@quickback-dev/cli 0.13.0 → 0.14.2

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Files changed (26) hide show
  1. package/dist/docs/content.js +11 -11
  2. package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/index.js +1 -1
  4. package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +192 -1
  5. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +164 -2
  6. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +145 -0
  7. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +46 -0
  8. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +2 -0
  9. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +11 -0
  10. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/read.md +8 -7
  11. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/views.md +100 -12
  12. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/full-example.md +12 -11
  13. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud.md +1 -2
  14. package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api.md +8 -13
  15. package/package.json +1 -1
  16. package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +192 -1
  17. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +164 -2
  18. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +145 -0
  19. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +46 -0
  20. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +2 -0
  21. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +11 -0
  22. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/read.md +8 -7
  23. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/views.md +100 -12
  24. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/full-example.md +12 -11
  25. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud.md +1 -2
  26. package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api.md +8 -13
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ type FirewallPredicate =
64
64
  | { field: string; equals: string } // column = ctx.* (or literal)
65
65
  | { field: string; isNull: true } // column IS NULL
66
66
  | { field: string; in: string[] | string }// column IN (...)
67
+ | { field: string; via: string } // column IN (relationship subquery)
67
68
  | { exception: true }; // opt out of tenant scoping
68
69
 
69
70
  type FirewallConfig = ReadonlyArray<FirewallPredicate>;
@@ -74,6 +75,51 @@ firewallErrorMode?: 'reveal' | 'hide';
74
75
 
75
76
  Predicates are AND'd together. `firewallErrorMode` lives at the resource top level — it's a presentation-layer choice (403 vs 404), not a query-shape one.
76
77
 
78
+ ## Relationship-based scoping (`via:`)
79
+
80
+ For relationship authorization — "this user can see rows X if they have a confirmed `event_guests` row pointing at X" — declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` in `quickback.config.ts`, then reference it from `firewall:` with a `via:` predicate:
81
+
82
+ ```typescript
83
+ // quickback.config.ts
84
+ authz: {
85
+ relationships: {
86
+ guestOf: {
87
+ from: 'event_guests', // table name
88
+ subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side
89
+ resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side
90
+ where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional row filter
91
+ },
92
+ },
93
+ }
94
+
95
+ // features/sessions/sessions.ts
96
+ firewall: [
97
+ { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },
98
+ { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' },
99
+ ]
100
+ ```
101
+
102
+ Compiles to:
103
+
104
+ ```sql
105
+ WHERE sessions.organizationId = ?
106
+ AND sessions.eventId IN (
107
+ SELECT eventId FROM event_guests
108
+ WHERE userId = ?
109
+ AND status = 'confirmed'
110
+ AND <event_guests' own firewall — tenant scope + soft-delete>
111
+ )
112
+ ```
113
+
114
+ Key properties:
115
+
116
+ - **Firewall stays the outermost AND.** A guest of an event in another tenant is still blocked by your tenant predicate. Relationship-based scoping never bypasses tenant isolation.
117
+ - **The relationship table's own firewall is AND'd into the subquery.** Soft-deleting a `event_guests` row revokes access immediately; cross-tenant relationship rows can't grant access.
118
+ - **Anonymous callers fail closed.** `ctx.userId` is null-guarded; the subquery short-circuits to `WHERE 1 = 0` for unauthenticated requests.
119
+ - **The relationship table must be tenant-scoped** (`firewall: { exception: true }` is rejected at compile time on relationship tables).
120
+
121
+ See [Access — relationships](/compiler/definitions/access#authz-relationships) for the full `authz.relationships` shape and role-binding patterns.
122
+
77
123
  ## Context Sources
78
124
 
79
125
  When `equals` references the request context, use these standard sources:
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ The firewall controls **which records** a user can see. It automatically adds WH
110
110
 
111
111
  No manual configuration needed - Quickback applies smart rules based on your schema.
112
112
 
113
+ For relationship-based row visibility (e.g. "user can see this event because they have a confirmed `event_guests` row pointing at it"), declare the relationship under `authz.relationships` and reference it from the firewall with a `via:` predicate. See [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via).
114
+
113
115
  [Learn more about Firewall →](/compiler/definitions/firewall)
114
116
 
115
117
  ### 2. Access (CRUD Permissions)
@@ -139,6 +139,17 @@ show: {
139
139
 
140
140
  The `'owner'` condition compares against the owner column declared via `q.scope('owner')` (or auto-detected from a `userId` / `ownerId` column). If no owner scope is present, it falls back to `createdBy`.
141
141
 
