|
1405
|
-
// New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership
|
|
1406
|
-
access: { userRole: ['admin'] }
|
|
1407
|
-
|
|
1408
|
-
// "Org owner OR platform admin"
|
|
846
|
+
// Org owner OR platform admin
|
|
1409
847
|
access: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }
|
|
1410
848
|
|
|
1411
849
|
// Platform admins see SSNs across every org
|
|
1412
850
|
masking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }
|
|
1413
851
|
```
|
|
1414
852
|
|
|
1415
|
-
`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or
|
|
853
|
+
`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or` / `and` combinators. See [Access → userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).
|
|
1416
854
|
|
|
1417
|
-
###
|
|
855
|
+
### CMS admin gate enforced server-side
|
|
1418
856
|
|
|
1419
|
-
|
|
857
|
+
`cms: { access: "admin" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an "Access Denied" screen inside the SPA. Server-side enforcement now applies at every CMS-facing surface: the SPA shell, `/api/v1/schema`, and `custom_view` CRUD.
|
|
1420
858
|
|
|
1421
|
-
|
|
859
|
+
### Better Auth 1.5 + `@cloudflare/workers-types` compatibility
|
|
1422
860
|
|
|
1423
|
-
|
|
1424
|
-
|
|
1425
|
-
### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`
|
|
1426
|
-
|
|
1427
|
-
When a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.
|
|
1428
|
-
|
|
1429
|
-
The preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.
|
|
1430
|
-
|
|
1431
|
-
### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `"local-files"` on every compile
|
|
1432
|
-
|
|
1433
|
-
Projects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = "local-files"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.
|
|
1434
|
-
|
|
1435
|
-
The files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.
|
|
1436
|
-
|
|
1437
|
-
No config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.
|
|
1438
|
-
|
|
1439
|
-
---
|
|
1440
|
-
|
|
1441
|
-
## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026
|
|
1442
|
-
|
|
1443
|
-
### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback
|
|
1444
|
-
|
|
1445
|
-
Tables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —
|
|
1446
|
-
|
|
1447
|
-
```ts
|
|
1448
|
-
export const episodeTags = sqliteTable("episode_tags", {
|
|
1449
|
-
id: text("id").primaryKey(),
|
|
1450
|
-
episodeId: text("episode_id").notNull(),
|
|
1451
|
-
tagId: text("tag_id").notNull(),
|
|
1452
|
-
}, (t) => [ // <-- "}, (t) =>" on one line
|
|
1453
|
-
uniqueIndex("episode_tag_unique").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),
|
|
1454
|
-
]);
|
|
1455
|
-
```
|
|
1456
|
-
|
|
1457
|
-
never received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.
|
|
1458
|
-
|
|
1459
|
-
The regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.
|
|
1460
|
-
|
|
1461
|
-
**Recovery path:**
|
|
1462
|
-
|
|
1463
|
-
- Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.
|
|
1464
|
-
- Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with "duplicate column name" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.
|
|
1465
|
-
|
|
1466
|
-
### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column
|
|
1467
|
-
|
|
1468
|
-
Resources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.
|
|
1469
|
-
|
|
1470
|
-
The three concerns are now fully independent:
|
|
1471
|
-
|
|
1472
|
-
- **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.
|
|
1473
|
-
- **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.
|
|
1474
|
-
- **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.
|
|
1475
|
-
|
|
1476
|
-
In the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.
|
|
1477
|
-
|
|
1478
|
-
No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.
|
|
861
|
+
Generated API code typechecks against the new versions. The org-member role-change broadcast hook is emitted via `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` (the supported shape after the 1.5 deprecation of `databaseHooks.member.update.after`). `REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN` are always emitted as optional bindings when the organization plugin is active.