142
+ ### Relationship-roles in masking (v1 limitation)
143
+
144
+ Relationship-roles declared under `authz.roles` (e.g. `guest: { via: 'guestOf' }`) are **not yet supported in `show:` clauses**. The compiler refuses to build with a clear error message because async, db-aware mask functions plus a batched relationship matcher (to avoid N+1 on list responses) are required to ship safely — that pipeline has not yet landed. The runtime evaluator fails closed on unrecognized arms, so silent grants are impossible.
145
+
146
+ **Workarounds**, depending on intent:
147
+
148
+ - **Gate on BA roles only**: keep masking simple and put the relationship check at the access layer instead — `read.views.<v>.access: { roles: ['guest'] }` returns a curated field projection that excludes the sensitive column entirely for non-staff callers, without involving masking.
149
+ - **Move the field into a view that's gated by the relationship-role at access**: same pattern — column-level security via field projection rather than per-row masking.
150
+
151
+ A future async-mask pipeline with batched lookups will lift this limitation; the schema slot is reserved so the v2 add will be non-breaking.
152
+
142
153
  ## Query Gate (filter / sort / search)
143
154
 
144
155
  Masking has a second concern beyond hiding values in the response: a non-admin caller could enumerate masked PII via the query string — e.g. `?filter=email:like:%@target.com` — and infer presence even when the response payload is redacted. The `query` allowlist closes this:
@@ -53,8 +53,7 @@ export default defineTable(customers, {
53
53
  |----------|------|
54
54
  | `GET /api/v1/{resource}` | `read.access` |
55
55
  | `GET /api/v1/{resource}/:id` | `read.access` |
56
- | `GET /api/v1/{resource}?view={name}` | `read.views[name].access` (falls back to `read.access`) |
57
- | `GET /api/v1/{resource}/views/{name}` | Same — explicit path form of the `?view=` dispatch |
56
+ | `GET /api/v1/{resource}/views/{name}` | `read.views[name].access` (falls back to `read.access`) |
58
57
 
59
58
  Single-record `GET /:id` inherits `read.access` automatically — there's no
60
59
  separate `read.get` block. If you need different access for single records,
@@ -145,10 +144,10 @@ read: {
145
144
  }
146
145
  ```
147
146
 
148
- Both endpoint shapes are emitted automatically:
147
+ Named views are emitted at dedicated path routes:
149
148
 
150
- - Query-string dispatch: `GET /api/v1/jobs?view=internal`
151
- - Explicit path: `GET /api/v1/jobs/views/internal`
149
+ - `GET /api/v1/jobs/views/internal`
150
+ - If `read.defaultView` is set, bare `GET /api/v1/jobs` resolves to that view.
152
151
 
153
152
  ## Migrating from `crud.list` / `crud.get`
154
153
 
@@ -161,7 +160,7 @@ DSL v2 rejects both at compile time. The migration is mechanical:
161
160
  | `crud.list.maxPageSize` | `read.maxPageSize` |
162
161
  | `crud.list.fields: [...]` | Move to a named view under `read.views` |
163
162
  | `crud.get.access` | `read.access` (or record-level conditions) |
164
- | `crud.get.fields: [...]` | Move to a named view; clients call `?view=...` |
163
+ | `crud.get.fields: [...]` | Move to a named view; clients call `/views/{name}` |
165
164
  | Top-level `views: {...}` | `read.views: {...}` |
166
165
 
167
166
  Example before/after:
@@ -197,7 +196,9 @@ crud: {
197
196
  ```
198
197
 
199
198
  Clients that previously hit `GET /:id` to retrieve only summary fields now
200
- call `GET /:id?view=summary`.
199
+ move that projection to a named collection view such as
200
+ `GET /api/v1/jobs/views/summary`. Single-record `GET /:id` always returns the
201
+ full masked record.
201
202
 
202
203
  ## Read-Only Resources
203
204
 
@@ -75,20 +75,18 @@ export default defineTable(candidates, {
75
75
 
76
76
  ## Generated Endpoints
77
77
 
78
- Each view generates **two** equivalent GET endpoints — pick whichever is more ergonomic for your client:
78
+ Each named view generates a dedicated GET endpoint:
79
79
 
80
80
  ```
81
81
  GET /api/v1/candidates # Full read - read.access fields
82
- GET /api/v1/candidates?view=pipeline # Query-string dispatch
83
- GET /api/v1/candidates/views/pipeline # Explicit path form
84
- GET /api/v1/candidates?view=full # hiring-manager/recruiter only
82
+ GET /api/v1/candidates/views/pipeline # interviewer/recruiter/etc.
83
+ GET /api/v1/candidates/views/full # hiring-manager/recruiter only
85
84
  GET /api/v1/candidates/views/report # report fields
86
85
  ```
87
86
 
88
- The `?view=` query-string form is convenient when the rest of your client
89
- already builds collection URLs and you only need to swap the projection.
90
- The `/views/{name}` path form is better when you want a stable URL per
91
- projection.
87
+ If `read.defaultView` is set, bare `GET /api/v1/candidates` can also resolve
88
+ to that named view. Without `defaultView`, bare `GET /api/v1/candidates`
89
+ returns `VIEW_REQUIRED` once views are declared.
92
90
 
93
91
  ## Query Parameters
94
92
 
@@ -227,6 +225,93 @@ read: {
227
225
  | `/views/full` | interviewer | Yes | `j***@c******.com` |
228
226
  | `/views/full` | recruiter | Yes | `jane@company.com` |
229
227
 
228
+ ## Aggregations
229
+
230
+ Views can declare pre-computed aggregations that run alongside the row
231
+ query and surface as `aggregations: { ... }` on the response. This avoids a
232
+ custom standalone action for every "count of X grouped by Y" dashboard
233
+ tile — the firewall and view filters already in place drive the metric.
234
+
235
+ ```typescript
236
+ read: {
237
+ access: { roles: ['owner', 'admin', 'member'] },
238
+ views: {
239
+ pipeline: {
240
+ fields: ['id', 'jobId', 'candidateId', 'status', 'appliedAt'],
241
+ aggregations: {
242
+ totalApplications: { fn: 'count' },
243
+ byStatus: { fn: 'groupBy', field: 'status' },
244
+ },
245
+ },
246
+ },
247
+ }
248
+ ```
249
+
250
+ Response now carries the aggregations alongside `data`:
251
+
252
+ ```json
253
+ {
254
+ "data": [/* paginated rows */],
255
+ "view": "pipeline",
256
+ "pagination": { "count": 50, "page": 1, "pageSize": 50, "hasMore": true },
257
+ "aggregations": {
258
+ "totalApplications": 173,
259
+ "byStatus": {
260
+ "applied": 102,
261
+ "screening": 41,
262
+ "interview": 18,
263
+ "offer": 7,
264
+ "rejected": 5
265
+ }
266
+ }
267
+ }
268
+ ```
269
+
270
+ ### Supported aggregation functions
271
+
272
+ | `fn` | `field` | Returns | Example |
273
+ |---|---|---|---|
274
+ | `sum` | required, numeric | scalar number | `{ fn: 'sum', field: 'guestCount' }` |
275
+ | `avg` | required, numeric | scalar number | `{ fn: 'avg', field: 'salary' }` |
276
+ | `min` | required | scalar number | `{ fn: 'min', field: 'price' }` |
277
+ | `max` | required | scalar number | `{ fn: 'max', field: 'price' }` |
278
+ | `count` | optional | `COUNT(*)` if omitted, `COUNT(field)` (non-null) if given | `{ fn: 'count' }` |
279
+ | `count_distinct` | required | scalar number | `{ fn: 'count_distinct', field: 'sourceId' }` |
280
+ | `groupBy` | required | `{ value: count }` map | `{ fn: 'groupBy', field: 'status' }` |
281
+
282
+ `groupBy` always returns a count map keyed by the distinct values of `field`.
283
+ `NULL` values bucket under the literal string `"(none)"`. Other rollup
284
+ functions (`groupBy` + `sum` of another column) are deferred to a future
285
+ release.
286
+
287
+ ### Filter and firewall inheritance
288
+
289
+ Aggregations always run over the **same** filtered, firewalled set as the
290
+ row query. Pagination is intentionally ignored — you get the value over
291
+ every matching record, not just the current page.
292
+
293
+ In practice: a request like
294
+ `GET /applications/views/pipeline?status=applied&jobId=job_123&limit=10`
295
+ returns the first 10 applied rows for that job, AND `byStatus` reflects
296
+ only that filtered set (which will be `{ applied: <total> }` since the
297
+ filter pinned the status). This is the only consistent default — divorcing
298
+ the metric from the user's filters would surprise.
299
+
300
+ ### Constraints (compile-time)
301
+
302
+ - `field` must reference a real column on the table.
303
+ - `sum`/`avg` require numeric column types (`int`, `real`, `decimal`,
304
+ `numeric`, `bigint`). Non-numeric columns are rejected at compile time.
305
+ - The same masking opt-out gate that governs `query.{filterable, sortable,
306
+ searchable}` applies to aggregations: the view's roles must satisfy the
307
+ masking rule, otherwise the aggregation is rejected. (A `sum(salary)`
308
+ leaks structure across the masked set even when the row payload is
309
+ redacted.)
310
+ - Aggregation names cannot collide with the reserved response fields
311
+ `data`, `pagination`, `view`.
312
+ - No raw SQL `expr:` form. Column references only — declare a generated
313
+ column or write a custom action if you need arithmetic.
314
+
230
315
  ## Response Format
231
316
 