|
|
1479
862
|
|
|
1480
863
|
---
|
|
1481
864
|
|
|
1482
865
|
## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026
|
|
1483
866
|
|
|
1484
|
-
###
|
|
867
|
+
### `generateId: "short"` strategy
|
|
1485
868
|
|
|
1486
|
-
|
|
869
|
+
A compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:
|
|
1487
870
|
|
|
1488
871
|
```typescript
|
|
1489
872
|
providers: {
|
|
1490
|
-
database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", {
|
|
1491
|
-
generateId: "short",
|
|
1492
|
-
}),
|
|
873
|
+
database: defineDatabase("cloudflare-d1", { generateId: "short" }),
|
|
1493
874
|
}
|
|
1494
875
|
```
|
|
1495
876
|
|
|
1496
|
-
Generates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package
|
|
1497
|
-
|
|
1498
|
-
**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.
|
|
877
|
+
Generates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package.
|
|
1499
878
|
|
|
1500
|
-
**When
|
|
879
|
+
**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records.
|
|
1501
880
|
|
|
1502
|
-
See [Providers
|
|
1503
|
-
|
|
1504
|
-
---
|
|
1505
|
-
|
|
1506
|
-
## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026
|
|
1507
|
-
|
|
1508
|
-
### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs
|
|
1509
|
-
|
|
1510
|
-
Two bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:
|
|
1511
|
-
|
|
1512
|
-
**Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: "routes"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.
|
|
1513
|
-
|
|
1514
|
-
**D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `"local-features"`, `"local-files"`, and `"local"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:
|
|
1515
|
-
|
|
1516
|
-
| Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |
|
|
1517
|
-
|---------|-----------------------------------|
|
|
1518
|
-
| `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |
|
|
1519
|
-
| `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |
|
|
1520
|
-
| `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |
|
|
1521
|
-
| `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |
|
|
1522
|
-
|
|
1523
|
-
See [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.
|
|
1524
|
-
|
|
1525
|
-
### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain
|
|
1526
|
-
|
|
1527
|
-
When the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.
|
|
1528
|
-
|
|
1529
|
-
The SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.
|
|
1530
|
-
|
|
1531
|
-
No config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.
|
|
881
|
+
**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability. For large tables stick with `"uuid"`, `"cuid"`, or `"prefixed"`. See [Providers → ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options).
|
|
1532
882
|
|
|
1533
883
|
---
|
|
1534
884
|
|
|
1535
885
|
## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026
|
|
1536
886
|
|
|
1537
|
-
### Catch-
|
|
887
|
+
### Catch-all `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL`
|
|
1538
888
|
|
|
1539
|
-
|
|
889
|
+
A single Quickback origin can be set in place of four separate URL env vars:
|
|
1540
890
|
|
|
1541
891
|
```bash
|
|
1542
|
-
# One variable — done.
|
|
1543
892
|
VITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com
|
|
1544
893
|
```
|
|
1545
894
|
|
|
1546
|
-
When set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:
|
|
1547
|
-
|
|
1548
895
|
| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |
|
|
1549
896
|
|---|---|
|
|
1550
897
|
| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |
|
|
1551
898
|
| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |
|
|
1552
899
|
| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |
|
|
1553
900
|
|
|
1554
|
-
`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend
|
|
1555
|
-
|
|
1556
|
-
**Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.
|
|
1557
|
-
|
|
1558
|
-
See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.
|
|
901
|
+
`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend. Non-breaking; individual vars take precedence when set. Library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis`. See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables).
|
|
1559
902
|
|
|
1560
903
|
---
|
|
1561
904
|
|
|
1562
905
|
## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026
|
|
1563
906
|
|
|
1564
|
-
### Role
|
|
907
|
+
### Role hierarchy with `+` suffix
|
|
1565
908
|
|
|
1566
|
-
|
|
909
|
+
Define a hierarchy and use `+` to mean "this role and above":
|
|
1567
910
|
|
|
1568
911
|
```typescript
|
|
1569
|
-
|
|
1570
|
-
auth: {
|
|
1571
|
-
roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],
|
|
1572
|
-
}
|
|
912
|
+
auth: { roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'] }
|
|
1573
913
|
|
|
1574
|
-
// In resource definitions
|
|
1575
914
|
crud: {
|
|
1576
915
|
list: { access: { roles: ["member+"] } }, // member, admin, owner
|
|
1577
916
|
create: { access: { roles: ["admin+"] } }, // admin, owner
|
|
@@ -1579,15 +918,15 @@ crud: {
|
|
|
1579
918
|
}
|
|
1580
919
|
```
|
|
1581
920
|
|
|
1582
|
-
Roles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access
|
|
921
|
+
Roles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access → Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).