232
317
  View responses include metadata about the view:
@@ -238,15 +323,18 @@ View responses include metadata about the view:
238
323
  { "id": "cnd_456", "name": "John Smith", "source": "referral" }
239
324
  ],
240
325
  "view": "pipeline",
241
- "fields": ["id", "name", "source"],
242
326
  "pagination": {
243
- "limit": 50,
244
- "offset": 0,
245
- "count": 2
327
+ "count": 2,
328
+ "page": 1,
329
+ "pageSize": 50,
330
+ "hasMore": false
246
331
  }
247
332
  }
248
333
  ```
249
334
 
335
+ When the view declares `aggregations`, the response also includes an
336
+ `aggregations: { ... }` field. See [Aggregations](#aggregations).
337
+
250
338
  ## Complete Example
251
339
 
252
340
  ```typescript
@@ -253,16 +253,17 @@ import { AuthErrors, AccessErrors, GuardErrors } from '../../lib/errors';
253
253
 
254
254
  const app = new Hono();
255
255
 
256
- // GET /candidates?view=<name> — unified read handler dispatched by ?view
256
+ // GET /candidates/views/:viewName — named view projection
257
257
  const READ_ACCESS = { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter', 'interviewer'] };
258
258
 
259
- app.get('/', async (c) => {
259
+ app.get('/views/:viewName', async (c) => {
260
260
  const ctx = c.get('ctx');
261
261
  const db = c.get('db');
262
262
 
263
+ const viewName = c.req.param('viewName');
263
264
  const params = Object.fromEntries(new URL(c.req.url).searchParams);
264
- const view = VIEWS_CONFIG[params.view as keyof typeof VIEWS_CONFIG];
265
- if (!view) return c.json({ error: 'View required', code: 'VIEW_REQUIRED' }, 400);
265
+ const view = VIEWS_CONFIG[viewName as keyof typeof VIEWS_CONFIG];
266
+ if (!view) return c.json({ error: 'Unknown view', code: 'VIEW_NOT_FOUND' }, 400);
266
267
 
267
268
  // Per-view access gate (falls back to read-level access)
268
269
  if (!await evaluateAccess(view.access ?? READ_ACCESS, ctx)) {
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ app.get('/', async (c) => {
273
274
  const results = await db.select(/* projected fields */).from(candidates)
274
275
  .where(buildFirewallConditions(ctx));
275
276
 
276
- return c.json({ data: maskCandidates(results, ctx), view: params.view });
277
+ return c.json({ data: maskCandidates(results, ctx), view: viewName });
277
278
  });
278
279
 
279
280
  // POST /candidates - Create with guards
@@ -383,10 +384,10 @@ Views control **which fields are returned**. Masking controls **what values are
383
384
 
384
385
  | Endpoint | Role | `phone` in response? | `phone` value |
385
386
  |----------|------|--------------------|-------------|
386
- | `/candidates?view=pipeline` | interviewer | No | N/A |
387
- | `/candidates?view=pipeline` | recruiter | No | N/A |
388
- | `/candidates?view=full` | interviewer | No | N/A (no access) |
389
- | `/candidates?view=full` | recruiter | Yes | `555-123-4567` |
387
+ | `/candidates/views/pipeline` | interviewer | No | N/A |
388
+ | `/candidates/views/pipeline` | recruiter | No | N/A |
389
+ | `/candidates/views/full` | interviewer | No | N/A (no access) |
390
+ | `/candidates/views/full` | recruiter | Yes | `555-123-4567` |
390
391
 
391
392
  ### Guards Enforcement
392
393
 
@@ -417,8 +418,8 @@ POST /candidates
417
418
  | `POST` | `/candidates` | hiring-manager, recruiter |
418
419
  | `PATCH` | `/candidates/:id` | hiring-manager, recruiter |
419
420
  | `DELETE` | `/candidates/:id` | hiring-manager |
420
- | `GET` | `/candidates?view=pipeline` | owner, hiring-manager, recruiter, interviewer |
421
- | `GET` | `/candidates?view=full` | hiring-manager, recruiter |
421
+ | `GET` | `/candidates/views/pipeline` | owner, hiring-manager, recruiter, interviewer |
422
+ | `GET` | `/candidates/views/full` | hiring-manager, recruiter |
422
423
 
423
424
  ---
424
425
 
@@ -75,8 +75,7 @@ Calls a client makes:
75
75
  ```bash
76
76
  GET /jobs # Collection — gated by read.access
77
77
  GET /jobs/:id # Single — gated by read.access (with ID-probe defense)
78
- GET /jobs?view=summary # View dispatch
79
- GET /jobs/views/summary # Explicit view path
78
+ GET /jobs/views/summary # Named view projection
80
79
  ```
81
80
 
82
81
  ### ID-probe defense on `/:id`
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ Views provide named column projections that limit which fields are returned in A
4
4
 
5
5
  ## Endpoints
6
6
 
7
- Views are dispatched two equivalent ways:
7
+ Named views are queried through a dedicated path endpoint:
8
8
 