|
|
1583
922
|
|
|
1584
923
|
---
|
|
1585
924
|
|
|
1586
925
|
## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026
|
|
1587
926
|
|
|
1588
|
-
### Breaking: VITE URL
|
|
927
|
+
### Breaking: VITE URL environment variables namespaced
|
|
1589
928
|
|
|
1590
|
-
All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are
|
|
929
|
+
All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.
|
|
1591
930
|
|
|
1592
931
|
| Old | New |
|
|
1593
932
|
|-----|-----|
|
|
@@ -1596,129 +935,58 @@ All Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE
|
|
|
1596
935
|
| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |
|
|
1597
936
|
| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |
|
|
1598
937
|
|
|
1599
|
-
|
|
938
|
+
Non-URL variables are unchanged (`VITE_ENABLE_*`, branding vars, `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY`).
|
|
1600
939
|
|
|
1601
940
|
**Action required:**
|
|
1602
|
-
-
|
|
1603
|
-
-
|
|
1604
|
-
-
|
|
1605
|
-
|
|
1606
|
-
See [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.
|
|
941
|
+
- Compiled projects: re-run `quickback compile`.
|
|
942
|
+
- Standalone deploys: update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.
|
|
943
|
+
- Library users: `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globals are unchanged.
|
|
1607
944
|
|
|
1608
|
-
### CMS
|
|
945
|
+
### CMS access control
|
|
1609
946
|
|
|
1610
|
-
|
|
1611
|
-
|
|
1612
|
-
```typescript
|
|
1613
|
-
cms: { access: "admin" }
|
|
1614
|
-
```
|
|
1615
|
-
|
|
1616
|
-
When set to `"admin"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== "admin"`) see an "Access Denied" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `"user"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.
|
|
1617
|
-
|
|
1618
|
-
See [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.
|
|
1619
|
-
|
|
1620
|
-
### SPA Sub-Route Fix
|
|
1621
|
-
|
|
1622
|
-
Fixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.
|
|
947
|
+
`cms.access: "admin"` enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility. Non-admin users (`user.role !== "admin"`) see an "Access Denied" screen with a sign-out button.
|
|
1623
948
|
|
|
1624
949
|
---
|
|
1625
950
|
|
|
1626
951
|
## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026
|
|
1627
952
|
|
|
1628
|
-
###
|
|
1629
|
-
|
|
1630
|
-
- Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly
|
|
1631
|
-
- Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead
|
|
1632
|
-
- Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)
|
|
953
|
+
### Mandatory unsafe action audit trail
|
|
1633
954
|
|
|
1634
|
-
|
|
955
|
+
Structured `unsafe` config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`). Cross-tenant unsafe actions require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === "admin"`). Mandatory audit logging on success, denial, and error paths. Cloudflare output includes `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present.
|
|
1635
956
|
|
|
1636
|
-
-
|
|
1637
|
-
- The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix
|
|
957
|
+
Compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action).
|
|
1638
958
|
|
|
1639
|
-
###
|
|
959
|
+
### Security contract report artifacts
|
|
1640
960
|
|
|
1641
|
-
|
|
1642
|
-
- Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys
|
|
1643
|
-
- See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details
|
|
961
|
+
Generated security contract artifacts: `reports/security-contracts.report.json`, `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`. Config-driven signing controls (`compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.*`). Missing required signing keys fail loudly with explicit remediation.
|
|
1644
962
|
|
|
1645
|
-
###
|
|
963
|
+
### Headless Drizzle rename hints
|
|
1646
964
|
|
|
1647
|
-
|
|
1648
|
-
- `reports/security-contracts.report.json`
|
|
1649
|
-
- `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`
|
|
1650
|
-
- Added config-driven signing controls:
|
|
1651
|
-
- `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`
|
|
1652
|
-
- `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`
|
|
1653
|
-
- `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`
|
|
1654
|
-
- Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance
|
|
1655
|
-
- Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options
|
|
965
|
+
`compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts block compilation. See [Configuration](/compiler/config).
|
|
1656
966
|
|
|
1657
|
-
###
|
|
967
|
+
### Minor
|
|
1658
968
|
|
|
1659
|
-
-
|
|
1660
|
-
-
|
|
1661
|
-
-
|
|
1662
|
-
- Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present
|
|
1663
|
-
- Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)
|
|
1664
|
-
|
|
1665
|
-
---
|
|
1666
|
-
|
|
1667
|
-
## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026
|
|
1668
|
-
|
|
1669
|
-
### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output
|
|
1670
|
-
|
|
1671
|
-
- Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions
|
|
1672
|
-
- Better CLI output formatting during compilation
|
|
1673
|
-
- Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration
|
|
1674
|
-
|
|
1675
|
-
### Bug Fixes
|
|
1676
|
-
|
|
1677
|
-
- Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)
|
|
1678
|
-
- API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)
|
|
1679
|
-
|
|
1680
|
-
---
|
|
1681
|
-
|
|
1682
|
-
## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026
|
|
1683
|
-
|
|
1684
|
-
### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support
|
|
1685
|
-
|
|
1686
|
-
- Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages
|
|
1687
|
-
- Auth middleware improvements for page routes
|
|
1688
|
-
- CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions
|
|
969
|
+
- Email OTP magic links work correctly.
|
|
970
|
+
- Auth is required for all API routes when running locally.
|
|
971
|
+
- Single-file multi-table exports alongside `defineTable()` produce a clear error.
|
|
1689
972
|
|
|
1690
973
|
---
|
|
1691
974
|
|
|
1692
975
|
## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026
|
|
1693
976
|
|
|
1694
|
-
### CMS
|
|
1695
|
-
|
|
1696
|
-
- Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API
|
|
1697
|
-
- CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations
|
|
1698
|
-
- Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions
|
|
1699
|
-
|
|
1700
|
-
### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements
|
|
1701
|
-
|
|
1702
|
-
- Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS
|
|
1703
|
-
- Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments
|
|
977
|
+
### Quickback CMS
|
|
1704
978
|
|
|
1705
|
-
|
|
1706
|
-
|
|
1707
|
-
- Fixed anonymous user email format generation
|
|
1708
|
-
- Organization selector improvements in Account UI
|
|
1709
|
-
- Config validation now catches more errors at compile time
|
|
1710
|
-
- Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses
|
|
1711
|
-
- Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting
|
|
979
|
+
A schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API. The compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry consumed by the CMS at runtime. Firewall error modes (`reveal` for 403 with details, `hide` for opaque 404) are configurable per resource for security-sensitive deployments.
|
|
1712
980
|
|
|
1713
981
|
---
|
|
1714
982
|
|
|
1715
983
|
## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026
|
|
1716
984
|
|
|
1717
|
-
### Scoped
|
|
985
|
+
### Scoped database for actions
|
|
1718
986
|
|
|
1719
|
-
Actions
|
|
987
|
+
Actions receive a security-scoped database instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.
|
|
1720
988
|
|
|
1721
|
-
|
|
989
|
+
Duck-typed column detection at runtime:
|
|
1722
990
|
|
|
1723
991
|
| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |
|
|
1724
992
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
@@ -1726,24 +994,9 @@ The scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:
|
|
|
1726
994
|
| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |
|
|
1727
995
|
| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |
|
|
1728
996
|
|
|
1729
|
-
|
|
997
|
+
Every action is secure by default — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.