9
9
  ```
10
- GET /api/v1/{resource}?view={view-name} # Query-string dispatch
11
- GET /api/v1/{resource}/views/{view-name} # Explicit path
10
+ GET /api/v1/{resource}/views/{view-name}
12
11
  ```
13
12
 
14
- Both forms are emitted automatically and behave identically.
13
+ If you set `read.defaultView`, bare `GET /api/v1/{resource}` can still resolve
14
+ to that view. Named views themselves are addressed via `/views/{view-name}`.
15
15
 
16
16
  ## Example
17
17
 
@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ export default defineTable(candidates, {
39
39
  ### Request
40
40
 
41
41
  ```bash
42
- # Query-string form
43
- curl '/api/v1/candidates?view=pipeline' \
44
- -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
45
-
46
- # Path form (equivalent)
47
42
  curl /api/v1/candidates/views/pipeline \
48
43
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
49
44
  ```
@@ -57,11 +52,11 @@ curl /api/v1/candidates/views/pipeline \
57
52
  { "id": "cand_002", "name": "Bob Martinez", "source": "referral" }
58
53
  ],
59
54
  "view": "pipeline",
60
- "fields": ["id", "name", "source"],
61
55
  "pagination": {
62
- "limit": 50,
63
- "offset": 0,
64
- "count": 2
56
+ "count": 2,
57
+ "page": 1,
58
+ "pageSize": 50,
59
+ "hasMore": false
65
60
  }
66
61
  }
67
62
  ```
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
3
- "version": "0.13.0",
3
+ "version": "0.14.2",
4
4
  "description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
5
5
  "author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
6
6
  "license": "MIT",
@@ -4,6 +4,197 @@ Release notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.
4
4
 
5
5
  ---
6
6
 
7
+ ## v0.14.2 — May 7, 2026
8
+
9
+ ### Wrangler `[[migrations]]` no longer drops historical Durable Object lifecycle entries
10
+
11
+ Cloudflare requires the `[[migrations]]` list in `wrangler.toml` to be **append-only**: once a tag has been deployed, removing it on a subsequent compile causes the next deploy to fail with `Cannot apply <new|deleted|renamed|transferred>-class migration to class <X>` — CF replays the full migrations log on every push and notices the tag is gone.
12
+
13
+ Pre-fix, the compiler regenerated the `[[migrations]]` blocks from scratch on every compile, emitting only entries for the *current* `durableObjects` bindings. Any historical lifecycle events the user had hand-maintained — `deleted_classes`, `renamed_classes`, `transferred_classes` — were silently dropped and the deploy then broke. AttendVIP hit this first: a `qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05` deletion entry got dropped, and the next deploy tried to re-apply `qb-do-Notepad`'s `new_sqlite_classes` against the existing class.
14
+
15
+ The fix adds a new config slot — `bindings.durableObjectMigrations` — for historical entries that survive recompiles. Declared entries are emitted FIRST in the generated `wrangler.toml`'s migrations list (preserving chronological order), then the auto-generated current-class creation entries follow, deduplicated by tag so an explicit user entry wins over the auto-emit.
16
+
17
+ ```ts
18
+ // quickback.config.ts
19
+ bindings: {
20
+ durableObjects: [
21
+ { name: 'NOTEPAD', className: 'Notepad', from: 'lib/Notepad' },
22
+ ],
23
+ durableObjectMigrations: [
24
+ // Carry forward across recompiles — Cloudflare's migration list is append-only.
25
+ {
26
+ tag: 'qb-do-deleted-legacy-notes-2026-05-05',
27
+ deletedClasses: ['LegacyNotes'],
28
+ },
29
+ ],
30
+ }
31
+ ```
32
+
33
+ All four lifecycle shapes are supported: `newClasses` / `newSqliteClasses` (creations), `deletedClasses` (removals), `renamedClasses` (`{ from, to }` inline-table-array), `transferredClasses` (`{ from, from_script, to }` for moves between workers). The user-declared entry can also override the auto-emit by reusing the same tag — useful when a DO started life as KV-backed before SQLite-DOs existed.
34
+
35
+ This is a config-side fix, not a wrangler.toml-merging one — Quickback doesn't read your existing `wrangler.toml`. The discipline is the same as for any append-only log: declare lifecycle events as you make them. Auto-detection of removed classes from the schema diff is on the roadmap; for now the compiler trusts your declaration.
36
+
37
+ 7 new tests covering deletion, rename, transfer, multi-entry ordering, override-via-same-tag, no-history bit-identical output, and the historical-only-no-current-DOs edge case.
38
+
39
+ ---
40
+
41
+ ## v0.14.1 — May 7, 2026
42
+
43
+ ### Bulk action variants now appear in `openapi.json`
44
+
45
+ Record-based actions with `bulkVariant: true` (introduced in v0.14.0) generate a working `POST /<base>/batch/<actionName>` route at runtime, but the OpenAPI generator wasn't aware of them — so the bulk endpoints were invisible to typed-client codegen (`api-types.gen.ts`) and to MCP-driven agents discovering operations from the spec. AttendVIP's v0.14.0 rollout (seven actions with `bulkVariant: true`: `approve`, `checkIn`, `checkOut`, `setVisibility`, `cancelInvite`, `sendInvite`, `sessionApprove`) found this within hours of shipping.