|
|
1730
998
|
|
|
1731
|
-
|
|
1732
|
-
defineActions(todos, {
|
|
1733
|
-
complete: {
|
|
1734
|
-
type: "record",
|
|
1735
|
-
execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {
|
|
1736
|
-
// db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted
|
|
1737
|
-
const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);
|
|
1738
|
-
// ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL
|
|
1739
|
-
},
|
|
1740
|
-
},
|
|
1741
|
-
});
|
|
1742
|
-
```
|
|
1743
|
-
|
|
1744
|
-
#### Unsafe Mode
|
|
1745
|
-
|
|
1746
|
-
Actions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:
|
|
999
|
+
Actions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle via `rawDb`:
|
|
1747
1000
|
|
|
1748
1001
|
```typescript
|
|
1749
1002
|
defineActions(analytics, {
|
|
@@ -1758,108 +1011,45 @@ defineActions(analytics, {
|
|
|
1758
1011
|
});
|
|
1759
1012
|
```
|
|
1760
1013
|
|
|
1761
|
-
Without `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.
|
|
1762
|
-
|
|
1763
|
-
**Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)
|
|
1764
|
-
|
|
1765
|
-
---
|
|
1766
|
-
|
|
1767
|
-
### Cascading Soft Delete
|
|
1768
|
-
|
|
1769
|
-
Soft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.
|
|
1014
|
+
Without `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`. See [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions).
|
|
1770
1015
|
|
|
1771
|
-
|
|
1772
|
-
DELETE /api/v1/projects/:id
|
|
1773
|
-
```
|
|
1016
|
+
### Cascading soft delete
|
|
1774
1017
|
|
|
1775
|
-
|
|
1776
|
-
```typescript
|
|
1777
|
-
// 1. Soft delete the parent
|
|
1778
|
-
await db.update(projects)
|
|
1779
|
-
.set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
|
|
1780
|
-
.where(eq(projects.id, id));
|
|
1781
|
-
|
|
1782
|
-
// 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)
|
|
1783
|
-
await db.update(projectMembers)
|
|
1784
|
-
.set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
|
|
1785
|
-
.where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));
|
|
1786
|
-
|
|
1787
|
-
await db.update(projectTasks)
|
|
1788
|
-
.set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })
|
|
1789
|
-
.where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));
|
|
1790
|
-
```
|
|
1018
|
+
Soft-deleting a parent record automatically cascades to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade `UPDATE` statements.
|
|
1791
1019
|
|
|
1792
1020
|
Rules:
|
|
1793
|
-
-
|
|
1794
|
-
-
|
|
1795
|
-
- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler
|
|
1021
|
+
- Applies to soft delete only. Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.
|
|
1022
|
+
- Cascades within the same feature only — cross-feature references are not affected.
|
|
1023
|
+
- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler).
|
|
1796
1024
|
|
|
1797
|
-
|
|
1025
|
+
See [Actions API → Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete).
|
|
1798
1026
|
|
|
1799
|
-
|
|
1800
|
-
|
|
1801
|
-
### Advanced Query Parameters
|
|
1027
|
+
### Advanced query parameters
|
|
1802
1028
|
|
|
1803
|
-
New
|
|
1029
|
+
New capabilities for all list endpoints:
|
|
1804
1030
|
|
|
1805
|
-
- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`
|
|
1806
|
-
- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`
|
|
1807
|
-
- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in
|
|
1031
|
+
- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status`
|
|
1032
|
+
- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc`
|
|
1033
|
+
- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in `X-Total-Count`
|
|
1808
1034
|
- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns
|
|
1809
1035
|
|
|
1810
|
-
|
|
1811
|
-
# Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count
|
|
1812
|
-
GET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true
|
|
1813
|
-
|
|
1814
|
-
# Search across all text fields
|
|
1815
|
-
GET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent
|
|
1816
|
-
```
|
|
1817
|
-
|
|
1818
|
-
**Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)
|
|
1819
|
-
|
|
1820
|
-
---
|
|
1821
|
-
|
|
1822
|
-
### Audit Field Improvements
|
|
1823
|
-
|
|
1824
|
-
- `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema
|
|
1825
|
-
- All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed
|
|
1826
|
-
|
|
1827
|
-
---
|
|
1828
|
-
|
|
1829
|
-
## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026
|
|
1830
|
-
|
|
1831
|
-
### Database Naming Conventions
|
|
1832
|
-
|
|
1833
|
-
- Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`
|
|
1834
|
-
- Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency
|
|
1835
|
-
- Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard
|
|
1836
|
-
|
|
1837
|
-
### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix
|
|
1838
|
-
|
|
1839
|
-
- Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import
|
|
1840
|
-
- Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes
|
|
1036
|
+
See [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params).
|
|
1841
1037
|
|
|
1842
1038
|
---
|
|
1843
1039
|
|
|
1844
1040
|
## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026
|
|
1845
1041
|
|
|
1846
|
-
###
|
|
1042
|
+
### OpenAPI spec generation
|
|
1847
1043
|
|
|
1848
|
-
|
|
1849
|
-
- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication
|
|
1850
|
-
- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth
|
|
1044
|
+
Generated APIs include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`. Better Auth endpoints are included in the spec.
|
|
1851
1045
|
|
|
1852
|
-
###
|
|
1046
|
+
### Better Auth plugins
|
|
1853
1047
|
|
|
1854
|
-
-
|
|
1855
|
-
- Better Auth endpoints included in the spec
|
|
1856
|
-
- Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`
|
|
1048
|
+
Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` (post-passkey email collection flow), `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` (combined email + password + OTP), and `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` (AWS SES email provider).
|
|
1857
1049
|
|
|
1858
|
-
### Security
|
|
1050
|
+
### Security headers
|
|
1859
1051
|
|
|
1860
|
-
|
|
1861
|
-
- Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
|
|
1862
|
-
- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config
|
|
1052
|
+
Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details. Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options). `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config.
|
|
1863
1053
|
|
|
1864
1054
|
---
|
|
1865
1055
|
|
|
@@ -1867,34 +1057,28 @@ GET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent
|
|
|
1867
1057
|
|
|
1868
1058
|
### Account UI
|
|
1869
1059
|
|
|
1870
|
-
|
|
1871
|
-
- Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys
|
|
1872
|
-
- Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects
|
|
1060
|
+
Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers. Sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys. Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects.
|
|
1873
1061
|
|
|
1874
|
-
### Webhook
|
|
1062
|
+
### Webhook system
|
|
1875
1063
|
|
|
1876
|
-
|
|
1877
|
-
- Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries
|
|
1878
|
-
- Configurable per-feature webhook events
|
|
1064
|
+
Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification. Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries. Configurable per-feature webhook events.
|
|
1879
1065
|
|
|
1880
|
-
### Realtime &
|
|
1066
|
+
### Realtime & vector search
|
|
1881
1067
|
|
|
1882
|
-
|
|
1883
|
-
- Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize
|
|
1884
|
-
- KV and R2 storage integrations
|
|
1068
|
+
Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions. Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize. KV and R2 storage integrations.
|
|
1885
1069
|
|
|
1886
1070
|
---
|
|
1887
1071
|
|
|
1888
1072
|
## v0.5.0 — January 2026
|
|
1889
1073
|
|
|
1890
|
-
### Initial
|
|
1891
|
-
|
|
1892
|
-
- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler
|
|
1893
|
-
- **Four
|
|
1894
|
-
- **`defineTable()`** —
|
|
1895
|
-
- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers,
|
|
1896
|
-
- **Cloud
|
|
1897
|
-
- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile
|
|
1898
|
-
- **Better Auth
|
|
1899
|
-
- **Drizzle ORM** —
|
|
1900
|
-
- **Cloudflare D1** —
|
|
1074
|
+
### Initial release
|
|
1075
|
+
|
|
1076
|
+
- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler.
|
|
1077
|
+
- **Four security pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking.
|
|
1078
|
+
- **`defineTable()`** — schema + security configuration in a single file.
|
|
1079
|
+
- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, B2B SaaS.
|
|
1080
|
+
- **Cloud compiler** — remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`.
|
|
1081
|
+
- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`.
|
|
1082
|
+
- **Better Auth integration** — organizations, roles, sessions.
|
|
1083
|
+
- **Drizzle ORM** — schema-first with automatic migrations.
|
|
1084
|
+
- **Cloudflare D1** — split database support (auth + features).
|