46
+
47
+ The OpenAPI generator now emits each bulk variant as a sibling operation to its per-record action, with the documented request shape (`{ ids: string[], input, failFast? }`), correct 200 / 207 / 400 responses, an `x-bulk-variant: true` marker, and a separate `<resource><Action>Bulk` `operationId` so client codegen can distinguish single from bulk. The fix also threads `bulkVariant` through `getAllActions` so any other downstream consumer of the action registry sees the flag — previously the parser captured it but the spec-emit path silently dropped it.
48
+
49
+ No changes required in user code. Re-running `quickback compile` regenerates `openapi.json` with both routes per `bulkVariant: true` action; downstream `api-types.gen.ts` builds pick up the new operations on the next codegen run.
50
+
51
+ ### Cross-tenant "my events" pattern documented with a worked example
52
+
53
+ The v0.14.0 docs noted that relationship-roles do **not** solve cross-tenant aggregation ("a guest's view of events across all tenants they were invited to") and pointed at function-form access as the workaround, but didn't show what that looked like in practice. The access docs now carry a full standalone-action example for `GET /my-events` — the canonical attendee-dashboard pattern — including the two security guardrails (always filter by `ctx.userId`; the action takes responsibility for soft-delete and other invariants the firewall would otherwise apply). Standalone actions are already mandatorily audit-logged in the runtime, so the cross-tenant traversal is recorded automatically.
54
+
55
+ See [Access → Cross-tenant "my events" dashboards](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this).
56
+
57
+ ---
58
+
59
+ ## v0.14.0 — May 7, 2026
60
+
61
+ ### Relationship-based authorization roles
62
+
63
+ Quickback's role system now supports a third kind of role beyond Better Auth org membership and the four pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`/`AUTHENTICATED`/`USER`/`ADMIN`): **relationship-roles** that bind to a domain-table membership ("user is a confirmed guest of this event") rather than an org/admin gate. The original ask was a B2B event-management app where logged-in users who aren't team members but ARE confirmed guests of an event need to see that event's sessions, pages, and tracks — same data, different access lane. The old workarounds (function-form access, hand-written actions, `firewall: { exception: true }`) all gave up some combination of OpenAPI/MCP visibility, CRUD code generation, or tenant safety.
64
+
65
+ Declare the relationship once in `quickback.config.ts`, then reference it from `firewall:` or `access.roles:`:
66
+
67
+ ```ts
68
+ // quickback.config.ts
69
+ authz: {
70
+ relationships: {
71
+ guestOf: {
72
+ from: 'event_guests', // relationship table
73
+ subject: { column: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }, // caller side
74
+ resource: { column: 'eventId' }, // resource side
75
+ where: { status: 'confirmed' }, // optional row filter
76
+ },
77
+ },
78
+ roles: {
79
+ guest: { via: 'guestOf' },
80
+ eventStaff: {
81
+ or: [{ via: 'guestOf' }, { roles: ['admin', 'owner'] }],
82
+ },
83
+ },
84
+ }
85
+
86
+ // features/sessions/sessions.ts
87
+ firewall: [
88
+ { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },
89
+ { field: 'eventId', via: 'guestOf' }, // ← row scoping
90
+ ],
91
+ read: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'member', 'guest'] } }, // ← OR-composed
92
+ crud: {
93
+ create: { access: { roles: ['admin', 'guest'] } }, // inline async lookup
94
+ update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },
95
+ }
96
+ ```
97
+
98
+ The compiler emits an inline Drizzle subquery against the relationship table and AND-composes it as the outermost firewall clause. The relationship table's own `buildFirewallConditions(ctx)` is called inside the subquery so soft-delete and tenant scope on the relationship row are always honored — soft-deleting an `event_guests` row revokes access immediately. Anonymous callers fail closed (the subquery short-circuits to `WHERE 1 = 0` when `ctx.userId` is null). Cross-tenant grants are impossible because the resource's tenant filter sits as the outermost AND, never folded into a role OR. See [Firewall → Relationship-based scoping](/compiler/definitions/firewall#relationship-based-scoping-via) and [Access → Relationship-based authorization](/compiler/definitions/access#relationship-based-authorization).
99
+
100
+ What works in v0.14.0:
101
+
102
+ | Surface | Status |
103
+ |---|---|
104
+ | `firewall: [{ field, via }]` row-level scoping | Full |
105
+ | `crud.<op>.access` `roles: ['guest']` (inline emission) | Full |
106
+ | `read.access` and `read.views.*.access` | Full |
107
+ | `masking.<f>.show` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
108
+ | `actions.<n>.access` `roles: ['guest']` | Compile-refused (workaround pointer) |
109
+
110
+ The runtime evaluator fails closed on relationship arms regardless of which surface you hit, so silent grants are impossible everywhere. The two refused surfaces have clear compile-time errors pointing to the working pattern (gate the row at the firewall layer with `via:`, gate the role at the access layer with BA roles).
111
+
112
+ Compile-time refusals also catch: unknown `via:` reference, cycles in role composition (`a → b → a`), reserved role-name shadowing (auth-provider-derived only — `guest`/`speaker`/`attendee` are free; `admin`/`owner`/`member` are reserved when the BA org plugin is on), unknown relationship `from` table, resource missing the `resource.column`, relationship table with `firewall: { exception: true }` (would let cross-tenant grants slip through), `lowering: 'session'` (reserved for v2 — staleness/invalidation ergonomics not yet shipped), and `+` hierarchy on relationship-roles (terminal, like pseudo-roles).
113
+
114
+ Cross-tenant "my events" dashboards (a logged-in user wants `GET /my-events` returning events they're a guest of *across all tenants*) are **not** solved by relationship-roles — the tenant firewall stays the outermost AND. For that pattern, use a user-scoped firewall (`firewall: { owner: { column: 'userId' } }`) or function-form access on a dedicated route. Documented prominently in [access.mdx](/compiler/definitions/access#cross-tenant-my-events-dashboards-are-not-this) so users don't reach for relationship-roles first and get confused.
115
+
116
+ Roadmap: `lowering: 'session'` ergonomics, inline relationship emission for `actions.access` (needs `relationshipBindings` design), async/batched mask functions for `masking.show`. The schema slots are reserved so v2 lands non-breaking.
117
+
118
+ ### Bulk variants of record-based actions
119
+
120
+ Record-based actions can now opt into an auto-generated bulk route alongside the per-record route. Set `bulkVariant: true` on a `defineAction({...})` and the compiler emits `POST /:resource/batch/{action}` that loops the same access + transition + execute pipeline over a `{ ids: [...], input, failFast? }` body. The original ask was an event-management UX where every domain bulk operation (approve N guests, rescind N invites, advance N applications) became a hand-written standalone action that re-implemented a per-record action's transition + execute logic in a `for` loop — `PATCH /:resource/batch` couldn't do it because state lives on a protected field, which is the right call for safety.
121
+
122
+ ```ts
123
+ // features/applications/actions/advance.ts
124
+ export default defineAction({
125
+ description: "Move an application forward in the pipeline.",
126
+ input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum(["screening", "interview", "offer"]) }),
127
+ access: { roles: ["owner", "admin"] },
128
+ bulkVariant: true, // ← opt-in
129
+ transition: { field: "status", via: "nextStatus", fromTo: { /* ... */ } },
130
+ async execute({ db, record, input, whereTransition }) {
131
+ // exact same body as before — runs once per id
132
+ },
133
+ });
134
+ ```
135
+
136
+ Per-record outcomes return as 207 Multi-Status with the same `{ success, errors, meta }` shape as `PATCH /batch`. Each id flows through the firewall fetch, the per-record `evaluateAccessReason` split (403 role / 409 record-precondition), the transition pre-check, and the same `whereTransition` factory the single-record route uses — so a stale-state record fails for that id alone, not the whole batch. `failFast: true` aborts on the first failure and (on Postgres / Supabase / Neon / libsql / sqlite drivers) wraps the loop in `db.transaction()` so prior writes roll back; D1 is documented as fail-fast-without-rollback because it has no `db.transaction`.
137
+
138
+ Compile-time refusals: `bulkVariant: true` is rejected on standalone actions (no record context to loop over) and on actions that declare `unsafe` (cross-tenant per-record audit not yet wired). Method is forced to POST regardless of the action's `method` setting — the one-row-to-many-rows asymmetry makes inheriting GET/DELETE confusing. Max batch size is 100 ids per request, mirroring the CRUD batch endpoints. See [Actions → Bulk variant](/compiler/definitions/actions#bulk-variant).
139
+
140
+ ### Aggregations on read views
141
+
142
+ Read views can now declare pre-computed metrics that surface on the response next to the row payload, without a custom standalone action. Every dashboard tile that previously turned into a standalone action just for "count of X grouped by Y" now lives in the same view config that drives the rows.
143
+
144
+ ```ts
145
+ read: {
146
+ views: {
147
+ pipeline: {
148
+ fields: ["id", "jobId", "candidateId", "status", "appliedAt"],
149
+ aggregations: {
150
+ totalApplications: { fn: "count" },
151
+ byStatus: { fn: "groupBy", field: "status" },
152
+ },
153
+ },
154
+ },
155
+ }
156
+ ```
157
+
158
+ Response carries `aggregations: { ... }` alongside `data`:
159
+
160
+ ```json
161
+ {
162
+ "data": [/* paginated rows */],
163
+ "view": "pipeline",
164
+ "pagination": { "count": 50, "page": 1, "pageSize": 50, "hasMore": true },
165
+ "aggregations": {
166
+ "totalApplications": 173,
167
+ "byStatus": { "applied": 102, "screening": 41, "interview": 18, "offer": 7, "rejected": 5 }
168
+ }
169
+ }
170
+ ```
171
+
172
+ Aggregations always run over the **same firewalled, filtered set** as the row query — pagination is intentionally ignored, so `?status=applied&limit=10` returns the 10 paged rows AND the count over every applied row. Supported `fn`s: `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `count` (with or without `field` — `COUNT(*)` vs `COUNT(field)`), `count_distinct`, and `groupBy` (returns `{ value: count }`, NULLs bucket as `"(none)"`).
173
+
174
+ Compile-time validation: `field` must reference a real column; `sum`/`avg` require numeric column types; the same masking opt-out gate that governs `query.{filterable, sortable, searchable}` applies to aggregations (a `sum(salary)` leaks structure even when the row payload is redacted); aggregation names cannot collide with the reserved response fields `data`, `pagination`, `view`. No raw SQL `expr:` form in v1 — column references only. See [Views → Aggregations](/compiler/definitions/views#aggregations).
175
+
176
+ ---
177
+
178
+ ## v0.13.5 — May 6, 2026
179
+
180
+ ### Object-form `auth.plugins` no longer crashes the compiler
181
+
182
+ The documented object form for per-plugin config — `plugins: { oauthProvider: {...} }`, `plugins: { organization: { teams: { enabled: true } } }`, etc. (see [Better Auth Plugins → Custom configuration](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready)) — was rejected by the compiler with `plugins.includes is not a function`. `hasCliAuthRoutes` called `.includes()` directly on `auth.config.plugins` to detect `deviceAuthorization`, and `generateAuthFiles` flattened plugins to a string array before handing them to the better-auth generator, silently dropping every per-plugin user option on the way through.
183
+
184
+ Both paths now run through a shared resolver that preserves the user's input format (object in → object out, array in → array out) and only adds the compiler's auto-included plugins (`organization`, `admin`, `apiKey`, plus `bearer` when `deviceAuthorization` is present) as `true` entries that don't clobber user config. Per-plugin options like `oauthProvider: { scopes: [...] }`, `organization: { teams: { enabled: true } }`, and `deviceAuthorization: { verificationUri: '...' }` now reach the generated `auth.ts` as written.
185
+
186
+ Better Auth's `ac` / `roles` access-control objects (the result of `createAccessControl(...)`) still require a custom `auth.ts` override — they're live runtime values that can't survive the JSON config trip from CLI → compiler. A declarative escape hatch for that is on the roadmap.
187
+
188
+ ### `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` is allowed on writes and actions again
189
+
190
+ v0.10.17 added a compile-time block that rejected `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` on `crud.create` / `crud.update` / `crud.delete` and on every action. The intent — "anonymous mutations are usually a misconfiguration" — collided with the legitimate use cases the rest of Quickback was built around: Gmail one-click RSVP confirms, public RSVP forms, magic-link redemption, List-Unsubscribe-Post handlers, webhook ingest, captcha-gated contact forms. None of those carry a session, so `AUTHENTICATED` 401s the caller before the handler can validate its own token, and the suggested escape hatch ("custom action that does its own auth + `firewall: { exception: true }`") was itself blocked by the same validator.
191
+
192
+ The block is removed. `PUBLIC` is the explicit, uppercase opt-in for unauthenticated access on every access node — reads, CRUD writes, views, and actions. The compiler trusts the marker; row-level safety comes from firewall, masking, and the action's own token validation. `PUBLIC` actions continue to receive **mandatory audit logging** (IP, input, result, timing) in the runtime regardless. `crud.create`/`update`/`delete` typically pair `roles: ["PUBLIC"]` with `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource so the row predicate doesn't reject every unauthenticated caller.
193
+
194
+ `USER` and `ADMIN` keep their compile-time prerequisites (firewall must scope by `userId` / admin plugin must be enabled).
195
+
196
+ ---
197
+
7
198
  ## v0.12.0 — May 5, 2026
8
199
 
9
200
  ### Per-room authorization for PartyServer rooms
@@ -682,7 +873,7 @@ for the full reference and migration table.
682
873
  - `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)
683
874
  - `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)
684
875
  - Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)
685
- - `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `?view={name}` (or `/views/{name}`)
876
+ - `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `/views/{name}`
686
877
 
687
878
  **Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only
688
879
  access check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching